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Today's Daf Yomi

October 16, 2020 | כ״ח בתשרי תשפ״א

Masechet Eruvin is sponsored by Adina and Eric Hagege in honor of our parents, Rabbi Dov and Elayne Greenstone and Roger and Ketty Hagege who raised children, grandchildren and great grandchildren committed to Torah learning.

Eruvin 68

Today’s shiur is dedicated in memory of Rana Samuels Ofran z”l on her yahrzeit by Erin Piateski. 

The gemara brings several cases where they had heated water before Shabbat for a baby for the brit milah and it spilled. In each case, they found a solution for how to get more water, either by carrying from a nearby courtyard, even though there was no eruv (by asking a gentile to move the water or by having someone relinquish rights) or by heating water for the mother if she was still considered in danger. Can one relinquish rights to another and then the other person can relinquish their rights back? Rav and Shmuel disagree about this. Is their debate connected to a tannitic debate? Is a Sadducee treated like a gentile for laws of eruv or like a Jew? There is a debate between Rabban Gamliel and the rabbis about this.

מה הזאה שבות ואינה דוחה את השבת אף אמירה לגוי שבות ואינה דוחה את השבת

Just as sprinkling the water of purification is prohibited by rabbinic decree and does not override Shabbat, even for the purpose of a mitzva, so too, telling a gentile to perform a prohibited labor Shabbat is prohibited by rabbinic decree and does not override Shabbat. How, then, could Rabba suggest that they instruct a gentile and thus transgress a rabbinic decree?

אמר ליה ולא שני לך בין שבות דאית ביה מעשה לשבות דלית ביה מעשה דהא מר לא אמר לגוי זיל אחים

Rav Yosef said to him: But do you not differentiate between a rabbinic decree that involves an action and a rabbinic decree that does not involve an action? As the Master, Rabba, did not say to the gentile: Go and heat water on Shabbat, but only told him to transfer something from one domain to another, which does not involve an action and is therefore less severe.

אמר ליה רבה בר רב חנן לאביי מבואה דאית ביה תרי גברי רברבי כרבנן לא ליהוי ביה לא עירוב ולא שיתוף אמר ליה מאי נעביד מר לאו אורחיה אנא טרידנא בגירסאי אינהו לא משגחי

Upon hearing of this incident and the ensuing discussion, Rabba bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye: In an alleyway that contains two such great people as the Sages Rabba and Abaye, is it possible that there could be neither an eiruv nor a merging of alleyways? Abaye said to him: What should we do? As for the Master, Rabba, it is not his manner to go and collect for the eiruv from all the residents of the alleyway. As for myself, I am busy with my studies and do not have time to take care of this issue. And they, the other residents of the alleyway, do not attend to such matters.

ואי אקני להו פיתא בסלא כיון דאי בעו לה מינאי ולא אפשר ליתבה נהלייהו בטיל שיתוף

And if I were to transfer to the residents of the alleyway a share of the bread in my basket, so as to allow them to join a merging of alleyways, since if they would want to take it from me it would be impossible for me to give it to them because I am poor and need the small amount of bread that I can afford for myself, the merging of alleyways would therefore be invalid.

דתניא אחד מבני מבוי שביקש יין ושמן ולא נתנו לו בטל השתוף

As it was taught in a baraita: If one of the residents of an alleyway requested wine or oil from the merging of alleyways, and they did not give him any, the merging of alleyways is invalid. This is because it has become evident that he is not considered a true partner in it.

ונקני להו מר רביעתא דחלא בחביתא תניא אין משתתפין באוצר

Rabba bar Rav Ḥanin further asked: But let the Master transfer to them a quarter-log of vinegar in one of his barrels; certainly even Abaye could afford to provide such a small amount of vinegar for the rest of the residents. Abaye replied: It was taught in a baraita: One may not use food in a storeroom for a merging of alleyways, as it is not clear which specific portion of the food is being set aside for that purpose. The same halakha would apply to an unspecified quarter-log of vinegar in a barrel.

והא תניא משתתפין אמר רב אושעיא לא קשיא הא בית שמאי הא בית הלל

Rabba bar Rav Ḥanin raised a difficulty. Wasn’t it taught in a different baraita: One may use stored food for a merging of alleyways? Rav Oshaya said: This is not difficult. This source, the baraita that states that one may not use stored food for a merging of alleyways, is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. And that source, the baraita that states that it is permitted to do so, is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree about whether or not to apply the principle of retroactive clarification.

דתנן המת בבית ולו פתחים הרבה כולן טמאין

As we learned in a mishna: If a corpse is in a house, and the house has many entrances, they are all ritually impure. It is currently unknown through which entrance the corpse will be removed from the house, and any of the entrances might be used for this purpose. Therefore, they all contract impurity imparted by a corpse in a tent as though the corpse had already passed through each of them.

