Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Sara Averick in loving memory of her mother, Leah Shifrin Averick, לאה בת יהודה לייב חייקל וחיה מאשה. “She infused her many descendants with her love for Torah, Israel and the Jewish people.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Elana and Daniel Storch in honor of their youngest daughter Arianne Yael’s engagement to Brett Aiken and for a for a refuah shleima for Ilana Malka bat Aviva Tamar and Leah Maritza bat Raizel. “We are thrilled to share besorot tovot with our Hadran Family. We pray that the chuppah will take place בשעה טובה ומוצלחת and they should be zoche to build a בית נאמן בישראל.
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Summary
Rav Nachman states in the name of Rav that meat is permitted if someone supervised the slaughter throughout the process. The Gemara questions why supervision is necessary, given the principle that most who engage in slaughtering are experts. It concludes that the case involves someone known to be ignorant of the laws of shechita who successfully severed the first siman (sign); however, this is insufficient to assume the second will be handled correctly, thus requiring supervision to ensure no disqualifying error occurs during the remainder of the slaughter.
Rav Dimi bar Yosef asked Rav Nachman: If an agent is appointed to slaughter an animal or separate teruma (tithes), and the owner subsequently finds the meat slaughtered or the produce tithed, can we assume the agent performed the task and the food is permitted? Rav Nachman distinguished between the two: the meat is permitted, but the produce is not. He explained that we cannot automatically assume the agent performed the task, and must consider that a third party might have intervened. Regarding shechita, this is acceptable because of the presumption that most slaughterers are experts. However, regarding teruma, if a third party separates tithes without the owner’s permission, the act is legally ineffective.
The Gemara suggests that the question of whether we presume most slaughterers are experts is a Tannaitic dispute, but this suggestion is ultimately rejected.
Although a deaf-mute, a minor, or a mentally incompetent person may slaughter under supervision, the Gemara infers from the Mishna’s phrasing that one should not grant them an animal to slaughter ab initio. Furthermore, the fact that their slaughter is valid and the meat is permitted indicates that slaughtering does not require intent (kavana), a position attributed to Rabbi Natan.
Today’s daily daf tools:
Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Sara Averick in loving memory of her mother, Leah Shifrin Averick, לאה בת יהודה לייב חייקל וחיה מאשה. “She infused her many descendants with her love for Torah, Israel and the Jewish people.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Elana and Daniel Storch in honor of their youngest daughter Arianne Yael’s engagement to Brett Aiken and for a for a refuah shleima for Ilana Malka bat Aviva Tamar and Leah Maritza bat Raizel. “We are thrilled to share besorot tovot with our Hadran Family. We pray that the chuppah will take place בשעה טובה ומוצלחת and they should be zoche to build a בית נאמן בישראל.
Chullin 12
פֶּסַח וְקָדָשִׁים מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? אֶלָּא הֵיכָא דְּאֶפְשָׁר – אֶפְשָׁר, הֵיכָא דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר – לָא אֶפְשָׁר. הָכָא נָמֵי, הֵיכָא דְּאֶפְשָׁר – אֶפְשָׁר, הֵיכָא דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר – לָא אֶפְשָׁר.
then with regard to the Paschal offering and sacrificial meat that one is obligated to eat, what is there to say? Rather, according to Rabbi Meir, there is no alternative to saying: Where it is possible to examine the situation it is possible, and the majority is not followed; where it is not possible to examine the situation it is not possible, and the majority is followed. If so, here too, according to the Rabbis, it cannot be proven from the above sources that one follows a non-quantifiable majority ab initio, as perhaps where it is possible to examine the situation it is possible, and where it is not possible to examine the situation it is not possible, and the majority is followed.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַב: רָאָה אֶחָד שֶׁשָּׁחַט, אִם רָאָהוּ מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְאִם לָאו – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
§ Rav Naḥman says that Rav says: In the case of a person who saw one who slaughtered an animal, if the person saw him slaughtering continuously from beginning to end of the act, he is permitted to eat from his slaughter, and if not, he is prohibited from eating from his slaughter.
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּיָדַע דִּגְמִיר, לְמָה לִי רָאָה? וְאִי דְּיָדַע דְּלָא גְּמִיר, פְּשִׁיטָא!
