Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility Skip to content

Today's Daf Yomi

May 3, 2019 | 讻状讞 讘谞讬住谉 转砖注状讟

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Bekhorot 16

What is one allowed to do with offspring or a sibstitution of an animal that was sanctified and then developed a blemish – is there a solution? One who does a deal with a non-Jew that the Jew will take the animal to bear offspring and they will share in the offspring, while the Jew will return the animal at its original value – is the animal, offspring (up to how many generations?) exempt from firstborn because the non-Jew is connected to the animals? Does this law contradict a mishna in Bava Metzia relating to laws of interest?


If the lesson doesn't play, click "Download"

诇讗转讜讬讬 讞诇讘讜

serves to include its milk in the prohibition, i.e., it is prohibited to consume milk of disqualified consecrated animals that were redeemed.

讗诪专 诪专 讗讬谉 谞驻讚讬谉 转诪讬诪讬谉 讜讗讬谉 诪转驻讬住谉 诇讻诇 讝讘讞 砖讬专爪讛 转诪讬诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 诪讬驻专拽讬 讛讗 讘注诇讬 诪讜诪讬谉 诪讬驻专拽讬 诇讻诇 砖讬专爪讛 讛讜讗 讚讗讬谉 诪转驻讬住谉 讛讗 诇讗讜转讜 讝讘讞 诪转驻讬住谉

The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The Master said above: With regard to disqualified sacrificial animals whose consecration preceded their blemish, their offspring are sacred and may not be redeemed while they are unblemished, and one may not dedicate them as any offering he desires. The Gemara infers: It is only unblemished offspring that one may not redeem, which indicates that one may redeem blemished offspring. Likewise, it is only for any offering he desires that he may not dedicate the offspring, but for the same offering as the mother, one may dedicate the offspring.

讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讚诪转驻讬住谉 诇讗讜转讜 讝讘讞 讜谞驻讚讬谉 讘诪讜诪谉 谞讬诪讗 转讬讛讜讬 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讛讜谞讗

The Gemara asks: How can you find a situation that includes both of these inferences? They apply in a case where one dedicates the unborn offspring as the same offering for which its mother was consecrated, and it may then be redeemed after having developed a blemish. The Gemara remarks: Shall we say that this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna, who maintains that the offspring cannot be redeemed and rules that one must leave them to die?

讗诪专 诇讱 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讘注诇讬 诪讜诪讬谉 讗讬谉 谞驻讚讬谉 讜讗讬讬讚讬 讚转谞讗 专讬砖讗 谞驻讚讬谉 转诪讬诪讬诐 转谞讗 谞诪讬 住讬驻讗 讗讬谉 谞驻讚讬谉 转诪讬诪讬诐 讜讗讬讬讚讬 讚转谞讗 专讬砖讗 诇讻诇 讝讘讞 砖讬专爪讛 转谞讗 谞诪讬 住讬驻讗 诇讻诇 讝讘讞 砖讬专爪讛

Rav Huna could have said to you: The inferences upon which the refutation is based are false. Just as these unblemished offspring cannot be redeemed, the same is true with regard to blemished animals, as even blemished offspring cannot be redeemed. And since the former clause taught the phrase: They may be redeemed unblemished, the latter clause also taught the phrase: They may not be redeemed unblemished. And since the former clause taught: As any offering he desires, the latter clause also taught: As any offering he desires. According to Rav Huna, no inferences can be made from these rulings of the baraita because they were phrased in this manner for the sake of symmetry between its two sections, rather than to teach a specific halakha.

讜讛砖讜讞讟谉 讘讞讜抓 驻讟讜专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪转谞讬 讞讬讬讘 讜诪讜拽讬诐 诇讛 讘讚讜拽讬谉 砖讘注讬谉 讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗诪专 讗诐 注诇讜 诇讗 讬专讚讜

It is stated: And one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is exempt from karet. The Gemara notes: Rav Huna taught this as: One who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is liable to receive karet, and he interprets it as referring to a case involving an animal with a minor blemish, such as on the cornea of the eye. And the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says: Although animals with a minor blemish may not be sacrificed ab initio, if they ascended the altar they shall not descend and are sacrificed. Since an animal with a minor blemish is potentially suitable for sacrifice, one who slaughters it outside the Temple courtyard is liable to receive karet.

讘讬谉 诇驻谞讬 驻讚讬讜谞讜 讘讬谉 诇讗讞专 驻讚讬讜谞讜 注讜砖讛 转诪讜专讛 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 讜转诪讜专转讜 诇讗讞专 驻讚讬讜谞讜 诪转讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讛讬讻讬 诇讬注讘讬讚 诇讬拽专讘讬讛 诪讻讞 拽讚讜砖讛 讚讞讜讬讛 拽讗转讬讗 诇讬驻专拽讛 诇讗 讗诇讬诪讗 诇诪讬转驻住 驻讚讬讜谞讛 讛诇讻讱 诪转讛

The Gemara continues analyzing the baraita, which teaches: Whether before its redemption or after its redemption, an animal whose consecration preceded its blemish renders an animal that was a substitute for it sacred. Rav Na岣an says that Rabba bar Avuh says: And its substitute that was imbued with sanctity after its redemption must die. What is the reason? The Gemara explains: What are we to do? Shall we sacrifice it? It cannot be sacrificed, as it received its status from the deferred sanctity of the redeemed blemished animal and is therefore unfit for the altar. Shall we redeem it? It cannot be redeemed, as its sanctity is not strong enough to be transferable to the money for its redemption. Therefore, it must die.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 注诪专诐 讜转讬转讻讬诇 讘诪讜诪讛 诇讘注诇讬诐 讜讻讬 诪讛 讘讬谉 讝讜 诇转诪讜专转 讘讻讜专 讜诪注砖专 讚转谞谉 转诪讜专转 讘讻讜专 讜诪注砖专 讛谉 讜讜诇讚谉 讜讜诇讚 讜诇讚谉 注讚 住讜祝 讻诇 讛注讜诇诐 讛专讬 讛谉 讻讘讻讜专 讜诪注砖专 讜讬讗讻诇讜 讘诪讜诪谉 诇讘注诇讬诐

