Keritot 18

איתיביה ספק בן תשעה לראשון או בן שבעה לאחרון יוציא והולד כשר וחייב באשם תלוי הא מני רבי אליעזר היא

The Gemara raised an objection to Rabbi Zeira from a baraita: If one consummates a levirate marriage with his yevama and seven months later she gives birth, there is uncertainty whether the child is nine months old and is the offspring of the first husband, or whether the child is only seven months old and is the offspring of the latter husband, i.e., the yavam. In such a case he must divorce her, but the offspring is of unflawed lineage. And to atone for the possibility that they engaged in forbidden intercourse, they are each obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering. The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

איתיביה נמצא על שלה אתיום טמאין וחייבין בקרבן נמצא על שלה לאחר זמן טמאין מספק ופטורין מן הקרבן ותני עלה וחייבין באשם תלוי הא מני רבי אליעזר היא

The Gemara raised another objection to Rabbi Zeira from a mishna (Nidda 14a): If blood was found on her cloth immediately after intercourse, the woman and her husband are impure for seven days and are each liable to bring a sin offering. If blood was found on her cloth after time passed, they are both impure due to uncertainty and they are exempt from bringing the sin offering. And it is taught with regard to this last case that they are each liable to bring a provisional guilt offering. The Gemara again answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה אמר רב היו לפניו שתי חתיכות אחת של חלב ואחת של שומן ואכל אחת מהן ואינו יודע איזו מהן אכל חייב חתיכה ספק של חלב ספק של שומן ואכלה פטור

§ Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: In a case where one had two pieces of fat before him, one of permitted fat and one of forbidden fat, and he ate one of them and he does not know which of them he ate, he is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering. But if there was only one piece before him and it was uncertain if it is of forbidden fat and uncertain if it is of permitted fat, and he ate it, he is exempt.

אמר רב נחמן מאי טעמא דרב קסבר שתי חתיכות איקבע איסורא חתיכה אחת לא קבעה איסורא

Rav Naḥman said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rav? He holds that one is liable in the case of two pieces because the prohibition was established, i.e., there was definitely a prohibited piece before him, and nevertheless he proceeded to eat one of them. By contrast, he is exempt in the case of one uncertain piece, as the prohibition was not established.

מאי איכא בין איקבע איסורא לשאי אפשר לברר איסוריה

The Gemara asks: What difference is there between the reasoning for Rav’s opinion given by Rav Naḥman, that one is liable in the case of two pieces because the prohibition was established, and the reasoning given by Rabbi Zeira, that if there is one piece it is impossible to identify its prohibition?

איכא בינייהו כגון שהיו לפניו שתי חתיכות אחת של חלב ואחת של שומן ובא גוי ואכל את הראשונה ובא ישראל ואכל את השניה לרבא ליכא מצוות בעידנא דאכל ישראל לרבי זירא אי אפשר לברר איסוריה לרב נחמן איקבע איסורא

The Gemara answers: The difference between them is in a case where someone had two pieces of fat before him, one of forbidden fat and one of permitted fat. And a gentile came and ate the first piece, and then a Jew came and ate the second piece. According to Rava he is exempt, because at the time when the Jew ate the uncertain piece there was only one piece present, which does not fulfill the requirement of two items, as derived from the word mitzvot in the verse. According to Rabbi Zeira he is exempt because it is impossible to identify its prohibition, as both pieces are gone. But according to Rav Naḥman he is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, as the presence of a prohibition was established, i.e., there was definitely a forbidden piece there at one point.

איתיביה רבא לרב נחמן רבי אליעזר אומר כוי חייבין על חלבו אשם תלוי רבי אליעזר לא בעי קביעותא לאיסורא

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from a baraita. Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to a koy, one is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering for eating its fat. Rav Naḥman answered: Rabbi Eliezer does not require the prohibition to be established in order for one to be obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering.

