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Today's Daf Yomi

February 2, 2016 | 讻状讙 讘砖讘讟 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Gittin 51

A few more cases are discussed that were instituted for tikun olam and the reasons behind them or conflicting opinions are brought.

Study Guide Gittin 51


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讗讜 讚诇诪讗 拽爪讜讘讬谉 讜讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谞谉 讻转讜讘讬诐

Or perhaps, in order to collect from liened property, it suffices that the obligation be of a fixed amount, even if it is not written?

转讗 砖诪注 讚讗讬转诪专 诪讬 砖诪转 讜讛谞讬讞 砖转讬 讘谞讜转 讜讘谉 讜拽讚诪讛 讛专讗砖讜谞讛 讜谞讟诇讛 注讬砖讜专 谞讻住讬诐 讜诇讗 讛住驻讬拽讛 砖谞讬讛 诇讙讘讜转 注讚 砖诪转 讛讘谉

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an answer to this question from what was stated, that the amora鈥檌m disagree about the following issue: There is a case of one who died and left two daughters and a son, and the first daughter went ahead and took one-tenth of the estate as her dowry, as sons are obligated to sustain their deceased father鈥檚 daughters until they reach majority or become betrothed and to give them part of his estate as a dowry, as daughters do not inherit when there are sons; but the second daughter did not manage to collect her tenth of the estate for her dowry before the son died. Therefore, the entire estate fell to the two daughters, who then divide it between themselves, and there is a dispute as to how they divide the estate.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 砖谞讬讛 讜讬转专讛 讜讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讙讚讜诇讛 诪讝讜 讗诪专讜 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 诇驻专谞住讛 讜讗讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 诇诪讝讜谞讜转 讜讗转 讗诪专转 砖谞讬讛 讜讬转专讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The second daughter forfeited her one-tenth of the estate, and therefore she cannot demand that she should first receive one-tenth of the estate as her dowry, as did her sister, and that only afterward they divide what remains of the estate equally between themselves. And Rabbi 岣nina said to him: Did they not say even more than this, that if the brother sold off property belonging to his father鈥檚 estate, payment for the daughter鈥檚 dowry can be appropriated from the buyer, but payment for her sustenance cannot be appropriated from him? If the father鈥檚 estate is liened to his daughter鈥檚 dowry, so that she can collect her dowry even from a third party who bought the property from the son, she should be able to collect it from her father鈥檚 estate before it is divided up between the daughters. And you say that the second daughter forfeited her one-tenth of the estate?

讜讛讗 驻专谞住讛 讚诪讬拽抓 拽讬讬爪讗 诪讬讻转讘 诇讗 讻转讬讘讗 讜拽讗 诪讜爪讬讗讛

The Gemara tries to draw a conclusion with regard to the question that was raised previously: But isn鈥檛 the dowry mentioned by Rabbi 岣nina, i.e., the dowry to which an orphan daughter is entitled from her father鈥檚 estate, of a fixed amount, i.e., one-tenth of the estate, and it is not written? And nevertheless, according to Rabbi 岣nina, it can be appropriated from liened property that has been sold to another party.

砖讗谞讬 驻专谞住讛 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬转 诇讛 拽诇讗 讻诪讗谉 讚讻转讬讘讗 讚诪讬

The Gemara rejects this argument: A dowry is different, since it generates publicity. If one dies and is survived by daughters, everyone knows that a portion of his estate is pledged for their dowries. Therefore, the obligation is considered to be as if it were written. In other situations, it might be necessary according to Rabbi 岣nina that the obligation be both of a fixed amount and written.

诪转讬讘 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专 诪谞讜讞 诪转讜 讘谞讜转讬讛谉 谞讝讜谞讜转 诪谞讻住讬诐 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉

Rav Huna bar Manoa岣 raised an objection from a mishna (Ketubot 101b) that addresses the case of a woman who was married to a man with whom she had stipulated that he would sustain her daughter from a previous marriage. After receiving a divorce from him, she married a different man with whom she made the same stipulation, so that the stepdaughter receives sustenance from the two husbands. That mishna states: If the husbands died, then their own daughters, even from that same woman, are sustained only from the unsold property in their estate. This accords with the halakha taught in the mishna above (48b).

讜讛讬讗 谞讝讜谞转 诪谞讻住讬诐 诪砖讜注讘讚讬诐 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讬讗 讻讘注诇转 讞讜讘

The mishna in Ketubot continues: But the stepdaughter is sustained even from liened property that had been sold to a third party. This is due to the fact that her legal status is like that of a creditor, and therefore she has the right to collect her debt from property formerly owned by her stepfather, her debtor. This is difficult according to both opinions, as the stepdaughter鈥檚 sustenance is appropriated from liened property that has been sold to another person, despite it being neither a fixed amount nor written.

讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘砖拽谞讜 诪讬讚讜

The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the mother acquired the right to the daughter鈥檚 sustenance from his possession, i.e., where they performed an act of acquisition confirming the stipulation. Consequently, it is considered as though the stipulation were been written and publicized, and so the property of the two husbands is liened for the stepdaughter鈥檚 sustenance.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讘谞讜转 谞诪讬 讘砖拽谞讜 诇讝讜 讜诇讗 拽谞讜 诇讝讜

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that mishna is referring to a case where they performed an act acquisition, then the deceased鈥檚 own daughters as well should be entitled to collect their sustenance from liened property that has been sold to a third party. The Gemara rejects this argument: The mishna is referring to a case where the mother acquired the right to sustenance on behalf of this one, the stepdaughter, but did not acquire the right to sustenance on behalf of the other daughters.

