In the previous shiur we discussed essential and transactional holiness. This week, we add another layer of considering holiness – holiness that comes automatically (such as the holiness of a firstborn animal) and holiness that is human-made (such as consecrating an animal or something else to the Mikdash). How does this additional layer shed light on the concept of holiness?
Bekhorot 24-25
sources:
- בכורות כד:
מַתְנִי׳ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם אוֹמֵר: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּכוֹר, עוֹשֶׂה מָקוֹם בְּקוֹפִיץ מִיכָּן וּמִיכָּן, וְתוֹלֵשׁ אֶת הַשֵּׂעָר, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יְזִיזֶנּוּ מִמְּקוֹמוֹ, וְכֵן תּוֹלֵשׁ אֶת הַשֵּׂעָר לִרְאוֹת מְקוֹם מוּם.
MISHNA: Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam says: Since it is prohibited by Torah law to shear a firstborn, as it states: “And you shall not shear the firstborn of your flock” (Deuteronomy 15:19), one who is slaughtering a firstborn, and must clear hair or wool from the area of the neck in order to facilitate proper slaughter, clears space by uprooting the hair with a cleaver [bekofitz] from here and from there, on either side of the neck, although he thereby plucks out the hair. He may clear space in this manner provided that he does not move the plucked hair from its place; it must remain intermingled with the rest of the hair so it will appear that he did not shear the animal. And likewise, one plucks the hair to enable one of the Sages to examine the place of a blemish and thereby determine whether it is permitted to slaughter the firstborn outside the Temple.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם. בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב הוּנָא: כְּנֶגְדּוֹ בְּיוֹם טוֹב מַהוּ? טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם מִשּׁוּם דְּקָסָבַר תּוֹלֵשׁ לָאו הַיְינוּ גּוֹזֵז, וּבְיוֹם טוֹב אָסוּר, דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ עוֹקֵר דָּבָר מִגִּידּוּלוֹ.
GEMARA: Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam. The Sages raised a dilemma before Rav Huna: What is the halakha in the parallel case of one who wishes to slaughter a non-sacred animal on a Festival? The resolution depends on the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam: Does he permit clearing hair with a cleaver because he holds that plucking is not the same as shearing, and as opposed to plucking the hair of a firstborn, it is prohibited to pluck hair on the Festival, as this is considered uprooting an item from its place of growth?
אוֹ דִלְמָא בְּעָלְמָא סָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם תּוֹלֵשׁ הַיְינוּ גּוֹזֵז, וְהַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דִּשְׁרֵי, דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין, וּבְיוֹם טוֹב דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין מוּתָּר?
Or perhaps in general Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam holds that plucking is considered a form of shearing. And this is the reason that it is permitted to clear space with a cleaver in the case of the firstborn, as it is an unintentional act, i.e., an action performed for a permitted purpose from which a prohibited labor may inadvertently ensue, since he does not intend to pluck out the hair; and on a Festival an unintentional act is permitted.
- תוספתא ביצה ב:יח (ליברמן)
ר’ שמעון או’ גורר אדם מטה כסא וספסל וקתדרה אצלו בשבת, ואין צריך לומר ביום טוב.
R. Shimon says: One may have a bed, a chair, a bench or pull up a chair on the Sabbath; and one doesn’t even have to say: on a holiday.
- ביצה כג:
מַתְנִי׳ עֲגָלָה שֶׁל קָטָן — טְמֵאָה מִדְרָס, וְנִטֶּלֶת בְּשַׁבָּת, וְאֵינָהּ נִגְרֶרֶת אֶלָּא עַל גַּבֵּי כֵלִים.
MISHNA: A child’s wagon, with which he plays and upon which he also sits, is susceptible to ritual impurity imparted by treading. It is considered a fixed seat of the child, so that if the child is a zav and he sits on the wagon, it contracts the ritual impurity imparted by the treading of a zav. And this wagon may be handled on Shabbat, as it is considered a vessel. And it may be dragged on the ground on Shabbat only upon cloth, a stone pavement, or the like, as otherwise it would create a furrow when dragged, and one would be liable due to the prohibited labor of plowing.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: כׇּל הַכֵּלִים אֵין נִגְרָרִין, חוּץ מִן הָעֲגָלָה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא כּוֹבֶשֶׁת.
