Gittin 54

ואין מונין לשבתות

But they do not count from Shabbat, as there is no significance to the day of the week on which the tree was planted, and consequently no one remembers that the tree was planted on Shabbat.

דבר אחר נחשדו ישראל על השביעית ולא נחשדו על השבתות

Alternatively, the difference between Shabbat and the Sabbatical Year can be explained as follows: Jews are suspected of desecrating the Sabbatical Year, but they are not suspected of desecrating Shabbat. Therefore, Rabbi Meir imposes a penalty for the unintentional desecration of the Sabbatical Year, but he imposes no such penalty for the unintentional desecration of Shabbat.

מאי דבר אחר הכי קאמר וכי תימא שבת נמי זימנין דמיקלע יום שלשים בשבת דאי נטע ההוא יומא הוא דסלקא ליה שתא ואי לא לא סלקא ליה שתא

The Gemara asks: What is the point of Rabbi Meir adding the second reason, introduced with the term alternatively? The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Meir is saying: And if you would say to contest the first reason: Jews also count from Shabbat, and unless the tree is uprooted, people will remember that it was planted on Shabbat, as at times the thirtieth day before Rosh HaShana falls on Shabbat. As, if he planted the tree on that day, the time from when he planted it counts for him as a full year with regard to the prohibition of fruit that grows during the first three years after the tree was planted. And if he did not plant it on that Shabbat, but rather on the next day, the twenty-ninth day before Rosh HaShana, it does not count for him as a full year. In such a case people will remember that the tree was planted on Shabbat, and they might come to think that planting a tree on Shabbat is permitted.

תא שמע דבר אחר נחשדו ישראל על השביעית ולא נחשדו על השבתות

Consequently, Rabbi Meir adds: Come and hear that alternatively, the difference between Shabbat and the Sabbatical Year can be explained as follows: Jews are suspected of desecrating the Sabbatical Year, but they are not suspected of desecrating Shabbat. Therefore, Rabbi Meir imposes a penalty for the unintentional desecration of the Sabbatical Year, but not for the unintentional desecration of Shabbat.

דרבי יהודה אדרבי יהודה לא קשיא באתריה דרבי יהודה חמירא להו שביעית

The Gemara continues: And there is also no contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the Sabbatical Year and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to Shabbat. This is because in Rabbi Yehuda’s place the prohibition against desecrating the Sabbatical Year was regarded by them as a most serious one, and therefore there was no need to impose a penalty for its unintentional desecration, although it is a Torah law.

דההוא דאמר ליה לחבירו דייר בר דיירתא אמר ליה אנא לא אכלי פירי דשביעית כוותך

The Gemara adduces proof that this is true: It once happened that there was a certain person who said to another to insult him: Convert [dayyar], son of a convert. In anger the second person said to the first in response: At least I don’t eat produce of the Sabbatical Year as you do. This indicates that the Sabbatical Year was treated in that place as a very serious prohibition; therefore, Rabbi Yehuda deemed it unnecessary to impose a penalty for its unintentional desecration.

תא שמע אכל תרומה טמאה משלם חולין טהורין שילם חולין טמאים מהו אמר סומכוס משום רבי מאיר בשוגג תשלומיו תשלומין במזיד אין תשלומיו תשלומין וחכמים אומרים אחד זה ואחד זה תשלומיו תשלומין וחוזר ומשלם חולין טהורים

The Gemara proceeds to discuss another apparent contradiction between rulings of Rabbi Meir with regard to penalties imposed for the unintentional transgression of a rabbinic law: Come and hear what was taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 7:7): If one partook of teruma,which is the property of a priest, and it was ritually impure, he pays restitution with ritually pure, non-sacred produce. What is the halakha if he paid restitution with ritually impure, non-sacred produce? Sumakhos said in the name of Rabbi Meir: If he paid restitution with ritually impure, non-sacred produce unintentionally, his payment is valid. But if he did so intentionally, his payment is not valid. And the Rabbis say: Although both in this case and in that case his payment is valid, the Sages imposed a penalty and said that he returns and pays restitution a second time with ritually pure, non-sacred produce.

