Rav Nachman held like Rebbi on both issues – that one who cancels a get in a court, even after Rabban Gamliel’s takana, the cancellation will be effective, and one can cancel some of the witnesses not in the presence of the others. A contradiction is raised against Rav Nachman , as elsewhere he rules the one needs to upholds the power of the court when it comes to dividing up the property of orphans. A distinction is made between monetary laws (orphan’s property) and prohibitions (divorce). Rava and Abaye disagree about whether or not we accept gilui daat (where someone indicated his wishes but did not say them explicitly) in cases of divorce. This is one of the six cases (Y’AL K’GaM) where we hold like Abaye against Rava. The case in which they argue is when a messenger arrived with a get and the wife told him to come back tomorrow as she is busy weaving. When the messenger returns with this information to the husband, he responds, “Baruch hatov v’hameitiv,” indicating that he was happy she did not receive the get, but not stating explicitly that the get was canceled. Abaye and Rava each bring cases to try to prove their position. The Gemara rules like Rav Nachman on two issues – one, that one cancels a get in front of two people and two, that we hold like Rebbi on both issues (see above). They also rule like Abaye that gilui daat is not effective in divorce. If people are known by different names in different places, originally, they would only write the name they were known as in their current city, but later they instituted that they should put in the get all the names they are known by (or perhaps just add the words “and any other name that they are known by). Rav Ashi limits this to a case where the person is known by both names in the place where the get is given (however, some understand Rav Ashi to be saying the reverse). A widow can only collect her ketuba money from orphans by taking an oath. However, the rabbis would not permit women to take oaths as they were concerned about false oaths. Therefore they instituted a takana that women could collect the money by making a vow that the orphans would agree to. Another two takanot were that witnesses need to sign a get and Hillel instituted prosbol to allow loans to be collected after the shmita year.
This month’s learning is dedicated in memory of Rabbi Dr. Raymond Harari z”l, on his 1st yahrzeit. As an educator, principal of Yeshiva of Flatbush, and community rabbi, he inspired thousands with his wisdom, warmth, and unwavering commitment to Torah.
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Gittin 34
יְתוֹמִין שֶׁבָּאוּ לַחֲלוֹק בְּנִכְסֵי אֲבִיהֶן, בֵּית דִּין מַעֲמִידִין לָהֶן אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס, וּבוֹרְרִים לָהֶן חֵלֶק יָפֶה. הִגְדִּילוּ – יְכוֹלִין לְמַחוֹת. וְרַב נַחְמָן דִּידֵיהּ אָמַר: הִגְדִּילוּ – אֵין יְכוֹלִין לְמַחוֹת; דְּאִם כֵּן, מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה?
with regard to the halakhot of a steward who cares for the estate of orphans: In the case of orphans who came to divide their father’s property, the court appoints a steward [apotropos] for them, and they select for them, i.e., for each of the orphans, a fine portion. When the orphans have grown up, they can protest the division and demand the redistribution of the property. And Rav Naḥman said his own statement: When they have grown up, they cannot protest, for if so, what advantage does the court have? This demonstrates that Rav Naḥman agrees with the principle of: If so, what advantage does the court have?
הָתָם מָמוֹנָא, הָכָא אִיסּוּרָא.
The Gemara answers: There is no contradiction between Rav Naḥman’s statement concerning the inheritance of orphans and his statement with regard to rendering a bill of divorce void. There, in the former case, it is in the realm of monetary matters, and the preservation of the court’s honor is more important than the accurate distribution of the property. Here, in the case of divorce, it is in the realm of matters of prohibition, and one would not permit a married woman to remarry in order to strengthen the authority of the court.
גִּידּוּל בַּר רְעִילַאי שַׁדַּר לַהּ גִּיטָּא לִדְבֵיתְהוּ; אֲזַל שְׁלִיחָא, אַשְׁכְּחַהּ דַּהֲוָה יָתְבָה וְנָוְולָה, אֲמַר לַהּ: הֵא גִּיטִּיךְ. אֲמַרָה לֵיהּ: זִיל הַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא, וְתָא לִמְחַר. אֲזַל לְגַבֵּיהּ וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ. פְּתַח וַאֲמַר: ״בָּרוּךְ הַטּוֹב וְהַמֵּטִיב״.
§ The Gemara relates: A man named Giddul bar Re’ilai sent a bill of divorce to his wife. The agent went and found that she was sitting and weaving [navla]. He said to her: This is your bill of divorce. She said to him: At least go away from here now and come tomorrow to give me the bill of divorce. The agent went to Giddul bar Re’ilai and told him what had occurred. Giddul bar Re’ilai opened his mouth and said: Blessed is He Who is good and does good, as he was happy that the bill of divorce was not delivered.
אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: ״בָּרוּךְ הַטּוֹב וְהַמֵּטִיב״, וְלָא בָּטֵל גִּיטָּא. רָבָא אָמַר: ״בָּרוּךְ הַטּוֹב וְהַמֵּטִיב״, וּבָטֵל גִּיטָּא.
The Sages disagreed with regard to the status of this bill of divorce. Abaye said that he said: Blessed is He Who is good and does good, as he was happy that it was not delivered, but the bill of divorce is not rendered void through this statement. Rava said that he said: Blessed is He Who is good and does good, and the bill of divorce is rendered void.
בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? בְּגִלּוּי דַעְתָּא בְּגִיטָּא קָמִיפַּלְגִי – דְּאַבָּיֵי סָבַר: גִּלּוּי דַעְתָּא בְּגִיטָּא לָאו מִלְּתָא הִיא, וְרָבָא סָבַר: גִּלּוּי דַעְתָּא בְּגִיטָּא מִילְּתָא הִיא.
The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? The Gemara answers: They disagree in their understanding of disclosure of intent with regard to a bill of divorce, i.e., when the husband demonstrates that he does not desire the bill of divorce to be delivered, but does not render it void explicitly. As Abaye holds: Disclosure of intent with regard to a bill of divorce is not a significant matter and does not render it void, and Rava holds: Disclosure of intent with regard to a bill of divorce is a significant matter, and does render it void.
אָמַר רָבָא: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת אַשְׁקְלֵיהּ גִּיטָּא לְהָהוּא גַּבְרָא בְּעַל כֻּרְחֵיהּ, וַאֲמַר לְהוּ לְסָהֲדִי: הָכִי אָמַר לְכוּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת – לְבַטֵּל גִּיטָּא. וְאַצְרְכֵיהּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת גִּיטָּא אַחֲרִינָא.
Rava said: From where do I say this halakha? From a case where Rav Sheshet extracted the authorization to write a bill of divorce from a certain man against his will, and that man then said to the witnesses: This is what Rav Sheshet said to you: Let the bill of divorce be rendered void, and Rav Sheshet required him to write another bill of divorce. Evidently, though the man did not explicitly render the bill of divorce void with his statement, but only demonstrated that he did not want the bill of divorce to be given, Rav Sheshet considered the bill of divorce to be rendered void.
וְאַבָּיֵי – אַטּוּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת מְבַטֵּל גִּיטָּא דְּאִינָשֵׁי הֲוָה?! אִיהוּ בַּטְּלַהּ; וְהַאי דְּקָאָמַר לְהוּ הָכִי, מִשּׁוּם דָּפְנוֹיֵ[י].
And Abaye would respond: Is that to say Rav Sheshet would render void the bills of divorce of other people? Rather, the husband rendered void the bill of divorce himself. And the reason why he told them this, that it was Rav Sheshet’s instructions that the bill of divorce be rendered void, was due to the lashes that he would have received from the court appointees if he said that he was rendering the bill of divorce void against the wishes of Rav Sheshet.
וְאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דְּרַב יְהוּדָה אַשְׁקְלֵיהּ גִּיטָּא לְחַתְנֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יִרְמְיָה בִּירָאָה, וּבַטְּלֵיהּ; תְּנָא אַשְׁקְלֵיהּ, וּבַטְּלֵיהּ; הֲדַר תְּנָא וְאַשְׁקְלֵיהּ עַל כֻּרְחֵיהּ, וַאֲמַר לְהוּ לְסָהֲדִי: אוֹתִיבוּ קָרֵי בְּאוּנַּיְכוּ וּכְתוּבוּ לֵיהּ. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ גִּלּוּי דַעְתָּא בְּגִיטָּא מִילְּתָא הִיא, הָא חָזוּ לֵיהּ דְּקָא רָהֵיט בָּתְרַיְיהוּ!
And Abaye said: From where do I say that disclosure of intent with regard to bills of divorce is disregarded? From the case where Rav Yehuda extracted the authorization to write a bill of divorce from the son-in-law of Rabbi Yirmeya Bira’a, and the man rendered the bill of divorce void. Rav Yehuda again extracted the authorization to write a bill of divorce, and the man rendered the bill of divorce void. Rav Yehuda returned and again extracted the authorization to write a bill of divorce against his will, and said to the witnesses: Place pieces of gourd in your ears and write the bill of divorce for him, so that you will not hear if he renders the bill of divorce void again. Abaye states his proof: And if it enters your mind that disclosure of intent with regard to bills of divorce is a significant matter, in this case the witnesses see that he is running after them even though they do not hear him, so the bill of divorce should be rendered void.
