Bekhorot 16

לאתויי חלבו

serves to include its milk in the prohibition, i.e., it is prohibited to consume milk of disqualified consecrated animals that were redeemed.

אמר מר אין נפדין תמימין ואין מתפיסן לכל זבח שירצה תמימים הוא דלא מיפרקי הא בעלי מומין מיפרקי לכל שירצה הוא דאין מתפיסן הא לאותו זבח מתפיסן

The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The Master said above: With regard to disqualified sacrificial animals whose consecration preceded their blemish, their offspring are sacred and may not be redeemed while they are unblemished, and one may not dedicate them as any offering he desires. The Gemara infers: It is only unblemished offspring that one may not redeem, which indicates that one may redeem blemished offspring. Likewise, it is only for any offering he desires that he may not dedicate the offspring, but for the same offering as the mother, one may dedicate the offspring.

היכי משכחת לה דמתפיסן לאותו זבח ונפדין במומן נימא תיהוי תיובתא דרב הונא

The Gemara asks: How can you find a situation that includes both of these inferences? They apply in a case where one dedicates the unborn offspring as the same offering for which its mother was consecrated, and it may then be redeemed after having developed a blemish. The Gemara remarks: Shall we say that this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna, who maintains that the offspring cannot be redeemed and rules that one must leave them to die?

אמר לך רב הונא הוא הדין דאפילו בעלי מומין אין נפדין ואיידי דתנא רישא נפדין תמימים תנא נמי סיפא אין נפדין תמימים ואיידי דתנא רישא לכל זבח שירצה תנא נמי סיפא לכל זבח שירצה

Rav Huna could have said to you: The inferences upon which the refutation is based are false. Just as these unblemished offspring cannot be redeemed, the same is true with regard to blemished animals, as even blemished offspring cannot be redeemed. And since the former clause taught the phrase: They may be redeemed unblemished, the latter clause also taught the phrase: They may not be redeemed unblemished. And since the former clause taught: As any offering he desires, the latter clause also taught: As any offering he desires. According to Rav Huna, no inferences can be made from these rulings of the baraita because they were phrased in this manner for the sake of symmetry between its two sections, rather than to teach a specific halakha.

והשוחטן בחוץ פטור רב הונא מתני חייב ומוקים לה בדוקין שבעין ואליבא דרבי עקיבא דאמר אם עלו לא ירדו

It is stated: And one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is exempt from karet. The Gemara notes: Rav Huna taught this as: One who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is liable to receive karet, and he interprets it as referring to a case involving an animal with a minor blemish, such as on the cornea of the eye. And the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says: Although animals with a minor blemish may not be sacrificed ab initio, if they ascended the altar they shall not descend and are sacrificed. Since an animal with a minor blemish is potentially suitable for sacrifice, one who slaughters it outside the Temple courtyard is liable to receive karet.

בין לפני פדיונו בין לאחר פדיונו עושה תמורה אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה ותמורתו לאחר פדיונו מתה מאי טעמא היכי ליעביד ליקרביה מכח קדושה דחויה קאתיא ליפרקה לא אלימא למיתפס פדיונה הלכך מתה

The Gemara continues analyzing the baraita, which teaches: Whether before its redemption or after its redemption, an animal whose consecration preceded its blemish renders an animal that was a substitute for it sacred. Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: And its substitute that was imbued with sanctity after its redemption must die. What is the reason? The Gemara explains: What are we to do? Shall we sacrifice it? It cannot be sacrificed, as it received its status from the deferred sanctity of the redeemed blemished animal and is therefore unfit for the altar. Shall we redeem it? It cannot be redeemed, as its sanctity is not strong enough to be transferable to the money for its redemption. Therefore, it must die.

מתקיף לה רב עמרם ותיתכיל במומה לבעלים וכי מה בין זו לתמורת בכור ומעשר דתנן תמורת בכור ומעשר הן וולדן וולד ולדן עד סוף כל העולם הרי הן כבכור ומעשר ויאכלו במומן לבעלים

Rav Amram objects to this: But let the substitute be eaten in its blemished state by the owners. After all, what is the difference between this substitute and the substitute of a firstborn or of an animal tithe offering, which may be eaten? The Gemara explains the question: As we learned in a mishna (Temura 21a): With regard to the substitute of a firstborn and of an animal tithe offering, both they, the substitutes themselves, and their offspring, and the offspring of their offspring, forever, i.e., for all future generations, are like the firstborn and the animal tithe offering, respectively, and therefore they are eaten in their blemished state by the owners. Why is the blemished substitute of a firstborn or an animal tithe permitted whereas the substitute of a disqualified consecrated animal remains forbidden?

