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Today's Daf Yomi

October 19, 2020 | 讗壮 讘诪专讞砖讜讜谉 转砖驻状讗

Masechet Eruvin is sponsored by Adina and Eric Hagege in honor of our parents, Rabbi Dov and Elayne Greenstone and Roger and Ketty Hagege who raised children, grandchildren and great grandchildren committed to Torah learning.

This month's shiurim are sponsored by Tamara Katz in honor of the yahrzeits of her grandparents,聽 Sarah bat Chaya v'Tzvi Hirsh and Meir Leib ben Esther v'Harav Yehoshua Zelig z"l.

  • This month is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross z'l, on his 1st yahrzeit

Eruvin 71

This month’s shiurim are sponsored by Tamara Katz in honor of the yahrzeits of her grandparents,聽 Sarah bat Chaya v’Tzvi Hirsh and Meir Leib ben Esther v’Harav Yehoshua Zelig z”l.

The gemara brings a third source to question Rav Nachman鈥檚 opinion that one who inherits property on Shabbat can relinquish rights to the property. The gemara brings two answers. Ulla and Abaye disagree regarding relinquishing of rights on Shabbat. According, their opinions are shaped by the way they understand how the mechanism of relinquishing rights works 鈥 it is that the others are acquiring rights to the other鈥檚 property or is it that one is removing oneself from the property? If one has food in two separate partnerships with each courtyard that is next to him/her, can that serve as an eruv between them all? Or between some of them? There are three opinions. Does it depend on whether the partnerships are with the same food item? Does it need to all be in one utensil? Raba and Rav Yosef disagree about how to understand the root of the debate among the tannaim.

 

 

讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讞讝讬拽 讬砖专讗诇 讗讞专 讘谞讻住讬讜 讗讜住专 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讛讞讝讬拽 讬砖专讗诇 讗讞专 讗讬谞讜 讗讜住专


In such a case, even though a different Jew took possession of the convert鈥檚 property, the one who acquires it renders carrying prohibited. If, however, he died after nightfall, even though a different Jew did not take possession of his property, it, i.e., carrying, is not prohibited, for carrying had already been permitted on that Shabbat.


讛讗 讙讜驻讗 拽砖讬讗 讗诪专转 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讞讝讬拽 讜诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 讻讬 诇讗 讛讞讝讬拽 讗讚专讘讛 讻讬 诇讗 讛讞讝讬拽 诇讗 讗住专


The Gemara raises a difficulty: The baraita itself is difficult. You first said: If the convert died while it was still day, even though a different Jew took possession of his property, the latter renders carrying prohibited, which implies that it is not necessary to say so where another Jew did not take possession of the property, for in such a case it is certainly prohibited. But this is incorrect. On the contrary, in a case where a different person did not take possession of the property, it is certainly not prohibited, for in such a case the convert鈥檚 property is ownerless and there is nobody to render carrying in the courtyard prohibited.


讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讗讬诪讗 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讛讞讝讬拽 讜讛讗 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讞讝讬拽 拽转谞讬


Rav Pappa said: Say that the baraita should read as follows: Even though a different Jew did not take possession of it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can it be corrected in this manner? But doesn鈥檛 it teach: Even though he took possession of it?


讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讛讞讝讬拽 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讗诇讗 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 讻讬讜谉 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇讛讞讝讬拽 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讗讜住专 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讛讞讝讬拽 讬砖专讗诇 讗讞专 讗讬谞讜 讗讜住专


The Gemara answers: This is what the baraita is saying: If the convert died while it was still day, then even though a different Jew did not take possession of the property while it was still day but only after nightfall, since he had the possibility of taking possession of it while it was still day, the person who acquires it renders carrying prohibited. If, however, the convert died after nightfall, even though a different Jew did not take possession of his property, it does not render it prohibited to carry.


讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讛讞讝讬拽 讬砖专讗诇 讗讞专 讜诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 讻讬 讛讞讝讬拽 讗讚专讘讛 讻讬 讛讞讝讬拽 讗住专


The Gemara now considers the next clause of the baraita, which states: If the convert died after nightfall, even though a different Jew did not take possession of his property, carrying is not prohibited. This implies that it is not necessary to say so where another Jew did take possession of the property, for in such a case it is certainly not prohibited. But, on the contrary, where a different person takes possession of the property, he renders carrying prohibited.


讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讗讬诪讗 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讞讝讬拽 讜讛讗 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讛讞讝讬拽 拽转谞讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讞讝讬拽 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇讛讞讝讬拽 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讗讬谞讜 讗讜住专


Rav Pappa said: Say that the baraita should read as follows: Even though a different Jew took possession of it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn鈥檛 the baraita teach: Even though he did not take possession of it? The Gemara explains: This is what the baraita is saying: If the convert died after nightfall, even though a different Jew took possession of his property after nightfall, since he did not have the possibility of taking possession of it while it was still day, he does not render carrying prohibited.


拽转谞讬 诪讬讛转 专讬砖讗 讗讜住专 讗诪讗讬 讗讜住专 谞讬讘讟诇


After explaining the baraita, the Gemara proceeds to clarify the issue at hand: In any event, the first clause is teaching that the person who acquires the convert鈥檚 property renders carrying prohibited; but why does he render carrying prohibited? Let him renounce his rights in the domain like an heir. The implication then is that he does not have the option of renunciation, in contrast to the opinion of Rav Na岣an.


