Eruvin 67
שָׁכַח אֶחָד מִן הַחִיצוֹנָה וְלֹא עֵירַב — וַדַּאי פְּנִימִית מוּתֶּרֶת, דְּאָחֲדָא דַּשָּׁא, וּמִשְׁתַּמְּשָׁא, וְחִיצוֹנָה אֲסוּרָה.
But if a resident of the outer courtyard forgot and did not establish an eiruv, it is certainly permitted to carry in the inner courtyard, as its residents can close the door between the two courtyards, thereby preventing the residents of the outer courtyard from entering, and they can then use their courtyard on their own. However, it is still prohibited to carry in the outer courtyard.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לְרָבָא: וְכִי שָׁכַח אֶחָד מִן הַפְּנִימִית וְלֹא עֵירַב אַמַּאי שְׁתֵּיהֶן אֲסוּרוֹת, לְבַטֵּיל בַּר פְּנִימִית לִבְנֵי פְּנִימִית, וְתֵיתֵי חִיצוֹנָה וְתִשְׁתְּרֵי בַּהֲדַיְיהוּ!
Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rava: And if a resident of the inner courtyard forgot and did not establish an eiruv, why is it prohibited to carry in both courtyards? Let the resident of the inner courtyard who forgot to establish an eiruv renounce his rights in favor of the other residents of the inner courtyard, and then let the residents of the outer courtyard, who had established an eiruv with the inner one, come and be permitted to carry together with them.
כְּמַאן — כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, דְּאָמַר: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת לְכׇל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד? כִּי קָאָמֵינָא לְרַבָּנַן, דְּאָמְרִי: צָרִיךְ לְבַטֵּל לְכׇל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד!
Rava replied: In accordance with whose opinion do you make this suggestion? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said: It is not necessary to renounce one’s rights in favor of each and every resident. Rather, it is enough for a person to renounce his rights in favor of a single person, as once he no longer has any rights in the courtyard, he can no longer render it prohibited to carry there. According to this approach, a resident of the inner courtyard may indeed renounce his rights in favor of the other residents of his courtyard. The outer courtyard would then be rendered permitted together with the inner courtyard. However, when I spoke, it was in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: It is necessary to renounce one’s rights in favor of each and every resident. Therefore, in order to render the outer courtyard permitted, it would be necessary for the person who forgot to establish the eiruv to renounce his rights in favor of the residents of the outer courtyard as well. However, he may not do so, as one may not renounce rights from one courtyard to another. Therefore, the outer courtyard may not be rendered permitted in this manner.
רַב חִסְדָּא וְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת כִּי פָּגְעִי בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי — רַב חִסְדָּא מִרַתְעָן שִׂיפְווֹתֵיהּ מִמַּתְנְיָיתָא דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת, וְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת מִרְתַע כּוּלֵּיהּ גּוּפֵיהּ מִפִּלְפּוּלֵיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא.
The Gemara relates that when Rav Ḥisda and Rav Sheshet would meet each other, Rav Ḥisda’s lips would tremble from the teachings of Rav Sheshet. Rav Sheshet’s fluency and expertise were such that Rav Ḥisda would be filled with awe in his presence. For his part, Rav Sheshet’s entire body would shake from Rav Ḥisda’s sharpness, i.e., from his brilliant, analytical mind.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב חִסְדָּא מֵרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: שְׁנֵי בָתִּים מִשְּׁנֵי צִידֵּי רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וּבָאוּ גּוֹיִם וְהִקִּיפוּם מְחִיצָה בְּשַׁבָּת, מַהוּ?
Rav Ḥisda raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: If there were two unconnected houses on two sides of a public domain, and gentiles came and enclosed them in a partition on Shabbat, what is the halakha? By erecting the fence, the gentiles nullified the public domain between the two houses, turning it into a private domain. Consequently, carrying from one house to the other is permitted by Torah law. The question is: Is it possible to render it permitted to carry even by rabbinic law? Can one resident renounce his rights to the area between the houses and thereby allow the other to carry there?
אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר, לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ. הַשְׁתָּא דְּאִי בָּעוּ לְעָרוֹבֵי מֵאֶתְמוֹל מָצוּ מְעָרְבִי — אָמְרַתְּ ״אֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר״, הָכָא דְּאִי בָּעוּ לְעָרוֹבֵי מֵאֶתְמוֹל לָא מָצוּ מְעָרְבִי — לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!
The Gemara clarifies the question: In accordance with the opinion of the one who said that there is no renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another, you have no dilemma, as carrying is certainly prohibited. Now, if in a case where had they wanted to establish an eiruv yesterday they could have established an eiruv, e.g., in a case of two adjacent courtyards with an entranceway between them, you say that there is no renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another, then here, in a case of two houses situated on opposite sides of a public domain, where had they wanted to establish an eiruv yesterday they could not have established an eiruv, because of the public domain between the houses, all the more so is it not clear that there is no renouncing of rights?
כִּי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר ״יֵשׁ בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר״. הָתָם, דְּאִי בָּעוּ לְעָרוֹבֵי מֵאֶתְמוֹל מָצוּ מְעָרְבִי — בַּטּוֹלֵי נָמֵי מָצֵי מְבַטֵּל — אֲבָל הָכָא, דְּלָא מָצוּ מְעָרְבִי מֵאֶתְמוֹל — בַּטּוֹלֵי נָמֵי לָא מָצֵי מְבַטֵּל.
Where you have a dilemma is in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that there is renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another, and the two sides of the question are as follows: Perhaps there, where had they wanted to establish an eiruv yesterday they could have established an eiruv then, they can also renounce rights now. But here, where they could not have established an eiruv yesterday even had they wanted to, one may not renounce rights now either.
אוֹ דִילְמָא לָא שְׁנָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵין מְבַטְּלִין.
Or perhaps there is no difference between the two cases. Since renunciation of rights is possible under the current circumstances, yesterday’s situation is not taken into account. Rav Sheshet said to Rav Ḥisda: In such a case, one may not renounce his rights.
מֵת גּוֹי בְּשַׁבָּת מַהוּ?
Rav Ḥisda posed a similar question: If two Jews and a gentile shared a courtyard, and no steps had been taken prior to Shabbat to render it permitted to carry in the courtyard, and the gentile died on Shabbat, what is the halakha? Since the gentile died, he no longer imposes restrictions on carrying in the courtyard. May one Jew now renounce his rights in favor of the other and thereby render it permitted for him to carry in the courtyard?
אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר שׂוֹכְרִין — לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ: הַשְׁתָּא תַּרְתֵּי עָבְדִינַן, חֲדָא מִיבַּעְיָא!
The Gemara clarifies the question: In accordance with the opinion of the one who said that one may rent from a gentile who arrives on Shabbat, you have no dilemma. Now that we may perform two actions, both rent and renounce rights, as the Jewish neighbors may rent from the gentile and subsequently each could renounce his rights in favor of the other, is it necessary to state that we may perform one action? Each Jew may certainly renounce his rights in favor of the other.
אֶלָּא כִּי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵין שׂוֹכְרִין. תַּרְתֵּי הוּא דְּלָא עָבְדִינַן, הָא חֲדָא — עָבְדִינַן, אוֹ דִילְמָא לָא שְׁנָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנִי אוֹמֵר מְבַטְּלִין, וְהַמְנוּנָא אָמַר אֵין מְבַטְּלִין.