נפתח אחד מהן הוא טמא וכולן טהורין חישב להוציאו באחד מהן או בחלון שיש בו ארבעה על ארבעה מציל על כל הפתחים כולן

However, if only one of them was open, that particular entrance is ritually impure, as the corpse will certainly be removed through it, while all of the others are ritually pure. If one decided from the outset to remove the corpse through one of the entrances, or through a window that is four by four handbreadths in size, it saves all of the other entrances from contracting impurity.

בית שמאי אומרים והוא שחישב עד שלא ימות המת ובית הלל אומרים אף משימות המת

Beit Shammai say: This applies only if he had decided on an entrance before the person died, so that the entrance through which his body would be removed was already determined at the time of death. But Beit Hillel say: This applies even if he decided the matter only after the person had died, as the principle of retroactive selection is invoked and the entrance through which the deceased will be removed has been retroactively established. The same dispute applies to a merging of alleyways with an unspecified portion of stored food, and it revolves around whether it can be retroactively established that a specific portion had been set aside for the merging of alleyways.

ההוא ינוקא דאישתפוך חמימיה אמר להו רבא נישיילה לאימיה אי צריכא נחים ליה גוי אגב אימיה

The Gemara relates another story about a certain baby whose warm water, which had been prepared for his Shabbat circumcision, spilled. Rava said to those who had brought the matter to his attention: Let us ask the baby’s mother. If the warm water is necessary for her health, let a gentile heat water for the baby indirectly, through his mother. In other words, the water may be heated for the mother, as a woman after childbirth is regarded as being in a life-threatening situation.

אמר ליה רב משרשיא לרבא אימיה קא אכלה תמרי אמר ליה אימור תונבא בעלמא הוא דנקט לה

Rav Mesharshiya said to Rava: The baby’s mother is healthy enough that she is eating dates. Certainly her condition is not precarious enough to necessitate the heating of water. Rava said to him: It is possible to say that it was merely a ravenous hunger that had seized her, and she is unaware of what she is eating, but in fact she is still dangerously ill.

ההוא ינוקא דאישתפוך חמימיה אמר להו רבא פנו לי מאני מבי גברי לבי נשי ואיזיל ואיתיב התם ואיבטיל להו הא חצר

The Gemara relates yet another similar incident: There was once a certain baby whose warm water, which had been prepared for his Shabbat circumcision, spilled. Rava, who had water in his courtyard but had not established a joint eiruv with the adjacent courtyard where the baby was located, said to those who asked him about the matter: Clear away my belongings from the men’s chamber, which opens directly into my courtyard, to the inner women’s chamber, which does not. Rava was concerned that he would come to carry his belongings into the courtyard, which would be prohibited once he had renounced his rights to it. And I will go and sit there, in the women’s chamber, and I will renounce my rights to this courtyard in favor of the residents of the baby’s courtyard, so that they will be able to transfer the warm water from one courtyard to the other.

אמר ליה רבינא לרבא והאמר שמואל אין ביטול רשות מחצר לחצר אמר ליה אנא כרבי יוחנן סבירא לי דאמר יש ביטול מחצר לחצר

Ravina said to Rava: Didn’t Shmuel say: There is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another. How, then, can you renounce your rights to your courtyard in this manner? Rava said to him: I hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: There is renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another.

ואי לא סבר לה מר כשמואל

Ravina then asked Rava: But if the Master does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel,

יתיב מר בדוכתיה וניבטיל להו לדידהו וניהדרו אינהו וניבטלו ליה למר דהא אמר רב מבטלין וחוזרין ומבטלין

let the Master remain in his place, i.e., in the men’s chamber, and renounce his rights to his courtyard in favor of the residents of the baby’s courtyard, so that they may transfer the water from one courtyard to the other. And then, after the water has been moved, let them renounce their rights in favor of the Master, so that he may once again carry in his courtyard. As Rav said: If two people who live in the same courtyard forgot to establish an eiruv, one person may renounce his rights in favor of the other when he needs it, and the second person may then renounce his rights in favor of the first when he needs it.

אנא בהא כשמואל סבירא לי דאמר אין מבטלין וחוזרין ומבטלין

Rava replied: In this regard, I hold in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who said: One person may not renounce his rights in favor of the other and then subsequently have the second person renounce his rights in favor of the first.

ולאו חד טעמא הוא מאי טעמא אין מבטלין וחוזרין ומבטלין לאו משום דכיון דבטליה לרשותיה אסתלק ליה מהכא לגמרי והוה ליה כבן חצר אחרת ואין ביטול רשות מחצר לחצר מר נמי לא ניבטיל

Ravina raised a difficulty: Isn’t the reason for both halakhot one and the same? What is the reason that one may not renounce his rights in favor of the other and then subsequently have the other renounce his rights in favor of the first? Is it not because it is assumed that since he renounced his rights to the courtyard, it is as if he has completely removed himself from here, and he is now considered like the resident of a different courtyard, and Shmuel holds that there is no renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another? If so, the Master should likewise not renounce his rights to his courtyard. If you accept Shmuel’s opinion with regard to subsequent renouncing, you should likewise accept his opinion with regard to renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another.