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If it is a case where the onlooker knows that he is knowledgeable in the halakhot of slaughter, why do I require that the onlooker saw the slaughter? Even if he did not see him slaughter, the onlooker may rely on his slaughter. And if the onlooker knows that he is not knowledgeable in the halakhot of slaughter, it is obvious that only if the person saw him slaughtering from beginning to end he is permitted to eat from his slaughter.
וְאֶלָּא, דְּלָא יְדַע אִי גְּמִיר אִי לָא גְּמִיר, לֵימָא: רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן.
Rather, perhaps it is a case where the onlooker does not know whether he is knowledgeable or whether he is not knowledgeable. But if that is the case, let us say: The majority of those associated with slaughter are experts in the halakhot of slaughter, and one may rely on his slaughter.
מִי לָא תַּנְיָא: הֲרֵי שֶׁמָּצָא תַּרְנְגוֹלֶת שְׁחוּטָה בַּשּׁוּק, אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ ״צֵא שְׁחוֹט״, וְהָלַךְ וּמָצָא שָׁחוּט – חֶזְקָתוֹ שָׁחוּט.
Isn’t it taught in a baraita: In a case where one found a slaughtered chicken in the marketplace, or where one said to his agent: Go out and slaughter a chicken, and he went and found the chicken slaughtered and he does not know who slaughtered it, its presumptive status is that it was slaughtered properly.
אַלְמָא אָמְרִינַן: רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן. הָכָא נָמֵי לֵימָא: רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן!
Apparently, we say: The majority of those associated with slaughter are experts. Here too, in a case where it is unknown whether he is knowledgeable, let us say: The majority of those associated with slaughter are experts.
לְעוֹלָם דְּיָדַע דְּלָא גְּמִיר, וּכְגוֹן דִּשְׁחַט קַמַּן חַד סִימָן שַׁפִּיר. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: מִדְּהַאי שַׁפִּיר הָךְ נָמֵי שַׁפִּיר, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: הַאי אִתְרְמוֹיֵי אִיתְרְמִי לֵיהּ, אִידַּךְ – שֶׁמָּא שָׁהָה שֶׁמָּא דָּרַס.
The Gemara answers: Actually, the reference is to a case where the onlooker knows that the one slaughtering is not knowledgeable in the halakhot of slaughter, and where he slaughtered one siman before us properly. Lest you say: From the fact that this siman was slaughtered properly, that siman was also slaughtered properly; therefore, Rav teaches us that this is not so. As, perhaps this siman happened to be slaughtered properly for him, but with regard to the other siman, perhaps he interrupted the slaughter or perhaps he pressed the knife, invalidating the slaughter.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב דִּימִי בַּר יוֹסֵף מֵרַב נַחְמָן: הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ ״צֵא וּשְׁחוֹט״, וְהָלַךְ וּמָצָא שָׁחוּט, מַהוּ? אָמַר לוֹ: חֶזְקָתוֹ שָׁחוּט. הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ ״צֵא וּתְרוֹם״, וְהָלַךְ וּמָצָא תָּרוּם, מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵין חֶזְקָתוֹ תָּרוּם.
Rav Dimi bar Yosef raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: With regard to one who says to his agent: Go out and slaughter a chicken, and he went and found the chicken slaughtered, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him: Its presumptive status is that it was slaughtered properly. And he raised another dilemma: With regard to one who says to his agent: Go out and separate teruma for me, and he went and found that teruma was separated from his produce, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him: Its presumptive status is not that teruma was separated.
מָה נַפְשָׁךְ, אִי חֲזָקָה שָׁלִיחַ עוֹשֶׂה שְׁלִיחוּתוֹ – אֲפִילּוּ תְּרוּמָה נָמֵי, וְאִי אֵין חֲזָקָה שָׁלִיחַ עוֹשֶׂה שְׁלִיחוּתוֹ – אֲפִילּוּ שְׁחִיטָה נָמֵי לָא.
Rav Dimi bar Yosef challenged: Whichever way you look at it, your ruling is problematic. If there is a presumption that an agent performs his assigned agency, that should be the case even with regard to teruma; and if there is no presumption that an agent performs his assigned agency, there should be no such presumption even with regard to slaughter.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְכִי תֵּיכוּל עֲלַהּ כּוֹרָא דְמִלְחָא, לְעוֹלָם אֵין חֲזָקָה שָׁלִיחַ עוֹשֶׂה שְׁלִיחוּתוֹ, וּשְׁחִיטָה – אִי נָמֵי דִּילְמָא אִינָשׁ אַחֲרִינָא שְׁמַע וַאֲזַל שְׁחַט – רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן. תְּרוּמָה – דִּילְמָא אִינָשׁ אַחֲרִינָא שְׁמַע וַאֲזַל תְּרַם, הָוֵה לֵיהּ תּוֹרֵם שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת, וְהַתּוֹרֵם שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת – אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה.
