Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Tina Lamm for the refuah shleima for מעין ליאורה בת שלומית פייגא. “Our precious Maya”
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Summary
Rav Hamnuna states in the name of Rabbi Shimon that the prohibition of oto v’et beno does not apply to consecrated animals (kodashim). This is based on Rabbi Shimon’s principle that an invalid slaughter is not halakhically considered a slaughter (shechita she’eina reuya lo shema shechita), and since the meat of a sacrifice is not permitted for consumption until its blood is sprinkled, the slaughter itself is initially unfit. Rava challenges this using a text discussing various combinations of slaughtering consecutive sacrifices inside or outside the Temple courtyard (bifnim or bachutz), tracing the respective liabilities of karet and negative prohibitions under the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. To resolve the contradiction, Rava explains that Rabbi Shimon does acknowledge the prohibition for kodashim, but holds that one does not receive lashes for it because the warning given at the time of slaughter is a doubtful warning (hatra’at safek), as the validity of the slaughter depends on the future sprinkling of the blood, and a doubtful warning is legally invalid.
The Mishna states that if one slaughters an animal and it is found to be a treifa, or slaughters it for idolatry, as a Red Heifer, an ox convicted to be stoned, or a broken-necked heifer, Rabbi Shimon exempts him from the prohibition of oto v’et beno because the slaughter is invalid since the animal is not permitted for consumption, while the Rabbis declare him liable. However, if the slaughter itself is physically disqualified, such as if the animal becomes a carcass during the shechita process or if one stabbed the animal, all agree he is exempt. Reish Lakish establishes the Mishna’s liability (according to the Rabbis’ position) for idolatry only when the first animal was slaughtered for idolatry and the second for consumption. If the second was for idolatry, the rule of kim lei b’draba minei applies (one incurs the capital punishment for idolatry and is exempt from the lashes of oto v’et beno) as one only receives the harsher of the two punishments. Rabbi Yochanan counters that even if the second animal was for idolatry, one can still be liable for lashes for oto v’et beno if one was warned specifically for that prohibition and not for idolatry. Reish Lakish maintains that since one would be exempt if properly warned for the capital crime, one remains exempt even without that warning, and even without receiving the harsher punishment. They have the same dispute regarding the rule of kim lei b’draba minei even in cases of death/lashes and monetary liability when one was not warned for the death/lashes.
Today’s daily daf tools:
Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Tina Lamm for the refuah shleima for מעין ליאורה בת שלומית פייגא. “Our precious Maya”
Chullin 81
נִתְּקוֹ לַעֲשֵׂה. מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״מִיּוֹם הַשְּׁמִינִי וָהָלְאָה יֵרָצֶה״ – מִיּוֹם הַשְׁמִינִי אִין, מֵעִיקָּרָא לָא. לָאו הַבָּא מִכְּלַל עֲשֵׂה – עֲשֵׂה.
transmuted it from the standard prohibition of: It shall not be accepted, which is violated in the case of the other disqualifications, into a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva. What is the reasoning by which this is derived? It is derived from that which the verse states: “From the eighth day and forward it may be accepted for an offering” (Leviticus 22:27), which teaches that from the eighth day after its birth, yes, it may be sacrificed as an offering, but initially, before the eighth day, no, it may not be sacrificed. Therefore, this is a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva, which is not considered a negative prohibition for which one is flogged, but rather a positive mitzva.
וְהָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ לְכִדְרַבִּי אַפְטוֹרִיקִי, דְּרַבִּי אַפְטוֹרִיקִי רָמֵי: כְּתִיב ״וְהָיָה שִׁבְעַת יָמִים תַּחַת אִמּוֹ״, הָא לַיְלָה חֲזֵי, וּכְתִיב ״מִיּוֹם הַשְּׁמִינִי וָהָלְאָה יֵרָצֶה״ – מִיּוֹם הַשְּׁמִינִי וָהָלְאָה אִין, לַיְלָה לָא!
The Gemara asks: But this verse is required for the statement of Rabbi Aptoriki, as Rabbi Aptoriki raises a contradiction: It is written: “Then it shall be seven days with its mother” (Leviticus 22:27), indicating that on the night after the seventh day it is already fit to be sacrificed. But it is also written in that verse: “From the eighth day and forward it may be accepted,” indicating that from the eighth day forward, yes, it is fit, but on the night before it is not.
הָא כֵּיצַד? לַיְלָה לִקְדוּשָּׁה, יוֹם לְהַרְצָאָה. כְּתִיב קְרָא אַחֲרִינָא: ״כֵּן תַּעֲשֶׂה לְשֹׁרְךָ לְצֹאנֶךָ״.
How can these texts be reconciled? The night after the seventh day is fit for consecration, which is permitted at that time, while the eighth day is fit for effecting acceptance, and only then may it be sacrificed on the altar. The Gemara answers that another verse is also written that specifies this positive mitzva: “So shall you do with your ox and with your sheep; seven days shall it be with its mother; on the eighth day you shall give it to Me” (Exodus 22:29).
אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: אוֹמֵר הָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: אֵין אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ נוֹהֵג בְּקׇדָשִׁים, מַאי טַעְמָא? כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה לֹא שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, שְׁחִיטַת קֳדָשִׁים נָמֵי שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה הִיא.
§ The Gemara returns to discussing Rabbi Shimon’s opinion with regard to slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day. Rav Hamnuna says that Rabbi Shimon would say: The prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring does not apply to sacrificial animals. What is the reason? The reason is that since Rabbi Shimon says that an act of slaughter that is unfit to permit consumption is not considered to have the halakhic status of an act of slaughter, the prohibition will not apply here. This case of slaughtering sacrificial animals is also considered slaughter that is unfit, in that the flesh may not be burned upon the altar or eaten until the blood has been presented.
מֵתִיב רָבָא: אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ קָדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: שֵׁנִי בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה, שֶׁהָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: כׇּל הָרָאוּי לָבֹא לְאַחַר זְמַן – הֲרֵי הוּא בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: כֹּל שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת – אֵינוֹ בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.
Rava raises an objection from a baraita: If one slaughtered an animal itself and its offspring and both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, Rabbi Shimon says: For slaughtering the second animal he transgresses a prohibition in slaughtering it outside the Temple, as Rabbi Shimon would say: With regard to any offering that is fit to come to the altar after a certain amount of time and is offered outside the Temple before that time, he who slaughters it transgresses a prohibition, but there is no liability to receive karet. And the Rabbis say: With regard to any offering slaughtered outside of the Temple for which there is no liability to receive karet because it is unfit to be an offering at that time, he who sacrifices it also does not transgress a prohibition.
וְקַשְׁיָא לַן: קָדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ, שֵׁנִי בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה? קַמָּא מִיקְטָל קְטַל, שֵׁנִי מִתְקַבֵּל בִּפְנִים הוּא, כָּרֵת נָמֵי לִיחַיַּיב!
And this statement in the baraita is difficult for us: If both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, Rabbi Shimon says: For slaughtering the second animal he transgresses a prohibition for slaughtering outside the Temple. According to Rabbi Shimon, slaughter that is unfit for consumption is not considered slaughter. Therefore, with regard to the first animal, it is as if he has killed it without ritual slaughter, since its slaughter was unfit, and the second animal would be accepted inside the Temple upon the altar. Therefore, let one who slaughters it outside of the Temple be liable to receive karet as well.
וְאָמַר רָבָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ כְּדִי: חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: קָדָשִׁים שְׁנֵיהֶם בַּחוּץ, לְרַבָּנַן – רִאשׁוֹן עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת, שֵׁנִי פָּסוּל וּפָטוּר מִלָּאו דִּשְׁחוּטֵי חוּץ.
And Rava said, and some say it unattributed: The baraita is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: If one slaughters an animal and its offspring that are both sacrificial animals, and both of them are slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the slaughter of the first animal is punishable by karet, while the second animal is disqualified as its time has not yet arrived, and therefore, for its slaughter one is exempt from punishment for violating the prohibition of offerings slaughtered outside the Temple.
לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – שְׁנֵיהֶם עֲנוּשִׁים כָּרֵת.
According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the slaughter of both of them, including the second one alone, is punishable by karet. This is because the slaughter of the first is not considered slaughter, and therefore it does not disqualify the second through the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring.
אֶחָד בַּחוּץ וְאֶחָד בִּפְנִים: לְרַבָּנַן – רִאשׁוֹן עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת, שֵׁנִי פָּסוּל וּפָטוּר; לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – שֵׁנִי כָּשֵׁר.
If an animal and its offspring that are sacrificial animals are slaughtered, the first one outside the Temple courtyard, and the second one inside the Temple courtyard, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the slaughter of the first is punishable by karet, while the second animal is disqualified as its time has not yet arrived, and its slaughterer is exempt from punishment for its slaughter outside the Temple, because he slaughtered it inside the Temple. According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the second animal is fit for the altar, and it is sacrificed, as the slaughter of the first animal is not considered slaughter, and therefore the slaughter of the second does not violate the prohibition of a mother and its offspring.
אֶחָד בִּפְנִים וְאֶחָד בַּחוּץ: לְרַבָּנַן – רִאשׁוֹן כָּשֵׁר וּפָטוּר, שֵׁנִי פָּסוּל וּפָטוּר, לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – שֵׁנִי בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.
If an animal and its offspring that are sacrificial animals are slaughtered, the first one inside the Temple courtyard and the second one outside the Temple courtyard, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the first animal is fit for the altar, and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment, as its slaughter is perfectly legitimate. The second is unfit for the altar, as it was slaughtered outside the Temple, but its slaughterer is exempt from punishment for its slaughter outside the Temple because it is unfit for the altar, as its time has not yet arrived. According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, for slaughtering the second animal outside the Temple one transgresses a prohibition, as he holds that an offering whose time has not yet arrived that was slaughtered outside the Temple violates a prohibition.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ אֵין ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״ נוֹהֵג בְּקָדָשִׁים, שֵׁנִי אַמַּאי בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה וְתוּ לָא? כָּרֵת נָמֵי לִיחַיַּיב!