והוינן בה במזיד אמאי אין תשלומיו תשלומין תבא עליו ברכה דאכיל מיניה מידי דלא חזי ליה בימי טומאתו וקא משלם ליה מידי דחזי ליה בימי טומאתו

And we discussed the following question concerning the opinion of Rabbi Meir: In the case where he paid restitution with ritually impure, non-sacred produce intentionally, why is his payment not valid? On the contrary, blessing should come upon him, as he partook of something that is not fit for the priest to partake of even during the days of his impurity, since it is prohibited for a priest to partake of impure teruma, whether he himself is pure or impure, and he pays restitution to him with something, i.e., impure, non-sacred produce, which is at least fit for him to partake of during the days of his impurity.

ואמר רבא ואמרי לה כדי חסורי מחסרא והכי קתני אכל תרומה טמאה משלם כל דהו אכל תרומה טהורה משלם חולין טהורים שילם חולין טמאין מהו סומכוס אומר משום רבי מאיר בשוגג תשלומיו תשלומין במזיד אין תשלומיו תשלומין וחכמים אומרים אחד זה ואחד זה תשלומיו תשלומין וחוזר ומשלם חולין טהורין

And Rava said, and some say it is unattributed: The baraita is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: If one partook of ritually impure teruma, he can pay restitution with anything, even impure, non-sacred produce. If he partook of ritually pure teruma, he pays restitution with ritually pure, non-sacred produce. The baraita continues: What is the halakha if he paid restitution for ritually pure teruma with ritually impure, non-sacred produce? There is a tannaitic dispute about this. Sumakhos said in the name of Rabbi Meir: If he paid restitution with ritually impure, non-sacred produce unintentionally, his payment is valid. But if he did so intentionally, his payment is not valid. And the Rabbis say: Both in this case and in that case, his payment is valid, but the Sages imposed a penalty and said that he returns and pays restitution a second time with ritually pure, non-sacred produce.

ואמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא הכא בקנסו שוגג אטו מזיד איכא בינייהו (דרבי מאיר סבר לא קנסו שוגג אטו מזיד וחכמים אומרים קנסו)

And Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: Here, the practical difference between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis relates to the question of whether or not the Sages penalized an unintentional offender due to an intentional offender. Rabbi Meir holds that they did not penalize an unintentional offender due to an intentional offender, and the Rabbis say that they penalized him. Consequently, Rabbi Meir does not impose a penalty for an unintentional transgression of a rabbinic law, as by Torah law one can pay restitution to a priest with anything if he partakes of teruma. This contradicts what was stated previously, that in the case of a violation of rabbinic law, Rabbi Meir imposes a penalty even for an unintentional offense.

הכי השתא התם גברא לשלומי קא מיכוין אנן ניקום וליקנסיה

The Gemara answers: How can these cases be compared? There, the man intends to pay; should we arise and penalize him? It is specifically with regard to this case that Rabbi Meir holds that no penalty is imposed, as his mistake was made in the course of performing a laudatory action. By contrast, in cases where one rendered another’s produce impure and the like, there is a penalty, as the mistake was made while performing an action he should not have been performing.

תא שמע דם שנטמא וזרקו בשוגג הורצה במזיד לא הורצה

The Gemara tries to bring proof concerning the previously stated opinion of Rabbi Meir that a penalty is imposed in a case of an unintentional transgression of a rabbinical law: Come and hear what was taught in a baraita: In the case of blood of an offering that became impure and a priest sprinkled it on the altar, if he did so unintentionally, the offering is accepted and achieves atonement for the owner of the offering. If he sprinkled the blood intentionally, the offering is not accepted. In any event, the tanna of this baraita did not penalize the unintentional offender due to an intentional offender, and this sprinkling of blood is prohibited by rabbinic law.