אמר ליה אביי זה שם אמו עליו וזה שם אמו עליו זה כולו תמורת בכור ומעשר מיקריא מה בכור ומעשר במומן מיתאכלן לבעלים אף תמורתן מיתאכלא

Abaye said to Rav Amram: This one bears its mother’s name and that one bears its mother’s name, i.e., each substitute is subject to the same halakha as the animal for which it was substituted. This animal is entirely called a substitute of a firstborn or an animal tithe offering: Just as a firstborn and an animal tithe offering are eaten in their blemished state by the owners, so too, their substitute is eaten even when it is blemished.

וזה שם אמו עליו תמורת קדשים מיקריא מה קדשים לא מיתכלי אלא בפדיון אף תמורתן נמי לא מיתכלי אלא בפדיון והא לא אלימא למיתפס פדיונה

And likewise, this substitute for a redeemed animal whose consecration preceded its blemish bears its mothers name, i.e., it is called the substitute of a sacrificial animal: Just as sacrificial animals are eaten only once they have been rendered permitted through redemption, so too, their substitutes are also eaten only through redemption. But the sanctity of this particular substitute is not strong enough to be transferable to money for its redemption, and therefore it cannot be redeemed. Consequently, it may not be eaten.

תניא כוותיה דרב נחמן מנין לתמורת פסולי המוקדשין שמתה תלמוד לומר ממעלי הגרה טמא האי מיבעי ליה לחמש חטאות מתות ההוא ממפריסי הפרסה טמא נפקא

The Gemara notes that it is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman: From where is it derived with regard to the substitute of disqualified consecrated animals that it must die? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “Nevertheless, these you shall not eat, of them that only chew the cud, or of them that only have a split hoof…it is impure to you” (Leviticus 11:4). The extraneous phrase “impure to you” indicates that there exists an animal which possesses the signs of a kosher animal but is nevertheless prohibited in consumption, and that is the substitute of a disqualified consecrated animal. The Gemara raises an objection: But isn’t that extraneous phrase necessary for the halakha of the five sin offerings that are left to die, which may not be eaten? The Gemara answers: No; that halakha is derived from the phrase: “Of them that only have a split hoof…is impure.”

תניא נמי הכי מנין לחמש חטאות מתות תלמוד לומר ממפריסי הפרסה טמא חמש חטאות מתות הילכתא גמירי לה אלא כי אתא קרא לתמורת אשם

The Gemara notes that this is also taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that there are five sin offerings that are left to die? The verse states: “Of them that have a split hoof…is impure to you,” which indicates that there is a second category of animals that possess the signs of a kosher animal, but that are nevertheless prohibited in consumption. The Gemara raises an objection: But isn’t the category of the five sin offerings that are left to die a halakha learned as a tradition, not from a verse? Rather, when that verse came, it came to teach that the substitute of a guilt offering may not be sacrificed and is left to graze until it develops a blemish.

תמורת אשם נמי הילכתא היא כל שבחטאת מתה באשם רועה

The Gemara raises a further objection: The halakha of a substitute for a guilt offering is also a halakha learned as a tradition, as stated in the principle: In any case where a sin offering is left to die, a guilt offering is left to graze. Since the substitute of a sin offering is left to die, it is established by tradition that the substitute of a guilt offering is left to graze, and therefore no verse is required to teach this halakha.

אלא לעולם חמש חטאות מתות ואצטריך קרא ואצטריך הילכתא דאי מקרא הוה אמינא לרעייה קא משמע לן הילכתא למיתה ואי מהילכתא הוה אמינא היכא דעבד איקרי ואכל מהני חמש חטאות איסורא איכא לאו ליכא קמשמע לן דאיכא לאו

The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse is actually the source for a halakha that applies to the five sin offerings left to die. And both a verse is necessary and the halakha learned as a tradition is also necessary to determine the final course of action that one should take. The Gemara elaborates: If the concept of the five sin offerings had been derived from the verse alone, I would say that the five sin offerings are left to graze. Therefore, the halakha learned through tradition teaches us that they are left to die. And if this ruling were based only on the halakha learned as a tradition, I would say: In a case where one happened to eat from one of these five sin offerings, there is a prohibition that he violated, but not a negative mitzva, for which one is liable to receive lashes. The verse therefore teaches us that there is a negative mitzva here as well.

