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Today's Daf Yomi

December 28, 2015 | 讟状讝 讘讟讘转 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Gittin 15

Discussions continue about whether or not the tannaim disagreed about if one sends a messenger to deliver something, does the聽messenger acquire rights to the object from the moment he receives it or only when it gets to the hands of the receiver? second chapter starts with a bunch of unique cases where the statement that the messenger bringing a get from abroad needs to say was not said in its entirety by the messenger.

Study Guide Gittin 15

 

讻讘讬谞转讬 诇讘转讬 讜讛讬讗 讘砖谞讬诐 注砖专 诪谞讛 讜诪转讛 讜拽讬讬诪讜 讞讻诪讬诐 讗转 讚讘专讬讛 讗诪专 诇讛诐 讘谞讬 专讜讻诇 转拽讘专诐 讗诪诐

my brooch [kevinati] to my daughter, and the brooch is worth twelve hundred dinars. And this woman subsequently died, and the Sages fulfilled her statement. Rabbi Elazar said to them that the sons of Rokhel should be buried by their mother, i.e., he cursed them. Rabbi Elazar meant that it is not possible to bring a proof from this incident, as these sons were wicked people. Consequently, when dealing with them the Sages did not act in accordance with the halakha, but allowed their mother to give this valuable piece of jewelry to their sister, circumventing the halakhot of inheritance.

转谞讗 拽诪讗 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讜专讘讬 谞转谉 讜专讘讬 讬注拽讘 谞诪讬 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诪讬转 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪爪讜讛 诇拽讬讬诐 讚讘专讬 讛诪转 讜讬砖 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻专讘谞谉

The Gemara states: The first tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who holds that there must be an actual act of acquisition or the money still belongs to the giver. And Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov also hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. However, they add that even though the giver died one does not say: It is a mitzva to fulfill the statement of the dead. And the Sages in the clause beginning: Some say, hold in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that the statement of a person on his deathbed effects acquisition through mere speech.

讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛谞砖讬讗 砖讗诪专 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪讬讛讜 讛讬讻讗 讚诪讬转 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪爪讜讛 诇拽讬讬诐 讚讘专讬 讛诪转 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬讞诇讜拽讜 诪住驻拽讗 诇讛讜 讜讻讗谉 讗诪专讜 砖讜讚讗 注讚讬祝 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛谞砖讬讗 诪注砖讛 讗转讗 诇讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉

And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said his opinion in the name of Rabbi Meir, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. However, he maintains that where the giver died we say: It is a mitzva to fulfill the statement of the dead. And the Rabbis say: They should divide it, because they are uncertain about the halakha in this situation. And according to the Sages in the clause beginning: Here they said, the discretion of the agent is preferable. And Rabbi Shimon HaNasi came to teach us a relevant incident but does not express an additional opinion.

讗讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛谞砖讬讗 谞砖讬讗 讛讜讗 讗讜 诪砖诪讬讛 讚谞砖讬讗 拽讗诪专 转讗 砖诪注 讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛谞砖讬讗 讜注讚讬讬谉 转讬讘注讬 诇讱 谞砖讬讗 讛讜讗 讗讜 讚拽讗诪专 诪砖诪讬讛 讚谞砖讬讗 转讬拽讜

A dilemma was raised before those studying this issue: Is the Rabbi Shimon HaNasi mentioned here himself a Nasi, or does the baraita mean that he spoke in the name of the Nasi? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear that which Rav Yosef, who was precise in his statements, says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon HaNasi. This indicates that he was an actual Nasi. But you can still raise the dilemma: Is he a Nasi, or does the baraita mean that he spoke in the name of the Nasi, as Rav Yosef may merely be quoting the above baraita? The Gemara has no answer for this question, and states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

讙讜驻讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛谞砖讬讗 讜讛讗 拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 讚讘专讬 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讻讻转讜讘讬谉 讜讻诪住讜专讬谉 讚诪讜

The Gemara returns to the matter itself: Rav Yosef says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon HaNasi, that the money should be returned to the heirs of the sender. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But don鈥檛 we maintain that the statement of a person on his deathbed is considered written and delivered? If so, the agent should give the money to the heirs of the recipient.

专讘 讬讜住祝 诪讜拽讬 诇讛 讘讘专讬讗 讜讛讗 诇讬讜专砖讬 诪砖诇讞 拽讗诪专 讜拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 诪爪讜讛 诇拽讬讬诐 讚讘专讬 讛诪转 转谞讬 讬讞讝专讜 诇诪砖诇讞

The Gemara answers: Rav Yosef establishes this halakha with regard to a healthy person, not someone on his deathbed. The Gemara asks: But he said that the money should be returned to the heirs of the sender, and we maintain that it is a mitzva to fulfill the statement of the dead, even if he issued these instructions when he was healthy. The Gemara answers: Emend Rabbi Shimon HaNasi鈥檚 statement and teach: Return the money to the sender, not to his heirs, as this is referring to a case where the sender had not died.