Rav Naḥman said to Rav Dimi in jest: After you eat a kor of salt over it, and analyze the matter at length, you will be able to understand the difference. Actually, there is no presumption that an agent performs his assigned agency, and in the case of slaughter, even if perhaps another person heard him instruct the agent and that person went and slaughtered the chicken, the slaughter would be valid, because the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts. By contrast, in the case of teruma, if perhaps another person heard him instruct the agent and then went and separated his teruma, he becomes one who designates teruma without the knowledge of the owner of the produce; and with regard to one who designates teruma without the knowledge of the owner of the produce, his teruma is not teruma.
לֵימָא: רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן תַּנָּאֵי הִיא? דְּתַנְיָא: הֲרֵי שֶׁאָבְדוּ לוֹ גְּדָיָיו וְתַרְנְגוֹלָיו וְהָלַךְ וּמְצָאָן שְׁחוּטִים – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹסֵר, רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי מַתִּיר. אָמַר רַבִּי: נִרְאִין דְּבָרִים שֶׁל רַבִּי יְהוּדָה שֶׁמְּצָאָן בְּאַשְׁפָּה, וְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי שֶׁמְּצָאָן בְּבַיִת.
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the statement: The majority of those associated with slaughter are experts, is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: In a case where one’s young goats and roosters were lost, and the owner went and found them slaughtered, Rabbi Yehuda deems the meat forbidden, and Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, deems it permitted. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears correct in a case where the owner found the slaughtered animals in a scrap heap, as the concern is that they were thrown away because the slaughter was not valid. And the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, appears correct in a case where he found them in the house.
מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: אָמְרִינַן רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן, וּמָר סָבַר: לָא אָמְרִינַן רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן?
What, is it not with regard to this matter that they disagree, that one Sage, Rabbi Ḥanina, holds: We say that the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts, and one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds: We do not say that the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts?
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן, וּבְבַיִת – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דִּשְׁרֵי, בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּשּׁוּק – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאָסוּר, כִּי פְּלִיגִי בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת: מָר סָבַר אָדָם עָשׂוּי לְהַטִּיל נִבְלָתוֹ בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת, וּמַר סָבַר אֵין אָדָם עָשׂוּי לְהַטִּיל נִבְלָתוֹ בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: No, the fact is that everyone agrees that the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts, and if he found the slaughtered goats or roosters in the house, everyone agrees that it is permitted to eat the meat. If he found them in a scrap heap that is in the marketplace, everyone agrees that it is prohibited to eat the meat. When they disagree is in a case where he found them in a scrap heap that is in the house. One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds: A person is prone to cast his unslaughtered animal carcass onto a scrap heap that is in the house. And one Sage, Rabbi Ḥanina, holds: A person is not prone to cast his unslaughtered animal carcass onto a scrap heap that is in the house.
אָמַר מָר, אָמַר רַבִּי: נִרְאִין דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה שֶׁמְּצָאָן בְּאַשְׁפָּה. מַאי אַשְׁפָּה? אִילֵּימָא אַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבְּשׁוּק – הָא אָמְרַתְּ דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאָסוּר! אֶלָּא לָאו פְּשִׁיטָא בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת.
The Master said in the baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears correct in a case where he found them in the scrap heap. The Gemara asks: What is the term scrap heap referring to in this context? If we say the reference is to a scrap heap in the marketplace, didn’t you say that everyone agrees that it is prohibited, and it is not merely the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? Rather, it is obvious that he found it on a scrap heap that is in the house, and it is in that case that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
אֵימָא סֵיפָא, וְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי שֶׁמְּצָאָן בְּבַיִת. מַאי בַּיִת? אִילֵּימָא בַּיִת מַמָּשׁ – הָאָמְרַתְּ דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דִּשְׁרֵי! אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת. קַשְׁיָא דְּרַבִּי אַדְּרַבִּי!
