Masechet Bekhorot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag in loving memory of her father, Arthur Aaron, Asher ben Yaakov Yehuda v’Esther on his first yahrzeit. “You always said Talmud Torah was the best s’char. This one’s for you, Daddy.”
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Masechet Bekhorot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag in loving memory of her father, Arthur Aaron, Asher ben Yaakov Yehuda v’Esther on his first yahrzeit. “You always said Talmud Torah was the best s’char. This one’s for you, Daddy.”
Masechet Bekhorot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag in loving memory of her father, Arthur Aaron, Asher ben Yaakov Yehuda v’Esther on his first yahrzeit. “You always said Talmud Torah was the best s’char. This one’s for you, Daddy.”
Today’s daf is sponsored by Aviva Appleman in loving memory of her mother, Florence Appleman. “May her neshama have an aliya.”
Bekhorot 24
הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם לְמָה לִי?
why do I need him to state that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam?
אִי אָמַר הִלְכְתָא דְּכוּלֵּיהּ פִּירְקִין, וְלָא אָמַר הִלְכְתָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: אַדְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם קָאֵי, וּמַאי ״בְּכוּלֵּיהּ פִּירְקִין״? דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי תַּרְתֵּי אָמַר, וּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּבָרַיְיתָא פְּלוּגְתָּא הִיא.
The Gemara explains: Had Rav said only that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the anonymous tanna in the mishnayot throughout the whole chapter, but did not say explicitly that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam, I would say: Rav is referring specifically to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam. And what is the meaning of the phrase: Throughout the whole chapter, which indicates he is speaking of more than one case? This is referring to the fact that Rabbi Yosei said two separate statements in the chapter. And this would indicate with regard to Rav’s statement that if a mishna is contradicted by a dissenting opinion cited in a baraita, that is considered a dispute.
אַשְׁמְעִינַן הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי — לְאַשְׁמוֹעִינַן דְּאַדְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל קָאֵי, וּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּבָרַיְיתָא לָאו פְּלוּגְתָּא הִיא.
Rav taught that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei in order to teach us that his statement with regard to the whole chapter is referring to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and with regard to Rav’s statement, if a mishna is contradicted by a dissenting opinion cited in a baraita, that is not considered a dispute.
מַאי בָּרַיְיתָא? דְּתַנְיָא: הַלּוֹקֵחַ בְּהֵמָה מְנִיקָה מִן הַגּוֹי, הַבָּא אַחֲרָיו בְּכוֹר מִסָּפֵק, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמְּרַחֶמֶת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינָהּ יוֹלֶדֶת. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: דָּבָר בְּחֶזְקָתוֹ.
What is the baraita mentioned previously? As it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who purchases a nursing female animal from a gentile, the young that is born after the offspring currently being nursed is treated as a firstborn due to the uncertainty whether it is the animal’s offspring, because an animal might be merciful and nurse another animal even though it has not given birth at all. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The matter stands in its presumptive status, i.e., the nursing animal is assumed to be the mother of the nursing offspring.
וְכֵן הָיָה רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: הַנִּכְנָס לְתוֹךְ עֶדְרוֹ בַּלַּיְלָה וְרָאָה כְּעֶשֶׂר כַּחֲמֵשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה, מַבְכִּירוֹת וְשֶׁאֵינָן מַבְכִּירוֹת, יוֹלְדוֹת, לְמָחָר הִשְׁכִּים וּמָצָא זְכָרִים (תְּלוּיוֹת) [תְּלוּיִין] בְּשֶׁאֵין מַבְכִּירוֹת, וּנְקֵבוֹת תְּלוּיוֹת בְּמַבְכִּירוֹת — אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ שֶׁמָּא בְּנָהּ שֶׁל זוֹ בָּא לוֹ אֵצֶל זוֹ.
The baraita continues: And similarly, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would say: One who enters amid his flock at night and sees about ten or about fifteen animals, some of whose offspring is a firstborn and others whose offspring is not a firstborn, and all were giving birth, and on the next day he arose and found that the male young were nursing from the mothers whose offspring is not a firstborn, and the female young were nursing from the mothers whose offspring is a firstborn, he does not need to be concerned that perhaps the young of this mother came to nurse from that mother. Rather, he may assume that each animal is nursing its own offspring.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: דָּבָר בְּחֶזְקָתוֹ דְּקָאָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, דְּאֵינָהּ מְרַחֶמֶת אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יוֹלֶדֶת — הָא הֵיכָא דְּאוֹלִיד חָיְישִׁינַן לְרַחוֹמֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא: דִּידַהּ מְרַחֲמָא, דְּלָא דִּידַהּ לָא מְרַחֲמָא לֵיהּ?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the precise meaning of the phrase: The matter stands in its presumptive status, which Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel stated? Does this mean that an animal does not show mercy unless it has given birth, and consequently, in a case where the animal has given birth we are concerned for the possibility that it might be merciful and nurse an offspring that is not its own? Or perhaps it means that an animal might be merciful only toward its own offspring, but it does not show mercy to an animal that is not its own?
לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? לְמִלְקֵא עֲלַהּ מִשּׁוּם ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״. אִי אָמְרַתְּ דִּידַהּ מְרַחֲמָא, דְּלָא דִּידַהּ לָא מְרַחֲמָא — לָקֵי, וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ דְּלָא דִּידַהּ נָמֵי מְרַחֲמָא — לָא לָקֵי.