התם היינו טעמא כי היכי דלא ליהוי מלתא דרבנן כחוכא ואטלולא

Rava responded: That is not Shmuel’s reason for prohibiting subsequent renunciations. There, this is the rationale for his opinion: So that the words of the Sages should not be a subject of laughter and mockery. If it is permitted for one person to renounce his rights in favor of another and then for the second person to renounce his rights in favor of the first, the Sages’ enactment will lose all meaning.

גופא רב אמר מבטלין וחוזרין ומבטלין ושמואל אמר אין מבטלין וחוזרין ומבטלין

The Gemara proceeds to examine in greater detail the issue raised in the previous discussion. Returning to the matter itself, Rav said: If two people who live in the same courtyard forgot to establish an eiruv, one may renounce his rights in favor of the other, and then the second person may renounce his rights in favor of the first. And Shmuel said: One may not renounce his rights in favor of the other and then subsequently have the second person renounce his rights in favor of the first.

לימא רב ושמואל בפלוגתא דרבנן ורבי אליעזר קא מיפלגי

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rav and Shmuel disagree about the same point of dispute as the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer. Elsewhere it is taught that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the halakha in a case where one of the residents of a courtyard forgot to join in the eiruv, but subsequently renounced his rights to the courtyard on Shabbat. The dispute revolves around the status of this resident’s house. Rabbi Eliezer holds that it is prohibited for him to carry in and out of his house, while the other residents of the courtyard are permitted to do so. However, the Rabbis hold that the other residents are prohibited from carrying in and out of his house as well.

דרב דאמר כרבנן ושמואל דאמר כרבי אליעזר

The suggestion is that Rav stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that even one who renounces his rights to his courtyard does not renounce his rights to his house. As he has not completely removed himself from the courtyard, the other residents may later go back and renounce their rights in his favor. And Shmuel stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. He maintains that this resident has completely removed himself from the courtyard. Therefore, there is no possibility of others subsequently renouncing their rights in his favor, as he is no longer considered a resident of the courtyard.

אמר לך רב אנא דאמרי אפילו לרבי אליעזר עד כאן לא קאמר רבי אליעזר התם המבטל רשות חצירו רשות ביתו ביטל משום דבבית בלא חצר לא דיירי אינשי אבל לענין איסתלוקי מי אמר

The Gemara rejects this comparison: Rav could have said to you: What I said is even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Eliezer stated his opinion there, that one who renounces his rights to his courtyard also renounces his rights to his house, only because people do not live in a house without a courtyard, and therefore it is evident that he has renounced his rights to his house as well. However, with regard to whether or not the person himself is considered entirely removed from the courtyard to the extent that the others would be unable to then renounce their rights in his favor, did he state this? According to this explanation, it is possible that Rav’s opinion concurs with Rabbi Eliezer’s statement.

ושמואל אמר אנא דאמרי אפילו כרבנן עד כאן לא קאמרי רבנן התם אלא מאי דבטיל בטיל ודלא בטיל לא בטיל אבל מאי דבטיל מיהא איסתלק לגמרי

And Shmuel could have said: What I said is even in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. The Rabbis stated their opinion only there, where they ruled: That which he has renounced, i.e., his rights to his courtyard, is renounced; and that which he has not renounced, i.e., his rights in his house, is not renounced. However, from that which he has renounced, he has removed himself completely. Consequently, all agree that one who renounces his rights to his courtyard is no longer considered a resident of that place.

אמר רב אחא בר חנא אמר רב ששת כתנאי מי שנתן רשותו והוציא בין בשוגג בין במזיד אוסר דברי רבי מאיר רבי יהודה אומר במזיד אוסר בשוגג אינו אוסר

Rav Aḥa bar Ḥana said that Rav Sheshet said: This dispute between Rav and Shmuel is like an earlier dispute between tanna’im. We learned elsewhere in a mishna: If one gave away his rights to his share of the courtyard to the other residents of the courtyard by renouncing them after having forgotten to establish an eiruv with the other residents on the previous day, and then he carried something out from his house into the courtyard, whether he did so unwittingly, forgetting that he had renounced his rights, or intentionally, he once again renders carrying prohibited for all the residents of the courtyard, as his action cancels his renunciation. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he did so intentionally, he renders carrying prohibited for the other residents; but if he did it unwittingly, he does not render carrying prohibited for them.

