The mishna and the braita have different versions of Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion regarding Rabban Gamliel’s approach to Sadducees and eruvin. One implies the law regarding Jews is true for them that they can relinquish their rights and the other seems to hold that they are treated as gentiles. How is this contradiction reconciled? What makes someone considered a mumar, an apostate for all laws of the Torah? Is there a different definition for eruv than for other areas of law? If there is a courtyard in which one or more members did not join the eruv, how can one relinquish their rights and what then is permitted in the courtyard? The mishna brings a number of different scenarios and the gemara begins to analyze the different cases.
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Eruvin 69
וְהָתְנַן מִי שֶׁנָּתַן רְשׁוּתוֹ וְהוֹצִיא, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד — אוֹסֵר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
But didn’t we learn elsewhere in the mishna: If one gave away his rights in his courtyard to the other residents of the courtyard, renouncing them after having forgotten to establish an eiruv with them the previous day, and then he carried something out from his house into the courtyard, whether unwittingly or intentionally, he again renders it prohibited for all the residents of the courtyard to carry; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. This indicates that according to Rabbi Meir, even if the resident carried something into the courtyard on Shabbat itself, he cancels his renunciation, contrary to Rabbi Meir’s own statement in the mishna with regard to a Sadducee.
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: אֵימָא ״אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר״. אַבָּיֵי אָמַר, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן — שֶׁהֶחֱזִיקוּ בְּנֵי מָבוֹי בַּמָּבוֹי, כָּאן — שֶׁלֹּא הֶחְזִיקוּ בְּנֵי מָבוֹי בַּמָּבוֹי.
Rav Yosef said: Say that Rabbi Meir’s statement should read instead: He does not render it prohibited. Abaye said: It is not difficult, as the contradiction between the two teachings of Rabbi Meir can be resolved as follows: Here, where the Sadducee cannot cancel his renunciation, it refers to a case where the residents of the alleyway had already taken possession of the alleyway before he brought out his vessels; whereas here, where the Jew cancels his renunciation, it refers to a case where the residents of the alleyway had not taken possession of the alleyway prior to his act of carrying.
וְהָתַנְיָא: עַד שֶׁלֹּא נָתַן רְשׁוּתוֹ, הוֹצִיא בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד — יָכוֹל לְבַטֵּל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּשׁוֹגֵג יָכוֹל לְבַטֵּל, בְּמֵזִיד אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְבַטֵּל.
And similarly, it was taught in a baraita: With regard to one who failed to join in an eiruv with the other residents of his alleyway, if he carried something from his house into the alleyway before he gave away, i.e., renounced, his rights in the alleyway, whether unwittingly or intentionally, he can still renounce his rights; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he unwittingly carried from his house into the alleyway, he can still renounce his rights, but if he did so intentionally, he cannot renounce them, for one who publicly transgresses the words of the Sages and intentionally desecrates Shabbat has the status of a gentile.
מִי שֶׁנָּתַן רְשׁוּתוֹ וְהוֹצִיא, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד — אוֹסֵר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּמֵזִיד אוֹסֵר, בְּשׁוֹגֵג אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — בְּשֶׁלֹּא הֶחְזִיקוּ בְּנֵי מָבוֹי בַּמָּבוֹי, אֲבָל הֶחְזִיקוּ בְּנֵי מָבוֹי בַּמָּבוֹי, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג וּבֵין בְּמֵזִיד — אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר.
However, if one already gave away, i.e., renounced, his rights in the alleyway, and then he carried something from his house into the alleyway, whether unwittingly or intentionally, he renders prohibited all the residents’ use of the alleyway, for his action cancels his renunciation; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he did it intentionally, he renders carrying prohibited; but if he carried inadvertently, he does not render carrying prohibited. In what case is this statement said? In a case where the residents of the alleyway had not already taken possession of the alleyway. But if the residents of the alleyway had already taken possession of the alleyway before he carried something into the alleyway, all agree that whether he did it unwittingly or intentionally, he does not render prohibited their use of the alleyway.
אָמַר מָר: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר בְּלָשׁוֹן אַחֶרֶת: מַהֲרוּ וַעֲשׂוּ צוֹרְכֵיכֶם בַּמָּבוֹי עַד שֶׁלֹּא תֶּחְשַׁךְ וְיֶאֱסֹר עֲלֵיכֶם. אַלְמָא גּוֹי הוּא. וְהָא אֲנַן ״עַד שֶׁלֹּא יוֹצִיא״ תְּנַן!
The Master said above in the baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: Rabban Gamliel spoke to them with a different formulation, saying: Hurry, and do whatever you must do in the alleyway prior to Shabbat, before night falls, and he will render prohibited your use of the alleyway. It is apparent from this statement that a Sadducee is considered a gentile, whose renunciation of his rights in an alleyway is ineffective. But didn’t we learn in the mishna that according to Rabbi Yehuda, he said: Hurry, and do whatever you have to do before he takes out [yotzi] his vessels and renders prohibited your use of the alleyway, which implies that until then they may in fact use the alleyway; that is, his renunciation is effective?
אֵימָא ״עַד שֶׁלֹּא יוֹצִיא הַיּוֹם״. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן — בְּמוּמָר לְחַלֵּל שַׁבָּתוֹת בְּצִנְעָא, כָּאן — בְּמוּמָר לְחַלֵּל שַׁבָּתוֹת בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא.
The Gemara answers: Say that the mishna should read as follows: Hurry, and do whatever you have to do before the day goes out [yotzi hayom], i.e., before the end of Friday. And if you wish, say: It is not difficult. Here, where the mishna implies that a Sadducee may renounce his rights in an alleyway, it refers to an apostate of the kind who desecrates Shabbat in private; here, where the baraita implies that a Sadducee may not renounce his rights in an alleyway, it refers to an apostate who desecrates Shabbat in public [befarhesya]. Such a person is likened to a gentile in all regards, and therefore he may not renounce his rights in the alleyway.
כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: מוּמָר וְגִילּוּי פָּנִים הֲרֵי זֶה אֵינוֹ מְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת. גִּילּוּי פָּנִים — מוּמָר הָוֵי?
The Gemara comments: In accordance with which tanna is the ruling that was taught in the following baraita: An apostate or a brazen-faced person may not renounce his rights in favor of his neighbors. Before discussing the halakha itself, the Gemara wonders at the phrase brazen-faced person. It would appear to mean an impudent person who acts against the Torah in a brazen manner, but is not such a one an apostate? Why then are the two listed separately?
אֶלָּא: מוּמָר בְּגִילּוּי פָּנִים — אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת, כְּמַאן כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
Rather, read the baraita as follows: A brazen-faced apostate, i.e., one who publicly displays his deviation from Torah, may not renounce his rights in favor of his neighbors. In accordance with whose opinion was this stated? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
הָהוּא דִּנְפַק בְּחוּמַרְתָּא דִמְדוּשָׁא. כֵּיוָן דְּחַזְיֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה נְשִׂיאָה, כַּסְּיַיהּ. אָמַר: כְּגוֹן זֶה מְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
The Gemara now relates that a certain person went out with a coral ring into the public domain, and it is prohibited to do so on Shabbat. When he saw Rabbi Yehuda Nesia approaching, he quickly covered it. Although he was desecrating the Shabbat, he did not want the Sage to see it. Rabbi Yehuda Nesia said: A person such as this, who is careful not to desecrate Shabbat in public, may renounce his rights in his courtyard according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: אֵיזֶהוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל מוּמָר — זֶה הַמְחַלֵּל שַׁבָּתוֹת בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן: כְּמַאן? אִי כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר דְּאָמַר: חָשׁוּד לְדָבָר אֶחָד, — חָשׁוּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ, אֲפִילּוּ בְּאֶחָד מִכׇּל אִיסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה נָמֵי.
In connection with the preceding discussion with regard to one who does not conform to Torah law, Rav Huna said: Who is an apostate Jew? This is one who desecrates Shabbat in public. Rav Naḥman said to him: In accordance with whose opinion did you say this? If he said this in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: One who is suspected of transgressing one matter, i.e., someone who is known to have committed one transgression, is suspected of transgressing the entire Torah, he should be considered an apostate even if he transgresses one of all the other prohibitions of the Torah as well, and not necessarily one as severe as Shabbat desecration.
אִי כְּרַבָּנַן, הָאָמְרִי: חָשׁוּד לְדָבָר אֶחָד לָא הָוֵי חָשׁוּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ,
If he said this in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, it is difficult. Didn’t they say: One who is suspected of transgressing one matter is not suspected of transgressing the entire Torah,
עַד דְּהָוֵי מוּמָר לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.
unless he is an apostate with regard to idolatry. As long as he has not worshipped idols, his transgression of a single prohibition does not put him under suspicion of transgressing the rest of the Torah.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לִיתֵּן רְשׁוּת וּלְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת. וְכִדְתַנְיָא: יִשְׂרָאֵל מוּמָר, מְשַׁמֵּר שַׁבַּתּוֹ בַּשּׁוּק — מְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּר שַׁבַּתּוֹ בַּשּׁוּק — אֵינוֹ מְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Rav Huna was not attempting to offer a broad definition of an apostate, but was rather referring to the specific issue of giving away rights or renouncing rights in a domain with regard to the halakhot of eiruvin. And as it was taught in the following Tosefta: An apostate Jew, if he observes his Shabbat in the marketplace, i.e., in public, he may renounce his rights in a domain like a regular Jew, but if he does not observe his Shabbat in the marketplace, he may not renounce his rights in a domain, as he is no longer considered a Jew in this regard.
מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאָמְרוּ: יִשְׂרָאֵל נוֹטֵל רְשׁוּת וְנוֹתֵן רְשׁוּת. וּבְגוֹי, עַד שֶׁיַּשְׂכִּיר. כֵּיצַד? אוֹמֵר לוֹ: רְשׁוּתִי קְנוּיָה לָךְ, רְשׁוּתִי מְבוּטֶּלֶת לָךְ — קָנָה, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לִזְכּוֹת.
This distinction is significant due to the fact that the Sages said: A Jew may receive rights and give away rights in a domain through a mere statement of renunciation, but with regard to a gentile it is not so, as he may not transfer his rights to others or renounce them in a domain unless he actually rents it out. How so? A Jew may say to his fellow: May my rights in this domain be acquired by you, or May my rights in this domain be renounced to you, and his fellow thereby acquires those rights, and it is not necessary that he take possession of it through a formal mode of acquisition.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: הַאי תַּנָּא הוּא דַּחֲמִירָא עֲלֵיהּ שַׁבָּת כַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.
Rav Ashi said: Rav Huna’s statement that a Jew who desecrates Shabbat in public is an apostate is indeed a general statement, as he is no longer considered a Jew in any sense. In accordance with the opinion of which tanna did he make that statement? It is in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, for whom Shabbat is as severe as idolatry, and therefore one who desecrates Shabbat is treated like an idol worshipper.
כִּדְתַנְיָא: ״מִכֶּם״ — וְלֹא כּוּלְּכֶם, פְּרָט לַמּוּמָר. ״מִכֶּם״ — בָּכֶם חִלַּקְתִּי, וְלֹא בָּאוּמּוֹת.
As it was taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “Speak to the children of Israel and say to them: When any man of you brings an offering to the Lord, you shall bring your offering of the cattle, of the herd, or of the flock” (Leviticus 1:2). The baraita expounds: “Of you,” i.e., some of you, but not all of you may bring an offering – to the exclusion of an apostate. “Of you” additionally serves to emphasize that among you, the children of Israel, I distinguish between those who observe the Torah and are fit to bring an offering, and those who are not fit, but not among the nations, i.e., in regard to the other nations, even those who do not fulfill the precepts binding upon them may offer their sacrifices.
