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Today's Daf Yomi

October 15, 2020 | כ״ז בתשרי תשפ״א

Masechet Eruvin is sponsored by Adina and Eric Hagege in honor of our parents, Rabbi Dov and Elayne Greenstone and Roger and Ketty Hagege who raised children, grandchildren and great grandchildren committed to Torah learning.

Eruvin 67

Today’s daf is dedicated in honor of Sam Cohen, starting a year of shlichut in Germany. Wishing you only the best and may we continue to strengthen each other and continue daf yomi. Also thank you to our amazing teacher who constantly makes complicated sugiout comprehensible and relatable. Ben and Shai.

Rav Chisda asks Rav Sheshet two questions regarding situations that changed over Shabbat regarding gentiles (the gentile fenced in two houses that were previously separated by a public domain or the gentile died on Shabbat) would relinquishing of rights be allowed? A gentile who lives in the same alleyway as Jews but has a separate smaller entrance, can one assume the gentile prefers that entrance and is not considered part of the shared alleyway and therefore one would not need to rent the space from the gentile. On what does it depend? What are laws regarding a karpaf when it comes to carrying from the public domain into it, if it is larger than beit sa’atayim and considered a carmelit. Rabbi Yochanan says it is still viewed as a private domain for those purposes and one would be obligated by Torah law. A braita is brought to contradict and Rava and Rav Ashi bring two possible answers.

שכח אחד מן החיצונה ולא עירב ודאי פנימית מותרת דאחדא דשא ומשתמשא וחיצונה אסורה

But if a resident of the outer courtyard forgot and did not establish an eiruv, it is certainly permitted to carry in the inner courtyard, as its residents can close the door between the two courtyards, thereby preventing the residents of the outer courtyard from entering, and they can then use their courtyard on their own. However, it is still prohibited to carry in the outer courtyard.

אמר ליה רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע לרבא וכי שכח אחד מן הפנימית ולא עירב אמאי שתיהן אסורות לבטיל בר פנימית לבני פנימית ותיתי חיצונה ותשתרי בהדייהו

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rava: And if a resident of the inner courtyard forgot and did not establish an eiruv, why is it prohibited to carry in both courtyards? Let the resident of the inner courtyard who forgot to establish an eiruv renounce his rights in favor of the other residents of the inner courtyard, and then let the residents of the outer courtyard, who had established an eiruv with the inner one, come and be permitted to carry together with them.

כמאן כרבי אליעזר דאמר אינו צריך לבטל רשות לכל אחד ואחד כי קאמינא לרבנן דאמרי צריך לבטל לכל אחד ואחד:

Rava replied: In accordance with whose opinion do you make this suggestion? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said: It is not necessary to renounce one’s rights in favor of each and every resident. Rather, it is enough for a person to renounce his rights in favor of a single person, as once he no longer has any rights in the courtyard, he can no longer render it prohibited to carry there. According to this approach, a resident of the inner courtyard may indeed renounce his rights in favor of the other residents of his courtyard. The outer courtyard would then be rendered permitted together with the inner courtyard. However, when I spoke, it was in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: It is necessary to renounce one’s rights in favor of each and every resident. Therefore, in order to render the outer courtyard permitted, it would be necessary for the person who forgot to establish the eiruv to renounce his rights in favor of the residents of the outer courtyard as well. However, he may not do so, as one may not renounce rights from one courtyard to another. Therefore, the outer courtyard may not be rendered permitted in this manner.

רב חסדא ורב ששת כי פגעי בהדי הדדי רב חסדא מרתען שיפוותיה ממתנייתא דרב ששת ורב ששת מרתע כוליה גופיה מפלפוליה דרב חסדא

The Gemara relates that when Rav Ḥisda and Rav Sheshet would meet each other, Rav Ḥisda’s lips would tremble from the teachings of Rav Sheshet. Rav Sheshet’s fluency and expertise were such that Rav Ḥisda would be filled with awe in his presence. For his part, Rav Sheshet’s entire body would shake from Rav Ḥisda’s sharpness, i.e., from his brilliant, analytical mind.

בעא מיניה רב חסדא מרב ששת שני בתים משני צידי רשות הרבים ובאו גוים והקיפום מחיצה בשבת מהו

Rav Ḥisda raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: If there were two unconnected houses on two sides of a public domain, and gentiles came and enclosed them in a partition on Shabbat, what is the halakha? By erecting the fence, the gentiles nullified the public domain between the two houses, turning it into a private domain. Consequently, carrying from one house to the other is permitted by Torah law. The question is: Is it possible to render it permitted to carry even by rabbinic law? Can one resident renounce his rights to the area between the houses and thereby allow the other to carry there?