Say the latter clause of the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: And the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, appears correct in a case where he found them in the house. What is the word house referring to in this context? If we say the reference is to an actual house, didn’t you say that everyone agrees that it is permitted? Rather, it is obvious that he found it on a scrap heap that is in the house. If so, it is difficult, as there is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, where he rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda to prohibit the meat in a case where it is found in a scrap heap in the house, and another statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, where he rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, to permit the meat in that case.
הָכִי קָאָמַר: נִרְאִין דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּשּׁוּק, שֶׁאַף רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי לֹא נֶחְלַק עָלָיו אֶלָּא בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת, אֲבָל בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּשּׁוּק מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ, וְנִרְאִין כּוּ׳.
The Gemara explains: This is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying: The statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears correct to Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, in a case where one found them in a scrap heap that is in a marketplace, as Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda only in a case where one found them in a scrap heap that is in the house. But in a case where he found them in a scrap heap that is in a marketplace he concedes to Rabbi Yehuda. And the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, appears correct to Rabbi Yehuda in a case where he found them in the house, as he concedes to Rabbi Ḥanina in that case.
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, שֶׁמָּא יְקַלְקְלוּ אֶת שְׁחִיטָתָן. ״שֶׁמָּא קִלְקְלוּ״ לָא קָתָנֵי, אֶלָּא ״שֶׁמָּא יְקַלְקְלוּ״. אָמַר רָבָא: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת אֵין מוֹסְרִין לָהֶן חוּלִּין לְכַתְּחִלָּה.
§ The mishna stated: Everyone slaughters an animal, i.e., can perform halakhically valid slaughter, and their slaughter is valid, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, lest they ruin their slaughter. The Gemara infers: The tanna does not teach: Due to the concern that they ruined their slaughter, in the past tense; rather, he teaches: Lest they ruin their slaughter, in the future. Rava says: That is to say that one does not give them non-sacred animals for slaughter ab initio, even with the supervision of others.
וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ וַאֲחֵרִים רוֹאִים אוֹתָם, שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה. מַאן תְּנָא דְּלָא בָּעֵינַן כַּוָּונָה לִשְׁחִיטָה?
The mishna continues: And for all of them, when they slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, including even a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who lack competence and whose intent is not halakhically effective. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that we do not require intent for slaughter?
אָמַר רָבָא: רַבִּי נָתָן הִיא, דְּתָנֵי אוֹשַׁעְיָא זְעֵירָא דְּמִן חַבְרַיָּא: זָרַק סַכִּין לְנוֹעֳצָהּ בַּכּוֹתֶל, וְהָלְכָה וְשָׁחֲטָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ – רַבִּי נָתָן מַכְשִׁיר, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹסְלִין. הוּא תָּנֵי לַהּ, וְהוּא אָמַר לַהּ: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי נָתָן.
Rava said: It is Rabbi Natan, as Oshaya, the youngest of the company of Sages, taught a baraita, stating: If one threw a knife to embed it in the wall, and in the course of its flight the knife went and slaughtered an animal in its proper manner, Rabbi Natan deems the slaughter valid, and the Rabbis deem the slaughter not valid. Oshaya teaches the baraita and he states about it: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan that there is no need for intent to perform a valid act of slaughter.
וְהָא בָּעֵינַן מוֹלִיךְ וּמֵבִיא? שֶׁהָלְכָה וּבָאָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ.
The Gemara asks: How could the slaughter in the baraita be valid? But don’t we require that the slaughterer move the knife back and forth on the throat of the animal? When one throws a knife, it goes in one direction and does not return. The Gemara answers: The case in the baraita is one where the knife went and cut the animal’s throat, caromed off the wall and came back to cut the throat again in its proper manner.
אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא, בָּעֵי רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: קָטָן יֵשׁ לוֹ מַחְשָׁבָה, אוֹ אֵין לוֹ מַחְשָׁבָה?
§ Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan raises a dilemma: In matters that require thought and intent, does a minor have halakhically effective thought, or does he not have halakhically effective thought?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אַמֵּי: וְתִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ מַעֲשֶׂה? מַאי שְׁנָא מַעֲשֶׂה דְּלָא קָא מִבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ – דִּתְנַן: ״יֵשׁ לָהֶן מַעֲשֶׂה״? מַחְשָׁבָה נָמֵי לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ, דִּתְנַן: ״אֵין לָהֶן מַחְשָׁבָה״!