מאי לאו בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר מבטלין וחוזרין ומבטלין ומר סבר אין מבטלין וחוזרין ומבטלין

What, is it not that they disagree with regard to this: One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that a person who renounces his rights does not remove himself completely from his domain, and therefore one person may renounce his rights in favor of another, and the second person may then renounce his rights in favor of the first. As a result, even an inadvertent act of carrying serves to cancel the renunciation. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that one who renounces his rights removes himself completely from his domain, and therefore one person may not renounce his rights in favor of another and then subsequently have the second person renounce his rights in favor of the first. In that case, only an intentional act of carrying can cancel the renunciation.

אמר רב אחא בר תחליפא משמיה דרבא לא דכולי עלמא אין מבטלין וחוזרין ומבטלין והכא בקנסו שוגג אטו מזיד קא מיפלגי מר סבר קנסו שוגג אטו מזיד ומר סבר לא קנסו שוגג אטו מזיד

Rav Aḥa bar Taḥalifa said in the name of Rava: No, everyone agrees that a person who renounces his rights removes himself completely from his domain, and therefore one person may not renounce his rights in favor of another and then subsequently have the second person renounce his rights in favor of the first. And here, they disagree with regard to the question: Did the Sages penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender? One Sage, Rabbi Meir, who states that the resident always renders carrying prohibited for the others, holds that they penalized an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, who states that the resident renders carrying prohibited for the others only if he acted intentionally, holds that they did not penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender.

רב אשי אמר רב ושמואל בפלוגתא דרבי אליעזר ורבנן קא מיפלגי:

Rav Ashi, disagreeing with the Gemara’s refutation, said: Rav and Shmuel disagree in the same dispute as do Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis.

אמר רבן גמליאל מעשה בצדוקי אחד שהיה דר עמנו: צדוקי מאן דכר שמיה

It was stated in the mishna that Rabban Gamliel said: There was an incident involving a certain Sadducee who lived with us in the same alleyway in Jerusalem, who renounced his rights in the alleyway before Shabbat. The mishna then continues with a discussion about how and whether the alleyway may be used on Shabbat. The Gemara first poses a question: A Sadducee; who mentioned his name? The mishna had thus far spoken only of a gentile, so why does Rabban Gamliel invoke an incident involving a Sadducee?

חסורי מיחסרא והכי קתני צדוקי הרי הוא כגוי ורבן גמליאל אומר צדוקי אינו כגוי ואמר רבן גמליאל מעשה בצדוקי אחד שהיה דר עמנו במבוי בירושלים ואמר לנו אבא מהרו והוציאו את הכלים למבוי עד שלא יוציא ויאסר עליכם

The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete. It is missing an important element, and this is what it is teaching: The legal status of a Sadducee is like that of a gentile, and Rabban Gamliel says: The legal status of a Sadducee is not like that of a gentile. And Rabban Gamliel further said: There was an incident involving a certain Sadducee who lived with us in the same alleyway in Jerusalem, who renounced his rights in the alleyway before Shabbat, and Father said to us: Hurry and take out your utensils to the alleyway to establish possession of it before he changes his mind and takes out his utensils, in which case he would render it prohibited for you to use the entire alleyway.

והתניא הדר עם הנכרי צדוקי וביתוסי הרי אלו אוסרין עליו (רבן גמליאל אומר צדוקי וביתוסי אינן אוסרין) ומעשה בצדוקי אחד שהיה דר עם רבן גמליאל במבוי בירושלים ואמר להם רבן גמליאל לבניו בני מהרו והוציאו מה שאתם מוציאין והכניסו מה שאתם מכניסין עד שלא יוציא התועב הזה ויאסר עליכם שהרי ביטל רשותו לכם דברי רבי מאיר

And similarly, wasn’t it taught in a baraita that the status of a Sadducee is a matter of dispute between tanna’im: If one lives with a gentile, a Sadducee, or a Boethusian in the same alleyway, they render carrying prohibited for him. Rabban Gamliel says: A Sadducee or a Boethusian do not prohibit one from carrying. There was an incident involving a certain Sadducee who lived with Rabban Gamliel in the same alleyway in Jerusalem, and he renounced his rights to the alleyway before Shabbat. Rabban Gamliel said to his sons: Hurry and take out those utensils that you wish to take out, and bring in those utensils that you wish to bring in, before that loathsome person retracts his renunciation and takes out his utensils and prohibits you from using the alleyway, as he renounced his rights in your favor; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

רבי יהודה אומר בלשון אחרת מהרו ועשו צורכיכם במבוי עד שלא תחשך ויאסר עליכם

Rabbi Yehuda says: Rabban Gamliel spoke to them with a different formulation, saying: Hurry and do whatever you must do in the alleyway prior to Shabbat, before night falls and he prohibits you from using the alleyway.