Rav Amram objects to this: But let the substitute be eaten in its blemished state by the owners. After all, what is the difference between this substitute and the substitute of a firstborn or of an animal tithe offering, which may be eaten? The Gemara explains the question: As we learned in a mishna (Temura 21a): With regard to the substitute of a firstborn and of an animal tithe offering, both they, the substitutes themselves, and their offspring, and the offspring of their offspring, forever, i.e., for all future generations, are like the firstborn and the animal tithe offering, respectively, and therefore they are eaten in their blemished state by the owners. Why is the blemished substitute of a firstborn or an animal tithe permitted whereas the substitute of a disqualified consecrated animal remains forbidden?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讝讛 砖诐 讗诪讜 注诇讬讜 讜讝讛 砖诐 讗诪讜 注诇讬讜 讝讛 讻讜诇讜 转诪讜专转 讘讻讜专 讜诪注砖专 诪讬拽专讬讗 诪讛 讘讻讜专 讜诪注砖专 讘诪讜诪谉 诪讬转讗讻诇谉 诇讘注诇讬诐 讗祝 转诪讜专转谉 诪讬转讗讻诇讗

Abaye said to Rav Amram: This one bears its mother鈥檚 name and that one bears its mother鈥檚 name, i.e., each substitute is subject to the same halakha as the animal for which it was substituted. This animal is entirely called a substitute of a firstborn or an animal tithe offering: Just as a firstborn and an animal tithe offering are eaten in their blemished state by the owners, so too, their substitute is eaten even when it is blemished.

讜讝讛 砖诐 讗诪讜 注诇讬讜 转诪讜专转 拽讚砖讬诐 诪讬拽专讬讗 诪讛 拽讚砖讬诐 诇讗 诪讬转讻诇讬 讗诇讗 讘驻讚讬讜谉 讗祝 转诪讜专转谉 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪讬转讻诇讬 讗诇讗 讘驻讚讬讜谉 讜讛讗 诇讗 讗诇讬诪讗 诇诪讬转驻住 驻讚讬讜谞讛

And likewise, this substitute for a redeemed animal whose consecration preceded its blemish bears its mothers name, i.e., it is called the substitute of a sacrificial animal: Just as sacrificial animals are eaten only once they have been rendered permitted through redemption, so too, their substitutes are also eaten only through redemption. But the sanctity of this particular substitute is not strong enough to be transferable to money for its redemption, and therefore it cannot be redeemed. Consequently, it may not be eaten.

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 诪谞讬谉 诇转诪讜专转 驻住讜诇讬 讛诪讜拽讚砖讬谉 砖诪转讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪诪注诇讬 讛讙专讛 讟诪讗 讛讗讬 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讞诪砖 讞讟讗讜转 诪转讜转 讛讛讜讗 诪诪驻专讬住讬 讛驻专住讛 讟诪讗 谞驻拽讗

The Gemara notes that it is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Na岣an: From where is it derived with regard to the substitute of disqualified consecrated animals that it must die? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: 鈥淣evertheless, these you shall not eat, of them that only chew the cud, or of them that only have a split hoof鈥t is impure to you鈥 (Leviticus 11:4). The extraneous phrase 鈥渋mpure to you鈥 indicates that there exists an animal which possesses the signs of a kosher animal but is nevertheless prohibited in consumption, and that is the substitute of a disqualified consecrated animal. The Gemara raises an objection: But isn鈥檛 that extraneous phrase necessary for the halakha of the five sin offerings that are left to die, which may not be eaten? The Gemara answers: No; that halakha is derived from the phrase: 鈥淥f them that only have a split hoof鈥s impure.鈥

转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 诪谞讬谉 诇讞诪砖 讞讟讗讜转 诪转讜转 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪诪驻专讬住讬 讛驻专住讛 讟诪讗 讞诪砖 讞讟讗讜转 诪转讜转 讛讬诇讻转讗 讙诪讬专讬 诇讛 讗诇讗 讻讬 讗转讗 拽专讗 诇转诪讜专转 讗砖诐

The Gemara notes that this is also taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that there are five sin offerings that are left to die? The verse states: 鈥淥f them that have a split hoof鈥s impure to you,鈥 which indicates that there is a second category of animals that possess the signs of a kosher animal, but that are nevertheless prohibited in consumption. The Gemara raises an objection: But isn鈥檛 the category of the five sin offerings that are left to die a halakha learned as a tradition, not from a verse? Rather, when that verse came, it came to teach that the substitute of a guilt offering may not be sacrificed and is left to graze until it develops a blemish.

转诪讜专转 讗砖诐 谞诪讬 讛讬诇讻转讗 讛讬讗 讻诇 砖讘讞讟讗转 诪转讛 讘讗砖诐 专讜注讛

The Gemara raises a further objection: The halakha of a substitute for a guilt offering is also a halakha learned as a tradition, as stated in the principle: In any case where a sin offering is left to die, a guilt offering is left to graze. Since the substitute of a sin offering is left to die, it is established by tradition that the substitute of a guilt offering is left to graze, and therefore no verse is required to teach this halakha.