Rather, there is a dilemma in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that they may not rent from the gentile in such a case. The two sides of the question are as follows: Perhaps it is two actions that we may not perform, rent and renounce; however, one action alone we may perform; or perhaps there is no difference between one action and two. Rav Sheshet said to Rav Ḥisda: I say that in such a case one may renounce his rights, while Rav Hamnuna said that one may not renounce his rights.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: גּוֹי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ פֶּתַח אַרְבָּעָה עַל אַרְבָּעָה פָּתוּחַ לְבִקְעָה, אֲפִילּוּ מַכְנִיס וּמוֹצִיא גְּמַלִּים וּקְרוֹנוֹת כׇּל הַיּוֹם כּוּלּוֹ דֶּרֶךְ מָבוֹי, אֵין אוֹסֵר עַל בְּנֵי מָבוֹי.
Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: With regard to a gentile who lives in a courtyard that opens into an alleyway in which many Jews reside, and he has another entrance on the other side of the courtyard, even one that is only four by four handbreadths in size, that opens into a valley, then in such a case, even if all day long he brings camels and wagons in and out of his courtyard by way of the alleyway, so that it is evident that he uses the alleyway, he nonetheless does not render it prohibited for the residents of the alleyway to carry. He is not considered a resident of the alleyway alongside them, as the entrance from the field is viewed as the true entrance to his courtyard.
מַאי טַעְמָא? בְּפִיתְחָא דִּמְיַחַד לֵיהּ, בְּהָהוּא נִיחָא לֵיהּ.
What is the reason that his small entrance from the field is considered his main entrance? Because the entrance that is exclusively his is preferable to him. Despite its small size, the gentile views the entrance from the field as his main entrance, while he uses the one that opens into the alleyway only when it is convenient.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: פָּתוּחַ לְקַרְפֵּף, מַהוּ? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר אַמֵּי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּאוּלְפָנָא:
Based on this assumption, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the gentile’s courtyard opens into an alleyway in which Jews reside, and it also has an entrance that opens into an enclosure rather than into a valley, what is the halakha? Which entrance is considered his primary entrance? Rav Naḥman bar Ami said, citing a tradition [mishmei de’ulpana] he received from his teachers:
אֲפִילּוּ פָּתוּחַ לְקַרְפֵּף.
Even if it opens into an enclosure, this is considered its main entrance, rather than the one that opens into the alleyway.
רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: גּוֹי בֵּית סָאתַיִם — אוֹסֵר, יוֹתֵר מִבֵּית סָאתַיִם — אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר.
It is Rabba and Rav Yosef who both say: The halakha in such a case depends on the identity of the owner of the courtyard. With regard to a courtyard owned by a gentile, if the enclosure behind his courtyard is the size of two beit se’a or less, he renders it prohibited for the Jewish residents of the alleyway to carry. An enclosure of this size is not large enough for all the gentile’s needs, and therefore his main entrance is the one that opens into the alleyway. However, if the enclosure is greater than the size of two beit se’a, he does not render it prohibited for the residents of the alleyway to carry, as such an enclosure is sufficient for all his needs.
וְיִשְׂרָאֵל בֵּית סָאתַיִם — אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר.
On the other hand, with regard to a courtyard owned by a Jew, if the enclosure is the size of two beit se’a or less, he does not render it prohibited for the other residents of the alleyway to carry, even if he did not join in an eiruv with them. Because he has the option of carrying in such an enclosure on Shabbat, he would not carry in the alleyway, as it is more convenient for him to carry in a place that belongs exclusively to him.
יוֹתֵר מִבֵּית סָאתַיִם — אוֹסֵר.
However, if the enclosure is greater than the size of two beit se’a, in which case it is prohibited to carry there, the Jew would carry only by way of the alleyway. Therefore, he renders it prohibited for his fellow residents of the alleyway to carry unless he establishes an eiruv with them.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא בַּר חַקְלַאי מֵרַב הוּנָא: פָּתוּחַ לְקַרְפֵּף מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲרֵי אָמְרוּ בֵּית סָאתַיִם — אוֹסֵר, יוֹתֵר מִבֵּית סָאתַיִם — אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר.