״מִן הַבְּהֵמָה״ — לְהָבִיא בְּנֵי אָדָם הַדּוֹמִין לִבְהֵמָה. מִכָּאן אָמְרוּ: מְקַבְּלִין קׇרְבָּנוֹת מִפּוֹשְׁעֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, כְּדֵי שֶׁיַּחְזְרוּ בִּתְשׁוּבָה. חוּץ מִן הַמּוּמָר, וְהַמְנַסֵּךְ יַיִן, וְהַמְחַלֵּל שַׁבָּתוֹת בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא.
“Of the cattle” is expounded as follows: To include people who are similar to animals in their disdain for the proper behavior of man, i.e., that the wicked too may offer sacrifices. From here the Sages stated: We accept voluntary sacrifices from Jewish transgressors, in order to enable them to repent, apart from the apostate, one who pours wine libations as part of idol worship, and one who desecrates Shabbat in public, from whom we do not accept sacrifices without their complete repentance.
הָא גוּפָא קַשְׁיָא: אָמְרַתְּ ״מִכֶּם״ וְלֹא כּוּלְּכֶם, לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַמּוּמָר. וַהֲדַר תָּנֵי: מְקַבְּלִין קׇרְבָּנוֹת מִפּוֹשְׁעֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל! הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא: רֵישָׁא — בְּמוּמָר לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ, מְצִיעֲתָא — בְּמוּמָר לְדָבָר אֶחָד.
The Gemara expresses surprise: This baraita itself is difficult, i.e., it contains an internal contradiction: You first said: “Of you,” but not all of you, to the exclusion of an apostate; and then you taught: We accept sacrifices from Jewish transgressors. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as it can be explained as follows: The first clause refers to an apostate with regard to the entire Torah, whose sacrifices are not accepted, whereas the middle clause speaks of an apostate with regard to one matter alone, whose sacrifices are indeed accepted.
אֵימָא סֵיפָא: חוּץ מִן הַמּוּמָר וְהַמְנַסֵּךְ יַיִן. הַאי מוּמָר, הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי מוּמָר לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה — הַיְינוּ רֵישָׁא. אִי לְדָבָר אֶחָד, קַשְׁיָא מְצִיעֲתָא.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, say an explanation of the last clause of the mishna: Apart from the apostate and one who pours wine libations to idolatry, and one who desecrates Shabbat in public. This apostate, what are the circumstances indicating his status? If it refers to an apostate with regard to the entire Torah, this is the same as the first clause. And if it refers to an apostate with regard to only one thing, the middle clause of the baraita is difficult, for it states that we accept sacrifices from such an apostate.
אֶלָּא לָאו הָכִי קָאָמַר: חוּץ מִן הַמּוּמָר לְנַסֵּךְ וּלְחַלֵּל שַׁבָּתוֹת בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא. אַלְמָא עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְשַׁבָּת כִּי הֲדָדֵי נִינְהוּ. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
Rather, is it not true that this is what it is saying: Apart from the apostate with regard to pouring wine libations to idolatry and desecrating Shabbat in public? Although they transgress only one matter, this transgression is so serious that they are considered apostates with regard to the entire Torah. It is apparent from here that idolatry and Shabbat are equivalent, which indicates that there is a tanna who considers public Shabbat desecration as severe a transgression as idolatry. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from this that it is so.
מַתְנִי׳ אַנְשֵׁי חָצֵר שֶׁשָּׁכַח אֶחָד מֵהֶן וְלֹא עֵירַב — בֵּיתוֹ אָסוּר מִלְּהַכְנִיס וּמִלְּהוֹצִיא לוֹ וְלָהֶם, וְשֶׁלָּהֶם מוּתָּרִין לוֹ וְלָהֶם. נָתְנוּ לוֹ רְשׁוּתָן — הוּא מוּתָּר, וְהֵן אֲסוּרִין.
MISHNA: If one of the residents of a courtyard forgot and did not participate in an eiruv with the other residents before Shabbat, and on Shabbat he renounced his rights in the courtyard to the other residents, his house is prohibited both to him, who forgot to establish an eiruv, and to them, the other residents, to bring in objects from the courtyard to his house or to take them out from his house into the courtyard. But their houses are permitted both to him and to them, for taking objects out into the courtyard and for bringing them in. If they gave away their rights in the courtyard to him, i.e., if they renounced their rights in his favor, he is permitted to carry from his house into the courtyard, but they are prohibited from doing so.
הָיוּ שְׁנַיִם — אוֹסְרִין זֶה עַל זֶה. שֶׁאֶחָד נוֹתֵן רְשׁוּת וְנוֹטֵל רְשׁוּת, שְׁנַיִם נוֹתְנִין רְשׁוּת וְאֵין נוֹטְלִין רְשׁוּת.
If two residents of the courtyard forgot to establish an eiruv, and the others renounced their rights in the courtyard in their favor, they prohibit one another. In this scenario, the courtyard would belong to both of them, but each individual house remains the domain of its owner. It would therefore be prohibited for each of these residents to carry into the courtyard. For one resident may give away and receive rights in a domain, whereas two residents may only give away rights in a domain, but they may not receive rights in a domain. Since they did not establish an eiruv, it is unreasonable for the other residents of the courtyard to give away their rights in the domain, as the two who are prohibited because they did not participate in the eiruv render it prohibited for each other to carry.
מֵאֵימָתַי נוֹתְנִין רְשׁוּת? בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם. בֵּית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁיכָה. מִי שֶׁנָּתַן רְשׁוּתוֹ וְהוֹצִיא, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד — הֲרֵי זֶה אוֹסֵר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּמֵזִיד אוֹסֵר, בְּשׁוֹגֵג אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר.
The mishna poses a general question: When may one give away rights in a domain? Beit Shammai say: While it is still day, i.e., before the onset of Shabbat; and Beit Hillel say: Even after nightfall, when it is already Shabbat. The mishna cites another dispute: If one gave away his rights in his courtyard to the other residents of the courtyard, renouncing them after having forgotten to establish an eiruv with them the previous day, and then he carried something out from his house into the courtyard – whether unwittingly, forgetting that he had renounced his rights, or intentionally, he renders carrying prohibited for all the residents of the courtyard, for his action cancels his renunciation; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he acted intentionally, he renders carrying prohibited; but if he acted unwittingly, he does not render carrying prohibited.
