What is the status of an item that was detached and then became attached to the ground – is it treated like an attached or detached item – as regards idol worship, susceptibility to impurities, and shchita? What are 5 things one cannot do with a stalk of a reed? What types of things can one not use for wiping in the bathroom? Why? The debate between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva is brought regarding basar taava – and what the laws were regarding meat in the desert.
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Chullin 16
קַשְׁיָין אַהֲדָדֵי! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ שָׁאנֵי בֵּין מְחוּבָּר מֵעִיקָּרוֹ לְתָלוּשׁ וּלְבַסּוֹף חִבְּרוֹ, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
Ostensibly, the two clauses of the baraita are difficult, as they contradict each other, since the first clause states that slaughter with a blade that is attached is valid and the latter clause states that slaughter is not valid. Rather, must one not conclude from it that there is a difference between a case where the blade was attached from the outset and a case where the blade was detached and ultimately he reattached it? The Gemara affirms: Indeed, learn from it.
אָמַר מָר: הַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּמוּכְנִי שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה, וְהָתַנְיָא: שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה! לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא בְּסַרְנָא דְּפַחְרָא, הָא בְּסַרְנָא דְּמַיָּא.
§ The Master said: In the case of one who slaughters with a mechanism of a wheel with a knife attached to it, his slaughter is valid. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that his slaughter is not valid? The Gemara answers: This contradiction is not difficult. This baraita, which rules that the slaughter is valid, is in a case where the knife was attached to a potter’s wheel, whose movement is generated by the potter pressing on a pedal. Since the slaughter was performed by the force of the person’s actions, the slaughter is valid. That baraita, which rules that the slaughter is not valid, is in a case where the knife was attached to a waterwheel. Since the slaughter was not performed by the force of the person’s actions, the slaughter is not valid.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָא וְהָא בְּסַרְנָא דְּמַיָּא, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא בְּכֹחַ רִאשׁוֹן, הָא בְּכֹחַ שֵׁנִי.
And if you wish, say instead: The rulings of both this baraita and that baraita are in a case where the knife was attached to a waterwheel, and the contradiction is not difficult. This baraita, which rules that the slaughter is valid, is in a case where the movement of the slaughter was generated by primary force, as the person releases the water that turns the wheel, and on that initial turn of the wheel the knife slaughters the animal. That baraita, which rules that the slaughter is not valid, is in a case where the slaughter was generated by secondary force, as the knife slaughters the animal on the second turn of the wheel.
וְכִי הָא דְּאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הַאי מַאן דְּכַפְתֵיהּ לְחַבְרֵיהּ וְאַשְׁקֵיל עֲלֵיהּ בִּידְקָא דְּמַיָּא וּמִית – חַיָּיב. מַאי טַעְמָא? גִּירֵי דִּידֵיהּ הוּא דְּאַהֲנִי בֵּיהּ. וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי – בְּכֹחַ רִאשׁוֹן, אֲבָל בְּכֹחַ שֵׁנִי – גְּרָמָא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא.
And this is like that which Rav Pappa says: In the case of a certain person who bound another and diverted a flow [bidka] of water upon him and he died, the one who diverted the water is liable for his murder. What is the reason? It is because those were his arrows that were effective in his murder. And this matter applies in a case where he killed the other person by primary force, as the person was proximate to him and was directly drowned by the water. But if the person was further away and was killed by secondary force after the water flowed on its own, it is not by his direct action; rather, it is merely an indirect action, and he is exempt.
יָתֵיב רַב אֲחוֹרֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא, וְרַבִּי חִיָּיא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי, וְיָתֵיב רַבִּי וְקָאָמַר: מִנַּיִן לִשְׁחִיטָה שֶׁהִיא בְּתָלוּשׁ? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַיִּקַּח אֶת הַמַּאֲכֶלֶת לִשְׁחֹט״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב לְרַבִּי חִיָּיא: מַאי קָאָמַר? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וָי״ו דִּכְתִיב אַאוּפְתָּא קָאָמַר. וְהָא קְרָא קָאָמַר! קְרָא זְרִיזוּתֵיהּ דְּאַבְרָהָם קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
§ Rav sat behind Rabbi Ḥiyya, and Rabbi Ḥiyya sat before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi sat and said: From where is it derived that slaughter is performed specifically with a blade that is detached? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And Abraham stretched forth his hand and took the knife to slaughter his son” (Genesis 22:10). Rav said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: What is he saying? Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rav: He is saying an incorrect reason, comparable to the letter vav that is written on the rough surface of a tree trunk [a’ufta]. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi say a verse as proof for his statement? The Gemara answers: The verse teaches us the diligence of Abraham, who had a knife prepared to slaughter Isaac. It does not teach any halakha concerning ritual slaughter.
אָמַר רָבָא: פְּשִׁיטָא לִי, תָּלוּשׁ וּלְבַסּוֹף חִבְּרוֹ לְעִנְיַן עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה הָוֵי תָּלוּשׁ, דְּאָמַר מָר: הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה לְבַיִת שֶׁלּוֹ אֲסָרוֹ, וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ הָוֵי מְחוּבָּר – ״אֱלֹהֵיהֶם עַל הֶהָרִים״ וְלֹא הֶהָרִים אֱלֹהֵיהֶם.