איתיביה ספק בן תשעה לראשון או בן שבעה לאחרון יוציא והולד כשר וחייבין באשם תלוי הא מני רבי אליעזר היא

Rava raised another objection to Rav Naḥman from a baraita: If one consummates a levirate marriage with his yevama and seven months later she gives birth, there is uncertainty whether the child is nine months old and is the offspring of the first husband, or whether the child is only seven months old and is the offspring of the latter husband, and therefore he must divorce her; but the offspring is of unflawed lineage. And they are each obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering. Once again, the Gemara responds: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

איתיביה נמצא על שלו טמאין וחייבין בקרבן נמצא על שלה אתיום טמאין וחייבין בקרבן נמצא על שלה לאחר זמן טמאים מספק ופטורין מן הקרבן ותני עלה וחייבין באשם תלוי

Rava raised a final objection to Rav Naḥman from a mishna: If blood was found on his cloth, the woman and her husband are both ritually impure for seven days and they are each liable to bring a sin offering. If blood was found on her cloth immediately after intercourse, they are impure for seven days and are each liable to bring a sin offering. If it was found on her cloth after time passed, they are both impure due to uncertainty and they are exempt from bringing the sin offering. And it is taught with regard to this last case that they each is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering.

אישתיק לבתר דנפק אמר מאי טעמא לא אמרי ליה דהא מני רבי מאיר היא דלא בעי קביעותא לאיסורא

When presented with this last objection, Rav Naḥman was silent and did not reply. After Rava left he said: What is the reason I did not say to him, i.e., I should have said to him, that in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who does not require the prohibition to be established in order for one to be obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering.

דתניא השוחט אשם תלוי בחוץ רבי מאיר מחייב וחכמים פוטרין

As it is taught in a baraita: If one slaughters an animal designated as a provisional guilt offering outside the Temple, Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering and the Rabbis deem him exempt. Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering despite the fact that it is possible the owner of the first provisional guilt offering never violated any transgression and therefore was never obligated to bring his provisional guilt offering. This demonstrates that according to Rabbi Meir it is not necessary for the prohibition to be established for one to be obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering.

ואמאי לימא ליה דרבי אליעזר היא הא קא משמע לן דרבי מאיר בשיטת רבי אליעזר קאי

The Gemara asks: But why did Rav Naḥman say that he could have responded to Rava’s contradiction by claiming the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir? Let him say to him that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as was the response to the previous objections. The Gemara explains that this is what Rav Naḥman is teaching us: That the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Meir is that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says an established prohibition is not required for one to be obligated in a provisional guilt offering.

אמר רבה בר אבוה אמר רב חתיכה ספק של חלב ספק של שומן ואכלה באנו למחלוקת רבי אליעזר וחכמים

§ Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: If there was a piece of fat before someone and it was uncertain if it is of forbidden fat and uncertain if it is of permitted fat, and he ate it, we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis. In a mishna on 25a, Rabbi Eliezer states that one may bring a voluntary provisional guilt offering whenever he pleases. The Rabbis disagree and maintain that a provisional guilt offering may be brought only in a case of actual uncertainty whether one performed a sin for which he would be liable to bring a sin offering.

לרבי אליעזר מאי איריא כי אכלה אפילו לא אכלה נמי דהתנן רבי אליעזר אומר מתנדב אדם אשם תלוי בכל יום

The Gemara asks: Why did Rav specifically choose a case where one ate the item of uncertain status in order to exemplify the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? Even if he had not eaten anything, Rabbi Eliezer would also permit him to bring a provisional guilt offering, as we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: A person may volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day.