גְּמָ׳ בֵּיתוֹ הוּא דְּאָסוּר, הָא חֲצֵירוֹ שַׁרְיָא.
GEMARA: The Gemara first analyzes the language of the mishna. It states: It is prohibited to bring in objects from the courtyard to his house and to take them out from his house into the courtyard. It can be inferred from this that it is carrying to and from his house that is prohibited, but carrying to and from his share of the courtyard is permitted to the other residents of the courtyard.
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּבַטֵּיל, בֵּיתוֹ אַמַּאי אָסוּר. אִי דְּלָא בַּטֵּיל, חֲצֵירוֹ אַמַּאי שַׁרְיָא? הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, כְּגוֹן שֶׁבִּיטֵּל רְשׁוּת חֲצֵירוֹ, וְלֹא בִּיטֵּל רְשׁוּת בֵּיתוֹ. וְקָא סָבְרִי רַבָּנַן: הַמְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת חֲצֵירוֹ — רְשׁוּת בֵּיתוֹ לֹא בִּיטֵּל, דְּדָיַיר אִינִישׁ בְּבַיִת בְּלָא חָצֵר.
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances where this ruling applies? If the resident who forgot to establish an eiruv renounced his rights, why is his house rendered prohibited? And if he did not renounce his rights, why is his courtyard permitted? The Gemara explains: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a special case, where he renounced his rights in his courtyard to the others but did not renounce his rights in his house to them. And the Rabbis hold that one who renounces his rights in his courtyard has not renounced his rights in his house, as it is common for people to reside in a house without a courtyard.
וְשֶׁלָּהֶן מוּתָּר לוֹ וְלָהֶן, מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּהָוֵי אוֹרֵחַ לְגַבַּיְיהוּ.
The Gemara proceeds in its analysis of the mishna: It states that carrying in and out of their houses is permitted for him and for them. The Gemara poses a question: What is the reason that their houses are permitted to him? The Gemara answers: For he is regarded like a guest of theirs, i.e., he is subordinate to them and may carry wherever they may do so.
נָתְנוּ לוֹ רְשׁוּתָן, הוּא מוּתָּר וְהֵן אֲסוּרִין. וְנֶהֱוֵי אִינְהוּ לְגַבֵּיהּ כִּי אוֹרְחִין! חַד לְגַבֵּי חֲמִשָּׁה — הָוֵי אוֹרֵחַ, חֲמִשָּׁה לְגַבֵּי חַד — לָא הָוֵי אוֹרֵחַ.
We learned in the mishna: If the other residents gave away their rights in the courtyard to him, he is permitted to carry from his house into the courtyard, but they are prohibited from doing so. The Gemara asks: But let them, the ones who renounced their rights in the courtyard, be regarded as guests of his, which would enable them to carry as well. The Gemara answers: One vis-à-vis five is considered a guest, whereas five or more vis-à-vis one are not ordinarily viewed as guests.
שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, מְבַטְּלִין וְחוֹזְרִין וּמְבַטְּלִין.
The Gemara attempts to draw another inference from the wording of the mishna: Shall we not learn from this, from the order of events in the mishna, that one may renounce his rights in favor of another when he needs it, and then the latter may renounce his rights in favor of the former when he needs it? For the mishna first describes a case in which the one who forgot to establish an eiruv renounces his rights in favor of the others, at which stage they may use the courtyard, and then afterward recounts that the other residents renounce their rights in favor of the one who forgot to establish an eiruv, leaving it permitted for him and prohibited for them.
הָכִי קָאָמַר: נָתְנוּ לוֹ רְשׁוּתָן מֵעִיקָּרָא — הוּא מוּתָּר וְהֵן אֲסוּרִין.
The Gemara answers: No proof can be brought from here, for this is what the mishna is saying: If they gave away their rights in the courtyard to him at the outset, it is permitted for him and it is prohibited for them. In other words, this is not a continuation of the previous clause, but a separate case.
הָיוּ שְׁנַיִם אוֹסְרִין זֶה עַל זֶה. פְּשִׁיטָא? לָא צְרִיכָא, דַּהֲדַר חַד מִינַּיְיהוּ וּבַטֵּיל לֵיהּ לְחַבְרֵיהּ. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא לִישְׁתְּרֵי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּכֵיוָן דִּבְעִידָּנָא דְּבַטֵּיל לָא הֲוָה לֵיהּ שַׁרְיוּתָא בְּהַאי חָצֵר.
We learned in the mishna: If two residents of a courtyard forgot to establish an eiruv, and the others renounced their rights in the courtyard in their favor, they render one another prohibited from carrying. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Isn’t this obvious? What novel teaching is stated here? The Gemara answers: No, this ruling is necessary in a case where the others renounced their rights in the courtyard in favor of the pair, and one of them then renounced his rights in favor of the other. Lest you say let it now be permitted for him to carry, the mishna teaches us that since at the time of his renunciation it was not permitted for him to carry in that courtyard, he may not renounce his rights either. Therefore, his renunciation is ineffective, and they are both prohibited from carrying.
שֶׁאֶחָד נוֹתֵן רְשׁוּת. הָא תּוּ לְמָה לִי? אִי נוֹתֵן — תְּנֵינָא, אִי נוֹטֵל — תְּנֵינָא?
The mishna explains: For one resident may give away and receive rights in a domain. The Gemara poses a question: Why do I need this further explanation? This ruling can be deduced from the previous cases: If the mishna wishes to teach the halakha with regard to giving away rights, we already learned that one person may give away his rights in a domain, and if it wishes to teach the halakha with regard to receiving rights, we already learned it as well, so why the repetition?