The Gemara asks: What difference is there in practice based on this distinction? Either way the nursing animal is assumed to have given birth and its future offspring will not be considered a firstborn. The Gemara answers that there is a difference with regard to whether or not one is flogged for slaughtering it due to violating the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day. If you say an animal is merciful only toward its own offspring but is not merciful toward an animal that is not its own, then one is flogged if he deliberately slaughters an animal and the offspring that it is nursing. But if you say it is also merciful toward an animal that is not its own, then one is not flogged in such a case.
מַאי? תָּא שְׁמַע, רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: הַלּוֹקֵחַ בְּהֵמָה מִן הַגּוֹי — אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ שֶׁמָּא בְּנָהּ שֶׁל אַחֶרֶת הָיָה. מִי קָתָנֵי ״הוּא״? ״הָיָה״ קָתָנֵי! הָכִי קָאָמַר: אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ שֶׁמָּא בְּנָהּ שֶׁל אַחֶרֶת, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הָיָה לָהּ וָלָד מֵעִיקָּרָא.
The Gemara returns to its initial inquiry. What is the precise meaning of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s statement? Come and hear a proof from the mishna, as Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In the case of one who purchases a nursing female animal from a gentile, he does not need to be concerned lest the offspring currently being nursed was the offspring of another animal. Evidently, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that an animal nurses only its own offspring. The Gemara rejects this proof: Does the mishna teach that one does not need to be concerned that perhaps it is the offspring of another animal? No, it teaches that one does not need to be concerned that perhaps it was the offspring of another animal, and this is what it is saying: Whichever way you look at it, the next offspring is not a firstborn, as one does not need to be concerned that perhaps it was the offspring of another animal that it is nursing, as it would not nurse unless it already had an offspring initially.
תָּא שְׁמַע: נִכְנַס בְּתוֹךְ עֶדְרוֹ וְרָאָה אֶת הַמַּבְכִּירוֹת מְנִיקוֹת, וְאֶת שֶׁאֵינָן מַבְכִּירוֹת מְנִיקוֹת — אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ שֶׁמָּא בְּנָהּ שֶׁל זוֹ בָּא לוֹ אֵצֶל זוֹ, אוֹ שֶׁמָּא בְּנָהּ שֶׁל זוֹ בָּא לוֹ אֵצֶל זוֹ.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the continuation of the mishna: In the case of one who enters amid his flock and sees mother animals that gave birth for the first time that were nursing, and also sees mother animals that gave birth not for the first time that were also nursing, he does not need to be concerned that perhaps the offspring of this animal came to that animal to be nursed, or that perhaps the offspring of that animal came to this animal to be nursed.
אַמַּאי? לֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא רַחוֹמֵי רַחֵים! בִּמְקוֹם דִּידַהּ, לָא שָׁבְקָא דִּידַהּ וּמְרַחֲמָא דְּלָא דִּידַהּ.
The Gemara explains the proof: But why not? Let us be concerned that perhaps the nursing animal is merciful toward an offspring that is not its own. Evidently, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that an animal nurses only its own offspring, even if it had previously given birth. The Gemara rejects this proof: Even if an animal does show mercy toward offspring that is not its own, in a place where it has its own offspring, it does not set aside its own offspring and show mercy toward offspring that is not its own.
תָּא שְׁמַע: דָּבָר בְּחֶזְקָתוֹ כּוּ׳. מַאי לָאו רֵישָׁא דּוּמְיָא דְּסֵיפָא? מָה סֵיפָא וַדַּאי דִּידַהּ, אַף רֵישָׁא וַדַּאי דִּידַהּ.
The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear a proof from Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s statement in the baraita: If one purchases a nursing animal from a gentile, the matter stands in its presumptive status. From the phrase: And similarly, in the continuation of the baraita, the Gemara infers: What, is it not so that the first clause is similar to the latter clause? Just as in the latter clause the nursing young is certainly considered to be the nursing animal’s own offspring, so too, in the first clause it is certainly considered to be the nursing animal’s own offspring, despite the fact that the animal mother might have given birth previously.
מִידֵּי אִירְיָא? הַאי כִּדְאִיתֵאּ, וְהַאי כִּדְאִיתֵאּ. וּמַאי ״וְכֵן״? אַפְּטוּרָה דִּבְכוֹרָה.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Are the cases comparable? This first clause of the baraita stands as it is and that second clause of the baraita stands as it is, i.e., they are referring to different cases. In the second clause, where all the offspring are standing before their mothers, it is certain that each mother will nurse only its own child. Conversely, in the first clause it is uncertain whether that child is its own. But if so, what is the meaning of the phrase: And similarly? It means both clauses state that the nursing animal is exempt from having its future offspring counted a firstborn, since even if that offspring is not the mother’s, the mother would not nurse it unless it had previously given birth.
אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רָאָה חֲזִיר שֶׁכָּרוּךְ אַחַר רָחֵל, פְּטוּרָה מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה, וְאָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה ״עַד יָבֹא וְיוֹרֶה צֶדֶק לָכֶם״.