Rabbi Yehuda says: For this reason, no vessels may be dragged on the ground on Shabbat except for a wagon, which is permitted because its wheels do not make a furrow in the ground but merely press the earth down. Since no earth is moved from its place, this is not considered digging or plowing on Shabbat.
גְּמָ׳ עֲגָלָה שֶׁל קָטָן — טְמֵאָה מִדְרָס, דְּהָא סָמֵיךְ עִלָּוַיהּ. וְנִטֶּלֶת בְּשַׁבָּת, מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא תּוֹרַת כְּלִי עֲלַהּ.
GEMARA: It is taught in the mishna that a child’s wagon is susceptible to ritual impurity imparted by treading. Why? It is because he leans on it. The mishna also teaches that this wagon may be handled on Shabbat. Why? It is because it has the status of a vessel, and one may handle a vessel on Shabbat.
וְאֵינָהּ נִגְרֶרֶת אֶלָּא עַל גַּבֵּי כֵלִים. עַל גַּבֵּי כֵלִים — אִין, עַל גַּבֵּי קַרְקַע — לָא. מַאי טַעְמָא, דְּקָא עָבֵיד חָרִיץ. מַנִּי? רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּאָמַר: דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין — אָסוּר.
The mishna further teaches that a child’s wagon may be dragged on Shabbat only upon cloth. The Gemara infers: Upon cloth, yes, it is permitted; but directly on the ground, no, it is not permitted. What is the reason for this halakha? It is because he creates a furrow in the ground when he drags the wagon across it. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: An unintentional act, i.e., a permitted action from which an unintended prohibited labor ensues on Shabbat, is prohibited, even though the person performing it does not have the prohibited labor in mind.
דְּאִי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, הָאָמַר: דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין — מוּתָּר. (דִּתְנַן) רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: גּוֹרֵר אָדָם מִטָּה כִּסֵּא וְסַפְסָל, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִתְכַּוֵּין לַעֲשׂוֹת חָרִיץ.
As, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, didn’t he say: An unintentional act is permitted, since there was no intention to perform the prohibited action? As we learned explicitly in a mishna that Rabbi Shimon says: A person may drag a bed, a chair, or a bench on the ground, provided that he does not intend to make a furrow. Even if one forms a furrow unwittingly, one need not be concerned, as this was not his intention.
אֵימָא סֵיפָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵין הַכֹּל נִגְרָרִין בְּשַׁבָּת, חוּץ מִן הָעֲגָלָה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא כּוֹבֶשֶׁת. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁכּוֹבֶשֶׁת — אִין, אֲבָל חָרִיץ — לָא עָבְדָא?
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna as follows: Rabbi Yehuda says: No vessels may be dragged on the ground on Shabbat except for a wagon, because it merely presses the earth down. This is not prohibited as plowing because it does not create a furrow. This indicates that a wagon may be dragged on the ground on Shabbat because, yes, it presses the earth down, but it does not make a furrow. Since it has already been established that the first section of the mishna is also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and there it appears that a wagon dragged along the ground makes a furrow, Rabbi Yehuda seems to contradict himself.
תְּרֵי תַנָּאֵי, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
The Gemara answers: It must be explained that this is a dispute between two tanna’im who hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda but differ with regard to the content of that opinion. The first tanna holds that even a wagon makes a furrow, whereas the other tanna maintains in the name of Rabbi Yehuda that a wagon does not make a furrow.
- משנה כלאים ט:ה
מוֹכְרֵי כְסוּת מוֹכְרִין כְּדַרְכָּן, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִתְכַּוְּנוּ בַּחַמָּה מִפְּנֵי הַחַמָּה, וּבַגְּשָׁמִים מִפְּנֵי הַגְּשָׁמִים. וְהַצְּנוּעִים מַפְשִׁילִין בְּמַקֵּל לַאֲחוֹרֵיהֶם:
Sellers of clothes may sell [clothes made of kilayim] in accordance with their custom, as long as they do have not the intention in the sun, [to protect themselves] from the sun, or in the rain [to protect themselves] from the rain. The scrupulous hang [such materials or garments] on a stick over their backs.