סֵיפָא אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ: שְׁנַיִם נוֹתְנִין רְשׁוּת. הָא נָמֵי פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא
The Gemara answers: He needed it due to the ruling in the latter clause, which includes the novel teaching that two residents may give away rights in a domain. The Gemara again wonders: But this halakha as well, that even multiple residents may give away their rights in a domain, is obvious. The Gemara answers: This was stated lest you say:
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Eruvin 69
וְהָתְנַן מִי שֶׁנָּתַן רְשׁוּתוֹ וְהוֹצִיא, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד — אוֹסֵר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
But didn’t we learn elsewhere in the mishna: If one gave away his rights in his courtyard to the other residents of the courtyard, renouncing them after having forgotten to establish an eiruv with them the previous day, and then he carried something out from his house into the courtyard, whether unwittingly or intentionally, he again renders it prohibited for all the residents of the courtyard to carry; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. This indicates that according to Rabbi Meir, even if the resident carried something into the courtyard on Shabbat itself, he cancels his renunciation, contrary to Rabbi Meir’s own statement in the mishna with regard to a Sadducee.
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: אֵימָא ״אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר״. אַבָּיֵי אָמַר, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן — שֶׁהֶחֱזִיקוּ בְּנֵי מָבוֹי בַּמָּבוֹי, כָּאן — שֶׁלֹּא הֶחְזִיקוּ בְּנֵי מָבוֹי בַּמָּבוֹי.
Rav Yosef said: Say that Rabbi Meir’s statement should read instead: He does not render it prohibited. Abaye said: It is not difficult, as the contradiction between the two teachings of Rabbi Meir can be resolved as follows: Here, where the Sadducee cannot cancel his renunciation, it refers to a case where the residents of the alleyway had already taken possession of the alleyway before he brought out his vessels; whereas here, where the Jew cancels his renunciation, it refers to a case where the residents of the alleyway had not taken possession of the alleyway prior to his act of carrying.
וְהָתַנְיָא: עַד שֶׁלֹּא נָתַן רְשׁוּתוֹ, הוֹצִיא בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד — יָכוֹל לְבַטֵּל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּשׁוֹגֵג יָכוֹל לְבַטֵּל, בְּמֵזִיד אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְבַטֵּל.
And similarly, it was taught in a baraita: With regard to one who failed to join in an eiruv with the other residents of his alleyway, if he carried something from his house into the alleyway before he gave away, i.e., renounced, his rights in the alleyway, whether unwittingly or intentionally, he can still renounce his rights; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he unwittingly carried from his house into the alleyway, he can still renounce his rights, but if he did so intentionally, he cannot renounce them, for one who publicly transgresses the words of the Sages and intentionally desecrates Shabbat has the status of a gentile.
מִי שֶׁנָּתַן רְשׁוּתוֹ וְהוֹצִיא, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד — אוֹסֵר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּמֵזִיד אוֹסֵר, בְּשׁוֹגֵג אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — בְּשֶׁלֹּא הֶחְזִיקוּ בְּנֵי מָבוֹי בַּמָּבוֹי, אֲבָל הֶחְזִיקוּ בְּנֵי מָבוֹי בַּמָּבוֹי, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג וּבֵין בְּמֵזִיד — אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר.
However, if one already gave away, i.e., renounced, his rights in the alleyway, and then he carried something from his house into the alleyway, whether unwittingly or intentionally, he renders prohibited all the residents’ use of the alleyway, for his action cancels his renunciation; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he did it intentionally, he renders carrying prohibited; but if he carried inadvertently, he does not render carrying prohibited. In what case is this statement said? In a case where the residents of the alleyway had not already taken possession of the alleyway. But if the residents of the alleyway had already taken possession of the alleyway before he carried something into the alleyway, all agree that whether he did it unwittingly or intentionally, he does not render prohibited their use of the alleyway.
אָמַר מָר: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר בְּלָשׁוֹן אַחֶרֶת: מַהֲרוּ וַעֲשׂוּ צוֹרְכֵיכֶם בַּמָּבוֹי עַד שֶׁלֹּא תֶּחְשַׁךְ וְיֶאֱסֹר עֲלֵיכֶם. אַלְמָא גּוֹי הוּא. וְהָא אֲנַן ״עַד שֶׁלֹּא יוֹצִיא״ תְּנַן!
The Master said above in the baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: Rabban Gamliel spoke to them with a different formulation, saying: Hurry, and do whatever you must do in the alleyway prior to Shabbat, before night falls, and he will render prohibited your use of the alleyway. It is apparent from this statement that a Sadducee is considered a gentile, whose renunciation of his rights in an alleyway is ineffective. But didn’t we learn in the mishna that according to Rabbi Yehuda, he said: Hurry, and do whatever you have to do before he takes out [yotzi] his vessels and renders prohibited your use of the alleyway, which implies that until then they may in fact use the alleyway; that is, his renunciation is effective?
אֵימָא ״עַד שֶׁלֹּא יוֹצִיא הַיּוֹם״. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן — בְּמוּמָר לְחַלֵּל שַׁבָּתוֹת בְּצִנְעָא, כָּאן — בְּמוּמָר לְחַלֵּל שַׁבָּתוֹת בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא.
The Gemara answers: Say that the mishna should read as follows: Hurry, and do whatever you have to do before the day goes out [yotzi hayom], i.e., before the end of Friday. And if you wish, say: It is not difficult. Here, where the mishna implies that a Sadducee may renounce his rights in an alleyway, it refers to an apostate of the kind who desecrates Shabbat in private; here, where the baraita implies that a Sadducee may not renounce his rights in an alleyway, it refers to an apostate who desecrates Shabbat in public [befarhesya]. Such a person is likened to a gentile in all regards, and therefore he may not renounce his rights in the alleyway.
כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: מוּמָר וְגִילּוּי פָּנִים הֲרֵי זֶה אֵינוֹ מְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת. גִּילּוּי פָּנִים — מוּמָר הָוֵי?