אליבא דמאן דאמר אין ביטול רשות מחצר לחצר לא תיבעי לך השתא דאי בעו לערובי מאתמול מצו מערבי אמרת אין ביטול רשות מחצר לחצר הכא דאי בעו לערובי מאתמול לא מצו מערבי לא כל שכן

The Gemara clarifies the question: In accordance with the opinion of the one who said that there is no renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another, you have no dilemma, as carrying is certainly prohibited. Now, if in a case where had they wanted to establish an eiruv yesterday they could have established an eiruv, e.g., in a case of two adjacent courtyards with an entranceway between them, you say that there is no renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another, then here, in a case of two houses situated on opposite sides of a public domain, where had they wanted to establish an eiruv yesterday they could not have established an eiruv, because of the public domain between the houses, all the more so is it not clear that there is no renouncing of rights?

כי תיבעי לך אליבא דמאן דאמר יש ביטול רשות מחצר לחצר התם דאי בעו לערובי מאתמול מצו מערבי בטולי נמי מצי מבטל אבל הכא דלא מצו מערבי מאתמול בטולי נמי לא מצי מבטל

Where you have a dilemma is in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that there is renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another, and the two sides of the question are as follows: Perhaps there, where had they wanted to establish an eiruv yesterday they could have established an eiruv then, they can also renounce rights now. But here, where they could not have established an eiruv yesterday even had they wanted to, one may not renounce rights now either.

או דילמא לא שנא אמר ליה אין מבטלין

Or perhaps there is no difference between the two cases. Since renunciation of rights is possible under the current circumstances, yesterday’s situation is not taken into account. Rav Sheshet said to Rav Ḥisda: In such a case, one may not renounce his rights.

מת גוי בשבת מהו

Rav Ḥisda posed a similar question: If two Jews and a gentile shared a courtyard, and no steps had been taken prior to Shabbat to render it permitted to carry in the courtyard, and the gentile died on Shabbat, what is the halakha? Since the gentile died, he no longer imposes restrictions on carrying in the courtyard. May one Jew now renounce his rights in favor of the other and thereby render it permitted for him to carry in the courtyard?

אליבא דמאן דאמר שוכרין לא תיבעי לך השתא תרתי עבדינן חדא מיבעיא

The Gemara clarifies the question: In accordance with the opinion of the one who said that one may rent from a gentile who arrives on Shabbat, you have no dilemma. Now that we may perform two actions, both rent and renounce rights, as the Jewish neighbors may rent from the gentile and subsequently each could renounce his rights in favor of the other, is it necessary to state that we may perform one action? Each Jew may certainly renounce his rights in favor of the other.

אלא כי תיבעי לך אליבא דמאן דאמר אין שוכרין תרתי הוא דלא עבדינן הא חדא עבדינן או דילמא לא שנא אמר ליה אני אומר מבטלין והמנונא אמר אין מבטלין:

Rather, there is a dilemma in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that they may not rent from the gentile in such a case. The two sides of the question are as follows: Perhaps it is two actions that we may not perform, rent and renounce; however, one action alone we may perform; or perhaps there is no difference between one action and two. Rav Sheshet said to Rav Ḥisda: I say that in such a case one may renounce his rights, while Rav Hamnuna said that one may not renounce his rights.

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל גוי שיש לו פתח ארבעה על ארבעה פתוח לבקעה אפילו מכניס ומוציא גמלים וקרונות כל היום כולו דרך מבוי אין אוסר על בני מבוי

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: With regard to a gentile who lives in a courtyard that opens into an alleyway in which many Jews reside, and he has another entrance on the other side of the courtyard, even one that is only four by four handbreadths in size, that opens into a valley, then in such a case, even if all day long he brings camels and wagons in and out of his courtyard by way of the alleyway, so that it is evident that he uses the alleyway, he nonetheless does not render it prohibited for the residents of the alleyway to carry. He is not considered a resident of the alleyway alongside them, as the entrance from the field is viewed as the true entrance to his courtyard.

מאי טעמא בפיתחא דמיחד ליה בההוא ניחא ליה

What is the reason that his small entrance from the field is considered his main entrance? Because the entrance that is exclusively his is preferable to him. Despite its small size, the gentile views the entrance from the field as his main entrance, while he uses the one that opens into the alleyway only when it is convenient.

איבעיא להו פתוח לקרפף מהו אמר רב נחמן בר אמי משמיה דאולפנא

Based on this assumption, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the gentile’s courtyard opens into an alleyway in which Jews reside, and it also has an entrance that opens into an enclosure rather than into a valley, what is the halakha? Which entrance is considered his primary entrance? Rav Naḥman bar Ami said, citing a tradition [mishmei de’ulpana] he received from his teachers:

אפילו פתוח לקרפף

Even if it opens into an enclosure, this is considered its main entrance, rather than the one that opens into the alleyway.