诪讗讬 驻住拽讗 讘转 讗砖转讜 讚讛讜讗讬 讘砖注转 拽谞讬谉 诪讛谞讬 诇讛 拽谞讬谉 讘转讜 讚诇讗 讛讜讗讬 讘砖注转 拽谞讬谉 诇讗 诪讛谞讬 诇讛 拽谞讬谉

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the decision of the tanna to record the halakha in a case where the mother acquired the right for this one but not for that one? The Gemara explains: With regard to his wife鈥檚 daughter from her previous marriage, who was alive at the time of the act of acquisition, i.e., when he gave the mother her marriage contract, the act of acquisition is effective for her. With regard to his own daughter from this mother, who was not alive at the time of the act of acquisition, the act of acquisition is not effective for her.

诪讬 诇讗 注住拽讬谞谉 讚讛讜讜 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讘砖注转 拽谞讬谉 讜讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讚讙专砖讛 讜讗讛讚专讛

The Gemara raises an objection: Are we not dealing here even with a case where both of them were alive at the time of the act of acquisition? And what are the circumstances? It is a case where after she was married to him and had a daughter from him, he divorced her and later remarried her, at which time an act of acquisition was performed to confirm the stipulation with regard to sustenance. As his own daughter was alive at the time, why is the act of acquisition not effective for his own daughter鈥檚 sustenance as it is for that of his stepdaughter?

讗诇讗 讘转讜 讚讘转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 拽讗讻诇讛 诇讗 诪讛谞讬 诇讛 拽谞讬谉 讘转 讗砖转讜 讚诇讗讜 讘转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 拽讗讻诇讛 诪讛谞讬 诇讛 拽谞讬谉

Rather, that the difference between them is as follows: With regard to his own daughter, who eats, i.e., is sustained, from his estate based on a stipulation of the court, as the daughter鈥檚 right to sustenance from her father鈥檚 estate is an inseparable part of her mother鈥檚 marriage contract, the act of acquisition that was performed is not effective for her, because her entitlement is derived from a different source, the stipulation of the court. With regard to his wife鈥檚 daughter, who eats from his estate not based on a stipulation of the court, as her entitlement is based on the explicit stipulation made between the husband and the wife, the act of acquisition is effective for her and enables her to collect her sustenance even from liened property that has been sold to a third party.

讜讻讬 诪讬讙专注 讙专注讛 讗诇讗 讘转讜 讻讬讜谉 讚讘转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 拽讗讻诇讛 讗讬诪专 爪专专讬 讗转驻住讛

The Gemara challenges this explanation: But is a right that is rooted in two sources, both a stipulation of the court and an act of acquisition, inferior to a right that is rooted in an act of acquisition alone? The act of acquisition is in addition to the stipulation of the court, and should be effective for her as well. Rather, this is the difference between them: With regard to his own daughter, since his daughter eats from his estate based on a stipulation of the court, say that perhaps he already gave her money during his lifetime for her sustenance. Since there is uncertainty, she cannot recover her sustenance from liened property, even if an act of acquisition was performed to confirm the stipulation. With regard to the stepdaughter, there is no concern that perhaps he already gave her the money while he was alive. Therefore, if an act of acquisition was performed, she can collect her sustenance even from liened property that has been sold to another.

转讗 砖诪注 讗诪专 专讘讬 谞转谉 讗讬诪转讬 讘讝诪谉 砖拽讚诐 诪拽讞讜 砖诇 砖谞讬 诇砖讘讞讜 砖诇 专讗砖讜谉

The Gemara continues its discussion with regard to collection from liened property that has been sold to a third party: Come and hear what Rabbi Natan said: When do we say that if one appropriated a field and sold it, and the buyer worked the land and enhanced it, and then the initial owner from whom the field had, been appropriated reclaimed the property the buyer can recover the increase in value of the field resulting from his enhancements only from unsold property in the robber鈥檚 possession but not from liened property that has been sold to another party? This is said when the purchase of the second buyer, i.e., the party who purchased the property that rightfully belonged to the robber, preceded the enhancements made by the first buyer to the appropriated property he purchased from the robber.

讗讘诇 拽讚诐 砖讘讞讜 砖诇 专讗砖讜谉 诇诪拽讞讜 砖诇 砖谞讬 讙讜讘讛 诪谞讻住讬诐 诪砖讜注讘讚讬诐 讗诇诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 拽讚讬诐 讛讜讗

But if the enhancements made by the first buyer preceded the acquisition of the second buyer, then he can collect the increase in value of the field resulting from his enhancements even from liened property that has been sold to the second buyer. Apparently, he cannot collect the increase in value from liened property because the enhancements did not precede the sale of the other field, not because the increase in value is not of a fixed amount or written in a deed.

