Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility Skip to content

Today's Daf Yomi

September 10, 2019 | ื™ืณ ื‘ืืœื•ืœ ืชืฉืขืดื˜

  • Masechet Nazir is sponsored by the family of Rabbi Howard Alpert, HaRav Tzvi Lipa ben Hillel, in honor of his first yahrzeit.

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

  • This monthโ€™s learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. โ€œAnd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.โ€

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Keritot 20

Shmuel said one who acts unawares is exempt – three questions from sourcesย are brought to contradict, including two from our mishna. In order to resolve one of the questions, Shmuel explain the case in the mishna differently – one intended one action but then forgot and went to do a different action but then accidentally ended up doing the first one. Also the debate between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri is explained in a few different ways. In light of Rava’s interpretation, a different braita is brought (regarding stoking coals on Shabbat) where Rava explains the issue to be the same as here – although others understand it differently. For what types of blood is one obligated with karet/sin offering? How is this derived from the verse in the Torah?


If the lesson doesn't play, click "Download"

ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจื‘ ืื•ืฉืขื™ื ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืฉื–ื•ืจื™ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืื•ืžืจื™ื ืœื ื ื—ืœืงื• ืขืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ืžืฉื ืื—ื“ ืฉื”ื•ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืืœื ืขืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ืžืฉื•ื ืฉื ื™ ืฉืžื•ืช ืฉืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืžื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื—ื˜ืืช ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ืฉืข ืคื•ื˜ืจ

Rav Oshaya raises an objection from the mishna to Shmuelโ€™s opinion that all agree that one who acts unawares on Shabbat is exempt: Rabbi Shimon Shezuri and Rabbi Shimon say: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree with regard to a case involving a matter where his lack of knowledge involves items from one category, as in that case they both agree he is liable. Rather, they disagree with regard to a case involving a matter where his lack of knowledge involves items from two categories, as in that case Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin offering, and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt.

ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืžืื™ ืงืืžืจ ื“ืคืœื™ื’ื™ ื‘ื ืชื›ื•ื™ืŸ ืœืœืงื˜ ืขื ื‘ื™ื ื•ืœืงื˜ ืชืื ื™ื ืฉื—ื•ืจื•ืช ื•ืœืงื˜ ืœื‘ื ื•ืช ืขื ื‘ื™ื ื•ืชืื ื™ื ืฉื—ื•ืจื•ืช ื•ืœื‘ื ื•ืช ืžืื™ ื ื™ื”ื• ืฉื ื™ ืฉืžื•ืช ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืฉื–ื•ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืžืื™ ืืชื ืœืืฉืžื•ืขื™ื ืŸ

Rav Oshaya continues: And with regard to Rabbi Yehuda, about what matter is he saying that they disagree? If you say he maintains that they disagree in a case where one intended to pick grapes and he picked figs, or to pick black ones and he picked white ones, that is problematic. Rav Oshaya explains: Grapes and figs, black ones and white ones, what are they? Arenโ€™t they two categories? If so, this is identical to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, who say that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree specifically with regard to a mistake involving two categories. If so, what is Rabbi Yehuda coming to teach us?

ืืœื ืœืื• ืžืชืขืกืง ืื™ื›ื ื‘ื™ื ื™ื™ื”ื• ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืกื‘ืจ ืžืชืขืกืง ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืฉื–ื•ืจื™ ืกื‘ืจื™ ืžืชืขืกืง ืคื˜ื•ืจ

Rav Oshaya concludes: Rather, is it not correct to say that that the difference between them is the halakha concerning one who performs a transgression while acting unawares? As Rabbi Yehuda holds that one who acts unawares when committing a transgression is liable, and Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri hold that one who acts unawares when committing a transgression is exempt. If so, the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda refutes Shmuelโ€™s statement that all agree that one who acts unawares while performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat is exempt.

ืœื ืžืชืขืกืง ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ื›ืœ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ื”ื›ื ื‘ื”ื ืงื ืžื™ืคืœื’ื™ ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืฉื–ื•ืจื™ ืกื‘ืจ ืฉื›ื— ืžืœืงื˜ ืžืœื‘ื• ื‘ืฉื ืื—ื“ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ื›ืœ ื—ื™ื™ื‘

The Gemara answers: No, this is not a refutation. In fact, everyone agrees that one who acts unawares is exempt. The difference between the opinions involves a case where the picker lost his train of thought. He initially intended to pick one item, then he forgot and thought that he wanted a different item, and subsequently he unwittingly picked the item he had initially intended to pick. And here it is with regard to this matter that they disagree: As Rabbi Shimon Shezuri holds that when the picker forgot his initial train of thought and instead thought he wanted a different fruit, and both fruits are of one category, all agree he is liable if he ends up unwittingly picking the fruit he initially intended to pick.

