Eruvin 71
אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶחֱזִיק יִשְׂרָאֵל אַחֵר בִּנְכָסָיו — אוֹסֵר. מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁיכָה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הֶחְזִיק יִשְׂרָאֵל אַחֵר — אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר.
In such a case, even though a different Jew took possession of the convert’s property, the one who acquires it renders carrying prohibited. If, however, he died after nightfall, even though a different Jew did not take possession of his property, it, i.e., carrying, is not prohibited, for carrying had already been permitted on that Shabbat.
הָא גוּפָא קַשְׁיָא, אָמְרַתְּ: מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם — אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶחְזִיק, וְלָא מִיבַּעְיָא כִּי לֹא הֶחְזִיק. אַדְּרַבָּה, כִּי לֹא הֶחְזִיק לָא אָסַר!
The Gemara raises a difficulty: The baraita itself is difficult. You first said: If the convert died while it was still day, even though a different Jew took possession of his property, the latter renders carrying prohibited, which implies that it is not necessary to say so where another Jew did not take possession of the property, for in such a case it is certainly prohibited. But this is incorrect. On the contrary, in a case where a different person did not take possession of the property, it is certainly not prohibited, for in such a case the convert’s property is ownerless and there is nobody to render carrying in the courtyard prohibited.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: אֵימָא: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הֶחְזִיק. וְהָא ״אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶחְזִיק״ קָתָנֵי?
Rav Pappa said: Say that the baraita should read as follows: Even though a different Jew did not take possession of it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can it be corrected in this manner? But doesn’t it teach: Even though he took possession of it?
הָכִי קָאָמַר: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הֶחְזִיק מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם אֶלָּא מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁיכָה, כֵּיוָן דַּהֲוָה לֵיהּ לְהַחְזִיק מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם — אוֹסֵר. מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁיכָה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הֶחְזִיק יִשְׂרָאֵל אַחֵר — אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר.
The Gemara answers: This is what the baraita is saying: If the convert died while it was still day, then even though a different Jew did not take possession of the property while it was still day but only after nightfall, since he had the possibility of taking possession of it while it was still day, the person who acquires it renders carrying prohibited. If, however, the convert died after nightfall, even though a different Jew did not take possession of his property, it does not render it prohibited to carry.
״אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הֶחְזִיק יִשְׂרָאֵל אַחֵר״, וְלָא מִיבַּעְיָא כִּי הֶחְזִיק?! אַדְּרַבָּה, כִּי הֶחְזִיק אָסַר!
The Gemara now considers the next clause of the baraita, which states: If the convert died after nightfall, even though a different Jew did not take possession of his property, carrying is not prohibited. This implies that it is not necessary to say so where another Jew did take possession of the property, for in such a case it is certainly not prohibited. But, on the contrary, where a different person takes possession of the property, he renders carrying prohibited.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא, אֵימָא: ״אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶחְזִיק״. וְהָא ״אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הֶחְזִיק״ קָתָנֵי! הָכִי קָאָמַר: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶחְזִיק מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁיכָה, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְהַחְזִיק מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם — אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר.
Rav Pappa said: Say that the baraita should read as follows: Even though a different Jew took possession of it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn’t the baraita teach: Even though he did not take possession of it? The Gemara explains: This is what the baraita is saying: If the convert died after nightfall, even though a different Jew took possession of his property after nightfall, since he did not have the possibility of taking possession of it while it was still day, he does not render carrying prohibited.
קָתָנֵי מִיהַת רֵישָׁא אוֹסֵר, אַמַּאי אוֹסֵר? נִיבַטֵּל!
After explaining the baraita, the Gemara proceeds to clarify the issue at hand: In any event, the first clause is teaching that the person who acquires the convert’s property renders carrying prohibited; but why does he render carrying prohibited? Let him renounce his rights in the domain like an heir. The implication then is that he does not have the option of renunciation, in contrast to the opinion of Rav Naḥman.
מַאי ״אוֹסֵר״ דְּקָתָנֵי — עַד שֶׁיְּבַטֵּל.