§ Apropos the issue of slaughter with a detached blade, Rava said: It is obvious to me that concerning an item that was detached and ultimately one attached it, with regard to the matter of idol worship its halakhic status is that of a detached item, as the Master says: One who bows to his house has rendered it forbidden as an object of idol worship. And if it enters your mind to say that its halakhic status is that of an attached item, it is written with regard to idolatry: “Their gods, upon the high mountains” (Deuteronomy 12:2), from which it is derived: But the mountains are not their gods, as items attached to the ground are never rendered forbidden as objects of idol worship. The halakhic status of a house built from stones that were detached is that of a detached item.
לְעִנְיַן הֶכְשֵׁר זְרָעִים תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דִּתְנַן: הַכּוֹפֶה קְעָרָה עַל הַכּוֹתֶל בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁתּוּדַח – הֲרֵי זֶה בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״, בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁלֹּא יִלְקֶה הַכּוֹתֶל – אֵינוֹ בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״.
With regard to the matter of rendering seeds susceptible to ritual impurity, there is a dispute between tanna’im, as we learned in a mishna (Makhshirin 4:3): In the case of one who places a bowl on the wall while it is raining so that the bowl will be rinsed with the rainwater, if the water from the bowl then falls onto produce, that is under the rubric of the verse: “But when water is placed upon the seed” (Leviticus 11:38). The water has the halakhic status of a liquid that he poured of his own volition on fruit and seeds. Consequently, it renders them susceptible to ritual impurity. But if he placed the bowl there so that the wall will not be damaged, it is not under the rubric of the verse “but when water is placed upon the seed.” Since he had no intent to use the water, it is not considered to have entered the bowl of his own volition, and it does not render produce susceptible to impurity.
הָא גּוּפַהּ קַשְׁיָא: אָמְרַתְּ, בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁתּוּדַח – הֲרֵי זֶה בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״, הָא בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיּוּדַח הַכּוֹתֶל – אֵין זֶה בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״.
This mishna itself is difficult, as the inferences from the first clause and the latter clause are contradictory. In the first clause you said: In the case of one who places a bowl on the wall so that the bowl will be rinsed with the rainwater, that is under the rubric of the verse “but when water is placed upon the seed,” and the water renders produce susceptible to impurity. By inference, if he placed the bowl so that the wall will be rinsed by means of the bowl, that is not under the rubric of the verse “but when water is placed upon the seed.” That water would not render produce susceptible to impurity, because the intent was for the water to rinse the wall, which is an item attached to the ground.
וַהֲדַר תָּנֵי: בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁלֹּא יִלְקֶה הַכּוֹתֶל – אֵינוֹ בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״, הָא בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיּוּדַח הַכּוֹתֶל – הֲרֵי זֶה בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״.
And then the mishna teaches in the latter clause: If he placed the bowl so that the wall will not be damaged, it is not under the rubric of the verse: “But when water is placed upon the seed.” By inference, if he placed the bowl so that the wall will be rinsed, that is under the rubric of the verse: “But when water is placed upon the seed,” as a wall has the status of a detached item, since it was built from stones that were detached.
אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: תִּבְרַאּ, מִי שֶׁשָּׁנָה זוֹ לֹא שָׁנָה זוֹ. רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: כּוּלָּהּ חַד תַּנָּא הוּא, הָא בַּכּוֹתֶל מְעָרָה, הָא בְּכוֹתֶל בִּנְיָן.
Rabbi Elazar said: This mishna is disjointed; the tanna who taught this first clause did not teach that second clause. There is a tannaitic dispute whether the status of a wall that is built from detached stones is that of an attached item or a detached item. Rav Pappa said: The entire mishna is the opinion of one tanna: This first clause is in the case of the wall of a cave, which is attached from the outset; that latter clause is in the case of the wall of a building, which is built from stones that were detached from the ground.
וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: הַכּוֹפֶה קְעָרָה עַל הַכּוֹתֶל בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁתּוּדַח – הֲרֵי זֶה בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״, הָא בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיּוּדַח הַכּוֹתֶל – אֵין זֶה בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״.
And this is what the mishna is saying: In the case of one who places a bowl on the wall so that the bowl will be rinsed with the rainwater, that is under the rubric of the verse “but when water is placed upon the seed,” and the water renders produce susceptible to impurity. By inference, if he placed the bowl so that the wall will be rinsed by means of the bowl, that is not under the rubric of the verse “but when water is placed upon the seed.”
בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בְּכוֹתֶל מְעָרָה, אֲבָל בְּכוֹתֶל בִּנְיָן – בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁלֹּא יִלְקֶה הַכּוֹתֶל הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״, הָא בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיּוּדַח הַכּוֹתֶל – הֲרֵי זֶה בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״.
In what case is this statement said? It is said in the case of the wall of a cave, which was always attached to the ground. But in the case of the wall of a building, whose stones were detached and subsequently reattached, if he places the bowl so that the wall will not be damaged, that is when it is not under the rubric of the verse “but when water is placed upon the seed.” But if he places the bowl so that the wall will be rinsed, that is under the rubric of the verse “but when water is placed upon the seed.”
בָּעֵי רָבָא:
Rava raises a dilemma:
תָּלוּשׁ וּלְבַסּוֹף חִבְּרוֹ לְעִנְיַן שְׁחִיטָה מַאי?
In the case of a blade that was detached and ultimately one attached it, with regard to slaughter, what is the halakha?