אמר רב אשי רבי אליעזר אליבא דבבא בן בוטא דתנן אלא אומרים לו המתן עד שתכנס לבית ספק

Rav Ashi said: Rav mentioned a case involving the consumption of an item whose status is uncertain in order to teach the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer in accordance with the opinion of Bava ben Buta, as we learned in the mishna: They said about Bava ben Buta that he would volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day except for the day after Yom Kippur, as Yom Kippur atones for all uncertain sins. He said: If they would have allowed me to do so I would have brought a provisional guilt offering even on that day. But they say to him: Wait until you enter into a situation of potential uncertainty. For this reason Rav presents a scenario where an item whose status is uncertain was consumed, in order to allow for the potential uncertainty that would justify bringing a provisional guilt offering.

תנו רבנן היו לפניו שתי חתיכות אחת של שומן ואחת של חלב בא ישראל ואכל את הראשונה בא גוי ואכל את השניה חייב וכן כלב וכן עורב בא גוי ואכל את הראשונה בא ישראל ואכל את השניה פטור ורבי מחייב

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: In a case where one had before him two pieces of fat, one of permitted fat and one of forbidden fat, if a Jew came and ate the first piece and then a gentile came and ate the second, the Jew is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering. And the same applies if a dog ate the second piece and the same is true if a raven ate it. But if a gentile came and ate the first piece and then a Jew came and ate the second piece, the Jew is exempt, because at the time that he ate the uncertain piece there was only one item of uncertainty. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering, as he does not maintain that two items are required for one to be obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering.

אכל את הראשונה בשוגג והשניה במזיד חייב הראשונה במזיד והשניה בשוגג פטור ורבי מחייב אכל שתיהן במזיד פטור מכלום

The baraita continues: If the Jew ate the first piece unwittingly and the second intentionally, he is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for the first piece. But if he ate the first piece intentionally and the second piece unwittingly, he is exempt, because at the time that he ate the second piece, only one piece was present. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him obligated to bring an offering. If he ate both of them intentionally, he is exempt from bringing anything.

שתיהן בשוגג שניהן חייבין השני לא מן הדין אלא שאם אתה אומר פטור קבעת את הראשונה בחטאת

The baraita concludes: If two Jews each ate one of two items, each of them unwittingly, each of them is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, albeit for different reasons. The first is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering in case he ate the forbidden piece. By contrast, the second one is not strictly obligated by law, as he unwittingly ate the uncertain piece when there was no other piece present. Rather, the reason he is obligated is that if you say he is exempt, you have in effect established that the first individual is obligated to bring a sin offering. One might think that the second individual is exempt because he definitely ate the permitted piece, which would mean the first one ate the forbidden piece and he must therefore bring a sin offering.

ומנו אי רבי מן הדין ומן הדין הוא אי רבנן משום דלא נקבע ראשון בחטאת נימא ליה לשני אייתי חולין לעזרה אמר רב אשי

The Gemara asks: And in accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, why does the baraita say the second individual is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering merely as a precaution and not by law? It is certainly by law that the second is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that one is obligated even for an uncertainty involving a single item. If it is in accordance with the Rabbis, can it be correct that merely in order to prevent a misunderstanding and ensure that we do not establish the first one as obligated to bring a sin offering, that we would say to the second individual: Bring and slaughter a non-sacred animal in the Temple courtyard? After all, he is not obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering. Rav Ashi said in response:

רבי אליעזר היא דאמר מתנדב אדם אשם תלוי בכל יום הילכך אמרינן ליה אייתי אשם תלוי ואתני אי אכל ראשון שומן הוא אכל חלב ליהוי כפרה ואי לא ליהוי נדבה

It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says a person may volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day. Therefore, we say to the second person: Volunteer and bring a provisional guilt offering, to prevent the first individual from bringing an unwarranted sin offering. And he should stipulate: If the first person ate the piece of permitted fat, that means that he himself ate the forbidden fat and consequently the offering should be an atonement for his own transgression. And if not, i.e., if the first person ate the forbidden fat and he himself committed no transgression, let it be a gift offering.