转谞讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 讗讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 诇讗讻讬诇转 驻讬专讜转 讜诇砖讘讞 拽专拽注讜转 讜诇诪讝讜谉 讗砖讛 讜讛讘谞讜转 诪谞讻住讬诐 诪砖讜注讘讚讬诐 诪驻谞讬 转讬拽讜谉 讛注讜诇诐 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谉 讻转讜讘讬谉

The Gemara answers: Proof cannot be brought one way or the other from this baraita, since the issue is the subject of a dispute between tanna鈥檌m, as it is taught in another baraita: The court does not appropriate payment from liened property that has been sold to a third party for the consumption of produce or for the enhanced value of land or for the sustenance of a man鈥檚 wife and daughters. The reason why one cannot collect these debts from liened property is for the betterment of the world, because all these obligations are not written in any deed. If purchasers are at risk of losing the land they purchased to pay debts of the seller that had not been written, they will have no way to protect themselves, and no one will purchase land.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜讻讬 诪讛 转讬拽讜谉 讛注讜诇诐 讬砖 讘讝讜 讜讛诇讗 讗讬谉 拽爪讜讘讬谉

The baraita continues: Rabbi Yosei said: And what betterment of the world is there in this, in stating that the reason the land is not appropriated is only because the debt was not written? But isn鈥檛 the real reason that these obligations cannot be collected from liened property is that they are not of a fixed amount? No one would be willing to purchase land if the land were liened to an unlimited debt. It is clear in this baraita that the criteria for collection from liened property that has been sold to a third party are subject to a tannaitic dispute.

讜讛诪讜爪讗 诪爪讬讗讛 诇讗 讬砖讘注 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 砖谞讬 讻讬住讬谉 拽砖讜专讬谉 诪爪讗转 诇讬 讜讛诇讛 讗讜诪专 诇讗 诪爪讗转讬 讗诇讗 讗讞讚 谞砖讘注 砖谞讬 砖讜讜专讬诐 拽砖讜专讬谉 诪爪讗转 诇讬 讜讛诇讛 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讛讬讛 讗诇讗 讗讞讚 讗讬谞讜 谞砖讘注

搂 The mishna teaches: And it was further instituted that one who finds a lost item and returns it to its rightful owner is not required to take an oath that he did not keep any part of the lost item for himself. This ordinance was also instituted for the betterment of the world. Rabbi Yitz岣k says: If the owner of the lost item brings a claim against the finder, saying: You found two money pouches tied together that belong to me, and the other person says: I found only one pouch, then the finder takes an oath, similar to anyone who admits to part of a claim. If the owner claims: You found two oxen tied together that belong to me, and the other person says: There was only one ox, the finder is not required to take an oath.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 砖讜讜专讬谉 诪谞转讞讬 诪讛讚讚讬 讻讬住讬谉 诇讗 诪谞转讞讬 诪讛讚讚讬

The Gemara explains: What is the reason for the difference between the two cases? It is that oxen become detached from each other. Consequently, it is possible that when the oxen were lost, there had been two that were tied together, but afterward they became separated and the finder found only one. By contrast, pouches do not become detached from each other. Since the finder admits that he found one of them, it stands to reason that he actually found both of them.

砖谞讬 砖讜讜专讬谉 拽砖讜专讬谉 诪爪讗转 讜讛诇讛 讗讜诪专 诪爪讗转讬 讜讛讞讝专转讬 诇讱 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讛专讬 讝讛 谞砖讘注

Rabbi Yitz岣k also says: If the owner of the lost item says to the finder: You found two tied oxen, and the other person says: I found two oxen, but I already returned one of them to you, then the finder takes an oath.

讜专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讛诪讜爪讗 诪爪讬讗讛 诇讗 讬砖讘注 诪驻谞讬 转讬拽讜谉 讛注讜诇诐

A question may be raised against these rulings of Rabbi Yitz岣k: But does Rabbi Yitz岣k not accept the halakha stated in the mishna that one who finds a lost item is not required to take an oath, this being an enactment instituted for the betterment of the world?

讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗讜诪专 驻注诪讬诐 砖讗讚诐 谞砖讘注 注诇 讟注谞转 注爪诪讜 讻讬爪讚 诪谞讛 诇讗讘讬讱 讘讬讚讬 讜讛讗讻诇转讬讜 驻专住 讛专讬 讝讛 谞砖讘注 讜讝讛 讛讜讗 砖谞砖讘注 注诇 讟注谞转 注爪诪讜

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yitz岣k stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Shevuot 5:10) that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov says: There are times when a person takes an oath about his own claim. How so? One says to another: One hundred dinars of your deceased father鈥檚 was in my possession, as I had borrowed that sum from him. And I already paid him part [peras] of it, but I still owe you fifty dinars. In this case, he is not believed unless he takes an oath that he repaid the half, like anyone who admits to part of a claim. And this is an example of a case where one takes an oath about his own claim. Although nobody has claimed anything from him, he still takes an oath on the basis of his own statement.

讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 讻诪砖讬讘 讗讘讬讚讛 讜驻讟讜专

But the Rabbis say: In such a case, the borrower is regarded only as someone who is returning a lost item, and therefore he is exempt from an oath. Rabbi Yitz岣k鈥檚 position is similar to that of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov. Since the finder says that he found only half of what the owner claims was lost, he is treated like someone who admits to part of a claim and therefore takes an oath.

讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 诇讬转 诇讬讛 诪砖讬讘 讗讘讬讚讛 驻讟讜专 讗诪专 专讘 讘讟讜注谞讜 拽讟谉

The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov not maintain that someone who returns a lost item is exempt from an oath? Rav says: The case in dispute between Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov and the Rabbis is not one where nobody has claimed anything from the borrower, as in such a case all agree that the borrower is exempt from taking an oath. Rather, it is a case where the creditor has died, leaving a child as his heir, and this minor confronts the borrower and claims a hundred dinars from him, which he alleges was lent by his late father. The other admits to having borrowed the money but claims that he already repaid half the sum. Since he admits to part of the claim, he takes an oath that he did repay the other part.