אמר מר הוציאו מה שאתם מוציאין והכניסו מה שאתם מכניסין עד שלא יוציא התועב הזה ויאסר עליכם למימרא דכי מפקי אינהו והדר מפיק איהו לא אסר

The Gemara proceeds to analyze this baraita. The Master said previously: Take out those utensils that you wish to take out, and bring in those utensils that you wish to bring in, before that loathsome person takes out his utensils and prohibits you from using the alleyway. The Gemara poses a question: Is that to say that, according to Rabbi Meir, if they took out their utensils and then afterward the gentile or Sadducee took out his utensils on Shabbat, he does not render carrying prohibited for them?

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Eruvin 68

מה הזאה שבות ואינה דוחה את השבת אף אמירה לגוי שבות ואינה דוחה את השבת

Just as sprinkling the water of purification is prohibited by rabbinic decree and does not override Shabbat, even for the purpose of a mitzva, so too, telling a gentile to perform a prohibited labor Shabbat is prohibited by rabbinic decree and does not override Shabbat. How, then, could Rabba suggest that they instruct a gentile and thus transgress a rabbinic decree?

אמר ליה ולא שני לך בין שבות דאית ביה מעשה לשבות דלית ביה מעשה דהא מר לא אמר לגוי זיל אחים

Rav Yosef said to him: But do you not differentiate between a rabbinic decree that involves an action and a rabbinic decree that does not involve an action? As the Master, Rabba, did not say to the gentile: Go and heat water on Shabbat, but only told him to transfer something from one domain to another, which does not involve an action and is therefore less severe.

אמר ליה רבה בר רב חנן לאביי מבואה דאית ביה תרי גברי רברבי כרבנן לא ליהוי ביה לא עירוב ולא שיתוף אמר ליה מאי נעביד מר לאו אורחיה אנא טרידנא בגירסאי אינהו לא משגחי

Upon hearing of this incident and the ensuing discussion, Rabba bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye: In an alleyway that contains two such great people as the Sages Rabba and Abaye, is it possible that there could be neither an eiruv nor a merging of alleyways? Abaye said to him: What should we do? As for the Master, Rabba, it is not his manner to go and collect for the eiruv from all the residents of the alleyway. As for myself, I am busy with my studies and do not have time to take care of this issue. And they, the other residents of the alleyway, do not attend to such matters.

ואי אקני להו פיתא בסלא כיון דאי בעו לה מינאי ולא אפשר ליתבה נהלייהו בטיל שיתוף

And if I were to transfer to the residents of the alleyway a share of the bread in my basket, so as to allow them to join a merging of alleyways, since if they would want to take it from me it would be impossible for me to give it to them because I am poor and need the small amount of bread that I can afford for myself, the merging of alleyways would therefore be invalid.

דתניא אחד מבני מבוי שביקש יין ושמן ולא נתנו לו בטל השתוף

As it was taught in a baraita: If one of the residents of an alleyway requested wine or oil from the merging of alleyways, and they did not give him any, the merging of alleyways is invalid. This is because it has become evident that he is not considered a true partner in it.

ונקני להו מר רביעתא דחלא בחביתא תניא אין משתתפין באוצר

Rabba bar Rav Ḥanin further asked: But let the Master transfer to them a quarter-log of vinegar in one of his barrels; certainly even Abaye could afford to provide such a small amount of vinegar for the rest of the residents. Abaye replied: It was taught in a baraita: One may not use food in a storeroom for a merging of alleyways, as it is not clear which specific portion of the food is being set aside for that purpose. The same halakha would apply to an unspecified quarter-log of vinegar in a barrel.

והא תניא משתתפין אמר רב אושעיא לא קשיא הא בית שמאי הא בית הלל

Rabba bar Rav Ḥanin raised a difficulty. Wasn’t it taught in a different baraita: One may use stored food for a merging of alleyways? Rav Oshaya said: This is not difficult. This source, the baraita that states that one may not use stored food for a merging of alleyways, is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. And that source, the baraita that states that it is permitted to do so, is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree about whether or not to apply the principle of retroactive clarification.

דתנן המת בבית ולו פתחים הרבה כולן טמאין

As we learned in a mishna: If a corpse is in a house, and the house has many entrances, they are all ritually impure. It is currently unknown through which entrance the corpse will be removed from the house, and any of the entrances might be used for this purpose. Therefore, they all contract impurity imparted by a corpse in a tent as though the corpse had already passed through each of them.

נפתח אחד מהן הוא טמא וכולן טהורין חישב להוציאו באחד מהן או בחלון שיש בו ארבעה על ארבעה מציל על כל הפתחים כולן

However, if only one of them was open, that particular entrance is ritually impure, as the corpse will certainly be removed through it, while all of the others are ritually pure. If one decided from the outset to remove the corpse through one of the entrances, or through a window that is four by four handbreadths in size, it saves all of the other entrances from contracting impurity.