אמר לך רבי מאיר הכי השתא התם גברא לכפורי קא מכוין אנן ניקום ונקנסיה

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Meir could have said to you: How can these cases be compared? There, the person intends to do a mitzva and atone; should we arise and penalize him? Here too, the mistake was made while performing a laudatory act. In such a case, even Rabbi Meir agrees that an unintentional offender is not penalized due to an intentional offender.

תא שמע המעשר בשבת בשוגג יאכל במזיד לא יאכל הכי השתא התם גברא לתקוני קא מיכוין אנן ליקום וליקנסיה

The Gemara attempts to adduce further proof: Come and hear what was taught in a mishna (Terumot 2:3): With regard to one who tithes produce on Shabbat, which is prohibited by rabbinic law because it appears as though he were repairing an article that requires repair, if he did this unintentionally, he may consume the produce, as it has been tithed and rendered fit for consumption. But if he did this intentionally, he may not consume it. Apparently, the Sages did not penalize the unintentional offender due to an intentional offender, although tithing produce on Shabbat is prohibited by rabbinic law. The Gemara answers: How can these cases be compared? There, the man intends to do a worthy deed and repair the produce by tithing it; should we arise and penalize him? As above, Rabbi Meir would agree that in such a case the unintentional offender is not penalized.

תא שמע המטביל כלים בשבת בשוגג ישתמש בהן במזיד לא ישתמש בהן הכי השתא התם גברא לטהורי מאני קא מיכוין אנן ליקום וליקנסיה

The Gemara brings yet another proof: Come and hear what was taught in that same mishna (Terumot 2:3): With regard to one who immerses utensils in a ritual bath on Shabbat, which is also prohibited by the Sages because it appears as if he were repairing an article that requires repair, if he immerses them unintentionally, he may use them. But if he immerses them intentionally, he may not use them. Here too the Sages did not penalize the unintentional offender due to an intentional offender. The Gemara answers as before: How can these cases be compared? There, the man intends to do a praiseworthy act and purify the utensils; should we arise and penalize him? The same distinction stated previously applies in this mishna as well.

ורמי דרבי יהודה אדרבי יהודה בדרבנן דתניא

The Gemara discusses the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda: And they raised a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and another statement of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to matters that are prohibited only by rabbinic law. As it is taught in a baraita:

נפלו ונתפצעו אחד שוגג ואחד מזיד לא יעלו דברי רבי מאיר ורבי יהודה רבי יוסי ורבי שמעון אומרים בשוגג יעלו במזיד לא יעלו

If there are nuts from Perekh that are orla, and they fell into other nuts and became intermingled with them, the entire mixture is forbidden, even if the nuts that are orla are few in number. This is because they are deemed significant when they are whole and they are not nullified in a mixture. If the nuts were broken afterward, whether they were broken unintentionally or they were broken intentionally, they are not nullified in the mixture, despite the fact that they are no longer regarded as significant and should therefore be subject to nullification; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon disagree and say: If they were broken unintentionally, they are nullified, but if they were broken intentionally, they are not nullified.

והא הכא דמדאורייתא חד בתרי בטל ורבנן הוא דגזור וקא קניס רבי יהודה התם היינו טעמא דרבי יהודה משום דאתי לאיערומי

The Gemara asks: But here, by Torah law the forbidden substance is nullified if its ratio in the mixture is not more than one in two, i.e., when the majority of the mixture is permitted, and it was the Sages who decreed that significant items are not subject to nullification. And nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda penalizes an unintentional offender due to an intentional offender. This seems to contradict what was stated previously, that Rabbi Yehuda does not impose a penalty for an unintentional offense if the transgression involves the violation of a rabbinic law. The Gemara answers: There, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda, that a penalty was imposed in the case where he unintentionally broke the nuts due to the concern that without a penalty he will come to employ artifice and intentionally break the nuts in order to effect nullification of the Perekh nuts.