ואיבעית אימא לאקושי דבר הבא ממעלי גרה לדבר הבא ממפריסי הפרסה מה להלן במיתה אף כאן במיתה

And if you wish, say instead that the halakha of the five sin offerings left to die is in fact a halakha learned as a tradition, and therefore no verse is required for its own sake. Rather, the verse: “Of them that have a split hoof,” serves to juxtapose an item that comes, i.e., that is derived, from the mention of animals who chew their cud, referring to the substitutes of disqualified consecrated animals, with an item that comes from animals who have a split hoof, referring to the five sin offerings: Just as there, the sin offerings are left to die, so too here, the substitutes are left to die.

מתני׳ המקבל צאן ברזל מן הגוי

MISHNA: With regard to one who receives animals as part of a guaranteed investment from a gentile, i.e., the Jew receives the animals to raise them and commits to pay a fixed price at a later date even if they die or their value decreases, and the offspring born in the interim are divided between the gentile and the Jew,

ולדותיהן פטורין ולדי ולדותיהן חייבין העמיד ולדותיהן תחת אמותיהן ולדי ולדות פטורין וולדי וולדי וולדות חייבים רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר אפילו עד עשרה פטורים שאחריותן לנכרי

their direct offspring are exempt from the mitzva of the firstborn if they give birth to a male, but the offspring of their direct offspring are obligated in the mitzva of the firstborn if they gave birth to a male. If the Jew established their offspring in place of their mothers for collection in case the mothers die, the offspring of their direct offspring are exempt and the offspring of the offspring of their direct offspring are obligated. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even until ten generations, the offspring are exempt, as they all serve as a guarantee for the gentile, because if he does not receive the fixed payment for the animal, he will collect his debt from any offspring born to it or its offspring.

רחל שילדה מין עז ועז שילדה מין רחל פטורה מן הבכורה ואם יש בו מקצת סימנין חייב

A ewe that gave birth to a goat of sorts and a goat that gave birth to a ewe of sorts are exempt from the mitzva of the firstborn. And if the offspring has some of the characteristics of its mother, it is obligated in the mitzva of firstborn.

גמ׳ למימרא דכיון דלא נקט מרא זוזי ברשותא דמרא קיימא

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that animals given to a Jew as a guaranteed investment by a gentile are not subject to their offspring being counted a firstborn because they belong to the gentile. The Gemara suggests: Is this to say that since the owner did not yet take the money that will be owed to him, the investment itself stands in the owner’s possession, i.e., the owner is still regarded as such?

ורמינהו אין מקבלין צאן ברזל מישראל מפני שהוא רבית אלמא ברשותא דמקבל קיימא

And the Gemara raises a contradiction to this conclusion from a mishna (Bava Metzia 70b): One may not accept from a Jew sheep to raise or other items to care for as a guaranteed investment, in which the terms of the transaction dictate that the one accepting the item takes upon himself complete responsibility to repay its value in the event of depreciation or loss, but receives only part of the profit. This is because it is a loan, as the principal is fixed and always returned to the owner, and any additional sum the owner receives is interest. The Gemara remarks: Evidently, the investment stands in the possession of the recipient, as otherwise it would not be considered a loan.

אמר אביי לא קשיא הא דקביל עליה אונסא וזולא והא דלא קביל עליה אונסא וזולא

Abaye said: This is not difficult. This case, i.e., the mishna here, is where the gentile owner of the sheep accepts upon himself the responsibility for losses due to an accident or depreciation in the market value, and that is why the sheep are considered to still belong to him. And that case, the mishna in Bava Metzia, is where the owner did not accept upon himself responsibility for losses due to an accident or depreciation. Therefore, the guaranteed investment stands in the possession of the recipient.

אמר ליה רבא דקביל עליה אונסא וזולא צאן ברזל קרית ליה ועוד מאי פסקא

Rava said to Abaye: If the owner accepted upon himself responsibility for losses due to an accident or depreciation, can you call it a guaranteed investment? This case is not a guaranteed investment, as the owner is not guaranteed to receive what he had given; rather, it is a type of joint business venture that is permitted between two Jews. And furthermore, if the term: Guaranteed investment, can refer to two different kinds of investments, then why was it stated without qualification in both mishnayot?