בית שמאי אומרים והוא שחישב עד שלא ימות המת ובית הלל אומרים אף משימות המת

Beit Shammai say: This applies only if he had decided on an entrance before the person died, so that the entrance through which his body would be removed was already determined at the time of death. But Beit Hillel say: This applies even if he decided the matter only after the person had died, as the principle of retroactive selection is invoked and the entrance through which the deceased will be removed has been retroactively established. The same dispute applies to a merging of alleyways with an unspecified portion of stored food, and it revolves around whether it can be retroactively established that a specific portion had been set aside for the merging of alleyways.

ההוא ינוקא דאישתפוך חמימיה אמר להו רבא נישיילה לאימיה אי צריכא נחים ליה גוי אגב אימיה

The Gemara relates another story about a certain baby whose warm water, which had been prepared for his Shabbat circumcision, spilled. Rava said to those who had brought the matter to his attention: Let us ask the baby’s mother. If the warm water is necessary for her health, let a gentile heat water for the baby indirectly, through his mother. In other words, the water may be heated for the mother, as a woman after childbirth is regarded as being in a life-threatening situation.

אמר ליה רב משרשיא לרבא אימיה קא אכלה תמרי אמר ליה אימור תונבא בעלמא הוא דנקט לה

Rav Mesharshiya said to Rava: The baby’s mother is healthy enough that she is eating dates. Certainly her condition is not precarious enough to necessitate the heating of water. Rava said to him: It is possible to say that it was merely a ravenous hunger that had seized her, and she is unaware of what she is eating, but in fact she is still dangerously ill.

ההוא ינוקא דאישתפוך חמימיה אמר להו רבא פנו לי מאני מבי גברי לבי נשי ואיזיל ואיתיב התם ואיבטיל להו הא חצר

The Gemara relates yet another similar incident: There was once a certain baby whose warm water, which had been prepared for his Shabbat circumcision, spilled. Rava, who had water in his courtyard but had not established a joint eiruv with the adjacent courtyard where the baby was located, said to those who asked him about the matter: Clear away my belongings from the men’s chamber, which opens directly into my courtyard, to the inner women’s chamber, which does not. Rava was concerned that he would come to carry his belongings into the courtyard, which would be prohibited once he had renounced his rights to it. And I will go and sit there, in the women’s chamber, and I will renounce my rights to this courtyard in favor of the residents of the baby’s courtyard, so that they will be able to transfer the warm water from one courtyard to the other.

אמר ליה רבינא לרבא והאמר שמואל אין ביטול רשות מחצר לחצר אמר ליה אנא כרבי יוחנן סבירא לי דאמר יש ביטול מחצר לחצר

Ravina said to Rava: Didn’t Shmuel say: There is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another. How, then, can you renounce your rights to your courtyard in this manner? Rava said to him: I hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: There is renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another.

ואי לא סבר לה מר כשמואל

Ravina then asked Rava: But if the Master does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel,

יתיב מר בדוכתיה וניבטיל להו לדידהו וניהדרו אינהו וניבטלו ליה למר דהא אמר רב מבטלין וחוזרין ומבטלין

let the Master remain in his place, i.e., in the men’s chamber, and renounce his rights to his courtyard in favor of the residents of the baby’s courtyard, so that they may transfer the water from one courtyard to the other. And then, after the water has been moved, let them renounce their rights in favor of the Master, so that he may once again carry in his courtyard. As Rav said: If two people who live in the same courtyard forgot to establish an eiruv, one person may renounce his rights in favor of the other when he needs it, and the second person may then renounce his rights in favor of the first when he needs it.

אנא בהא כשמואל סבירא לי דאמר אין מבטלין וחוזרין ומבטלין

Rava replied: In this regard, I hold in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who said: One person may not renounce his rights in favor of the other and then subsequently have the second person renounce his rights in favor of the first.

ולאו חד טעמא הוא מאי טעמא אין מבטלין וחוזרין ומבטלין לאו משום דכיון דבטליה לרשותיה אסתלק ליה מהכא לגמרי והוה ליה כבן חצר אחרת ואין ביטול רשות מחצר לחצר מר נמי לא ניבטיל

Ravina raised a difficulty: Isn’t the reason for both halakhot one and the same? What is the reason that one may not renounce his rights in favor of the other and then subsequently have the other renounce his rights in favor of the first? Is it not because it is assumed that since he renounced his rights to the courtyard, it is as if he has completely removed himself from here, and he is now considered like the resident of a different courtyard, and Shmuel holds that there is no renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another? If so, the Master should likewise not renounce his rights to his courtyard. If you accept Shmuel’s opinion with regard to subsequent renouncing, you should likewise accept his opinion with regard to renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another.