诪讗讬 讗讜住专 讚拽转谞讬 注讚 砖讬讘讟诇


Rav Na岣an replied: What is the meaning of the word prohibits that it teaches here? It means he renders carrying prohibited until he renounces his rights, but renunciation is effective.


专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诪转谞讬转讬谉 诪谞讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗讬谉 讘讬讟讜诇 专砖讜转 讘砖讘转 讚转谞谉 诪讗讬诪转讬 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪砖转讞砖讱


Rabbi Yo岣nan said: Who is the tanna of the problematic baraitot that imply that an heir cannot renounce rights, and from which objections were brought against Rav Na岣an? It is Beit Shammai, who say that there is no renunciation of rights on Shabbat at all, even for the owner of the property. As we learned in the mishna: When may one give away rights in a domain? Beit Shammai say: While it is still day. And Beit Hillel say: Even after nightfall.


讗诪专 注讜诇讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讘讬转 讛诇诇 谞注砖讛 讻讗讜诪专 讻诇讱 讗爪诇 讬驻讜转


With regard to this dispute itself, Ulla said: What is the reason of Beit Hillel that one may renounce rights even after nightfall? This should be considered an act of acquisition, which is prohibited on Shabbat. He explains: It is comparable to one who says: Turn toward the high-quality ones. If a person sets aside teruma from another person鈥檚 produce without the latter鈥檚 knowledge, and when the owner finds out he says: Why did you set aside this produce? Turn toward the high-quality ones, i.e., you should have gone to find better produce to use as teruma, then the teruma that was separated is considered teruma, provided there was indeed quality produce in that place. The reason is that the owner has demonstrated his retroactive acquiescence to the other person鈥檚 setting aside of teruma. Therefore, the latter is considered his agent for this purpose. The same applies to our issue. If a person intended to permit both himself and others to carry in a courtyard by means of establishing an eiruv but forgot to do so, by renouncing his rights after nightfall, he retroactively makes plain his desire that his domain should be mingled with that of his neighbors. What he then does on Shabbat is not a complete action, but merely a demonstration of his intentions.


讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪转 讙讜讬 讘砖讘转 诪讗讬 讻诇讱 讗爪诇 讬驻讜转 讗讬讻讗


Abaye said: This explanation is unsatisfactory, as when a gentile dies on Shabbat, what connection is there to the concept: Turn toward the high-quality ones? When a gentile dies on Shabbat, his Jewish neighbors may renounce their rights in the courtyard to each other and thus render carrying in the courtyard permitted, even though such renunciation would have been ineffective prior to his passing. Consequently, it cannot be said that it works retroactively.


讗诇讗 讛讻讗 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 住讘专讬 讘讬讟讜诇 专砖讜转 诪讬拽谞讗 专砖讜转讗 讛讜讗 讜诪讬拽谞讗 专砖讜转讗 讘砖讘转 讗住讜专 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 住讘专讬 讗住转诇讜拽讬 专砖讜转讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 讜讗住转诇讜拽讬 专砖讜转讗 讘砖讘转 砖驻讬专 讚诪讬:


Rather, the Gemara rejects Ulla鈥檚 explanation and states that here they disagree over the following: Beit Shammai hold that renunciation of a domain is equivalent to acquisition of a domain, and acquisition of a domain is prohibited on Shabbat. And Beit Hillel hold that it is merely withdrawal from a domain, and withdrawal from a domain seems well on Shabbat, i.e., it is permitted. As such, there is no reason to prohibit renunciation as a form of acquisition, which is prohibited as a part of a decree against conducting commerce on Shabbat.


诪转谞讬壮 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 砖讛讬讛 砖讜转祝 诇砖讻谞讬讜 诇讝讛 讘讬讬谉 讜诇讝讛 讘讬讬谉 讗讬谞谉 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇注专讘


MISHNA: If a homeowner was in partnership with his neighbors, with this one in wine and with that one in wine, they need not establish an eiruv, for due to their authentic partnership they are considered to be one household, and no further partnership is required.


诇讝讛 讘讬讬谉 讜诇讝讛 讘砖诪谉 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇注专讘 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讗讞讚 讝讛 讜讗讞讚 讝讛 讗讬谞谉 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇注专讘:


If, however, he was in partnership with this one in wine and with that one in oil, they must establish an eiruv. As they are not partners in the same item, they are not all considered one partnership. Rabbi Shimon says: In both this case and that case, i.e., even if he partners with his neighbors in different items, they need not establish an eiruv.


讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讘 讜讘讻诇讬 讗讞讚 讗诪专 专讘讗 讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 诇讝讛 讘讬讬谉 讜诇讝讛 讘砖诪谉 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇注专讘 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 专讬砖讗 讘讻诇讬 讗讞讚 讜住讬驻讗 讘砖谞讬 讻诇讬诐 砖驻讬专 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 专讬砖讗 讘砖谞讬 讻诇讬诐 讜住讬驻讗 讘砖谞讬 讻诇讬诐 诪讛 诇讬 讬讬谉 讜讬讬谉 诪讛 诇讬 讬讬谉 讜砖诪谉


GEMARA: Rav said: The halakha that one who is in partnership in wine with both his neighbors need not establish an eiruv applies only if their wine is in one vessel. Rava said: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: If he was in partnership with this one in wine and with the other one in oil, they must establish an eiruv. Granted, if you say that the first clause of the mishna deals with one vessel, and the latter clause deals with two vessels, one of wine and one of oil, it is well. But, if you say that the first clause of the mishna speaks of two vessels, and the latter clause also speaks of two vessels, what difference is it to me if it is wine and wine or wine and oil? The halakha should be the same in both cases.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讬讬谉 讜讬讬谉 专讗讜讬 诇注专讘 讬讬谉 讜砖诪谉 讗讬谉 专讗讜讬 诇注专讘:


Abaye said to him: This is no proof, and the first clause can be referring to a case where the wine was in separate vessels as well. The difference is that wine and wine is suitable for mixing together, and therefore can be considered a single unit even if divided into two containers. Wine and oil, however, are not suitable for mixing.