讛讚专谉 注诇讱 讛诪讘讬讗 拽诪讗

 

诪转谞讬壮 讛诪讘讬讗 讙讟 诪诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讗诪专 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讗讘诇 诇讗 讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 讗讘诇 诇讗 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讻讜诇讜 讜讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 讞爪讬讜 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讞爪讬讜 讜讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 讻讜诇讜 驻住讜诇

MISHNA: With regard to one who brings a bill of divorce from a country overseas and says: The bill of divorce was written in my presence but it was not signed in my presence; or if he said: It was signed in my presence but it was not written in my presence; or: All of it was written in my presence and half of it was signed in my presence, i.e., he observed the signing of only one witness; or: Half of it was written in my presence and all of it was signed in my presence, in all these cases the document is invalid.

讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讜讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 驻住讜诇 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讘驻谞讬谞讜 谞讻转讘 讜讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 驻住讜诇 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讻砖讬专 讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讘驻谞讬谞讜 谞讞转诐 讻砖专

If one agent bringing a bill of divorce says: It was written in my presence, and one other agent says: It was signed in my presence, it is invalid. If two agents say: It was written in our presence, and one says: It was signed in my presence, it is invalid. And Rabbi Yehuda deems the document valid. If one agent says: It was written in my presence, and two agents say: It was signed in our presence, it is valid.

讙诪壮 讛讗 转讜 诇诪讛 诇讬 讛讗 转谞讗 诇讬讛 讞讚讗 讝讬诪谞讗 讛诪讘讬讗 讙讟 诪诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 爪专讬讱 砖讬讗诪专 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讜讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 讗讬 诪讛讛讬讗 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 爪专讬讱 讜讗讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻砖专 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

GEMARA: The Gemara asks with regard to the entire mishna: Why do I need all these further examples? Didn鈥檛 it teach these halakhot once, as the mishna states (2a): One who brings a bill of divorce from a country overseas is required to say: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence? This indicates that if one did not state this declaration, then the bill of divorce is invalid. The Gemara explains: If the halakha were derived from that mishna alone, I would say: He is required to issue this statement ab initio, but if he did not say it the bill of divorce is nevertheless valid after the fact. Therefore, this mishna teaches us that the bill of divorce is invalid.

讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讞爪讬讜 讜讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 讻讜诇讜 驻住讜诇 讛讬 讞爪讬讜 讗诇讬诪讗 讞爪讬讜 专讗砖讜谉 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讻转讘 讘讜 讗诇讗 砖讬讟讛 讗讞转 诇砖诪讛 砖讜讘 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讞爪讬讜 讗讞专讜谉

搂 The mishna taught that if the agent said: Half of it was written in my presence and all of it was signed in my presence, the document is invalid. The Gemara asks: With regard to which half of the bill of divorce did he claim he saw written? If we say that he saw its first half written, but didn鈥檛 Rabbi Elazar say: Even if the husband or scribe wrote only one line of it for her sake, the agent is no longer required to check if the rest of the bill of divorce was written properly? Rather, Rav Ashi said: He testifies that he saw that its latter half was written, and he does not testify with regard to the first half, which is the primary section of the bill of divorce.

讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讻讜诇讜 讜讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 讞爪讬讜 驻住讜诇 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讜讗驻讬诇讜 砖谞讬诐 诪注讬讚讬诐 注诇 讞转讬诪转 讬讚 砖谞讬 驻住讜诇 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗

搂 The mishna taught that if he said: All of it was written in my presence and half of it was signed in my presence, i.e., the agent observed the signing of only one of the witnesses, it is invalid. Rav 岣sda says: And even if two people testify to the signature of the second witness, and the court ratifies this signature, nevertheless it is invalid. What is the reason for this ruling? After all, the court has the agent鈥檚 testimony with regard to one signature and the confirmation of two witnesses for the second signature.

讗讜 讻讜诇讜 讘拽讬讜诐 讛讙讟 讗讜 讻讜诇讜 讘转拽谞转 讞讻诪讬诐

The Gemara answers: The document must be authenticated either entirely through the process of the ratification of a bill of divorce, i.e., the bill of divorce must be ratified like any other legal document, by two people attesting to the validity of the signatures of both witnesses, or it must be entirely ratified via the rabbinic decree that the agent is deemed credible when he states: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讗 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讗讬诇讜 讗诪专 讞讚 讻砖专 讛砖转讗 讚讗讬讻讗 转专讬 驻住讜诇 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讗驻讬诇讜

Rava objects to this: Is there any situation in which if one person said it, the document is valid, i.e., if the agent would have attested to the signature of the second witness the bill of divorce would be valid, and now that there are two witnesses who attest to the signatures it is invalid? Rather, Rava says: Even if

