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Today's Daf Yomi

July 29, 2023 | 讬状讗 讘讗讘 转砖驻状讙

  • This month's learning聽is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of聽her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat聽Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.

  • Masechet Gittin is sponsored by Elaine and聽Saul聽Schreiber in honor of their daughter-in-law Daniela Schreiber on receiving her Master of Science in Marriage and Family Therapy.

Gittin 74

讜诪讟诪讗 诇讛 讻诇诇讜 砖诇 讚讘专 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻讗砖转讜 诇讻诇 讚讘专 讗诇讗 砖讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讙讟 砖谞讬 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛


and he becomes ritually impure for her if he is a priest. The principle of the matter is as follows: At that time she is like his wife in every sense, but she does not require a second bill of divorce from him when he dies. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.


专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讘注讬诇转讛 转诇讜讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讘注讬诇转讛 住驻拽 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪讙讜专砖转 讜讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转 讜讘诇讘讚 砖讬诪讜转


Rabbi Meir says: If she engages in sexual intercourse with another man, the legal status of her sexual intercourse depends on whether or not her husband dies from this illness. If he dies, she is considered to have been divorced from the time the bill of divorce was given, and her sexual intercourse is not deemed adulterous. Rabbi Yosei says: Her sexual intercourse has an uncertain status. And the Rabbis say: There is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced, and this is an uncertainty provided that he dies from this illness. If he does not, they are certainly not divorced.


诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谉 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬


The Gemara clarifies: What difference is there between the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that the status of her sexual intercourse depends on whether or not her husband dies from his illness, and the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says that the status of her sexual intercourse is uncertain?


讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诇专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诇讗 诪讬讬转讬 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 讜诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诪讬讬转讬 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬


Rabbi Yo岣nan said: The practical difference between them is with regard to the bringing of a provisional guilt-offering, which is brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin-offering. According to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the paramour does not bring a provisional guilt-offering (see Leviticus 5:17鈥19), because, although there was uncertainty at the time of the act of sexual intercourse, the matter will eventually be clarified once the husband either dies or recovers from his illness. If the husband survives her paramour must bring a sin-offering, and if the husband dies the other man is exempt from bringing any offering. And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei her status is uncertain, and even if the husband dies from this illness Rabbi Yosei is uncertain when the bill of divorce took effect. Therefore, her paramour must bring a provisional guilt-offering.


讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪讙讜专砖转 讜讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转 讞讻诪讬诐 讛讬讬谞讜 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讬专诪讬讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 诪讙讜专砖转 讜讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转 讘注诇讛 讞讬讬讘 讘诪讝讜谞讜转讬讛


The baraita taught: And the Rabbis say: There is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced. The Gemara comments: Apparently, the opinion of the Rabbis is the same as the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Why are they recorded as having a dispute? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to the halakhic ruling transmitted by Rabbi Zeira. As Rabbi Zeira says that Rabba bar Yirmeya says that Shmuel says: Wherever the Sages said: There is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced, her husband is obligated to provide her with sustenance. This formulation is stated only by the Rabbis, and Rabbi Zeira鈥檚 halakha would apply only according to them, not according to Rabbi Yosei.


诪转谞讬壮 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讛专讬 讝讜 诪讙讜专砖转 讜转转谉


MISHNA: If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, then she is divorced and must give two hundred dinars in order to fulfill the condition of the bill of divorce.


注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讬讻谉 讜注讚 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讗诐 谞转谞讛 诇讜 讘转讜讱 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 诪讙讜专砖转 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转


If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me money from now until the conclusion of thirty days, if she gives the money to him within thirty days she is divorced. And if not she is not divorced.


讗诪专 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪注砖讛 讘爪讬讚谉 讘讗讞讚 砖讗诪专 诇讗砖转讜 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 讗讬爪讟诇讬转讬 讜讗讘讚讛 讗讬爪讟诇讬转讜 讜讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 转转谉 诇讜 讗转 讚诪讬讛


Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: There was an incident in the city of Tzaidan involving one who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me my coat [itztaliti], and she lost his coat, so that she could not give it to him. And the Rabbis said that she must give him the value of the coat, and by doing so she fulfills the condition and is divorced.


讙诪壮 诪讗讬 讜转转谉 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讜讛讬讗 转转谉 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讻砖转转谉


GEMARA: The mishna teaches: She is divorced and must give the money. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: And must give? Rav Huna says: She is divorced immediately, once the bill of divorce has been given over to her, and she must give him the money subsequently in order to fulfill the condition. The bill of divorce takes effect retroactively, from the time when it was given, after she gives the money. Rav Yehuda says: She is divorced only when she gives him this sum.


诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 砖谞转拽专注 讛讙讟 讗讜 砖讗讘讚 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讜讛讬讗 转转谉 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讙讟 砖谞讬 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讻砖转转谉 爪专讬讻讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讙讟 砖谞讬


The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinion of Rav Huna and the opinion of Rav Yehuda? The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them if the bill of divorce was torn or lost after she received it but before she gave the money. According to the opinion of Rav Huna, who says: And she must give but the bill of divorce takes effect retroactively, if it was torn or lost then she does not require a second bill of divorce from him. By contrast, Rav Yehuda says that the divorce takes effect only when she gives him the sum. Therefore, if the document is torn or lost she requires a second bill of divorce from him, as in his opinion it is not yet a valid bill of divorce until she has given him the money.


讜转谞谉 谞诪讬 讙讘讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讻讬 讛讗讬 讙讜讜谞讗 讚转谞谉 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讬 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗转谉 诇讱 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讛专讬 讛讬讗 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讬转谉 讜讗讬转诪专 诪讗讬 讜讬转谉 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讜讛讜讗 讬转谉 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讻砖讬转谉


The Gemara comments: And it was also taught in the mishna with regard to betrothal that Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda also disagreed about a case like this, as we learned in a mishna (Kiddushin 60a): If one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will give you two hundred dinars, then she is betrothed, and he must give the sum. And it was stated that Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda disagreed with regard to what is the meaning of: And he must give. Rav Huna says: And he must give, meaning that she is betrothed immediately, provided that the husband gives what he promised. Rav Yehuda says: She is betrothed only when he gives.


诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 砖驻砖讟讛 讬讚讛 讜拽讬讘诇讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诪讗讞专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讜讛讜讗 讬转谉 转谞讗讛 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 诪拽讬讬诐 转谞讗讬讛 讜讗讝讬诇 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讻砖讬转谉 诇讻讬 讬讛讬讘 诇讛 讛讜讗 讚讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讛砖转讗 诇讗 讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉


The Gemara asks: What is the difference between them? The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them in a case where she extended her hand and received betrothal from another man before the first man gave her the money that he promised. Rav Huna says: And he must give, meaning that it is merely a condition that he accepted upon himself. He fulfills his condition and moves on, and the woman is betrothed to him immediately. Therefore, her betrothal to the second man has no validity. Rav Yehuda says: When he gives, which means that when he gives her the money it will be a valid betrothal. But now it is not a valid betrothal and therefore the betrothal from the second man takes effect.


讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜讛讜讗 讬转谉 诪砖讜诐 讚诇拽专讜讘讛 拽讗转讬 讗讘诇 讙讘讬 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讚诇专讞讜拽讛 拽讗转讬 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讛 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛


The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to mention this dispute in both the case of divorce and the case of betrothal. As if it would have taught us their opinions only with regard to betrothal, then one may think that it is specifically with regard to this case that Rav Huna says: And he should give, because he comes to draw her close in marriage. Consequently, he does this willingly, and therefore there is an assumption that his intention was for the betrothal to take effect immediately. But with regard to divorce, where he comes to distance her, there is an assumption that he does so unwillingly, so that he makes the divorce dependent on a condition in order to delay the matter. Therefore, say that Rav Huna concedes to Rav Yehuda that the divorce does not take effect until the condition has been fulfilled.


讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜讛讬讗 转转谉 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 讻住讬祝 诇诪讬转讘注讛 讗讘诇 讙讘讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讚讻住讬驻讗 诇诪讬转讘注讬讛 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛


And if it would have taught us their opinions only with regard to divorce, then one may think that it is specifically with regard to this case that Rav Huna says: And she must give, because he is not embarrassed to demand the money from her afterward to fulfill the condition of the bill of divorce, and his intent was to divorce her immediately. But with regard to betrothal, where she is embarrassed to demand the money that he promised would come from him, she may not agree to be betrothed to him until she actually receives the money. Therefore, you might say that Rav Huna concedes to Rav Yehuda that the betrothal is valid only once he gives her the money.


讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 诇讻砖讬转谉 诪砖讜诐 讚讻住讬驻讗 诇诪讬转讘注讬讛 讗讘诇 讙讘讬 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讚诇讗 讻住讬祝 诇诪讬转讘注讛 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讛 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讛讜谞讗


And furthermore, if it would have taught us their opinions only with regard to betrothal, then one may think that it is specifically with regard to this case that Rav Yehuda says that the betrothal is valid only when he gives her the money, because she is embarrassed to demand it from him if he does not give it to her. Therefore, her intention is that she will be betrothed only once the condition is fulfilled. But with regard to divorce, where the husband is not embarrassed to demand the money from her, you might say that Rav Yehuda concedes to Rav Huna that the bill of divorce takes effect immediately.


讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 诇讻砖转转谉 诪砖讜诐 讚诇专讞讜拽讛 拽讗转讬 讗讘诇 讙讘讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讚诇拽专讜讘讛 拽讗转讬 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讛 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讛讜谞讗 爪专讬讻讗


And furthermore, if it would have taught us only with regard to the case of divorce, then one may think that it is specifically with regard to this case that Rav Yehuda says that the divorce is valid only when she gives him the money, because the husband comes to distance her. But with regard to betrothal, where he comes to draw her close, you might say that Rav Yehuda concedes to Rav Huna. Therefore, it is necessary to state this dispute in both cases.


诪讬转讬讘讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖谞拽专注 讛讙讟 讗讜 砖谞讗讘讚 诪讙讜专砖转 讜诇讗讞专 诇讗 转谞砖讗 注讚 砖转转谉


The Gemara raises an objection based on what was taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:5): If one says to a woman: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, then even though the bill of divorce was torn or lost she is divorced. And she may not marry another man until she gives her first husband the money.


讜注讜讚 转谞讬讗 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讜诪转 谞转谞讛 讗讬谞讛 讝拽讜拽讛 诇讬讘诐 诇讗 谞转谞讛 讝拽讜拽讛 诇讬讘诐 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 谞讜转谞转 诇讗讘讬讜 讗讜 诇讗讞讬讜 讗讜 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛拽专讜讘讬诐


And it is taught further in that same baraita: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give two hundred dinars to me, and the husband died childless, if she had already given him the money, then she is not bound with a levirate bond to the yavam because she was already divorced from her husband through the bill of divorce that he gave her. But if she had not given him the money, then she is bound with a levirate bond to the yavam because the bill of divorce did not take effect and she is a widow. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She should give the money to her late husband鈥檚 father, or to his brother, or to one of the relatives who inherit from him, and by doing so she fulfills the condition and is released from the levirate bond.


注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讗 讚诪专 住讘专 诇讬 讜诇讗 诇讬讜专砖讬 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讬 讜讗驻讬诇讜 诇讬讜专砖讬 讜讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诪讬讛讗 转谞讗讛 讛讜讬 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛


The Gemara notes: The first tanna and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree only with regard to the meaning of the condition. One Sage, the first tanna, holds that when the husband said: On the condition that she will give to me, he meant: To me specifically and not to my heirs. Consequently, she cannot fulfill the condition by giving the money to his heirs. And one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that when the husband said that she will give the money to me, he meant and even to my heirs. But in any event, everyone agrees that this is a valid condition, yet its fulfillment does not change the date that the bill of divorce takes effect. This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehuda, who said that the bill of divorce takes effect only when she gives.


讗诪专 诇讱 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讗讜诪专 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬 讜驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 注诇讬讛 讜讗谞讗 讚讗诪专讬 讻专讘谞谉


The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda could have said to you: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states: The agreement will take effect retroactively from now, even though the condition is fulfilled only later on. And the Rabbis disagree with him. And I say my ruling in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.


讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讻讬 讛讜讬谞谉 讘讘讘诇 讗诪专讬谞谉 讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讗讜诪专 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 注诇讬讛 讻讬 住诇讬拽讬 讗砖讻讞转讬讛 诇专讘讬 讗住讬 讚讬转讬讘 讜拽讗诪专 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 讘讗讜诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讗讜诪专 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗 讘诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛


And Rabbi Zeira says: When we were in Babylonia we would say with regard to this following statement that Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states: The agreement will take effect retroactively from now, even though the condition is fulfilled only later on; we would say that the Rabbis disagree with him. When I ascended to Eretz Yisrael I found Rabbi Asi, who was sitting and saying in the name of Rabbi Yo岣nan: Everyone concedes that with regard to anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, he is like one who states: The agreement will take effect retroactively from now; and the Rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi only in a case where the bill of divorce included the condition: From today and after my death.


讜讛转谞讬讗 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讙讟 讜讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讻讝讛 讙讟


And it is taught in a baraita: If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, then this is both a valid bill of divorce and not a valid bill of divorce. This is the statement of the Rabbis. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagrees and says: A case like this is a valid bill of divorce without any uncertainty. This teaches that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagree only in this case, but everyone agrees that when he employed the language: On the condition, it is as though he stipulated: From now.


讜诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 讘注诇 诪谞转 驻诇讬讙讬 讗讚诪讬驻诇讙讬 讘诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诇讬驻诇讙讬 讘注诇 诪谞转 诇讛讜讚讬注讱 讻讞讜 讚专讘讬


The Gemara asks: And according to Rav Yehuda, who said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagree about one who employs the language: On the condition, rather than disagreeing with regard to the case where the husband said: From today and after my death, let them disagree with regard to the case where the husband said: On the condition. The Gemara answers that the baraita uses this case to inform you about the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who is certain that the bill of divorce is valid.


讜诇讬驻诇讙讜 讘注诇 诪谞转 讜诇讛讜讚讬注讱 讻讞谉 讚专讘谞谉 讻讞 讚讛讬转讬专讗 注讚讬祝 诇讬讛


The Gemara challenges: And let them disagree about: On the condition, to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of the Rabbis, who do not hold that the phrase: On the condition, is considered to be like the phrase: From now, as this ruling is a more general matter. The Gemara answers: It is preferable to emphasize the power of leniency, and therefore it is preferable to teach the degree to which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is lenient.


注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讻讗谉 讜注讚 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讜讻讜壮 驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 拽驻讬讚讬讛 诇讗讜 拽驻讬讚讗 讜诇讝专讝讛 拽讗转讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉


搂 The mishna teaches: If a husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me money from now until the conclusion of thirty days, if she gives the money to him within thirty days she is divorced, and if not she is not divorced. The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 that obvious, since everything depends on whether or not the condition was fulfilled? The Gemara answers: No, the halakha that the divorce does not take effect unless she gives the money by that time needs to be said, lest you say that the concern of the husband that his wife will give him the money within a specific time frame is not a real concern, and he comes only to galvanize her. Although he wishes to receive this money as soon as possible, in truth he does not care if he receives it later. Therefore, it teaches us that his statement is a valid condition, and if she does not fulfill it then it is not a valid bill of divorce.


讗诪专 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪注砖讛 讘爪讬讚谉 讻讜壮 诪讗讬 转谞讗 讚拽转谞讬 诪注砖讛


搂 The mishna teaches that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: There was an incident in the city of Tzaidan involving one who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me my coat, and she lost his coat. And the Rabbis said that she should give him the value of that coat, and by doing so she fulfills the condition and is divorced. The Gemara asks: What did Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel teach before, such that he now teaches and cites an incident which is similar to it? This incident does not seem to be referring to what was stated immediately before in the mishna.


讞住讜专讬 诪讬讞住专讗 讜讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讗诐 讗诪专 诇讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 讗讬爪讟诇讬转讬 讜讗讘讚讛 讗讬爪讟诇讬转讜 讗讬爪讟诇讬转讬 讚讜拽讗 拽讗诪专 诇讛 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 转转谉 诇讜 讗转 讚诪讬讛 讜讗诪专 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪注砖讛 谞诪讬 讘爪讬讚谉 讘讗讞讚 砖讗诪专 诇讗砖转讜 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 讗爪讟诇讬转讬 讜讗讘讚讛 讗爪讟诇讬转讜 讜讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 转转谉 诇讜 讗转 讚诪讬讛


The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: If the husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me my coat, and she lost his coat, then since he specifically stated to her: Give me my coat, she cannot give him its value instead. And since she has lost the coat, the bill of divorce is not valid; this is the opinion of the Rabbis. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In such a case she can give him its value. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said in support of his statement: There was an incident also in the city of Tzaidan involving one who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me my coat, and she lost his coat. And the Rabbis said that she should give him its value.


讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讬 讗住讬 诪专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讜讞讝专 讜讗诪专 诇讛 诪讞讜诇讬诐 诇讱 诪讛讜


Rabbi Asi raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yo岣nan: If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, and afterward he returned and said to her: It is waived for you, then what is the halakha?


转讬讘注讬 诇专讘谞谉 转讬讘注讬 诇专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇


He explained his question in detail: Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis, and let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.


转讬讘注讬 诇专讘谞谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚诇讗 讗讞诇讛 讙讘讛 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讛讗 拽讗诪专 诇讛 诪讞讜诇讬诐 诇讱 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诇讗 拽讗诪专 讗诇讗 讚拽讗 诪驻讬讬住讛 诇讬讛 讘讚诪讬 讗讘诇 诇讙诪专讬 诇讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转


Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis: One can say that only there do the Rabbis state their opinion that she is not divorced if the condition is not fulfilled and she gives him his coat, because he did not waive his claim to it; but here he says to her: It is waived for you, so they are divorced. Or perhaps one can say that even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel states that she can be divorced even if he does not receive the coat only there, as she appeases him by giving him money, i.e., the condition is considered to be fulfilled due to the fact that he received the value of the coat; but in a case where he waives the condition entirely, no, because he does not receive anything from her. Rabbi Yo岣nan said to him in response: She is not divorced, because the condition has not been fulfilled.


讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讛讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 拽讜谞诐 砖讗转讛 谞讛谞讛 诇讬 讗诐 讗讬 讗转讛 谞讜转谉 诇讘谞讬 讻讜专 讗讞讚 砖诇 讞讟讬谉 讜砖转讬 讞讘讬讜转 砖诇 讬讬谉 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讗住讜专 注讚 砖讬转谉 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗祝 讝讛 讬讻讜诇 诇讛转讬专 讗转 谞讚专讜 砖诇讗 注诇 驻讬 讞讻诐 讜讗讜诪专 讛专讬谞讬 讻讗讬诇讜 讛转拽讘诇转讬


He raised an objection to his opinion from a mishna (Nedarim 63b): In the case of one who says to another: Benefiting from me is konam for you, meaning it is prohibited for you to derive benefit from me, if you do not give my son one kor of wheat and two barrels of wine as a wedding gift, Rabbi Meir says: It is prohibited for this other person to benefit from the person who took the vow until he gives his son the gift. And the Rabbis say: Even this individual who took the vow can dissolve his vow without the consent of a halakhic authority, and he does this by saying: I hereby consider it as though I have received the gift from you. Based on this mishna, it would seem that if the husband forgives his wife the money that she owes him, it should be considered as if he received it, and the bill of divorce should be valid.


讛讻讬 讛砖转讗 讛转诐 诇爪注讜专讛 拽讗 诪讻讜讬谉 讜诇讗 爪讬注专讛 讛讻讗 诪砖讜诐 讛专讜讜讞讛 讛讜讗 讜讛讗 诇讗 讗讬爪讟专讬讱


The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of a bill of divorce, he intends to vex her, and until she pays him he did not vex her. If he forgives this condition, his initial intention has not been fulfilled. Here, in the case of the vow, the reason the father took the vow is for the sake of profit; he wants his son to receive a valuable gift, but subsequently the one who took the vow decides that it was not necessary. Therefore, he can waive his claim.


讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗专讬住讬讛 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讚诇讜 转诇转 讚诇讜讜转讗 讜讗讻诇讬 专讬讘注讗 讗转 讚诇讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讗讻讜诇 转讬诇转讗 诇住讜祝 讗转讗 诪讬讟专讗


The Gemara relates an incident of a certain man who said to his sharecropper: Everyone waters the field three times during the season, and they consume, i.e., receive as payment, one quarter of the crops from the field. Will you water four times and consume as your payment one-third of the produce? Ultimately, rain came when the sharecropper would have needed to water a fourth time, and so he did not need to water the field a fourth time. The question was presented to the Sages: Is the sharecropper still entitled to receive one-third of the produce since he was prepared to water the field four times, although ultimately it was not necessary to do so?


讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讛讗 诇讗 讚诇讛 专讘讛 讗诪专 讛讗 诇讗 讗讬爪讟专讬讻讗


Rav Yosef said: But he did not water the field a fourth time, so the condition was not fulfilled. Consequently, he deserves the same as the other sharecroppers, and receives only one quarter of the produce. Rabba said: But it was not necessary to water the field the fourth time because the rain fell to the benefit of the sharecropper, and therefore he should receive one-third of the produce.


诇讬诪讗 专讘 讬讜住祝 讚讗诪专 讻专讘谞谉 讜专讘讛 讚讗诪专 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇


The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Rav Yosef said his ruling in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who require that the condition of the bill of divorce be fulfilled, and that Rabba said his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that it is not the fulfillment of the specifics of the condition that matter but the fulfillment of the intent of the condition?


讜转讬住讘专讗 讜讛讗 拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 讛讬诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讛 讜讘讛讗 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇


The Gemara asks: And how can you understand it in this way? But don鈥檛 we maintain that in all of their disputes the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba when he disagrees with Rav Yosef? And with regard to this halakha we maintain that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. If so, this presents a contradiction between one halakha and another.


讗诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讻专讘谞谉 专讘 讬讜住祝 讻专讘谞谉 讜专讘讛 讗诪专 诇讱 讗谞讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗驻讬诇讜 诇专讘谞谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚诇爪注讜专讛 拽讗 诪讬讻讜讬谉 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诪砖讜诐 讛专讜讜讞讛 讛讜讗 讜讛讗 诇讗 讗讬爪讟专讬讱


Rather, according to both opinions, this dispute is actually in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Rav Yosef clearly rules in accordance with the Rabbis. And Rabba could have said to you: I was saying my statement even according to the opinion of the Rabbis, as the Rabbis are saying there that she is not divorced if she does not return the coat itself only when the husband intends to vex her, and if she does not need to give the coat itself she will not be vexed, as it is not difficult for her to give him its value. But here, in the case of watering the field, the reason the owner is making the condition is only for the sake of increasing his profit, and it was not necessary to actually water the field.


转谞谉 讛转诐 讘专讗砖讜谞讛 讛讬讛 谞讟诪谉 讬讜诐 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 讻讚讬 砖讬讛讗 讞诇讜讟 诇讜 讛转拽讬谉 讛诇诇 讛讝拽谉 砖讬讛讗 讞讜诇砖 讗转 诪注讜转讬讜 诇诇砖讻讛 讜讬讛讗 砖讜讘专 讗转 讛讚诇转 讜谞讻谞住 讜讗讬诪转讬 砖讬专爪讛 讛诇讛 讬讘讜讗 讜讬讟讜诇 讗转 诪注讜转讬讜


搂 With regard to the redemption of houses in walled cities, we learned elsewhere in a mishna (Arakhin 31b) that if a house was sold and not redeemed by its owners within twelve months it remains permanently in the possession of the purchaser. The Gemara describes this: At first the purchaser would hide for all of the final day of the twelfth month so that the house would be confirmed as his (see Leviticus 25:29鈥30). Because the purchaser was in hiding, the seller would be unable to redeem the house from him. Hillel the Elder instituted an ordinance whereby the seller may deposit [岣lesh] his redemption money in the Temple treasury chamber, and then he may break the door of his house and enter and take possession. And when that purchaser wishes, he should come and take his money from the Temple treasury.


讜讗诪专 专讘讗 诪转拽谞转讜 砖诇 讛诇诇 谞砖诪注 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讜谞转谞讛 诇讜 诪讚注转讜 诪讙讜专砖转 注诇 讻讜专讞讜 讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转


And Rava says: From the ordinance of Hillel we learn that if one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, and she gave him the money with his consent, then she is divorced. If she gave it to him against his will then she is not divorced.


诪讚讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇讬讛 诇讛诇诇 诇转拽讜谞讬 谞转讬谞讛 讘注诇 讻讜专讞讬讛 讚讛讜讬讗 诇讛 谞转讬谞讛


How does Rava prove this? From the fact that it was necessary for Hillel to institute a unique ordinance in the case of houses in walled cities whereby giving against the will of the receiver is considered giving.