רבה ורב יוסף דאמרי תרוייהו גוי בית סאתים אוסר יותר מבית סאתים אינו אוסר

It is Rabba and Rav Yosef who both say: The halakha in such a case depends on the identity of the owner of the courtyard. With regard to a courtyard owned by a gentile, if the enclosure behind his courtyard is the size of two beit se’a or less, he renders it prohibited for the Jewish residents of the alleyway to carry. An enclosure of this size is not large enough for all the gentile’s needs, and therefore his main entrance is the one that opens into the alleyway. However, if the enclosure is greater than the size of two beit se’a, he does not render it prohibited for the residents of the alleyway to carry, as such an enclosure is sufficient for all his needs.

וישראל בית סאתים אינו אוסר

On the other hand, with regard to a courtyard owned by a Jew, if the enclosure is the size of two beit se’a or less, he does not render it prohibited for the other residents of the alleyway to carry, even if he did not join in an eiruv with them. Because he has the option of carrying in such an enclosure on Shabbat, he would not carry in the alleyway, as it is more convenient for him to carry in a place that belongs exclusively to him.

יותר מבית סאתים אוסר

However, if the enclosure is greater than the size of two beit se’a, in which case it is prohibited to carry there, the Jew would carry only by way of the alleyway. Therefore, he renders it prohibited for his fellow residents of the alleyway to carry unless he establishes an eiruv with them.

בעא מיניה רבא בר חקלאי מרב הונא פתוח לקרפף מהו אמר ליה הרי אמרו בית סאתים אוסר יותר מבית סאתים אינו אוסר

With regard to this issue, Rava bar Ḥaklai raised a dilemma before Rav Huna: If the gentile’s courtyard opens into an alleyway, and it also has an entrance that opens into an enclosure, what is the halakha? He said to him: They have already said that if the enclosure is the size of two beit se’a or less, the gentile renders it prohibited for the Jewish residents of the alleyway to carry; however, if it is more than two beit se’a, he does not render it prohibited for them to carry.

אמר עולא אמר רבי יוחנן קרפף יותר מבית סאתים שלא הוקף לדירה ואפילו כור ואפילו כוריים הזורק לתוכו חייב מאי טעמא מחיצה היא אלא שמחוסרת דיורין

Ulla said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to an enclosure greater than the size of two beit se’a that was not originally surrounded by a fence for the purpose of residence, even if it is as large as a field that produces a crop of one kor, and even two kor, one who inadvertently throws an object into it from the public domain is liable to bring a sin-offering, like one who throws into a private domain. What is the reason for this? It is because the partition of an enclosure is a valid partition. Consequently, the enclosure is considered a private domain by Torah law, except that it is lacking residents, and therefore the Sages did not permit one to carry inside it as in a proper private domain.

מתיב רב הונא בר חיננא סלע שבים גבוה עשרה ורוחב ארבעה אין מטלטלין לא מן תוכו לים ולא מן הים לתוכו פחות מכאן מטלטלין עד כמה עד בית סאתים

Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana raised an objection from the following baraita: With regard to a rock protruding from the sea that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, one may not carry from it to the sea or from the sea to it on Shabbat. The rock has the status of a private domain, while the sea is a karmelit, and it is prohibited to carry from a private domain into a karmelit or vice versa on Shabbat. If the rock is smaller than this, either in height or width, so that it is no longer considered a private domain, one may carry to or from it. How large may the rock be? It may be up to the size of two beit se’a.

אהייא אילימא אסיפא בית סאתים טפי לא והא מכרמלית לכרמלית קא מטלטל

The Gemara attempts to clarify the meaning of this baraita: To which part of the baraita is the clause: Up to the size of two beit se’a, referring? If you say it is referring to the latter clause, can it be that with regard to a rock that is less than ten handbreadths high, the halakha is that carrying is permitted if the rock is up to the size of two beit se’a, but no more than that? Wouldn’t he be carrying from one karmelit to another, which is certainly permitted?

אלא לאו ארישא והכי קאמר סלע שבים גבוה עשרה ורוחב ארבעה אין מטלטלין לא מתוכו לים ולא מן הים לתוכו ועד כמה עד בית סאתים הא יתר מבית סאתים מטלטלין אלמא כרמלית היא תיובתא דרבי יוחנן

Rather, is it not referring to the first clause of the baraita, and this is what it is saying: With regard to a rock protruding from the sea that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, one may not carry from it to the sea or from the sea to it, as it has the status of a private domain. And how large may it be for this prohibition to apply? Up to the size of two beit se’a. But if the rock is greater than the size of two beit se’a, one may carry. Apparently, it is a karmelit in all respects, and not just as a stringency. This appears to be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

אמר רבא מאן דלא ידע תרוצי מתנייתא תיובתא מותיב ליה לרבי יוחנן לעולם ארישא והכי קאמר הא בתוכו מטלטלין ועד כמה עד בית סאתים

Rava said: Only one who does not know how to explain mishnayot raises such refutations against Rabbi Yoḥanan, one of the greatest Sages of his generation. Rather, the baraita is to be understood as follows: Actually, the final words of the baraita refer to the first clause, and this is what it is saying: With regard to a rock protruding from the sea that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, one may not carry from it to the sea or from the sea to it, but within it, on the rock itself, one may carry, as it is considered a private domain. And how large may the rock be and remain permitted? Up to two beit se’a.

