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Today's Daf Yomi

July 30, 2023 | 讬状讘 讘讗讘 转砖驻状讙

  • This month's learning聽is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of聽her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat聽Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.

  • Masechet Gittin is sponsored by Elaine and聽Saul聽Schreiber in honor of their daughter-in-law Daniela Schreiber on receiving her Master of Science in Marriage and Family Therapy.

Gittin 75

诪讻诇诇 讚讘注诇诪讗 谞转讬谞讛 讘注诇 讻专讞讬讛 诇讗 讛讜讬讗 谞转讬谞讛


This proves by inference that generally, giving against the recipient鈥檚 will is not considered valid giving, as if it were, then Hillel would not have needed to institute this ordinance.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 驻驻讗 讜讗讬转讬诪讗 专讘 砖讬诪讬 讘专 讗砖讬 讜讚诇诪讗 讻讬 讗爪讟专讬讱 诇讬讛 诇转拽讜谞讬 砖诇讗 讘驻谞讬讜 讗讘诇 讘驻谞讬讜 讘讬谉 诪讚注转讜 讘讬谉 讘注诇 讻专讞讜 讛讜讬讗 谞转讬谞讛


Rav Pappa objects to this, and some say it was Rav Shimi bar Ashi who raises this objection: And perhaps when it was necessary for Hillel to institute an ordinance allowing the seller to repay the money against the will of the purchaser it was specifically in a case where he gives the money not in the presence of the purchaser. But when he repays him in his presence, whether the recipient was willing or whether it was against his will, it is considered valid giving. Accordingly, one cannot apply Hillel鈥檚 ordinance to the case of conditional bills of divorce.


讜讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪转拽谞转讜 砖诇 讛诇诇 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讜谞转谞讛 诇讜 讘讬谉 诪讚注转讜 讜讘讬谉 讘注诇 讻专讞讜 讛讜讬讗 谞转讬谞讛 讜讻讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇讬讛 诇讛诇诇 诇转拽讜谞讬 砖诇讗 讘驻谞讬讜 讗讘诇 讘驻谞讬讜 讘讬谉 诪讚注转讜 讘讬谉 讘注诇 讻专讞讜 讛讜讬讗 谞转讬谞讛


And there are those who say a different version of this discussion. Rava says: From the ordinance of Hillel it can be inferred that if one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, and she gave it to him, whether it was with his consent or whether it was against his will, it is valid giving. And the case where it was necessary for Hillel to institute his ordinance was when the giving of the money was not in his presence. But if the repayment was in his presence, whether it was with his consent or whether it was against his will, it is considered valid giving.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 驻驻讗 讜讗讬转讬诪讗 专讘 砖讬诪讬 讘专 讗砖讬 讜讚诇诪讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讘驻谞讬讜 谞诪讬 诪讚注转讜 讗讬谉 注诇 讻专讞讜 诇讗 讜讛诇诇 诪讗讬 讚讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇讬讛 转拽讬谉


Rav Pappa objects to this, and some say it was Rav Shimi bar Ashi who raises this objection: And perhaps even in a case where she gives him the money in his presence, if she gives it with his consent, yes, it is valid. If she gives it against his will, no, it is not considered to be valid giving. And Hillel specifically instituted what was necessary, because in the case of a house in a walled city the purchaser would hide, and therefore that ordinance was necessary there.


讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讘专 讞谞讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖砖谞讛 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讘诪砖谞转讬谞讜 讛诇讻讛 讻诪讜转讜 讞讜抓 诪注专讘 讜爪讬讚谉


Rabba bar bar 岣na says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: In every place where Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught a halakha in our body of Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, even though it is cited as an individual opinion, except for three cases. With regard to the halakha of a guarantor (Bava Batra 173b), if the creditor stipulated that he can collect his debt from either the debtor or the guarantor, according to the Rabbis he can collect from the guarantor鈥檚 property even if the debtor has available property. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the creditor can collect the debt only from the debtor. And likewise the halakha is not like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with regard to the case mentioned here concerning the incident that occurred in Tzaidan.


讜专讗讬讛 讗讞专讜谞讛


And similarly, the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concerning the dispute with regard to evidence in the final disagreement (Sanhedrin 31a), where the Rabbis hold that if one claims that he has no evidence or witnesses, but subsequently brings evidence to court, the judges do not accept it. According to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel they can accept it.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 讜讛谞讬讬专 砖诇讬 讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讞讝讬专讬 诇讬 讗转 讛谞讬讬专 诪讙讜专砖转


The Sages taught in a baraita: If the husband said to his wife: Behold this is your bill of divorce, but the paper on which it is written is still mine, then she is not divorced, as he must give her the actual bill of divorce in order for the divorce to take effect. Since the paper still belongs to him, it is as if he had given her only the writing. But if he said to her: Behold this is your bill of divorce on the condition that you return the paper to me, then she is divorced. The bill of divorce belongs entirely to her, and the returning of the paper is only a stipulation that must be fulfilled later.