With regard to this issue, Rava bar Ḥaklai raised a dilemma before Rav Huna: If the gentile’s courtyard opens into an alleyway, and it also has an entrance that opens into an enclosure, what is the halakha? He said to him: They have already said that if the enclosure is the size of two beit se’a or less, the gentile renders it prohibited for the Jewish residents of the alleyway to carry; however, if it is more than two beit se’a, he does not render it prohibited for them to carry.
אָמַר עוּלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: קַרְפֵּף יוֹתֵר מִבֵּית סָאתַיִם שֶׁלֹּא הוּקַּף לְדִירָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ כּוֹר וַאֲפִילּוּ כּוֹרַיִים — הַזּוֹרֵק לְתוֹכוֹ חַיָּיב. מַאי טַעְמָא, מְחִיצָה הִיא, אֶלָּא שֶׁמְחוּסֶּרֶת דָּיוֹרִין.
Ulla said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to an enclosure greater than the size of two beit se’a that was not originally surrounded by a fence for the purpose of residence, even if it is as large as a field that produces a crop of one kor, and even two kor, one who inadvertently throws an object into it from the public domain is liable to bring a sin-offering, like one who throws into a private domain. What is the reason for this? It is because the partition of an enclosure is a valid partition. Consequently, the enclosure is considered a private domain by Torah law, except that it is lacking residents, and therefore the Sages did not permit one to carry inside it as in a proper private domain.
מֵתִיב רַב הוּנָא בַּר חִינָּנָא: סֶלַע שֶׁבַּיָּם גָּבוֹהַּ עֲשָׂרָה וְרוֹחַב אַרְבָּעָה — אֵין מְטַלְטְלִין לֹא מִן תּוֹכוֹ לַיָּם וְלֹא מִן הַיָּם לְתוֹכוֹ. פָּחוֹת מִכָּאן — מְטַלְטְלִין. עַד כַּמָּה — עַד בֵּית סָאתַיִם.
Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana raised an objection from the following baraita: With regard to a rock protruding from the sea that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, one may not carry from it to the sea or from the sea to it on Shabbat. The rock has the status of a private domain, while the sea is a karmelit, and it is prohibited to carry from a private domain into a karmelit or vice versa on Shabbat. If the rock is smaller than this, either in height or width, so that it is no longer considered a private domain, one may carry to or from it. How large may the rock be? It may be up to the size of two beit se’a.
אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַסֵּיפָא — בֵּית סָאתַיִם, טְפֵי לָא? וְהָא מִכַּרְמְלִית לְכַרְמְלִית קָא מְטַלְטֵל.
The Gemara attempts to clarify the meaning of this baraita: To which part of the baraita is the clause: Up to the size of two beit se’a, referring? If you say it is referring to the latter clause, can it be that with regard to a rock that is less than ten handbreadths high, the halakha is that carrying is permitted if the rock is up to the size of two beit se’a, but no more than that? Wouldn’t he be carrying from one karmelit to another, which is certainly permitted?
אֶלָּא לָאו אַרֵישָׁא, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: סֶלַע שֶׁבַּיָּם גָּבוֹהַּ עֲשָׂרָה וְרוֹחַב אַרְבָּעָה — אֵין מְטַלְטְלִין לֹא מִתּוֹכוֹ לַיָּם וְלֹא מִן הַיָּם לְתוֹכוֹ. וְעַד כַּמָּה — עַד בֵּית סָאתַיִם, הָא יָתֵר מִבֵּית סָאתַיִם — מְטַלְטְלִין. אַלְמָא כַּרְמְלִית הִיא, תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן!
Rather, is it not referring to the first clause of the baraita, and this is what it is saying: With regard to a rock protruding from the sea that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, one may not carry from it to the sea or from the sea to it, as it has the status of a private domain. And how large may it be for this prohibition to apply? Up to the size of two beit se’a. But if the rock is greater than the size of two beit se’a, one may carry. Apparently, it is a karmelit in all respects, and not just as a stringency. This appears to be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.