  • This month's learning聽is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of聽her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat聽Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.

  • Masechet Gittin is sponsored by Elaine and聽Saul聽Schreiber in honor of their daughter-in-law Daniela Schreiber on receiving her Master of Science in Marriage and Family Therapy.

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Gittin 74

讜诪讟诪讗 诇讛 讻诇诇讜 砖诇 讚讘专 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻讗砖转讜 诇讻诇 讚讘专 讗诇讗 砖讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讙讟 砖谞讬 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛


and he becomes ritually impure for her if he is a priest. The principle of the matter is as follows: At that time she is like his wife in every sense, but she does not require a second bill of divorce from him when he dies. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.


专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讘注讬诇转讛 转诇讜讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讘注讬诇转讛 住驻拽 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪讙讜专砖转 讜讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转 讜讘诇讘讚 砖讬诪讜转


Rabbi Meir says: If she engages in sexual intercourse with another man, the legal status of her sexual intercourse depends on whether or not her husband dies from this illness. If he dies, she is considered to have been divorced from the time the bill of divorce was given, and her sexual intercourse is not deemed adulterous. Rabbi Yosei says: Her sexual intercourse has an uncertain status. And the Rabbis say: There is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced, and this is an uncertainty provided that he dies from this illness. If he does not, they are certainly not divorced.


诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谉 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬


The Gemara clarifies: What difference is there between the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that the status of her sexual intercourse depends on whether or not her husband dies from his illness, and the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says that the status of her sexual intercourse is uncertain?


讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诇专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诇讗 诪讬讬转讬 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 讜诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诪讬讬转讬 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬


Rabbi Yo岣nan said: The practical difference between them is with regard to the bringing of a provisional guilt-offering, which is brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin-offering. According to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the paramour does not bring a provisional guilt-offering (see Leviticus 5:17鈥19), because, although there was uncertainty at the time of the act of sexual intercourse, the matter will eventually be clarified once the husband either dies or recovers from his illness. If the husband survives her paramour must bring a sin-offering, and if the husband dies the other man is exempt from bringing any offering. And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei her status is uncertain, and even if the husband dies from this illness Rabbi Yosei is uncertain when the bill of divorce took effect. Therefore, her paramour must bring a provisional guilt-offering.


讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪讙讜专砖转 讜讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转 讞讻诪讬诐 讛讬讬谞讜 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讬专诪讬讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 诪讙讜专砖转 讜讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转 讘注诇讛 讞讬讬讘 讘诪讝讜谞讜转讬讛


The baraita taught: And the Rabbis say: There is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced. The Gemara comments: Apparently, the opinion of the Rabbis is the same as the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Why are they recorded as having a dispute? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to the halakhic ruling transmitted by Rabbi Zeira. As Rabbi Zeira says that Rabba bar Yirmeya says that Shmuel says: Wherever the Sages said: There is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced, her husband is obligated to provide her with sustenance. This formulation is stated only by the Rabbis, and Rabbi Zeira鈥檚 halakha would apply only according to them, not according to Rabbi Yosei.


诪转谞讬壮 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讛专讬 讝讜 诪讙讜专砖转 讜转转谉


MISHNA: If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, then she is divorced and must give two hundred dinars in order to fulfill the condition of the bill of divorce.


注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讬讻谉 讜注讚 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讗诐 谞转谞讛 诇讜 讘转讜讱 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 诪讙讜专砖转 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转


If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me money from now until the conclusion of thirty days, if she gives the money to him within thirty days she is divorced. And if not she is not divorced.


讗诪专 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪注砖讛 讘爪讬讚谉 讘讗讞讚 砖讗诪专 诇讗砖转讜 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 讗讬爪讟诇讬转讬 讜讗讘讚讛 讗讬爪讟诇讬转讜 讜讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 转转谉 诇讜 讗转 讚诪讬讛


Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: There was an incident in the city of Tzaidan involving one who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me my coat [itztaliti], and she lost his coat, so that she could not give it to him. And the Rabbis said that she must give him the value of the coat, and by doing so she fulfills the condition and is divorced.


讙诪壮 诪讗讬 讜转转谉 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讜讛讬讗 转转谉 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讻砖转转谉


GEMARA: The mishna teaches: She is divorced and must give the money. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: And must give? Rav Huna says: She is divorced immediately, once the bill of divorce has been given over to her, and she must give him the money subsequently in order to fulfill the condition. The bill of divorce takes effect retroactively, from the time when it was given, after she gives the money. Rav Yehuda says: She is divorced only when she gives him this sum.


诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 砖谞转拽专注 讛讙讟 讗讜 砖讗讘讚 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讜讛讬讗 转转谉 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讙讟 砖谞讬 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讻砖转转谉 爪专讬讻讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讙讟 砖谞讬


The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinion of Rav Huna and the opinion of Rav Yehuda? The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them if the bill of divorce was torn or lost after she received it but before she gave the money. According to the opinion of Rav Huna, who says: And she must give but the bill of divorce takes effect retroactively, if it was torn or lost then she does not require a second bill of divorce from him. By contrast, Rav Yehuda says that the divorce takes effect only when she gives him the sum. Therefore, if the document is torn or lost she requires a second bill of divorce from him, as in his opinion it is not yet a valid bill of divorce until she has given him the money.


讜转谞谉 谞诪讬 讙讘讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讻讬 讛讗讬 讙讜讜谞讗 讚转谞谉 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讬 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗转谉 诇讱 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讛专讬 讛讬讗 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讬转谉 讜讗讬转诪专 诪讗讬 讜讬转谉 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讜讛讜讗 讬转谉 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讻砖讬转谉


The Gemara comments: And it was also taught in the mishna with regard to betrothal that Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda also disagreed about a case like this, as we learned in a mishna (Kiddushin 60a): If one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will give you two hundred dinars, then she is betrothed, and he must give the sum. And it was stated that Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda disagreed with regard to what is the meaning of: And he must give. Rav Huna says: And he must give, meaning that she is betrothed immediately, provided that the husband gives what he promised. Rav Yehuda says: She is betrothed only when he gives.


诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 砖驻砖讟讛 讬讚讛 讜拽讬讘诇讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诪讗讞专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讜讛讜讗 讬转谉 转谞讗讛 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 诪拽讬讬诐 转谞讗讬讛 讜讗讝讬诇 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讻砖讬转谉 诇讻讬 讬讛讬讘 诇讛 讛讜讗 讚讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讛砖转讗 诇讗 讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉


The Gemara asks: What is the difference between them? The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them in a case where she extended her hand and received betrothal from another man before the first man gave her the money that he promised. Rav Huna says: And he must give, meaning that it is merely a condition that he accepted upon himself. He fulfills his condition and moves on, and the woman is betrothed to him immediately. Therefore, her betrothal to the second man has no validity. Rav Yehuda says: When he gives, which means that when he gives her the money it will be a valid betrothal. But now it is not a valid betrothal and therefore the betrothal from the second man takes effect.


讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜讛讜讗 讬转谉 诪砖讜诐 讚诇拽专讜讘讛 拽讗转讬 讗讘诇 讙讘讬 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讚诇专讞讜拽讛 拽讗转讬 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讛 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛


The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to mention this dispute in both the case of divorce and the case of betrothal. As if it would have taught us their opinions only with regard to betrothal, then one may think that it is specifically with regard to this case that Rav Huna says: And he should give, because he comes to draw her close in marriage. Consequently, he does this willingly, and therefore there is an assumption that his intention was for the betrothal to take effect immediately. But with regard to divorce, where he comes to distance her, there is an assumption that he does so unwillingly, so that he makes the divorce dependent on a condition in order to delay the matter. Therefore, say that Rav Huna concedes to Rav Yehuda that the divorce does not take effect until the condition has been fulfilled.


讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜讛讬讗 转转谉 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 讻住讬祝 诇诪讬转讘注讛 讗讘诇 讙讘讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讚讻住讬驻讗 诇诪讬转讘注讬讛 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛


And if it would have taught us their opinions only with regard to divorce, then one may think that it is specifically with regard to this case that Rav Huna says: And she must give, because he is not embarrassed to demand the money from her afterward to fulfill the condition of the bill of divorce, and his intent was to divorce her immediately. But with regard to betrothal, where she is embarrassed to demand the money that he promised would come from him, she may not agree to be betrothed to him until she actually receives the money. Therefore, you might say that Rav Huna concedes to Rav Yehuda that the betrothal is valid only once he gives her the money.


讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 诇讻砖讬转谉 诪砖讜诐 讚讻住讬驻讗 诇诪讬转讘注讬讛 讗讘诇 讙讘讬 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讚诇讗 讻住讬祝 诇诪讬转讘注讛 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讛 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讛讜谞讗


And furthermore, if it would have taught us their opinions only with regard to betrothal, then one may think that it is specifically with regard to this case that Rav Yehuda says that the betrothal is valid only when he gives her the money, because she is embarrassed to demand it from him if he does not give it to her. Therefore, her intention is that she will be betrothed only once the condition is fulfilled. But with regard to divorce, where the husband is not embarrassed to demand the money from her, you might say that Rav Yehuda concedes to Rav Huna that the bill of divorce takes effect immediately.


讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 诇讻砖转转谉 诪砖讜诐 讚诇专讞讜拽讛 拽讗转讬 讗讘诇 讙讘讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讚诇拽专讜讘讛 拽讗转讬 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讛 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讛讜谞讗 爪专讬讻讗


And furthermore, if it would have taught us only with regard to the case of divorce, then one may think that it is specifically with regard to this case that Rav Yehuda says that the divorce is valid only when she gives him the money, because the husband comes to distance her. But with regard to betrothal, where he comes to draw her close, you might say that Rav Yehuda concedes to Rav Huna. Therefore, it is necessary to state this dispute in both cases.


诪讬转讬讘讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖谞拽专注 讛讙讟 讗讜 砖谞讗讘讚 诪讙讜专砖转 讜诇讗讞专 诇讗 转谞砖讗 注讚 砖转转谉


The Gemara raises an objection based on what was taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:5): If one says to a woman: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, then even though the bill of divorce was torn or lost she is divorced. And she may not marry another man until she gives her first husband the money.


讜注讜讚 转谞讬讗 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讜诪转 谞转谞讛 讗讬谞讛 讝拽讜拽讛 诇讬讘诐 诇讗 谞转谞讛 讝拽讜拽讛 诇讬讘诐 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 谞讜转谞转 诇讗讘讬讜 讗讜 诇讗讞讬讜 讗讜 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛拽专讜讘讬诐


And it is taught further in that same baraita: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give two hundred dinars to me, and the husband died childless, if she had already given him the money, then she is not bound with a levirate bond to the yavam because she was already divorced from her husband through the bill of divorce that he gave her. But if she had not given him the money, then she is bound with a levirate bond to the yavam because the bill of divorce did not take effect and she is a widow. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She should give the money to her late husband鈥檚 father, or to his brother, or to one of the relatives who inherit from him, and by doing so she fulfills the condition and is released from the levirate bond.


注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讗 讚诪专 住讘专 诇讬 讜诇讗 诇讬讜专砖讬 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讬 讜讗驻讬诇讜 诇讬讜专砖讬 讜讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诪讬讛讗 转谞讗讛 讛讜讬 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛


The Gemara notes: The first tanna and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree only with regard to the meaning of the condition. One Sage, the first tanna, holds that when the husband said: On the condition that she will give to me, he meant: To me specifically and not to my heirs. Consequently, she cannot fulfill the condition by giving the money to his heirs. And one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that when the husband said that she will give the money to me, he meant and even to my heirs. But in any event, everyone agrees that this is a valid condition, yet its fulfillment does not change the date that the bill of divorce takes effect. This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehuda, who said that the bill of divorce takes effect only when she gives.


讗诪专 诇讱 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讗讜诪专 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬 讜驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 注诇讬讛 讜讗谞讗 讚讗诪专讬 讻专讘谞谉


The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda could have said to you: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states: The agreement will take effect retroactively from now, even though the condition is fulfilled only later on. And the Rabbis disagree with him. And I say my ruling in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.


讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讻讬 讛讜讬谞谉 讘讘讘诇 讗诪专讬谞谉 讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讗讜诪专 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 注诇讬讛 讻讬 住诇讬拽讬 讗砖讻讞转讬讛 诇专讘讬 讗住讬 讚讬转讬讘 讜拽讗诪专 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 讘讗讜诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讗讜诪专 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗 讘诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛


And Rabbi Zeira says: When we were in Babylonia we would say with regard to this following statement that Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states: The agreement will take effect retroactively from now, even though the condition is fulfilled only later on; we would say that the Rabbis disagree with him. When I ascended to Eretz Yisrael I found Rabbi Asi, who was sitting and saying in the name of Rabbi Yo岣nan: Everyone concedes that with regard to anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, he is like one who states: The agreement will take effect retroactively from now; and the Rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi only in a case where the bill of divorce included the condition: From today and after my death.


讜讛转谞讬讗 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讙讟 讜讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讻讝讛 讙讟


And it is taught in a baraita: If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, then this is both a valid bill of divorce and not a valid bill of divorce. This is the statement of the Rabbis. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagrees and says: A case like this is a valid bill of divorce without any uncertainty. This teaches that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagree only in this case, but everyone agrees that when he employed the language: On the condition, it is as though he stipulated: From now.


讜诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 讘注诇 诪谞转 驻诇讬讙讬 讗讚诪讬驻诇讙讬 讘诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诇讬驻诇讙讬 讘注诇 诪谞转 诇讛讜讚讬注讱 讻讞讜 讚专讘讬


The Gemara asks: And according to Rav Yehuda, who said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagree about one who employs the language: On the condition, rather than disagreeing with regard to the case where the husband said: From today and after my death, let them disagree with regard to the case where the husband said: On the condition. The Gemara answers that the baraita uses this case to inform you about the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who is certain that the bill of divorce is valid.


讜诇讬驻诇讙讜 讘注诇 诪谞转 讜诇讛讜讚讬注讱 讻讞谉 讚专讘谞谉 讻讞 讚讛讬转讬专讗 注讚讬祝 诇讬讛


The Gemara challenges: And let them disagree about: On the condition, to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of the Rabbis, who do not hold that the phrase: On the condition, is considered to be like the phrase: From now, as this ruling is a more general matter. The Gemara answers: It is preferable to emphasize the power of leniency, and therefore it is preferable to teach the degree to which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is lenient.


注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讻讗谉 讜注讚 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讜讻讜壮 驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 拽驻讬讚讬讛 诇讗讜 拽驻讬讚讗 讜诇讝专讝讛 拽讗转讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉


搂 The mishna teaches: If a husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me money from now until the conclusion of thirty days, if she gives the money to him within thirty days she is divorced, and if not she is not divorced. The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 that obvious, since everything depends on whether or not the condition was fulfilled? The Gemara answers: No, the halakha that the divorce does not take effect unless she gives the money by that time needs to be said, lest you say that the concern of the husband that his wife will give him the money within a specific time frame is not a real concern, and he comes only to galvanize her. Although he wishes to receive this money as soon as possible, in truth he does not care if he receives it later. Therefore, it teaches us that his statement is a valid condition, and if she does not fulfill it then it is not a valid bill of divorce.


讗诪专 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪注砖讛 讘爪讬讚谉 讻讜壮 诪讗讬 转谞讗 讚拽转谞讬 诪注砖讛


搂 The mishna teaches that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: There was an incident in the city of Tzaidan involving one who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me my coat, and she lost his coat. And the Rabbis said that she should give him the value of that coat, and by doing so she fulfills the condition and is divorced. The Gemara asks: What did Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel teach before, such that he now teaches and cites an incident which is similar to it? This incident does not seem to be referring to what was stated immediately before in the mishna.


讞住讜专讬 诪讬讞住专讗 讜讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讗诐 讗诪专 诇讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 讗讬爪讟诇讬转讬 讜讗讘讚讛 讗讬爪讟诇讬转讜 讗讬爪讟诇讬转讬 讚讜拽讗 拽讗诪专 诇讛 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 转转谉 诇讜 讗转 讚诪讬讛 讜讗诪专 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪注砖讛 谞诪讬 讘爪讬讚谉 讘讗讞讚 砖讗诪专 诇讗砖转讜 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 讗爪讟诇讬转讬 讜讗讘讚讛 讗爪讟诇讬转讜 讜讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 转转谉 诇讜 讗转 讚诪讬讛


The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: If the husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me my coat, and she lost his coat, then since he specifically stated to her: Give me my coat, she cannot give him its value instead. And since she has lost the coat, the bill of divorce is not valid; this is the opinion of the Rabbis. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In such a case she can give him its value. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said in support of his statement: There was an incident also in the city of Tzaidan involving one who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me my coat, and she lost his coat. And the Rabbis said that she should give him its value.


讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讬 讗住讬 诪专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讜讞讝专 讜讗诪专 诇讛 诪讞讜诇讬诐 诇讱 诪讛讜


Rabbi Asi raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yo岣nan: If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, and afterward he returned and said to her: It is waived for you, then what is the halakha?


转讬讘注讬 诇专讘谞谉 转讬讘注讬 诇专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇


He explained his question in detail: Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis, and let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.


转讬讘注讬 诇专讘谞谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚诇讗 讗讞诇讛 讙讘讛 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讛讗 拽讗诪专 诇讛 诪讞讜诇讬诐 诇讱 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诇讗 拽讗诪专 讗诇讗 讚拽讗 诪驻讬讬住讛 诇讬讛 讘讚诪讬 讗讘诇 诇讙诪专讬 诇讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转


Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis: One can say that only there do the Rabbis state their opinion that she is not divorced if the condition is not fulfilled and she gives him his coat, because he did not waive his claim to it; but here he says to her: It is waived for you, so they are divorced. Or perhaps one can say that even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel states that she can be divorced even if he does not receive the coat only there, as she appeases him by giving him money, i.e., the condition is considered to be fulfilled due to the fact that he received the value of the coat; but in a case where he waives the condition entirely, no, because he does not receive anything from her. Rabbi Yo岣nan said to him in response: She is not divorced, because the condition has not been fulfilled.


讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讛讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 拽讜谞诐 砖讗转讛 谞讛谞讛 诇讬 讗诐 讗讬 讗转讛 谞讜转谉 诇讘谞讬 讻讜专 讗讞讚 砖诇 讞讟讬谉 讜砖转讬 讞讘讬讜转 砖诇 讬讬谉 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讗住讜专 注讚 砖讬转谉 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗祝 讝讛 讬讻讜诇 诇讛转讬专 讗转 谞讚专讜 砖诇讗 注诇 驻讬 讞讻诐 讜讗讜诪专 讛专讬谞讬 讻讗讬诇讜 讛转拽讘诇转讬


He raised an objection to his opinion from a mishna (Nedarim 63b): In the case of one who says to another: Benefiting from me is konam for you, meaning it is prohibited for you to derive benefit from me, if you do not give my son one kor of wheat and two barrels of wine as a wedding gift, Rabbi Meir says: It is prohibited for this other person to benefit from the person who took the vow until he gives his son the gift. And the Rabbis say: Even this individual who took the vow can dissolve his vow without the consent of a halakhic authority, and he does this by saying: I hereby consider it as though I have received the gift from you. Based on this mishna, it would seem that if the husband forgives his wife the money that she owes him, it should be considered as if he received it, and the bill of divorce should be valid.


讛讻讬 讛砖转讗 讛转诐 诇爪注讜专讛 拽讗 诪讻讜讬谉 讜诇讗 爪讬注专讛 讛讻讗 诪砖讜诐 讛专讜讜讞讛 讛讜讗 讜讛讗 诇讗 讗讬爪讟专讬讱


The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of a bill of divorce, he intends to vex her, and until she pays him he did not vex her. If he forgives this condition, his initial intention has not been fulfilled. Here, in the case of the vow, the reason the father took the vow is for the sake of profit; he wants his son to receive a valuable gift, but subsequently the one who took the vow decides that it was not necessary. Therefore, he can waive his claim.


讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗专讬住讬讛 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讚诇讜 转诇转 讚诇讜讜转讗 讜讗讻诇讬 专讬讘注讗 讗转 讚诇讬 讗专讘注讛 讜讗讻讜诇 转讬诇转讗 诇住讜祝 讗转讗 诪讬讟专讗


The Gemara relates an incident of a certain man who said to his sharecropper: Everyone waters the field three times during the season, and they consume, i.e., receive as payment, one quarter of the crops from the field. Will you water four times and consume as your payment one-third of the produce? Ultimately, rain came when the sharecropper would have needed to water a fourth time, and so he did not need to water the field a fourth time. The question was presented to the Sages: Is the sharecropper still entitled to receive one-third of the produce since he was prepared to water the field four times, although ultimately it was not necessary to do so?


讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讛讗 诇讗 讚诇讛 专讘讛 讗诪专 讛讗 诇讗 讗讬爪讟专讬讻讗


Rav Yosef said: But he did not water the field a fourth time, so the condition was not fulfilled. Consequently, he deserves the same as the other sharecroppers, and receives only one quarter of the produce. Rabba said: But it was not necessary to water the field the fourth time because the rain fell to the benefit of the sharecropper, and therefore he should receive one-third of the produce.


诇讬诪讗 专讘 讬讜住祝 讚讗诪专 讻专讘谞谉 讜专讘讛 讚讗诪专 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇


The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Rav Yosef said his ruling in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who require that the condition of the bill of divorce be fulfilled, and that Rabba said his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that it is not the fulfillment of the specifics of the condition that matter but the fulfillment of the intent of the condition?


讜转讬住讘专讗 讜讛讗 拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 讛讬诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讛 讜讘讛讗 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇


The Gemara asks: And how can you understand it in this way? But don鈥檛 we maintain that in all of their disputes the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba when he disagrees with Rav Yosef? And with regard to this halakha we maintain that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. If so, this presents a contradiction between one halakha and another.


讗诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讻专讘谞谉 专讘 讬讜住祝 讻专讘谞谉 讜专讘讛 讗诪专 诇讱 讗谞讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗驻讬诇讜 诇专讘谞谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚诇爪注讜专讛 拽讗 诪讬讻讜讬谉 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诪砖讜诐 讛专讜讜讞讛 讛讜讗 讜讛讗 诇讗 讗讬爪讟专讬讱


Rather, according to both opinions, this dispute is actually in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Rav Yosef clearly rules in accordance with the Rabbis. And Rabba could have said to you: I was saying my statement even according to the opinion of the Rabbis, as the Rabbis are saying there that she is not divorced if she does not return the coat itself only when the husband intends to vex her, and if she does not need to give the coat itself she will not be vexed, as it is not difficult for her to give him its value. But here, in the case of watering the field, the reason the owner is making the condition is only for the sake of increasing his profit, and it was not necessary to actually water the field.


转谞谉 讛转诐 讘专讗砖讜谞讛 讛讬讛 谞讟诪谉 讬讜诐 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 讻讚讬 砖讬讛讗 讞诇讜讟 诇讜 讛转拽讬谉 讛诇诇 讛讝拽谉 砖讬讛讗 讞讜诇砖 讗转 诪注讜转讬讜 诇诇砖讻讛 讜讬讛讗 砖讜讘专 讗转 讛讚诇转 讜谞讻谞住 讜讗讬诪转讬 砖讬专爪讛 讛诇讛 讬讘讜讗 讜讬讟讜诇 讗转 诪注讜转讬讜


搂 With regard to the redemption of houses in walled cities, we learned elsewhere in a mishna (Arakhin 31b) that if a house was sold and not redeemed by its owners within twelve months it remains permanently in the possession of the purchaser. The Gemara describes this: At first the purchaser would hide for all of the final day of the twelfth month so that the house would be confirmed as his (see Leviticus 25:29鈥30). Because the purchaser was in hiding, the seller would be unable to redeem the house from him. Hillel the Elder instituted an ordinance whereby the seller may deposit [岣lesh] his redemption money in the Temple treasury chamber, and then he may break the door of his house and enter and take possession. And when that purchaser wishes, he should come and take his money from the Temple treasury.


讜讗诪专 专讘讗 诪转拽谞转讜 砖诇 讛诇诇 谞砖诪注 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讜谞转谞讛 诇讜 诪讚注转讜 诪讙讜专砖转 注诇 讻讜专讞讜 讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转


And Rava says: From the ordinance of Hillel we learn that if one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, and she gave him the money with his consent, then she is divorced. If she gave it to him against his will then she is not divorced.


诪讚讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇讬讛 诇讛诇诇 诇转拽讜谞讬 谞转讬谞讛 讘注诇 讻讜专讞讬讛 讚讛讜讬讗 诇讛 谞转讬谞讛


How does Rava prove this? From the fact that it was necessary for Hillel to institute a unique ordinance in the case of houses in walled cities whereby giving against the will of the receiver is considered giving.

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