Rav Naḥman replied: What is the meaning of the word prohibits that it teaches here? It means he renders carrying prohibited until he renounces his rights, but renunciation is effective.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מַתְנִיתִין, מַנִּי? — בֵּית שַׁמַּאי הִיא, דְּאָמְרִי: אֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת בְּשַׁבָּת. דִּתְנַן: מֵאֵימָתַי נוֹתְנִין רְשׁוּת? בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם, וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: מִשֶּׁתֶּחְשַׁךְ.
Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Who is the tanna of the problematic baraitot that imply that an heir cannot renounce rights, and from which objections were brought against Rav Naḥman? It is Beit Shammai, who say that there is no renunciation of rights on Shabbat at all, even for the owner of the property. As we learned in the mishna: When may one give away rights in a domain? Beit Shammai say: While it is still day. And Beit Hillel say: Even after nightfall.
אָמַר עוּלָּא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּבֵית הִלֵּל, נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר ״כְּלָךְ אֵצֶל יָפוֹת״.
With regard to this dispute itself, Ulla said: What is the reason of Beit Hillel that one may renounce rights even after nightfall? This should be considered an act of acquisition, which is prohibited on Shabbat. He explains: It is comparable to one who says: Turn toward the high-quality ones. If a person sets aside teruma from another person’s produce without the latter’s knowledge, and when the owner finds out he says: Why did you set aside this produce? Turn toward the high-quality ones, i.e., you should have gone to find better produce to use as teruma, then the teruma that was separated is considered teruma, provided there was indeed quality produce in that place. The reason is that the owner has demonstrated his retroactive acquiescence to the other person’s setting aside of teruma. Therefore, the latter is considered his agent for this purpose. The same applies to our issue. If a person intended to permit both himself and others to carry in a courtyard by means of establishing an eiruv but forgot to do so, by renouncing his rights after nightfall, he retroactively makes plain his desire that his domain should be mingled with that of his neighbors. What he then does on Shabbat is not a complete action, but merely a demonstration of his intentions.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מֵת גּוֹי בְּשַׁבָּת מַאי ״כְּלָךְ אֵצֶל יָפוֹת״ אִיכָּא?
Abaye said: This explanation is unsatisfactory, as when a gentile dies on Shabbat, what connection is there to the concept: Turn toward the high-quality ones? When a gentile dies on Shabbat, his Jewish neighbors may renounce their rights in the courtyard to each other and thus render carrying in the courtyard permitted, even though such renunciation would have been ineffective prior to his passing. Consequently, it cannot be said that it works retroactively.
אֶלָּא הָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: בֵּית שַׁמַּאי סָבְרִי בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מִיקְנֵא רְשׁוּתָא הוּא, וּמִיקְנֵא רְשׁוּתָא בְּשַׁבָּת — אָסוּר. וּבֵית הִלֵּל סָבְרִי אִסְתַּלּוֹקֵי רְשׁוּתָא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא, וְאִסְתַּלּוֹקֵי רְשׁוּתָא בְּשַׁבָּת — שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי.
Rather, the Gemara rejects Ulla’s explanation and states that here they disagree over the following: Beit Shammai hold that renunciation of a domain is equivalent to acquisition of a domain, and acquisition of a domain is prohibited on Shabbat. And Beit Hillel hold that it is merely withdrawal from a domain, and withdrawal from a domain seems well on Shabbat, i.e., it is permitted. As such, there is no reason to prohibit renunciation as a form of acquisition, which is prohibited as a part of a decree against conducting commerce on Shabbat.
מַתְנִי׳ בַּעַל הַבַּיִת שֶׁהָיָה שׁוּתָּף לִשְׁכֵנָיו, לָזֶה בְּיַיִן וְלָזֶה בְּיַיִן — אֵינָן צְרִיכִין לְעָרֵב.
MISHNA: If a homeowner was in partnership with his neighbors, with this one in wine and with that one in wine, they need not establish an eiruv, for due to their authentic partnership they are considered to be one household, and no further partnership is required.
לָזֶה בְּיַיִן וְלָזֶה בְּשֶׁמֶן — צְרִיכִין לְעָרֵב. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה, אֵינָן צְרִיכִין לְעָרֵב.