专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讗讞讚 讝讛 讜讗讞讚 讝讛 讗讬谉 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇注专讘: 讜讗驻讬诇讜 诇讝讛 讘讬讬谉 讜诇讝讛 讘砖诪谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘讞爪专 砖讘讬谉 砖谞讬 诪讘讜讗讜转 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诇讟注诪讬讛


We learned in the mishna: Rabbi Shimon says: In both this case, where they are partners in wine alone, and that case, where the partnerships are in wine and oil, they need not establish an eiruv. The Gemara poses a question: Did he say this even if the partnership is with this one in wine and with the other one in oil? But these are not suitable for mixing. Rabba said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a courtyard positioned between two alleyways, and Rabbi Shimon follows his usual line of reasoning.


讚转谞谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诇诪讛 讛讚讘专 讚讜诪讛 诇砖诇砖 讞爪讬专讜转 讛驻转讜讞讜转 讝讜 诇讝讜 讜驻转讜讞讜转 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 注讬专讘讜 砖转讬诐 讛讞讬爪讜谞讜转 注诐 讛讗诪爪注讬转 讛讬讗 诪讜转专转 注诪讛谉 讜讛谉 诪讜转专讜转 注诪讛 讜砖转讬诐 讛讞讬爪讜谞讜转 讗住讜专讜转 讝讜 注诐 讝讜


As we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Shimon said: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to the case of three courtyards that open into one another and also open into a public domain. If the two outer courtyards each established an eiruv with the middle one, it is permitted for residents of the middle one to carry with the two outer ones, and it is permitted for residents of the two outer ones to carry with the middle one. However, it is prohibited for the residents of the two outer courtyards to carry with each other, as they did not establish an eiruv with each other. This teaches that the residents of one courtyard can establish an eiruv with a courtyard on each side, and need not choose between them. Here too, the residents of the courtyard can participate in an eiruv with both alleyways, one by means of wine and the other by means of oil.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 拽转谞讬 砖转讬诐 讛讞讬爪讜谞讜转 讗住讜专讜转 讛讻讗 拽转谞讬 讗讬谉 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇注专讘 讻诇诇


Abaye said to him: Are the cases really comparable? There it teaches: It is prohibited for the residents of the two outer courtyards to carry with each other, whereas here it teaches: They need not establish an eiruv, indicating that it is permitted for residents of all three domains to carry with each other.


诪讗讬 讗讬谉 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇注专讘 砖讻谞讬诐 讘讛讚讬 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗讘诇 砖讻谞讬诐 讘讛讚讬 讛讚讚讬 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇注专讘


The Gemara explains: What is the subject of the phrase they need not establish an eiruv? It refers to the neighbors together with the homeowner, i.e., the residents of the courtyards that open into each of the alleyways with the resident of the courtyard in the middle. But with regard to the neighbors with each other, i.e., if the residents of the two alleyways wish to be permitted to carry with each other, they must establish an eiruv and place it in the middle courtyard.


讜专讘 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讜专讘谞谉 讘驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 讜专讘谞谉 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚转谞谉 砖诪谉 砖爪祝 注诇 讙讘讬 讬讬谉 讜谞讙注 讟讘讜诇 讬讜诐 讘砖诪谉 诇讗 驻住诇 讗诇讗 砖诪谉 讘诇讘讚 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 讗讜诪专 砖谞讬讛谉 讞讬讘讜专讬谉 讝讛 诇讝讛


And Rav Yosef said: In fact we are dealing here with a single alleyway, and Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree about the same point of dispute between Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri and the Rabbis. As we learned in a mishna: If teruma oil was floating on the surface of wine, and one who immersed during the day, touched the oil, he disqualified only the oil alone. However, he did not disqualify the wine, because it is considered separate from the oil. Only the oil is disqualified, and it does not render other items ritually impure. And Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri says: They are both connected to each other and are considered as one, so the wine is also ritually impure.


专讘谞谉 讻专讘谞谉 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬


The Gemara explains: The opinion of the Rabbis in our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis in the other mishna, who maintain that wine and oil are not connected and therefore cannot be used together in an eiruv, and the opinion of Rabbi Shimon is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri, who holds that wine and oil are connected, and may be used together in an eiruv.


转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 转讚讗讬 讗讜诪专 讗讞讚 讝讛 讜讗讞讚 讝讛 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇注专讘 讜讗驻讬诇讜 诇讝讛 讘讬讬谉 讜诇讝讛 讘讬讬谉


It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Taddai says: In both this case, of wine and wine, and that case, of wine and oil, they must establish an eiruv. The Gemara expresses wonder: Did he say this even if the partnership is with this one in wine and also with the other one in wine? Why should these partnerships not be sufficient to consider the items merged?