Rabbi Ami said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: And let Rabbi Yoḥanan raise this dilemma with regard to the action of a minor, whether the action of a minor that indicates intent is effective. What is different about the action of a minor that Rabbi Yoḥanan does not raise a dilemma? Is it due to the fact that we learned in a mishna (Kelim 17:15): A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor have the capacity to perform an action that is halakhically effective? With regard to thought as well let him not raise this dilemma, as we learned in the same mishna: They do not have the capacity for halakhically effective thought.
דִּתְנַן: הָאַלּוֹן, וְהָרִמּוֹן, וְהָאֱגוֹז שֶׁחֲקָקוּם תִּינוֹקוֹת לָמוֹד בָּהֶן עָפָר, אוֹ שֶׁהִתְקִינוּם לְכַף מֹאזְנַיִם – טְמֵאִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן מַעֲשֶׂה,
As we learned in that mishna: With regard to an acorn, a pomegranate, or a nut, which minors hollowed in order to measure dirt with them or that they affixed to a scale, the halakhic status of those shells is that of vessels, and they are susceptible to ritual impurity. By contrast, if the minors merely thought to use the shells for measuring or weighing, unlike adults, they do not thereby render those shells into vessels. The reason for this distinction is due to the fact that they have the capacity to perform an action,
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Chullin 12
פֶּסַח וְקָדָשִׁים מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? אֶלָּא הֵיכָא דְּאֶפְשָׁר – אֶפְשָׁר, הֵיכָא דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר – לָא אֶפְשָׁר. הָכָא נָמֵי, הֵיכָא דְּאֶפְשָׁר – אֶפְשָׁר, הֵיכָא דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר – לָא אֶפְשָׁר.
then with regard to the Paschal offering and sacrificial meat that one is obligated to eat, what is there to say? Rather, according to Rabbi Meir, there is no alternative to saying: Where it is possible to examine the situation it is possible, and the majority is not followed; where it is not possible to examine the situation it is not possible, and the majority is followed. If so, here too, according to the Rabbis, it cannot be proven from the above sources that one follows a non-quantifiable majority ab initio, as perhaps where it is possible to examine the situation it is possible, and where it is not possible to examine the situation it is not possible, and the majority is followed.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַב: רָאָה אֶחָד שֶׁשָּׁחַט, אִם רָאָהוּ מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְאִם לָאו – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
§ Rav Naḥman says that Rav says: In the case of a person who saw one who slaughtered an animal, if the person saw him slaughtering continuously from beginning to end of the act, he is permitted to eat from his slaughter, and if not, he is prohibited from eating from his slaughter.
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּיָדַע דִּגְמִיר, לְמָה לִי רָאָה? וְאִי דְּיָדַע דְּלָא גְּמִיר, פְּשִׁיטָא!
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If it is a case where the onlooker knows that he is knowledgeable in the halakhot of slaughter, why do I require that the onlooker saw the slaughter? Even if he did not see him slaughter, the onlooker may rely on his slaughter. And if the onlooker knows that he is not knowledgeable in the halakhot of slaughter, it is obvious that only if the person saw him slaughtering from beginning to end he is permitted to eat from his slaughter.
וְאֶלָּא, דְּלָא יְדַע אִי גְּמִיר אִי לָא גְּמִיר, לֵימָא: רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן.
Rather, perhaps it is a case where the onlooker does not know whether he is knowledgeable or whether he is not knowledgeable. But if that is the case, let us say: The majority of those associated with slaughter are experts in the halakhot of slaughter, and one may rely on his slaughter.
מִי לָא תַּנְיָא: הֲרֵי שֶׁמָּצָא תַּרְנְגוֹלֶת שְׁחוּטָה בַּשּׁוּק, אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ ״צֵא שְׁחוֹט״, וְהָלַךְ וּמָצָא שָׁחוּט – חֶזְקָתוֹ שָׁחוּט.
Isn’t it taught in a baraita: In a case where one found a slaughtered chicken in the marketplace, or where one said to his agent: Go out and slaughter a chicken, and he went and found the chicken slaughtered and he does not know who slaughtered it, its presumptive status is that it was slaughtered properly.
אַלְמָא אָמְרִינַן: רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן. הָכָא נָמֵי לֵימָא: רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן!