The Gemara analyzes a similar case. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one saw a young animal resembling a pig that was trailing after a ewe, the ewe is exempt from having its future offspring counted a firstborn. And the pig-like animal is forbidden for consumption “until he comes and instructs righteousness to you” (Hosea 10:12), i.e., until Elijah the prophet arrives and determines the halakha.
פָּטוּר מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה — כְּמַאן? כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, וְאָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה — כְּרַבָּנַן.
The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to Rabba bar bar Ḥana’s statement: On the one hand, the ewe is exempt from having its future offspring counted a firstborn, which is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that an animal that nurses from another is presumed to be its offspring. But on the other hand, the pig-like animal is forbidden for consumption, which is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that an animal might nurse the young of another.
וְתוּ, אִי כְּרַבָּנַן, מַאי ״עַד יָבֹא וְיוֹרֶה צֶדֶק לָכֶם״? ״עַד שֶׁיִּוָּדַע לְךָ דָּבָר״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
And furthermore, if the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and there is a concern with regard to the identity of the mother of the offspring, what is the reason for citing the verse: “Until he comes and instructs righteousness to you”? By citing it, the baraita is indicating that the status of the pig-like animal is a halakhic uncertainty that can be resolved only by Elijah the prophet. Instead, it should have stated: Until the matter becomes known to you, in reference to the empirical uncertainty as to whether the pig-like animal is the offspring of the ewe.
וְכִי תֵּימָא: מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ אִי הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אִי כְּרַבָּנַן, אִי מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ — אַמַּאי פְּטוּרָה מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה? וְתוּ: מִי מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ? וְהָאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁשָּׁנָה רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בְּמִשְׁנָתֵינוּ — הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ, חוּץ מֵעָרֵב, וְצַיְדָן, וּרְאָיָה אַחֲרוֹנָה!
And if you would say that it is uncertain whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel or in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that cannot be correct: If that matter is uncertain, then why is the ewe exempt from having its future offspring counted a firstborn? And furthermore, is this question of whose opinion is accepted as the halakha an uncertainty at all? But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Wherever Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught a halakha in the corpus of our Mishna the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, except for the following three cases: The responsibility of the guarantor (see Bava Batra 174a), and the incident that occurred in the city of Tzaidan (see Gittin 74a), and the dispute with regard to evidence in the final disagreement (see Sanhedrin 31a)?
לְעוֹלָם פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, מִיהוּ מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ אִי סָבַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל יוֹלֶדֶת מְרַחֶמֶת, אוֹ אֵינָהּ מְרַחֶמֶת. אִי הָכִי, עַד דְּאַשְׁמְעִינַן חֲזִיר, לַישְׁמְעִינַן טָלֶה, וּלְמִילְקֵי עֲלֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״!
The Gemara answers: Actually, it is obvious to Rabba bar bar Ḥana that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. But it is uncertain if Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that an animal that has given birth might be merciful toward offspring that is not its own, or if he holds that it is not merciful toward the offspring of another. The Gemara rejects this claim: If that is so, instead of teaching a case involving an animal with the appearance of a pig, he should have taught the more common case of a mother ewe nursing a baby lamb. And accordingly, rather than inquiring with regard to the prohibition against eating a non-kosher animal, he should have inquired as to whether or not one is flogged for it due to violating the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day.
חֲזִיר אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן טָלֶה, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: אִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר דְּסָבַר יוֹלֶדֶת מְרַחֲמָא — דְּמִינַהּ, דְּלָא מִינַהּ — לָא. אַשְׁמְעִינַן חֲזִיר, דִּמְרַחֶמֶת, וַאֲפִילּוּ דְּלָאו מִינַהּ נָמֵי, דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר דִּלְמָא מְרַחֲמָא.
The Gemara explains: It was necessary for Rabba bar bar Ḥana to teach the case of a pig, as, had he taught a case involving a lamb, I would say: Even if you say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that an animal that has given birth might be merciful toward the offspring of another, this is so only with regard to its own species, but with regard to an animal that is not of its own species, it would not show mercy and would not nurse the offspring. Therefore, Rabba bar bar Ḥana teaches us the case of a pig, to convey that an animal might be merciful, and this is also true even where the offspring is not of its own species, as it could be said that perhaps the animal was merciful in such a case as well.
וְהַיְינוּ דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בָּעֵי
And this is the meaning of that which Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A dilemma was raised
אַחַאי בְּרִיבִּי: רָאָה חֲזִיר שֶׁכָּרוּךְ אַחַר רָחֵל, מַהוּ? מַאי קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ? אִילֵּימָא לִבְכוֹרָה, וְקָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ אִי הִלְכְתָא כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אִי הִלְכְתָא כְּרַבָּנַן, תִּיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ טָלֶה!
by Aḥai the Distinguished [beribbi]: If one saw an animal with the appearance of a pig that was trailing after a ewe, what is the halakha? The Gemara asks: What is the dilemma he is raising? If we say he is inquiring with regard to the firstborn status of the future offspring, and he is therefore essentially asking if the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel or if the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, then let the dilemma be raised with respect to the more common case of a lamb, rather than the irregular case of a pig-like animal.
כִּי קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ, לִבְכוֹרָה וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן, לַאֲכִילָה וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל.