讗诪专 专讘讛 讝讛 讘讗 讘诇讙讬谞讜 讜砖驻讱 讜讝讛 讘讗 讘诇讙讬谞讜 讜砖驻讱 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讛讜讬 注讬专讜讘


Rabba said: If they partnered in the following manner, such that this one came with his wine-filled jug and poured its contents into a barrel, and the other one came with his jug and poured his wine into that same barrel, everyone agrees that it is a valid eiruv, even if they did not act specifically for that purpose.


讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讻讙讜谉 砖诇拽讞讜 讞讘讬转 砖诇 讬讬谉 讘砖讜转驻讜转 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 转讚讗讬 住讘专 讗讬谉 讘专讬专讛 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讬砖 讘专讬专讛


Where they disagree is in the case where they bought a barrel of wine in partnership. Rabbi Eliezer ben Taddai holds: There is no principle of retroactive clarification, i.e., there is no halakhic assumption that the undetermined halakhic status of items can be retroactively clarified. Consequently, after the wine is consumed, it is not possible to clarify retroactively which portion of the wine belonged to each person. Therefore, they cannot each be said to own a particular part of the wine, which renders it unfit for an eiruv. But the Rabbis hold that there is retroactive clarification, and therefore they may rely on this partnership to establish an eiruv.


专讘 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 转讚讗讬 讜专讘谞谉 讘住讜诪讻讬谉 注诇 砖讬转讜祝 讘诪拽讜诐 注讬专讜讘 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬


Rav Yosef said that this dispute should be understood differently, as Rabbi Eliezer ben Taddai and the Rabbis disagree about whether one may rely on a merging of an alleyway instead of an eiruv, i.e., whether the merging of an alleyway to permit carrying in the alleyway, exempts the courtyards that open into the alleyway from having to establish an eiruv for the purpose of carrying from one courtyard to the other.


讚诪专 住讘专 讗讬谉 住讜诪讻讬谉 讜诪专 住讘专 住讜诪讻讬谉


As one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer ben Taddai, holds that one may not rely on it in that case, as carrying in the courtyards requires specifically an eiruv, and the merging of alleyways is insufficient. And one Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, maintains that one may rely on and use the merging of alleyways to permit carrying between the courtyards as well.


讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讗诪专 专讘 讘专讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 转讚讗讬 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讞讚 讟注诪讗 讛讜讗


Rav Yosef said: From where do I say this, that this is the subject of their dispute? As Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, which will be detailed later, that one may not rely on a merging of alleyways instead of an eiruv. And Rav Beruna said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Taddai, that in both cases they must establish an eiruv. What is the reason he ruled in this manner? Is it not because the rationale for both rulings is one and the same?


讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讜讗讬 讞讚 讟注诪讗 转专转讬 讛讬诇讻转讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚诇讗 注讘讚讬谞谉 讻转专讬 讞讜诪专讬 讘注讬专讜讘讬谉


Abaye said to him: But if it is one reason, why do I need two rulings? On the contrary, it would be enough to rule in one case, from which we could infer the other as well. Rav Yosef replied: There is nevertheless a reason for both rulings, as this comes to teach us that we do not act in accordance with two stringencies of one tanna in matters of eiruv. Had Rav ruled only in accordance with Rabbi Meir, we would have known only that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion with regard to one specific detail of the case. He therefore ruled in accordance with two Sages: Rabbi Eliezer ben Taddai with regard to a merging of alleyways with wine, and Rabbi Meir with regard to a merging of alleyways with bread. Each is stringent with regard to a different detail of the case.


诪讗讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜诪讗讬 专讘谞谉 讚转谞讬讗 诪注专讘讬谉 讘讞爪讬专讜转 讘驻转 讜讗诐 专爪讜 诇注专讘 讘讬讬谉 讗讬谉 诪注专讘讬谉 诪砖转转驻讬谉 讘诪讘讜讬 讘讬讬谉 讜讗诐 专爪讜 诇讛砖转转祝 讘驻转 诪砖转转驻讬谉


Having mentioned Rabbi Meir, the Gemara now asks: What is the statement of Rabbi Meir, and what is the statement of the Rabbis? As it was taught in the following baraita: One may establish an eiruv with bread between courtyards that open to one another, but if one wanted to establish an eiruv with wine, one may not establish an eiruv in that manner. One may merge the courtyards that open into an alleyway with wine, and if one wanted to establish a merging of alleyways with bread, one may merge the courtyards of alleyways in this manner.


诪注专讘讬谉 讘讞爪讬专讜转 讜诪砖转转驻讬谉 讘诪讘讜讬 砖诇讗 诇砖讻讞 转讜专转 注讬专讜讘 诪谉 讛转讬谞讜拽讜转 砖讬讗诪专讜 讗讘讜转讬谞讜 诇讗 注讬专讘讜 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讜 诪注专讘讬谉 讗讜 诪砖转转驻讬谉


Why does one establish an eiruv between courtyards and also merge the courtyards that open into an alleyway? It is so as not to cause the halakhic category of eiruv to be forgotten by the children, as if a merging of alleyways alone were used, the children would later say: Our fathers never established an eiruv. Therefore, an eiruv is established for educational purposes; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: One may either establish an eiruv or merge alleyways.