拽讟谉 诪讬讚讬 诪砖砖讗 讗讬转 讘讬讛 讜讛转谞谉 讗讬谉 谞砖讘注讬谉 注诇 讟注谞转 讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉

The Gemara asks: Does the claim of a minor have any substance? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Shevuot 38b): One does not take an oath in response to the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, as the claim of one who lacks halakhic competence has no significance whatsoever. According to this, if a minor brought a claim against the borrower, it is as though there were no claim at all but only the borrower鈥檚 admission, and so the borrower should be exempt from taking an oath.

诪讗讬 拽讟谉 讙讚讜诇 讜讗诪讗讬 拽专讬 诇讬讛 拽讟谉 讚诇讙讘讬 诪讬诇讬 讚讗讘讬讜 拽讟谉 讛讜讗

The Gemara answers: To which kind of minor was Rav referring? It was to an adult son of the creditor. And why does Rav call him a minor, if he is in fact an adult? It is as with regard to his father鈥檚 affairs he is like a minor. He does not know with certainty how much money the borrower repaid but merely says that he thinks he owes his father more.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讟注谞转 注爪诪讜 讟注谞转 讗讞专讬诐 讛讜讗 讟注谞转 讗讞专讬诐 讜讛讜讚讗转 注爪诪讜

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that we are dealing with a case where the deceased creditor鈥檚 adult son made a claim against the debtor, how can Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov say about this claim that it is his own claim? Is this an oath taken about his own claim? It is an oath taken about the claim of others, i.e., the son. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov calls it an oath taken about one鈥檚 own claim, although it is really the claim of others, because it is his own admission that obligates him to take the oath.

讻讜诇讛讜 讟注谞转讗 谞诪讬 讟注谞转 讗讞专讬诐 讜讛讜讚讗转 注爪诪讜 谞讬谞讛讜 讗诇讗 讘讚专讘讛 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚讗诪专 专讘讛 诪驻谞讬 诪讛 讗诪专讛 转讜专讛 诪讜讚讛 诪拽爪转 讛讟注谞讛 讬砖讘注 讞讝拽讛 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪注讬讝 驻谞讬讜 讘驻谞讬 讘注诇 讞讜讘讜

The Gemara objects: All claims that lead to the oath of one who admits to part of the claim are also a combination of the claim of others and the defendant鈥檚 own admission. Rather, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the following explanation given by Rabba, as Rabba says: For what reason did the Torah say that one who admits to part of the claim brought against him takes an oath with regard to the rest of the claim, which he denies, whereas one who denies the entire claim is not required to take an oath? Rabba answers: The oath of partial admission is based on a presumption with regard to the defendant鈥檚 behavior. There is a presumption that a person would not be so brazen as to stand before his creditor and deny his debt when his creditor knows that he is lying.

讜讛讗讬 讘讻讜诇讬讛 讘注讬 诇诪讻驻专讬讛 诇讬讛 讜讛讗讬 讚诇讗 讻驻专讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪注讬讝 驻谞讬讜 讘驻谞讬 讘注诇 讞讜讘讜 讜讘讻讜诇讬讛 讘注讬 讚诇讜讚讬 诇讬讛 讜讛讗讬 讚诇讗 讗讜讚讬 诇讬讛 讗讬砖转诪讜讟讬 讛讜讗 讚拽讗 诪砖转诪讬讟 诇讬讛 住讘专 注讚 讚讛讜讜 诇讬 讝讜讝讬 讜驻专注谞讗 诇讬讛 讜讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 专诪讬 砖讘讜注讛 注讬诇讜讬讛 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讜讚讬 诇讬讛 讘讻讜诇讬讛

Rabba continues: And this one who admits to part of the claim would want to deny all of it, and the only reason he does not deny all of it is because a person would not be so brazen before his creditor. And in fact, he would want to admit to all of the claim to him. And the reason that he did not admit the whole claim to him and say that in fact he owes him the entire sum is that he was evading his obligation temporarily. The debtor is short of money and he thinks: I will pay my creditor as much as I can afford now, and I will evade paying the rest until I have enough money, and then I will repay him the rest, to which I have not yet admitted. Therefore, the Merciful One states: Impose an oath on the debtor in order to induce him to admit all of the debt to the creditor.

专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 住讘专 诇讗 砖谞讗 讘讜 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 讘讘谞讜 讗讬谞讜 诪注讬讝 讜讛讬诇讻讱 诇讗讜 诪砖讬讘 讗讘讬讚讛 讛讜讗 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讘讜 讛讜讗 讚讗讬谞讜 诪注讬讝 讗讘诇 讘讘谞讜 诪注讬讝 讜诪讚诇讗 诪注讬讝 诪砖讬讘 讗讘讬讚讛 讛讜讗

Following Rabba鈥檚 reasoning, the difference of opinion between Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov and the Rabbis can be explained as follows: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov holds that there is no difference between the creditor himself and the creditor鈥檚 son, as in all cases the debtor would not be so brazen as to deny his debt. Therefore, the debtor is not considered like someone who is returning a lost item. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov maintains that Rabba鈥檚 reasoning applies in this case as well, so he is required to take an oath. And the Rabbis hold that he would not be so brazen as to deny a debt before the creditor himself, but toward his creditor鈥檚 son he would be brazen and deny the claim completely. And since he was not so brazen as to deny the entire claim, but admitted to part of it, he is considered like someone returning a lost item, and therefore he is exempt from taking an oath.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Gittin 51

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Gittin 51

讗讜 讚诇诪讗 拽爪讜讘讬谉 讜讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谞谉 讻转讜讘讬诐

Or perhaps, in order to collect from liened property, it suffices that the obligation be of a fixed amount, even if it is not written?