ื›ื™ ืคืœื™ื’ื™ ื‘ืฉื ื™ ืฉืžื•ืช ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืกื‘ืจ ืœื ืฉื ื ื‘ืฉื ืื—ื“ ื•ืœื ืฉื ื ื‘ืฉื ื™ ืฉืžื•ืช ืคืœื™ื’ื™

When do Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree? They disagree with regard to a case involving two categories, i.e., when the picker forgot his initial thought and instead thought he required a fruit of a different category. By contrast, Rabbi Yehuda holds that there is no difference between a case of one category and a case of two categories: In both cases they disagree, as Rabbi Yehoshua rules he is exempt because his action did not follow his current intention. But in a case where one acts fully unawares, all agree he is exempt.

ืจื‘ื ืืžืจ ืœื™ืงื“ื ืื™ื›ื ื‘ื™ื ื™ื™ื”ื•

The Gemara cites another answer: Rava said that the difference between them is with regard to a case where one intended to perform two transgressions in a specific order and he mistakenly performed the second transgression first. According to Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree with regard to a situation where one intended to pick two fruits of two different categories and he unwittingly picked them in the reverse order. In such a case Rabbi Yehoshua holds he is exempt. But when he intended to pick two pieces of fruit of the same category and he unwittingly reversed the order, Rabbi Yehoshua agrees he is liable. According to Rabbi Yehuda, whether the case involves one category or two categories, in both instances Rabbi Yehoshua holds that he is exempt.

ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ื”ื™ื• ืœืคื ื™ื• ืฉืชื™ ื ืจื•ืช ื“ื•ืœืงื•ืช ืืจื•ื›ื•ืช ื•ื ืชื›ื•ื™ืŸ ืœื›ื‘ื•ืช ืืช ื–ื• ื•ื›ื™ื‘ื” ืืช ื–ื• ืœื”ื“ืœื™ืง ืืช ื–ื• ื•ื”ื“ืœื™ืง ืืช ื–ื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืœื”ื“ืœื™ืง ื•ืœื›ื‘ื•ืช ื•ื›ื™ื‘ื” ื•ื”ื“ืœื™ืง ื‘ื ืฉื™ืžื” ืื—ืช ื—ื™ื™ื‘

With regard to Ravaโ€™s explanation, the Gemara cites a baraita that supports the claim that if one intended to perform two prohibited labors in one order and mistakenly reversed the order, he is exempt. And it is taught: If someone had before him two long candles that were lit, and he intended to extinguish this one and instead he extinguished that one, or if he intended to light this one and instead he lit that one, he is exempt. But in a case where he intended to light one and then extinguish the other, and instead he drew a breath and blew the flame from one candle to the other, as he accomplished his intention and extinguished one and lit the other, albeit with one breath, he is liable. This indicates that if he had not performed the two acts simultaneously, but in the reverse order, he is exempt.

ืคืฉื™ื˜ื ืžื”ื• ื“ืชื™ืžื ืœื ืื™ืชืขื‘ื“ ืžื—ืฉื‘ืชื™ื” ื“ื”ื ืœื”ื“ืœื™ืง ืžืขื™ืงืจื ื‘ืขื™ ื•ืœื‘ืกื•ืฃ ืœื›ื‘ื•ืช ื•ื›ื™ ืขื‘ื“ ืžืขืฉื” ื›ื™ื‘ื” ื•ื‘ืกื•ืฃ ื”ื“ืœื™ืง ื”ื•ื ื•ืื™ืžื ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ ื ื”ื™ ื“ืืงื“ื•ืžื™ ื ืžื™ ืœื ืžืงื“ื™ื ืื—ื•ืจื™ ื ืžื™ ืœื ืžืื—ืจ

With regard to the last ruling, the Gemara asks: Isnโ€™t this obvious? Since he accomplished his act as he had intended, he is clearly liable. The Gemara answers that the ruling is necessary, lest you say: He did not actually perform the labors in accordance with his thought, as he wanted to light one initially and ultimately to extinguish the other, but when he performed the action, it might be considered as though he first extinguished one and ultimately lit the other. And therefore one might say he is exempt. Consequently, the baraita teaches us that although he did not perform the lighting first, as he had intended, nevertheless he also did not perform the lighting after the extinguishing, as they occurred simultaneously. Since his action did not entirely contradict his intention, he is liable.

ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ื—ื•ืชื” ื’ื—ืœื™ื ื‘ืฉื‘ืช ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื—ื˜ืืช ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ืžืฉื•ื ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืฆื“ื•ืง ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืฉืชื™ื ืžืคื ื™ ืฉื”ื•ื ืžื›ื‘ื” ืืช ื”ืขืœื™ื•ื ื•ืช ื•ืžื‘ืขื™ืจ ืืช ื”ืชื—ืชื•ื ื•ืช ื‘ืžืื™ ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ืื™ ื“ืงื ืžื™ื›ื•ื™ืŸ ืœื›ื‘ื•ืช ื•ืœื”ื‘ืขื™ืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืžืืŸ ื“ืคื˜ืจ ืืœื ื“ืœื ืงื ืžื›ื•ื™ืŸ ืœื”ื‘ืขื™ืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืžืืŸ ื“ืžื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืชืจืชื™

ยง The Sages taught in a baraita: One who stokes coals on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin offering. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok: He is liable to bring two sin offerings, because he extinguishes the upper coals that are moved to the bottom, due to lack of oxygen, and he ignites the bottom coals as he moves them to the top. The Gemara asks: What are we dealing with here? If it is a case where he intends to extinguish and kindle, what is the reason of the one who exempts him? Rather, it must be that he does not intend to kindle, but only to extinguish. If so, what is the reason of the one who deems him liable to bring two sin offerings?

ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื™ื ื ื“ืืžืจื™ ืชืจื•ื•ื™ื™ื”ื• ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉื ืชื›ื•ื™ืŸ ืœื›ื‘ื•ืช ื”ืขืœื™ื•ื ื•ืช ื›ื“ื™ ืœื”ื‘ืขื™ืจ ืืช ื”ืชื—ืชื•ื ื•ืช ื“ืชื ื ืงืžื ืงืกื‘ืจ ืžืงืœืงืœ ื‘ื”ื‘ืขืจื” ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืฆื“ื•ืง ืืžืจ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื•ื›ืŸ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ื ืคื— ืฉื ื• ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืขื“ ื›ืืŸ ืœื ื ืชื’ืœืชื” ื˜ืขืžื ืฉืœ ื”ืœื›ื” ื–ื•

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi แธคanina both say in explanation: The baraita is referring to a case where a blacksmith needed the coals on top and he therefore intended to extinguish the upper coals, and in order to do that he knew he would ignite the bottom ones. The tannaโ€™im disagree with regard to an undesired act of kindling on Shabbat, which is tantamount to a destructive act. As, the first tanna holds that one who produces an undesired or destructive outcome when he performs the labor of kindling is exempt, and Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says he is liable. And similarly, Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says: That disagreement was taught with regard to the case of a blacksmith. And Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says: Until it was taught that the case involves a blacksmith, the reason for this halakha was not revealed.

ืืžื™ ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื™ืŸ ื•ืจื‘ ื—ื ื ื™ื ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื™ืŸ ื“ืืžืจื™ ืชืจื•ื•ื™ื™ื”ื•

Ami bar Avin and Rav แธคananya bar Avin both say another explanation:

ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉื ืชื›ื•ื™ืŸ ืœื›ื‘ื•ืช ื•ืœื”ื‘ืขื™ืจ ื“ืชื ื ืงืžื ืกื‘ืจ ืœื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื“ืืžืจ ื”ื‘ืขืจื” ืœืœืื• ื™ืฆืืช

This is referring to a case where he intended both to extinguish and to kindle. The Torah singles out the labor of kindling on Shabbat, as it is written: โ€œYou shall not kindle fire in all your dwelling places on the day of Shabbatโ€ (Exodus 35:3). The Sages disagree with regard to the interpretation of this verse. As the first tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: Kindling was singled out from the general category of prohibited labors in order to teach that it is unlike other labors, teaching that it is a regular prohibition, i.e., it is punishable only with lashes and does not entail karet or stoning for an intentional transgression, or a sin offering for an unwitting transgression. Consequently, he is not liable to bring a sin offering for the kindling.

ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืฆื“ื•ืง ืกื‘ืจ ืœื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ื ืชืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื”ื‘ืขืจื” ืœื—ืœืง ื™ืฆืืช

And Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, who says: Kindling was singled out in the Torah to divide the various primary categories of labor and to establish liability for the performance of each of them. According to this opinion, the prescribed punishments for kindling are the same as for the rest of the prohibited labors.

ืจื‘ื ืืžืจ ืœื”ืงื“ื™ื ืื™ื›ื ื‘ื™ื ื™ื™ื”ื•

Rava said yet another explanation of the disagreement in the baraita: The difference between them involves a case where one intended to ignite the lower coals and subsequently extinguish the upper coals, and instead he extinguished the upper ones and ignited the lower ones simultaneously. Since he performed the extinguishing first and did not perform it after he ignited as he had intended, the first tanna rules he is liable to bring only one sin offering. By contrast, Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, maintains there is no exemption for performing the prohibited labors in a different sequence than intended.

ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ืืžืจ ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉื ืชื›ื•ื™ืŸ ืœื›ื‘ื•ืช ื•ื”ื•ื‘ืขืจื• ืžืื™ืœื™ื”ืŸ ื•ืชื ื ืงืžื ืกื‘ืจ ืœื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืžืชื›ื•ื™ืŸ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืฆื“ื•ืง ืกื‘ืจ ืœื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื“ืืžืจ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืžืชื›ื•ื™ืŸ ื—ื™ื™ื‘

Rav Ashi said another explanation: The baraita is referring to a case where he intended to extinguish a flame and he was not aware that the bottom coals would be kindled. Rather, they ignited by themselves, as he moved aside and extinguished the upper coals. And the first tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: If one commits an unintentional act, an action from which an unintended prohibited result ensues on Shabbat, as he did not intend to perform a prohibited labor, he is exempt. And Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: One who commits an unintentional act from which a prohibited labor inadvertently results is liable.

ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ื—ื•ืชื” ื’ื—ืœื™ื ื‘ืฉื‘ืช ืœื”ืชื—ืžื ื‘ื”ื ื•ื”ื•ื‘ืขืจื• ืžืื™ืœื™ื”ืŸ ืชื ื™ ื—ื“ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื•ืชื ื™ ืื™ื“ืš ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื”ื“ืชื ื™ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืงืกื‘ืจ ืžืœืื›ื” ืฉืื™ื ื” ืฆืจื™ื›ื” ืœื’ื•ืคื” ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืขืœื™ื” ื•ื”ื ื“ืชื ื ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืงืกื‘ืจ ืžืœืื›ื” ืฉืื™ื ื” ืฆืจื™ื›ื” ืœื’ื•ืคื” ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืขืœื™ื”

The Sages taught in a baraita: Concerning one who stokes coals on Shabbat with the intention to move them in order to be warmed by them, and they ignited by themselves; it is taught in one baraita that he is liable and it is taught in another baraita that he is exempt. The Gemara explains: The reason for that which is taught in the first baraita, i.e., that he is liable, is that this tanna holds that one who performs a labor on Shabbat that is not necessary for its own sake, i.e., he performs the labor for a purpose other than the direct result of the action, is held liable for it. And the reason for that which is taught in the second baraita, i.e., that he is exempt, is that he holds that one who performs a labor that is not necessary for its own sake is exempt from liability for it.

ื”ื“ืจืŸ ืขืœืš ืกืคืง ืื›ืœ ื—ืœื‘

 

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ืื›ืœ ื“ื ืฉื—ื™ื˜ื” ื‘ื‘ื”ืžื” ื‘ื—ื™ื” ื•ื‘ืขื•ืฃ ื‘ื™ืŸ ื˜ืžืื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ืŸ ื˜ื”ื•ืจื™ืŸ ื“ื ื ื—ื™ืจื” ื“ื ืขื™ืงื•ืจ ื“ื ื”ืงื–ื” ืฉื”ื ืฉืžื” ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืขืœื™ื•

MISHNA: If one consumed an olive-bulk of blood that spurted during the slaughter of a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird, whether it is a kosher or non-kosher species; or if one consumed blood that flowed after stabbing an animal or killing it in a manner other than by ritual slaughter, or blood that spurted after ripping the animalโ€™s windpipe or gullet, or blood that spurted during bloodletting with which the soul departs, one is liable to receive karet for consuming it intentionally or to bring a sin offering for consuming it unwittingly.