אָמַר רָבָא: מַאן דְּלָא יָדַע תָּרוֹצֵי מַתְנְיָיתָא — תְּיוּבְתָּא מוֹתֵיב לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. לְעוֹלָם אַרֵישָׁא, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: הָא בְּתוֹכוֹ — מְטַלְטְלִין. וְעַד כַּמָּה — עַד בֵּית סָאתַיִם.
Rava said: Only one who does not know how to explain mishnayot raises such refutations against Rabbi Yoḥanan, one of the greatest Sages of his generation. Rather, the baraita is to be understood as follows: Actually, the final words of the baraita refer to the first clause, and this is what it is saying: With regard to a rock protruding from the sea that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, one may not carry from it to the sea or from the sea to it, but within it, on the rock itself, one may carry, as it is considered a private domain. And how large may the rock be and remain permitted? Up to two beit se’a.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם אַרֵישָׁא, הֵן אָמְרוּ וְהֵן אָמְרוּ.
Rav Ashi said that the baraita may be explained differently, yet still in a manner that does not refute the words of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Actually, the final words of the baraita refer to the first clause, as stated by Rav Huna bar Ḥanina. However, one may not infer from them a principle with regard to enclosures, as they said that the halakha is stringent in one case, and they said that the halakha should be lenient in a different case, i.e., the same Sages who were stringent in one case were lenient in another.
הֵן אָמְרוּ: קַרְפֵּף יָתֵר מִבֵּית סָאתַיִם שֶׁלֹּא הוּקַּף לְדִירָה — אֵין מְטַלְטְלִין בּוֹ אֶלָּא בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת. וְהֵן אָמְרוּ: אֵין מְטַלְטְלִין מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לְכַרְמְלִית.
How so? They said that in the case of an enclosure greater than the size of two beit se’a that was not originally enclosed with a fence for the purpose of residence, one may carry only a distance of four cubits, as it has the status of a karmelit in this regard. And they also said that one may not carry from a private domain to a karmelit. Both of these halakhot are decrees of the Sages.
בֵּית סָאתַיִם דְּשָׁרֵי לְטַלְטוֹלֵי בְּכוּלֵּיהּ, אָסְרִי רַבָּנַן לְטַלְטוֹלֵי לֹא מִן הַיָּם לְתוֹכוֹ וְלֹא מִתּוֹכוֹ לַיָּם. מַאי טַעְמָא, רְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד גְּמוּרָה הִיא.
Therefore, the Sages developed the following principles: With regard to a rock that is no larger than two beit se’a, so that it is permitted to carry on all of it, the Sages prohibited carrying from the sea to it and from it to the sea. What is the reason for this? It is that the rock is a full-fledged private domain, and they did not permit one to carry from a private domain to a karmelit or vice versa.
יָתֵר מִבֵּית סָאתַיִם, דְּאָסוּר לְטַלְטוֹלֵי בְּכוּלֵּיהּ, שָׁרוּ רַבָּנַן לְטַלְטוֹלֵי מִתּוֹכוֹ לַיָּם וּמִן הַיָּם לְתוֹכוֹ. מַאי טַעְמָא? דִּלְמָא אָמְרִי: רְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד גְּמוּרָה הִיא, וְאָתֵי לְטַלְטוֹלֵי בְּכוּלֵּיהּ.
However, if it is larger than the size of two beit se’a, so that it is prohibited to carry on all of it by rabbinic decree, the Sages permitted carrying from the sea to it and from it to the sea. What is the reason for this? It is because the Sages were concerned that perhaps people would say that it is a proper private domain, and they would come to carry on all of it. Were the Sages to prohibit carrying from the rock to the sea, people would think that it is a full-fledged private domain, and they would carry on it. Since all these decrees are rabbinic in nature, the Sages permitted carrying from a private domain to a karmelit in this case in order to prevent people from violating a different rabbinic decree, which prohibits carrying in an enclosure that is greater than the size of two beit se’a. However, no general conclusion may be inferred from this that an enclosure larger than two beit se’a is not a private domain by Torah law.