The Gemara answers: Actually, when Aḥai the Distinguished raised the dilemma it was with respect to the ramifications of each opinion: He inquired with regard to the future offspring’s firstborn status, and this aspect of the dilemma was raised under the assumption that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. He also inquired with regard to whether or not the pig-like animal is permitted for consumption, and this aspect of the dilemma was raised under the assumption that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
לִבְכוֹרָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבָּנַן דְאָמְרִי מְרַחֲמָא, כִּי מְרַחֲמָא דְּמִינַהּ, דְּלָא מִינַהּ — לָא, אוֹ דִלְמָא דְּלָא מִינַהּ נָמֵי מְרַחֲמָא?
The Gemara elaborates: He inquired with regard to the offspring’s firstborn status, and this question applies even according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that an animal might be merciful toward other young animals. The Gemara explains the dilemma: One can say that when an animal is merciful this applies only toward an animal that is of its own species, but to a young animal that is not of its own species a mother animal certainly does not show mercy. Therefore, the fact that it nursed proves that it is its offspring. Or perhaps an animal might also be merciful toward an offspring that is not of its own species. If it is merciful only to its own species, the ewe is exempt from having its future offspring counted a firstborn; if its mercy extends to other species then it is not exempt.
לַאֲכִילָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל — אִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר סָבַר: יוֹלֶדֶת מְרַחֲמָא דְּמִינַהּ, דְּלָאו מִינַהּ — לָא; אוֹ דִלְמָא: דְּלָאו מִינַהּ נָמֵי מְרַחֲמָא? תֵּיקוּ.
And Aḥai the Distinguished also inquired with regard to whether the pig-like animal is permitted for consumption, and this question applies even according to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: If you say he holds that an animal that has given birth might be merciful and nurse another mother’s offspring, perhaps that is so only with regard to an animal that is of its own species, but to an animal that is not of its own species it is not merciful, which means the pig-like animal is kosher. Or perhaps a mother might also be merciful toward an offspring that is not of its own species, in which case the pig-like animal might not be kosher and therefore may not be eaten. After explaining the dilemma of Aḥai the Distinguished, the Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
מַתְנִי׳ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם אוֹמֵר: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּכוֹר, עוֹשֶׂה מָקוֹם בְּקוֹפִיץ מִיכָּן וּמִיכָּן, וְתוֹלֵשׁ אֶת הַשֵּׂעָר, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יְזִיזֶנּוּ מִמְּקוֹמוֹ, וְכֵן תּוֹלֵשׁ אֶת הַשֵּׂעָר לִרְאוֹת מְקוֹם מוּם.
MISHNA: Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam says: Since it is prohibited by Torah law to shear a firstborn, as it states: “And you shall not shear the firstborn of your flock” (Deuteronomy 15:19), one who is slaughtering a firstborn, and must clear hair or wool from the area of the neck in order to facilitate proper slaughter, clears space by uprooting the hair with a cleaver [bekofitz] from here and from there, on either side of the neck, although he thereby plucks out the hair. He may clear space in this manner provided that he does not move the plucked hair from its place; it must remain intermingled with the rest of the hair so it will appear that he did not shear the animal. And likewise, one plucks the hair to enable one of the Sages to examine the place of a blemish and thereby determine whether it is permitted to slaughter the firstborn outside the Temple.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם. בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב הוּנָא: כְּנֶגְדּוֹ בְּיוֹם טוֹב מַהוּ? טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם מִשּׁוּם דְּקָסָבַר תּוֹלֵשׁ לָאו הַיְינוּ גּוֹזֵז, וּבְיוֹם טוֹב אָסוּר, דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ עוֹקֵר דָּבָר מִגִּידּוּלוֹ.
GEMARA: Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam. The Sages raised a dilemma before Rav Huna: What is the halakha in the parallel case of one who wishes to slaughter a non-sacred animal on a Festival? The resolution depends on the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam: Does he permit clearing hair with a cleaver because he holds that plucking is not the same as shearing, and as opposed to plucking the hair of a firstborn, it is prohibited to pluck hair on the Festival, as this is considered uprooting an item from its place of growth?
אוֹ דִלְמָא בְּעָלְמָא סָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם תּוֹלֵשׁ הַיְינוּ גּוֹזֵז, וְהַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דִּשְׁרֵי, דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין, וּבְיוֹם טוֹב דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין מוּתָּר?
Or perhaps in general Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam holds that plucking is considered a form of shearing. And this is the reason that it is permitted to clear space with a cleaver in the case of the firstborn, as it is an unintentional act, i.e., an action performed for a permitted purpose from which a prohibited labor may inadvertently ensue, since he does not intend to pluck out the hair; and on a Festival an unintentional act is permitted.
אֲמַר לְהוּ: זִילוּ שַׁיְילוּהּ לְרַב חֲנַנְאֵל, אִי אָמַר הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם, אֶיפְשׁוֹט לְכוּ. אֲתוֹ שַׁיְילוּהּ, אֲמַר לְהוּ: הָכִי אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא, אֲמַר לְהוּ: כְּנֶגְדּוֹ בְּיוֹם טוֹב מוּתָּר. אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי, אָמַר רַב חֲנַנְיָה בַּר שֶׁלֶמְיָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב: כְּנֶגְדּוֹ בְּיוֹם טוֹב
Rav Huna said to them: Go and ask Rav’s disciple, Rav Ḥananel, and if Rav in fact said the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam, I will explain to you the resolution of your dilemma. They went and asked Rav Ḥananel, and he said to them that this is what Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam. They came before Rav Huna, and he said to them: In the parallel case of one who wishes to slaughter a non-sacred animal on a Festival, it is permitted to pluck the hair in order to facilitate proper slaughter. It was also stated that Rav Ḥananya bar Shelamya says in the name of Rav: In the parallel case of one who wishes to slaughter a non-sacred animal on a Festival,
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Bekhorot 24
הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם לְמָה לִי?
why do I need him to state that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam?