讛讜讗 讜讗讞专 诪注讬讚讬谉 注诇 讞转讬诪转 讬讚 砖谞讬 驻住讜诇 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗转讜 诇讗讬讞诇讜驻讬 讘拽讬讜诐 砖讟专讜转 讚注诇诪讗 讜拽讗 谞驻讬拽 谞讻讬 专讬讘注讗 讚诪诪讜谞讗 讗驻讜诪讗 讚讞讚 住讛讚讗

he, i.e., the agent, and another person testify with regard to the signature of the second witness, the bill of divorce is invalid. What is the reason for this? Perhaps people will come to confuse it with the typical case of ratification of legal documents, and will rely on one witness who testifies about his own signature and that of the other signatory, while another witness joins with him to testify with regard to the other signature. And as a result of this, the full sum of money, minus a quarter, will be extracted based upon the testimony of one witness. In order to ratify legal documents in general, two witnesses must testify as to the validity of each of the signatures. If the Sages were to allow one witness to testify about his own signature and another witness to join him in testifying about the other signature in the case of a bill of divorce, it may lead to the same method being employed with regard to other legal documents.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讗砖讬 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讗讬诇讜 诪住讬拽 诇讬讛 讗讬讛讜 诇讻讜诇讬讛 讚讬讘讜专讗 讻砖专 讛砖转讗 讚讗讬讻讗 讞讚 讘讛讚讬讛 驻住讜诇

Rav Ashi objects to this: Is there any situation in which if he himself would complete his entire statement by saying: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, the document would be valid, and now that there is another one who testifies with him, the bill of divorce is invalid?

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讗讜诪专 讗谞讬 讛讜讗 注讚 砖谞讬 驻住讜诇 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗讜 讻讜诇讜 讘拽讬讜诐 讛讙讟 讗讜 讻讜诇讜 讘转拽谞转 讞讻诪讬诐

Rather, Rav Ashi says that even if the agent says: I am the second witness who signed the bill of divorce, it is invalid. What is the reason for this? A bill of divorce cannot be validated by a combination of two types of credibility. It must be authenticated either entirely through the ratification of the bill of divorce, in the manner that other documents are ratified, or it must be entirely ratified via the rabbinic decree, in which case the testimony of the agent is considered equivalent to that of two people who ratify the signatures.

转谞谉 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讻讜诇讜 讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 讞爪讬讜 驻住讜诇 讗讬讚讱 讞爪讬讜 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚诇讬讻讗 讚拽讗 诪住讛讬讚 注诇讬讛 讻诇诇 讛砖转讗 讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讜讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 讚讛讗讬 拽诪住讛讬讚 讗讻讜诇讛 讻转讬讘讛 讜讛讗讬 拽诪住讛讬讚 讗讻讜诇讛 讞转讬诪讛 驻住讜诇 讞爪讬讜 诪讬讘注讬讗

The Gemara cites a proof for this claim: We learned in the mishna that if an agent for a bill of divorce said: All of it was written in my presence and half of it was signed in my presence, this bill of divorce is invalid. The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances with regard to the other half of the bill of divorce? If we say that there is no one who testifies about it at all, this is problematic: Now the mishna taught that if one agent says: It was written in my presence, and one agent says: It was signed in my presence, in which case this agent testifies with regard to all the writing and that agent testifies with regard to all the signing, it is invalid. When the agent testifies that only half of it was signed in his presence, is it necessary to say that the document is invalid?

讗诇讗 讗讜 讻讚专讘讗 讗讜 讻讚专讘 讗砖讬

Rather, the mishna must be teaching that the bill of divorce is invalid even if there is additional testimony with regard to the second signature. This novelty can be explained either in accordance with the opinion of Rava, who holds that the agent joins with another person to testify about the second signature, or in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ashi, who holds that he testifies about his own signature.

讜诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讚专讘 讞住讚讗

The Gemara adds: And this is to exclude the opinion of Rav 岣sda, who declares that the document is invalid even when there is a full ratification of the second signature. Because the mishna merely alludes to the novelty in this clause, without specifying it, one may infer only the lesser novelty. Since Rav 岣sda鈥檚 novelty is greater than that of the other two Sages, had the mishna been taught for that purpose, it should have issued an explicit statement to that effect.

讗诪专 诇讱 专讘 讞住讚讗 讜诇讟注诪讬讱 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讗讘诇 诇讗 讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 诇诪讛 诇讬 讗诇讗 诇讗 讝讜 讗祝 讝讜 拽转谞讬

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Rav 岣sda could have said to you: And according to your reasoning, why do I need the ruling of the mishna which states that if the agent said: It was written in my presence but it was not signed in my presence, the bill of divorce is invalid? The mishna could simply have stated: If he said: All of it was written in my presence and half of it was signed in my presence, it is invalid. One would have inferred that it is invalid all the more so if one does not testify with regard to the signature at all. Rather, one must say that the tanna teaches the mishna employing the style: Not only this but also that, i.e., each ensuing statement adds something novel.

讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 讝讜 讗祝 讝讜 拽转谞讬

If so, here too the tanna teaches the mishna employing the style: Not only this but also that. In other words, Rav 岣sda would answer that the above inference, i.e., that the clause dealing with: It was written in my presence but it was not signed in my presence, must be teaching an additional novelty, is incorrect. This is because it is a stylistic feature of the Mishna to teach a less novel case followed by a more novel one, regardless of the fact that had it taught the more novel case first, there would have been no need to mention the less novel case at all. Therefore, there is no need to infer a special, unstated novelty from this clause at all, which means it cannot be cited as proof against Rav 岣sda鈥檚 greater novelty.

讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讙讬讚讜讚 讞诪砖讛 讜诪讞讬爪讛 讞诪砖讛 讗讬谉 诪爪讟专驻讬谉 注讚 砖讬讛讗 讗讜 讻讜诇讜 讘诪讞讬爪讛 讗讜 讻讜诇讜 讘讙讬讚讜讚

搂 Tangentially, the Gemara cites a discussion that involves a similar underlying principle. Rav 岣sda says, with regard to Shabbat domains: An embankment, i.e., a height disparity between two surfaces, of five handbreadths and an additional partition of five handbreadths, do not join together to form a partition of ten handbreadths, which is the minimum height for a partition to enclose a private domain. A halakhic partition is regarded as being composed of ten handbreadths only if it is composed entirely of a partition, e.g., a fence, or entirely of the embankment, e.g., a pit or incline.

讚专砖 诪专讬诪专 讙讬讚讜讚 讞诪砖讛 讜诪讞讬爪讛 讞诪砖讛 诪爪讟专驻讬谉 讜讛诇讻转讗 诪爪讟专驻讬谉

Mareimar taught: An embankment of five handbreadths and a partition of five handbreadths do join together to form a partition of ten handbreadths. The Gemara comments: And the halakha is that they join together. Rav 岣sda鈥檚 opinion is analogous to the aforementioned case that a bill of divorce must be either entirely upheld by the agent or entirely upheld by the ratification of its signatures, although the halakha is ruled differently in the case of Shabbat domains.

讘注讬 讗讬诇驻讗 讬讚讬诐 讟讛讜专讜转 诇讞爪讗讬谉 讗讜 讗讬谉 讟讛讜专讜转 诇讞爪讗讬谉 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚拽讗 诪砖讜 讘讬 转专讬 诪专讘讬注讬转 讜讛讗 转谞谉 诪专讘讬注讬转 谞讜讟诇讬谉 诇讬讚讬诐 诇讗讞讚 讜讗驻讬诇讜 诇砖谞讬诐

The Gemara cites another case that is based on the same principle. Ilfa raised a dilemma: With regard to ritual washing, can one鈥檚 hands be ritually pure in halves, or can they not be ritually pure in halves? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that two people wash with the requisite one quarter-log of water, and therefore in actuality each one of them washes with only half of a quarter-log, but didn鈥檛 we learn explicitly in a mishna (Yadayim 1:1): With the amount of a quarter-log one can wash the hands of one person and even of two? A quarter-log of water suffices for one person to wash his hands before eating bread, and even two may wash their hands simultaneously with this amount, if they do so in the correct manner.

讜讗诇讗 讚拽讗 诪砖讬 讞讚讗 讞讚讗 讬讚讬讛 讜讛转谞谉 讛谞讜讟诇 讬讚讜 讗讞转 讘谞讟讬诇讛 讜讗讞转 讘砖讟讬驻讛 讬讚讬讜 讟讛讜专讜转

But rather, Ilfa is referring to a case where one washed his two hands one by one, not both hands at the same time. The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Yadayim 2:1): With regard to one who purifies one hand by washing with a vessel and one hand by immersing it in a river, his hands are ritually pure? This mishna indicates that there is no need for both hands to be washed simultaneously.

讜讗诇讗 讚拽讗 诪砖讬 驻诇讙讗 驻诇讙讗 讚讬讚讬讛 讜讛讗诪专讬 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讬讚讬诐 讗讬谉 讟讛讜专讜转 诇讞爪讗讬谉 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 诪砖拽讛 讟讜驻讞

But rather, Ilfa鈥檚 dilemma refers to a case where he washes his hand in two halves, i.e., he first washes one half of his hand and next washes the second half of that same hand. The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 the Sages from the school of Rabbi Yannai say: Hands cannot be rendered ritually pure in halves? If so, one who washes half of his hand and pauses before washing the second half has not performed the act of washing the hands at all. The Gemara answers: No, Ilfa鈥檚 question is necessary only for a case where there is liquid that is still moist on his hand. When one washes the second half of his hand, some moisture remains on the portion of his hand that he already washed, and therefore one might think that this liquid joins with the water with which he washes the second half of his hand.