וְרָבָא – הַאי דְּקָא רָהֵיט בָּתְרַיְיהוּ, דְּאָמַר לְהוּ: אַשּׁוּר הַבוּ לַהּ הַיָּיא, כִּי הֵיכָא דְּמִשְׁלַם צַעֲרָא דְּהָהוּא גַּבְרָא.
And Rava would respond: Since they cannot hear him, his intent is not disclosed; this, that he is running after them, does not prove that he wishes to render the bill of divorce void, as it could be that he wishes to say to them: Make haste [ashur], give her the bill of divorce speedily [hayya] in order to end the pain of that man, i.e., my pain, that I am divorcing my wife.
וְאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דְּהָהוּא דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ: אִי לָא אָתֵינָא עַד תְּלָתִין יוֹמִין, לֶיהֱוֵי גִּיטָּא. אֲתָא, וּפַסְקֵיהּ מַבָּרָא; אֲמַר לְהוּ: ״חֲזוֹ דַּאֲתַאי, חֲזוֹ דַּאֲתַאי״; וַאֲמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לָא שְׁמֵיהּ מַתְיָא.
And Abaye said further: From where do I say that disclosure of intent with regard to bills of divorce is disregarded? From the case where there was a certain man who said to the agents with whom he entrusted the bill of divorce: If I do not arrive from now until thirty days have passed, let this be a bill of divorce. He came after thirty days had passed, but was prevented from crossing the river by the ferry that was located on the other side of the river, so he did not arrive within the designated time. He said to the people across the river: See that I have arrived, see that I have arrived, and Shmuel said: It is not considered to be an arrival, even though it is clear that this was his intention, and the bill of divorce is not void.
וְרָבָא – אַטּוּ הָתָם לְבַטּוֹלֵי גִּיטָּא בָּעֵי?! הָתָם לְקַיּוֹמֵי תְּנָאֵיהּ קָא בָעֵי, וְהָא לָא אִיקַּיַּים תְּנָאֵיהּ.
And Rava said: This case cannot serve as a proof; is that to say that there he desires to render the bill of divorce void? There, in that case, he desires to fulfill his stipulation, and he did not fulfill his condition, as he did not arrive. Therefore, the bill of divorce remains valid.
הָהוּא דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ: אִי לָא נָסֵיבְנָא עַד תְּלָתִין יוֹמִין – לֶיהֱוֵי גִּיטָּא. כִּי מְטוֹ תְּלָתִין יוֹמִין, אֲמַר לְהוּ: הָא טָרַחְנָא.
The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who said to witnesses when he gave a bill of divorce to his betrothed: If I do not marry her within up to thirty days, then this will be a bill of divorce. When thirty days arrived, he said to them: I took the trouble but I did not succeed in marrying her.
לְמַאי נֵיחוּשׁ לַהּ? אִי מִשּׁוּם אוּנְסָא – אֵין אוֹנֶס בְּגִיטִּין. אִי מִשּׁוּם גַּלּוֹיֵי דַּעְתָּא בְּגִיטָּא – פְּלוּגְתָּא דְּאַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא הוּא.
The Gemara asks: With regard to what need we be concerned in the case of this bill of divorce? If we are concerned because he attempted to marry her and there were circumstances beyond his control that prevented him from doing so, isn’t there a principle that unavoidable circumstances have no legal standing with regard to bills of divorce? If the concern is due to disclosure of intent with regard to bills of divorce, and the husband demonstrated that he does not want the bill of divorce to take effect, then this is a dispute of Abaye and Rava, and, as the Gemara explains later, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye.
הָהוּא דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ: אִי לָא נָסֵיבְנָא לְרֵישׁ יַרְחָא דַּאֲדָר, לֶיהֱוֵי גִּיטָּא. כִּי מְטָא רֵישׁ יַרְחָא דַּאֲדָר, אֲמַר לְהוּ: אֲנָא לְרֵישׁ יַרְחָא דְנִיסָן אֲמַרִי. לְמַאי נֵיחוּשׁ לַהּ? אִי מִשּׁוּם אוֹנֶס – אֵין אוֹנֶס בְּגִיטִּין. אִי מִשּׁוּם גַּלּוֹיֵי דַּעְתָּא – פְּלוּגְתָּא דְּאַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא.