诪讗讬 砖谞讗 专讬砖讗 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 住讬驻讗 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 转转谉 诇讜 讗转 讚诪讬讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讗驻砖专 讚诪驻讬讬住讛 诇讬讛 讘讚诪讬


The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause of the baraita and what is different in the latter clause? In neither case does she have ownership of the bill of divorce. Rav 岣sda said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says with regard to his coat that she can give him its value and does not need to give the item itself in order to fulfill the condition. Here also, since it is possible for her to appease him with money and she may give him the value of the paper, therefore it is considered as though she received the paper.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 讗讘讬讬 讗讬诪讜专 讚讗诪专 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讬转讬讛 讘注讬谞讬讛 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬转讬讛 讘注讬谞讬讛 诪讬 讗诪专


Abaye objects to this answer: Say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that it is acceptable to give the value instead of the item itself when the item is not extant, because it is lost. But in a case where it is extant, such as the paper in this case, did Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel actually say that giving the value of the item is sufficient?


讗诇讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 讘注讬谞谉 转谞讗讬 讻驻讜诇 讜讛讻讗 讛讗 诇讗 讻驻诇讬讛 诇转谞讗讬讛


Rather, Abaye said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: We require any stipulated condition to be structured as a compound condition describing both outcomes, meaning that the condition must mention what will happen both if the condition is fulfilled and if it is not fulfilled. And here he did not compound his condition. The husband said only: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you return the paper to me. He did not specify that it will not be a valid bill of divorce if she does not return it.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讗 讟注诪讗 讚诇讗 讻驻诇讬讛 诇转谞讗讬讛 讛讗 讻驻诇讬讛 诇转谞讗讬讛 诇讗 讛讜讬 讙讬讟讗 诪讻讚讬 讻诇 转谞讗讬 诪讛讬讻讗 讙诪专讬谞谉 诇讛讜 诪转谞讗讬 讘谞讬 讙讚 讜讘谞讬 专讗讜讘谉


Rava objects to this explanation: According to Abaye the reason the bill of divorce is valid is that the husband did not compound his condition, but if the husband did compound his condition then it would not be a valid bill of divorce. Now, from where do we learn the halakhot of all conditions? They are derived from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben. Moses stipulated with them that if they fight the battles with the Jewish people in Eretz Yisrael, they will inherit the land of Gilead in the Transjordan, as they requested; but if they do not fight the battles with the Jewish people in Eretz Yisrael, they will not inherit that land (see Numbers, chapter 32).


诪讛 讛转诐 转谞讗讬 拽讜讚诐 诇诪注砖讛 讗祝 讻诇 转谞讗讬 拽讜讚诐 诇诪注砖讛 诇讗驻讜拽讬 讛讻讗 讚诪注砖讛 拽讜讚诐 诇转谞讗讬


Just as there, in the conditions that Moses made, the language of the condition precedes the consequent action, for he first stated the condition and afterward he described the result if they fulfill the condition: 鈥淎nd you shall give them the land of Gilead as an inheritance鈥 (Numbers 32:29), so too, any condition is valid only when it is stated before the resultant action. And this serves to exclude the case mentioned here, where the resultant action of the giving of the bill of divorce precedes the condition. Consequently, according to Rabbi Meir this bill of divorce would not be valid, even if the husband had compounded the condition.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诪注砖讛 拽讜讚诐 诇转谞讗讬


Rather, Rava said: The condition does not apply and the woman is divorced because the action of giving the bill of divorce precedes the condition.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 讟注诪讗 讚诪注砖讛 拽讜讚诐 诇转谞讗讬 讛讗 转谞讗讬 拽讜讚诐 诇诪注砖讛 诇讗 讛讜讬 讙讬讟讗 诪讻讚讬 讻诇 转谞讗讬 诪讛讬讻讗 讙诪专讬谞谉 诇讛讜 诪转谞讗讬 讘谞讬 讙讚 讜讘谞讬 专讗讜讘谉 诪讛 讛转诐 转谞讗讬 讘讚讘专 讗讞讚 讜诪注砖讛 讘讚讘专 讗讞专 讗祝 讻诇 诇讗驻讜拽讬 讛讻讗


Rav Adda bar Ahava objects to this explanation: The reason that the bill of divorce is valid is that the action precedes the condition, and the condition does not take effect. But if the condition were to precede the action then it would not be a valid bill of divorce. Now, from where do we learn all the halakhot of conditions? They are derived from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben. Just as there it is a condition with regard to one matter, i.e., that they should fight along with the rest of the Jewish people, and a resultant action with regard to another matter, i.e., that they would receive the land of Gilead, so too, every other condition must follow this pattern. This serves to exclude the case mentioned here,


讚转谞讗讬 讜诪注砖讛 讘讚讘专 讗讞讚 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 诪砖讜诐 讚转谞讗讬 讜诪注砖讛 讘讚讘专 讗讞讚


where the condition and the action are about the same matter, the giving of the bill of divorce. Accordingly, the condition would not be valid even if one were to disregard the concern of the action preceding the condition. Rather, Rav Adda bar Ahava said that this condition is void because the condition and the action are about the same matter, and therefore the bill of divorce is valid even without fulfillment of the condition.


专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讗讜诪专 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬


Rav Ashi said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as Rav Huna says that Rav says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states: The agreement will take effect retroactively from now, even though the condition is fulfilled only later on. Consequently, the bill of divorce is effective immediately, even if the woman will later be required to return the document itself to him.