רב אשי אמר לעולם ארישא הן אמרו והן אמרו

Rav Ashi said that the baraita may be explained differently, yet still in a manner that does not refute the words of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Actually, the final words of the baraita refer to the first clause, as stated by Rav Huna bar Ḥanina. However, one may not infer from them a principle with regard to enclosures, as they said that the halakha is stringent in one case, and they said that the halakha should be lenient in a different case, i.e., the same Sages who were stringent in one case were lenient in the another.

הן אמרו קרפף יתר מבית סאתים שלא הוקף לדירה אין מטלטלין בו אלא בארבע אמות והן אמרו אין מטלטלין מרשות היחיד לכרמלית

How so? They said that in the case of an enclosure greater than the size of two beit se’a that was not originally enclosed with a fence for the purpose of residence, one may carry only a distance of four cubits, as it has the status of a karmelit in this regard. And they also said that one may not carry from a private domain to a karmelit. Both of these halakhot are decrees of the Sages.

בית סאתים דשרי לטלטולי בכוליה אסרי רבנן לטלטולי לא מן הים לתוכו ולא מתוכו לים מאי טעמא רשות היחיד גמורה היא

Therefore, the Sages developed the following principles: With regard to a rock that is no larger than two beit se’a, so that it is permitted to carry on all of it, the Sages prohibited carrying from the sea to it and from it to the sea. What is the reason for this? It is that the rock is a full-fledged private domain, and they did not permit one to carry from a private domain to a karmelit or vice versa.

יתר מבית סאתים דאסור לטלטולי בכוליה שרו רבנן לטלטולי מתוכו לים ומן הים לתוכו מאי טעמא דלמא אמרי רשות היחיד גמורה היא ואתי לטלטולי בכוליה

However, if it is larger than the size of two beit se’a, so that it is prohibited to carry on all of it by rabbinic decree, the Sages permitted carrying from the sea to it and from it to the sea. What is the reason for this? It is because the Sages were concerned that perhaps people would say that it is a proper private domain, and they would come to carry on all of it. Were the Sages to prohibit carrying from the rock to the sea, people would think that it is a full-fledged private domain, and they would carry on it. Since all these decrees are rabbinic in nature, the Sages permitted carrying from a private domain to a karmelit in this case in order to prevent people from violating a different rabbinic decree, which prohibits carrying in an enclosure that is greater than the size of two beit se’a. However, no general conclusion may be inferred from this that an enclosure larger than two beit se’a is not a private domain by Torah law.

ומאי שנא תוכו שכיח מתוכו לים ומן הים לתוכו לא שכיח:

The Gemara asks: And what is the difference between the decrees that caused the Sages to choose to uphold the one decree and not the other? The Gemara answers: The difference is that carrying within the rock is common, whereas carrying from it to the sea and from the sea to it is not common. The Sages permitted carrying in the less likely scenario in order to reinforce the decree against carrying within the rock, the more common situation.

ההוא ינוקא דאשתפיך חמימיה אמר להו רבה נייתו ליה חמימי מגו ביתאי אמר ליה אביי והא לא ערבינן

The Gemara now relates that there was once a certain baby whose warm water, which had been prepared for his Shabbat circumcision, spilled. Rabba said to them: Let them bring warm water for him from my house. Abaye said to him: But we did not establish an eiruv in the courtyard, so it is prohibited to carry the water.

אמר ליה נסמוך אשיתוף אמר ליה הא לא שתפינן נימרו ליה לגוי ליתי ליה

Rabba said to him: Let us rely on the merging of alleyways, which may serve in place of a joining of courtyards in pressing circumstances such as these. Abaye said to him: But we did not establish a merging of alleyways either. Rabba replied: If so, let them instruct a gentile to bring the warm water for him, even though it is generally prohibited to instruct a gentile to perform labor for a Jew that involves a desecration of Shabbat.

אמר אביי בעי לאותביה למר ולא שבקן רב יוסף דאמר רב [יוסף אמר רב] כהנא כי הוינן בי רב יהודה הוה אמר לן בדאורייתא מותבינן תיובתא והדר עבדינן מעשה בדרבנן עבדינן מעשה והדר מותבינן תיובתא

Abaye said: I wanted to raise an objection against the Master, Rabba, but Rav Yosef would not let me do so, as Rav Yosef said that Rav Kahana said: When we were in Rav Yehuda’s house, he would say to us when we were presented with a halakhic difficulty: With regard to a Torah law, we first raise objections and then we perform an act, i.e., if someone has an objection to a proposed action, we must first clarify the matter and only then may we proceed. However, with regard to rabbinic laws, we first perform an act and then we raise objections.