תָּא שְׁמַע: הָיָה צוֹר יוֹצֵא מִן הַכּוֹתֶל, אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה קָנֶה עוֹלֶה מֵאֵלָיו וְשָׁחַט בּוֹ – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If there was a flint emerging from a wall or a reed arising from the ground on its own and he slaughtered with it, his slaughter is not valid. Since the wall itself was made from stones that were detached and subsequently reattached, the slaughter is not valid.
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? בְּכוֹתֶל מְעָרָה. דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי דּוּמְיָא דְּ״קָנֶה עוֹלֶה מֵאֵלָיו״, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
The Gemara rejects that proof: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with the case of the wall of a cave that was always attached. The language of the baraita is also precise in support of that explanation, as the tanna teaches the case of the flint emerging from a wall juxtaposed to, and therefore similar to, the case of a reed arising from the ground on its own, which was also always attached. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, learn from it that this is the case.
תָּא שְׁמַע: נָעַץ סַכִּין בַּכּוֹתֶל וְשָׁחַט בָּהּ – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה. שָׁאנֵי סַכִּין, דְּלָא מְבַטֵּל לֵיהּ.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If one embedded a knife in a wall and slaughtered with it, his slaughter is valid. The knife was detached and then reattached, and the slaughter is valid. The Gemara rejects the proof: The reason that the slaughter is valid is that a knife is different, as he does not subsume it to the wall.
תָּא שְׁמַע: בִּמְחוּבָּר לַקַּרְקַע שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה. דִּלְמָא פָּרוֹשֵׁי קָא מְפָרֵשׁ לַהּ – מַאי ״מְחוּבָּר לַקַּרְקַע״? סַכִּין, דְּלָא מְבַטֵּל לֵיהּ.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from an earlier point in that baraita: If one slaughtered with an item that is attached to the ground, his slaughter is valid. This is a case where it was detached and then attached, as later in the baraita a case is cited when the blade was always attached and the slaughter is not valid. The Gemara rejects the proof: Perhaps the phrase that follows in the baraita: If one embedded a knife in a wall, is explaining the previous case. And accordingly, what is the meaning of attached to the ground? It is in the case of a knife, as he does not subsume it to the wall. But if he embedded a flint in a wall and slaughtered with it, his slaughter would be valid. Therefore, there is no proof from this baraita.
אָמַר מָר: נָעַץ סַכִּין בַּכּוֹתֶל וְשָׁחַט בָּהּ, שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה. אָמַר רַב עָנָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁהַסַּכִּין לְמַעְלָה וְצַוַּאר בְּהֵמָה לְמַטָּה, אֲבָל סַכִּין לְמַטָּה וְצַוַּאר בְּהֵמָה לְמַעְלָה – חָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא יִדְרוֹס.
§ The Master said in the baraita: If one embedded a knife in a wall and slaughtered with it, his slaughter is valid. Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: The tanna taught this halakha only in a case where the knife is above and the animal’s neck is below, and he raises the animal’s head and draws it back and forth on the blade. But in a case where the knife is below and the animal’s neck is above, the slaughter is not valid because we are concerned lest he press the knife, due to the weight of the animal, thereby cutting the simanim without drawing the knife back and forth, which invalidates the slaughter.
וְהָא קָתָנֵי: בֵּין שֶׁהַסַּכִּין לְמַטָּה וְצַוַּאר בְּהֵמָה לְמַעְלָה, בֵּין שֶׁהַסַּכִּין לְמַעְלָה וְצַוַּאר בְּהֵמָה לְמַטָּה!
The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught explicitly in the baraita: With any item that cuts, one may slaughter, whether with a blade that is attached to the ground or with a blade that is detached from the ground; whether the knife is below and the neck of the animal is above or the knife is above and the neck of the animal is below?
אָמַר רַב זְבִיד: לִצְדָדִין קָתָנֵי, סַכִּין לְמַטָּה וְצַוַּאר בְּהֵמָה לְמַעְלָה – בְּתָלוּשׁ, סַכִּין לְמַעְלָה וְצַוַּאר בְּהֵמָה לְמַטָּה – בִּמְחוּבָּר. רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: בְּעוֹפָא דְּקַלִּיל.
Rav Zevid said: The baraita is taught disjunctively: In the case where the knife is below and the neck of the animal is above, the slaughter is valid when the blade is detached. In the case where the knife is above and the neck of the animal is below, the slaughter is valid even when the blade is attached. Rav Pappa said: The baraita that teaches that one may slaughter even when the attached knife is below is referring to slaughter of a bird, which is light, and there is no concern that the weight of the bird will cause the slaughterer to press the bird’s neck onto the knife.
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ בְּמַתְנִיתָא תָּנָא: חֲמִשָּׁה דְּבָרִים נֶאֶמְרוּ בִּקְרוּמִית שֶׁל קָנֶה: אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין בָּהּ, וְאֵין מָלִין בָּהּ, וְאֵין מְחַתְּכִין בָּהּ בָּשָׂר, וְאֵין מְחַצְּצִין בָּהּ שִׁינַּיִם, וְאֵין מְקַנְּחִים בָּהּ.
§ Rav Ḥisda says that Rabbi Yitzḥak says, and some say it was taught in a baraita: Five matters were said with regard to the stalk of a reed, which is used for cutting due to its sharpness. One may neither slaughter with it, due to the concern that splinters will be separated and become embedded in the simanim, invalidating the slaughter; nor circumcise with it for the same reason, due to the potential danger; nor cut meat with it, lest splinters become embedded in the meat and endanger one who eats it; nor pick one’s teeth with it, lest he wound himself; nor wipe with it after relieving oneself.
אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין בָּהּ, וְהָתַנְיָא: בַּכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, בֵּין בְּצוֹר, בֵּין בִּזְכוּכִית, בֵּין בִּקְרוּמִית שֶׁל קָנֶה! אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: בְּסִימוֹנָא דְּאַגְמָא.
The baraita teaches: One may neither slaughter with it. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in another baraita: With any sharp object one may slaughter an animal, whether with a flint, or with glass shards, or with the stalk of a reed? Rav Pappa said: There, the reference is to a specific type of reed that grows in a marsh, which becomes a smooth, hard surface when it dries.
וְאֵין מְחַתְּכִין בָּהּ בָּשָׂר. רַב פָּפָּא מְחַתֵּךְ בַּהּ קִרְבֵי דָגִים, דְּזִיגִי. רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא מְחַתֵּךְ בַּהּ עוֹפָא דְּרַכִּיךְ.
The baraita teaches: Nor cut meat with it. Rav Pappa cuts with the stalk of a reed the innards of fish, which are transparent, such that any splinters would be obvious. Rabba bar Rav Huna cuts with it the meat of a bird, which is soft and will not cause the stalk of the reed to splinter.
וְאֵין מְקַנְּחִין בַּהּ, תִּיפּוֹק לֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמַר מָר: הַמְקַנֵּחַ בְּדָבָר שֶׁהָאוּר שׁוֹלֶטֶת בּוֹ שִׁינָּיו נוֹשְׁרוֹת. אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: קִינּוּחַ פִּי מַכָּה קָאָמְרִינַן.
The baraita teaches: Nor wipe with it after relieving oneself. The Gemara objects: Derive that one may not wipe with it because the Master said: One who wipes with an object that is flammable, his lower teeth, i.e., the rectum that holds the intestines in place, fall out. Rav Pappa said in explanation: The reference in the baraita is not to wiping after relieving oneself. Rather, we are speaking with regard to wiping the blood or dirt from the opening of a wound.
הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, וּלְעוֹלָם שׁוֹחֲטִין. הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין – הַכֹּל בִּשְׁחִיטָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ עוֹף.
§ The mishna teaches: All slaughter [hakkol shoḥatin] and one may always slaughter. The Gemara interprets the phrase: All slaughter [hakkol shoḥatin], to mean all animals are included in the mitzva of slaughter, and even a bird.
לְעוֹלָם שׁוֹחֲטִין, מַאן תַּנָּא? אָמַר רַבָּה: רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: ״כִּי יַרְחִיב ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֶת גְּבוּלְךָ כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר לָךְ וְאָמַרְתָּ אֹכְלָה בָשָׂר וְגוֹ׳״, רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר: לֹא בָּא הַכָּתוּב אֶלָּא לְהַתִּיר לָהֶם בְּשַׂר תַּאֲוָה.
With regard to the statement: One may always slaughter, who is the tanna who taught this halakha? Rabba said: It is Rabbi Yishmael, as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “When the Lord your God shall expand your border, as He has promised you, and you shall say: I will eat flesh…you may eat flesh with all the desire of your soul” (Deuteronomy 12:20), Rabbi Yishmael says: The verse comes only to permit consumption of the non-sacrificial meat of desire to the Jewish people.
שֶׁבַּתְּחִלָּה, נֶאֱסַר לָהֶם בְּשַׂר תַּאֲוָה, מִשֶּׁנִּכְנְסוּ לָאָרֶץ הוּתַּר לָהֶם בְּשַׂר תַּאֲוָה.
As, at the outset, the meat of desire was forbidden to them, and anyone who wanted to eat meat would sacrifice the animal as an offering. After the priest sprinkled the blood, it was permitted for one to eat the meat. When they entered into Eretz Yisrael, the meat of desire was permitted for them, and they could slaughter and eat meat wherever they chose.
וְעַכְשָׁיו שֶׁגָּלוּ, יָכוֹל יַחְזְרוּ לְאִיסּוּרָן הָרִאשׁוֹן? לְכָךְ שָׁנִינוּ: לְעוֹלָם שׁוֹחֲטִין.
Rabba added: And now that the Jewish people were exiled, might one have thought that they return to their initial prohibition? Therefore, we learned in the mishna: One may always slaughter non-sacrificial meat.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב יוֹסֵף: הַאי ״לְעוֹלָם שׁוֹחֲטִין״, ״לְעוֹלָם שׁוֹחֲטִין וְאוֹכְלִין״ מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! וְעוֹד, מֵעִיקָּרָא מַאי טַעְמָא אִיתְּסַר – מִשּׁוּם דְּהָווּ מְקָרְבִי לְמִשְׁכָּן, וּלְבַסּוֹף מַאי טַעְמָא אִישְׁתְּרוֹ – דַּהֲווֹ מְרַחֲקִי מִמִּשְׁכָּן,
Rav Yosef objects to this. If so, this phrase: One may always slaughter, is inappropriate; the tanna should have taught: One may always slaughter and eat, as the matter of permission primarily relates to eating the meat, not to slaughtering the animal. And furthermore, initially, what is the reason that the meat of desire was forbidden? It was because in the wilderness, they were proximate to the Tabernacle and could partake of sacrificial meat from the table of God. And ultimately, what is the reason that the meat of desire was permitted? The reason was that in Eretz Yisrael they were distant from the Tabernacle.