Rava now explains his objection: And if it enters your mind that the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does not apply to sacrificial animals, then with regard to slaughtering the second animal outside the Temple, why does one transgress only a prohibition and nothing more? Let him be liable to receive karet as well, as since its slaughter does not violate the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, it would be fit to be sacrificed inside the Temple. Therefore, it is clear that the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does apply to sacrificial animals.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא, הָכִי קָא אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: אֵין מַלְקוֹת ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״ נוֹהֵג בְּקָדָשִׁים,
Rather, Rava said: This is what Rav Hamnuna is saying: Though the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does apply to sacrificial animals, the administering of lashes for violating the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does not apply to sacrificial animals.
כֵּיוָן דְּכַמָּה דְּלָא זָרֵיק דָּם – לָא מִישְׁתְּרֵי בָּשָׂר, מֵעִידָּנָא דְּקָא שָׁחֵיט הָוֵאי הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק, וְהַתְרָאַת סָפֵק – לֹא שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה.
The reason is that since as long as one has not sprinkled the blood, the flesh is not permitted to be burned on the altar or eaten, at the time that one slaughters the second animal, when he receives a forewarning that his action violates the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, it is an uncertain forewarning, because if the blood will not be sprinkled, the flesh will not be permitted, sparing him from violating the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring. And an uncertain forewarning is not considered a valid forewarning that renders one liable to receive lashes.
וְאַזְדָּא רָבָא לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: הִיא חוּלִּין וּבְנָהּ שְׁלָמִים, שָׁחַט חוּלִּין וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט שְׁלָמִים – פָּטוּר.
And Rava follows his line of reasoning, as Rava says: According to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that one does not incur punishment for the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, for a slaughtering that is unfit, if she, the mother, is non-sacred, and her offspring is a peace offering, and one slaughtered the non-sacred mother, and afterward one slaughtered her offspring that is a peace offering on the same day, he is exempt for slaughtering the offspring. This is because the forewarning for slaughtering the offspring is uncertain as its blood might not be sprinkled, rendering the slaughter unfit.
שְׁלָמִים וְאַחַר כָּךְ חוּלִּין – חַיָּיב, וְאָמַר רָבָא: הִיא חוּלִּין וּבְנָהּ עוֹלָה, לָא מִיבַּעְיָא שָׁחַט חוּלִּין וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט עוֹלָה דְּפָטוּר,
But if one slaughtered the offspring that is a peace offering first and sprinkled its blood, and afterward he slaughtered the non-sacred mother, he is liable to receive lashes for slaughtering the mother. Once the non-sacred mother is slaughtered, the meat is fit; therefore, the forewarning is definite. And Rava says: If she, the mother, is non-sacred, and her offspring is sacrificed as a burnt offering, and both are slaughtered on the same day, it is not necessary to state that if one slaughtered the non-sacred mother, and afterward he slaughtered her offspring as a burnt offering, that he is exempt.
אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ שָׁחַט עוֹלָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט חוּלִּין – פָּטוּר, שְׁחִיטָה קַמַּיְיתָא לָאו שְׁחִיטָה בַּת אֲכִילָה הִיא.
But even if one slaughtered the offspring as a burnt offering and sprinkled its blood, and afterward slaughtered the non-sacred mother, he is exempt. The reason is that the slaughter of the first animal is not an act of slaughter subject to consumption, as a burnt offering is entirely burned upon the altar, and according to Rabbi Shimon, it is an act of slaughter that is improper, in that it does not render the meat fit to be eaten, is not considered slaughter.
וְרַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ שְׁמָהּ אֲכִילָה. מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְאִם הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל מִבְּשַׂר זֶבַח שְׁלָמָיו״.
And Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Consumption by the altar is considered consumption. What is the reason? The reason is that the verse states with regard to an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time [piggul]: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings be at all eaten [he’akhol ye’akhel] on the third day, it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18).
בִּשְׁתֵּי אֲכִילוֹת הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, אֶחָד אֲכִילַת אָדָם וְאֶחָד אֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ.
The repetitive expression “he’akhol ye’akhel” teaches that the verse is speaking of two types of consumption: One is human consumption, and the other one is consumption by the altar, and both are considered consumption with regard to piggul and other matters. Therefore, the slaughter of a burnt offering is considered slaughter that is fit for consumption, and the slaughter of a mother animal and its offspring, one of which is sacrificed as a burnt offering on the same day as the slaughter of the other, renders one liable to receive lashes even according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְנִמְצָא טְרֵפָה, הַשּׁוֹחֵט לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְהַשּׁוֹחֵט פָּרַת חַטָּאת, וְשׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל, וְעֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר, וַחֲכָמִים מְחַיְּיבִין.