讗转拽讬谉 砖诪讜讗诇 讘讙讬讟讗 讚砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讗诐 诇讗 诪转讬 诇讗 讬讛讗 讙讟 讜讗诐 诪转讬 讬讛讗 讙讟


搂 With regard to conditions in a bill of divorce, Shmuel instituted that in a bill of divorce of a person on his deathbed the following expression should be written: If I do not die this will not be a valid bill of divorce, and if I die it will be a valid bill of divorce.


讜诇讬诪讗 讗诐 诪转讬 讬讛讗 讙讟 讜讗诐 诇讗 诪转讬 诇讗 讬讛讗 讙讟 诇讗 诪拽讚讬诐 讗讬谞讬砖 驻讜专注谞讜转讗 诇谞驻砖讬讛


The Gemara asks about the wording used here: But let us say this statement in a more intuitive order: If I die it will be a valid bill of divorce, and if I do not die this will not be a valid bill of divorce. The Gemara explains: A person does not hasten a calamity upon himself. Consequently, he does not wish to mention his death first.


讜诇讬诪讗 诇讗 讬讛讗 讙讟 讗诐 诇讗 诪转讬 讘注讬谞谉 转谞讗讬 拽讜讚诐 诇诪注砖讛


The Gemara asks: Why did Shmuel use this phrasing? But let us say the condition using the following formulation: It will not be a valid bill of divorce if I do not die, and it will be a valid bill of divorce if I do die. The Gemara asks: When stipulating a condition, we require the condition to come before the action, but in this formulation the resultant action, that the bill of divorce is not valid, precedes the condition, if I do not die.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讗 诪讻讚讬 讻诇 转谞讗讬 诪讛讬讻讗 讙诪专讬谞谉 诪转谞讗讬 讘谞讬 讙讚 讜讘谞讬 专讗讜讘谉 诪讛 讛转诐 讛谉 拽讜讚诐 诇诇讗讜 讗祝 讻诇 诇讗驻讜拽讬 讛讻讗 讚诇讗讜 拽讜讚诐 诇讛谉


Rava objects to this explanation: Now, from where do we learn the principles of all conditions? They are derived from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben. Just as there, the affirmative precedes the negative, meaning that the positive portion that speaks about what will occur if the condition is fulfilled appears before the negative portions that describe what will exist if the condition is not fulfilled, so too, all conditions must be formulated in this manner. This serves to exclude the case here, instituted by Shmuel, where the negative precedes the affirmative.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诐 诇讗 诪转讬 诇讗 讬讛讗 讙讟 讗诐 诪转讬 讬讛讗 讙讟 讗诐 诇讗 诪转讬 诇讗 讬讛讗 讙讟


Rather, Rava said that the condition in the bill of divorce of a dying man should be worded in the following manner: If I do not die this will not be a bill of divorce. If I die this will be a bill of divorce, and if I do not die this will not be a bill of divorce.


讗诐 诇讗 诪转讬 诇讗 讬讛讗 讙讟 诇讗 诪拽讚讬诐 讗讬谞讬砖 驻讜专注谞讜转讗 诇谞驻砖讬讛 讗诐 诪转讬 讬讛讗 讙讟 讗诐 诇讗 诪转讬 诇讗 讬讛讗 讙讟 讘注讬谞谉 讛谉 拽讜讚诐 诇诇讗讜


The Gemara explains the necessity for such a formulation: The husband first says: If I do not die this will not be a bill of divorce, because a person does not hasten a calamity upon himself. Therefore, he first mentions the possibility that he will not die. Then he states the compound condition in the following order: If I die this will be a bill of divorce, and if I do not die this will not be a bill of divorce. This is because we require that the affirmative precedes the negative.


诪转谞讬壮 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转砖诪砖讬 讗转 讗讘讗 注诇 诪谞转 砖转谞讬拽讬 讗转 讘谞讬 讻诪讛 讛讬讗 诪谞讬拽转讜 砖转讬 砖谞讬诐 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 砖诪谞讛 注砖专 讞讚砖 诪转 讛讘谉 讗讜 砖诪转 讛讗讘 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟


MISHNA: If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will serve my father, or: On the condition that you will nurse, i.e., breastfeed, my son, without specifying a time period, how long is she required to nurse him in order to fulfill the condition? She is required to nurse the baby for two years from his birth, which is the length of time generally designated for nursing. Rabbi Yehuda says: The time for nursing is only eighteen months. If the baby son died or the husband鈥檚 father died, this is a valid bill of divorce, even though the condition was not fulfilled.


讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转砖诪砖讬 讗转 讗讘讗 砖转讬 砖谞讬诐 注诇 诪谞转 砖转谞讬拽讬 讗转 讘谞讬 砖转讬 砖谞讬诐 诪转 讛讘谉 讗讜 砖讗诪专 讛讗讘 讗讬 讗驻砖讬 砖转砖诪砖谞讬 砖诇讗 讘讛拽驻讚讛 讗讬谞讜 讙讟


But if the husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will serve my father for two years, or: On the condition that you will nurse my son for two years, and the son died before she nursed him for two years, or the father said: I do not want you to serve me, then even if the father did not say this in anger and she did everything she was expected to do, it is not a valid bill of divorce because the condition was not fulfilled.


专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讻讝讛 讙讟 讻诇诇 讗诪专 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讻诇 注讻讘讛 砖讗讬谞讛 讛讬诪谞讛 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟


Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In a case like this it is a valid bill of divorce. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel stated a principle: If there is any hindrance to the fulfillment of the condition that does not result from her, then it is a valid bill of divorce.