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Chullin 16
קַשְׁיָין אַהֲדָדֵי! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ שָׁאנֵי בֵּין מְחוּבָּר מֵעִיקָּרוֹ לְתָלוּשׁ וּלְבַסּוֹף חִבְּרוֹ, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
Ostensibly, the two clauses of the baraita are difficult, as they contradict each other, since the first clause states that slaughter with a blade that is attached is valid and the latter clause states that slaughter is not valid. Rather, must one not conclude from it that there is a difference between a case where the blade was attached from the outset and a case where the blade was detached and ultimately he reattached it? The Gemara affirms: Indeed, learn from it.
אָמַר מָר: הַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּמוּכְנִי שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה, וְהָתַנְיָא: שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה! לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא בְּסַרְנָא דְּפַחְרָא, הָא בְּסַרְנָא דְּמַיָּא.
§ The Master said: In the case of one who slaughters with a mechanism of a wheel with a knife attached to it, his slaughter is valid. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that his slaughter is not valid? The Gemara answers: This contradiction is not difficult. This baraita, which rules that the slaughter is valid, is in a case where the knife was attached to a potter’s wheel, whose movement is generated by the potter pressing on a pedal. Since the slaughter was performed by the force of the person’s actions, the slaughter is valid. That baraita, which rules that the slaughter is not valid, is in a case where the knife was attached to a waterwheel. Since the slaughter was not performed by the force of the person’s actions, the slaughter is not valid.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָא וְהָא בְּסַרְנָא דְּמַיָּא, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא בְּכֹחַ רִאשׁוֹן, הָא בְּכֹחַ שֵׁנִי.
And if you wish, say instead: The rulings of both this baraita and that baraita are in a case where the knife was attached to a waterwheel, and the contradiction is not difficult. This baraita, which rules that the slaughter is valid, is in a case where the movement of the slaughter was generated by primary force, as the person releases the water that turns the wheel, and on that initial turn of the wheel the knife slaughters the animal. That baraita, which rules that the slaughter is not valid, is in a case where the slaughter was generated by secondary force, as the knife slaughters the animal on the second turn of the wheel.
וְכִי הָא דְּאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הַאי מַאן דְּכַפְתֵיהּ לְחַבְרֵיהּ וְאַשְׁקֵיל עֲלֵיהּ בִּידְקָא דְּמַיָּא וּמִית – חַיָּיב. מַאי טַעְמָא? גִּירֵי דִּידֵיהּ הוּא דְּאַהֲנִי בֵּיהּ. וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי – בְּכֹחַ רִאשׁוֹן, אֲבָל בְּכֹחַ שֵׁנִי – גְּרָמָא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא.
And this is like that which Rav Pappa says: In the case of a certain person who bound another and diverted a flow [bidka] of water upon him and he died, the one who diverted the water is liable for his murder. What is the reason? It is because those were his arrows that were effective in his murder. And this matter applies in a case where he killed the other person by primary force, as the person was proximate to him and was directly drowned by the water. But if the person was further away and was killed by secondary force after the water flowed on its own, it is not by his direct action; rather, it is merely an indirect action, and he is exempt.
יָתֵיב רַב אֲחוֹרֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא, וְרַבִּי חִיָּיא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי, וְיָתֵיב רַבִּי וְקָאָמַר: מִנַּיִן לִשְׁחִיטָה שֶׁהִיא בְּתָלוּשׁ? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַיִּקַּח אֶת הַמַּאֲכֶלֶת לִשְׁחֹט״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב לְרַבִּי חִיָּיא: מַאי קָאָמַר? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וָי״ו דִּכְתִיב אַאוּפְתָּא קָאָמַר. וְהָא קְרָא קָאָמַר! קְרָא זְרִיזוּתֵיהּ דְּאַבְרָהָם קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
§ Rav sat behind Rabbi Ḥiyya, and Rabbi Ḥiyya sat before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi sat and said: From where is it derived that slaughter is performed specifically with a blade that is detached? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And Abraham stretched forth his hand and took the knife to slaughter his son” (Genesis 22:10). Rav said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: What is he saying? Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rav: He is saying an incorrect reason, comparable to the letter vav that is written on the rough surface of a tree trunk [a’ufta]. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi say a verse as proof for his statement? The Gemara answers: The verse teaches us the diligence of Abraham, who had a knife prepared to slaughter Isaac. It does not teach any halakha concerning ritual slaughter.
אָמַר רָבָא: פְּשִׁיטָא לִי, תָּלוּשׁ וּלְבַסּוֹף חִבְּרוֹ לְעִנְיַן עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה הָוֵי תָּלוּשׁ, דְּאָמַר מָר: הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה לְבַיִת שֶׁלּוֹ אֲסָרוֹ, וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ הָוֵי מְחוּבָּר – ״אֱלֹהֵיהֶם עַל הֶהָרִים״ וְלֹא הֶהָרִים אֱלֹהֵיהֶם.