讗诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讞诪砖 讞讟讗讜转 诪转讜转 讜讗爪讟专讬讱 拽专讗 讜讗爪讟专讬讱 讛讬诇讻转讗 讚讗讬 诪拽专讗 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 诇专注讬讬讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讛讬诇讻转讗 诇诪讬转讛 讜讗讬 诪讛讬诇讻转讗 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讬讻讗 讚注讘讚 讗讬拽专讬 讜讗讻诇 诪讛谞讬 讞诪砖 讞讟讗讜转 讗讬住讜专讗 讗讬讻讗 诇讗讜 诇讬讻讗 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗讬讻讗 诇讗讜

The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse is actually the source for a halakha that applies to the five sin offerings left to die. And both a verse is necessary and the halakha learned as a tradition is also necessary to determine the final course of action that one should take. The Gemara elaborates: If the concept of the five sin offerings had been derived from the verse alone, I would say that the five sin offerings are left to graze. Therefore, the halakha learned through tradition teaches us that they are left to die. And if this ruling were based only on the halakha learned as a tradition, I would say: In a case where one happened to eat from one of these five sin offerings, there is a prohibition that he violated, but not a negative mitzva, for which one is liable to receive lashes. The verse therefore teaches us that there is a negative mitzva here as well.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇讗拽讜砖讬 讚讘专 讛讘讗 诪诪注诇讬 讙专讛 诇讚讘专 讛讘讗 诪诪驻专讬住讬 讛驻专住讛 诪讛 诇讛诇谉 讘诪讬转讛 讗祝 讻讗谉 讘诪讬转讛

And if you wish, say instead that the halakha of the five sin offerings left to die is in fact a halakha learned as a tradition, and therefore no verse is required for its own sake. Rather, the verse: 鈥淥f them that have a split hoof,鈥 serves to juxtapose an item that comes, i.e., that is derived, from the mention of animals who chew their cud, referring to the substitutes of disqualified consecrated animals, with an item that comes from animals who have a split hoof, referring to the five sin offerings: Just as there, the sin offerings are left to die, so too here, the substitutes are left to die.

诪转谞讬壮 讛诪拽讘诇 爪讗谉 讘专讝诇 诪谉 讛讙讜讬

MISHNA: With regard to one who receives animals as part of a guaranteed investment from a gentile, i.e., the Jew receives the animals to raise them and commits to pay a fixed price at a later date even if they die or their value decreases, and the offspring born in the interim are divided between the gentile and the Jew,

讜诇讚讜转讬讛谉 驻讟讜专讬谉 讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讜转讬讛谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讛注诪讬讚 讜诇讚讜转讬讛谉 转讞转 讗诪讜转讬讛谉 讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讜转 驻讟讜专讬谉 讜讜诇讚讬 讜讜诇讚讬 讜讜诇讚讜转 讞讬讬讘讬诐 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 注讚 注砖专讛 驻讟讜专讬诐 砖讗讞专讬讜转谉 诇谞讻专讬

their direct offspring are exempt from the mitzva of the firstborn if they give birth to a male, but the offspring of their direct offspring are obligated in the mitzva of the firstborn if they gave birth to a male. If the Jew established their offspring in place of their mothers for collection in case the mothers die, the offspring of their direct offspring are exempt and the offspring of the offspring of their direct offspring are obligated. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even until ten generations, the offspring are exempt, as they all serve as a guarantee for the gentile, because if he does not receive the fixed payment for the animal, he will collect his debt from any offspring born to it or its offspring.

专讞诇 砖讬诇讚讛 诪讬谉 注讝 讜注讝 砖讬诇讚讛 诪讬谉 专讞诇 驻讟讜专讛 诪谉 讛讘讻讜专讛 讜讗诐 讬砖 讘讜 诪拽爪转 住讬诪谞讬谉 讞讬讬讘

A ewe that gave birth to a goat of sorts and a goat that gave birth to a ewe of sorts are exempt from the mitzva of the firstborn. And if the offspring has some of the characteristics of its mother, it is obligated in the mitzva of firstborn.

讙诪壮 诇诪讬诪专讗 讚讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 谞拽讟 诪专讗 讝讜讝讬 讘专砖讜转讗 讚诪专讗 拽讬讬诪讗

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that animals given to a Jew as a guaranteed investment by a gentile are not subject to their offspring being counted a firstborn because they belong to the gentile. The Gemara suggests: Is this to say that since the owner did not yet take the money that will be owed to him, the investment itself stands in the owner鈥檚 possession, i.e., the owner is still regarded as such?

讜专诪讬谞讛讜 讗讬谉 诪拽讘诇讬谉 爪讗谉 讘专讝诇 诪讬砖专讗诇 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讜讗 专讘讬转 讗诇诪讗 讘专砖讜转讗 讚诪拽讘诇 拽讬讬诪讗

And the Gemara raises a contradiction to this conclusion from a mishna (Bava Metzia 70b): One may not accept from a Jew sheep to raise or other items to care for as a guaranteed investment, in which the terms of the transaction dictate that the one accepting the item takes upon himself complete responsibility to repay its value in the event of depreciation or loss, but receives only part of the profit. This is because it is a loan, as the principal is fixed and always returned to the owner, and any additional sum the owner receives is interest. The Gemara remarks: Evidently, the investment stands in the possession of the recipient, as otherwise it would not be considered a loan.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讚拽讘讬诇 注诇讬讛 讗讜谞住讗 讜讝讜诇讗 讜讛讗 讚诇讗 拽讘讬诇 注诇讬讛 讗讜谞住讗 讜讝讜诇讗

Abaye said: This is not difficult. This case, i.e., the mishna here, is where the gentile owner of the sheep accepts upon himself the responsibility for losses due to an accident or depreciation in the market value, and that is why the sheep are considered to still belong to him. And that case, the mishna in Bava Metzia, is where the owner did not accept upon himself responsibility for losses due to an accident or depreciation. Therefore, the guaranteed investment stands in the possession of the recipient.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讚拽讘讬诇 注诇讬讛 讗讜谞住讗 讜讝讜诇讗 爪讗谉 讘专讝诇 拽专讬转 诇讬讛 讜注讜讚 诪讗讬 驻住拽讗

Rava said to Abaye: If the owner accepted upon himself responsibility for losses due to an accident or depreciation, can you call it a guaranteed investment? This case is not a guaranteed investment, as the owner is not guaranteed to receive what he had given; rather, it is a type of joint business venture that is permitted between two Jews. And furthermore, if the term: Guaranteed investment, can refer to two different kinds of investments, then why was it stated without qualification in both mishnayot?