转讗 砖诪注 讚讗讬转诪专 诪讬 砖诪转 讜讛谞讬讞 砖转讬 讘谞讜转 讜讘谉 讜拽讚诪讛 讛专讗砖讜谞讛 讜谞讟诇讛 注讬砖讜专 谞讻住讬诐 讜诇讗 讛住驻讬拽讛 砖谞讬讛 诇讙讘讜转 注讚 砖诪转 讛讘谉

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an answer to this question from what was stated, that the amora鈥檌m disagree about the following issue: There is a case of one who died and left two daughters and a son, and the first daughter went ahead and took one-tenth of the estate as her dowry, as sons are obligated to sustain their deceased father鈥檚 daughters until they reach majority or become betrothed and to give them part of his estate as a dowry, as daughters do not inherit when there are sons; but the second daughter did not manage to collect her tenth of the estate for her dowry before the son died. Therefore, the entire estate fell to the two daughters, who then divide it between themselves, and there is a dispute as to how they divide the estate.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 砖谞讬讛 讜讬转专讛 讜讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讙讚讜诇讛 诪讝讜 讗诪专讜 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 诇驻专谞住讛 讜讗讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 诇诪讝讜谞讜转 讜讗转 讗诪专转 砖谞讬讛 讜讬转专讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The second daughter forfeited her one-tenth of the estate, and therefore she cannot demand that she should first receive one-tenth of the estate as her dowry, as did her sister, and that only afterward they divide what remains of the estate equally between themselves. And Rabbi 岣nina said to him: Did they not say even more than this, that if the brother sold off property belonging to his father鈥檚 estate, payment for the daughter鈥檚 dowry can be appropriated from the buyer, but payment for her sustenance cannot be appropriated from him? If the father鈥檚 estate is liened to his daughter鈥檚 dowry, so that she can collect her dowry even from a third party who bought the property from the son, she should be able to collect it from her father鈥檚 estate before it is divided up between the daughters. And you say that the second daughter forfeited her one-tenth of the estate?

讜讛讗 驻专谞住讛 讚诪讬拽抓 拽讬讬爪讗 诪讬讻转讘 诇讗 讻转讬讘讗 讜拽讗 诪讜爪讬讗讛

The Gemara tries to draw a conclusion with regard to the question that was raised previously: But isn鈥檛 the dowry mentioned by Rabbi 岣nina, i.e., the dowry to which an orphan daughter is entitled from her father鈥檚 estate, of a fixed amount, i.e., one-tenth of the estate, and it is not written? And nevertheless, according to Rabbi 岣nina, it can be appropriated from liened property that has been sold to another party.

砖讗谞讬 驻专谞住讛 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬转 诇讛 拽诇讗 讻诪讗谉 讚讻转讬讘讗 讚诪讬

The Gemara rejects this argument: A dowry is different, since it generates publicity. If one dies and is survived by daughters, everyone knows that a portion of his estate is pledged for their dowries. Therefore, the obligation is considered to be as if it were written. In other situations, it might be necessary according to Rabbi 岣nina that the obligation be both of a fixed amount and written.

诪转讬讘 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专 诪谞讜讞 诪转讜 讘谞讜转讬讛谉 谞讝讜谞讜转 诪谞讻住讬诐 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉

Rav Huna bar Manoa岣 raised an objection from a mishna (Ketubot 101b) that addresses the case of a woman who was married to a man with whom she had stipulated that he would sustain her daughter from a previous marriage. After receiving a divorce from him, she married a different man with whom she made the same stipulation, so that the stepdaughter receives sustenance from the two husbands. That mishna states: If the husbands died, then their own daughters, even from that same woman, are sustained only from the unsold property in their estate. This accords with the halakha taught in the mishna above (48b).

讜讛讬讗 谞讝讜谞转 诪谞讻住讬诐 诪砖讜注讘讚讬诐 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讬讗 讻讘注诇转 讞讜讘

The mishna in Ketubot continues: But the stepdaughter is sustained even from liened property that had been sold to a third party. This is due to the fact that her legal status is like that of a creditor, and therefore she has the right to collect her debt from property formerly owned by her stepfather, her debtor. This is difficult according to both opinions, as the stepdaughter鈥檚 sustenance is appropriated from liened property that has been sold to another person, despite it being neither a fixed amount nor written.

讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘砖拽谞讜 诪讬讚讜

The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the mother acquired the right to the daughter鈥檚 sustenance from his possession, i.e., where they performed an act of acquisition confirming the stipulation. Consequently, it is considered as though the stipulation were been written and publicized, and so the property of the two husbands is liened for the stepdaughter鈥檚 sustenance.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讘谞讜转 谞诪讬 讘砖拽谞讜 诇讝讜 讜诇讗 拽谞讜 诇讝讜

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that mishna is referring to a case where they performed an act acquisition, then the deceased鈥檚 own daughters as well should be entitled to collect their sustenance from liened property that has been sold to a third party. The Gemara rejects this argument: The mishna is referring to a case where the mother acquired the right to sustenance on behalf of this one, the stepdaughter, but did not acquire the right to sustenance on behalf of the other daughters.