§ Apropos the issue of slaughter with a detached blade, Rava said: It is obvious to me that concerning an item that was detached and ultimately one attached it, with regard to the matter of idol worship its halakhic status is that of a detached item, as the Master says: One who bows to his house has rendered it forbidden as an object of idol worship. And if it enters your mind to say that its halakhic status is that of an attached item, it is written with regard to idolatry: “Their gods, upon the high mountains” (Deuteronomy 12:2), from which it is derived: But the mountains are not their gods, as items attached to the ground are never rendered forbidden as objects of idol worship. The halakhic status of a house built from stones that were detached is that of a detached item.
לְעִנְיַן הֶכְשֵׁר זְרָעִים תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דִּתְנַן: הַכּוֹפֶה קְעָרָה עַל הַכּוֹתֶל בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁתּוּדַח – הֲרֵי זֶה בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״, בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁלֹּא יִלְקֶה הַכּוֹתֶל – אֵינוֹ בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״.
With regard to the matter of rendering seeds susceptible to ritual impurity, there is a dispute between tanna’im, as we learned in a mishna (Makhshirin 4:3): In the case of one who places a bowl on the wall while it is raining so that the bowl will be rinsed with the rainwater, if the water from the bowl then falls onto produce, that is under the rubric of the verse: “But when water is placed upon the seed” (Leviticus 11:38). The water has the halakhic status of a liquid that he poured of his own volition on fruit and seeds. Consequently, it renders them susceptible to ritual impurity. But if he placed the bowl there so that the wall will not be damaged, it is not under the rubric of the verse “but when water is placed upon the seed.” Since he had no intent to use the water, it is not considered to have entered the bowl of his own volition, and it does not render produce susceptible to impurity.
הָא גּוּפַהּ קַשְׁיָא: אָמְרַתְּ, בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁתּוּדַח – הֲרֵי זֶה בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״, הָא בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיּוּדַח הַכּוֹתֶל – אֵין זֶה בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״.
This mishna itself is difficult, as the inferences from the first clause and the latter clause are contradictory. In the first clause you said: In the case of one who places a bowl on the wall so that the bowl will be rinsed with the rainwater, that is under the rubric of the verse “but when water is placed upon the seed,” and the water renders produce susceptible to impurity. By inference, if he placed the bowl so that the wall will be rinsed by means of the bowl, that is not under the rubric of the verse “but when water is placed upon the seed.” That water would not render produce susceptible to impurity, because the intent was for the water to rinse the wall, which is an item attached to the ground.
וַהֲדַר תָּנֵי: בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁלֹּא יִלְקֶה הַכּוֹתֶל – אֵינוֹ בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״, הָא בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיּוּדַח הַכּוֹתֶל – הֲרֵי זֶה בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״.
And then the mishna teaches in the latter clause: If he placed the bowl so that the wall will not be damaged, it is not under the rubric of the verse: “But when water is placed upon the seed.” By inference, if he placed the bowl so that the wall will be rinsed, that is under the rubric of the verse: “But when water is placed upon the seed,” as a wall has the status of a detached item, since it was built from stones that were detached.
אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: תִּבְרַאּ, מִי שֶׁשָּׁנָה זוֹ לֹא שָׁנָה זוֹ. רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: כּוּלָּהּ חַד תַּנָּא הוּא, הָא בַּכּוֹתֶל מְעָרָה, הָא בְּכוֹתֶל בִּנְיָן.
Rabbi Elazar said: This mishna is disjointed; the tanna who taught this first clause did not teach that second clause. There is a tannaitic dispute whether the status of a wall that is built from detached stones is that of an attached item or a detached item. Rav Pappa said: The entire mishna is the opinion of one tanna: This first clause is in the case of the wall of a cave, which is attached from the outset; that latter clause is in the case of the wall of a building, which is built from stones that were detached from the ground.
וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: הַכּוֹפֶה קְעָרָה עַל הַכּוֹתֶל בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁתּוּדַח – הֲרֵי זֶה בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״, הָא בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיּוּדַח הַכּוֹתֶל – אֵין זֶה בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״.
And this is what the mishna is saying: In the case of one who places a bowl on the wall so that the bowl will be rinsed with the rainwater, that is under the rubric of the verse “but when water is placed upon the seed,” and the water renders produce susceptible to impurity. By inference, if he placed the bowl so that the wall will be rinsed by means of the bowl, that is not under the rubric of the verse “but when water is placed upon the seed.”
בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בְּכוֹתֶל מְעָרָה, אֲבָל בְּכוֹתֶל בִּנְיָן – בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁלֹּא יִלְקֶה הַכּוֹתֶל הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״, הָא בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיּוּדַח הַכּוֹתֶל – הֲרֵי זֶה בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״.
In what case is this statement said? It is said in the case of the wall of a cave, which was always attached to the ground. But in the case of the wall of a building, whose stones were detached and subsequently reattached, if he places the bowl so that the wall will not be damaged, that is when it is not under the rubric of the verse “but when water is placed upon the seed.” But if he places the bowl so that the wall will be rinsed, that is under the rubric of the verse “but when water is placed upon the seed.”
בָּעֵי רָבָא:
Rava raises a dilemma:
תָּלוּשׁ וּלְבַסּוֹף חִבְּרוֹ לְעִנְיַן שְׁחִיטָה מַאי?
In the case of a blade that was detached and ultimately one attached it, with regard to slaughter, what is the halakha?
תָּא שְׁמַע: הָיָה צוֹר יוֹצֵא מִן הַכּוֹתֶל, אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה קָנֶה עוֹלֶה מֵאֵלָיו וְשָׁחַט בּוֹ – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If there was a flint emerging from a wall or a reed arising from the ground on its own and he slaughtered with it, his slaughter is not valid. Since the wall itself was made from stones that were detached and subsequently reattached, the slaughter is not valid.