讜讻讬 讗讬讻讗 诪砖拽讛 讟讜驻讞 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讜讛转谞谉

The Gemara asks: And when there is liquid that rendered one鈥檚 hand moist, what of it? Is this a relevant factor? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Teharot 8:9):

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Gittin 15

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Gittin 15

讻讘讬谞转讬 诇讘转讬 讜讛讬讗 讘砖谞讬诐 注砖专 诪谞讛 讜诪转讛 讜拽讬讬诪讜 讞讻诪讬诐 讗转 讚讘专讬讛 讗诪专 诇讛诐 讘谞讬 专讜讻诇 转拽讘专诐 讗诪诐

my brooch [kevinati] to my daughter, and the brooch is worth twelve hundred dinars. And this woman subsequently died, and the Sages fulfilled her statement. Rabbi Elazar said to them that the sons of Rokhel should be buried by their mother, i.e., he cursed them. Rabbi Elazar meant that it is not possible to bring a proof from this incident, as these sons were wicked people. Consequently, when dealing with them the Sages did not act in accordance with the halakha, but allowed their mother to give this valuable piece of jewelry to their sister, circumventing the halakhot of inheritance.

转谞讗 拽诪讗 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讜专讘讬 谞转谉 讜专讘讬 讬注拽讘 谞诪讬 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诪讬转 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪爪讜讛 诇拽讬讬诐 讚讘专讬 讛诪转 讜讬砖 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻专讘谞谉

The Gemara states: The first tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who holds that there must be an actual act of acquisition or the money still belongs to the giver. And Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov also hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. However, they add that even though the giver died one does not say: It is a mitzva to fulfill the statement of the dead. And the Sages in the clause beginning: Some say, hold in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that the statement of a person on his deathbed effects acquisition through mere speech.

讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛谞砖讬讗 砖讗诪专 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪讬讛讜 讛讬讻讗 讚诪讬转 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪爪讜讛 诇拽讬讬诐 讚讘专讬 讛诪转 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬讞诇讜拽讜 诪住驻拽讗 诇讛讜 讜讻讗谉 讗诪专讜 砖讜讚讗 注讚讬祝 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛谞砖讬讗 诪注砖讛 讗转讗 诇讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉

And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said his opinion in the name of Rabbi Meir, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. However, he maintains that where the giver died we say: It is a mitzva to fulfill the statement of the dead. And the Rabbis say: They should divide it, because they are uncertain about the halakha in this situation. And according to the Sages in the clause beginning: Here they said, the discretion of the agent is preferable. And Rabbi Shimon HaNasi came to teach us a relevant incident but does not express an additional opinion.

讗讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛谞砖讬讗 谞砖讬讗 讛讜讗 讗讜 诪砖诪讬讛 讚谞砖讬讗 拽讗诪专 转讗 砖诪注 讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛谞砖讬讗 讜注讚讬讬谉 转讬讘注讬 诇讱 谞砖讬讗 讛讜讗 讗讜 讚拽讗诪专 诪砖诪讬讛 讚谞砖讬讗 转讬拽讜

A dilemma was raised before those studying this issue: Is the Rabbi Shimon HaNasi mentioned here himself a Nasi, or does the baraita mean that he spoke in the name of the Nasi? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear that which Rav Yosef, who was precise in his statements, says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon HaNasi. This indicates that he was an actual Nasi. But you can still raise the dilemma: Is he a Nasi, or does the baraita mean that he spoke in the name of the Nasi, as Rav Yosef may merely be quoting the above baraita? The Gemara has no answer for this question, and states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

讙讜驻讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛谞砖讬讗 讜讛讗 拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 讚讘专讬 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讻讻转讜讘讬谉 讜讻诪住讜专讬谉 讚诪讜

The Gemara returns to the matter itself: Rav Yosef says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon HaNasi, that the money should be returned to the heirs of the sender. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But don鈥檛 we maintain that the statement of a person on his deathbed is considered written and delivered? If so, the agent should give the money to the heirs of the recipient.

专讘 讬讜住祝 诪讜拽讬 诇讛 讘讘专讬讗 讜讛讗 诇讬讜专砖讬 诪砖诇讞 拽讗诪专 讜拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 诪爪讜讛 诇拽讬讬诐 讚讘专讬 讛诪转 转谞讬 讬讞讝专讜 诇诪砖诇讞

The Gemara answers: Rav Yosef establishes this halakha with regard to a healthy person, not someone on his deathbed. The Gemara asks: But he said that the money should be returned to the heirs of the sender, and we maintain that it is a mitzva to fulfill the statement of the dead, even if he issued these instructions when he was healthy. The Gemara answers: Emend Rabbi Shimon HaNasi鈥檚 statement and teach: Return the money to the sender, not to his heirs, as this is referring to a case where the sender had not died.