讜注讜讚 讗讚转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讗讘诇 诪拽讘诇讬谉 爪讗谉 讘专讝诇 诪谉 讛讙讜讬 诇讬驻诇讜讙 讜诇讬转谞讬 讘讚讬讚讛 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讚诇讗 拽讘讬诇 注诇讬讛 讗讜谞住讗 讜讝讜诇讗 讗讘诇 拽讘讬诇 注诇讬讛 讗讜谞住讗 讜讝讜诇讗 砖驻讬专 讚诪讬

Rava continued: And furthermore, even if one grants that this arrangement can be called a guaranteed investment, there is another difficulty. Instead of the tanna teaching in the latter clause of the mishna in Bava Metzia: But one may accept a guaranteed investment from gentiles, let the tanna distinguish and teach within the case itself, that of accepting a guaranteed investment from a Jew. He should have taught: In what case is this statement, i.e., that one may not accept from a Jew sheep to raise or other items to care for as a guaranteed investment, said? It is in a case when the owner did not accept upon himself responsibility for losses due to an accident or depreciation, but if the owner accepted upon himself responsibility for losses due to an accident or depreciation, one may well enter into such an arrangement.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讚诇讗 拽讘讬诇 注诇讬讛 讗讜谞住讗 讜讝讜诇讗 讜讛讻讗 讙讘讬 讘讻讜专讛 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚讗讬诇讜 讗转讬 讙讜讬 讘注讬 讝讜讝讬 讜诇讗 讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 转驻讬住 诇讛 诇讘讛诪讛 讜讗讬 诇讗 诪砖讻讞 诇讛 诇讘讛诪讛 转驻讬住 讜诇讚讜转 讚讬讚讛 讜讛专讬 讬讚 讙讜讬 讘讗诪爪注 讜讻诇 讬讚 讙讜讬 讘讗诪爪注 驻讟讜专讛 诪谉 讛讘讻讜专讛

Rather, Rava rejected this explanation and said: Both this case in the mishna here and that case in Bava Metzia are discussing a situation where the owner did not accept upon himself responsibility for losses due to an accident or depreciation. And here, with regard to the firstborn, this is the reason that the offspring are exempt from the halakhot of a firstborn: Since, if the gentile comes and wants his money, and the Jew does not give it to him, the gentile will seize the animal, and if he does not find the animal he will seize the offspring, this means that the hand of a gentile is in the middle, i.e., even though the animals stand in the possession of the recipient, the gentile has some degree of ownership over the bodies of the offspring. And there is a halakha: In every case where the hand of a gentile is in the middle, the animal is exempt from the halakhot of a firstborn.

讛注诪讬讚 讜诇讚讜转讬讛谉 转讞转 讗诪讜转讬讛谉 讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讜转 驻讟讜专讬诐 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜诇讚讜转 驻讟讜专讬谉 讜讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讜转讬讛谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讜专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讜转 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专讬谉 讜讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讜转 讞讬讬讘讬谉

搂 The mishna teaches: If the Jew established their offspring in place of their mothers for collection in case the mothers die, the offspring of their direct offspring are exempt. The Gemara cites a dispute with regard to animals involved in a guaranteed investment, in a case where the Jew did not establish their offspring in the place of their mothers. Rav Huna says: Their direct offspring are exempt, but the offspring of their direct offspring are obligated. And Rav Yehuda says: The offspring of their direct offspring are also exempt, and the offspring of the offspring of their direct offspring are obligated.

转谞谉 讛注诪讬讚 讜诇讚讜转 转讞转 讗诪讜转讬讛谉 讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讜转 驻讟讜专讬谉 讟注诪讗 讚讛注诪讬讚 讛讗 诇讗 讛注诪讬讚 诇讗 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. We learned in the mishna: If the Jew established their offspring in place of their mothers for collection in case the mothers die, the offspring of their direct offspring are exempt. The Gemara infers: The reason they are exempt is that he established the offspring in place of their mothers; but if he did not establish them in place of their mothers, they are not exempt. This is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

讗诪专 诇讱 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 讛注诪讬讚 讜讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讗驻讬诇讜 讛注诪讬讚 谞诪讬

The Gemara answers that Rav Yehuda could have said to you: That inference is incorrect, as the same is true even though he did not establish the offspring in place of their mothers. In that case as well, the offspring of their offspring are exempt. And this is what the mishna is teaching us by stating the halakha in that manner: Even if he established the offspring in place of the mother, only the first two generations of offspring are exempt, but not all successive generations.

讚讗讜专讞讬讛 讚讙讜讬 诇诪讬转驻住 讘谞讛 讜讛讜讬 讻诪讬 讚诇讗 讛注诪讬讚 讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讜转 驻讟讜专讬谉 讜讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讜转 讞讬讬讘讬谉

And it is necessary to teach this halakha that although he established the offspring in place of their mothers all successive generations are not exempt, as one might think that it is the normal manner of the gentile to seize not only the direct offspring, but her young of any generation as payment, which would mean that all successive generations are exempt. And therefore the mishna teaches that he is like one who did not establish the offspring in place of the mother, which means that the offspring of the direct offspring are exempt, but the offspring of the offspring of the direct offspring are obligated.

转谞谉 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 注讚 注砖专讛 讚讜专讜转 驻讟讜专讬谉 砖讗讞专讬讜转谉 诇谞讻专讬 讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 谞讞讬转 转谞讗 拽诪讗 诇讚专讬

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Huna. We learned in the mishna that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even until ten generations the offspring are exempt, as they serve as a guarantee for the gentile, because if he does not receive the fixed payment for the animal he will collect his debt from any offspring born to it or its offspring. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel鈥檚 use of the term: Even, indicates that he disagrees with the first tanna only with regard to how many generations of offspring are exempt, but both agree that at least some generations are exempt. Granted, according to Rav Yehuda, who says that, in exempting from firstborn status, the first tanna descended to two generational levels,

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

Sorry, there aren't any posts in this category yet. We're adding more soon!