Apparently, we say: The majority of those associated with slaughter are experts. Here too, in a case where it is unknown whether he is knowledgeable, let us say: The majority of those associated with slaughter are experts.
לְעוֹלָם דְּיָדַע דְּלָא גְּמִיר, וּכְגוֹן דִּשְׁחַט קַמַּן חַד סִימָן שַׁפִּיר. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: מִדְּהַאי שַׁפִּיר הָךְ נָמֵי שַׁפִּיר, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: הַאי אִתְרְמוֹיֵי אִיתְרְמִי לֵיהּ, אִידַּךְ – שֶׁמָּא שָׁהָה שֶׁמָּא דָּרַס.
The Gemara answers: Actually, the reference is to a case where the onlooker knows that the one slaughtering is not knowledgeable in the halakhot of slaughter, and where he slaughtered one siman before us properly. Lest you say: From the fact that this siman was slaughtered properly, that siman was also slaughtered properly; therefore, Rav teaches us that this is not so. As, perhaps this siman happened to be slaughtered properly for him, but with regard to the other siman, perhaps he interrupted the slaughter or perhaps he pressed the knife, invalidating the slaughter.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב דִּימִי בַּר יוֹסֵף מֵרַב נַחְמָן: הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ ״צֵא וּשְׁחוֹט״, וְהָלַךְ וּמָצָא שָׁחוּט, מַהוּ? אָמַר לוֹ: חֶזְקָתוֹ שָׁחוּט. הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ ״צֵא וּתְרוֹם״, וְהָלַךְ וּמָצָא תָּרוּם, מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵין חֶזְקָתוֹ תָּרוּם.
Rav Dimi bar Yosef raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: With regard to one who says to his agent: Go out and slaughter a chicken, and he went and found the chicken slaughtered, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him: Its presumptive status is that it was slaughtered properly. And he raised another dilemma: With regard to one who says to his agent: Go out and separate teruma for me, and he went and found that teruma was separated from his produce, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him: Its presumptive status is not that teruma was separated.
מָה נַפְשָׁךְ, אִי חֲזָקָה שָׁלִיחַ עוֹשֶׂה שְׁלִיחוּתוֹ – אֲפִילּוּ תְּרוּמָה נָמֵי, וְאִי אֵין חֲזָקָה שָׁלִיחַ עוֹשֶׂה שְׁלִיחוּתוֹ – אֲפִילּוּ שְׁחִיטָה נָמֵי לָא.
Rav Dimi bar Yosef challenged: Whichever way you look at it, your ruling is problematic. If there is a presumption that an agent performs his assigned agency, that should be the case even with regard to teruma; and if there is no presumption that an agent performs his assigned agency, there should be no such presumption even with regard to slaughter.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְכִי תֵּיכוּל עֲלַהּ כּוֹרָא דְמִלְחָא, לְעוֹלָם אֵין חֲזָקָה שָׁלִיחַ עוֹשֶׂה שְׁלִיחוּתוֹ, וּשְׁחִיטָה – אִי נָמֵי דִּילְמָא אִינָשׁ אַחֲרִינָא שְׁמַע וַאֲזַל שְׁחַט – רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן. תְּרוּמָה – דִּילְמָא אִינָשׁ אַחֲרִינָא שְׁמַע וַאֲזַל תְּרַם, הָוֵה לֵיהּ תּוֹרֵם שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת, וְהַתּוֹרֵם שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת – אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה.
Rav Naḥman said to Rav Dimi in jest: After you eat a kor of salt over it, and analyze the matter at length, you will be able to understand the difference. Actually, there is no presumption that an agent performs his assigned agency, and in the case of slaughter, even if perhaps another person heard him instruct the agent and that person went and slaughtered the chicken, the slaughter would be valid, because the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts. By contrast, in the case of teruma, if perhaps another person heard him instruct the agent and then went and separated his teruma, he becomes one who designates teruma without the knowledge of the owner of the produce; and with regard to one who designates teruma without the knowledge of the owner of the produce, his teruma is not teruma.
לֵימָא: רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן תַּנָּאֵי הִיא? דְּתַנְיָא: הֲרֵי שֶׁאָבְדוּ לוֹ גְּדָיָיו וְתַרְנְגוֹלָיו וְהָלַךְ וּמְצָאָן שְׁחוּטִים – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹסֵר, רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי מַתִּיר. אָמַר רַבִּי: נִרְאִין דְּבָרִים שֶׁל רַבִּי יְהוּדָה שֶׁמְּצָאָן בְּאַשְׁפָּה, וְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי שֶׁמְּצָאָן בְּבַיִת.