אִי אָמַר הִלְכְתָא דְּכוּלֵּיהּ פִּירְקִין, וְלָא אָמַר הִלְכְתָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: אַדְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם קָאֵי, וּמַאי ״בְּכוּלֵּיהּ פִּירְקִין״? דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי תַּרְתֵּי אָמַר, וּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּבָרַיְיתָא פְּלוּגְתָּא הִיא.
The Gemara explains: Had Rav said only that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the anonymous tanna in the mishnayot throughout the whole chapter, but did not say explicitly that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam, I would say: Rav is referring specifically to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam. And what is the meaning of the phrase: Throughout the whole chapter, which indicates he is speaking of more than one case? This is referring to the fact that Rabbi Yosei said two separate statements in the chapter. And this would indicate with regard to Rav’s statement that if a mishna is contradicted by a dissenting opinion cited in a baraita, that is considered a dispute.
אַשְׁמְעִינַן הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי — לְאַשְׁמוֹעִינַן דְּאַדְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל קָאֵי, וּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּבָרַיְיתָא לָאו פְּלוּגְתָּא הִיא.
Rav taught that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei in order to teach us that his statement with regard to the whole chapter is referring to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and with regard to Rav’s statement, if a mishna is contradicted by a dissenting opinion cited in a baraita, that is not considered a dispute.
מַאי בָּרַיְיתָא? דְּתַנְיָא: הַלּוֹקֵחַ בְּהֵמָה מְנִיקָה מִן הַגּוֹי, הַבָּא אַחֲרָיו בְּכוֹר מִסָּפֵק, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמְּרַחֶמֶת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינָהּ יוֹלֶדֶת. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: דָּבָר בְּחֶזְקָתוֹ.
What is the baraita mentioned previously? As it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who purchases a nursing female animal from a gentile, the young that is born after the offspring currently being nursed is treated as a firstborn due to the uncertainty whether it is the animal’s offspring, because an animal might be merciful and nurse another animal even though it has not given birth at all. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The matter stands in its presumptive status, i.e., the nursing animal is assumed to be the mother of the nursing offspring.
וְכֵן הָיָה רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: הַנִּכְנָס לְתוֹךְ עֶדְרוֹ בַּלַּיְלָה וְרָאָה כְּעֶשֶׂר כַּחֲמֵשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה, מַבְכִּירוֹת וְשֶׁאֵינָן מַבְכִּירוֹת, יוֹלְדוֹת, לְמָחָר הִשְׁכִּים וּמָצָא זְכָרִים (תְּלוּיוֹת) [תְּלוּיִין] בְּשֶׁאֵין מַבְכִּירוֹת, וּנְקֵבוֹת תְּלוּיוֹת בְּמַבְכִּירוֹת — אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ שֶׁמָּא בְּנָהּ שֶׁל זוֹ בָּא לוֹ אֵצֶל זוֹ.
The baraita continues: And similarly, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would say: One who enters amid his flock at night and sees about ten or about fifteen animals, some of whose offspring is a firstborn and others whose offspring is not a firstborn, and all were giving birth, and on the next day he arose and found that the male young were nursing from the mothers whose offspring is not a firstborn, and the female young were nursing from the mothers whose offspring is a firstborn, he does not need to be concerned that perhaps the young of this mother came to nurse from that mother. Rather, he may assume that each animal is nursing its own offspring.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: דָּבָר בְּחֶזְקָתוֹ דְּקָאָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, דְּאֵינָהּ מְרַחֶמֶת אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יוֹלֶדֶת — הָא הֵיכָא דְּאוֹלִיד חָיְישִׁינַן לְרַחוֹמֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא: דִּידַהּ מְרַחֲמָא, דְּלָא דִּידַהּ לָא מְרַחֲמָא לֵיהּ?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the precise meaning of the phrase: The matter stands in its presumptive status, which Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel stated? Does this mean that an animal does not show mercy unless it has given birth, and consequently, in a case where the animal has given birth we are concerned for the possibility that it might be merciful and nurse an offspring that is not its own? Or perhaps it means that an animal might be merciful only toward its own offspring, but it does not show mercy to an animal that is not its own?
לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? לְמִלְקֵא עֲלַהּ מִשּׁוּם ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״. אִי אָמְרַתְּ דִּידַהּ מְרַחֲמָא, דְּלָא דִּידַהּ לָא מְרַחֲמָא — לָקֵי, וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ דְּלָא דִּידַהּ נָמֵי מְרַחֲמָא — לָא לָקֵי.
The Gemara asks: What difference is there in practice based on this distinction? Either way the nursing animal is assumed to have given birth and its future offspring will not be considered a firstborn. The Gemara answers that there is a difference with regard to whether or not one is flogged for slaughtering it due to violating the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day. If you say an animal is merciful only toward its own offspring but is not merciful toward an animal that is not its own, then one is flogged if he deliberately slaughters an animal and the offspring that it is nursing. But if you say it is also merciful toward an animal that is not its own, then one is not flogged in such a case.