לבתר הכי אמר ליה מאי בעית לאותביה למר אמר [ליה דתניא] הזאה שבות ואמירה לגוי שבות

Afterward, when they had brought the water, Rav Yosef said to Abaye: What objection did you wish to raise against the Master, Rabba? He said to him: As it was taught in a baraita: Sprinkling the water of purification on an impure person on Shabbat is not prohibited by Torah law; rather, it is only a rabbinic decree to enhance the character of Shabbat as a day of rest. And telling a gentile to perform a Shabbat labor on behalf of a Jew is likewise only a rabbinic decree.

Masechet Eruvin is sponsored by Adina and Eric Hagege in honor of our parents, Rabbi Dov and Elayne Greenstone and Roger and Ketty Hagege who raised children, grandchildren and great grandchildren committed to Torah learning.

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Eruvin 67

שכח אחד מן החיצונה ולא עירב ודאי פנימית מותרת דאחדא דשא ומשתמשא וחיצונה אסורה

But if a resident of the outer courtyard forgot and did not establish an eiruv, it is certainly permitted to carry in the inner courtyard, as its residents can close the door between the two courtyards, thereby preventing the residents of the outer courtyard from entering, and they can then use their courtyard on their own. However, it is still prohibited to carry in the outer courtyard.

אמר ליה רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע לרבא וכי שכח אחד מן הפנימית ולא עירב אמאי שתיהן אסורות לבטיל בר פנימית לבני פנימית ותיתי חיצונה ותשתרי בהדייהו

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rava: And if a resident of the inner courtyard forgot and did not establish an eiruv, why is it prohibited to carry in both courtyards? Let the resident of the inner courtyard who forgot to establish an eiruv renounce his rights in favor of the other residents of the inner courtyard, and then let the residents of the outer courtyard, who had established an eiruv with the inner one, come and be permitted to carry together with them.

כמאן כרבי אליעזר דאמר אינו צריך לבטל רשות לכל אחד ואחד כי קאמינא לרבנן דאמרי צריך לבטל לכל אחד ואחד:

Rava replied: In accordance with whose opinion do you make this suggestion? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said: It is not necessary to renounce one’s rights in favor of each and every resident. Rather, it is enough for a person to renounce his rights in favor of a single person, as once he no longer has any rights in the courtyard, he can no longer render it prohibited to carry there. According to this approach, a resident of the inner courtyard may indeed renounce his rights in favor of the other residents of his courtyard. The outer courtyard would then be rendered permitted together with the inner courtyard. However, when I spoke, it was in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: It is necessary to renounce one’s rights in favor of each and every resident. Therefore, in order to render the outer courtyard permitted, it would be necessary for the person who forgot to establish the eiruv to renounce his rights in favor of the residents of the outer courtyard as well. However, he may not do so, as one may not renounce rights from one courtyard to another. Therefore, the outer courtyard may not be rendered permitted in this manner.

רב חסדא ורב ששת כי פגעי בהדי הדדי רב חסדא מרתען שיפוותיה ממתנייתא דרב ששת ורב ששת מרתע כוליה גופיה מפלפוליה דרב חסדא

The Gemara relates that when Rav Ḥisda and Rav Sheshet would meet each other, Rav Ḥisda’s lips would tremble from the teachings of Rav Sheshet. Rav Sheshet’s fluency and expertise were such that Rav Ḥisda would be filled with awe in his presence. For his part, Rav Sheshet’s entire body would shake from Rav Ḥisda’s sharpness, i.e., from his brilliant, analytical mind.

בעא מיניה רב חסדא מרב ששת שני בתים משני צידי רשות הרבים ובאו גוים והקיפום מחיצה בשבת מהו

Rav Ḥisda raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: If there were two unconnected houses on two sides of a public domain, and gentiles came and enclosed them in a partition on Shabbat, what is the halakha? By erecting the fence, the gentiles nullified the public domain between the two houses, turning it into a private domain. Consequently, carrying from one house to the other is permitted by Torah law. The question is: Is it possible to render it permitted to carry even by rabbinic law? Can one resident renounce his rights to the area between the houses and thereby allow the other to carry there?

אליבא דמאן דאמר אין ביטול רשות מחצר לחצר לא תיבעי לך השתא דאי בעו לערובי מאתמול מצו מערבי אמרת אין ביטול רשות מחצר לחצר הכא דאי בעו לערובי מאתמול לא מצו מערבי לא כל שכן

The Gemara clarifies the question: In accordance with the opinion of the one who said that there is no renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another, you have no dilemma, as carrying is certainly prohibited. Now, if in a case where had they wanted to establish an eiruv yesterday they could have established an eiruv, e.g., in a case of two adjacent courtyards with an entranceway between them, you say that there is no renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another, then here, in a case of two houses situated on opposite sides of a public domain, where had they wanted to establish an eiruv yesterday they could not have established an eiruv, because of the public domain between the houses, all the more so is it not clear that there is no renouncing of rights?