讙诪壮 讜诪讬 讘注讬谞谉 讻讜诇讬 讛讗讬 讜专诪讬谞讛讬 砖诪砖转讜 讬讜诐 讗讞讚 讛谞讬拽转讜 讬讜诐 讗讞讚 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟


GEMARA: But do we require that she serve the father or nurse the son for all of this time that was stipulated? And the Gemara raises a contradiction based on what was taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Nidda 2:2): If she served the father for one day or she nursed the son for one day it is a valid bill of divorce.


讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 专讘谞谉 讜讛讗 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇


Rav 岣sda said that this is not difficult: This baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who disagreed in the previous mishna (74a) with regard to a coat that was lost. According to the opinion of the Rabbis there, if there is no possibility that the wife can fulfill the condition by returning the coat, as it was lost, the bill of divorce is not valid. According to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel there, she can give the husband the coat鈥檚 value and the bill of divorce is valid.


诪转谞讬转讬谉 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜讘专讬讬转讗 专讘谞谉


The Gemara explains: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who claims that the wife can give the husband the equivalent of the stipulated item to render the bill of divorce valid, as the primary factor is his receiving the benefit he intended when stating his condition. Therefore, she must nurse the child for the standard length of time, as that is the benefit he intended when stating his condition, or else the bill of divorce is not valid. And the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that the wife must fulfill the literal terms of the condition. If she nurses the baby for even one day, or serves the father for a single day, the literal terms of the condition have been fulfilled.


讛讗 诪讚住讬驻讗 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讜讬 诪讻诇诇 讚专讬砖讗 诇讗讜 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗诇讗 讘专讬讬转讗 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讬讗 讚诪讬拽诇 讘转谞讗讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 专讘谞谉


The Gemara challenges: Is this explanation possible? But from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna is attributed to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, it can be derived by inference that the first clause is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Rather, the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who is lenient with regard to a condition, and interprets it so that it can be fulfilled. The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who interpret the condition in an expanded manner.


专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 讘住转诐 讻讗谉 讘诪驻专砖


Rava offered an alternative explanation and said that the apparent contradiction is not difficult: Here, in the mishna, where the husband spoke without specification and did not set a time, the Sages assigned what they understand to be the standard time for the stipulated action. There, in the baraita, it is referring to where the husband said explicitly that she should perform the action for only one day.


专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讻诇 住转诐 谞诪讬 讻诪驻专砖 讬讜诐 讗讞讚 讚诪讬


Rav Ashi offered a different alternative explanation and said: Any unspecified statement is also considered to be as though he explicitly said one day. Since the husband did not mention a specific amount of time in which to perform the action, one day should be sufficient.


转谞谉 讻诪讛 讛讬讗 诪谞讬拽转讜 砖转讬 砖谞讬诐 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 砖诪谞讛 注砖专 讞讚砖 讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘讗 谞讬讞讗 讗诇讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 诇诪讛 诇讬 砖转讬 砖谞讬诐 诇诪讛 诇讬 砖诪谞讛 注砖专 讞讚砖 讘讬讜诐 讗讞讚 住讙讬


The Gemara challenges Rav Ashi鈥檚 explanation: We learned in the mishna: How long is she required to nurse him in order to fulfill the condition? She is required to nurse the baby for two years from his birth. Rabbi Yehuda says: The time for nursing is only eighteen months. Granted, according to the opinion of Rava, it works out well that if the husband does not specify the length of time, the wife must nurse the baby for the generally accepted time. But according to the opinion of Rav Ashi, why do I need her to nurse the baby for two years or why do I need her to nurse him for eighteen months? One day should suffice to fulfill the husband鈥檚 condition.


讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讬讜诐 讗讞讚 诪砖转讬 砖谞讬诐 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诇讗讞专 砖转讬 砖谞讬诐 讚诇讗 讬讜诐 讗讞讚 诪砖诪谞讛 注砖专 讞讚砖 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诇讗讞专 砖诪谞讛 注砖专 讞讚砖 讚诇讗


The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying according to the opinion of Rav Ashi: How long is the wife required to nurse the baby? One day from within the two years of the baby鈥檚 birth, to exclude the case where the one day that she nursed him occurred after he was two years old, in which case the husband鈥檚 condition would not be fulfilled, for that is the accepted length of time for a mother to nurse a baby. Or according to Rabbi Yehuda one day from within the eighteen months of the baby鈥檚 birth, to exclude the case where the one day that she nursed him occurred after he was she nursed him occurred after he was eighteen months old, in which case the bill of divorce would not be valid.


诪讬转讬讘讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转砖诪砖讬 讗转 讗讘讗 砖转讬 砖谞讬诐 注诇 诪谞转 砖转谞讬拽讬 讗转 讘谞讬 砖转讬 砖谞讬诐 诪转 讛讘谉 讗讜 砖讗诪专 讛讗讘 讗讬 讗驻砖讬 砖转砖诪砖谞讬 砖诇讗 讘讛拽驻讚讛 讗讬谞讜 讙讟


The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Ashi from the latter clause of the mishna: If a husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will serve my father for two years, or: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will nurse my son for two years, and the son died or the father said: I do not want you to serve me, then even though the father did not say this in anger, it is not a valid bill of divorce.