Bekhorot 16

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bekhorot 16

诇讗转讜讬讬 讞诇讘讜

serves to include its milk in the prohibition, i.e., it is prohibited to consume milk of disqualified consecrated animals that were redeemed.

讗诪专 诪专 讗讬谉 谞驻讚讬谉 转诪讬诪讬谉 讜讗讬谉 诪转驻讬住谉 诇讻诇 讝讘讞 砖讬专爪讛 转诪讬诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 诪讬驻专拽讬 讛讗 讘注诇讬 诪讜诪讬谉 诪讬驻专拽讬 诇讻诇 砖讬专爪讛 讛讜讗 讚讗讬谉 诪转驻讬住谉 讛讗 诇讗讜转讜 讝讘讞 诪转驻讬住谉

The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The Master said above: With regard to disqualified sacrificial animals whose consecration preceded their blemish, their offspring are sacred and may not be redeemed while they are unblemished, and one may not dedicate them as any offering he desires. The Gemara infers: It is only unblemished offspring that one may not redeem, which indicates that one may redeem blemished offspring. Likewise, it is only for any offering he desires that he may not dedicate the offspring, but for the same offering as the mother, one may dedicate the offspring.

讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讚诪转驻讬住谉 诇讗讜转讜 讝讘讞 讜谞驻讚讬谉 讘诪讜诪谉 谞讬诪讗 转讬讛讜讬 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讛讜谞讗

The Gemara asks: How can you find a situation that includes both of these inferences? They apply in a case where one dedicates the unborn offspring as the same offering for which its mother was consecrated, and it may then be redeemed after having developed a blemish. The Gemara remarks: Shall we say that this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna, who maintains that the offspring cannot be redeemed and rules that one must leave them to die?

讗诪专 诇讱 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讘注诇讬 诪讜诪讬谉 讗讬谉 谞驻讚讬谉 讜讗讬讬讚讬 讚转谞讗 专讬砖讗 谞驻讚讬谉 转诪讬诪讬诐 转谞讗 谞诪讬 住讬驻讗 讗讬谉 谞驻讚讬谉 转诪讬诪讬诐 讜讗讬讬讚讬 讚转谞讗 专讬砖讗 诇讻诇 讝讘讞 砖讬专爪讛 转谞讗 谞诪讬 住讬驻讗 诇讻诇 讝讘讞 砖讬专爪讛

Rav Huna could have said to you: The inferences upon which the refutation is based are false. Just as these unblemished offspring cannot be redeemed, the same is true with regard to blemished animals, as even blemished offspring cannot be redeemed. And since the former clause taught the phrase: They may be redeemed unblemished, the latter clause also taught the phrase: They may not be redeemed unblemished. And since the former clause taught: As any offering he desires, the latter clause also taught: As any offering he desires. According to Rav Huna, no inferences can be made from these rulings of the baraita because they were phrased in this manner for the sake of symmetry between its two sections, rather than to teach a specific halakha.

讜讛砖讜讞讟谉 讘讞讜抓 驻讟讜专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪转谞讬 讞讬讬讘 讜诪讜拽讬诐 诇讛 讘讚讜拽讬谉 砖讘注讬谉 讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗诪专 讗诐 注诇讜 诇讗 讬专讚讜

It is stated: And one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is exempt from karet. The Gemara notes: Rav Huna taught this as: One who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is liable to receive karet, and he interprets it as referring to a case involving an animal with a minor blemish, such as on the cornea of the eye. And the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says: Although animals with a minor blemish may not be sacrificed ab initio, if they ascended the altar they shall not descend and are sacrificed. Since an animal with a minor blemish is potentially suitable for sacrifice, one who slaughters it outside the Temple courtyard is liable to receive karet.

讘讬谉 诇驻谞讬 驻讚讬讜谞讜 讘讬谉 诇讗讞专 驻讚讬讜谞讜 注讜砖讛 转诪讜专讛 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 讜转诪讜专转讜 诇讗讞专 驻讚讬讜谞讜 诪转讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讛讬讻讬 诇讬注讘讬讚 诇讬拽专讘讬讛 诪讻讞 拽讚讜砖讛 讚讞讜讬讛 拽讗转讬讗 诇讬驻专拽讛 诇讗 讗诇讬诪讗 诇诪讬转驻住 驻讚讬讜谞讛 讛诇讻讱 诪转讛

The Gemara continues analyzing the baraita, which teaches: Whether before its redemption or after its redemption, an animal whose consecration preceded its blemish renders an animal that was a substitute for it sacred. Rav Na岣an says that Rabba bar Avuh says: And its substitute that was imbued with sanctity after its redemption must die. What is the reason? The Gemara explains: What are we to do? Shall we sacrifice it? It cannot be sacrificed, as it received its status from the deferred sanctity of the redeemed blemished animal and is therefore unfit for the altar. Shall we redeem it? It cannot be redeemed, as its sanctity is not strong enough to be transferable to the money for its redemption. Therefore, it must die.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 注诪专诐 讜转讬转讻讬诇 讘诪讜诪讛 诇讘注诇讬诐 讜讻讬 诪讛 讘讬谉 讝讜 诇转诪讜专转 讘讻讜专 讜诪注砖专 讚转谞谉 转诪讜专转 讘讻讜专 讜诪注砖专 讛谉 讜讜诇讚谉 讜讜诇讚 讜诇讚谉 注讚 住讜祝 讻诇 讛注讜诇诐 讛专讬 讛谉 讻讘讻讜专 讜诪注砖专 讜讬讗讻诇讜 讘诪讜诪谉 诇讘注诇讬诐