讛讚专谉 注诇讱 讛诪讘讬讗 拽诪讗

 

诪转谞讬壮 讛诪讘讬讗 讙讟 诪诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讗诪专 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讗讘诇 诇讗 讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 讗讘诇 诇讗 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讻讜诇讜 讜讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 讞爪讬讜 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讞爪讬讜 讜讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 讻讜诇讜 驻住讜诇

MISHNA: With regard to one who brings a bill of divorce from a country overseas and says: The bill of divorce was written in my presence but it was not signed in my presence; or if he said: It was signed in my presence but it was not written in my presence; or: All of it was written in my presence and half of it was signed in my presence, i.e., he observed the signing of only one witness; or: Half of it was written in my presence and all of it was signed in my presence, in all these cases the document is invalid.

讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讜讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 驻住讜诇 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讘驻谞讬谞讜 谞讻转讘 讜讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 驻住讜诇 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讻砖讬专 讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讘驻谞讬谞讜 谞讞转诐 讻砖专

If one agent bringing a bill of divorce says: It was written in my presence, and one other agent says: It was signed in my presence, it is invalid. If two agents say: It was written in our presence, and one says: It was signed in my presence, it is invalid. And Rabbi Yehuda deems the document valid. If one agent says: It was written in my presence, and two agents say: It was signed in our presence, it is valid.

讙诪壮 讛讗 转讜 诇诪讛 诇讬 讛讗 转谞讗 诇讬讛 讞讚讗 讝讬诪谞讗 讛诪讘讬讗 讙讟 诪诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 爪专讬讱 砖讬讗诪专 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讜讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 讗讬 诪讛讛讬讗 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 爪专讬讱 讜讗讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻砖专 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

GEMARA: The Gemara asks with regard to the entire mishna: Why do I need all these further examples? Didn鈥檛 it teach these halakhot once, as the mishna states (2a): One who brings a bill of divorce from a country overseas is required to say: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence? This indicates that if one did not state this declaration, then the bill of divorce is invalid. The Gemara explains: If the halakha were derived from that mishna alone, I would say: He is required to issue this statement ab initio, but if he did not say it the bill of divorce is nevertheless valid after the fact. Therefore, this mishna teaches us that the bill of divorce is invalid.

讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讞爪讬讜 讜讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 讻讜诇讜 驻住讜诇 讛讬 讞爪讬讜 讗诇讬诪讗 讞爪讬讜 专讗砖讜谉 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讻转讘 讘讜 讗诇讗 砖讬讟讛 讗讞转 诇砖诪讛 砖讜讘 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讞爪讬讜 讗讞专讜谉

搂 The mishna taught that if the agent said: Half of it was written in my presence and all of it was signed in my presence, the document is invalid. The Gemara asks: With regard to which half of the bill of divorce did he claim he saw written? If we say that he saw its first half written, but didn鈥檛 Rabbi Elazar say: Even if the husband or scribe wrote only one line of it for her sake, the agent is no longer required to check if the rest of the bill of divorce was written properly? Rather, Rav Ashi said: He testifies that he saw that its latter half was written, and he does not testify with regard to the first half, which is the primary section of the bill of divorce.

讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讻讜诇讜 讜讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 讞爪讬讜 驻住讜诇 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讜讗驻讬诇讜 砖谞讬诐 诪注讬讚讬诐 注诇 讞转讬诪转 讬讚 砖谞讬 驻住讜诇 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗

搂 The mishna taught that if he said: All of it was written in my presence and half of it was signed in my presence, i.e., the agent observed the signing of only one of the witnesses, it is invalid. Rav 岣sda says: And even if two people testify to the signature of the second witness, and the court ratifies this signature, nevertheless it is invalid. What is the reason for this ruling? After all, the court has the agent鈥檚 testimony with regard to one signature and the confirmation of two witnesses for the second signature.

讗讜 讻讜诇讜 讘拽讬讜诐 讛讙讟 讗讜 讻讜诇讜 讘转拽谞转 讞讻诪讬诐

The Gemara answers: The document must be authenticated either entirely through the process of the ratification of a bill of divorce, i.e., the bill of divorce must be ratified like any other legal document, by two people attesting to the validity of the signatures of both witnesses, or it must be entirely ratified via the rabbinic decree that the agent is deemed credible when he states: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讗 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讗讬诇讜 讗诪专 讞讚 讻砖专 讛砖转讗 讚讗讬讻讗 转专讬 驻住讜诇 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讗驻讬诇讜

Rava objects to this: Is there any situation in which if one person said it, the document is valid, i.e., if the agent would have attested to the signature of the second witness the bill of divorce would be valid, and now that there are two witnesses who attest to the signatures it is invalid? Rather, Rava says: Even if