诪讗讬 驻住拽讗 讘转 讗砖转讜 讚讛讜讗讬 讘砖注转 拽谞讬谉 诪讛谞讬 诇讛 拽谞讬谉 讘转讜 讚诇讗 讛讜讗讬 讘砖注转 拽谞讬谉 诇讗 诪讛谞讬 诇讛 拽谞讬谉

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the decision of the tanna to record the halakha in a case where the mother acquired the right for this one but not for that one? The Gemara explains: With regard to his wife鈥檚 daughter from her previous marriage, who was alive at the time of the act of acquisition, i.e., when he gave the mother her marriage contract, the act of acquisition is effective for her. With regard to his own daughter from this mother, who was not alive at the time of the act of acquisition, the act of acquisition is not effective for her.

诪讬 诇讗 注住拽讬谞谉 讚讛讜讜 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讘砖注转 拽谞讬谉 讜讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讚讙专砖讛 讜讗讛讚专讛

The Gemara raises an objection: Are we not dealing here even with a case where both of them were alive at the time of the act of acquisition? And what are the circumstances? It is a case where after she was married to him and had a daughter from him, he divorced her and later remarried her, at which time an act of acquisition was performed to confirm the stipulation with regard to sustenance. As his own daughter was alive at the time, why is the act of acquisition not effective for his own daughter鈥檚 sustenance as it is for that of his stepdaughter?

讗诇讗 讘转讜 讚讘转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 拽讗讻诇讛 诇讗 诪讛谞讬 诇讛 拽谞讬谉 讘转 讗砖转讜 讚诇讗讜 讘转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 拽讗讻诇讛 诪讛谞讬 诇讛 拽谞讬谉

Rather, that the difference between them is as follows: With regard to his own daughter, who eats, i.e., is sustained, from his estate based on a stipulation of the court, as the daughter鈥檚 right to sustenance from her father鈥檚 estate is an inseparable part of her mother鈥檚 marriage contract, the act of acquisition that was performed is not effective for her, because her entitlement is derived from a different source, the stipulation of the court. With regard to his wife鈥檚 daughter, who eats from his estate not based on a stipulation of the court, as her entitlement is based on the explicit stipulation made between the husband and the wife, the act of acquisition is effective for her and enables her to collect her sustenance even from liened property that has been sold to a third party.

讜讻讬 诪讬讙专注 讙专注讛 讗诇讗 讘转讜 讻讬讜谉 讚讘转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 拽讗讻诇讛 讗讬诪专 爪专专讬 讗转驻住讛

The Gemara challenges this explanation: But is a right that is rooted in two sources, both a stipulation of the court and an act of acquisition, inferior to a right that is rooted in an act of acquisition alone? The act of acquisition is in addition to the stipulation of the court, and should be effective for her as well. Rather, this is the difference between them: With regard to his own daughter, since his daughter eats from his estate based on a stipulation of the court, say that perhaps he already gave her money during his lifetime for her sustenance. Since there is uncertainty, she cannot recover her sustenance from liened property, even if an act of acquisition was performed to confirm the stipulation. With regard to the stepdaughter, there is no concern that perhaps he already gave her the money while he was alive. Therefore, if an act of acquisition was performed, she can collect her sustenance even from liened property that has been sold to another.

转讗 砖诪注 讗诪专 专讘讬 谞转谉 讗讬诪转讬 讘讝诪谉 砖拽讚诐 诪拽讞讜 砖诇 砖谞讬 诇砖讘讞讜 砖诇 专讗砖讜谉

The Gemara continues its discussion with regard to collection from liened property that has been sold to a third party: Come and hear what Rabbi Natan said: When do we say that if one appropriated a field and sold it, and the buyer worked the land and enhanced it, and then the initial owner from whom the field had, been appropriated reclaimed the property the buyer can recover the increase in value of the field resulting from his enhancements only from unsold property in the robber鈥檚 possession but not from liened property that has been sold to another party? This is said when the purchase of the second buyer, i.e., the party who purchased the property that rightfully belonged to the robber, preceded the enhancements made by the first buyer to the appropriated property he purchased from the robber.

讗讘诇 拽讚诐 砖讘讞讜 砖诇 专讗砖讜谉 诇诪拽讞讜 砖诇 砖谞讬 讙讜讘讛 诪谞讻住讬诐 诪砖讜注讘讚讬诐 讗诇诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 拽讚讬诐 讛讜讗

But if the enhancements made by the first buyer preceded the acquisition of the second buyer, then he can collect the increase in value of the field resulting from his enhancements even from liened property that has been sold to the second buyer. Apparently, he cannot collect the increase in value from liened property because the enhancements did not precede the sale of the other field, not because the increase in value is not of a fixed amount or written in a deed.