Rav Amram objects to this: But let the substitute be eaten in its blemished state by the owners. After all, what is the difference between this substitute and the substitute of a firstborn or of an animal tithe offering, which may be eaten? The Gemara explains the question: As we learned in a mishna (Temura 21a): With regard to the substitute of a firstborn and of an animal tithe offering, both they, the substitutes themselves, and their offspring, and the offspring of their offspring, forever, i.e., for all future generations, are like the firstborn and the animal tithe offering, respectively, and therefore they are eaten in their blemished state by the owners. Why is the blemished substitute of a firstborn or an animal tithe permitted whereas the substitute of a disqualified consecrated animal remains forbidden?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讝讛 砖诐 讗诪讜 注诇讬讜 讜讝讛 砖诐 讗诪讜 注诇讬讜 讝讛 讻讜诇讜 转诪讜专转 讘讻讜专 讜诪注砖专 诪讬拽专讬讗 诪讛 讘讻讜专 讜诪注砖专 讘诪讜诪谉 诪讬转讗讻诇谉 诇讘注诇讬诐 讗祝 转诪讜专转谉 诪讬转讗讻诇讗

Abaye said to Rav Amram: This one bears its mother鈥檚 name and that one bears its mother鈥檚 name, i.e., each substitute is subject to the same halakha as the animal for which it was substituted. This animal is entirely called a substitute of a firstborn or an animal tithe offering: Just as a firstborn and an animal tithe offering are eaten in their blemished state by the owners, so too, their substitute is eaten even when it is blemished.

讜讝讛 砖诐 讗诪讜 注诇讬讜 转诪讜专转 拽讚砖讬诐 诪讬拽专讬讗 诪讛 拽讚砖讬诐 诇讗 诪讬转讻诇讬 讗诇讗 讘驻讚讬讜谉 讗祝 转诪讜专转谉 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪讬转讻诇讬 讗诇讗 讘驻讚讬讜谉 讜讛讗 诇讗 讗诇讬诪讗 诇诪讬转驻住 驻讚讬讜谞讛

And likewise, this substitute for a redeemed animal whose consecration preceded its blemish bears its mothers name, i.e., it is called the substitute of a sacrificial animal: Just as sacrificial animals are eaten only once they have been rendered permitted through redemption, so too, their substitutes are also eaten only through redemption. But the sanctity of this particular substitute is not strong enough to be transferable to money for its redemption, and therefore it cannot be redeemed. Consequently, it may not be eaten.

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 诪谞讬谉 诇转诪讜专转 驻住讜诇讬 讛诪讜拽讚砖讬谉 砖诪转讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪诪注诇讬 讛讙专讛 讟诪讗 讛讗讬 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讞诪砖 讞讟讗讜转 诪转讜转 讛讛讜讗 诪诪驻专讬住讬 讛驻专住讛 讟诪讗 谞驻拽讗

The Gemara notes that it is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Na岣an: From where is it derived with regard to the substitute of disqualified consecrated animals that it must die? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: 鈥淣evertheless, these you shall not eat, of them that only chew the cud, or of them that only have a split hoof鈥t is impure to you鈥 (Leviticus 11:4). The extraneous phrase 鈥渋mpure to you鈥 indicates that there exists an animal which possesses the signs of a kosher animal but is nevertheless prohibited in consumption, and that is the substitute of a disqualified consecrated animal. The Gemara raises an objection: But isn鈥檛 that extraneous phrase necessary for the halakha of the five sin offerings that are left to die, which may not be eaten? The Gemara answers: No; that halakha is derived from the phrase: 鈥淥f them that only have a split hoof鈥s impure.鈥

转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 诪谞讬谉 诇讞诪砖 讞讟讗讜转 诪转讜转 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪诪驻专讬住讬 讛驻专住讛 讟诪讗 讞诪砖 讞讟讗讜转 诪转讜转 讛讬诇讻转讗 讙诪讬专讬 诇讛 讗诇讗 讻讬 讗转讗 拽专讗 诇转诪讜专转 讗砖诐

The Gemara notes that this is also taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that there are five sin offerings that are left to die? The verse states: 鈥淥f them that have a split hoof鈥s impure to you,鈥 which indicates that there is a second category of animals that possess the signs of a kosher animal, but that are nevertheless prohibited in consumption. The Gemara raises an objection: But isn鈥檛 the category of the five sin offerings that are left to die a halakha learned as a tradition, not from a verse? Rather, when that verse came, it came to teach that the substitute of a guilt offering may not be sacrificed and is left to graze until it develops a blemish.

转诪讜专转 讗砖诐 谞诪讬 讛讬诇讻转讗 讛讬讗 讻诇 砖讘讞讟讗转 诪转讛 讘讗砖诐 专讜注讛

The Gemara raises a further objection: The halakha of a substitute for a guilt offering is also a halakha learned as a tradition, as stated in the principle: In any case where a sin offering is left to die, a guilt offering is left to graze. Since the substitute of a sin offering is left to die, it is established by tradition that the substitute of a guilt offering is left to graze, and therefore no verse is required to teach this halakha.