If, however, he was in partnership with this one in wine and with that one in oil, they must establish an eiruv. As they are not partners in the same item, they are not all considered one partnership. Rabbi Shimon says: In both this case and that case, i.e., even if he partners with his neighbors in different items, they need not establish an eiruv.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב: וּבִכְלִי אֶחָד. אָמַר רָבָא, דַּיְקָא נָמֵי דְּקָתָנֵי: לָזֶה בְּיַיִן וְלָזֶה בְּשֶׁמֶן — צְרִיכִין לְעָרֵב. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא: רֵישָׁא בִּכְלִי אֶחָד, וְסֵיפָא בִּשְׁנֵי כֵלִים — שַׁפִּיר. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ: רֵישָׁא בִּשְׁנֵי כֵלִים, וְסֵיפָא בִּשְׁנֵי כֵלִים — מָה לִי יַיִן וָיַיִן, מָה לִי יַיִן וָשֶׁמֶן?!
GEMARA: Rav said: The halakha that one who is in partnership in wine with both his neighbors need not establish an eiruv applies only if their wine is in one vessel. Rava said: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: If he was in partnership with this one in wine and with the other one in oil, they must establish an eiruv. Granted, if you say that the first clause of the mishna deals with one vessel, and the latter clause deals with two vessels, one of wine and one of oil, it is well. But, if you say that the first clause of the mishna speaks of two vessels, and the latter clause also speaks of two vessels, what difference is it to me if it is wine and wine or wine and oil? The halakha should be the same in both cases.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: יַיִן וָיַיִן רָאוּי לְעָרֵב. יַיִן וְשֶׁמֶן אֵין רָאוּי לְעָרֵב.
Abaye said to him: This is no proof, and the first clause can be referring to a case where the wine was in separate vessels as well. The difference is that wine and wine is suitable for mixing together, and therefore can be considered a single unit even if divided into two containers. Wine and oil, however, are not suitable for mixing.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה — אֵין צְרִיכִין לְעָרֵב. וַאֲפִילּוּ לָזֶה בְּיַיִן וְלָזֶה בְּשֶׁמֶן! אָמַר רַבָּה: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן בְּחָצֵר שֶׁבֵּין שְׁנֵי מְבוֹאוֹת, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לְטַעְמֵיהּ —
We learned in the mishna: Rabbi Shimon says: In both this case, where they are partners in wine alone, and that case, where the partnerships are in wine and oil, they need not establish an eiruv. The Gemara poses a question: Did he say this even if the partnership is with this one in wine and with the other one in oil? But these are not suitable for mixing. Rabba said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a courtyard positioned between two alleyways, and Rabbi Shimon follows his usual line of reasoning.
דִּתְנַן, אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: לְמָה הַדָּבָר דּוֹמֶה, לְשָׁלֹשׁ חֲצֵירוֹת הַפְּתוּחוֹת זוֹ לָזוֹ וּפְתוּחוֹת לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים. עֵירְבוּ שְׁתַּיִם הַחִיצוֹנוֹת עִם הָאֶמְצָעִית — הִיא מוּתֶּרֶת עִמָּהֶן, וְהֵן מוּתָּרוֹת עִמָּהּ, וּשְׁתַּיִם הַחִיצוֹנוֹת אֲסוּרוֹת זוֹ עִם זוֹ.
As we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Shimon said: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to the case of three courtyards that open into one another and also open into a public domain. If the two outer courtyards each established an eiruv with the middle one, it is permitted for residents of the middle one to carry with the two outer ones, and it is permitted for residents of the two outer ones to carry with the middle one. However, it is prohibited for the residents of the two outer courtyards to carry with each other, as they did not establish an eiruv with each other. This teaches that the residents of one courtyard can establish an eiruv with a courtyard on each side, and need not choose between them. Here too, the residents of the courtyard can participate in an eiruv with both alleyways, one by means of wine and the other by means of oil.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם קָתָנֵי: שְׁתַּיִם הַחִיצוֹנוֹת אֲסוּרוֹת, הָכָא קָתָנֵי: אֵין צְרִיכִין לְעָרֵב כְּלָל!
Abaye said to him: Are the cases really comparable? There it teaches: It is prohibited for the residents of the two outer courtyards to carry with each other, whereas here it teaches: They need not establish an eiruv, indicating that it is permitted for residents of all three domains to carry with each other.