כי תיבעי לך אליבא דמאן דאמר יש ביטול רשות מחצר לחצר התם דאי בעו לערובי מאתמול מצו מערבי בטולי נמי מצי מבטל אבל הכא דלא מצו מערבי מאתמול בטולי נמי לא מצי מבטל

Where you have a dilemma is in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that there is renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another, and the two sides of the question are as follows: Perhaps there, where had they wanted to establish an eiruv yesterday they could have established an eiruv then, they can also renounce rights now. But here, where they could not have established an eiruv yesterday even had they wanted to, one may not renounce rights now either.

או דילמא לא שנא אמר ליה אין מבטלין

Or perhaps there is no difference between the two cases. Since renunciation of rights is possible under the current circumstances, yesterday’s situation is not taken into account. Rav Sheshet said to Rav Ḥisda: In such a case, one may not renounce his rights.

מת גוי בשבת מהו

Rav Ḥisda posed a similar question: If two Jews and a gentile shared a courtyard, and no steps had been taken prior to Shabbat to render it permitted to carry in the courtyard, and the gentile died on Shabbat, what is the halakha? Since the gentile died, he no longer imposes restrictions on carrying in the courtyard. May one Jew now renounce his rights in favor of the other and thereby render it permitted for him to carry in the courtyard?

אליבא דמאן דאמר שוכרין לא תיבעי לך השתא תרתי עבדינן חדא מיבעיא

The Gemara clarifies the question: In accordance with the opinion of the one who said that one may rent from a gentile who arrives on Shabbat, you have no dilemma. Now that we may perform two actions, both rent and renounce rights, as the Jewish neighbors may rent from the gentile and subsequently each could renounce his rights in favor of the other, is it necessary to state that we may perform one action? Each Jew may certainly renounce his rights in favor of the other.

אלא כי תיבעי לך אליבא דמאן דאמר אין שוכרין תרתי הוא דלא עבדינן הא חדא עבדינן או דילמא לא שנא אמר ליה אני אומר מבטלין והמנונא אמר אין מבטלין:

Rather, there is a dilemma in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that they may not rent from the gentile in such a case. The two sides of the question are as follows: Perhaps it is two actions that we may not perform, rent and renounce; however, one action alone we may perform; or perhaps there is no difference between one action and two. Rav Sheshet said to Rav Ḥisda: I say that in such a case one may renounce his rights, while Rav Hamnuna said that one may not renounce his rights.

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל גוי שיש לו פתח ארבעה על ארבעה פתוח לבקעה אפילו מכניס ומוציא גמלים וקרונות כל היום כולו דרך מבוי אין אוסר על בני מבוי

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: With regard to a gentile who lives in a courtyard that opens into an alleyway in which many Jews reside, and he has another entrance on the other side of the courtyard, even one that is only four by four handbreadths in size, that opens into a valley, then in such a case, even if all day long he brings camels and wagons in and out of his courtyard by way of the alleyway, so that it is evident that he uses the alleyway, he nonetheless does not render it prohibited for the residents of the alleyway to carry. He is not considered a resident of the alleyway alongside them, as the entrance from the field is viewed as the true entrance to his courtyard.

מאי טעמא בפיתחא דמיחד ליה בההוא ניחא ליה

What is the reason that his small entrance from the field is considered his main entrance? Because the entrance that is exclusively his is preferable to him. Despite its small size, the gentile views the entrance from the field as his main entrance, while he uses the one that opens into the alleyway only when it is convenient.

איבעיא להו פתוח לקרפף מהו אמר רב נחמן בר אמי משמיה דאולפנא

Based on this assumption, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the gentile’s courtyard opens into an alleyway in which Jews reside, and it also has an entrance that opens into an enclosure rather than into a valley, what is the halakha? Which entrance is considered his primary entrance? Rav Naḥman bar Ami said, citing a tradition [mishmei de’ulpana] he received from his teachers:

אפילו פתוח לקרפף

Even if it opens into an enclosure, this is considered its main entrance, rather than the one that opens into the alleyway.

רבה ורב יוסף דאמרי תרוייהו גוי בית סאתים אוסר יותר מבית סאתים אינו אוסר

It is Rabba and Rav Yosef who both say: The halakha in such a case depends on the identity of the owner of the courtyard. With regard to a courtyard owned by a gentile, if the enclosure behind his courtyard is the size of two beit se’a or less, he renders it prohibited for the Jewish residents of the alleyway to carry. An enclosure of this size is not large enough for all the gentile’s needs, and therefore his main entrance is the one that opens into the alleyway. However, if the enclosure is greater than the size of two beit se’a, he does not render it prohibited for the residents of the alleyway to carry, as such an enclosure is sufficient for all his needs.