תנו רבנן אכל ספק חלב ונודע לו ספק חלב ונודע לו רבי אומר אומר אני כשם שמביא חטאת על כל אחת ואחת כך מביא אשם תלוי על כל אחת ואחת

The Sages taught in a baraita: A person unwittingly ate a piece of fat about which it was uncertain whether it was forbidden fat or permitted fat, and he was subsequently informed of its questionable status. He then unwittingly ate another piece of fat about which it was uncertain whether it was forbidden fat or permitted fat, and he was again informed of its questionable status. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say that just as he would be liable to bring a sin offering for each and every one if he was later informed that they were all pieces of forbidden fat, so too, in these cases of uncertainty he must bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every one.

רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה ורבי אלעזר ורבי שמעון אומרים אין מביא אלא אשם תלוי אחד שנאמר על שגגתו אשר שגג אפילו על שגגות הרבה אינו חייב אלא אחת

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda; Rabbi Elazar; and Rabbi Shimon all say: He is obligated to bring only one provisional guilt offering, as it is stated: “And the priest shall make atonement for him concerning the unwitting error which he committed unwittingly and he shall be forgiven” (Leviticus 5:18). It is derived from the verse’s double mention of his unwitting status, for which he is liable to bring one offering, that a person is obligated to bring only one offering even for many unwitting sins, despite the fact that he was informed of the uncertainty in between each instance of consumption.

אמר רבי זירא כאן שנה רבי ידיעות ספק מחלקות לחטאות

With regard to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s statement in the baraita, Rabbi Zeira says: Here Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught a principle with regard to the obligation to bring sin offerings for several unwitting transgressions: Knowledge of the questionable status of an uncertain case prior to each subsequent transgression divides them into obligations to bring multiple sin offerings when one later learns that he definitely committed unwitting transgressions. In the case of the baraita, as he was informed prior to each instance of consumption of the uncertain status of the fat he ate before his subsequent consumption of uncertain fat, he is obligated to bring a sin offering for each instance of consumption if he later discovers he actually sinned.

רבא אמר אין ידיעות ספק מחלקות לחטאות אלא הכי קתני כשם שאם היתה לו ידיעה ודאי מביא חטאת על כל אחת ואחת כך אם היתה לו ידיעת ספק מביא אשם תלוי על כל אחת ואחת

Rava says: Knowledge of uncertainty prior to each possible transgression does not divide them into obligations to bring multiple sin offerings. Rather, this is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is teaching in the baraita: Just as if he had had definite knowledge prior to each instance of consumption that the piece he ate was prohibited before eating each subsequent piece he would have been liable to bring a sin offering for each and every one, so too, if he had knowledge of the uncertain status of the piece he ate before eating each subsequent piece, he is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every one. According to Rava, uncertain knowledge does not divide the unwitting transgressions to the extent that one is obligated to bring multiple sin offerings. Only definite knowledge renders one liable to bring multiple sin offerings.

אמר ליה אביי ואת לא תסברא דידיעות ספק מחלקות לחטאות דאי סלקא דעתך ידיעות אין מחלקות לחטאות וחטאת אחת מביא אמאי מביא אשם תלוי על כל אחת ואחת

Abaye said to Rava: And you? Do you not hold that knowledge of uncertainty prior to committing each transgression divides them with regard to the obligation to bring sin offerings for each one? As, if it enters your mind to say that knowledge of uncertainty prior to committing each transgression does not divide them with regard to multiple sin offerings, and therefore one brings only one sin offering, why does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi rule that he brings a provisional guilt offering for each and every one, when he had knowledge of uncertainty prior to each instance of consumption?

והתניא כללו של דבר כל שחלוקין בחטאות חלוקין באשמות

After all, isn’t it taught in a baraita: The principle with regard to the matter is as follows: In any case where separate transgressions are divided for the purpose of determining liability to bring multiple sin offerings, they are also considered divided for the purpose of determining liability to bring multiple provisional guilt offerings in cases of uncertainty. If one does not bring several sin offerings in a case of definite transgression, he is not obligated to bring several provisional guilt offerings in a case of uncertainty either.