驻诇讬讙讬 讘讛 专讘讬 谞讞讜诪讬 讜专讘讛 讞讚 讗诪专 讘驻转 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讘讞讚讗 住讙讬 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讘讬讬谉


Rabbi Na岣mi and Rabba disagreed about this issue. One of them said: In the case of bread, which may be used both for an eiruv and for a merging of alleyways, everyone agrees that one, either an eiruv or a merging of alleyways, is enough. When they disagree in the case of wine, which may be used only for a merging of alleyways but not for an eiruv, Rabbi Meir maintains that an eiruv is also necessary, while the Rabbis maintain that it is not required.


Masechet Eruvin is sponsored by Adina and Eric Hagege in honor of our parents, Rabbi Dov and Elayne Greenstone and Roger and Ketty Hagege who raised children, grandchildren and great grandchildren committed to Torah learning.

This month's shiurim are sponsored by Tamara Katz in honor of the yahrzeits of her grandparents,聽 Sarah bat Chaya v'Tzvi Hirsh and Meir Leib ben Esther v'Harav Yehoshua Zelig z"l.

  • This month is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross z'l, on his 1st yahrzeit

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Eruvin 71

讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讞讝讬拽 讬砖专讗诇 讗讞专 讘谞讻住讬讜 讗讜住专 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讛讞讝讬拽 讬砖专讗诇 讗讞专 讗讬谞讜 讗讜住专


In such a case, even though a different Jew took possession of the convert鈥檚 property, the one who acquires it renders carrying prohibited. If, however, he died after nightfall, even though a different Jew did not take possession of his property, it, i.e., carrying, is not prohibited, for carrying had already been permitted on that Shabbat.


讛讗 讙讜驻讗 拽砖讬讗 讗诪专转 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讞讝讬拽 讜诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 讻讬 诇讗 讛讞讝讬拽 讗讚专讘讛 讻讬 诇讗 讛讞讝讬拽 诇讗 讗住专


The Gemara raises a difficulty: The baraita itself is difficult. You first said: If the convert died while it was still day, even though a different Jew took possession of his property, the latter renders carrying prohibited, which implies that it is not necessary to say so where another Jew did not take possession of the property, for in such a case it is certainly prohibited. But this is incorrect. On the contrary, in a case where a different person did not take possession of the property, it is certainly not prohibited, for in such a case the convert鈥檚 property is ownerless and there is nobody to render carrying in the courtyard prohibited.


讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讗讬诪讗 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讛讞讝讬拽 讜讛讗 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讞讝讬拽 拽转谞讬


Rav Pappa said: Say that the baraita should read as follows: Even though a different Jew did not take possession of it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can it be corrected in this manner? But doesn鈥檛 it teach: Even though he took possession of it?


讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讛讞讝讬拽 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讗诇讗 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 讻讬讜谉 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇讛讞讝讬拽 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讗讜住专 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讛讞讝讬拽 讬砖专讗诇 讗讞专 讗讬谞讜 讗讜住专


The Gemara answers: This is what the baraita is saying: If the convert died while it was still day, then even though a different Jew did not take possession of the property while it was still day but only after nightfall, since he had the possibility of taking possession of it while it was still day, the person who acquires it renders carrying prohibited. If, however, the convert died after nightfall, even though a different Jew did not take possession of his property, it does not render it prohibited to carry.


讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讛讞讝讬拽 讬砖专讗诇 讗讞专 讜诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 讻讬 讛讞讝讬拽 讗讚专讘讛 讻讬 讛讞讝讬拽 讗住专


The Gemara now considers the next clause of the baraita, which states: If the convert died after nightfall, even though a different Jew did not take possession of his property, carrying is not prohibited. This implies that it is not necessary to say so where another Jew did take possession of the property, for in such a case it is certainly not prohibited. But, on the contrary, where a different person takes possession of the property, he renders carrying prohibited.


讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讗讬诪讗 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讞讝讬拽 讜讛讗 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讛讞讝讬拽 拽转谞讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讞讝讬拽 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇讛讞讝讬拽 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讗讬谞讜 讗讜住专


Rav Pappa said: Say that the baraita should read as follows: Even though a different Jew took possession of it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn鈥檛 the baraita teach: Even though he did not take possession of it? The Gemara explains: This is what the baraita is saying: If the convert died after nightfall, even though a different Jew took possession of his property after nightfall, since he did not have the possibility of taking possession of it while it was still day, he does not render carrying prohibited.


拽转谞讬 诪讬讛转 专讬砖讗 讗讜住专 讗诪讗讬 讗讜住专 谞讬讘讟诇


After explaining the baraita, the Gemara proceeds to clarify the issue at hand: In any event, the first clause is teaching that the person who acquires the convert鈥檚 property renders carrying prohibited; but why does he render carrying prohibited? Let him renounce his rights in the domain like an heir. The implication then is that he does not have the option of renunciation, in contrast to the opinion of Rav Na岣an.


诪讗讬 讗讜住专 讚拽转谞讬 注讚 砖讬讘讟诇


Rav Na岣an replied: What is the meaning of the word prohibits that it teaches here? It means he renders carrying prohibited until he renounces his rights, but renunciation is effective.