讗诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讞诪砖 讞讟讗讜转 诪转讜转 讜讗爪讟专讬讱 拽专讗 讜讗爪讟专讬讱 讛讬诇讻转讗 讚讗讬 诪拽专讗 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 诇专注讬讬讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讛讬诇讻转讗 诇诪讬转讛 讜讗讬 诪讛讬诇讻转讗 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讬讻讗 讚注讘讚 讗讬拽专讬 讜讗讻诇 诪讛谞讬 讞诪砖 讞讟讗讜转 讗讬住讜专讗 讗讬讻讗 诇讗讜 诇讬讻讗 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗讬讻讗 诇讗讜

The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse is actually the source for a halakha that applies to the five sin offerings left to die. And both a verse is necessary and the halakha learned as a tradition is also necessary to determine the final course of action that one should take. The Gemara elaborates: If the concept of the five sin offerings had been derived from the verse alone, I would say that the five sin offerings are left to graze. Therefore, the halakha learned through tradition teaches us that they are left to die. And if this ruling were based only on the halakha learned as a tradition, I would say: In a case where one happened to eat from one of these five sin offerings, there is a prohibition that he violated, but not a negative mitzva, for which one is liable to receive lashes. The verse therefore teaches us that there is a negative mitzva here as well.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇讗拽讜砖讬 讚讘专 讛讘讗 诪诪注诇讬 讙专讛 诇讚讘专 讛讘讗 诪诪驻专讬住讬 讛驻专住讛 诪讛 诇讛诇谉 讘诪讬转讛 讗祝 讻讗谉 讘诪讬转讛

And if you wish, say instead that the halakha of the five sin offerings left to die is in fact a halakha learned as a tradition, and therefore no verse is required for its own sake. Rather, the verse: 鈥淥f them that have a split hoof,鈥 serves to juxtapose an item that comes, i.e., that is derived, from the mention of animals who chew their cud, referring to the substitutes of disqualified consecrated animals, with an item that comes from animals who have a split hoof, referring to the five sin offerings: Just as there, the sin offerings are left to die, so too here, the substitutes are left to die.

诪转谞讬壮 讛诪拽讘诇 爪讗谉 讘专讝诇 诪谉 讛讙讜讬

MISHNA: With regard to one who receives animals as part of a guaranteed investment from a gentile, i.e., the Jew receives the animals to raise them and commits to pay a fixed price at a later date even if they die or their value decreases, and the offspring born in the interim are divided between the gentile and the Jew,

讜诇讚讜转讬讛谉 驻讟讜专讬谉 讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讜转讬讛谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讛注诪讬讚 讜诇讚讜转讬讛谉 转讞转 讗诪讜转讬讛谉 讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讜转 驻讟讜专讬谉 讜讜诇讚讬 讜讜诇讚讬 讜讜诇讚讜转 讞讬讬讘讬诐 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 注讚 注砖专讛 驻讟讜专讬诐 砖讗讞专讬讜转谉 诇谞讻专讬

their direct offspring are exempt from the mitzva of the firstborn if they give birth to a male, but the offspring of their direct offspring are obligated in the mitzva of the firstborn if they gave birth to a male. If the Jew established their offspring in place of their mothers for collection in case the mothers die, the offspring of their direct offspring are exempt and the offspring of the offspring of their direct offspring are obligated. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even until ten generations, the offspring are exempt, as they all serve as a guarantee for the gentile, because if he does not receive the fixed payment for the animal, he will collect his debt from any offspring born to it or its offspring.

专讞诇 砖讬诇讚讛 诪讬谉 注讝 讜注讝 砖讬诇讚讛 诪讬谉 专讞诇 驻讟讜专讛 诪谉 讛讘讻讜专讛 讜讗诐 讬砖 讘讜 诪拽爪转 住讬诪谞讬谉 讞讬讬讘

A ewe that gave birth to a goat of sorts and a goat that gave birth to a ewe of sorts are exempt from the mitzva of the firstborn. And if the offspring has some of the characteristics of its mother, it is obligated in the mitzva of firstborn.

讙诪壮 诇诪讬诪专讗 讚讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 谞拽讟 诪专讗 讝讜讝讬 讘专砖讜转讗 讚诪专讗 拽讬讬诪讗

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that animals given to a Jew as a guaranteed investment by a gentile are not subject to their offspring being counted a firstborn because they belong to the gentile. The Gemara suggests: Is this to say that since the owner did not yet take the money that will be owed to him, the investment itself stands in the owner鈥檚 possession, i.e., the owner is still regarded as such?

讜专诪讬谞讛讜 讗讬谉 诪拽讘诇讬谉 爪讗谉 讘专讝诇 诪讬砖专讗诇 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讜讗 专讘讬转 讗诇诪讗 讘专砖讜转讗 讚诪拽讘诇 拽讬讬诪讗

And the Gemara raises a contradiction to this conclusion from a mishna (Bava Metzia 70b): One may not accept from a Jew sheep to raise or other items to care for as a guaranteed investment, in which the terms of the transaction dictate that the one accepting the item takes upon himself complete responsibility to repay its value in the event of depreciation or loss, but receives only part of the profit. This is because it is a loan, as the principal is fixed and always returned to the owner, and any additional sum the owner receives is interest. The Gemara remarks: Evidently, the investment stands in the possession of the recipient, as otherwise it would not be considered a loan.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讚拽讘讬诇 注诇讬讛 讗讜谞住讗 讜讝讜诇讗 讜讛讗 讚诇讗 拽讘讬诇 注诇讬讛 讗讜谞住讗 讜讝讜诇讗

Abaye said: This is not difficult. This case, i.e., the mishna here, is where the gentile owner of the sheep accepts upon himself the responsibility for losses due to an accident or depreciation in the market value, and that is why the sheep are considered to still belong to him. And that case, the mishna in Bava Metzia, is where the owner did not accept upon himself responsibility for losses due to an accident or depreciation. Therefore, the guaranteed investment stands in the possession of the recipient.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讚拽讘讬诇 注诇讬讛 讗讜谞住讗 讜讝讜诇讗 爪讗谉 讘专讝诇 拽专讬转 诇讬讛 讜注讜讚 诪讗讬 驻住拽讗

Rava said to Abaye: If the owner accepted upon himself responsibility for losses due to an accident or depreciation, can you call it a guaranteed investment? This case is not a guaranteed investment, as the owner is not guaranteed to receive what he had given; rather, it is a type of joint business venture that is permitted between two Jews. And furthermore, if the term: Guaranteed investment, can refer to two different kinds of investments, then why was it stated without qualification in both mishnayot?