אמר ליה רבא בר חנן לאביי ולדידך דאמרת ידיעות ספק מחלקות לחטאות אלא מעתה אכל כזית חלב לפני יום הכיפורים וכזית חלב אחר יום הכיפורים ויום הכפורים במקום אשם תלוי קאי הכי נמי דמביא שתי חטאות

Rava bar Ḥanan said to Abaye: And according to you, that you said knowledge of uncertainty prior to each transgression divides them into obligations to bring separate sin offerings, if that is so, what would you say about the following case: Someone ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat before Yom Kippur and another olive-bulk of forbidden fat after Yom Kippur. Since Yom Kippur itself stands in place of a provisional guilt offering, i.e., it atones for any prior uncertain transgression, if he later learned that both pieces were in fact forbidden fat, would you say that so too, Yom Kippur divides the two actions and that he is obligated to bring two sin offerings?

הא בהעלם אחת אכלינון אמר ליה אביי ומאן לימא לן דיום הכיפורים מכפר על דלא מתידע ליה דילמא והוא דמתידע ליה אמר ליה רבא הודע ולא הודע תנן

But this cannot be correct, as he ate both of them in a single lapse of awareness and there was no knowledge of sin to divide them. Rather, it stands to reason that like Yom Kippur, knowledge of uncertainty does not divide transgressions into multiple sin offering obligations. Abaye said to Rava bar Ḥanan: That case in which Yom Kippur occurred in between transgressions is not comparable to having knowledge of uncertainty between each transgression. Who shall say to us that Yom Kippur atones for sins that were unknown to him? Perhaps it atones only for sins that were known to him. Rava said to him in reply: We learned this explicitly in a mishna (Shevuot 2b): Yom Kippur atones for sins whether one became aware of them before Yom Kippur or did not become aware of them.

איכא דאמרי אמר ליה רבא בר חנן לאביי מה אילו אכל כזית חלב שחרית ביום הכיפורים וכזית חלב במנחה ביום הכפורים הכי נמי דמיחייב שתי חטאות

The Gemara cites another version of the difficulty raised against Abaye’s opinion: Some say that Rava bar Ḥanan said to Abaye: Since Yom Kippur serves to divide the two acts of consumption into two obligations, similar to knowledge of the questionable status of fat according to Abaye, what is the halakha in the following case: If one ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat on the morning of Yom Kippur and an olive-bulk of forbidden fat in the afternoon of Yom Kippur, so too would he be obligated to bring two sin offerings? This cannot be correct, as both olive-bulks were consumed in a single lapse of awareness.

אמר ליה אביי ומאן לימא לן דיום הכפורים כל שעתא מכפר דילמא כוליה יומא מאורתא אמר ליה רבה בר בר חנה תרדא תניא הרי שבא לידו ספק עבירה ביום הכפורים אפילו עם חשיכה פטור שכל היום מכפר

Abaye said to Rava bar Ḥanan: Who shall say to us that Yom Kippur provides atonement at every hour of the day? Perhaps the entire day as a single unit serves to provide atonement only when it begins, in the evening? Rabba bar bar Ḥana said to him: Fool [terada]! It is taught in a mishna (25a): With regard to one who encountered uncertainty concerning whether he performed a sin on Yom Kippur, even if it was at nightfall at the end of the day, he is exempt, as the entire day atones for uncertain sins.

מתיב רב אידי בר אבין אכל ושתה בהעלם אחת אינו חייב אלא חטאת אחת והא בין אכילה לשתייה אי אפשר דלא הוה שהות ביום דמתיידע ליה וכפר ליה דיום הכפורים במקום אשם תלוי קאי וקתני אינו חייב אלא חטאת אחת

Rav Idi bar Avin raises another objection to Abaye’s opinion from a mishna (Yoma 81a): If one ate and drank unwittingly on Yom Kippur in one lapse of awareness, e.g., he forgot it was Yom Kippur, he is liable to bring only one sin offering. But according to Abaye he should be liable to bring two sin offerings, as between the eating and the drinking it is impossible that there was no interval of even a minimal amount of time during the day. That interval of time would allow him to gain knowledge of the possible transgression, and therefore it should serve to atone for him, as Yom Kippur stands in place of a provisional guilt offering. And yet it is taught in the mishna: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.