The Gemara comments: In accordance with which tanna is the ruling that was taught in the following baraita: An apostate or a brazen-faced person may not renounce his rights in favor of his neighbors. Before discussing the halakha itself, the Gemara wonders at the phrase brazen-faced person. It would appear to mean an impudent person who acts against the Torah in a brazen manner, but is not such a one an apostate? Why then are the two listed separately?
אֶלָּא: מוּמָר בְּגִילּוּי פָּנִים — אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת, כְּמַאן כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
Rather, read the baraita as follows: A brazen-faced apostate, i.e., one who publicly displays his deviation from Torah, may not renounce his rights in favor of his neighbors. In accordance with whose opinion was this stated? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
הָהוּא דִּנְפַק בְּחוּמַרְתָּא דִמְדוּשָׁא. כֵּיוָן דְּחַזְיֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה נְשִׂיאָה, כַּסְּיַיהּ. אָמַר: כְּגוֹן זֶה מְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
The Gemara now relates that a certain person went out with a coral ring into the public domain, and it is prohibited to do so on Shabbat. When he saw Rabbi Yehuda Nesia approaching, he quickly covered it. Although he was desecrating the Shabbat, he did not want the Sage to see it. Rabbi Yehuda Nesia said: A person such as this, who is careful not to desecrate Shabbat in public, may renounce his rights in his courtyard according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: אֵיזֶהוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל מוּמָר — זֶה הַמְחַלֵּל שַׁבָּתוֹת בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן: כְּמַאן? אִי כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר דְּאָמַר: חָשׁוּד לְדָבָר אֶחָד, — חָשׁוּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ, אֲפִילּוּ בְּאֶחָד מִכׇּל אִיסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה נָמֵי.
In connection with the preceding discussion with regard to one who does not conform to Torah law, Rav Huna said: Who is an apostate Jew? This is one who desecrates Shabbat in public. Rav Naḥman said to him: In accordance with whose opinion did you say this? If he said this in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: One who is suspected of transgressing one matter, i.e., someone who is known to have committed one transgression, is suspected of transgressing the entire Torah, he should be considered an apostate even if he transgresses one of all the other prohibitions of the Torah as well, and not necessarily one as severe as Shabbat desecration.
אִי כְּרַבָּנַן, הָאָמְרִי: חָשׁוּד לְדָבָר אֶחָד לָא הָוֵי חָשׁוּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ,
If he said this in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, it is difficult. Didn’t they say: One who is suspected of transgressing one matter is not suspected of transgressing the entire Torah,
עַד דְּהָוֵי מוּמָר לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.
unless he is an apostate with regard to idolatry. As long as he has not worshipped idols, his transgression of a single prohibition does not put him under suspicion of transgressing the rest of the Torah.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לִיתֵּן רְשׁוּת וּלְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת. וְכִדְתַנְיָא: יִשְׂרָאֵל מוּמָר, מְשַׁמֵּר שַׁבַּתּוֹ בַּשּׁוּק — מְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּר שַׁבַּתּוֹ בַּשּׁוּק — אֵינוֹ מְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Rav Huna was not attempting to offer a broad definition of an apostate, but was rather referring to the specific issue of giving away rights or renouncing rights in a domain with regard to the halakhot of eiruvin. And as it was taught in the following Tosefta: An apostate Jew, if he observes his Shabbat in the marketplace, i.e., in public, he may renounce his rights in a domain like a regular Jew, but if he does not observe his Shabbat in the marketplace, he may not renounce his rights in a domain, as he is no longer considered a Jew in this regard.
מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאָמְרוּ: יִשְׂרָאֵל נוֹטֵל רְשׁוּת וְנוֹתֵן רְשׁוּת. וּבְגוֹי, עַד שֶׁיַּשְׂכִּיר. כֵּיצַד? אוֹמֵר לוֹ: רְשׁוּתִי קְנוּיָה לָךְ, רְשׁוּתִי מְבוּטֶּלֶת לָךְ — קָנָה, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לִזְכּוֹת.
This distinction is significant due to the fact that the Sages said: A Jew may receive rights and give away rights in a domain through a mere statement of renunciation, but with regard to a gentile it is not so, as he may not transfer his rights to others or renounce them in a domain unless he actually rents it out. How so? A Jew may say to his fellow: May my rights in this domain be acquired by you, or May my rights in this domain be renounced to you, and his fellow thereby acquires those rights, and it is not necessary that he take possession of it through a formal mode of acquisition.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: הַאי תַּנָּא הוּא דַּחֲמִירָא עֲלֵיהּ שַׁבָּת כַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.
Rav Ashi said: Rav Huna’s statement that a Jew who desecrates Shabbat in public is an apostate is indeed a general statement, as he is no longer considered a Jew in any sense. In accordance with the opinion of which tanna did he make that statement? It is in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, for whom Shabbat is as severe as idolatry, and therefore one who desecrates Shabbat is treated like an idol worshipper.
כִּדְתַנְיָא: ״מִכֶּם״ — וְלֹא כּוּלְּכֶם, פְּרָט לַמּוּמָר. ״מִכֶּם״ — בָּכֶם חִלַּקְתִּי, וְלֹא בָּאוּמּוֹת.
As it was taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “Speak to the children of Israel and say to them: When any man of you brings an offering to the Lord, you shall bring your offering of the cattle, of the herd, or of the flock” (Leviticus 1:2). The baraita expounds: “Of you,” i.e., some of you, but not all of you may bring an offering – to the exclusion of an apostate. “Of you” additionally serves to emphasize that among you, the children of Israel, I distinguish between those who observe the Torah and are fit to bring an offering, and those who are not fit, but not among the nations, i.e., in regard to the other nations, even those who do not fulfill the precepts binding upon them may offer their sacrifices.
״מִן הַבְּהֵמָה״ — לְהָבִיא בְּנֵי אָדָם הַדּוֹמִין לִבְהֵמָה. מִכָּאן אָמְרוּ: מְקַבְּלִין קׇרְבָּנוֹת מִפּוֹשְׁעֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, כְּדֵי שֶׁיַּחְזְרוּ בִּתְשׁוּבָה. חוּץ מִן הַמּוּמָר, וְהַמְנַסֵּךְ יַיִן, וְהַמְחַלֵּל שַׁבָּתוֹת בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא.