ורמי דרבי יוסי אדרבי יוסי דתנן נטיעה של ערלה ושל כלאי הכרם שנתערבו בנטיעות אחרות הרי זה לא ילקט ואם ליקט יעלו באחד ומאתים ובלבד שלא יתכוין ללקט

The Gemara discusses the previous baraita: And they raised a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yosei and another statement of Rabbi Yosei, as we learned in a mishna (Orla 1:6): If a sapling that has the status of orla or a grapevine sapling has the status of diverse kinds in a vineyard, e.g., one vine in a vineyard had grain planted near it and become prohibited, and the grain was then uprooted, became intermingled with other saplings, and one does not know which is the forbidden sapling, he may not gather the produce of any of the saplings. And if he gathered the produce, the forbidden produce is nullified if its ratio in the mixture is not more than one part forbidden produce in two hundred parts permitted produce, provided that he did not intend to gather the produce in order that the forbidden produce will become nullified.

רבי יוסי אומר אף המתכוין ללקט יעלו באחד ומאתים

Rabbi Yosei says: Even if he intentionally gathered the produce in order that the forbidden produce would become nullified, the forbidden produce is nullified if its ratio in the mixture is not more than one part forbidden produce in two hundred parts permitted produce. This seems to contradict what Rabbi Yosei said in the baraita cited previously with regard to nuts, that if the nuts were broken intentionally, they are not nullified.

הא אתמר עלה אמר רבא חזקה אין אדם אוסר את כרמו בנטיעה אחת וכן כי אתא רבין אמר רבי יוחנן חזקה אין אדם אוסר את כרמו בנטיעה אחת

The Gemara answers: Wasn’t it already stated with regard to that mishna in explanation of Rabbi Yosei’s opinion that Rava says: There is a presumption that a person does not render his entire vineyard forbidden for the sake of one sapling. Therefore, it can be assumed that one does not intentionally plant a sapling that has the status of orla or of diverse kinds in a vineyard among other saplings without properly marking it. If he did so, it is uncommon, and the Sages did not impose a penalty in an uncommon case. And similarly, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There is a presumption that a person does not render his vineyard forbidden for the sake of one sapling, and therefore the Sages did not impose a penalty.

מתני׳ הכהנים שפגלו במקדש מזידין חייבין

MISHNA: If priests disqualified an offering with improper intention in the Temple, by expressing, while sacrificing the offering, the intention of sprinkling the blood of the offering, burning its fats on the altar, or consuming it, after its appointed time, and they did so intentionally, they are liable to pay the value of the offering to its owner, who must now bring another offering.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן היה עושה עמו בטהרות ואמר לו טהרות שעשיתי עמך נטמאו היה עושה עמו בזבחים ואמר לו זבחים שעשיתי עמך נתפגלו נאמן אבל אמר לו טהרות שעשיתי עמך ביום פלוני נטמאו וזבחים שעשיתי עמך ביום פלוני נתפגלו אינו נאמן

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 2:2): If one was preparing ritually pure food with another, and he said to him: The ritually pure food that I prepared with you became ritually impure, or if he was preparing sacrifices with another person, and he said to him: The sacrifices that I prepared with you became disqualified due to improper intention, he is deemed credible with regard to these claims. But if he said to the other: The ritually pure food that I prepared with you on such and such a day became ritually impure, or the sacrifices that I prepared with you on such and such a day became disqualified due to improper intention, he is not deemed credible.

מאי שנא רישא ומאי שנא סיפא אמר אביי כל שבידו נאמן

The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause of the baraita and what is different in the latter clause, that in the first clause he is deemed credible, whereas in the latter clause he is not? Abaye says that the principle is as follows: As long as it is still in his power to do what he said he had done, he is deemed credible. Therefore, while he is involved in the preparation of the ritually pure food or the sacrifices, and consequently he is still able to disqualify them, he is deemed credible when he says that they already became disqualified. But once he makes a statement about actions he performed in the past and he is no longer able to disqualify the objects of those actions, he is not deemed credible.