MISHNA: With regard to one who slaughters an animal and its offspring and one of them is discovered to be an animal with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [tereifa] and may not be eaten, or one who slaughters one of the animals for the sake of idol worship, from which deriving benefit is prohibited, or one who slaughters the red heifer of purification, or an ox that was to have been stoned, or a heifer whose neck was to have been broken, all of which are animals from which deriving benefit is prohibited, Rabbi Shimon deems one who slaughters them exempt from lashes for the slaughter of a mother and its offspring, as in his opinion, slaughter that does not render the animal fit for consumption is not considered slaughter and does not violate the prohibition. And the Rabbis deem him liable, as the slaughter need not render the animal fit for consumption in order to violate the prohibition.
הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְנִתְנַבְּלָה בְּיָדוֹ, וְהַנּוֹחֵר, וְהַמְעַקֵּר – פָּטוּר מִשּׁוּם ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״.
All agree that one who slaughters an animal and it becomes a carcass by his hand because the slaughter was invalid, or one who stabs an animal, or one who uproots the windpipe and the gullet, is exempt with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring, as it is written: “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28), and in these cases, no ritual slaughter was performed.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁשָּׁחַט רִאשׁוֹן לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְשֵׁנִי לְשֻׁלְחָנוֹ, אֲבָל רִאשׁוֹן לְשֻׁלְחָנוֹ וְשֵׁנִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – פָּטוּר, דְּקָם לֵיהּ בִּדְרַבָּה מִינֵּיהּ.
GEMARA: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The Rabbis in the mishna taught that one is liable when one of the animals is slaughtered for the sake of idol worship only when he slaughtered the first animal for the sake of idol worship and the second animal for his own table. But if he slaughtered the first animal for his own table and the second animal for the sake of idol worship, he is exempt from lashes for the second act of slaughter, as he receives only the greater punishment, that for idol worship, which is death.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זוֹ, אֲפִילּוּ תִּינוֹקוֹת שֶׁל בֵּית רַבָּן יוֹדְעִין אוֹתָהּ! אֶלָּא, פְּעָמִים שֶׁאֲפִילּוּ שָׁחַט רִאשׁוֹן לְשֻׁלְחָנוֹ וְשֵׁנִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – חַיָּיב.
Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Even schoolchildren know this halakha, that one who is liable to receive two punishments receives only the greater punishment. Rather, sometimes, even if he slaughtered the first for his own table and the second for the sake of idol worship, he is liable to receive lashes for the second act of slaughter.
כְּגוֹן דְּאַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ מִשּׁוּם ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״, וְלֹא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ מִשּׁוּם עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: כֵּיוָן דְּכִי אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ – פָּטוּר, כִּי לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ נָמֵי – פָּטוּר.
This occurs, for example, where the witnesses forewarned him before the second act of slaughter with regard to the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, but they did not forewarn him with regard to idol worship. Since he is not punished for performing idol worship, he receives lashes for the less severe transgression. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: Since, had they forewarned him with regard to idol worship he would have been exempt from lashes; therefore, even if they did not forewarn him with regard to idol worship, he is also exempt from lashes.
וְאָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ, דְּכִי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר: חַיָּיבֵי מִיתוֹת שׁוֹגְגִין, וְחַיָּיבֵי מַלְקוֹת שׁוֹגְגִין, וְדָבָר אַחֵר – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אוֹמֵר: חַיָּיב, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אוֹמֵר: פָּטוּר.
The Gemara notes: And they each follow their known lines of reasoning in this matter. As when Rav Dimi came to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael he said: With regard to those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive the death penalty if one performed it intentionally, or those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive lashes, and that transgression also involved another matter, monetary payment, and they were forewarned with regard to the monetary penalty but not with regard to the lashes or the death penalty, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable to pay; and Reish Lakish says: He is exempt.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אוֹמֵר: חַיָּיב, דְּהָא לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ; וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אוֹמֵר: פָּטוּר, דְּכֵיוָן דְּכִי אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ פָּטוּר – כִּי לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ נָמֵי פָּטוּר.
The Gemara clarifies the rationales for their statements. Rabbi Yoḥanan says that he is liable; since they did not forewarn him with regard to the severe transgression, he sinned unwittingly, and he remains liable only to pay the monetary payment. And Reish Lakish says that he is exempt; since had they forewarned him with regard to the severe transgression, he would have been exempt from the monetary payment, when they did not forewarn him, he is also exempt.
וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן בְּהָא – בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, אֲבָל בְּהָא – אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.
The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to state their disagreement with regard to both of these cases. As, if it were taught to us only about this case where one slaughters the mother for his private use and afterward slaughters its offspring for idol worship, perhaps only in this case involving the death penalty and lashes does Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish say that even if they did not forewarn the transgressor with regard to idol worship, he is still exempt from lashes for the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, because the death penalty and lashes are similar in that they are both corporal punishments, and so the obligation of lashes does not take effect at all when the death penalty is potentially applicable. But in that case, involving the death penalty or lashes together with a monetary payment, say that he agrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan that the transgressor is liable to pay the monetary payment.