ואי סלקא דעתך ידיעות ספק מחלקות לחטאות ליחייב שתי חטאות אמרי כי אמר רבי זירא לרבי הא רבנן היא

Rav Idi bar Avin concludes his objection: And if it enters your mind that knowledge of uncertainty prior to each possible transgression divides them into obligations to bring separate sin offerings for each one, this lapse of time on Yom Kippur should serve to divide his two transgressions and therefore he should be liable to bring two sin offerings. The Sages say in response: When Rabbi Zeira said that knowledge of uncertainty prior to each unwitting transgression divides them into obligations to bring separate sin offerings, he was clarifying the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. By contrast, this mishna, which indicates that the passage of time on Yom Kippur does not divide transgressions into obligations for separate sin offerings, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

והא מדסיפא רבי היא דקתני שתה ציר או מורייס פטור הא חומץ חייב

The Gemara objects: But from the fact that the latter clause of that mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, it follows that the first clause is also in accordance with his opinion. This is significant, as that same mishna later teaches (Yoma 81a): If on Yom Kippur one drank the salty liquid in which fish are pickled, or fish brine [morayes], he is exempt. One can infer: But if he drank vinegar he is liable.

ומני רבי היא דתניא חומץ אין משיב את הנפש רבי אומר אומר אני חומץ משיב את הנפש ומדסיפא רבי רישא נמי רבי אמרי סיפא רבי רישא רבנן

And who is the tanna of the mishna? It is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: Vinegar does not revive the spirit, i.e., it does not have the status of a beverage, and therefore one who drinks it on Yom Kippur is exempt. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say that vinegar does revive the spirit and is therefore considered like a beverage. And from the fact that the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the first clause must also be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Sages say in response: That is not necessarily so, as one can say the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi whereas the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

איתיביה רבא אכל היום אכל למחר נהנה היום נהנה למחר אכל היום נהנה למחר נהנה היום אכל למחר ואפילו מכאן ועד שלש שנים מנין שהן מצטרפין זה עם זה

Rava raised another objection to Abaye from a baraita: One is obligated to bring a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property only if he derived benefit of at least the value of one peruta from the property. If one unwittingly ate from consecrated property today and ate again tomorrow, or if he derived benefit from consecrated property today and again derived benefit tomorrow, or if he ate from the property today and derived benefit from it tomorrow, or if he derived benefit from it today and ate from it tomorrow, even if the time between them was as long as from now until three years later, from where is it derived that they combine with each other to amount to one peruta-worth of benefit and thereby render him obligated to bring a guilt offering?

תלמוד לומר תמעל מעל ריבה ואמאי הא כיפר עליה יום הכפורים

The baraita answers that the verse states: “If anyone commits a misuse [tim’ol ma’al]” (Leviticus 5:15). The double verb [tim’ol ma’al] extended the obligation to bring a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property to a case where the value of individual instances of misuse at different times amount to a total of one peruta. Rava concludes his objection: But why should that be the halakha according to Abaye, who maintains that knowledge of uncertainty, and similarly the day of Yom Kippur, which has the same effect as a provisional guilt offering, divides his actions into separate entities? When the second misuse occurs after Yom Kippur, isn’t his sin atoned for by Yom Kippur? Since his acts of possible transgression are divided, how can they combine to the value of one peruta?

אמרי כי מכפר יום הכפורים על איסורא על ממונא לא מכפר

The Sages say in response: When does Yom Kippur atone for sins? Only with regard to ritual prohibitions. But it does not atone with regard to monetary matters. Misuse of consecrated property entails a monetary obligation to restore the value of the principal with the addition of one-fifth. Since Yom Kippur does not exempt one from the monetary obligation entailed by a sin, the two acts of misuse combine to render one obligated to bring a guilt offering.