- משנה בכורות ה:ב
…בְּכוֹר שֶׁאֲחָזוֹ דָם, אֲפִלּוּ הוּא מֵת, אֵין מַקִּיזִין לוֹ דָם, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, יַקִּיז, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יַעֲשֶׂה בוֹ מוּם. וְאִם עָשָׂה בוֹ מוּם, הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא יִשָּׁחֵט עָלָיו. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר יַקִּיז, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא עוֹשֶׂה בוֹ מוּם:
…With regard to a firstborn animal that was congested with excess blood, even if the animal will die if one does not let the excess blood, one may not let its blood, as this might cause a blemish, and it is prohibited to cause a blemish on consecrated animals. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: One may let the blood provided that he will not cause a blemish while doing so, and if he caused a blemish, the animal may not be slaughtered on account of that blemish. Since he was the cause of the blemish, he may not slaughter the animal until it develops a different, unrelated blemish. Rabbi Shimon says: One may let the blood even if he thereby causes a blemish in the animal.
- רמב”ם פירוש משניות בכורות ה:ב
…וכבר ידעת דעת ר’ שמעון שהוא דבר שאין מתכוון מותר, ובארנו כמה פעמים שהלכה כמותו, ואין כוונתו כאן באמרו אף על פי שהוא עושה בו מום שהמום ייעשה בודאי בעת ההקזה, לפי שמודה ר’ שמעון באפסיק רישיה ולא ימות…אבל ענין מחלוקתם כאן שר’ יהודה אומר לא יקיז כלל שמא ייעשה מום ואף על פי שאינו מתכוון לכך דבר שאין מתכוון אסור. וחכמים אומרים שיקיז ובתנאי שידע שמהקזה זו לא יארע מום כלל. ור’ שמעון אומר יקיז מבלי לחוש למה שיארע אחרי ההקזה, ואם יולד מום מאותה הקזה אין בכל כלום לפי שהוא דבר שאין מתכוון ואין המום הכרחי שיהיה מחמת ההקזה כדי שנדמהו לאספיק רישיה ולא ימות
…And you already know the opinion of R. Shimon that that which is unintended is allowed, and we’ve explained a number of times that halakha follows him. And he does not mean here when he says, “even though one makes a blemish,” that there will definitely become a blemish at the time of bloodletting, because R. Shimon admits that an automatic transgression…but their debate here is that R. Yehuda says that a person should not bloodlet the animal just in case a blemish will be made, and even though one does not intend this, a unintended action is prohibited. And the sages say that one may do the bloodletting, on condition that they know that from this bloodletting no blemish will happen from this. And R. Shimon says, one may bloodlet without worrying what will happen after the bloodletting. And if a blemish emerges from that bloodletting, there is no problem because it is something that is not intended, and the blemish will not necessarily happen because of the bloodletting so that we would compare it to a pesik reisha, an automatic transgression.
- סנהדרין פד:
דְּאִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: בֵּן מַהוּ שֶׁיַּקִּיז דָּם לְאָבִיו? רַב מַתְנָא אָמַר: ״וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ״. רַב דִּימִי בַּר חִינָּנָא אָמַר: מַכֵּה אָדָם וּמַכֵּה בְהֵמָה, מָה מַכֵּה בְהֵמָה לִרְפוּאָה – פָּטוּר, אַף מַכֵּה אָדָם לִרְפוּאָה – פָּטוּר.
As a dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha with regard to whether a son may let blood for his father? Is he liable for wounding his father? Rav Mattana says that it is written: “And you shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18); just as one would want others to heal him when the need arises, one must heal others when the need arises.