  • This month's learning聽is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of聽her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat聽Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.

  • Masechet Gittin is sponsored by Elaine and聽Saul聽Schreiber in honor of their daughter-in-law Daniela Schreiber on receiving her Master of Science in Marriage and Family Therapy.

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Gittin 75

诪讻诇诇 讚讘注诇诪讗 谞转讬谞讛 讘注诇 讻专讞讬讛 诇讗 讛讜讬讗 谞转讬谞讛


This proves by inference that generally, giving against the recipient鈥檚 will is not considered valid giving, as if it were, then Hillel would not have needed to institute this ordinance.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 驻驻讗 讜讗讬转讬诪讗 专讘 砖讬诪讬 讘专 讗砖讬 讜讚诇诪讗 讻讬 讗爪讟专讬讱 诇讬讛 诇转拽讜谞讬 砖诇讗 讘驻谞讬讜 讗讘诇 讘驻谞讬讜 讘讬谉 诪讚注转讜 讘讬谉 讘注诇 讻专讞讜 讛讜讬讗 谞转讬谞讛


Rav Pappa objects to this, and some say it was Rav Shimi bar Ashi who raises this objection: And perhaps when it was necessary for Hillel to institute an ordinance allowing the seller to repay the money against the will of the purchaser it was specifically in a case where he gives the money not in the presence of the purchaser. But when he repays him in his presence, whether the recipient was willing or whether it was against his will, it is considered valid giving. Accordingly, one cannot apply Hillel鈥檚 ordinance to the case of conditional bills of divorce.


讜讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪转拽谞转讜 砖诇 讛诇诇 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讜谞转谞讛 诇讜 讘讬谉 诪讚注转讜 讜讘讬谉 讘注诇 讻专讞讜 讛讜讬讗 谞转讬谞讛 讜讻讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇讬讛 诇讛诇诇 诇转拽讜谞讬 砖诇讗 讘驻谞讬讜 讗讘诇 讘驻谞讬讜 讘讬谉 诪讚注转讜 讘讬谉 讘注诇 讻专讞讜 讛讜讬讗 谞转讬谞讛


And there are those who say a different version of this discussion. Rava says: From the ordinance of Hillel it can be inferred that if one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, and she gave it to him, whether it was with his consent or whether it was against his will, it is valid giving. And the case where it was necessary for Hillel to institute his ordinance was when the giving of the money was not in his presence. But if the repayment was in his presence, whether it was with his consent or whether it was against his will, it is considered valid giving.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 驻驻讗 讜讗讬转讬诪讗 专讘 砖讬诪讬 讘专 讗砖讬 讜讚诇诪讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讘驻谞讬讜 谞诪讬 诪讚注转讜 讗讬谉 注诇 讻专讞讜 诇讗 讜讛诇诇 诪讗讬 讚讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇讬讛 转拽讬谉


Rav Pappa objects to this, and some say it was Rav Shimi bar Ashi who raises this objection: And perhaps even in a case where she gives him the money in his presence, if she gives it with his consent, yes, it is valid. If she gives it against his will, no, it is not considered to be valid giving. And Hillel specifically instituted what was necessary, because in the case of a house in a walled city the purchaser would hide, and therefore that ordinance was necessary there.


讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讘专 讞谞讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖砖谞讛 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讘诪砖谞转讬谞讜 讛诇讻讛 讻诪讜转讜 讞讜抓 诪注专讘 讜爪讬讚谉


Rabba bar bar 岣na says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: In every place where Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught a halakha in our body of Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, even though it is cited as an individual opinion, except for three cases. With regard to the halakha of a guarantor (Bava Batra 173b), if the creditor stipulated that he can collect his debt from either the debtor or the guarantor, according to the Rabbis he can collect from the guarantor鈥檚 property even if the debtor has available property. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the creditor can collect the debt only from the debtor. And likewise the halakha is not like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with regard to the case mentioned here concerning the incident that occurred in Tzaidan.


讜专讗讬讛 讗讞专讜谞讛


And similarly, the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concerning the dispute with regard to evidence in the final disagreement (Sanhedrin 31a), where the Rabbis hold that if one claims that he has no evidence or witnesses, but subsequently brings evidence to court, the judges do not accept it. According to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel they can accept it.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 讜讛谞讬讬专 砖诇讬 讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讞讝讬专讬 诇讬 讗转 讛谞讬讬专 诪讙讜专砖转


The Sages taught in a baraita: If the husband said to his wife: Behold this is your bill of divorce, but the paper on which it is written is still mine, then she is not divorced, as he must give her the actual bill of divorce in order for the divorce to take effect. Since the paper still belongs to him, it is as if he had given her only the writing. But if he said to her: Behold this is your bill of divorce on the condition that you return the paper to me, then she is divorced. The bill of divorce belongs entirely to her, and the returning of the paper is only a stipulation that must be fulfilled later.