מַאי ״אֵין צְרִיכִין לְעָרֵב״ — שְׁכֵנִים בַּהֲדֵי בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, אֲבָל שְׁכֵנִים בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי — צְרִיכִין לְעָרֵב.
The Gemara explains: What is the subject of the phrase they need not establish an eiruv? It refers to the neighbors together with the homeowner, i.e., the residents of the courtyards that open into each of the alleyways with the resident of the courtyard in the middle. But with regard to the neighbors with each other, i.e., if the residents of the two alleyways wish to be permitted to carry with each other, they must establish an eiruv and place it in the middle courtyard.
וְרַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן וְרַבָּנַן בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי וְרַבָּנַן קָא מִיפַּלְגִי. דִּתְנַן: שֶׁמֶן שֶׁצָּף עַל גַּבֵּי יַיִן, וְנָגַע טְבוּל יוֹם בְּשֶׁמֶן — לֹא פָּסַל אֶלָּא שֶׁמֶן בִּלְבַד, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵיהֶן חִיבּוּרִין זֶה לָזֶה.
And Rav Yosef said: In fact we are dealing here with a single alleyway, and Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree about the same point of dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri and the Rabbis. As we learned in a mishna: If teruma oil was floating on the surface of wine, and one who immersed during the day, touched the oil, he disqualified only the oil alone. However, he did not disqualify the wine, because it is considered separate from the oil. Only the oil is disqualified, and it does not render other items ritually impure. And Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: They are both connected to each other and are considered as one, so the wine is also ritually impure.
רַבָּנַן — כְּרַבָּנַן, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן — כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי.
The Gemara explains: The opinion of the Rabbis in our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis in the other mishna, who maintain that wine and oil are not connected and therefore cannot be used together in an eiruv, and the opinion of Rabbi Shimon is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, who holds that wine and oil are connected, and may be used together in an eiruv.
תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן תַּדַּאי אוֹמֵר: אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה צְרִיכִין לְעָרֵב. וַאֲפִילּוּ לָזֶה בְּיַיִן וְלָזֶה בְּיַיִן?
It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Taddai says: In both this case, of wine and wine, and that case, of wine and oil, they must establish an eiruv. The Gemara expresses wonder: Did he say this even if the partnership is with this one in wine and also with the other one in wine? Why should these partnerships not be sufficient to consider the items merged?
אָמַר רַבָּה: זֶה בָּא בִּלְגִינוֹ וְשָׁפַךְ, וָזֶה בָּא בִּלְגִינוֹ וְשָׁפַךְ — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּהָוֵי עֵירוּב.
Rabba said: If they partnered in the following manner, such that this one came with his wine-filled jug and poured its contents into a barrel, and the other one came with his jug and poured his wine into that same barrel, everyone agrees that it is a valid eiruv, even if they did not act specifically for that purpose.
כִּי פְּלִיגִי כְּגוֹן שֶׁלָּקְחוּ חָבִית שֶׁל יַיִן בְּשׁוּתָּפוּת, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן תַּדַּאי סָבַר: אֵין בְּרֵירָה, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: יֵשׁ בְּרֵירָה.
Where they disagree is in the case where they bought a barrel of wine in partnership. Rabbi Eliezer ben Taddai holds: There is no principle of retroactive clarification, i.e., there is no halakhic assumption that the undetermined halakhic status of items can be retroactively clarified. Consequently, after the wine is consumed, it is not possible to clarify retroactively which portion of the wine belonged to each person. Therefore, they cannot each be said to own a particular part of the wine, which renders it unfit for an eiruv. But the Rabbis hold that there is retroactive clarification, and therefore they may rely on this partnership to establish an eiruv.
רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן תַּדַּאי וְרַבָּנַן בְּסוֹמְכִין עַל שִׁיתּוּף בִּמְקוֹם עֵירוּב קָמִיפַּלְגִי.
Rav Yosef said that this dispute should be understood differently, as Rabbi Eliezer ben Taddai and the Rabbis disagree about whether one may rely on a merging of an alleyway instead of an eiruv, i.e., whether the merging of an alleyway to permit carrying in the alleyway, exempts the courtyards that open into the alleyway from having to establish an eiruv for the purpose of carrying from one courtyard to the other.