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? בְּכוֹתֶל מְעָרָה. דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי דּוּמְיָא דְּ״קָנֶה עוֹלֶה מֵאֵלָיו״, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
The Gemara rejects that proof: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with the case of the wall of a cave that was always attached. The language of the baraita is also precise in support of that explanation, as the tanna teaches the case of the flint emerging from a wall juxtaposed to, and therefore similar to, the case of a reed arising from the ground on its own, which was also always attached. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, learn from it that this is the case.
תָּא שְׁמַע: נָעַץ סַכִּין בַּכּוֹתֶל וְשָׁחַט בָּהּ – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה. שָׁאנֵי סַכִּין, דְּלָא מְבַטֵּל לֵיהּ.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If one embedded a knife in a wall and slaughtered with it, his slaughter is valid. The knife was detached and then reattached, and the slaughter is valid. The Gemara rejects the proof: The reason that the slaughter is valid is that a knife is different, as he does not subsume it to the wall.
תָּא שְׁמַע: בִּמְחוּבָּר לַקַּרְקַע שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה. דִּלְמָא פָּרוֹשֵׁי קָא מְפָרֵשׁ לַהּ – מַאי ״מְחוּבָּר לַקַּרְקַע״? סַכִּין, דְּלָא מְבַטֵּל לֵיהּ.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from an earlier point in that baraita: If one slaughtered with an item that is attached to the ground, his slaughter is valid. This is a case where it was detached and then attached, as later in the baraita a case is cited when the blade was always attached and the slaughter is not valid. The Gemara rejects the proof: Perhaps the phrase that follows in the baraita: If one embedded a knife in a wall, is explaining the previous case. And accordingly, what is the meaning of attached to the ground? It is in the case of a knife, as he does not subsume it to the wall. But if he embedded a flint in a wall and slaughtered with it, his slaughter would be valid. Therefore, there is no proof from this baraita.
אָמַר מָר: נָעַץ סַכִּין בַּכּוֹתֶל וְשָׁחַט בָּהּ, שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה. אָמַר רַב עָנָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁהַסַּכִּין לְמַעְלָה וְצַוַּאר בְּהֵמָה לְמַטָּה, אֲבָל סַכִּין לְמַטָּה וְצַוַּאר בְּהֵמָה לְמַעְלָה – חָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא יִדְרוֹס.
§ The Master said in the baraita: If one embedded a knife in a wall and slaughtered with it, his slaughter is valid. Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: The tanna taught this halakha only in a case where the knife is above and the animal’s neck is below, and he raises the animal’s head and draws it back and forth on the blade. But in a case where the knife is below and the animal’s neck is above, the slaughter is not valid because we are concerned lest he press the knife, due to the weight of the animal, thereby cutting the simanim without drawing the knife back and forth, which invalidates the slaughter.
וְהָא קָתָנֵי: בֵּין שֶׁהַסַּכִּין לְמַטָּה וְצַוַּאר בְּהֵמָה לְמַעְלָה, בֵּין שֶׁהַסַּכִּין לְמַעְלָה וְצַוַּאר בְּהֵמָה לְמַטָּה!
The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught explicitly in the baraita: With any item that cuts, one may slaughter, whether with a blade that is attached to the ground or with a blade that is detached from the ground; whether the knife is below and the neck of the animal is above or the knife is above and the neck of the animal is below?
אָמַר רַב זְבִיד: לִצְדָדִין קָתָנֵי, סַכִּין לְמַטָּה וְצַוַּאר בְּהֵמָה לְמַעְלָה – בְּתָלוּשׁ, סַכִּין לְמַעְלָה וְצַוַּאר בְּהֵמָה לְמַטָּה – בִּמְחוּבָּר. רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: בְּעוֹפָא דְּקַלִּיל.
Rav Zevid said: The baraita is taught disjunctively: In the case where the knife is below and the neck of the animal is above, the slaughter is valid when the blade is detached. In the case where the knife is above and the neck of the animal is below, the slaughter is valid even when the blade is attached. Rav Pappa said: The baraita that teaches that one may slaughter even when the attached knife is below is referring to slaughter of a bird, which is light, and there is no concern that the weight of the bird will cause the slaughterer to press the bird’s neck onto the knife.
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ בְּמַתְנִיתָא תָּנָא: חֲמִשָּׁה דְּבָרִים נֶאֶמְרוּ בִּקְרוּמִית שֶׁל קָנֶה: אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין בָּהּ, וְאֵין מָלִין בָּהּ, וְאֵין מְחַתְּכִין בָּהּ בָּשָׂר, וְאֵין מְחַצְּצִין בָּהּ שִׁינַּיִם, וְאֵין מְקַנְּחִים בָּהּ.
§ Rav Ḥisda says that Rabbi Yitzḥak says, and some say it was taught in a baraita: Five matters were said with regard to the stalk of a reed, which is used for cutting due to its sharpness. One may neither slaughter with it, due to the concern that splinters will be separated and become embedded in the simanim, invalidating the slaughter; nor circumcise with it for the same reason, due to the potential danger; nor cut meat with it, lest splinters become embedded in the meat and endanger one who eats it; nor pick one’s teeth with it, lest he wound himself; nor wipe with it after relieving oneself.
אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין בָּהּ, וְהָתַנְיָא: בַּכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, בֵּין בְּצוֹר, בֵּין בִּזְכוּכִית, בֵּין בִּקְרוּמִית שֶׁל קָנֶה! אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: בְּסִימוֹנָא דְּאַגְמָא.
The baraita teaches: One may neither slaughter with it. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in another baraita: With any sharp object one may slaughter an animal, whether with a flint, or with glass shards, or with the stalk of a reed? Rav Pappa said: There, the reference is to a specific type of reed that grows in a marsh, which becomes a smooth, hard surface when it dries.
וְאֵין מְחַתְּכִין בָּהּ בָּשָׂר. רַב פָּפָּא מְחַתֵּךְ בַּהּ קִרְבֵי דָגִים, דְּזִיגִי. רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא מְחַתֵּךְ בַּהּ עוֹפָא דְּרַכִּיךְ.
The baraita teaches: Nor cut meat with it. Rav Pappa cuts with the stalk of a reed the innards of fish, which are transparent, such that any splinters would be obvious. Rabba bar Rav Huna cuts with it the meat of a bird, which is soft and will not cause the stalk of the reed to splinter.
וְאֵין מְקַנְּחִין בַּהּ, תִּיפּוֹק לֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמַר מָר: הַמְקַנֵּחַ בְּדָבָר שֶׁהָאוּר שׁוֹלֶטֶת בּוֹ שִׁינָּיו נוֹשְׁרוֹת. אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: קִינּוּחַ פִּי מַכָּה קָאָמְרִינַן.
The baraita teaches: Nor wipe with it after relieving oneself. The Gemara objects: Derive that one may not wipe with it because the Master said: One who wipes with an object that is flammable, his lower teeth, i.e., the rectum that holds the intestines in place, fall out. Rav Pappa said in explanation: The reference in the baraita is not to wiping after relieving oneself. Rather, we are speaking with regard to wiping the blood or dirt from the opening of a wound.
הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, וּלְעוֹלָם שׁוֹחֲטִין. הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין – הַכֹּל בִּשְׁחִיטָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ עוֹף.
§ The mishna teaches: All slaughter [hakkol shoḥatin] and one may always slaughter. The Gemara interprets the phrase: All slaughter [hakkol shoḥatin], to mean all animals are included in the mitzva of slaughter, and even a bird.
לְעוֹלָם שׁוֹחֲטִין, מַאן תַּנָּא? אָמַר רַבָּה: רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: ״כִּי יַרְחִיב ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֶת גְּבוּלְךָ כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר לָךְ וְאָמַרְתָּ אֹכְלָה בָשָׂר וְגוֹ׳״, רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר: לֹא בָּא הַכָּתוּב אֶלָּא לְהַתִּיר לָהֶם בְּשַׂר תַּאֲוָה.
With regard to the statement: One may always slaughter, who is the tanna who taught this halakha? Rabba said: It is Rabbi Yishmael, as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “When the Lord your God shall expand your border, as He has promised you, and you shall say: I will eat flesh…you may eat flesh with all the desire of your soul” (Deuteronomy 12:20), Rabbi Yishmael says: The verse comes only to permit consumption of the non-sacrificial meat of desire to the Jewish people.
שֶׁבַּתְּחִלָּה, נֶאֱסַר לָהֶם בְּשַׂר תַּאֲוָה, מִשֶּׁנִּכְנְסוּ לָאָרֶץ הוּתַּר לָהֶם בְּשַׂר תַּאֲוָה.
As, at the outset, the meat of desire was forbidden to them, and anyone who wanted to eat meat would sacrifice the animal as an offering. After the priest sprinkled the blood, it was permitted for one to eat the meat. When they entered into Eretz Yisrael, the meat of desire was permitted for them, and they could slaughter and eat meat wherever they chose.
וְעַכְשָׁיו שֶׁגָּלוּ, יָכוֹל יַחְזְרוּ לְאִיסּוּרָן הָרִאשׁוֹן? לְכָךְ שָׁנִינוּ: לְעוֹלָם שׁוֹחֲטִין.
Rabba added: And now that the Jewish people were exiled, might one have thought that they return to their initial prohibition? Therefore, we learned in the mishna: One may always slaughter non-sacrificial meat.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב יוֹסֵף: הַאי ״לְעוֹלָם שׁוֹחֲטִין״, ״לְעוֹלָם שׁוֹחֲטִין וְאוֹכְלִין״ מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! וְעוֹד, מֵעִיקָּרָא מַאי טַעְמָא אִיתְּסַר – מִשּׁוּם דְּהָווּ מְקָרְבִי לְמִשְׁכָּן, וּלְבַסּוֹף מַאי טַעְמָא אִישְׁתְּרוֹ – דַּהֲווֹ מְרַחֲקִי מִמִּשְׁכָּן,
Rav Yosef objects to this. If so, this phrase: One may always slaughter, is inappropriate; the tanna should have taught: One may always slaughter and eat, as the matter of permission primarily relates to eating the meat, not to slaughtering the animal. And furthermore, initially, what is the reason that the meat of desire was forbidden? It was because in the wilderness, they were proximate to the Tabernacle and could partake of sacrificial meat from the table of God. And ultimately, what is the reason that the meat of desire was permitted? The reason was that in Eretz Yisrael they were distant from the Tabernacle.
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