“Of the cattle” is expounded as follows: To include people who are similar to animals in their disdain for the proper behavior of man, i.e., that the wicked too may offer sacrifices. From here the Sages stated: We accept voluntary sacrifices from Jewish transgressors, in order to enable them to repent, apart from the apostate, one who pours wine libations as part of idol worship, and one who desecrates Shabbat in public, from whom we do not accept sacrifices without their complete repentance.
הָא גוּפָא קַשְׁיָא: אָמְרַתְּ ״מִכֶּם״ וְלֹא כּוּלְּכֶם, לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַמּוּמָר. וַהֲדַר תָּנֵי: מְקַבְּלִין קׇרְבָּנוֹת מִפּוֹשְׁעֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל! הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא: רֵישָׁא — בְּמוּמָר לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ, מְצִיעֲתָא — בְּמוּמָר לְדָבָר אֶחָד.
The Gemara expresses surprise: This baraita itself is difficult, i.e., it contains an internal contradiction: You first said: “Of you,” but not all of you, to the exclusion of an apostate; and then you taught: We accept sacrifices from Jewish transgressors. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as it can be explained as follows: The first clause refers to an apostate with regard to the entire Torah, whose sacrifices are not accepted, whereas the middle clause speaks of an apostate with regard to one matter alone, whose sacrifices are indeed accepted.
אֵימָא סֵיפָא: חוּץ מִן הַמּוּמָר וְהַמְנַסֵּךְ יַיִן. הַאי מוּמָר, הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי מוּמָר לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה — הַיְינוּ רֵישָׁא. אִי לְדָבָר אֶחָד, קַשְׁיָא מְצִיעֲתָא.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, say an explanation of the last clause of the mishna: Apart from the apostate and one who pours wine libations to idolatry, and one who desecrates Shabbat in public. This apostate, what are the circumstances indicating his status? If it refers to an apostate with regard to the entire Torah, this is the same as the first clause. And if it refers to an apostate with regard to only one thing, the middle clause of the baraita is difficult, for it states that we accept sacrifices from such an apostate.
אֶלָּא לָאו הָכִי קָאָמַר: חוּץ מִן הַמּוּמָר לְנַסֵּךְ וּלְחַלֵּל שַׁבָּתוֹת בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא. אַלְמָא עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְשַׁבָּת כִּי הֲדָדֵי נִינְהוּ. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
Rather, is it not true that this is what it is saying: Apart from the apostate with regard to pouring wine libations to idolatry and desecrating Shabbat in public? Although they transgress only one matter, this transgression is so serious that they are considered apostates with regard to the entire Torah. It is apparent from here that idolatry and Shabbat are equivalent, which indicates that there is a tanna who considers public Shabbat desecration as severe a transgression as idolatry. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from this that it is so.
מַתְנִי׳ אַנְשֵׁי חָצֵר שֶׁשָּׁכַח אֶחָד מֵהֶן וְלֹא עֵירַב — בֵּיתוֹ אָסוּר מִלְּהַכְנִיס וּמִלְּהוֹצִיא לוֹ וְלָהֶם, וְשֶׁלָּהֶם מוּתָּרִין לוֹ וְלָהֶם. נָתְנוּ לוֹ רְשׁוּתָן — הוּא מוּתָּר, וְהֵן אֲסוּרִין.
MISHNA: If one of the residents of a courtyard forgot and did not participate in an eiruv with the other residents before Shabbat, and on Shabbat he renounced his rights in the courtyard to the other residents, his house is prohibited both to him, who forgot to establish an eiruv, and to them, the other residents, to bring in objects from the courtyard to his house or to take them out from his house into the courtyard. But their houses are permitted both to him and to them, for taking objects out into the courtyard and for bringing them in. If they gave away their rights in the courtyard to him, i.e., if they renounced their rights in his favor, he is permitted to carry from his house into the courtyard, but they are prohibited from doing so.
הָיוּ שְׁנַיִם — אוֹסְרִין זֶה עַל זֶה. שֶׁאֶחָד נוֹתֵן רְשׁוּת וְנוֹטֵל רְשׁוּת, שְׁנַיִם נוֹתְנִין רְשׁוּת וְאֵין נוֹטְלִין רְשׁוּת.
If two residents of the courtyard forgot to establish an eiruv, and the others renounced their rights in the courtyard in their favor, they prohibit one another. In this scenario, the courtyard would belong to both of them, but each individual house remains the domain of its owner. It would therefore be prohibited for each of these residents to carry into the courtyard. For one resident may give away and receive rights in a domain, whereas two residents may only give away rights in a domain, but they may not receive rights in a domain. Since they did not establish an eiruv, it is unreasonable for the other residents of the courtyard to give away their rights in the domain, as the two who are prohibited because they did not participate in the eiruv render it prohibited for each other to carry.
מֵאֵימָתַי נוֹתְנִין רְשׁוּת? בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם. בֵּית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁיכָה. מִי שֶׁנָּתַן רְשׁוּתוֹ וְהוֹצִיא, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד — הֲרֵי זֶה אוֹסֵר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּמֵזִיד אוֹסֵר, בְּשׁוֹגֵג אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר.
The mishna poses a general question: When may one give away rights in a domain? Beit Shammai say: While it is still day, i.e., before the onset of Shabbat; and Beit Hillel say: Even after nightfall, when it is already Shabbat. The mishna cites another dispute: If one gave away his rights in his courtyard to the other residents of the courtyard, renouncing them after having forgotten to establish an eiruv with them the previous day, and then he carried something out from his house into the courtyard – whether unwittingly, forgetting that he had renounced his rights, or intentionally, he renders carrying prohibited for all the residents of the courtyard, for his action cancels his renunciation; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he acted intentionally, he renders carrying prohibited; but if he acted unwittingly, he does not render carrying prohibited.