דְּמָר סָבַר: אֵין סוֹמְכִין, וּמָר סָבַר: סוֹמְכִין.
As one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer ben Taddai, holds that one may not rely on it in that case, as carrying in the courtyards requires specifically an eiruv, and the merging of alleyways is insufficient. And one Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, maintains that one may rely on and use the merging of alleyways to permit carrying between the courtyards as well.
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ, דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר. וְאָמַר רַב בְּרוֹנָא אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן תַּדַּאי. מַאי טַעְמָא, לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּחַד טַעְמָא הוּא?
Rav Yosef said: From where do I say this, that this is the subject of their dispute? As Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, which will be detailed later, that one may not rely on a merging of alleyways instead of an eiruv. And Rav Beruna said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Taddai, that in both cases they must establish an eiruv. What is the reason he ruled in this manner? Is it not because the rationale for both rulings is one and the same?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וְאִי חַד טַעְמָא, תַּרְתֵּי הִילְכְתָא לְמָה לִי?! הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּלָא עָבְדִינַן כִּתְרֵי חוּמְרֵי בְּעֵירוּבִין.
Abaye said to him: But if it is one reason, why do I need two rulings? On the contrary, it would be enough to rule in one case, from which we could infer the other as well. Rav Yosef replied: There is nevertheless a reason for both rulings, as this comes to teach us that we do not act in accordance with two stringencies of one tanna in matters of eiruv. Had Rav ruled only in accordance with Rabbi Meir, we would have known only that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion with regard to one specific detail of the case. He therefore ruled in accordance with two Sages: Rabbi Eliezer ben Taddai with regard to a merging of alleyways with wine, and Rabbi Meir with regard to a merging of alleyways with bread. Each is stringent with regard to a different detail of the case.
מַאי רַבִּי מֵאִיר וּמַאי רַבָּנַן? דְּתַנְיָא: מְעָרְבִין בַּחֲצֵירוֹת בְּפַת, וְאִם רָצוּ לְעָרֵב בְּיַיִן — אֵין מְעָרְבִין. מִשְׁתַּתְּפִין בְּמָבוֹי בְּיַיִן, וְאִם רָצוּ לְהִשְׁתַּתֵּף בְּפַת — מִשְׁתַּתְּפִין.
Having mentioned Rabbi Meir, the Gemara now asks: What is the statement of Rabbi Meir, and what is the statement of the Rabbis? As it was taught in the following baraita: One may establish an eiruv with bread between courtyards that open to one another, but if one wanted to establish an eiruv with wine, one may not establish an eiruv in that manner. One may merge the courtyards that open into an alleyway with wine, and if one wanted to establish a merging of alleyways with bread, one may merge the courtyards of alleyways in this manner.
מְעָרְבִין בַּחֲצֵירוֹת וּמִשְׁתַּתְּפִין בְּמָבוֹי שֶׁלֹּא לְשַׁכֵּחַ תּוֹרַת עֵירוּב מִן הַתִּינוֹקוֹת, שֶׁיֹּאמְרוּ: אֲבוֹתֵינוּ לֹא עֵירְבוּ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אוֹ מְעָרְבִין אוֹ מִשְׁתַּתְּפִין.
Why does one establish an eiruv between courtyards and also merge the courtyards that open into an alleyway? It is so as not to cause the halakhic category of eiruv to be forgotten by the children, as if a merging of alleyways alone were used, the children would later say: Our fathers never established an eiruv. Therefore, an eiruv is established for educational purposes; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: One may either establish an eiruv or merge alleyways.
פְּלִיגִי בַּהּ רַבִּי נְחוּמִי וְרַבָּה, חַד אָמַר: בְּפַת דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּבַחֲדָא סַגִּי, כִּי פְּלִיגִי בְּיַיִן.
Rabbi Naḥumi and Rabba disagreed about this issue. One of them said: In the case of bread, which may be used both for an eiruv and for a merging of alleyways, everyone agrees that one, either an eiruv or a merging of alleyways, is enough. When they disagree in the case of wine, which may be used only for a merging of alleyways but not for an eiruv, Rabbi Meir maintains that an eiruv is also necessary, while the Rabbis maintain that it is not required.