转谞讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 讗讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 诇讗讻讬诇转 驻讬专讜转 讜诇砖讘讞 拽专拽注讜转 讜诇诪讝讜谉 讗砖讛 讜讛讘谞讜转 诪谞讻住讬诐 诪砖讜注讘讚讬诐 诪驻谞讬 转讬拽讜谉 讛注讜诇诐 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谉 讻转讜讘讬谉

The Gemara answers: Proof cannot be brought one way or the other from this baraita, since the issue is the subject of a dispute between tanna鈥檌m, as it is taught in another baraita: The court does not appropriate payment from liened property that has been sold to a third party for the consumption of produce or for the enhanced value of land or for the sustenance of a man鈥檚 wife and daughters. The reason why one cannot collect these debts from liened property is for the betterment of the world, because all these obligations are not written in any deed. If purchasers are at risk of losing the land they purchased to pay debts of the seller that had not been written, they will have no way to protect themselves, and no one will purchase land.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜讻讬 诪讛 转讬拽讜谉 讛注讜诇诐 讬砖 讘讝讜 讜讛诇讗 讗讬谉 拽爪讜讘讬谉

The baraita continues: Rabbi Yosei said: And what betterment of the world is there in this, in stating that the reason the land is not appropriated is only because the debt was not written? But isn鈥檛 the real reason that these obligations cannot be collected from liened property is that they are not of a fixed amount? No one would be willing to purchase land if the land were liened to an unlimited debt. It is clear in this baraita that the criteria for collection from liened property that has been sold to a third party are subject to a tannaitic dispute.

讜讛诪讜爪讗 诪爪讬讗讛 诇讗 讬砖讘注 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 砖谞讬 讻讬住讬谉 拽砖讜专讬谉 诪爪讗转 诇讬 讜讛诇讛 讗讜诪专 诇讗 诪爪讗转讬 讗诇讗 讗讞讚 谞砖讘注 砖谞讬 砖讜讜专讬诐 拽砖讜专讬谉 诪爪讗转 诇讬 讜讛诇讛 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讛讬讛 讗诇讗 讗讞讚 讗讬谞讜 谞砖讘注

搂 The mishna teaches: And it was further instituted that one who finds a lost item and returns it to its rightful owner is not required to take an oath that he did not keep any part of the lost item for himself. This ordinance was also instituted for the betterment of the world. Rabbi Yitz岣k says: If the owner of the lost item brings a claim against the finder, saying: You found two money pouches tied together that belong to me, and the other person says: I found only one pouch, then the finder takes an oath, similar to anyone who admits to part of a claim. If the owner claims: You found two oxen tied together that belong to me, and the other person says: There was only one ox, the finder is not required to take an oath.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 砖讜讜专讬谉 诪谞转讞讬 诪讛讚讚讬 讻讬住讬谉 诇讗 诪谞转讞讬 诪讛讚讚讬

The Gemara explains: What is the reason for the difference between the two cases? It is that oxen become detached from each other. Consequently, it is possible that when the oxen were lost, there had been two that were tied together, but afterward they became separated and the finder found only one. By contrast, pouches do not become detached from each other. Since the finder admits that he found one of them, it stands to reason that he actually found both of them.

砖谞讬 砖讜讜专讬谉 拽砖讜专讬谉 诪爪讗转 讜讛诇讛 讗讜诪专 诪爪讗转讬 讜讛讞讝专转讬 诇讱 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讛专讬 讝讛 谞砖讘注

Rabbi Yitz岣k also says: If the owner of the lost item says to the finder: You found two tied oxen, and the other person says: I found two oxen, but I already returned one of them to you, then the finder takes an oath.

讜专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讛诪讜爪讗 诪爪讬讗讛 诇讗 讬砖讘注 诪驻谞讬 转讬拽讜谉 讛注讜诇诐

A question may be raised against these rulings of Rabbi Yitz岣k: But does Rabbi Yitz岣k not accept the halakha stated in the mishna that one who finds a lost item is not required to take an oath, this being an enactment instituted for the betterment of the world?

讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗讜诪专 驻注诪讬诐 砖讗讚诐 谞砖讘注 注诇 讟注谞转 注爪诪讜 讻讬爪讚 诪谞讛 诇讗讘讬讱 讘讬讚讬 讜讛讗讻诇转讬讜 驻专住 讛专讬 讝讛 谞砖讘注 讜讝讛 讛讜讗 砖谞砖讘注 注诇 讟注谞转 注爪诪讜

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yitz岣k stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Shevuot 5:10) that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov says: There are times when a person takes an oath about his own claim. How so? One says to another: One hundred dinars of your deceased father鈥檚 was in my possession, as I had borrowed that sum from him. And I already paid him part [peras] of it, but I still owe you fifty dinars. In this case, he is not believed unless he takes an oath that he repaid the half, like anyone who admits to part of a claim. And this is an example of a case where one takes an oath about his own claim. Although nobody has claimed anything from him, he still takes an oath on the basis of his own statement.

讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 讻诪砖讬讘 讗讘讬讚讛 讜驻讟讜专

But the Rabbis say: In such a case, the borrower is regarded only as someone who is returning a lost item, and therefore he is exempt from an oath. Rabbi Yitz岣k鈥檚 position is similar to that of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov. Since the finder says that he found only half of what the owner claims was lost, he is treated like someone who admits to part of a claim and therefore takes an oath.

讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 诇讬转 诇讬讛 诪砖讬讘 讗讘讬讚讛 驻讟讜专 讗诪专 专讘 讘讟讜注谞讜 拽讟谉

The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov not maintain that someone who returns a lost item is exempt from an oath? Rav says: The case in dispute between Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov and the Rabbis is not one where nobody has claimed anything from the borrower, as in such a case all agree that the borrower is exempt from taking an oath. Rather, it is a case where the creditor has died, leaving a child as his heir, and this minor confronts the borrower and claims a hundred dinars from him, which he alleges was lent by his late father. The other admits to having borrowed the money but claims that he already repaid half the sum. Since he admits to part of the claim, he takes an oath that he did repay the other part.