诪讗讬 砖谞讗 专讬砖讗 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 住讬驻讗 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 转转谉 诇讜 讗转 讚诪讬讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讗驻砖专 讚诪驻讬讬住讛 诇讬讛 讘讚诪讬


The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause of the baraita and what is different in the latter clause? In neither case does she have ownership of the bill of divorce. Rav 岣sda said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says with regard to his coat that she can give him its value and does not need to give the item itself in order to fulfill the condition. Here also, since it is possible for her to appease him with money and she may give him the value of the paper, therefore it is considered as though she received the paper.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 讗讘讬讬 讗讬诪讜专 讚讗诪专 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讬转讬讛 讘注讬谞讬讛 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬转讬讛 讘注讬谞讬讛 诪讬 讗诪专


Abaye objects to this answer: Say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that it is acceptable to give the value instead of the item itself when the item is not extant, because it is lost. But in a case where it is extant, such as the paper in this case, did Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel actually say that giving the value of the item is sufficient?


讗诇讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 讘注讬谞谉 转谞讗讬 讻驻讜诇 讜讛讻讗 讛讗 诇讗 讻驻诇讬讛 诇转谞讗讬讛


Rather, Abaye said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: We require any stipulated condition to be structured as a compound condition describing both outcomes, meaning that the condition must mention what will happen both if the condition is fulfilled and if it is not fulfilled. And here he did not compound his condition. The husband said only: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you return the paper to me. He did not specify that it will not be a valid bill of divorce if she does not return it.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讗 讟注诪讗 讚诇讗 讻驻诇讬讛 诇转谞讗讬讛 讛讗 讻驻诇讬讛 诇转谞讗讬讛 诇讗 讛讜讬 讙讬讟讗 诪讻讚讬 讻诇 转谞讗讬 诪讛讬讻讗 讙诪专讬谞谉 诇讛讜 诪转谞讗讬 讘谞讬 讙讚 讜讘谞讬 专讗讜讘谉


Rava objects to this explanation: According to Abaye the reason the bill of divorce is valid is that the husband did not compound his condition, but if the husband did compound his condition then it would not be a valid bill of divorce. Now, from where do we learn the halakhot of all conditions? They are derived from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben. Moses stipulated with them that if they fight the battles with the Jewish people in Eretz Yisrael, they will inherit the land of Gilead in the Transjordan, as they requested; but if they do not fight the battles with the Jewish people in Eretz Yisrael, they will not inherit that land (see Numbers, chapter 32).


诪讛 讛转诐 转谞讗讬 拽讜讚诐 诇诪注砖讛 讗祝 讻诇 转谞讗讬 拽讜讚诐 诇诪注砖讛 诇讗驻讜拽讬 讛讻讗 讚诪注砖讛 拽讜讚诐 诇转谞讗讬


Just as there, in the conditions that Moses made, the language of the condition precedes the consequent action, for he first stated the condition and afterward he described the result if they fulfill the condition: 鈥淎nd you shall give them the land of Gilead as an inheritance鈥 (Numbers 32:29), so too, any condition is valid only when it is stated before the resultant action. And this serves to exclude the case mentioned here, where the resultant action of the giving of the bill of divorce precedes the condition. Consequently, according to Rabbi Meir this bill of divorce would not be valid, even if the husband had compounded the condition.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诪注砖讛 拽讜讚诐 诇转谞讗讬


Rather, Rava said: The condition does not apply and the woman is divorced because the action of giving the bill of divorce precedes the condition.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 讟注诪讗 讚诪注砖讛 拽讜讚诐 诇转谞讗讬 讛讗 转谞讗讬 拽讜讚诐 诇诪注砖讛 诇讗 讛讜讬 讙讬讟讗 诪讻讚讬 讻诇 转谞讗讬 诪讛讬讻讗 讙诪专讬谞谉 诇讛讜 诪转谞讗讬 讘谞讬 讙讚 讜讘谞讬 专讗讜讘谉 诪讛 讛转诐 转谞讗讬 讘讚讘专 讗讞讚 讜诪注砖讛 讘讚讘专 讗讞专 讗祝 讻诇 诇讗驻讜拽讬 讛讻讗


Rav Adda bar Ahava objects to this explanation: The reason that the bill of divorce is valid is that the action precedes the condition, and the condition does not take effect. But if the condition were to precede the action then it would not be a valid bill of divorce. Now, from where do we learn all the halakhot of conditions? They are derived from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben. Just as there it is a condition with regard to one matter, i.e., that they should fight along with the rest of the Jewish people, and a resultant action with regard to another matter, i.e., that they would receive the land of Gilead, so too, every other condition must follow this pattern. This serves to exclude the case mentioned here,


讚转谞讗讬 讜诪注砖讛 讘讚讘专 讗讞讚 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 诪砖讜诐 讚转谞讗讬 讜诪注砖讛 讘讚讘专 讗讞讚


where the condition and the action are about the same matter, the giving of the bill of divorce. Accordingly, the condition would not be valid even if one were to disregard the concern of the action preceding the condition. Rather, Rav Adda bar Ahava said that this condition is void because the condition and the action are about the same matter, and therefore the bill of divorce is valid even without fulfillment of the condition.


专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讗讜诪专 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬


Rav Ashi said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as Rav Huna says that Rav says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states: The agreement will take effect retroactively from now, even though the condition is fulfilled only later on. Consequently, the bill of divorce is effective immediately, even if the woman will later be required to return the document itself to him.