Rav Dimi bar Ḥinnana says: This is derived from the juxtaposition between one who strikes a person and one who strikes an animal. Just as one who strikes an animal for medical purposes is exempt from paying restitution, so too, one who strikes a person for medical purposes is exempt from liability.
רַב לָא שָׁבֵיק לִבְרֵיהּ לְמִישְׁקַל לֵיהּ סִילְוָא. מָר בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבִינָא לָא שָׁבֵיק לִבְרֵיהּ לְמִיפְתַּח לֵיהּ כְּוָותָא, דִּילְמָא חָבֵיל וְהָוְיָא לֵיהּ שִׁגְגַת אִיסּוּר.
Rav did not allow his son to extract a thorn from him, due to the concern that his son would unwittingly wound him. Mar, son of Ravina, did not allow his son to pierce his blister, lest he wound him, which would be an unwitting violation of a prohibition.
אִי הָכִי, אַחֵר נָמֵי? אַחֵר – שִׁיגְגַת לָאו, בְּנוֹ – שִׁגְגַת חֶנֶק.
The Gemara challenges this: If so, this should be a concern when another who is not his son treats him as well, as it is prohibited for one Jew to injure another. The Gemara explains: There is a distinction, as when another treats him, the concern is that the individual would be in unwitting violation of a prohibition. By contrast, when his son treats him, the concern is that he would be in unwitting violation of a prohibition punishable by strangulation.
- רש”י שם
שגגת לאו – כשאין מתכוין הוי שגגה באיסור שזדונו לאו בעלמא דקיל:
An accidental transgression – When one does not intend, it is a mistaken negative transgression which would only be a negative commandment which is light.
- חידושי הר”ן סנהדרין פד:
…ושגגת לאו דאמרינן דמותר פי’ בתוספות שהוא דבר שאין מתכוין ומותר באסור לאו כדאמרינן לגבי כלאים מוכרי כסות מוכרין כדרכן אבל באיסור מיתה לא הותר דבר שאין מתכוין. ואע”ג דהותר דבר שאין מתכוין באיסור מיתה דהיינו איסור שבת דאיכא סקילה ה”ט משום דמלאכת מחשבת אסרה תורה…
…Regarding the “unintentional violation of a negative commandment” that is deemed permissible—*Tosafot* explains that this refers to an act performed without specific intent (*davar she-ein mitkaven*). While such unintentional acts are permitted regarding certain negative prohibitions—as seen in the case of *kilayim* (forbidden mixtures), where clothing merchants may sell garments in their usual manner—an unintentional act is *not* permitted in the case of a prohibition punishable by death. Yet, even though an unintentional act *is* permitted regarding a prohibition punishable by death—specifically the Sabbath prohibitions, which carry the penalty of *sekilah* (stoning)—the reason for this is that the Torah forbade only *melechet machashevet* (purposeful, skilled creative labor)…
אלא נראה שהטעם הנכון דשגגת לאו מותר מפני שלא מצינו שענש הכתוב כלל ואפשר דאפילו בדיני שמים אינו מתחייב שאין לך לומר שעשה איסור כשהכניס עצמו לבית הספק שזה לטובה היתה כונתו לרפאות את חבירו. אבל בבנו ודאי אין אומרים כן שאפשר לו לעשות על ידי אחר. והאחר ראוי לו ליכנס לבית הספק יותר ממנו מפני שאיסורו יותר קל אבל בנו אפשר שיטעה בנטילת הקוץ ויחבול באביו ויהיה שגגת חנק וכן בשבת אם היה בנטילת הקוץ שיכול לבוא לידי איסור סקילה אסור ליטלו בשבת ולהמתין עד מחר. וזה כוונת רש”י ז”ל בפירושיו.
Rather, it appears that the correct reason why an inadvertent violation of a lav prohibition is permissible—because we find no scriptural penalty prescribed—and one might not even incur liability in the Heavenly Court; for one cannot say he committed a transgression by placing oneself in a situation of uncertainty, given that one’s intention was good—to heal his fellow. However, regarding his son, this certainly does not apply, as he could have had the task performed by another person. That other person is more suitable than he is to enter a situation of uncertainty, because the prohibition applicable to him is less severe; whereas his son might err while extracting the thorn and injure his father, potentially resulting in an inadvertent violation of the prohibition against strangulation. Similarly, regarding Shabbat: if the extraction of the thorn could lead to a violation punishable by stoning, it is forbidden to extract it on Shabbat; one must wait until the morrow. This is the intent of Rashi (of blessed memory) in his commentaries.