מַאי? תָּא שְׁמַע, רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: הַלּוֹקֵחַ בְּהֵמָה מִן הַגּוֹי — אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ שֶׁמָּא בְּנָהּ שֶׁל אַחֶרֶת הָיָה. מִי קָתָנֵי ״הוּא״? ״הָיָה״ קָתָנֵי! הָכִי קָאָמַר: אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ שֶׁמָּא בְּנָהּ שֶׁל אַחֶרֶת, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הָיָה לָהּ וָלָד מֵעִיקָּרָא.
The Gemara returns to its initial inquiry. What is the precise meaning of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s statement? Come and hear a proof from the mishna, as Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In the case of one who purchases a nursing female animal from a gentile, he does not need to be concerned lest the offspring currently being nursed was the offspring of another animal. Evidently, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that an animal nurses only its own offspring. The Gemara rejects this proof: Does the mishna teach that one does not need to be concerned that perhaps it is the offspring of another animal? No, it teaches that one does not need to be concerned that perhaps it was the offspring of another animal, and this is what it is saying: Whichever way you look at it, the next offspring is not a firstborn, as one does not need to be concerned that perhaps it was the offspring of another animal that it is nursing, as it would not nurse unless it already had an offspring initially.
תָּא שְׁמַע: נִכְנַס בְּתוֹךְ עֶדְרוֹ וְרָאָה אֶת הַמַּבְכִּירוֹת מְנִיקוֹת, וְאֶת שֶׁאֵינָן מַבְכִּירוֹת מְנִיקוֹת — אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ שֶׁמָּא בְּנָהּ שֶׁל זוֹ בָּא לוֹ אֵצֶל זוֹ, אוֹ שֶׁמָּא בְּנָהּ שֶׁל זוֹ בָּא לוֹ אֵצֶל זוֹ.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the continuation of the mishna: In the case of one who enters amid his flock and sees mother animals that gave birth for the first time that were nursing, and also sees mother animals that gave birth not for the first time that were also nursing, he does not need to be concerned that perhaps the offspring of this animal came to that animal to be nursed, or that perhaps the offspring of that animal came to this animal to be nursed.
אַמַּאי? לֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא רַחוֹמֵי רַחֵים! בִּמְקוֹם דִּידַהּ, לָא שָׁבְקָא דִּידַהּ וּמְרַחֲמָא דְּלָא דִּידַהּ.
The Gemara explains the proof: But why not? Let us be concerned that perhaps the nursing animal is merciful toward an offspring that is not its own. Evidently, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that an animal nurses only its own offspring, even if it had previously given birth. The Gemara rejects this proof: Even if an animal does show mercy toward offspring that is not its own, in a place where it has its own offspring, it does not set aside its own offspring and show mercy toward offspring that is not its own.
תָּא שְׁמַע: דָּבָר בְּחֶזְקָתוֹ כּוּ׳. מַאי לָאו רֵישָׁא דּוּמְיָא דְּסֵיפָא? מָה סֵיפָא וַדַּאי דִּידַהּ, אַף רֵישָׁא וַדַּאי דִּידַהּ.
The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear a proof from Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s statement in the baraita: If one purchases a nursing animal from a gentile, the matter stands in its presumptive status. From the phrase: And similarly, in the continuation of the baraita, the Gemara infers: What, is it not so that the first clause is similar to the latter clause? Just as in the latter clause the nursing young is certainly considered to be the nursing animal’s own offspring, so too, in the first clause it is certainly considered to be the nursing animal’s own offspring, despite the fact that the animal mother might have given birth previously.
מִידֵּי אִירְיָא? הַאי כִּדְאִיתֵאּ, וְהַאי כִּדְאִיתֵאּ. וּמַאי ״וְכֵן״? אַפְּטוּרָה דִּבְכוֹרָה.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Are the cases comparable? This first clause of the baraita stands as it is and that second clause of the baraita stands as it is, i.e., they are referring to different cases. In the second clause, where all the offspring are standing before their mothers, it is certain that each mother will nurse only its own child. Conversely, in the first clause it is uncertain whether that child is its own. But if so, what is the meaning of the phrase: And similarly? It means both clauses state that the nursing animal is exempt from having its future offspring counted a firstborn, since even if that offspring is not the mother’s, the mother would not nurse it unless it had previously given birth.
אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רָאָה חֲזִיר שֶׁכָּרוּךְ אַחַר רָחֵל, פְּטוּרָה מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה, וְאָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה ״עַד יָבֹא וְיוֹרֶה צֶדֶק לָכֶם״.
The Gemara analyzes a similar case. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one saw a young animal resembling a pig that was trailing after a ewe, the ewe is exempt from having its future offspring counted a firstborn. And the pig-like animal is forbidden for consumption “until he comes and instructs righteousness to you” (Hosea 10:12), i.e., until Elijah the prophet arrives and determines the halakha.
פָּטוּר מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה — כְּמַאן? כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, וְאָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה — כְּרַבָּנַן.