讗转拽讬谉 砖诪讜讗诇 讘讙讬讟讗 讚砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讗诐 诇讗 诪转讬 诇讗 讬讛讗 讙讟 讜讗诐 诪转讬 讬讛讗 讙讟


搂 With regard to conditions in a bill of divorce, Shmuel instituted that in a bill of divorce of a person on his deathbed the following expression should be written: If I do not die this will not be a valid bill of divorce, and if I die it will be a valid bill of divorce.


讜诇讬诪讗 讗诐 诪转讬 讬讛讗 讙讟 讜讗诐 诇讗 诪转讬 诇讗 讬讛讗 讙讟 诇讗 诪拽讚讬诐 讗讬谞讬砖 驻讜专注谞讜转讗 诇谞驻砖讬讛


The Gemara asks about the wording used here: But let us say this statement in a more intuitive order: If I die it will be a valid bill of divorce, and if I do not die this will not be a valid bill of divorce. The Gemara explains: A person does not hasten a calamity upon himself. Consequently, he does not wish to mention his death first.


讜诇讬诪讗 诇讗 讬讛讗 讙讟 讗诐 诇讗 诪转讬 讘注讬谞谉 转谞讗讬 拽讜讚诐 诇诪注砖讛


The Gemara asks: Why did Shmuel use this phrasing? But let us say the condition using the following formulation: It will not be a valid bill of divorce if I do not die, and it will be a valid bill of divorce if I do die. The Gemara asks: When stipulating a condition, we require the condition to come before the action, but in this formulation the resultant action, that the bill of divorce is not valid, precedes the condition, if I do not die.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讗 诪讻讚讬 讻诇 转谞讗讬 诪讛讬讻讗 讙诪专讬谞谉 诪转谞讗讬 讘谞讬 讙讚 讜讘谞讬 专讗讜讘谉 诪讛 讛转诐 讛谉 拽讜讚诐 诇诇讗讜 讗祝 讻诇 诇讗驻讜拽讬 讛讻讗 讚诇讗讜 拽讜讚诐 诇讛谉


Rava objects to this explanation: Now, from where do we learn the principles of all conditions? They are derived from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben. Just as there, the affirmative precedes the negative, meaning that the positive portion that speaks about what will occur if the condition is fulfilled appears before the negative portions that describe what will exist if the condition is not fulfilled, so too, all conditions must be formulated in this manner. This serves to exclude the case here, instituted by Shmuel, where the negative precedes the affirmative.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诐 诇讗 诪转讬 诇讗 讬讛讗 讙讟 讗诐 诪转讬 讬讛讗 讙讟 讗诐 诇讗 诪转讬 诇讗 讬讛讗 讙讟


Rather, Rava said that the condition in the bill of divorce of a dying man should be worded in the following manner: If I do not die this will not be a bill of divorce. If I die this will be a bill of divorce, and if I do not die this will not be a bill of divorce.


讗诐 诇讗 诪转讬 诇讗 讬讛讗 讙讟 诇讗 诪拽讚讬诐 讗讬谞讬砖 驻讜专注谞讜转讗 诇谞驻砖讬讛 讗诐 诪转讬 讬讛讗 讙讟 讗诐 诇讗 诪转讬 诇讗 讬讛讗 讙讟 讘注讬谞谉 讛谉 拽讜讚诐 诇诇讗讜


The Gemara explains the necessity for such a formulation: The husband first says: If I do not die this will not be a bill of divorce, because a person does not hasten a calamity upon himself. Therefore, he first mentions the possibility that he will not die. Then he states the compound condition in the following order: If I die this will be a bill of divorce, and if I do not die this will not be a bill of divorce. This is because we require that the affirmative precedes the negative.


诪转谞讬壮 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转砖诪砖讬 讗转 讗讘讗 注诇 诪谞转 砖转谞讬拽讬 讗转 讘谞讬 讻诪讛 讛讬讗 诪谞讬拽转讜 砖转讬 砖谞讬诐 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 砖诪谞讛 注砖专 讞讚砖 诪转 讛讘谉 讗讜 砖诪转 讛讗讘 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟


MISHNA: If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will serve my father, or: On the condition that you will nurse, i.e., breastfeed, my son, without specifying a time period, how long is she required to nurse him in order to fulfill the condition? She is required to nurse the baby for two years from his birth, which is the length of time generally designated for nursing. Rabbi Yehuda says: The time for nursing is only eighteen months. If the baby son died or the husband鈥檚 father died, this is a valid bill of divorce, even though the condition was not fulfilled.


讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转砖诪砖讬 讗转 讗讘讗 砖转讬 砖谞讬诐 注诇 诪谞转 砖转谞讬拽讬 讗转 讘谞讬 砖转讬 砖谞讬诐 诪转 讛讘谉 讗讜 砖讗诪专 讛讗讘 讗讬 讗驻砖讬 砖转砖诪砖谞讬 砖诇讗 讘讛拽驻讚讛 讗讬谞讜 讙讟


But if the husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will serve my father for two years, or: On the condition that you will nurse my son for two years, and the son died before she nursed him for two years, or the father said: I do not want you to serve me, then even if the father did not say this in anger and she did everything she was expected to do, it is not a valid bill of divorce because the condition was not fulfilled.


专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讻讝讛 讙讟 讻诇诇 讗诪专 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讻诇 注讻讘讛 砖讗讬谞讛 讛讬诪谞讛 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟


Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In a case like this it is a valid bill of divorce. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel stated a principle: If there is any hindrance to the fulfillment of the condition that does not result from her, then it is a valid bill of divorce.