וישראל בית סאתים אינו אוסר

On the other hand, with regard to a courtyard owned by a Jew, if the enclosure is the size of two beit se’a or less, he does not render it prohibited for the other residents of the alleyway to carry, even if he did not join in an eiruv with them. Because he has the option of carrying in such an enclosure on Shabbat, he would not carry in the alleyway, as it is more convenient for him to carry in a place that belongs exclusively to him.

יותר מבית סאתים אוסר

However, if the enclosure is greater than the size of two beit se’a, in which case it is prohibited to carry there, the Jew would carry only by way of the alleyway. Therefore, he renders it prohibited for his fellow residents of the alleyway to carry unless he establishes an eiruv with them.

בעא מיניה רבא בר חקלאי מרב הונא פתוח לקרפף מהו אמר ליה הרי אמרו בית סאתים אוסר יותר מבית סאתים אינו אוסר

With regard to this issue, Rava bar Ḥaklai raised a dilemma before Rav Huna: If the gentile’s courtyard opens into an alleyway, and it also has an entrance that opens into an enclosure, what is the halakha? He said to him: They have already said that if the enclosure is the size of two beit se’a or less, the gentile renders it prohibited for the Jewish residents of the alleyway to carry; however, if it is more than two beit se’a, he does not render it prohibited for them to carry.

אמר עולא אמר רבי יוחנן קרפף יותר מבית סאתים שלא הוקף לדירה ואפילו כור ואפילו כוריים הזורק לתוכו חייב מאי טעמא מחיצה היא אלא שמחוסרת דיורין

Ulla said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to an enclosure greater than the size of two beit se’a that was not originally surrounded by a fence for the purpose of residence, even if it is as large as a field that produces a crop of one kor, and even two kor, one who inadvertently throws an object into it from the public domain is liable to bring a sin-offering, like one who throws into a private domain. What is the reason for this? It is because the partition of an enclosure is a valid partition. Consequently, the enclosure is considered a private domain by Torah law, except that it is lacking residents, and therefore the Sages did not permit one to carry inside it as in a proper private domain.

מתיב רב הונא בר חיננא סלע שבים גבוה עשרה ורוחב ארבעה אין מטלטלין לא מן תוכו לים ולא מן הים לתוכו פחות מכאן מטלטלין עד כמה עד בית סאתים

Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana raised an objection from the following baraita: With regard to a rock protruding from the sea that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, one may not carry from it to the sea or from the sea to it on Shabbat. The rock has the status of a private domain, while the sea is a karmelit, and it is prohibited to carry from a private domain into a karmelit or vice versa on Shabbat. If the rock is smaller than this, either in height or width, so that it is no longer considered a private domain, one may carry to or from it. How large may the rock be? It may be up to the size of two beit se’a.

אהייא אילימא אסיפא בית סאתים טפי לא והא מכרמלית לכרמלית קא מטלטל

The Gemara attempts to clarify the meaning of this baraita: To which part of the baraita is the clause: Up to the size of two beit se’a, referring? If you say it is referring to the latter clause, can it be that with regard to a rock that is less than ten handbreadths high, the halakha is that carrying is permitted if the rock is up to the size of two beit se’a, but no more than that? Wouldn’t he be carrying from one karmelit to another, which is certainly permitted?

אלא לאו ארישא והכי קאמר סלע שבים גבוה עשרה ורוחב ארבעה אין מטלטלין לא מתוכו לים ולא מן הים לתוכו ועד כמה עד בית סאתים הא יתר מבית סאתים מטלטלין אלמא כרמלית היא תיובתא דרבי יוחנן

Rather, is it not referring to the first clause of the baraita, and this is what it is saying: With regard to a rock protruding from the sea that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, one may not carry from it to the sea or from the sea to it, as it has the status of a private domain. And how large may it be for this prohibition to apply? Up to the size of two beit se’a. But if the rock is greater than the size of two beit se’a, one may carry. Apparently, it is a karmelit in all respects, and not just as a stringency. This appears to be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

אמר רבא מאן דלא ידע תרוצי מתנייתא תיובתא מותיב ליה לרבי יוחנן לעולם ארישא והכי קאמר הא בתוכו מטלטלין ועד כמה עד בית סאתים

Rava said: Only one who does not know how to explain mishnayot raises such refutations against Rabbi Yoḥanan, one of the greatest Sages of his generation. Rather, the baraita is to be understood as follows: Actually, the final words of the baraita refer to the first clause, and this is what it is saying: With regard to a rock protruding from the sea that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, one may not carry from it to the sea or from the sea to it, but within it, on the rock itself, one may carry, as it is considered a private domain. And how large may the rock be and remain permitted? Up to two beit se’a.

רב אשי אמר לעולם ארישא הן אמרו והן אמרו

Rav Ashi said that the baraita may be explained differently, yet still in a manner that does not refute the words of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Actually, the final words of the baraita refer to the first clause, as stated by Rav Huna bar Ḥanina. However, one may not infer from them a principle with regard to enclosures, as they said that the halakha is stringent in one case, and they said that the halakha should be lenient in a different case, i.e., the same Sages who were stringent in one case were lenient in the another.