The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to Rabba bar bar Ḥana’s statement: On the one hand, the ewe is exempt from having its future offspring counted a firstborn, which is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that an animal that nurses from another is presumed to be its offspring. But on the other hand, the pig-like animal is forbidden for consumption, which is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that an animal might nurse the young of another.
וְתוּ, אִי כְּרַבָּנַן, מַאי ״עַד יָבֹא וְיוֹרֶה צֶדֶק לָכֶם״? ״עַד שֶׁיִּוָּדַע לְךָ דָּבָר״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
And furthermore, if the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and there is a concern with regard to the identity of the mother of the offspring, what is the reason for citing the verse: “Until he comes and instructs righteousness to you”? By citing it, the baraita is indicating that the status of the pig-like animal is a halakhic uncertainty that can be resolved only by Elijah the prophet. Instead, it should have stated: Until the matter becomes known to you, in reference to the empirical uncertainty as to whether the pig-like animal is the offspring of the ewe.
וְכִי תֵּימָא: מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ אִי הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אִי כְּרַבָּנַן, אִי מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ — אַמַּאי פְּטוּרָה מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה? וְתוּ: מִי מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ? וְהָאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁשָּׁנָה רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בְּמִשְׁנָתֵינוּ — הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ, חוּץ מֵעָרֵב, וְצַיְדָן, וּרְאָיָה אַחֲרוֹנָה!
And if you would say that it is uncertain whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel or in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that cannot be correct: If that matter is uncertain, then why is the ewe exempt from having its future offspring counted a firstborn? And furthermore, is this question of whose opinion is accepted as the halakha an uncertainty at all? But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Wherever Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught a halakha in the corpus of our Mishna the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, except for the following three cases: The responsibility of the guarantor (see Bava Batra 174a), and the incident that occurred in the city of Tzaidan (see Gittin 74a), and the dispute with regard to evidence in the final disagreement (see Sanhedrin 31a)?
לְעוֹלָם פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, מִיהוּ מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ אִי סָבַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל יוֹלֶדֶת מְרַחֶמֶת, אוֹ אֵינָהּ מְרַחֶמֶת. אִי הָכִי, עַד דְּאַשְׁמְעִינַן חֲזִיר, לַישְׁמְעִינַן טָלֶה, וּלְמִילְקֵי עֲלֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״!
The Gemara answers: Actually, it is obvious to Rabba bar bar Ḥana that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. But it is uncertain if Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that an animal that has given birth might be merciful toward offspring that is not its own, or if he holds that it is not merciful toward the offspring of another. The Gemara rejects this claim: If that is so, instead of teaching a case involving an animal with the appearance of a pig, he should have taught the more common case of a mother ewe nursing a baby lamb. And accordingly, rather than inquiring with regard to the prohibition against eating a non-kosher animal, he should have inquired as to whether or not one is flogged for it due to violating the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day.
חֲזִיר אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן טָלֶה, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: אִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר דְּסָבַר יוֹלֶדֶת מְרַחֲמָא — דְּמִינַהּ, דְּלָא מִינַהּ — לָא. אַשְׁמְעִינַן חֲזִיר, דִּמְרַחֶמֶת, וַאֲפִילּוּ דְּלָאו מִינַהּ נָמֵי, דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר דִּלְמָא מְרַחֲמָא.
The Gemara explains: It was necessary for Rabba bar bar Ḥana to teach the case of a pig, as, had he taught a case involving a lamb, I would say: Even if you say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that an animal that has given birth might be merciful toward the offspring of another, this is so only with regard to its own species, but with regard to an animal that is not of its own species, it would not show mercy and would not nurse the offspring. Therefore, Rabba bar bar Ḥana teaches us the case of a pig, to convey that an animal might be merciful, and this is also true even where the offspring is not of its own species, as it could be said that perhaps the animal was merciful in such a case as well.
וְהַיְינוּ דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בָּעֵי
And this is the meaning of that which Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A dilemma was raised
אַחַאי בְּרִיבִּי: רָאָה חֲזִיר שֶׁכָּרוּךְ אַחַר רָחֵל, מַהוּ? מַאי קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ? אִילֵּימָא לִבְכוֹרָה, וְקָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ אִי הִלְכְתָא כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אִי הִלְכְתָא כְּרַבָּנַן, תִּיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ טָלֶה!
by Aḥai the Distinguished [beribbi]: If one saw an animal with the appearance of a pig that was trailing after a ewe, what is the halakha? The Gemara asks: What is the dilemma he is raising? If we say he is inquiring with regard to the firstborn status of the future offspring, and he is therefore essentially asking if the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel or if the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, then let the dilemma be raised with respect to the more common case of a lamb, rather than the irregular case of a pig-like animal.
כִּי קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ, לִבְכוֹרָה וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן, לַאֲכִילָה וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל.
The Gemara answers: Actually, when Aḥai the Distinguished raised the dilemma it was with respect to the ramifications of each opinion: He inquired with regard to the future offspring’s firstborn status, and this aspect of the dilemma was raised under the assumption that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. He also inquired with regard to whether or not the pig-like animal is permitted for consumption, and this aspect of the dilemma was raised under the assumption that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
לִבְכוֹרָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבָּנַן דְאָמְרִי מְרַחֲמָא, כִּי מְרַחֲמָא דְּמִינַהּ, דְּלָא מִינַהּ — לָא, אוֹ דִלְמָא דְּלָא מִינַהּ נָמֵי מְרַחֲמָא?