גְּמָ׳ בֵּיתוֹ הוּא דְּאָסוּר, הָא חֲצֵירוֹ שַׁרְיָא.
GEMARA: The Gemara first analyzes the language of the mishna. It states: It is prohibited to bring in objects from the courtyard to his house and to take them out from his house into the courtyard. It can be inferred from this that it is carrying to and from his house that is prohibited, but carrying to and from his share of the courtyard is permitted to the other residents of the courtyard.
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּבַטֵּיל, בֵּיתוֹ אַמַּאי אָסוּר. אִי דְּלָא בַּטֵּיל, חֲצֵירוֹ אַמַּאי שַׁרְיָא? הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, כְּגוֹן שֶׁבִּיטֵּל רְשׁוּת חֲצֵירוֹ, וְלֹא בִּיטֵּל רְשׁוּת בֵּיתוֹ. וְקָא סָבְרִי רַבָּנַן: הַמְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת חֲצֵירוֹ — רְשׁוּת בֵּיתוֹ לֹא בִּיטֵּל, דְּדָיַיר אִינִישׁ בְּבַיִת בְּלָא חָצֵר.
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances where this ruling applies? If the resident who forgot to establish an eiruv renounced his rights, why is his house rendered prohibited? And if he did not renounce his rights, why is his courtyard permitted? The Gemara explains: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a special case, where he renounced his rights in his courtyard to the others but did not renounce his rights in his house to them. And the Rabbis hold that one who renounces his rights in his courtyard has not renounced his rights in his house, as it is common for people to reside in a house without a courtyard.
וְשֶׁלָּהֶן מוּתָּר לוֹ וְלָהֶן, מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּהָוֵי אוֹרֵחַ לְגַבַּיְיהוּ.
The Gemara proceeds in its analysis of the mishna: It states that carrying in and out of their houses is permitted for him and for them. The Gemara poses a question: What is the reason that their houses are permitted to him? The Gemara answers: For he is regarded like a guest of theirs, i.e., he is subordinate to them and may carry wherever they may do so.
נָתְנוּ לוֹ רְשׁוּתָן, הוּא מוּתָּר וְהֵן אֲסוּרִין. וְנֶהֱוֵי אִינְהוּ לְגַבֵּיהּ כִּי אוֹרְחִין! חַד לְגַבֵּי חֲמִשָּׁה — הָוֵי אוֹרֵחַ, חֲמִשָּׁה לְגַבֵּי חַד — לָא הָוֵי אוֹרֵחַ.
We learned in the mishna: If the other residents gave away their rights in the courtyard to him, he is permitted to carry from his house into the courtyard, but they are prohibited from doing so. The Gemara asks: But let them, the ones who renounced their rights in the courtyard, be regarded as guests of his, which would enable them to carry as well. The Gemara answers: One vis-à-vis five is considered a guest, whereas five or more vis-à-vis one are not ordinarily viewed as guests.
שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, מְבַטְּלִין וְחוֹזְרִין וּמְבַטְּלִין.
The Gemara attempts to draw another inference from the wording of the mishna: Shall we not learn from this, from the order of events in the mishna, that one may renounce his rights in favor of another when he needs it, and then the latter may renounce his rights in favor of the former when he needs it? For the mishna first describes a case in which the one who forgot to establish an eiruv renounces his rights in favor of the others, at which stage they may use the courtyard, and then afterward recounts that the other residents renounce their rights in favor of the one who forgot to establish an eiruv, leaving it permitted for him and prohibited for them.
הָכִי קָאָמַר: נָתְנוּ לוֹ רְשׁוּתָן מֵעִיקָּרָא — הוּא מוּתָּר וְהֵן אֲסוּרִין.
The Gemara answers: No proof can be brought from here, for this is what the mishna is saying: If they gave away their rights in the courtyard to him at the outset, it is permitted for him and it is prohibited for them. In other words, this is not a continuation of the previous clause, but a separate case.
הָיוּ שְׁנַיִם אוֹסְרִין זֶה עַל זֶה. פְּשִׁיטָא? לָא צְרִיכָא, דַּהֲדַר חַד מִינַּיְיהוּ וּבַטֵּיל לֵיהּ לְחַבְרֵיהּ. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא לִישְׁתְּרֵי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּכֵיוָן דִּבְעִידָּנָא דְּבַטֵּיל לָא הֲוָה לֵיהּ שַׁרְיוּתָא בְּהַאי חָצֵר.
We learned in the mishna: If two residents of a courtyard forgot to establish an eiruv, and the others renounced their rights in the courtyard in their favor, they render one another prohibited from carrying. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Isn’t this obvious? What novel teaching is stated here? The Gemara answers: No, this ruling is necessary in a case where the others renounced their rights in the courtyard in favor of the pair, and one of them then renounced his rights in favor of the other. Lest you say let it now be permitted for him to carry, the mishna teaches us that since at the time of his renunciation it was not permitted for him to carry in that courtyard, he may not renounce his rights either. Therefore, his renunciation is ineffective, and they are both prohibited from carrying.
שֶׁאֶחָד נוֹתֵן רְשׁוּת. הָא תּוּ לְמָה לִי? אִי נוֹתֵן — תְּנֵינָא, אִי נוֹטֵל — תְּנֵינָא?
The mishna explains: For one resident may give away and receive rights in a domain. The Gemara poses a question: Why do I need this further explanation? This ruling can be deduced from the previous cases: If the mishna wishes to teach the halakha with regard to giving away rights, we already learned that one person may give away his rights in a domain, and if it wishes to teach the halakha with regard to receiving rights, we already learned it as well, so why the repetition?
סֵיפָא אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ: שְׁנַיִם נוֹתְנִין רְשׁוּת. הָא נָמֵי פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא
The Gemara answers: He needed it due to the ruling in the latter clause, which includes the novel teaching that two residents may give away rights in a domain. The Gemara again wonders: But this halakha as well, that even multiple residents may give away their rights in a domain, is obvious. The Gemara answers: This was stated lest you say:
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