התם היינו טעמא כי היכי דלא ליהוי מלתא דרבנן כחוכא ואטלולא

Rava responded: That is not Shmuel’s reason for prohibiting subsequent renunciations. There, this is the rationale for his opinion: So that the words of the Sages should not be a subject of laughter and mockery. If it is permitted for one person to renounce his rights in favor of another and then for the second person to renounce his rights in favor of the first, the Sages’ enactment will lose all meaning.

גופא רב אמר מבטלין וחוזרין ומבטלין ושמואל אמר אין מבטלין וחוזרין ומבטלין

The Gemara proceeds to examine in greater detail the issue raised in the previous discussion. Returning to the matter itself, Rav said: If two people who live in the same courtyard forgot to establish an eiruv, one may renounce his rights in favor of the other, and then the second person may renounce his rights in favor of the first. And Shmuel said: One may not renounce his rights in favor of the other and then subsequently have the second person renounce his rights in favor of the first.

לימא רב ושמואל בפלוגתא דרבנן ורבי אליעזר קא מיפלגי

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rav and Shmuel disagree about the same point of dispute as the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer. Elsewhere it is taught that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the halakha in a case where one of the residents of a courtyard forgot to join in the eiruv, but subsequently renounced his rights to the courtyard on Shabbat. The dispute revolves around the status of this resident’s house. Rabbi Eliezer holds that it is prohibited for him to carry in and out of his house, while the other residents of the courtyard are permitted to do so. However, the Rabbis hold that the other residents are prohibited from carrying in and out of his house as well.

דרב דאמר כרבנן ושמואל דאמר כרבי אליעזר

The suggestion is that Rav stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that even one who renounces his rights to his courtyard does not renounce his rights to his house. As he has not completely removed himself from the courtyard, the other residents may later go back and renounce their rights in his favor. And Shmuel stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. He maintains that this resident has completely removed himself from the courtyard. Therefore, there is no possibility of others subsequently renouncing their rights in his favor, as he is no longer considered a resident of the courtyard.

אמר לך רב אנא דאמרי אפילו לרבי אליעזר עד כאן לא קאמר רבי אליעזר התם המבטל רשות חצירו רשות ביתו ביטל משום דבבית בלא חצר לא דיירי אינשי אבל לענין איסתלוקי מי אמר

The Gemara rejects this comparison: Rav could have said to you: What I said is even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Eliezer stated his opinion there, that one who renounces his rights to his courtyard also renounces his rights to his house, only because people do not live in a house without a courtyard, and therefore it is evident that he has renounced his rights to his house as well. However, with regard to whether or not the person himself is considered entirely removed from the courtyard to the extent that the others would be unable to then renounce their rights in his favor, did he state this? According to this explanation, it is possible that Rav’s opinion concurs with Rabbi Eliezer’s statement.

ושמואל אמר אנא דאמרי אפילו כרבנן עד כאן לא קאמרי רבנן התם אלא מאי דבטיל בטיל ודלא בטיל לא בטיל אבל מאי דבטיל מיהא איסתלק לגמרי

And Shmuel could have said: What I said is even in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. The Rabbis stated their opinion only there, where they ruled: That which he has renounced, i.e., his rights to his courtyard, is renounced; and that which he has not renounced, i.e., his rights in his house, is not renounced. However, from that which he has renounced, he has removed himself completely. Consequently, all agree that one who renounces his rights to his courtyard is no longer considered a resident of that place.

אמר רב אחא בר חנא אמר רב ששת כתנאי מי שנתן רשותו והוציא בין בשוגג בין במזיד אוסר דברי רבי מאיר רבי יהודה אומר במזיד אוסר בשוגג אינו אוסר

Rav Aḥa bar Ḥana said that Rav Sheshet said: This dispute between Rav and Shmuel is like an earlier dispute between tanna’im. We learned elsewhere in a mishna: If one gave away his rights to his share of the courtyard to the other residents of the courtyard by renouncing them after having forgotten to establish an eiruv with the other residents on the previous day, and then he carried something out from his house into the courtyard, whether he did so unwittingly, forgetting that he had renounced his rights, or intentionally, he once again renders carrying prohibited for all the residents of the courtyard, as his action cancels his renunciation. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he did so intentionally, he renders carrying prohibited for the other residents; but if he did it unwittingly, he does not render carrying prohibited for them.

מאי לאו בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר מבטלין וחוזרין ומבטלין ומר סבר אין מבטלין וחוזרין ומבטלין

What, is it not that they disagree with regard to this: One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that a person who renounces his rights does not remove himself completely from his domain, and therefore one person may renounce his rights in favor of another, and the second person may then renounce his rights in favor of the first. As a result, even an inadvertent act of carrying serves to cancel the renunciation. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that one who renounces his rights removes himself completely from his domain, and therefore one person may not renounce his rights in favor of another and then subsequently have the second person renounce his rights in favor of the first. In that case, only an intentional act of carrying can cancel the renunciation.