The Gemara elaborates: He inquired with regard to the offspring’s firstborn status, and this question applies even according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that an animal might be merciful toward other young animals. The Gemara explains the dilemma: One can say that when an animal is merciful this applies only toward an animal that is of its own species, but to a young animal that is not of its own species a mother animal certainly does not show mercy. Therefore, the fact that it nursed proves that it is its offspring. Or perhaps an animal might also be merciful toward an offspring that is not of its own species. If it is merciful only to its own species, the ewe is exempt from having its future offspring counted a firstborn; if its mercy extends to other species then it is not exempt.
לַאֲכִילָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל — אִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר סָבַר: יוֹלֶדֶת מְרַחֲמָא דְּמִינַהּ, דְּלָאו מִינַהּ — לָא; אוֹ דִלְמָא: דְּלָאו מִינַהּ נָמֵי מְרַחֲמָא? תֵּיקוּ.
And Aḥai the Distinguished also inquired with regard to whether the pig-like animal is permitted for consumption, and this question applies even according to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: If you say he holds that an animal that has given birth might be merciful and nurse another mother’s offspring, perhaps that is so only with regard to an animal that is of its own species, but to an animal that is not of its own species it is not merciful, which means the pig-like animal is kosher. Or perhaps a mother might also be merciful toward an offspring that is not of its own species, in which case the pig-like animal might not be kosher and therefore may not be eaten. After explaining the dilemma of Aḥai the Distinguished, the Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
מַתְנִי׳ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם אוֹמֵר: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּכוֹר, עוֹשֶׂה מָקוֹם בְּקוֹפִיץ מִיכָּן וּמִיכָּן, וְתוֹלֵשׁ אֶת הַשֵּׂעָר, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יְזִיזֶנּוּ מִמְּקוֹמוֹ, וְכֵן תּוֹלֵשׁ אֶת הַשֵּׂעָר לִרְאוֹת מְקוֹם מוּם.
MISHNA: Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam says: Since it is prohibited by Torah law to shear a firstborn, as it states: “And you shall not shear the firstborn of your flock” (Deuteronomy 15:19), one who is slaughtering a firstborn, and must clear hair or wool from the area of the neck in order to facilitate proper slaughter, clears space by uprooting the hair with a cleaver [bekofitz] from here and from there, on either side of the neck, although he thereby plucks out the hair. He may clear space in this manner provided that he does not move the plucked hair from its place; it must remain intermingled with the rest of the hair so it will appear that he did not shear the animal. And likewise, one plucks the hair to enable one of the Sages to examine the place of a blemish and thereby determine whether it is permitted to slaughter the firstborn outside the Temple.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם. בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב הוּנָא: כְּנֶגְדּוֹ בְּיוֹם טוֹב מַהוּ? טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם מִשּׁוּם דְּקָסָבַר תּוֹלֵשׁ לָאו הַיְינוּ גּוֹזֵז, וּבְיוֹם טוֹב אָסוּר, דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ עוֹקֵר דָּבָר מִגִּידּוּלוֹ.
GEMARA: Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam. The Sages raised a dilemma before Rav Huna: What is the halakha in the parallel case of one who wishes to slaughter a non-sacred animal on a Festival? The resolution depends on the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam: Does he permit clearing hair with a cleaver because he holds that plucking is not the same as shearing, and as opposed to plucking the hair of a firstborn, it is prohibited to pluck hair on the Festival, as this is considered uprooting an item from its place of growth?
אוֹ דִלְמָא בְּעָלְמָא סָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם תּוֹלֵשׁ הַיְינוּ גּוֹזֵז, וְהַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דִּשְׁרֵי, דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין, וּבְיוֹם טוֹב דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין מוּתָּר?
Or perhaps in general Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam holds that plucking is considered a form of shearing. And this is the reason that it is permitted to clear space with a cleaver in the case of the firstborn, as it is an unintentional act, i.e., an action performed for a permitted purpose from which a prohibited labor may inadvertently ensue, since he does not intend to pluck out the hair; and on a Festival an unintentional act is permitted.
אֲמַר לְהוּ: זִילוּ שַׁיְילוּהּ לְרַב חֲנַנְאֵל, אִי אָמַר הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם, אֶיפְשׁוֹט לְכוּ. אֲתוֹ שַׁיְילוּהּ, אֲמַר לְהוּ: הָכִי אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא, אֲמַר לְהוּ: כְּנֶגְדּוֹ בְּיוֹם טוֹב מוּתָּר. אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי, אָמַר רַב חֲנַנְיָה בַּר שֶׁלֶמְיָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב: כְּנֶגְדּוֹ בְּיוֹם טוֹב
Rav Huna said to them: Go and ask Rav’s disciple, Rav Ḥananel, and if Rav in fact said the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam, I will explain to you the resolution of your dilemma. They went and asked Rav Ḥananel, and he said to them that this is what Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam. They came before Rav Huna, and he said to them: In the parallel case of one who wishes to slaughter a non-sacred animal on a Festival, it is permitted to pluck the hair in order to facilitate proper slaughter. It was also stated that Rav Ḥananya bar Shelamya says in the name of Rav: In the parallel case of one who wishes to slaughter a non-sacred animal on a Festival,