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the statement: The majority of those associated with slaughter are experts, is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: In a case where one’s young goats and roosters were lost, and the owner went and found them slaughtered, Rabbi Yehuda deems the meat forbidden, and Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, deems it permitted. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears correct in a case where the owner found the slaughtered animals in a scrap heap, as the concern is that they were thrown away because the slaughter was not valid. And the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, appears correct in a case where he found them in the house.
מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: אָמְרִינַן רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן, וּמָר סָבַר: לָא אָמְרִינַן רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן?
What, is it not with regard to this matter that they disagree, that one Sage, Rabbi Ḥanina, holds: We say that the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts, and one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds: We do not say that the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts?
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן, וּבְבַיִת – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דִּשְׁרֵי, בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּשּׁוּק – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאָסוּר, כִּי פְּלִיגִי בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת: מָר סָבַר אָדָם עָשׂוּי לְהַטִּיל נִבְלָתוֹ בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת, וּמַר סָבַר אֵין אָדָם עָשׂוּי לְהַטִּיל נִבְלָתוֹ בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: No, the fact is that everyone agrees that the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts, and if he found the slaughtered goats or roosters in the house, everyone agrees that it is permitted to eat the meat. If he found them in a scrap heap that is in the marketplace, everyone agrees that it is prohibited to eat the meat. When they disagree is in a case where he found them in a scrap heap that is in the house. One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds: A person is prone to cast his unslaughtered animal carcass onto a scrap heap that is in the house. And one Sage, Rabbi Ḥanina, holds: A person is not prone to cast his unslaughtered animal carcass onto a scrap heap that is in the house.
אָמַר מָר, אָמַר רַבִּי: נִרְאִין דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה שֶׁמְּצָאָן בְּאַשְׁפָּה. מַאי אַשְׁפָּה? אִילֵּימָא אַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבְּשׁוּק – הָא אָמְרַתְּ דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאָסוּר! אֶלָּא לָאו פְּשִׁיטָא בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת.
The Master said in the baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears correct in a case where he found them in the scrap heap. The Gemara asks: What is the term scrap heap referring to in this context? If we say the reference is to a scrap heap in the marketplace, didn’t you say that everyone agrees that it is prohibited, and it is not merely the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? Rather, it is obvious that he found it on a scrap heap that is in the house, and it is in that case that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
אֵימָא סֵיפָא, וְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי שֶׁמְּצָאָן בְּבַיִת. מַאי בַּיִת? אִילֵּימָא בַּיִת מַמָּשׁ – הָאָמְרַתְּ דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דִּשְׁרֵי! אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת. קַשְׁיָא דְּרַבִּי אַדְּרַבִּי!
Say the latter clause of the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: And the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, appears correct in a case where he found them in the house. What is the word house referring to in this context? If we say the reference is to an actual house, didn’t you say that everyone agrees that it is permitted? Rather, it is obvious that he found it on a scrap heap that is in the house. If so, it is difficult, as there is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, where he rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda to prohibit the meat in a case where it is found in a scrap heap in the house, and another statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, where he rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, to permit the meat in that case.
הָכִי קָאָמַר: נִרְאִין דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּשּׁוּק, שֶׁאַף רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי לֹא נֶחְלַק עָלָיו אֶלָּא בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת, אֲבָל בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּשּׁוּק מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ, וְנִרְאִין כּוּ׳.
The Gemara explains: This is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying: The statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears correct to Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, in a case where one found them in a scrap heap that is in a marketplace, as Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda only in a case where one found them in a scrap heap that is in the house. But in a case where he found them in a scrap heap that is in a marketplace he concedes to Rabbi Yehuda. And the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, appears correct to Rabbi Yehuda in a case where he found them in the house, as he concedes to Rabbi Ḥanina in that case.
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, שֶׁמָּא יְקַלְקְלוּ אֶת שְׁחִיטָתָן. ״שֶׁמָּא קִלְקְלוּ״ לָא קָתָנֵי, אֶלָּא ״שֶׁמָּא יְקַלְקְלוּ״. אָמַר רָבָא: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת אֵין מוֹסְרִין לָהֶן חוּלִּין לְכַתְּחִלָּה.