讛讜讗 讜讗讞专 诪注讬讚讬谉 注诇 讞转讬诪转 讬讚 砖谞讬 驻住讜诇 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗转讜 诇讗讬讞诇讜驻讬 讘拽讬讜诐 砖讟专讜转 讚注诇诪讗 讜拽讗 谞驻讬拽 谞讻讬 专讬讘注讗 讚诪诪讜谞讗 讗驻讜诪讗 讚讞讚 住讛讚讗

he, i.e., the agent, and another person testify with regard to the signature of the second witness, the bill of divorce is invalid. What is the reason for this? Perhaps people will come to confuse it with the typical case of ratification of legal documents, and will rely on one witness who testifies about his own signature and that of the other signatory, while another witness joins with him to testify with regard to the other signature. And as a result of this, the full sum of money, minus a quarter, will be extracted based upon the testimony of one witness. In order to ratify legal documents in general, two witnesses must testify as to the validity of each of the signatures. If the Sages were to allow one witness to testify about his own signature and another witness to join him in testifying about the other signature in the case of a bill of divorce, it may lead to the same method being employed with regard to other legal documents.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讗砖讬 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讗讬诇讜 诪住讬拽 诇讬讛 讗讬讛讜 诇讻讜诇讬讛 讚讬讘讜专讗 讻砖专 讛砖转讗 讚讗讬讻讗 讞讚 讘讛讚讬讛 驻住讜诇

Rav Ashi objects to this: Is there any situation in which if he himself would complete his entire statement by saying: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, the document would be valid, and now that there is another one who testifies with him, the bill of divorce is invalid?

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讗讜诪专 讗谞讬 讛讜讗 注讚 砖谞讬 驻住讜诇 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗讜 讻讜诇讜 讘拽讬讜诐 讛讙讟 讗讜 讻讜诇讜 讘转拽谞转 讞讻诪讬诐

Rather, Rav Ashi says that even if the agent says: I am the second witness who signed the bill of divorce, it is invalid. What is the reason for this? A bill of divorce cannot be validated by a combination of two types of credibility. It must be authenticated either entirely through the ratification of the bill of divorce, in the manner that other documents are ratified, or it must be entirely ratified via the rabbinic decree, in which case the testimony of the agent is considered equivalent to that of two people who ratify the signatures.

转谞谉 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讻讜诇讜 讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 讞爪讬讜 驻住讜诇 讗讬讚讱 讞爪讬讜 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚诇讬讻讗 讚拽讗 诪住讛讬讚 注诇讬讛 讻诇诇 讛砖转讗 讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讜讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 讚讛讗讬 拽诪住讛讬讚 讗讻讜诇讛 讻转讬讘讛 讜讛讗讬 拽诪住讛讬讚 讗讻讜诇讛 讞转讬诪讛 驻住讜诇 讞爪讬讜 诪讬讘注讬讗

The Gemara cites a proof for this claim: We learned in the mishna that if an agent for a bill of divorce said: All of it was written in my presence and half of it was signed in my presence, this bill of divorce is invalid. The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances with regard to the other half of the bill of divorce? If we say that there is no one who testifies about it at all, this is problematic: Now the mishna taught that if one agent says: It was written in my presence, and one agent says: It was signed in my presence, in which case this agent testifies with regard to all the writing and that agent testifies with regard to all the signing, it is invalid. When the agent testifies that only half of it was signed in his presence, is it necessary to say that the document is invalid?

讗诇讗 讗讜 讻讚专讘讗 讗讜 讻讚专讘 讗砖讬

Rather, the mishna must be teaching that the bill of divorce is invalid even if there is additional testimony with regard to the second signature. This novelty can be explained either in accordance with the opinion of Rava, who holds that the agent joins with another person to testify about the second signature, or in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ashi, who holds that he testifies about his own signature.

讜诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讚专讘 讞住讚讗

The Gemara adds: And this is to exclude the opinion of Rav 岣sda, who declares that the document is invalid even when there is a full ratification of the second signature. Because the mishna merely alludes to the novelty in this clause, without specifying it, one may infer only the lesser novelty. Since Rav 岣sda鈥檚 novelty is greater than that of the other two Sages, had the mishna been taught for that purpose, it should have issued an explicit statement to that effect.

讗诪专 诇讱 专讘 讞住讚讗 讜诇讟注诪讬讱 讘驻谞讬 谞讻转讘 讗讘诇 诇讗 讘驻谞讬 谞讞转诐 诇诪讛 诇讬 讗诇讗 诇讗 讝讜 讗祝 讝讜 拽转谞讬

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Rav 岣sda could have said to you: And according to your reasoning, why do I need the ruling of the mishna which states that if the agent said: It was written in my presence but it was not signed in my presence, the bill of divorce is invalid? The mishna could simply have stated: If he said: All of it was written in my presence and half of it was signed in my presence, it is invalid. One would have inferred that it is invalid all the more so if one does not testify with regard to the signature at all. Rather, one must say that the tanna teaches the mishna employing the style: Not only this but also that, i.e., each ensuing statement adds something novel.

讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 讝讜 讗祝 讝讜 拽转谞讬

If so, here too the tanna teaches the mishna employing the style: Not only this but also that. In other words, Rav 岣sda would answer that the above inference, i.e., that the clause dealing with: It was written in my presence but it was not signed in my presence, must be teaching an additional novelty, is incorrect. This is because it is a stylistic feature of the Mishna to teach a less novel case followed by a more novel one, regardless of the fact that had it taught the more novel case first, there would have been no need to mention the less novel case at all. Therefore, there is no need to infer a special, unstated novelty from this clause at all, which means it cannot be cited as proof against Rav 岣sda鈥檚 greater novelty.

讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讙讬讚讜讚 讞诪砖讛 讜诪讞讬爪讛 讞诪砖讛 讗讬谉 诪爪讟专驻讬谉 注讚 砖讬讛讗 讗讜 讻讜诇讜 讘诪讞讬爪讛 讗讜 讻讜诇讜 讘讙讬讚讜讚

搂 Tangentially, the Gemara cites a discussion that involves a similar underlying principle. Rav 岣sda says, with regard to Shabbat domains: An embankment, i.e., a height disparity between two surfaces, of five handbreadths and an additional partition of five handbreadths, do not join together to form a partition of ten handbreadths, which is the minimum height for a partition to enclose a private domain. A halakhic partition is regarded as being composed of ten handbreadths only if it is composed entirely of a partition, e.g., a fence, or entirely of the embankment, e.g., a pit or incline.

讚专砖 诪专讬诪专 讙讬讚讜讚 讞诪砖讛 讜诪讞讬爪讛 讞诪砖讛 诪爪讟专驻讬谉 讜讛诇讻转讗 诪爪讟专驻讬谉

Mareimar taught: An embankment of five handbreadths and a partition of five handbreadths do join together to form a partition of ten handbreadths. The Gemara comments: And the halakha is that they join together. Rav 岣sda鈥檚 opinion is analogous to the aforementioned case that a bill of divorce must be either entirely upheld by the agent or entirely upheld by the ratification of its signatures, although the halakha is ruled differently in the case of Shabbat domains.

讘注讬 讗讬诇驻讗 讬讚讬诐 讟讛讜专讜转 诇讞爪讗讬谉 讗讜 讗讬谉 讟讛讜专讜转 诇讞爪讗讬谉 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚拽讗 诪砖讜 讘讬 转专讬 诪专讘讬注讬转 讜讛讗 转谞谉 诪专讘讬注讬转 谞讜讟诇讬谉 诇讬讚讬诐 诇讗讞讚 讜讗驻讬诇讜 诇砖谞讬诐

The Gemara cites another case that is based on the same principle. Ilfa raised a dilemma: With regard to ritual washing, can one鈥檚 hands be ritually pure in halves, or can they not be ritually pure in halves? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that two people wash with the requisite one quarter-log of water, and therefore in actuality each one of them washes with only half of a quarter-log, but didn鈥檛 we learn explicitly in a mishna (Yadayim 1:1): With the amount of a quarter-log one can wash the hands of one person and even of two? A quarter-log of water suffices for one person to wash his hands before eating bread, and even two may wash their hands simultaneously with this amount, if they do so in the correct manner.

讜讗诇讗 讚拽讗 诪砖讬 讞讚讗 讞讚讗 讬讚讬讛 讜讛转谞谉 讛谞讜讟诇 讬讚讜 讗讞转 讘谞讟讬诇讛 讜讗讞转 讘砖讟讬驻讛 讬讚讬讜 讟讛讜专讜转

But rather, Ilfa is referring to a case where one washed his two hands one by one, not both hands at the same time. The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Yadayim 2:1): With regard to one who purifies one hand by washing with a vessel and one hand by immersing it in a river, his hands are ritually pure? This mishna indicates that there is no need for both hands to be washed simultaneously.

讜讗诇讗 讚拽讗 诪砖讬 驻诇讙讗 驻诇讙讗 讚讬讚讬讛 讜讛讗诪专讬 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讬讚讬诐 讗讬谉 讟讛讜专讜转 诇讞爪讗讬谉 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 诪砖拽讛 讟讜驻讞

But rather, Ilfa鈥檚 dilemma refers to a case where he washes his hand in two halves, i.e., he first washes one half of his hand and next washes the second half of that same hand. The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 the Sages from the school of Rabbi Yannai say: Hands cannot be rendered ritually pure in halves? If so, one who washes half of his hand and pauses before washing the second half has not performed the act of washing the hands at all. The Gemara answers: No, Ilfa鈥檚 question is necessary only for a case where there is liquid that is still moist on his hand. When one washes the second half of his hand, some moisture remains on the portion of his hand that he already washed, and therefore one might think that this liquid joins with the water with which he washes the second half of his hand.

讜讻讬 讗讬讻讗 诪砖拽讛 讟讜驻讞 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讜讛转谞谉

The Gemara asks: And when there is liquid that rendered one鈥檚 hand moist, what of it? Is this a relevant factor? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Teharot 8:9):

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