וּמַאי שְׁנָא? תּוֹכוֹ שְׁכִיחַ. מִתּוֹכוֹ לַיָּם וּמִן הַיָּם לְתוֹכוֹ — לָא שְׁכִיחַ.
The Gemara asks: And what is the difference between the decrees that caused the Sages to choose to uphold the one decree and not the other? The Gemara answers: The difference is that carrying within the rock is common, whereas carrying from it to the sea and from the sea to it is not common. The Sages permitted carrying in the less likely scenario in order to reinforce the decree against carrying within the rock, the more common situation.
הָהוּא יָנוֹקָא דְּאִשְׁתְּפִיךְ חַמִּימֵיהּ. אֲמַר לְהוּ רַבָּה: נַיְיתוֹ לֵיהּ חַמִּימֵי מִגּוֹ בֵּיתַאי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וְהָא לָא עָרְבִינַן.
The Gemara now relates that there was once a certain baby whose warm water, which had been prepared for his Shabbat circumcision, spilled. Rabba said to them: Let them bring warm water for him from my house. Abaye said to him: But we did not establish an eiruv in the courtyard, so it is prohibited to carry the water.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: נִסְמוֹךְ אַשִּׁיתּוּף. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָא לָא שַׁתְּפִינַן. נֵימְרוּ לֵיהּ לְגוֹי לַיְתֵי לֵיהּ.
Rabba said to him: Let us rely on the merging of alleyways, which may serve in place of a joining of courtyards in pressing circumstances such as these. Abaye said to him: But we did not establish a merging of alleyways either. Rabba replied: If so, let them instruct a gentile to bring the warm water for him, even though it is generally prohibited to instruct a gentile to perform labor for a Jew that involves a desecration of Shabbat.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: בְּעַי לְאוֹתֹבֵיהּ לְמָר, וְלָא שַׁבְקַן רַב יוֹסֵף, דְּאָמַר רַב [יוֹסֵף אָמַר רַב] כָּהֲנָא: כִּי הֲוֵינַן בֵּי רַב יְהוּדָה, הֲוָה אֲמַר לַן: בִּדְאוֹרָיְיתָא — מוֹתְבִינַן תְּיוּבְתָּא וַהֲדַר עָבְדִינַן מַעֲשֶׂה, בִּדְרַבָּנַן — עָבְדִינַן מַעֲשֶׂה וַהֲדַר מוֹתְבִינַן תְּיוּבְתָּא.
Abaye said: I wanted to raise an objection against the Master, Rabba, but Rav Yosef would not let me do so, as Rav Yosef said that Rav Kahana said: When we were in Rav Yehuda’s house, he would say to us when we were presented with a halakhic difficulty: With regard to a Torah law, we first raise objections and then we perform an act, i.e., if someone has an objection to a proposed action, we must first clarify the matter and only then may we proceed. However, with regard to rabbinic laws, we first perform an act and then we raise objections.
לְבָתַר הָכִי אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי בָּעֵית לְאוֹתֹבֵיהּ לְמָר? אֲמַר [לֵיהּ: דְּתַנְיָא]: הַזָּאָה שְׁבוּת, וַאֲמִירָה לְגוֹי שְׁבוּת.
Afterward, when they had brought the water, Rav Yosef said to Abaye: What objection did you wish to raise against the Master, Rabba? He said to him: As it was taught in a baraita: Sprinkling the water of purification on an impure person on Shabbat is not prohibited by Torah law; rather, it is only a rabbinic decree to enhance the character of Shabbat as a day of rest. And telling a gentile to perform a Shabbat labor on behalf of a Jew is likewise only a rabbinic decree.