וְאִי אִיתְּמַר בְּהָא, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲבָל בְּהָא אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, צְרִיכָא.
And if the disagreement was stated only with regard to that case, where one unwittingly performed a transgression involving the death penalty or lashes together with a transgression bearing a monetary payment, perhaps only in that case does Rabbi Yoḥanan say that he is liable to pay the monetary payment. But in this case, where one slaughtered an animal and its offspring, and the second animal was slaughtered for the sake of idol worship, which involves the death penalty and lashes, but without a forewarning with regard to the death penalty, say that he agrees with Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish that one is exempt from lashes. Therefore, it is necessary to state their disagreement with regard to both cases.
וּפָרַת חַטָּאת שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה הִיא? וְהָתַנְיָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: פָּרָה מְטַמְּאָה טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין, הוֹאִיל וְהָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר.
§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon deems one who slaughters the red heifer of purification exempt from punishment for the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, as that act of slaughter does not render the animal fit for consumption. The Gemara asks: And is the slaughter of the red heifer of purification considered an act of slaughter that is unfit for consumption? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: A red heifer, even if it has been slaughtered and it is therefore prohibited to derive benefit from it, is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, since it had a time in which it was fit for consumption?
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Chullin 81
נִתְּקוֹ לַעֲשֵׂה. מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״מִיּוֹם הַשְּׁמִינִי וָהָלְאָה יֵרָצֶה״ – מִיּוֹם הַשְׁמִינִי אִין, מֵעִיקָּרָא לָא. לָאו הַבָּא מִכְּלַל עֲשֵׂה – עֲשֵׂה.
transmuted it from the standard prohibition of: It shall not be accepted, which is violated in the case of the other disqualifications, into a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva. What is the reasoning by which this is derived? It is derived from that which the verse states: “From the eighth day and forward it may be accepted for an offering” (Leviticus 22:27), which teaches that from the eighth day after its birth, yes, it may be sacrificed as an offering, but initially, before the eighth day, no, it may not be sacrificed. Therefore, this is a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva, which is not considered a negative prohibition for which one is flogged, but rather a positive mitzva.
וְהָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ לְכִדְרַבִּי אַפְטוֹרִיקִי, דְּרַבִּי אַפְטוֹרִיקִי רָמֵי: כְּתִיב ״וְהָיָה שִׁבְעַת יָמִים תַּחַת אִמּוֹ״, הָא לַיְלָה חֲזֵי, וּכְתִיב ״מִיּוֹם הַשְּׁמִינִי וָהָלְאָה יֵרָצֶה״ – מִיּוֹם הַשְּׁמִינִי וָהָלְאָה אִין, לַיְלָה לָא!
The Gemara asks: But this verse is required for the statement of Rabbi Aptoriki, as Rabbi Aptoriki raises a contradiction: It is written: “Then it shall be seven days with its mother” (Leviticus 22:27), indicating that on the night after the seventh day it is already fit to be sacrificed. But it is also written in that verse: “From the eighth day and forward it may be accepted,” indicating that from the eighth day forward, yes, it is fit, but on the night before it is not.
הָא כֵּיצַד? לַיְלָה לִקְדוּשָּׁה, יוֹם לְהַרְצָאָה. כְּתִיב קְרָא אַחֲרִינָא: ״כֵּן תַּעֲשֶׂה לְשֹׁרְךָ לְצֹאנֶךָ״.
How can these texts be reconciled? The night after the seventh day is fit for consecration, which is permitted at that time, while the eighth day is fit for effecting acceptance, and only then may it be sacrificed on the altar. The Gemara answers that another verse is also written that specifies this positive mitzva: “So shall you do with your ox and with your sheep; seven days shall it be with its mother; on the eighth day you shall give it to Me” (Exodus 22:29).
אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: אוֹמֵר הָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: אֵין אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ נוֹהֵג בְּקׇדָשִׁים, מַאי טַעְמָא? כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה לֹא שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, שְׁחִיטַת קֳדָשִׁים נָמֵי שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה הִיא.
§ The Gemara returns to discussing Rabbi Shimon’s opinion with regard to slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day. Rav Hamnuna says that Rabbi Shimon would say: The prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring does not apply to sacrificial animals. What is the reason? The reason is that since Rabbi Shimon says that an act of slaughter that is unfit to permit consumption is not considered to have the halakhic status of an act of slaughter, the prohibition will not apply here. This case of slaughtering sacrificial animals is also considered slaughter that is unfit, in that the flesh may not be burned upon the altar or eaten until the blood has been presented.
מֵתִיב רָבָא: אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ קָדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: שֵׁנִי בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה, שֶׁהָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: כׇּל הָרָאוּי לָבֹא לְאַחַר זְמַן – הֲרֵי הוּא בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: כֹּל שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת – אֵינוֹ בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.