ื“ื ื”ื˜ื—ื•ืœ ื“ื ื”ืœื‘ ื“ื ื‘ื™ืฆื™ื ื“ื ื—ื’ื‘ื™ื ื“ื ื”ืชืžืฆื™ืช ืื™ืŸ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืขืœื™ื• ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืžื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื“ื ื”ืชืžืฆื™ืช

But with regard to blood of the spleen, blood of the heart, blood of eggs, blood of grasshoppers, or blood of exudate [tamtzit], i.e., that oozes from the neck of the animal after the initial spurt of its slaughter concludes,one is not liable for consuming it. Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable in the case of blood of exudate.

ื’ืžืณ ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื›ืœ ื“ื ืœื ืชืื›ืœื• ืฉื•ืžืข ืื ื™ ืืคื™ืœื• ื“ื ืžื”ืœื›ื™ ืฉืชื™ื ื“ื ื‘ื™ืฆื™ื ื“ื ื—ื’ื‘ื™ื ื“ื ื“ื’ื™ื ื”ื›ืœ ื‘ื›ืœืœ ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืœืขื•ืฃ ื•ืœื‘ื”ืžื”

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: โ€œAnd you shall consume no manner of bloodโ€ (Leviticus 7:26). I would derive from here that even with regard to the blood of bipeds, i.e., human beings, and the blood of eggs, the blood of grasshoppers, and the blood of fish, all these are included in the prohibition against consuming blood. Therefore, the verse states: โ€œWhether it is of bird or of animalโ€ (Leviticus 7:26).

ืžื” ืขื•ืฃ ื•ื‘ื”ืžื” ืžื™ื•ื—ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉื™ืฉ ื‘ื”ืŸ ื˜ื•ืžืื” ืงืœื” ื•ื˜ื•ืžืื” ื—ืžื•ืจื” ื•ื™ืฉ ื‘ื”ืŸ ืื™ืกื•ืจ ื•ื”ื™ืชืจ ื•ื”ืŸ ืžื™ืŸ ื‘ืฉืจ ืืฃ ื›ืœ ืฉื™ืฉ ื‘ื”ืŸ ื˜ื•ืžืื” ืงืœื”

The baraita explains the derivation from the verse: Just as birds and animals are unique in that they have the capacity for both a light form of ritual impurity, if they become impure after they are slaughtered, in which case they are considered impure food, and a severe form of impurity, if they die without valid ritual slaughter, and they have the possibility of being forbidden or permitted, and they are a type of meat, so too, everything that has the capacity for both a light form of impurity and a severe form of ritual impurity, and has the possibility of being forbidden or permitted, and is a type of meat, is included in the prohibition.

ืื•ืฆื™ื ื“ื ืžื”ืœื›ื™ ืฉืชื™ื ืฉื™ืฉ ื‘ื”ืŸ ื˜ื•ืžืื” ื—ืžื•ืจื” ื•ืื™ืŸ ื‘ื”ื ื˜ื•ืžืื” ืงืœื”

I will therefore exclude the blood of bipeds, as they have the capacity for a severe form of ritual impurity, i.e., the impurity of a corpse, but they do not have the capacity for a light form of ritual impurity, since the halakhot of the impurity of food do not apply to the human body.

  • Masechet Nazir is sponsored by the family of Rabbi Howard Alpert, HaRav Tzvi Lipa ben Hillel, in honor of his first yahrzeit.

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

  • This monthโ€™s learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. โ€œAnd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.โ€

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

learn daf yomi one week at a time with tamara spitz

Nedarim: 13-20 – Daf Yomi One Week at a Time

This week we will learn the proper format to create a vow or an oath and the difference between the...
talking talmud_square

Nedarim 20: Women and the Deli Counter

A new mishnah! With various vows and caveats thereof. Including the famous injunction not to prolong conversation with a woman...
michelle speaking

Ketubot 20: Memory and Its Effect on Halacha – Young Israel of Jamaica Estates (USA Summer Tour)

Ketubot 20: Memory and Its Effect on Halacha Rabbanit Michelle Farber and Rabbi Seth Farber were scholars in residence at...
learn daf yomi one week at a time with tamara spitz

Ketubot: 14-20 – Daf Yomi One Week at a Time

This week we will continue learning key concepts of the Talmud, We will understand the concept of majority and when...