- חידושי הריטב”א מסכת יומא לד:
…ודאי דשבת בנין אב לכל התורה…
- פני יהושע (R. Yaakov Yehoshua Falk, 17-18th c. Europe (Eastern and Western
קס”ד דהא דסבר ר”ש בכל התורה דבר שאינו מתכוין מותר היינו משום דיליף מק”ו משבת דחמירא ואפילו הכי כתיב בה מלאכת מחשבת דמינה ממעטינן מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה ומתעסק כדאיתא בחגיגה (י.) ובכריתות (יט:), א”כ כל שכן דיש למעט מהאי קרא דמלאכת מחשבת דבר שאינו מתכוין דהכי משמע לשון מחשבת היינו מחשבה היינו מתכוין, אלמא דבכוונה תליא מילתא וכדאמרינן להדיא בפסחים (כה:) בלישנא בתרא אליבא דאביי דר”ש אזיל בתר כוונה בין לקולא בין לחומרא ולרבא לקולא דוקא ע”ש…
One might have thought that Rabbi Shimon’s general principle—that an unintended act (*davar she-eino mitkaven*) is permitted—derives from an *a fortiori* inference based on the laws of Shabbat; for Shabbat is a stringent prohibition, yet the Torah specifies “intentional labor” (*melekhet machashevet*) regarding it—a phrase from which we exclude labor not performed for its own sake (*melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah*) and the actions of one who acts inadvertently (*mit’asek*), as stated in *Chagigah* (10a) and *Keritot* (19b). If so, it stands to reason that an unintended act should certainly be excluded based on that same verse regarding “intentional labor”—since the term *machashevet* implies *machashavah* (thought/intent), indicating that the matter hinges on intent. Indeed, it is explicitly stated in *Pesachim* (25b)—in the final version of the discussion, according to Abaye—that Rabbi Shimon follows intent regarding both leniency and stringency, whereas Rava holds that he follows intent only regarding leniency (see there)…
- יבמות ד:
הָנֵי מִצְרָךְ צְרִיכִי, דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״לֹא יַעֲלֶה עָלֶיךָ״, הָוֵה אָמֵינָא: כׇּל דֶּרֶךְ הַעֲלָאָה אֲסַר רַחֲמָנָא, וַאֲפִילּוּ מוֹכְרֵי כְסוּת, כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״לֹא תִלְבַּשׁ שַׁעַטְנֵז״, דּוּמְיָא דִלְבִישָׁה, דְּאִית בֵּיהּ הֲנָאָה.
The Gemara rejects this explanation: Both of these verses are necessary, as, had the Merciful One written only: “Neither shall there come upon you,” I would say that the Merciful One prohibits every manner by which a garment of diverse kinds comes upon you, and this applies even to sellers of clothing. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “You shall not wear diverse kinds,” to teach that the prohibition applies only in cases similar to wearing, which provides benefit and does not simply involve placing the covering upon oneself.
וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״לֹא תִלְבַּשׁ״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: דַּוְקָא לְבִישָׁה, דִּנְפִישׁ הֲנָיָיתַהּ, אֲבָל הַעֲלָאָה — לָא, כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״לֹא יַעֲלֶה עָלֶיךָ״.
And had the Merciful One written only: “You shall not wear,” I would say that this means specifically wearing, which provides significant benefit, both warmth and adornment, but merely placing a garment of diverse kinds upon oneself is not prohibited, even if one is warmed by the clothing. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “Neither shall there come upon you.”
- רש”י יבמות ד:
ואפי’ מוכרי כסות – שאין מתכוונים להנאת חימום:
And even clothing sellers – who do not intend to benefit from warmth.