The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who said to witnesses: If I do not marry my betrothed by the New Moon of Adar then this will be a bill of divorce. When the New Moon of Adar arrived, he said to them: I said by the New Moon of Nisan. With regard to what need we be concerned? If we are concerned because he attempted to marry her and there were circumstances beyond his control that prevented him from doing so, isn’t there a principle that unavoidable circumstances have no legal standing with regard to bills of divorce? If the concern is due to disclosure of intent with regard to bills of divorce, and the husband demonstrated that he does not want the bill of divorce to take effect, then this is a dispute of Abaye and Rava, and, as the Gemara explains later, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye.
וְהִלְכְתָא כְּנַחְמָן; וְהִלְכְתָא כְּנַחְמָן;
The Gemara states several conclusions: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman, who ruled that one can render a bill of divorce void in the presence of two people. And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman, who ruled that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in both of his disputes with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
וְהִלְכְתָא כְּנַחְמָנִי.
And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Naḥmani, i.e., Abaye, that disclosure of intent with regard to bills of divorce is disregarded.
מַתְנִי׳ בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיָה מְשַׁנֶּה שְׁמוֹ וּשְׁמָהּ, שֵׁם עִירוֹ וְשֵׁם עִירָהּ. הִתְקִין רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הַזָּקֵן שֶׁיְּהֵא כּוֹתֵב: ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי וְכׇל שׁוּם שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ״, ״אִשָּׁה פְּלוֹנִית וְכׇל שׁוּם שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ״ – מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם.
MISHNA: Initially, the husband would change his name and her name, from the names by which they were known where they formerly lived to the names by which they were known where the bill of divorce was written, and write the name of his city and the name of her city. One was not required to list all of the names by which the husband and the wife were known, but only the names in the place where the bill of divorce was being written. Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that the scribe should write in the bill of divorce: The man so-and-so, and any other name that he has, and: The woman so-and-so, and any other name that she has. The reason for this ordinance was for the betterment of the world, as perhaps the people of a different city would not recognize the name written in the bill of divorce, and would claim that this bill of divorce does not belong to her.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, שְׁלַחוּ לֵיהּ בְּנֵי מְדִינַת הַיָּם לְרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: בְּנֵי אָדָם הַבָּאִים מִשָּׁם לְכָאן, שְׁמוֹ יוֹסֵף – וְקוֹרְאִין לוֹ יוֹחָנָן; יוֹחָנָן – וְקוֹרְאִין לוֹ יוֹסֵף, הֵיאַךְ מְגָרְשִׁין נְשׁוֹתֵיהֶן? עָמַד רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, וְהִתְקִין שֶׁיְּהוּ כּוֹתְבִין: ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי וְכׇל שׁוּם שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ״, ״אִשָּׁה פְּלוֹנִית וְכׇל שׁוּם שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ״ – מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: וְהוּא דְּאִתַּחְזַק בִּתְרֵי שְׁמֵי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: רַבִּי מָרִי וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר קָיְימִי כְּווֹתָךְ.
GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The residents of a country overseas sent an inquiry to Rabban Gamliel: With regard to people who come from there, Eretz Yisrael, to here, for example, someone whose name is Yosef but here they call him Yoḥanan, or someone whose name is Yoḥanan, but here they call him Yosef, how do they write bills of divorce to effectively divorce their wives? Rabban Gamliel arose and instituted that they should write: The man so-and-so, and any other name that he has, the woman so-and-so, and any other name that she has, for the betterment of the world. Rav Ashi said: And this applies only when he is known by two names. Rabbi Abba said to Rav Ashi: Rabbi Mari and Rabbi Elazar hold in accordance with your opinion.
תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב אָשֵׁי: הָיוּ לוֹ שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים – אַחַת בִּיהוּדָה וְאַחַת בַּגָּלִיל; וְלוֹ שְׁנֵי שֵׁמוֹת – אֶחָד בִּיהוּדָה וְאֶחָד בַּגָּלִיל; וְגֵרַשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁבִּיהוּדָה בִּשְׁמוֹ שֶׁבִּיהוּדָה, וְאֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁבַּגָּלִיל בִּשְׁמוֹ שֶׁבַּגָּלִיל – אֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת, עַד שֶׁיְּגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁבִּיהוּדָה בִּשְׁמוֹ שֶׁבִּיהוּדָה – וְשֵׁם דְּגָלִיל עִמּוֹ; וְאֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁבַּגָּלִיל בִּשְׁמוֹ שֶׁבַּגָּלִיל – וְשֵׁם דִּיהוּדָה עִמּוֹ. יָצָא לְמָקוֹם אַחֵר, וְגֵרַשׁ בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן – מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת.