专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诪转谞讬转讬谉 诪谞讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗讬谉 讘讬讟讜诇 专砖讜转 讘砖讘转 讚转谞谉 诪讗讬诪转讬 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪砖转讞砖讱


Rabbi Yo岣nan said: Who is the tanna of the problematic baraitot that imply that an heir cannot renounce rights, and from which objections were brought against Rav Na岣an? It is Beit Shammai, who say that there is no renunciation of rights on Shabbat at all, even for the owner of the property. As we learned in the mishna: When may one give away rights in a domain? Beit Shammai say: While it is still day. And Beit Hillel say: Even after nightfall.


讗诪专 注讜诇讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讘讬转 讛诇诇 谞注砖讛 讻讗讜诪专 讻诇讱 讗爪诇 讬驻讜转


With regard to this dispute itself, Ulla said: What is the reason of Beit Hillel that one may renounce rights even after nightfall? This should be considered an act of acquisition, which is prohibited on Shabbat. He explains: It is comparable to one who says: Turn toward the high-quality ones. If a person sets aside teruma from another person鈥檚 produce without the latter鈥檚 knowledge, and when the owner finds out he says: Why did you set aside this produce? Turn toward the high-quality ones, i.e., you should have gone to find better produce to use as teruma, then the teruma that was separated is considered teruma, provided there was indeed quality produce in that place. The reason is that the owner has demonstrated his retroactive acquiescence to the other person鈥檚 setting aside of teruma. Therefore, the latter is considered his agent for this purpose. The same applies to our issue. If a person intended to permit both himself and others to carry in a courtyard by means of establishing an eiruv but forgot to do so, by renouncing his rights after nightfall, he retroactively makes plain his desire that his domain should be mingled with that of his neighbors. What he then does on Shabbat is not a complete action, but merely a demonstration of his intentions.


讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪转 讙讜讬 讘砖讘转 诪讗讬 讻诇讱 讗爪诇 讬驻讜转 讗讬讻讗


Abaye said: This explanation is unsatisfactory, as when a gentile dies on Shabbat, what connection is there to the concept: Turn toward the high-quality ones? When a gentile dies on Shabbat, his Jewish neighbors may renounce their rights in the courtyard to each other and thus render carrying in the courtyard permitted, even though such renunciation would have been ineffective prior to his passing. Consequently, it cannot be said that it works retroactively.


讗诇讗 讛讻讗 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 住讘专讬 讘讬讟讜诇 专砖讜转 诪讬拽谞讗 专砖讜转讗 讛讜讗 讜诪讬拽谞讗 专砖讜转讗 讘砖讘转 讗住讜专 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 住讘专讬 讗住转诇讜拽讬 专砖讜转讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 讜讗住转诇讜拽讬 专砖讜转讗 讘砖讘转 砖驻讬专 讚诪讬:


Rather, the Gemara rejects Ulla鈥檚 explanation and states that here they disagree over the following: Beit Shammai hold that renunciation of a domain is equivalent to acquisition of a domain, and acquisition of a domain is prohibited on Shabbat. And Beit Hillel hold that it is merely withdrawal from a domain, and withdrawal from a domain seems well on Shabbat, i.e., it is permitted. As such, there is no reason to prohibit renunciation as a form of acquisition, which is prohibited as a part of a decree against conducting commerce on Shabbat.


诪转谞讬壮 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 砖讛讬讛 砖讜转祝 诇砖讻谞讬讜 诇讝讛 讘讬讬谉 讜诇讝讛 讘讬讬谉 讗讬谞谉 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇注专讘


MISHNA: If a homeowner was in partnership with his neighbors, with this one in wine and with that one in wine, they need not establish an eiruv, for due to their authentic partnership they are considered to be one household, and no further partnership is required.


诇讝讛 讘讬讬谉 讜诇讝讛 讘砖诪谉 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇注专讘 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讗讞讚 讝讛 讜讗讞讚 讝讛 讗讬谞谉 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇注专讘:


If, however, he was in partnership with this one in wine and with that one in oil, they must establish an eiruv. As they are not partners in the same item, they are not all considered one partnership. Rabbi Shimon says: In both this case and that case, i.e., even if he partners with his neighbors in different items, they need not establish an eiruv.


讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讘 讜讘讻诇讬 讗讞讚 讗诪专 专讘讗 讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 诇讝讛 讘讬讬谉 讜诇讝讛 讘砖诪谉 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇注专讘 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 专讬砖讗 讘讻诇讬 讗讞讚 讜住讬驻讗 讘砖谞讬 讻诇讬诐 砖驻讬专 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 专讬砖讗 讘砖谞讬 讻诇讬诐 讜住讬驻讗 讘砖谞讬 讻诇讬诐 诪讛 诇讬 讬讬谉 讜讬讬谉 诪讛 诇讬 讬讬谉 讜砖诪谉


GEMARA: Rav said: The halakha that one who is in partnership in wine with both his neighbors need not establish an eiruv applies only if their wine is in one vessel. Rava said: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: If he was in partnership with this one in wine and with the other one in oil, they must establish an eiruv. Granted, if you say that the first clause of the mishna deals with one vessel, and the latter clause deals with two vessels, one of wine and one of oil, it is well. But, if you say that the first clause of the mishna speaks of two vessels, and the latter clause also speaks of two vessels, what difference is it to me if it is wine and wine or wine and oil? The halakha should be the same in both cases.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讬讬谉 讜讬讬谉 专讗讜讬 诇注专讘 讬讬谉 讜砖诪谉 讗讬谉 专讗讜讬 诇注专讘:


Abaye said to him: This is no proof, and the first clause can be referring to a case where the wine was in separate vessels as well. The difference is that wine and wine is suitable for mixing together, and therefore can be considered a single unit even if divided into two containers. Wine and oil, however, are not suitable for mixing.