Rava raises an objection from a baraita: If one slaughtered an animal itself and its offspring and both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, Rabbi Shimon says: For slaughtering the second animal he transgresses a prohibition in slaughtering it outside the Temple, as Rabbi Shimon would say: With regard to any offering that is fit to come to the altar after a certain amount of time and is offered outside the Temple before that time, he who slaughters it transgresses a prohibition, but there is no liability to receive karet. And the Rabbis say: With regard to any offering slaughtered outside of the Temple for which there is no liability to receive karet because it is unfit to be an offering at that time, he who sacrifices it also does not transgress a prohibition.
וְקַשְׁיָא לַן: קָדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ, שֵׁנִי בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה? קַמָּא מִיקְטָל קְטַל, שֵׁנִי מִתְקַבֵּל בִּפְנִים הוּא, כָּרֵת נָמֵי לִיחַיַּיב!
And this statement in the baraita is difficult for us: If both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, Rabbi Shimon says: For slaughtering the second animal he transgresses a prohibition for slaughtering outside the Temple. According to Rabbi Shimon, slaughter that is unfit for consumption is not considered slaughter. Therefore, with regard to the first animal, it is as if he has killed it without ritual slaughter, since its slaughter was unfit, and the second animal would be accepted inside the Temple upon the altar. Therefore, let one who slaughters it outside of the Temple be liable to receive karet as well.
וְאָמַר רָבָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ כְּדִי: חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: קָדָשִׁים שְׁנֵיהֶם בַּחוּץ, לְרַבָּנַן – רִאשׁוֹן עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת, שֵׁנִי פָּסוּל וּפָטוּר מִלָּאו דִּשְׁחוּטֵי חוּץ.
And Rava said, and some say it unattributed: The baraita is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: If one slaughters an animal and its offspring that are both sacrificial animals, and both of them are slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the slaughter of the first animal is punishable by karet, while the second animal is disqualified as its time has not yet arrived, and therefore, for its slaughter one is exempt from punishment for violating the prohibition of offerings slaughtered outside the Temple.
לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – שְׁנֵיהֶם עֲנוּשִׁים כָּרֵת.
According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the slaughter of both of them, including the second one alone, is punishable by karet. This is because the slaughter of the first is not considered slaughter, and therefore it does not disqualify the second through the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring.
אֶחָד בַּחוּץ וְאֶחָד בִּפְנִים: לְרַבָּנַן – רִאשׁוֹן עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת, שֵׁנִי פָּסוּל וּפָטוּר; לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – שֵׁנִי כָּשֵׁר.
If an animal and its offspring that are sacrificial animals are slaughtered, the first one outside the Temple courtyard, and the second one inside the Temple courtyard, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the slaughter of the first is punishable by karet, while the second animal is disqualified as its time has not yet arrived, and its slaughterer is exempt from punishment for its slaughter outside the Temple, because he slaughtered it inside the Temple. According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the second animal is fit for the altar, and it is sacrificed, as the slaughter of the first animal is not considered slaughter, and therefore the slaughter of the second does not violate the prohibition of a mother and its offspring.
אֶחָד בִּפְנִים וְאֶחָד בַּחוּץ: לְרַבָּנַן – רִאשׁוֹן כָּשֵׁר וּפָטוּר, שֵׁנִי פָּסוּל וּפָטוּר, לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – שֵׁנִי בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.
If an animal and its offspring that are sacrificial animals are slaughtered, the first one inside the Temple courtyard and the second one outside the Temple courtyard, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the first animal is fit for the altar, and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment, as its slaughter is perfectly legitimate. The second is unfit for the altar, as it was slaughtered outside the Temple, but its slaughterer is exempt from punishment for its slaughter outside the Temple because it is unfit for the altar, as its time has not yet arrived. According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, for slaughtering the second animal outside the Temple one transgresses a prohibition, as he holds that an offering whose time has not yet arrived that was slaughtered outside the Temple violates a prohibition.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ אֵין ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״ נוֹהֵג בְּקָדָשִׁים, שֵׁנִי אַמַּאי בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה וְתוּ לָא? כָּרֵת נָמֵי לִיחַיַּיב!
Rava now explains his objection: And if it enters your mind that the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does not apply to sacrificial animals, then with regard to slaughtering the second animal outside the Temple, why does one transgress only a prohibition and nothing more? Let him be liable to receive karet as well, as since its slaughter does not violate the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, it would be fit to be sacrificed inside the Temple. Therefore, it is clear that the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does apply to sacrificial animals.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא, הָכִי קָא אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: אֵין מַלְקוֹת ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״ נוֹהֵג בְּקָדָשִׁים,
Rather, Rava said: This is what Rav Hamnuna is saying: Though the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does apply to sacrificial animals, the administering of lashes for violating the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does not apply to sacrificial animals.
כֵּיוָן דְּכַמָּה דְּלָא זָרֵיק דָּם – לָא מִישְׁתְּרֵי בָּשָׂר, מֵעִידָּנָא דְּקָא שָׁחֵיט הָוֵאי הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק, וְהַתְרָאַת סָפֵק – לֹא שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה.