אמר רב אחא בר תחליפא משמיה דרבא לא דכולי עלמא אין מבטלין וחוזרין ומבטלין והכא בקנסו שוגג אטו מזיד קא מיפלגי מר סבר קנסו שוגג אטו מזיד ומר סבר לא קנסו שוגג אטו מזיד

Rav Aḥa bar Taḥalifa said in the name of Rava: No, everyone agrees that a person who renounces his rights removes himself completely from his domain, and therefore one person may not renounce his rights in favor of another and then subsequently have the second person renounce his rights in favor of the first. And here, they disagree with regard to the question: Did the Sages penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender? One Sage, Rabbi Meir, who states that the resident always renders carrying prohibited for the others, holds that they penalized an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, who states that the resident renders carrying prohibited for the others only if he acted intentionally, holds that they did not penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender.

רב אשי אמר רב ושמואל בפלוגתא דרבי אליעזר ורבנן קא מיפלגי:

Rav Ashi, disagreeing with the Gemara’s refutation, said: Rav and Shmuel disagree in the same dispute as do Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis.

אמר רבן גמליאל מעשה בצדוקי אחד שהיה דר עמנו: צדוקי מאן דכר שמיה

It was stated in the mishna that Rabban Gamliel said: There was an incident involving a certain Sadducee who lived with us in the same alleyway in Jerusalem, who renounced his rights in the alleyway before Shabbat. The mishna then continues with a discussion about how and whether the alleyway may be used on Shabbat. The Gemara first poses a question: A Sadducee; who mentioned his name? The mishna had thus far spoken only of a gentile, so why does Rabban Gamliel invoke an incident involving a Sadducee?

חסורי מיחסרא והכי קתני צדוקי הרי הוא כגוי ורבן גמליאל אומר צדוקי אינו כגוי ואמר רבן גמליאל מעשה בצדוקי אחד שהיה דר עמנו במבוי בירושלים ואמר לנו אבא מהרו והוציאו את הכלים למבוי עד שלא יוציא ויאסר עליכם

The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete. It is missing an important element, and this is what it is teaching: The legal status of a Sadducee is like that of a gentile, and Rabban Gamliel says: The legal status of a Sadducee is not like that of a gentile. And Rabban Gamliel further said: There was an incident involving a certain Sadducee who lived with us in the same alleyway in Jerusalem, who renounced his rights in the alleyway before Shabbat, and Father said to us: Hurry and take out your utensils to the alleyway to establish possession of it before he changes his mind and takes out his utensils, in which case he would render it prohibited for you to use the entire alleyway.

והתניא הדר עם הנכרי צדוקי וביתוסי הרי אלו אוסרין עליו (רבן גמליאל אומר צדוקי וביתוסי אינן אוסרין) ומעשה בצדוקי אחד שהיה דר עם רבן גמליאל במבוי בירושלים ואמר להם רבן גמליאל לבניו בני מהרו והוציאו מה שאתם מוציאין והכניסו מה שאתם מכניסין עד שלא יוציא התועב הזה ויאסר עליכם שהרי ביטל רשותו לכם דברי רבי מאיר

And similarly, wasn’t it taught in a baraita that the status of a Sadducee is a matter of dispute between tanna’im: If one lives with a gentile, a Sadducee, or a Boethusian in the same alleyway, they render carrying prohibited for him. Rabban Gamliel says: A Sadducee or a Boethusian do not prohibit one from carrying. There was an incident involving a certain Sadducee who lived with Rabban Gamliel in the same alleyway in Jerusalem, and he renounced his rights to the alleyway before Shabbat. Rabban Gamliel said to his sons: Hurry and take out those utensils that you wish to take out, and bring in those utensils that you wish to bring in, before that loathsome person retracts his renunciation and takes out his utensils and prohibits you from using the alleyway, as he renounced his rights in your favor; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

רבי יהודה אומר בלשון אחרת מהרו ועשו צורכיכם במבוי עד שלא תחשך ויאסר עליכם

Rabbi Yehuda says: Rabban Gamliel spoke to them with a different formulation, saying: Hurry and do whatever you must do in the alleyway prior to Shabbat, before night falls and he prohibits you from using the alleyway.

אמר מר הוציאו מה שאתם מוציאין והכניסו מה שאתם מכניסין עד שלא יוציא התועב הזה ויאסר עליכם למימרא דכי מפקי אינהו והדר מפיק איהו לא אסר

The Gemara proceeds to analyze this baraita. The Master said previously: Take out those utensils that you wish to take out, and bring in those utensils that you wish to bring in, before that loathsome person takes out his utensils and prohibits you from using the alleyway. The Gemara poses a question: Is that to say that, according to Rabbi Meir, if they took out their utensils and then afterward the gentile or Sadducee took out his utensils on Shabbat, he does not render carrying prohibited for them?

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