讜注讜讚 讗讚转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讗讘诇 诪拽讘诇讬谉 爪讗谉 讘专讝诇 诪谉 讛讙讜讬 诇讬驻诇讜讙 讜诇讬转谞讬 讘讚讬讚讛 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讚诇讗 拽讘讬诇 注诇讬讛 讗讜谞住讗 讜讝讜诇讗 讗讘诇 拽讘讬诇 注诇讬讛 讗讜谞住讗 讜讝讜诇讗 砖驻讬专 讚诪讬

Rava continued: And furthermore, even if one grants that this arrangement can be called a guaranteed investment, there is another difficulty. Instead of the tanna teaching in the latter clause of the mishna in Bava Metzia: But one may accept a guaranteed investment from gentiles, let the tanna distinguish and teach within the case itself, that of accepting a guaranteed investment from a Jew. He should have taught: In what case is this statement, i.e., that one may not accept from a Jew sheep to raise or other items to care for as a guaranteed investment, said? It is in a case when the owner did not accept upon himself responsibility for losses due to an accident or depreciation, but if the owner accepted upon himself responsibility for losses due to an accident or depreciation, one may well enter into such an arrangement.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讚诇讗 拽讘讬诇 注诇讬讛 讗讜谞住讗 讜讝讜诇讗 讜讛讻讗 讙讘讬 讘讻讜专讛 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚讗讬诇讜 讗转讬 讙讜讬 讘注讬 讝讜讝讬 讜诇讗 讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 转驻讬住 诇讛 诇讘讛诪讛 讜讗讬 诇讗 诪砖讻讞 诇讛 诇讘讛诪讛 转驻讬住 讜诇讚讜转 讚讬讚讛 讜讛专讬 讬讚 讙讜讬 讘讗诪爪注 讜讻诇 讬讚 讙讜讬 讘讗诪爪注 驻讟讜专讛 诪谉 讛讘讻讜专讛

Rather, Rava rejected this explanation and said: Both this case in the mishna here and that case in Bava Metzia are discussing a situation where the owner did not accept upon himself responsibility for losses due to an accident or depreciation. And here, with regard to the firstborn, this is the reason that the offspring are exempt from the halakhot of a firstborn: Since, if the gentile comes and wants his money, and the Jew does not give it to him, the gentile will seize the animal, and if he does not find the animal he will seize the offspring, this means that the hand of a gentile is in the middle, i.e., even though the animals stand in the possession of the recipient, the gentile has some degree of ownership over the bodies of the offspring. And there is a halakha: In every case where the hand of a gentile is in the middle, the animal is exempt from the halakhot of a firstborn.

讛注诪讬讚 讜诇讚讜转讬讛谉 转讞转 讗诪讜转讬讛谉 讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讜转 驻讟讜专讬诐 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜诇讚讜转 驻讟讜专讬谉 讜讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讜转讬讛谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讜专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讜转 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专讬谉 讜讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讜转 讞讬讬讘讬谉

搂 The mishna teaches: If the Jew established their offspring in place of their mothers for collection in case the mothers die, the offspring of their direct offspring are exempt. The Gemara cites a dispute with regard to animals involved in a guaranteed investment, in a case where the Jew did not establish their offspring in the place of their mothers. Rav Huna says: Their direct offspring are exempt, but the offspring of their direct offspring are obligated. And Rav Yehuda says: The offspring of their direct offspring are also exempt, and the offspring of the offspring of their direct offspring are obligated.

转谞谉 讛注诪讬讚 讜诇讚讜转 转讞转 讗诪讜转讬讛谉 讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讜转 驻讟讜专讬谉 讟注诪讗 讚讛注诪讬讚 讛讗 诇讗 讛注诪讬讚 诇讗 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. We learned in the mishna: If the Jew established their offspring in place of their mothers for collection in case the mothers die, the offspring of their direct offspring are exempt. The Gemara infers: The reason they are exempt is that he established the offspring in place of their mothers; but if he did not establish them in place of their mothers, they are not exempt. This is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

讗诪专 诇讱 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 讛注诪讬讚 讜讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讗驻讬诇讜 讛注诪讬讚 谞诪讬

The Gemara answers that Rav Yehuda could have said to you: That inference is incorrect, as the same is true even though he did not establish the offspring in place of their mothers. In that case as well, the offspring of their offspring are exempt. And this is what the mishna is teaching us by stating the halakha in that manner: Even if he established the offspring in place of the mother, only the first two generations of offspring are exempt, but not all successive generations.

讚讗讜专讞讬讛 讚讙讜讬 诇诪讬转驻住 讘谞讛 讜讛讜讬 讻诪讬 讚诇讗 讛注诪讬讚 讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讜转 驻讟讜专讬谉 讜讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讬 讜诇讚讜转 讞讬讬讘讬谉

And it is necessary to teach this halakha that although he established the offspring in place of their mothers all successive generations are not exempt, as one might think that it is the normal manner of the gentile to seize not only the direct offspring, but her young of any generation as payment, which would mean that all successive generations are exempt. And therefore the mishna teaches that he is like one who did not establish the offspring in place of the mother, which means that the offspring of the direct offspring are exempt, but the offspring of the offspring of the direct offspring are obligated.

转谞谉 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 注讚 注砖专讛 讚讜专讜转 驻讟讜专讬谉 砖讗讞专讬讜转谉 诇谞讻专讬 讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 谞讞讬转 转谞讗 拽诪讗 诇讚专讬

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Huna. We learned in the mishna that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even until ten generations the offspring are exempt, as they serve as a guarantee for the gentile, because if he does not receive the fixed payment for the animal he will collect his debt from any offspring born to it or its offspring. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel鈥檚 use of the term: Even, indicates that he disagrees with the first tanna only with regard to how many generations of offspring are exempt, but both agree that at least some generations are exempt. Granted, according to Rav Yehuda, who says that, in exempting from firstborn status, the first tanna descended to two generational levels,

Scroll To Top