ואיבעית אימא כי מכפר יום הכפורים על כוליה שיעורא על פלגא דשיעורא לא מכפר

The Gemara suggests another answer. If you wish, say instead: When does Yom Kippur atone for sins? It atones for sins only if they were committed in their full measure, but it does not atone for sins that one transgressed only by half of their full measure. Consequently, Yom Kippur does not atone for misuse of consecrated property of the value of less than one peruta, which is why the two acts of misuse combine.

וכן אמר ריש לקיש כאן שנה רבי ידיעות ספק מחלקות לחטאות רבי יוחנן אמר אין ידיעות ספק מחלקות לחטאות

§ The Gemara cites the opinions of other amora’im with regard to this matter. Similarly, like Rabbi Zeira, Reish Lakish says: Here, in his statement in the baraita above, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught that knowledge of uncertain status prior to each possible transgression divides them into separate obligations to bring sin offerings for each one. And like Rava, Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees and says: Knowledge of uncertainty does not divide them into obligations to bring separate sin offerings.

אלא הכי קתני כשם שאם היתה לו ידיעה ודאי מביא על כל אחת ואחת כך אם היתה לו ידיעת ספק מביא אשם תלוי על כל אחת ואחת

Rather, this is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is teaching in the baraita: Just as if he had had definite knowledge prior to each instance of unwitting consumption he would bring a sin offering for each and every one, so too, if he had had knowledge of the uncertainty of each piece prior to his subsequent instance of unwitting consumption he would be obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every one. But knowledge of uncertainty prior to each instance of consumption does not render him obligated to bring multiple sin offerings if he later finds out they were all definitely prohibited.

בשלמא לרבי יוחנן היינו דקא תלי לאשם בחטאת אלא לריש לקיש חטאת באשם מיבעיא ליה קשיא

The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, this is why the baraita is formulated in a manner that indicates the halakha of a provisional guilt offering is dependent upon the halakhot governing the sin offering. Just as knowledge of an unwitting transgression renders one liable to bring a sin offering, so too, knowledge of uncertainty renders one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering. But according to Reish Lakish, the baraita should have taught that the halakha of a sin offering is dependent upon the knowledge of uncertainty necessary to render one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, rather than the other way around. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is difficult.

ורמי דרבי יוחנן אדרבי יוחנן ורמי דריש לקיש אדריש לקיש דתניא שני שבילין אחד טמא ואחד טהור והלך בראשון ולא נכנס בשני ונכנס חייב

And the Gemara raises a contradiction from one statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan to another statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and it likewise raises a contradiction from one statement of Reish Lakish to another statement of Reish Lakish. As it is taught in a baraita: There are two paths: one is ritually impure due to a corpse that is buried there and the other one is ritually pure, and it is unknown which path is which. If an individual walked on the first path and did not yet enter the Temple, and then he walked on the second path and afterward unwittingly entered the Temple, being that he certainly contracted ritual impurity after walking down both paths he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for entering the Temple in a state of ritual impurity.

הלך בראשון ונכנס פטור בשני ונכנס חייב הלך בראשון ונכנס והזה ושנה וטבל והלך בשני ונכנס חייב

The baraita continues: If he walked on the first path and entered the Temple he is exempt from bringing an offering. But if he then walked on the second path and afterward entered the Temple he is obligated to bring a sin offering, as he was definitely impure on one of the occasions that he entered the Temple. If he walked on the first path and entered the Temple, and subsequently went through the process of ritual purification, i.e., he received the sprinkling of the ashes of the red heifer on the third day and again on the seventh day, and immersed, and then walked on the second path and entered the Temple, he is liable to bring a sin offering, as he definitely entered the Temple while ritually impure, either on the first occasion or on the second.