רבא אמר כגון דאשכחיה ולא אמר ליה ולא מידי ולבתר הכי אשכחיה ואמר ליה

Rava said: Both the first clause and the latter clause deal with testimony about the past. The difference is that the latter clause is referring to a case where he found him a first time and told him nothing about disqualification, and then afterward he found him a second time and told him what had purportedly happened. In such a case he is suspected of lying, as, if it were true that the pure food had become impure or the offering had become disqualified, he would have imparted that information earlier. Since he had said nothing at the time, and he spoke up only later, it is assumed that he was lying and that his intention was merely to annoy the other.

ההוא דאמר ליה לחבריה טהרות שעשיתי עמך ביום פלוני נטמאו אתא לקמיה דרבי אמי אמר ליה שורת הדין אינו נאמן אמר לפניו רבי אסי רבי אתה אומר כן הכי אמר רבי יוחנן משום רבי יוסי מה אעשה שהתורה האמינתו

§ It is related that there was a certain person who said to another: The ritually pure food that I prepared with you on such and such a day became ritually impure. The owner of the food came before Rabbi Ami, asking him what to do. Rabbi Ami said to him: You may continue to treat the food as ritually pure, as in principle, the other person is not deemed credible. Rabbi Asi said before him: My teacher, do you say this? So said Rabbi Yoḥanan in the name of Rabbi Yosei: What can I do when I see that the Torah deemed him credible in such a case?

היכן האמינתו אמר רבי יצחק בר ביסנא כהן גדול ביום הכפורים יוכיח דכי אמר פגול מהימן ומנא ידעינן והכתיב וכל אדם לא יהיה באהל מועד אלא לאו משום דמהימן

The Gemara asks: Where does it deem him credible? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Bisna says: The High Priest on Yom Kippur will prove this point, as when he says that he had improper intent, he is deemed credible. And from where do we know that he had improper intent? But isn’t it written: “And no man shall be in the Tent of Meeting when he goes in to make atonement for the holy place” (Leviticus 16:17)? Rather, is it not because he is deemed credible in his testimony even after he performed the service, and it is no longer in his power to disqualify the offering?

ודלמא דשמעניה דפגיל אי לאו דמהימן אף על גב דשמעניה נמי לא מהימן דדלמא לבתר הכי קאמר

The Gemara rejects this argument: But perhaps we heard that he disqualified the offering with improper intention, i.e., maybe he stated his intention out loud while performing the service and it was heard outside. The Gemara answers: Were he not deemed credible about the matter, then even if we heard him voice his intention, he would also not be deemed credible. Why? The reason is that perhaps he actually sprinkled the blood with the proper intention, and it was only afterward that he said what he said, and at that time he could no longer disqualify the offering. Rather, he is certainly deemed credible when he says that he disqualified the offering with improper intention.

ודלמא דחזיניה בפישפש קשיא

The Gemara raises another objection: But perhaps we saw what the High Priest was doing through a small door, through which it was possible to monitor his actions, and we saw that he sprinkled the blood with improper intention. The Gemara says: This is difficult for Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Bisna, as his proof can be refuted.

ההוא דאתא לקמיה דרבי אמי אמר ליה ספר תורה שכתבתי לפלוני אזכרות שלו לא כתבתים לשמן אמר ליה ספר תורה ביד מי אמר ליה ביד לוקח אמר ליה נאמן אתה להפסיד שכרך ואי אתה נאמן להפסיד ספר תורה

§ It is similarly related that there was a certain person who came before Rabbi Ami and said to him: In the Torah scroll that I wrote for so-and-so, I did not write the mentions of God’s name with the proper intention that is required when writing a holy name, and therefore the scroll is not valid. Rabbi Ami said to him: This Torah scroll is currently in whose possession? The scribe said to him: It is now in the buyer’s possession. Rabbi Ami said to him: You are deemed credible to cause the loss of your wage, as you admit that you wrote the Torah scroll in a faulty manner, and therefore the buyer can refuse to pay you. But you are not deemed credible to cause a loss to, i.e., to invalidate, the Torah scroll.