הן אמרו קרפף יתר מבית סאתים שלא הוקף לדירה אין מטלטלין בו אלא בארבע אמות והן אמרו אין מטלטלין מרשות היחיד לכרמלית

How so? They said that in the case of an enclosure greater than the size of two beit se’a that was not originally enclosed with a fence for the purpose of residence, one may carry only a distance of four cubits, as it has the status of a karmelit in this regard. And they also said that one may not carry from a private domain to a karmelit. Both of these halakhot are decrees of the Sages.

בית סאתים דשרי לטלטולי בכוליה אסרי רבנן לטלטולי לא מן הים לתוכו ולא מתוכו לים מאי טעמא רשות היחיד גמורה היא

Therefore, the Sages developed the following principles: With regard to a rock that is no larger than two beit se’a, so that it is permitted to carry on all of it, the Sages prohibited carrying from the sea to it and from it to the sea. What is the reason for this? It is that the rock is a full-fledged private domain, and they did not permit one to carry from a private domain to a karmelit or vice versa.

יתר מבית סאתים דאסור לטלטולי בכוליה שרו רבנן לטלטולי מתוכו לים ומן הים לתוכו מאי טעמא דלמא אמרי רשות היחיד גמורה היא ואתי לטלטולי בכוליה

However, if it is larger than the size of two beit se’a, so that it is prohibited to carry on all of it by rabbinic decree, the Sages permitted carrying from the sea to it and from it to the sea. What is the reason for this? It is because the Sages were concerned that perhaps people would say that it is a proper private domain, and they would come to carry on all of it. Were the Sages to prohibit carrying from the rock to the sea, people would think that it is a full-fledged private domain, and they would carry on it. Since all these decrees are rabbinic in nature, the Sages permitted carrying from a private domain to a karmelit in this case in order to prevent people from violating a different rabbinic decree, which prohibits carrying in an enclosure that is greater than the size of two beit se’a. However, no general conclusion may be inferred from this that an enclosure larger than two beit se’a is not a private domain by Torah law.

ומאי שנא תוכו שכיח מתוכו לים ומן הים לתוכו לא שכיח:

The Gemara asks: And what is the difference between the decrees that caused the Sages to choose to uphold the one decree and not the other? The Gemara answers: The difference is that carrying within the rock is common, whereas carrying from it to the sea and from the sea to it is not common. The Sages permitted carrying in the less likely scenario in order to reinforce the decree against carrying within the rock, the more common situation.

ההוא ינוקא דאשתפיך חמימיה אמר להו רבה נייתו ליה חמימי מגו ביתאי אמר ליה אביי והא לא ערבינן

The Gemara now relates that there was once a certain baby whose warm water, which had been prepared for his Shabbat circumcision, spilled. Rabba said to them: Let them bring warm water for him from my house. Abaye said to him: But we did not establish an eiruv in the courtyard, so it is prohibited to carry the water.

אמר ליה נסמוך אשיתוף אמר ליה הא לא שתפינן נימרו ליה לגוי ליתי ליה

Rabba said to him: Let us rely on the merging of alleyways, which may serve in place of a joining of courtyards in pressing circumstances such as these. Abaye said to him: But we did not establish a merging of alleyways either. Rabba replied: If so, let them instruct a gentile to bring the warm water for him, even though it is generally prohibited to instruct a gentile to perform labor for a Jew that involves a desecration of Shabbat.

אמר אביי בעי לאותביה למר ולא שבקן רב יוסף דאמר רב [יוסף אמר רב] כהנא כי הוינן בי רב יהודה הוה אמר לן בדאורייתא מותבינן תיובתא והדר עבדינן מעשה בדרבנן עבדינן מעשה והדר מותבינן תיובתא

Abaye said: I wanted to raise an objection against the Master, Rabba, but Rav Yosef would not let me do so, as Rav Yosef said that Rav Kahana said: When we were in Rav Yehuda’s house, he would say to us when we were presented with a halakhic difficulty: With regard to a Torah law, we first raise objections and then we perform an act, i.e., if someone has an objection to a proposed action, we must first clarify the matter and only then may we proceed. However, with regard to rabbinic laws, we first perform an act and then we raise objections.

לבתר הכי אמר ליה מאי בעית לאותביה למר אמר [ליה דתניא] הזאה שבות ואמירה לגוי שבות

Afterward, when they had brought the water, Rav Yosef said to Abaye: What objection did you wish to raise against the Master, Rabba? He said to him: As it was taught in a baraita: Sprinkling the water of purification on an impure person on Shabbat is not prohibited by Torah law; rather, it is only a rabbinic decree to enhance the character of Shabbat as a day of rest. And telling a gentile to perform a Shabbat labor on behalf of a Jew is likewise only a rabbinic decree.

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