§ The mishna stated: Everyone slaughters an animal, i.e., can perform halakhically valid slaughter, and their slaughter is valid, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, lest they ruin their slaughter. The Gemara infers: The tanna does not teach: Due to the concern that they ruined their slaughter, in the past tense; rather, he teaches: Lest they ruin their slaughter, in the future. Rava says: That is to say that one does not give them non-sacred animals for slaughter ab initio, even with the supervision of others.
וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ וַאֲחֵרִים רוֹאִים אוֹתָם, שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה. מַאן תְּנָא דְּלָא בָּעֵינַן כַּוָּונָה לִשְׁחִיטָה?
The mishna continues: And for all of them, when they slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, including even a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who lack competence and whose intent is not halakhically effective. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that we do not require intent for slaughter?
אָמַר רָבָא: רַבִּי נָתָן הִיא, דְּתָנֵי אוֹשַׁעְיָא זְעֵירָא דְּמִן חַבְרַיָּא: זָרַק סַכִּין לְנוֹעֳצָהּ בַּכּוֹתֶל, וְהָלְכָה וְשָׁחֲטָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ – רַבִּי נָתָן מַכְשִׁיר, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹסְלִין. הוּא תָּנֵי לַהּ, וְהוּא אָמַר לַהּ: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי נָתָן.
Rava said: It is Rabbi Natan, as Oshaya, the youngest of the company of Sages, taught a baraita, stating: If one threw a knife to embed it in the wall, and in the course of its flight the knife went and slaughtered an animal in its proper manner, Rabbi Natan deems the slaughter valid, and the Rabbis deem the slaughter not valid. Oshaya teaches the baraita and he states about it: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan that there is no need for intent to perform a valid act of slaughter.
וְהָא בָּעֵינַן מוֹלִיךְ וּמֵבִיא? שֶׁהָלְכָה וּבָאָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ.
The Gemara asks: How could the slaughter in the baraita be valid? But don’t we require that the slaughterer move the knife back and forth on the throat of the animal? When one throws a knife, it goes in one direction and does not return. The Gemara answers: The case in the baraita is one where the knife went and cut the animal’s throat, caromed off the wall and came back to cut the throat again in its proper manner.
אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא, בָּעֵי רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: קָטָן יֵשׁ לוֹ מַחְשָׁבָה, אוֹ אֵין לוֹ מַחְשָׁבָה?
§ Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan raises a dilemma: In matters that require thought and intent, does a minor have halakhically effective thought, or does he not have halakhically effective thought?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אַמֵּי: וְתִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ מַעֲשֶׂה? מַאי שְׁנָא מַעֲשֶׂה דְּלָא קָא מִבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ – דִּתְנַן: ״יֵשׁ לָהֶן מַעֲשֶׂה״? מַחְשָׁבָה נָמֵי לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ, דִּתְנַן: ״אֵין לָהֶן מַחְשָׁבָה״!
Rabbi Ami said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: And let Rabbi Yoḥanan raise this dilemma with regard to the action of a minor, whether the action of a minor that indicates intent is effective. What is different about the action of a minor that Rabbi Yoḥanan does not raise a dilemma? Is it due to the fact that we learned in a mishna (Kelim 17:15): A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor have the capacity to perform an action that is halakhically effective? With regard to thought as well let him not raise this dilemma, as we learned in the same mishna: They do not have the capacity for halakhically effective thought.
דִּתְנַן: הָאַלּוֹן, וְהָרִמּוֹן, וְהָאֱגוֹז שֶׁחֲקָקוּם תִּינוֹקוֹת לָמוֹד בָּהֶן עָפָר, אוֹ שֶׁהִתְקִינוּם לְכַף מֹאזְנַיִם – טְמֵאִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן מַעֲשֶׂה,
As we learned in that mishna: With regard to an acorn, a pomegranate, or a nut, which minors hollowed in order to measure dirt with them or that they affixed to a scale, the halakhic status of those shells is that of vessels, and they are susceptible to ritual impurity. By contrast, if the minors merely thought to use the shells for measuring or weighing, unlike adults, they do not thereby render those shells into vessels. The reason for this distinction is due to the fact that they have the capacity to perform an action,