Keritot 20

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Keritot 20

ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจื‘ ืื•ืฉืขื™ื ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืฉื–ื•ืจื™ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืื•ืžืจื™ื ืœื ื ื—ืœืงื• ืขืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ืžืฉื ืื—ื“ ืฉื”ื•ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืืœื ืขืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื ืžืฉื•ื ืฉื ื™ ืฉืžื•ืช ืฉืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืžื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื—ื˜ืืช ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ืฉืข ืคื•ื˜ืจ

Rav Oshaya raises an objection from the mishna to Shmuelโ€™s opinion that all agree that one who acts unawares on Shabbat is exempt: Rabbi Shimon Shezuri and Rabbi Shimon say: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree with regard to a case involving a matter where his lack of knowledge involves items from one category, as in that case they both agree he is liable. Rather, they disagree with regard to a case involving a matter where his lack of knowledge involves items from two categories, as in that case Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin offering, and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt.

ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืžืื™ ืงืืžืจ ื“ืคืœื™ื’ื™ ื‘ื ืชื›ื•ื™ืŸ ืœืœืงื˜ ืขื ื‘ื™ื ื•ืœืงื˜ ืชืื ื™ื ืฉื—ื•ืจื•ืช ื•ืœืงื˜ ืœื‘ื ื•ืช ืขื ื‘ื™ื ื•ืชืื ื™ื ืฉื—ื•ืจื•ืช ื•ืœื‘ื ื•ืช ืžืื™ ื ื™ื”ื• ืฉื ื™ ืฉืžื•ืช ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืฉื–ื•ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืžืื™ ืืชื ืœืืฉืžื•ืขื™ื ืŸ

Rav Oshaya continues: And with regard to Rabbi Yehuda, about what matter is he saying that they disagree? If you say he maintains that they disagree in a case where one intended to pick grapes and he picked figs, or to pick black ones and he picked white ones, that is problematic. Rav Oshaya explains: Grapes and figs, black ones and white ones, what are they? Arenโ€™t they two categories? If so, this is identical to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, who say that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree specifically with regard to a mistake involving two categories. If so, what is Rabbi Yehuda coming to teach us?

ืืœื ืœืื• ืžืชืขืกืง ืื™ื›ื ื‘ื™ื ื™ื™ื”ื• ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืกื‘ืจ ืžืชืขืกืง ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืฉื–ื•ืจื™ ืกื‘ืจื™ ืžืชืขืกืง ืคื˜ื•ืจ

Rav Oshaya concludes: Rather, is it not correct to say that that the difference between them is the halakha concerning one who performs a transgression while acting unawares? As Rabbi Yehuda holds that one who acts unawares when committing a transgression is liable, and Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri hold that one who acts unawares when committing a transgression is exempt. If so, the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda refutes Shmuelโ€™s statement that all agree that one who acts unawares while performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat is exempt.

ืœื ืžืชืขืกืง ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ื›ืœ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ื”ื›ื ื‘ื”ื ืงื ืžื™ืคืœื’ื™ ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืฉื–ื•ืจื™ ืกื‘ืจ ืฉื›ื— ืžืœืงื˜ ืžืœื‘ื• ื‘ืฉื ืื—ื“ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ื›ืœ ื—ื™ื™ื‘

The Gemara answers: No, this is not a refutation. In fact, everyone agrees that one who acts unawares is exempt. The difference between the opinions involves a case where the picker lost his train of thought. He initially intended to pick one item, then he forgot and thought that he wanted a different item, and subsequently he unwittingly picked the item he had initially intended to pick. And here it is with regard to this matter that they disagree: As Rabbi Shimon Shezuri holds that when the picker forgot his initial train of thought and instead thought he wanted a different fruit, and both fruits are of one category, all agree he is liable if he ends up unwittingly picking the fruit he initially intended to pick.