讙诪壮 讜诪讬 讘注讬谞谉 讻讜诇讬 讛讗讬 讜专诪讬谞讛讬 砖诪砖转讜 讬讜诐 讗讞讚 讛谞讬拽转讜 讬讜诐 讗讞讚 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟


GEMARA: But do we require that she serve the father or nurse the son for all of this time that was stipulated? And the Gemara raises a contradiction based on what was taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Nidda 2:2): If she served the father for one day or she nursed the son for one day it is a valid bill of divorce.


讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 专讘谞谉 讜讛讗 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇


Rav 岣sda said that this is not difficult: This baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who disagreed in the previous mishna (74a) with regard to a coat that was lost. According to the opinion of the Rabbis there, if there is no possibility that the wife can fulfill the condition by returning the coat, as it was lost, the bill of divorce is not valid. According to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel there, she can give the husband the coat鈥檚 value and the bill of divorce is valid.


诪转谞讬转讬谉 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜讘专讬讬转讗 专讘谞谉


The Gemara explains: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who claims that the wife can give the husband the equivalent of the stipulated item to render the bill of divorce valid, as the primary factor is his receiving the benefit he intended when stating his condition. Therefore, she must nurse the child for the standard length of time, as that is the benefit he intended when stating his condition, or else the bill of divorce is not valid. And the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that the wife must fulfill the literal terms of the condition. If she nurses the baby for even one day, or serves the father for a single day, the literal terms of the condition have been fulfilled.


讛讗 诪讚住讬驻讗 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讜讬 诪讻诇诇 讚专讬砖讗 诇讗讜 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗诇讗 讘专讬讬转讗 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讬讗 讚诪讬拽诇 讘转谞讗讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 专讘谞谉


The Gemara challenges: Is this explanation possible? But from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna is attributed to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, it can be derived by inference that the first clause is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Rather, the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who is lenient with regard to a condition, and interprets it so that it can be fulfilled. The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who interpret the condition in an expanded manner.


专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 讘住转诐 讻讗谉 讘诪驻专砖


Rava offered an alternative explanation and said that the apparent contradiction is not difficult: Here, in the mishna, where the husband spoke without specification and did not set a time, the Sages assigned what they understand to be the standard time for the stipulated action. There, in the baraita, it is referring to where the husband said explicitly that she should perform the action for only one day.


专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讻诇 住转诐 谞诪讬 讻诪驻专砖 讬讜诐 讗讞讚 讚诪讬


Rav Ashi offered a different alternative explanation and said: Any unspecified statement is also considered to be as though he explicitly said one day. Since the husband did not mention a specific amount of time in which to perform the action, one day should be sufficient.


转谞谉 讻诪讛 讛讬讗 诪谞讬拽转讜 砖转讬 砖谞讬诐 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 砖诪谞讛 注砖专 讞讚砖 讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘讗 谞讬讞讗 讗诇讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 诇诪讛 诇讬 砖转讬 砖谞讬诐 诇诪讛 诇讬 砖诪谞讛 注砖专 讞讚砖 讘讬讜诐 讗讞讚 住讙讬


The Gemara challenges Rav Ashi鈥檚 explanation: We learned in the mishna: How long is she required to nurse him in order to fulfill the condition? She is required to nurse the baby for two years from his birth. Rabbi Yehuda says: The time for nursing is only eighteen months. Granted, according to the opinion of Rava, it works out well that if the husband does not specify the length of time, the wife must nurse the baby for the generally accepted time. But according to the opinion of Rav Ashi, why do I need her to nurse the baby for two years or why do I need her to nurse him for eighteen months? One day should suffice to fulfill the husband鈥檚 condition.


讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讬讜诐 讗讞讚 诪砖转讬 砖谞讬诐 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诇讗讞专 砖转讬 砖谞讬诐 讚诇讗 讬讜诐 讗讞讚 诪砖诪谞讛 注砖专 讞讚砖 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诇讗讞专 砖诪谞讛 注砖专 讞讚砖 讚诇讗


The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying according to the opinion of Rav Ashi: How long is the wife required to nurse the baby? One day from within the two years of the baby鈥檚 birth, to exclude the case where the one day that she nursed him occurred after he was two years old, in which case the husband鈥檚 condition would not be fulfilled, for that is the accepted length of time for a mother to nurse a baby. Or according to Rabbi Yehuda one day from within the eighteen months of the baby鈥檚 birth, to exclude the case where the one day that she nursed him occurred after he was she nursed him occurred after he was eighteen months old, in which case the bill of divorce would not be valid.


诪讬转讬讘讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转砖诪砖讬 讗转 讗讘讗 砖转讬 砖谞讬诐 注诇 诪谞转 砖转谞讬拽讬 讗转 讘谞讬 砖转讬 砖谞讬诐 诪转 讛讘谉 讗讜 砖讗诪专 讛讗讘 讗讬 讗驻砖讬 砖转砖诪砖谞讬 砖诇讗 讘讛拽驻讚讛 讗讬谞讜 讙讟


The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Ashi from the latter clause of the mishna: If a husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will serve my father for two years, or: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will nurse my son for two years, and the son died or the father said: I do not want you to serve me, then even though the father did not say this in anger, it is not a valid bill of divorce.

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