ועוד אדתני סיפא אבל מקבלין צאן ברזל מן הגוי ליפלוג וליתני בדידה במה דברים אמורים דלא קביל עליה אונסא וזולא אבל קביל עליה אונסא וזולא שפיר דמי

Rava continued: And furthermore, even if one grants that this arrangement can be called a guaranteed investment, there is another difficulty. Instead of the tanna teaching in the latter clause of the mishna in Bava Metzia: But one may accept a guaranteed investment from gentiles, let the tanna distinguish and teach within the case itself, that of accepting a guaranteed investment from a Jew. He should have taught: In what case is this statement, i.e., that one may not accept from a Jew sheep to raise or other items to care for as a guaranteed investment, said? It is in a case when the owner did not accept upon himself responsibility for losses due to an accident or depreciation, but if the owner accepted upon himself responsibility for losses due to an accident or depreciation, one may well enter into such an arrangement.

אלא אמר רבא אידי ואידי דלא קביל עליה אונסא וזולא והכא גבי בכורה היינו טעמא דאילו אתי גוי בעי זוזי ולא יהיב ליה תפיס לה לבהמה ואי לא משכח לה לבהמה תפיס ולדות דידה והרי יד גוי באמצע וכל יד גוי באמצע פטורה מן הבכורה

Rather, Rava rejected this explanation and said: Both this case in the mishna here and that case in Bava Metzia are discussing a situation where the owner did not accept upon himself responsibility for losses due to an accident or depreciation. And here, with regard to the firstborn, this is the reason that the offspring are exempt from the halakhot of a firstborn: Since, if the gentile comes and wants his money, and the Jew does not give it to him, the gentile will seize the animal, and if he does not find the animal he will seize the offspring, this means that the hand of a gentile is in the middle, i.e., even though the animals stand in the possession of the recipient, the gentile has some degree of ownership over the bodies of the offspring. And there is a halakha: In every case where the hand of a gentile is in the middle, the animal is exempt from the halakhot of a firstborn.

העמיד ולדותיהן תחת אמותיהן ולדי ולדות פטורים אמר רב הונא ולדות פטורין וולדי ולדותיהן חייבין ורב יהודה אמר ולדי ולדות נמי פטורין וולדי ולדי ולדות חייבין

§ The mishna teaches: If the Jew established their offspring in place of their mothers for collection in case the mothers die, the offspring of their direct offspring are exempt. The Gemara cites a dispute with regard to animals involved in a guaranteed investment, in a case where the Jew did not establish their offspring in the place of their mothers. Rav Huna says: Their direct offspring are exempt, but the offspring of their direct offspring are obligated. And Rav Yehuda says: The offspring of their direct offspring are also exempt, and the offspring of the offspring of their direct offspring are obligated.

תנן העמיד ולדות תחת אמותיהן ולדי ולדות פטורין טעמא דהעמיד הא לא העמיד לא תיובתא דרב יהודה

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. We learned in the mishna: If the Jew established their offspring in place of their mothers for collection in case the mothers die, the offspring of their direct offspring are exempt. The Gemara infers: The reason they are exempt is that he established the offspring in place of their mothers; but if he did not establish them in place of their mothers, they are not exempt. This is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

אמר לך רב יהודה הוא הדין אף על גב דלא העמיד והא קא משמע לן אפילו העמיד נמי

The Gemara answers that Rav Yehuda could have said to you: That inference is incorrect, as the same is true even though he did not establish the offspring in place of their mothers. In that case as well, the offspring of their offspring are exempt. And this is what the mishna is teaching us by stating the halakha in that manner: Even if he established the offspring in place of the mother, only the first two generations of offspring are exempt, but not all successive generations.

דאורחיה דגוי למיתפס בנה והוי כמי דלא העמיד ולדי ולדות פטורין וולדי ולדי ולדות חייבין

And it is necessary to teach this halakha that although he established the offspring in place of their mothers all successive generations are not exempt, as one might think that it is the normal manner of the gentile to seize not only the direct offspring, but her young of any generation as payment, which would mean that all successive generations are exempt. And therefore the mishna teaches that he is like one who did not establish the offspring in place of the mother, which means that the offspring of the direct offspring are exempt, but the offspring of the offspring of the direct offspring are obligated.

תנן רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר אפילו עד עשרה דורות פטורין שאחריותן לנכרי בשלמא לרב יהודה דאמר נחית תנא קמא לדרי

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Huna. We learned in the mishna that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even until ten generations the offspring are exempt, as they serve as a guarantee for the gentile, because if he does not receive the fixed payment for the animal he will collect his debt from any offspring born to it or its offspring. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s use of the term: Even, indicates that he disagrees with the first tanna only with regard to how many generations of offspring are exempt, but both agree that at least some generations are exempt. Granted, according to Rav Yehuda, who says that, in exempting from firstborn status, the first tanna descended to two generational levels,