The reason is that since as long as one has not sprinkled the blood, the flesh is not permitted to be burned on the altar or eaten, at the time that one slaughters the second animal, when he receives a forewarning that his action violates the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, it is an uncertain forewarning, because if the blood will not be sprinkled, the flesh will not be permitted, sparing him from violating the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring. And an uncertain forewarning is not considered a valid forewarning that renders one liable to receive lashes.
וְאַזְדָּא רָבָא לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: הִיא חוּלִּין וּבְנָהּ שְׁלָמִים, שָׁחַט חוּלִּין וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט שְׁלָמִים – פָּטוּר.
And Rava follows his line of reasoning, as Rava says: According to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that one does not incur punishment for the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, for a slaughtering that is unfit, if she, the mother, is non-sacred, and her offspring is a peace offering, and one slaughtered the non-sacred mother, and afterward one slaughtered her offspring that is a peace offering on the same day, he is exempt for slaughtering the offspring. This is because the forewarning for slaughtering the offspring is uncertain as its blood might not be sprinkled, rendering the slaughter unfit.
שְׁלָמִים וְאַחַר כָּךְ חוּלִּין – חַיָּיב, וְאָמַר רָבָא: הִיא חוּלִּין וּבְנָהּ עוֹלָה, לָא מִיבַּעְיָא שָׁחַט חוּלִּין וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט עוֹלָה דְּפָטוּר,
But if one slaughtered the offspring that is a peace offering first and sprinkled its blood, and afterward he slaughtered the non-sacred mother, he is liable to receive lashes for slaughtering the mother. Once the non-sacred mother is slaughtered, the meat is fit; therefore, the forewarning is definite. And Rava says: If she, the mother, is non-sacred, and her offspring is sacrificed as a burnt offering, and both are slaughtered on the same day, it is not necessary to state that if one slaughtered the non-sacred mother, and afterward he slaughtered her offspring as a burnt offering, that he is exempt.
אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ שָׁחַט עוֹלָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט חוּלִּין – פָּטוּר, שְׁחִיטָה קַמַּיְיתָא לָאו שְׁחִיטָה בַּת אֲכִילָה הִיא.
But even if one slaughtered the offspring as a burnt offering and sprinkled its blood, and afterward slaughtered the non-sacred mother, he is exempt. The reason is that the slaughter of the first animal is not an act of slaughter subject to consumption, as a burnt offering is entirely burned upon the altar, and according to Rabbi Shimon, it is an act of slaughter that is improper, in that it does not render the meat fit to be eaten, is not considered slaughter.
וְרַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ שְׁמָהּ אֲכִילָה. מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְאִם הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל מִבְּשַׂר זֶבַח שְׁלָמָיו״.
And Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Consumption by the altar is considered consumption. What is the reason? The reason is that the verse states with regard to an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time [piggul]: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings be at all eaten [he’akhol ye’akhel] on the third day, it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18).
בִּשְׁתֵּי אֲכִילוֹת הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, אֶחָד אֲכִילַת אָדָם וְאֶחָד אֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ.
The repetitive expression “he’akhol ye’akhel” teaches that the verse is speaking of two types of consumption: One is human consumption, and the other one is consumption by the altar, and both are considered consumption with regard to piggul and other matters. Therefore, the slaughter of a burnt offering is considered slaughter that is fit for consumption, and the slaughter of a mother animal and its offspring, one of which is sacrificed as a burnt offering on the same day as the slaughter of the other, renders one liable to receive lashes even according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְנִמְצָא טְרֵפָה, הַשּׁוֹחֵט לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְהַשּׁוֹחֵט פָּרַת חַטָּאת, וְשׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל, וְעֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר, וַחֲכָמִים מְחַיְּיבִין.
MISHNA: With regard to one who slaughters an animal and its offspring and one of them is discovered to be an animal with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [tereifa] and may not be eaten, or one who slaughters one of the animals for the sake of idol worship, from which deriving benefit is prohibited, or one who slaughters the red heifer of purification, or an ox that was to have been stoned, or a heifer whose neck was to have been broken, all of which are animals from which deriving benefit is prohibited, Rabbi Shimon deems one who slaughters them exempt from lashes for the slaughter of a mother and its offspring, as in his opinion, slaughter that does not render the animal fit for consumption is not considered slaughter and does not violate the prohibition. And the Rabbis deem him liable, as the slaughter need not render the animal fit for consumption in order to violate the prohibition.
הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְנִתְנַבְּלָה בְּיָדוֹ, וְהַנּוֹחֵר, וְהַמְעַקֵּר – פָּטוּר מִשּׁוּם ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״.
All agree that one who slaughters an animal and it becomes a carcass by his hand because the slaughter was invalid, or one who stabs an animal, or one who uproots the windpipe and the gullet, is exempt with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring, as it is written: “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28), and in these cases, no ritual slaughter was performed.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁשָּׁחַט רִאשׁוֹן לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְשֵׁנִי לְשֻׁלְחָנוֹ, אֲבָל רִאשׁוֹן לְשֻׁלְחָנוֹ וְשֵׁנִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – פָּטוּר, דְּקָם לֵיהּ בִּדְרַבָּה מִינֵּיהּ.