拽讟谉 诪讬讚讬 诪砖砖讗 讗讬转 讘讬讛 讜讛转谞谉 讗讬谉 谞砖讘注讬谉 注诇 讟注谞转 讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉

The Gemara asks: Does the claim of a minor have any substance? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Shevuot 38b): One does not take an oath in response to the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, as the claim of one who lacks halakhic competence has no significance whatsoever. According to this, if a minor brought a claim against the borrower, it is as though there were no claim at all but only the borrower鈥檚 admission, and so the borrower should be exempt from taking an oath.

诪讗讬 拽讟谉 讙讚讜诇 讜讗诪讗讬 拽专讬 诇讬讛 拽讟谉 讚诇讙讘讬 诪讬诇讬 讚讗讘讬讜 拽讟谉 讛讜讗

The Gemara answers: To which kind of minor was Rav referring? It was to an adult son of the creditor. And why does Rav call him a minor, if he is in fact an adult? It is as with regard to his father鈥檚 affairs he is like a minor. He does not know with certainty how much money the borrower repaid but merely says that he thinks he owes his father more.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讟注谞转 注爪诪讜 讟注谞转 讗讞专讬诐 讛讜讗 讟注谞转 讗讞专讬诐 讜讛讜讚讗转 注爪诪讜

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that we are dealing with a case where the deceased creditor鈥檚 adult son made a claim against the debtor, how can Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov say about this claim that it is his own claim? Is this an oath taken about his own claim? It is an oath taken about the claim of others, i.e., the son. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov calls it an oath taken about one鈥檚 own claim, although it is really the claim of others, because it is his own admission that obligates him to take the oath.

讻讜诇讛讜 讟注谞转讗 谞诪讬 讟注谞转 讗讞专讬诐 讜讛讜讚讗转 注爪诪讜 谞讬谞讛讜 讗诇讗 讘讚专讘讛 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚讗诪专 专讘讛 诪驻谞讬 诪讛 讗诪专讛 转讜专讛 诪讜讚讛 诪拽爪转 讛讟注谞讛 讬砖讘注 讞讝拽讛 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪注讬讝 驻谞讬讜 讘驻谞讬 讘注诇 讞讜讘讜

The Gemara objects: All claims that lead to the oath of one who admits to part of the claim are also a combination of the claim of others and the defendant鈥檚 own admission. Rather, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the following explanation given by Rabba, as Rabba says: For what reason did the Torah say that one who admits to part of the claim brought against him takes an oath with regard to the rest of the claim, which he denies, whereas one who denies the entire claim is not required to take an oath? Rabba answers: The oath of partial admission is based on a presumption with regard to the defendant鈥檚 behavior. There is a presumption that a person would not be so brazen as to stand before his creditor and deny his debt when his creditor knows that he is lying.

讜讛讗讬 讘讻讜诇讬讛 讘注讬 诇诪讻驻专讬讛 诇讬讛 讜讛讗讬 讚诇讗 讻驻专讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪注讬讝 驻谞讬讜 讘驻谞讬 讘注诇 讞讜讘讜 讜讘讻讜诇讬讛 讘注讬 讚诇讜讚讬 诇讬讛 讜讛讗讬 讚诇讗 讗讜讚讬 诇讬讛 讗讬砖转诪讜讟讬 讛讜讗 讚拽讗 诪砖转诪讬讟 诇讬讛 住讘专 注讚 讚讛讜讜 诇讬 讝讜讝讬 讜驻专注谞讗 诇讬讛 讜讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 专诪讬 砖讘讜注讛 注讬诇讜讬讛 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讜讚讬 诇讬讛 讘讻讜诇讬讛

Rabba continues: And this one who admits to part of the claim would want to deny all of it, and the only reason he does not deny all of it is because a person would not be so brazen before his creditor. And in fact, he would want to admit to all of the claim to him. And the reason that he did not admit the whole claim to him and say that in fact he owes him the entire sum is that he was evading his obligation temporarily. The debtor is short of money and he thinks: I will pay my creditor as much as I can afford now, and I will evade paying the rest until I have enough money, and then I will repay him the rest, to which I have not yet admitted. Therefore, the Merciful One states: Impose an oath on the debtor in order to induce him to admit all of the debt to the creditor.

专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 住讘专 诇讗 砖谞讗 讘讜 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 讘讘谞讜 讗讬谞讜 诪注讬讝 讜讛讬诇讻讱 诇讗讜 诪砖讬讘 讗讘讬讚讛 讛讜讗 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讘讜 讛讜讗 讚讗讬谞讜 诪注讬讝 讗讘诇 讘讘谞讜 诪注讬讝 讜诪讚诇讗 诪注讬讝 诪砖讬讘 讗讘讬讚讛 讛讜讗

Following Rabba鈥檚 reasoning, the difference of opinion between Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov and the Rabbis can be explained as follows: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov holds that there is no difference between the creditor himself and the creditor鈥檚 son, as in all cases the debtor would not be so brazen as to deny his debt. Therefore, the debtor is not considered like someone who is returning a lost item. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov maintains that Rabba鈥檚 reasoning applies in this case as well, so he is required to take an oath. And the Rabbis hold that he would not be so brazen as to deny a debt before the creditor himself, but toward his creditor鈥檚 son he would be brazen and deny the claim completely. And since he was not so brazen as to deny the entire claim, but admitted to part of it, he is considered like someone returning a lost item, and therefore he is exempt from taking an oath.

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