אמר ליה רבי ירמיה נהי דהפסיד שכר אזכרות שכר דספר תורה כוליה מי הפסיד אמר ליה אין שכל ספר תורה שאין אזכרות שלו כתובות לשמן אינו שוה כלום

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: Although he lost his wage with regard to the mentions of God’s name that he wrote in a faulty manner, did he lose his wage with regard to the entire Torah scroll, which he wrote correctly? Rabbi Ami said to him: Yes, he lost his wage for the entire Torah scroll, as any Torah scroll in which the mentions of God’s name have not been written with the proper intention is not worth anything.

וליעבר עלייהו קולמוס וליקדשיה כמאן נימא דלא כרבי יהודה

The Gemara asks: But let the scribe pass a reed pen [kulemos] with additional ink over instances of God’s name and sanctify them, going over the names with the proper intention. And since there is no option to correct the Torah scroll in this manner, in accordance with whose opinion was this ruling issued? Shall we say that it is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda?

דתנן הרי שהיה צריך לכתוב את השם ונתכוון לכתוב יהודה וטעה ולא הטיל בו דלת מעביר עליו קולמוס ומקדשו דברי רבי יהודה וחכמים אומרים אין השם מן המובחר

This is as we learned in a baraita: If a scribe writing a Torah scroll was at a point in the text that he needed to write the name of God, spelled yod, heh, vav, heh; and he erred and intended to write Yehuda, spelled yod, heh, vav, dalet, heh, but he made a mistake when writing Yehuda and did not place a dalet in the word, thereby unintentionally writing the name of God in the correct place, then he should pass over it with a reed pen. He writes over what was written and sanctifies it with the intention that he is writing the name of God. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: Even if he adds a second layer of ink, the name has not been written in the optimal manner. The fact that Rabbi Ami did not offer the option to rewrite the mentions of God’s name to correct the scroll indicates that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and not in accordance with that of Rabbi Yehuda.

אפילו תימא רבי יהודה עד כאן לא קאמר רבי יהודה אלא בחדא אזכרה אבל דכולי ספר תורה לא משום דמיחזי כמנומר

The Gemara rejects this argument: You can even say that in general the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, but there is a distinction between the cases. Rabbi Yehuda states his opinion only with regard to a single mention of God’s name that was initially written without the proper intention. In such a case, it is possible to pass over the name with additional ink and thereby sanctify it. But passing over all of the holy names found in an entire Torah scroll is not possible. Why not? Because if the scribe would pass his pen over all the names of God found in a Torah scroll, it would look speckled, as the instances of the Divine Name would be written with a thicker layer of ink and stand out.

ההוא דאתא לקמיה דרבי אבהו אמר ליה ספר תורה שכתבתי לפלוני גוילין שלו לא עיבדתים לשמן אמר ליה ספר תורה ביד מי אמר ליה ביד לוקח אמר לו מתוך שאתה נאמן להפסיד שכרך אתה נאמן להפסיד ספר תורה

It is further related that there was a certain person who came before Rabbi Abbahu and said to him: With regard to the Torah scroll that I wrote for so-and-so, I did not process its parchment with the proper intention. Rabbi Abbahu said to him: The Torah scroll is currently in whose possession? The scribe said to him: It is in the possession of the buyer. Rabbi Abbahu said to him: Since you are deemed credible to cause the loss of your wage, as you have admitted that the parchment upon which the Torah scroll was written is invalid, you are deemed credible to cause a loss to, i.e., disqualify, the Torah scroll.