GEMARA: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The Rabbis in the mishna taught that one is liable when one of the animals is slaughtered for the sake of idol worship only when he slaughtered the first animal for the sake of idol worship and the second animal for his own table. But if he slaughtered the first animal for his own table and the second animal for the sake of idol worship, he is exempt from lashes for the second act of slaughter, as he receives only the greater punishment, that for idol worship, which is death.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זוֹ, אֲפִילּוּ תִּינוֹקוֹת שֶׁל בֵּית רַבָּן יוֹדְעִין אוֹתָהּ! אֶלָּא, פְּעָמִים שֶׁאֲפִילּוּ שָׁחַט רִאשׁוֹן לְשֻׁלְחָנוֹ וְשֵׁנִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – חַיָּיב.
Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Even schoolchildren know this halakha, that one who is liable to receive two punishments receives only the greater punishment. Rather, sometimes, even if he slaughtered the first for his own table and the second for the sake of idol worship, he is liable to receive lashes for the second act of slaughter.
כְּגוֹן דְּאַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ מִשּׁוּם ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״, וְלֹא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ מִשּׁוּם עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: כֵּיוָן דְּכִי אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ – פָּטוּר, כִּי לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ נָמֵי – פָּטוּר.
This occurs, for example, where the witnesses forewarned him before the second act of slaughter with regard to the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, but they did not forewarn him with regard to idol worship. Since he is not punished for performing idol worship, he receives lashes for the less severe transgression. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: Since, had they forewarned him with regard to idol worship he would have been exempt from lashes; therefore, even if they did not forewarn him with regard to idol worship, he is also exempt from lashes.
וְאָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ, דְּכִי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר: חַיָּיבֵי מִיתוֹת שׁוֹגְגִין, וְחַיָּיבֵי מַלְקוֹת שׁוֹגְגִין, וְדָבָר אַחֵר – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אוֹמֵר: חַיָּיב, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אוֹמֵר: פָּטוּר.
The Gemara notes: And they each follow their known lines of reasoning in this matter. As when Rav Dimi came to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael he said: With regard to those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive the death penalty if one performed it intentionally, or those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive lashes, and that transgression also involved another matter, monetary payment, and they were forewarned with regard to the monetary penalty but not with regard to the lashes or the death penalty, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable to pay; and Reish Lakish says: He is exempt.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אוֹמֵר: חַיָּיב, דְּהָא לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ; וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אוֹמֵר: פָּטוּר, דְּכֵיוָן דְּכִי אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ פָּטוּר – כִּי לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ נָמֵי פָּטוּר.
The Gemara clarifies the rationales for their statements. Rabbi Yoḥanan says that he is liable; since they did not forewarn him with regard to the severe transgression, he sinned unwittingly, and he remains liable only to pay the monetary payment. And Reish Lakish says that he is exempt; since had they forewarned him with regard to the severe transgression, he would have been exempt from the monetary payment, when they did not forewarn him, he is also exempt.
וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן בְּהָא – בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, אֲבָל בְּהָא – אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.
The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to state their disagreement with regard to both of these cases. As, if it were taught to us only about this case where one slaughters the mother for his private use and afterward slaughters its offspring for idol worship, perhaps only in this case involving the death penalty and lashes does Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish say that even if they did not forewarn the transgressor with regard to idol worship, he is still exempt from lashes for the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, because the death penalty and lashes are similar in that they are both corporal punishments, and so the obligation of lashes does not take effect at all when the death penalty is potentially applicable. But in that case, involving the death penalty or lashes together with a monetary payment, say that he agrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan that the transgressor is liable to pay the monetary payment.
וְאִי אִיתְּמַר בְּהָא, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲבָל בְּהָא אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, צְרִיכָא.
And if the disagreement was stated only with regard to that case, where one unwittingly performed a transgression involving the death penalty or lashes together with a transgression bearing a monetary payment, perhaps only in that case does Rabbi Yoḥanan say that he is liable to pay the monetary payment. But in this case, where one slaughtered an animal and its offspring, and the second animal was slaughtered for the sake of idol worship, which involves the death penalty and lashes, but without a forewarning with regard to the death penalty, say that he agrees with Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish that one is exempt from lashes. Therefore, it is necessary to state their disagreement with regard to both cases.
וּפָרַת חַטָּאת שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה הִיא? וְהָתַנְיָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: פָּרָה מְטַמְּאָה טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין, הוֹאִיל וְהָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר.
§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon deems one who slaughters the red heifer of purification exempt from punishment for the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, as that act of slaughter does not render the animal fit for consumption. The Gemara asks: And is the slaughter of the red heifer of purification considered an act of slaughter that is unfit for consumption? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: A red heifer, even if it has been slaughtered and it is therefore prohibited to derive benefit from it, is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, since it had a time in which it was fit for consumption?