专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讗讞讚 讝讛 讜讗讞讚 讝讛 讗讬谉 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇注专讘: 讜讗驻讬诇讜 诇讝讛 讘讬讬谉 讜诇讝讛 讘砖诪谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘讞爪专 砖讘讬谉 砖谞讬 诪讘讜讗讜转 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诇讟注诪讬讛


We learned in the mishna: Rabbi Shimon says: In both this case, where they are partners in wine alone, and that case, where the partnerships are in wine and oil, they need not establish an eiruv. The Gemara poses a question: Did he say this even if the partnership is with this one in wine and with the other one in oil? But these are not suitable for mixing. Rabba said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a courtyard positioned between two alleyways, and Rabbi Shimon follows his usual line of reasoning.


讚转谞谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诇诪讛 讛讚讘专 讚讜诪讛 诇砖诇砖 讞爪讬专讜转 讛驻转讜讞讜转 讝讜 诇讝讜 讜驻转讜讞讜转 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 注讬专讘讜 砖转讬诐 讛讞讬爪讜谞讜转 注诐 讛讗诪爪注讬转 讛讬讗 诪讜转专转 注诪讛谉 讜讛谉 诪讜转专讜转 注诪讛 讜砖转讬诐 讛讞讬爪讜谞讜转 讗住讜专讜转 讝讜 注诐 讝讜


As we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Shimon said: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to the case of three courtyards that open into one another and also open into a public domain. If the two outer courtyards each established an eiruv with the middle one, it is permitted for residents of the middle one to carry with the two outer ones, and it is permitted for residents of the two outer ones to carry with the middle one. However, it is prohibited for the residents of the two outer courtyards to carry with each other, as they did not establish an eiruv with each other. This teaches that the residents of one courtyard can establish an eiruv with a courtyard on each side, and need not choose between them. Here too, the residents of the courtyard can participate in an eiruv with both alleyways, one by means of wine and the other by means of oil.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 拽转谞讬 砖转讬诐 讛讞讬爪讜谞讜转 讗住讜专讜转 讛讻讗 拽转谞讬 讗讬谉 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇注专讘 讻诇诇


Abaye said to him: Are the cases really comparable? There it teaches: It is prohibited for the residents of the two outer courtyards to carry with each other, whereas here it teaches: They need not establish an eiruv, indicating that it is permitted for residents of all three domains to carry with each other.


诪讗讬 讗讬谉 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇注专讘 砖讻谞讬诐 讘讛讚讬 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗讘诇 砖讻谞讬诐 讘讛讚讬 讛讚讚讬 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇注专讘


The Gemara explains: What is the subject of the phrase they need not establish an eiruv? It refers to the neighbors together with the homeowner, i.e., the residents of the courtyards that open into each of the alleyways with the resident of the courtyard in the middle. But with regard to the neighbors with each other, i.e., if the residents of the two alleyways wish to be permitted to carry with each other, they must establish an eiruv and place it in the middle courtyard.


讜专讘 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讜专讘谞谉 讘驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 讜专讘谞谉 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚转谞谉 砖诪谉 砖爪祝 注诇 讙讘讬 讬讬谉 讜谞讙注 讟讘讜诇 讬讜诐 讘砖诪谉 诇讗 驻住诇 讗诇讗 砖诪谉 讘诇讘讚 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 讗讜诪专 砖谞讬讛谉 讞讬讘讜专讬谉 讝讛 诇讝讛


And Rav Yosef said: In fact we are dealing here with a single alleyway, and Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree about the same point of dispute between Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri and the Rabbis. As we learned in a mishna: If teruma oil was floating on the surface of wine, and one who immersed during the day, touched the oil, he disqualified only the oil alone. However, he did not disqualify the wine, because it is considered separate from the oil. Only the oil is disqualified, and it does not render other items ritually impure. And Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri says: They are both connected to each other and are considered as one, so the wine is also ritually impure.


专讘谞谉 讻专讘谞谉 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬


The Gemara explains: The opinion of the Rabbis in our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis in the other mishna, who maintain that wine and oil are not connected and therefore cannot be used together in an eiruv, and the opinion of Rabbi Shimon is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri, who holds that wine and oil are connected, and may be used together in an eiruv.


转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 转讚讗讬 讗讜诪专 讗讞讚 讝讛 讜讗讞讚 讝讛 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇注专讘 讜讗驻讬诇讜 诇讝讛 讘讬讬谉 讜诇讝讛 讘讬讬谉


It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Taddai says: In both this case, of wine and wine, and that case, of wine and oil, they must establish an eiruv. The Gemara expresses wonder: Did he say this even if the partnership is with this one in wine and also with the other one in wine? Why should these partnerships not be sufficient to consider the items merged?


讗诪专 专讘讛 讝讛 讘讗 讘诇讙讬谞讜 讜砖驻讱 讜讝讛 讘讗 讘诇讙讬谞讜 讜砖驻讱 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讛讜讬 注讬专讜讘


Rabba said: If they partnered in the following manner, such that this one came with his wine-filled jug and poured its contents into a barrel, and the other one came with his jug and poured his wine into that same barrel, everyone agrees that it is a valid eiruv, even if they did not act specifically for that purpose.


讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讻讙讜谉 砖诇拽讞讜 讞讘讬转 砖诇 讬讬谉 讘砖讜转驻讜转 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 转讚讗讬 住讘专 讗讬谉 讘专讬专讛 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讬砖 讘专讬专讛


Where they disagree is in the case where they bought a barrel of wine in partnership. Rabbi Eliezer ben Taddai holds: There is no principle of retroactive clarification, i.e., there is no halakhic assumption that the undetermined halakhic status of items can be retroactively clarified. Consequently, after the wine is consumed, it is not possible to clarify retroactively which portion of the wine belonged to each person. Therefore, they cannot each be said to own a particular part of the wine, which renders it unfit for an eiruv. But the Rabbis hold that there is retroactive clarification, and therefore they may rely on this partnership to establish an eiruv.


专讘 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 转讚讗讬 讜专讘谞谉 讘住讜诪讻讬谉 注诇 砖讬转讜祝 讘诪拽讜诐 注讬专讜讘 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬


Rav Yosef said that this dispute should be understood differently, as Rabbi Eliezer ben Taddai and the Rabbis disagree about whether one may rely on a merging of an alleyway instead of an eiruv, i.e., whether the merging of an alleyway to permit carrying in the alleyway, exempts the courtyards that open into the alleyway from having to establish an eiruv for the purpose of carrying from one courtyard to the other.


讚诪专 住讘专 讗讬谉 住讜诪讻讬谉 讜诪专 住讘专 住讜诪讻讬谉


As one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer ben Taddai, holds that one may not rely on it in that case, as carrying in the courtyards requires specifically an eiruv, and the merging of alleyways is insufficient. And one Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, maintains that one may rely on and use the merging of alleyways to permit carrying between the courtyards as well.


讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讗诪专 专讘 讘专讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 转讚讗讬 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讞讚 讟注诪讗 讛讜讗


Rav Yosef said: From where do I say this, that this is the subject of their dispute? As Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, which will be detailed later, that one may not rely on a merging of alleyways instead of an eiruv. And Rav Beruna said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Taddai, that in both cases they must establish an eiruv. What is the reason he ruled in this manner? Is it not because the rationale for both rulings is one and the same?


讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讜讗讬 讞讚 讟注诪讗 转专转讬 讛讬诇讻转讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚诇讗 注讘讚讬谞谉 讻转专讬 讞讜诪专讬 讘注讬专讜讘讬谉


Abaye said to him: But if it is one reason, why do I need two rulings? On the contrary, it would be enough to rule in one case, from which we could infer the other as well. Rav Yosef replied: There is nevertheless a reason for both rulings, as this comes to teach us that we do not act in accordance with two stringencies of one tanna in matters of eiruv. Had Rav ruled only in accordance with Rabbi Meir, we would have known only that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion with regard to one specific detail of the case. He therefore ruled in accordance with two Sages: Rabbi Eliezer ben Taddai with regard to a merging of alleyways with wine, and Rabbi Meir with regard to a merging of alleyways with bread. Each is stringent with regard to a different detail of the case.


诪讗讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜诪讗讬 专讘谞谉 讚转谞讬讗 诪注专讘讬谉 讘讞爪讬专讜转 讘驻转 讜讗诐 专爪讜 诇注专讘 讘讬讬谉 讗讬谉 诪注专讘讬谉 诪砖转转驻讬谉 讘诪讘讜讬 讘讬讬谉 讜讗诐 专爪讜 诇讛砖转转祝 讘驻转 诪砖转转驻讬谉


Having mentioned Rabbi Meir, the Gemara now asks: What is the statement of Rabbi Meir, and what is the statement of the Rabbis? As it was taught in the following baraita: One may establish an eiruv with bread between courtyards that open to one another, but if one wanted to establish an eiruv with wine, one may not establish an eiruv in that manner. One may merge the courtyards that open into an alleyway with wine, and if one wanted to establish a merging of alleyways with bread, one may merge the courtyards of alleyways in this manner.


诪注专讘讬谉 讘讞爪讬专讜转 讜诪砖转转驻讬谉 讘诪讘讜讬 砖诇讗 诇砖讻讞 转讜专转 注讬专讜讘 诪谉 讛转讬谞讜拽讜转 砖讬讗诪专讜 讗讘讜转讬谞讜 诇讗 注讬专讘讜 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讜 诪注专讘讬谉 讗讜 诪砖转转驻讬谉


Why does one establish an eiruv between courtyards and also merge the courtyards that open into an alleyway? It is so as not to cause the halakhic category of eiruv to be forgotten by the children, as if a merging of alleyways alone were used, the children would later say: Our fathers never established an eiruv. Therefore, an eiruv is established for educational purposes; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: One may either establish an eiruv or merge alleyways.


驻诇讬讙讬 讘讛 专讘讬 谞讞讜诪讬 讜专讘讛 讞讚 讗诪专 讘驻转 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讘讞讚讗 住讙讬 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讘讬讬谉


Rabbi Na岣mi and Rabba disagreed about this issue. One of them said: In the case of bread, which may be used both for an eiruv and for a merging of alleyways, everyone agrees that one, either an eiruv or a merging of alleyways, is enough. When they disagree in the case of wine, which may be used only for a merging of alleyways but not for an eiruv, Rabbi Meir maintains that an eiruv is also necessary, while the Rabbis maintain that it is not required.


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