The Gemara adds: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ashi: If a husband has two wives, one in Judea and one in the Galilee; and he has two names, one that he is known by in Judea and one that he is known by in the Galilee; and he divorces his wife who is in Judea with a bill of divorce listing the name that he is known by in Judea, and he divorces his other wife who is in the Galilee with a bill of divorce listing the name that he is known by in the Galilee, then neither of his wives is divorced until he divorces his wife who is in Judea with a bill of divorce listing the name that he is known by in Judea and the name used by the people of the Galilee appended to it, and he also divorces his wife who is in the Galilee with the name that he is known by in the Galilee and the name used by the people of Judea appended to it. If he leaves to a different place, and divorces his wife with a bill of divorce listing one of these names, then she is divorced.
וְהָאָמְרַתְּ שֵׁם דְּגָלִיל עִמּוֹ! אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ – הָא דְּאִתַּחְזַק, הָא דְּלָא אֶתַּחְזַק; שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
The Gemara asks: But didn’t you say that even in Judea his name used by people of the Galilee must be appended to it? Why then is he not required to list all of the names that he is known by? Rather, learn from it that there is a difference between the two cases: This former case is one where he is known to have several names, for example when those in Judea are aware that the husband is known by a different name in the Galilee. And this latter case is one where he is not known to have two names, as he traveled to a place where he was not known. Therefore, he is required to write only the name that he is known by in that place. The Gemara determines: Conclude from it that one must list all of the names that he is known by only if it is known that he has several names.
הָהִיא דַּהֲווֹ קָרוּ לַהּ מִרְיָם, וּפוּרְתָּא שָׂרָה. אָמְרִי נְהַרְדָּעֵי: מִרְיָם וְכֹל שׁוּם שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ, וְלָא שָׂרָה וְכֹל שׁוּם שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ.
The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who many people called Miriam, and a few people called her Sara; the Sages of Neharde’a said: In her bill of divorce, one must write: Miriam, and any other name that she has, and one should not write: Sara, and any other name that she has, as one must use the name that she is primarily known by.
מַתְנִי׳ אֵין אַלְמָנָה נִפְרַעַת מִנִּכְסֵי יְתוֹמִים, אֶלָּא בִּשְׁבוּעָה. נִמְנְעוּ מִלְּהַשְׁבִּיעָהּ; הִתְקִין רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הַזָּקֵן, שֶׁתְּהֵא נוֹדֶרֶת לַיְּתוֹמִים כֹּל מַה שֶּׁיִּרְצוּ, וְגוֹבָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ.
MISHNA: A widow can collect payment of her marriage contract from the property of orphans only by means of an oath that she did not receive any part of the payment of the marriage contract during her husband’s lifetime. The mishna relates: The courts refrained from administering an oath to her, leaving the widow unable to collect payment of her marriage contract. Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that she should take, for the benefit of the orphans, any vow that the orphans wished to administer to her, e.g., that all produce will become prohibited to her if she received any payment of her marriage contract, and after stating this vow, she collects payment of her marriage contract.
הָעֵדִים חוֹתְמִין עַל הַגֵּט, מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם. וְהִלֵּל הִתְקִין פְּרוֹזְבּוּל, מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם.
The mishna lists additional ordinances that were instituted for the betterment of the world: The witnesses sign their names on the bill of divorce, even though the bill of divorce is valid without their signatures, for the betterment of the world, as the Gemara will explain. And Hillel instituted a document that prevents the Sabbatical Year from abrogating an outstanding debt [prosbol] for the betterment of the world, as the Gemara will explain.
גְּמָ׳ מַאי אִירְיָא אַלְמָנָה, אֲפִילּוּ כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא נָמֵי; דְּהָא קַיְימָא לַן – הַבָּא לִיפָּרַע מִנִּכְסֵי יְתוֹמִין, לֹא יִפָּרַע אֶלָּא בִּשְׁבוּעָה! אַלְמָנָה אִצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא:
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why discuss specifically a widow? This halakha should apply to everyone, as we maintain that anyone who comes to collect payment from the property of orphans can collect only by means of an oath. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the mishna to mention a widow, as it might enter your mind to say:




