ื›ื™ ืคืœื™ื’ื™ ื‘ืฉื ื™ ืฉืžื•ืช ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืกื‘ืจ ืœื ืฉื ื ื‘ืฉื ืื—ื“ ื•ืœื ืฉื ื ื‘ืฉื ื™ ืฉืžื•ืช ืคืœื™ื’ื™

When do Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree? They disagree with regard to a case involving two categories, i.e., when the picker forgot his initial thought and instead thought he required a fruit of a different category. By contrast, Rabbi Yehuda holds that there is no difference between a case of one category and a case of two categories: In both cases they disagree, as Rabbi Yehoshua rules he is exempt because his action did not follow his current intention. But in a case where one acts fully unawares, all agree he is exempt.

ืจื‘ื ืืžืจ ืœื™ืงื“ื ืื™ื›ื ื‘ื™ื ื™ื™ื”ื•

The Gemara cites another answer: Rava said that the difference between them is with regard to a case where one intended to perform two transgressions in a specific order and he mistakenly performed the second transgression first. According to Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree with regard to a situation where one intended to pick two fruits of two different categories and he unwittingly picked them in the reverse order. In such a case Rabbi Yehoshua holds he is exempt. But when he intended to pick two pieces of fruit of the same category and he unwittingly reversed the order, Rabbi Yehoshua agrees he is liable. According to Rabbi Yehuda, whether the case involves one category or two categories, in both instances Rabbi Yehoshua holds that he is exempt.

ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ื”ื™ื• ืœืคื ื™ื• ืฉืชื™ ื ืจื•ืช ื“ื•ืœืงื•ืช ืืจื•ื›ื•ืช ื•ื ืชื›ื•ื™ืŸ ืœื›ื‘ื•ืช ืืช ื–ื• ื•ื›ื™ื‘ื” ืืช ื–ื• ืœื”ื“ืœื™ืง ืืช ื–ื• ื•ื”ื“ืœื™ืง ืืช ื–ื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืœื”ื“ืœื™ืง ื•ืœื›ื‘ื•ืช ื•ื›ื™ื‘ื” ื•ื”ื“ืœื™ืง ื‘ื ืฉื™ืžื” ืื—ืช ื—ื™ื™ื‘

With regard to Ravaโ€™s explanation, the Gemara cites a baraita that supports the claim that if one intended to perform two prohibited labors in one order and mistakenly reversed the order, he is exempt. And it is taught: If someone had before him two long candles that were lit, and he intended to extinguish this one and instead he extinguished that one, or if he intended to light this one and instead he lit that one, he is exempt. But in a case where he intended to light one and then extinguish the other, and instead he drew a breath and blew the flame from one candle to the other, as he accomplished his intention and extinguished one and lit the other, albeit with one breath, he is liable. This indicates that if he had not performed the two acts simultaneously, but in the reverse order, he is exempt.

ืคืฉื™ื˜ื ืžื”ื• ื“ืชื™ืžื ืœื ืื™ืชืขื‘ื“ ืžื—ืฉื‘ืชื™ื” ื“ื”ื ืœื”ื“ืœื™ืง ืžืขื™ืงืจื ื‘ืขื™ ื•ืœื‘ืกื•ืฃ ืœื›ื‘ื•ืช ื•ื›ื™ ืขื‘ื“ ืžืขืฉื” ื›ื™ื‘ื” ื•ื‘ืกื•ืฃ ื”ื“ืœื™ืง ื”ื•ื ื•ืื™ืžื ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ ื ื”ื™ ื“ืืงื“ื•ืžื™ ื ืžื™ ืœื ืžืงื“ื™ื ืื—ื•ืจื™ ื ืžื™ ืœื ืžืื—ืจ

With regard to the last ruling, the Gemara asks: Isnโ€™t this obvious? Since he accomplished his act as he had intended, he is clearly liable. The Gemara answers that the ruling is necessary, lest you say: He did not actually perform the labors in accordance with his thought, as he wanted to light one initially and ultimately to extinguish the other, but when he performed the action, it might be considered as though he first extinguished one and ultimately lit the other. And therefore one might say he is exempt. Consequently, the baraita teaches us that although he did not perform the lighting first, as he had intended, nevertheless he also did not perform the lighting after the extinguishing, as they occurred simultaneously. Since his action did not entirely contradict his intention, he is liable.

ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ื—ื•ืชื” ื’ื—ืœื™ื ื‘ืฉื‘ืช ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื—ื˜ืืช ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ืžืฉื•ื ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืฆื“ื•ืง ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืฉืชื™ื ืžืคื ื™ ืฉื”ื•ื ืžื›ื‘ื” ืืช ื”ืขืœื™ื•ื ื•ืช ื•ืžื‘ืขื™ืจ ืืช ื”ืชื—ืชื•ื ื•ืช ื‘ืžืื™ ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ืื™ ื“ืงื ืžื™ื›ื•ื™ืŸ ืœื›ื‘ื•ืช ื•ืœื”ื‘ืขื™ืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืžืืŸ ื“ืคื˜ืจ ืืœื ื“ืœื ืงื ืžื›ื•ื™ืŸ ืœื”ื‘ืขื™ืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืžืืŸ ื“ืžื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืชืจืชื™

ยง The Sages taught in a baraita: One who stokes coals on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin offering. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok: He is liable to bring two sin offerings, because he extinguishes the upper coals that are moved to the bottom, due to lack of oxygen, and he ignites the bottom coals as he moves them to the top. The Gemara asks: What are we dealing with here? If it is a case where he intends to extinguish and kindle, what is the reason of the one who exempts him? Rather, it must be that he does not intend to kindle, but only to extinguish. If so, what is the reason of the one who deems him liable to bring two sin offerings?

ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื™ื ื ื“ืืžืจื™ ืชืจื•ื•ื™ื™ื”ื• ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉื ืชื›ื•ื™ืŸ ืœื›ื‘ื•ืช ื”ืขืœื™ื•ื ื•ืช ื›ื“ื™ ืœื”ื‘ืขื™ืจ ืืช ื”ืชื—ืชื•ื ื•ืช ื“ืชื ื ืงืžื ืงืกื‘ืจ ืžืงืœืงืœ ื‘ื”ื‘ืขืจื” ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืฆื“ื•ืง ืืžืจ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื•ื›ืŸ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ื ืคื— ืฉื ื• ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืขื“ ื›ืืŸ ืœื ื ืชื’ืœืชื” ื˜ืขืžื ืฉืœ ื”ืœื›ื” ื–ื•

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi แธคanina both say in explanation: The baraita is referring to a case where a blacksmith needed the coals on top and he therefore intended to extinguish the upper coals, and in order to do that he knew he would ignite the bottom ones. The tannaโ€™im disagree with regard to an undesired act of kindling on Shabbat, which is tantamount to a destructive act. As, the first tanna holds that one who produces an undesired or destructive outcome when he performs the labor of kindling is exempt, and Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says he is liable. And similarly, Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says: That disagreement was taught with regard to the case of a blacksmith. And Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says: Until it was taught that the case involves a blacksmith, the reason for this halakha was not revealed.

ืืžื™ ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื™ืŸ ื•ืจื‘ ื—ื ื ื™ื ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื™ืŸ ื“ืืžืจื™ ืชืจื•ื•ื™ื™ื”ื•

Ami bar Avin and Rav แธคananya bar Avin both say another explanation:

ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉื ืชื›ื•ื™ืŸ ืœื›ื‘ื•ืช ื•ืœื”ื‘ืขื™ืจ ื“ืชื ื ืงืžื ืกื‘ืจ ืœื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื“ืืžืจ ื”ื‘ืขืจื” ืœืœืื• ื™ืฆืืช

This is referring to a case where he intended both to extinguish and to kindle. The Torah singles out the labor of kindling on Shabbat, as it is written: โ€œYou shall not kindle fire in all your dwelling places on the day of Shabbatโ€ (Exodus 35:3). The Sages disagree with regard to the interpretation of this verse. As the first tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: Kindling was singled out from the general category of prohibited labors in order to teach that it is unlike other labors, teaching that it is a regular prohibition, i.e., it is punishable only with lashes and does not entail karet or stoning for an intentional transgression, or a sin offering for an unwitting transgression. Consequently, he is not liable to bring a sin offering for the kindling.

ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืฆื“ื•ืง ืกื‘ืจ ืœื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ื ืชืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื”ื‘ืขืจื” ืœื—ืœืง ื™ืฆืืช

And Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, who says: Kindling was singled out in the Torah to divide the various primary categories of labor and to establish liability for the performance of each of them. According to this opinion, the prescribed punishments for kindling are the same as for the rest of the prohibited labors.

ืจื‘ื ืืžืจ ืœื”ืงื“ื™ื ืื™ื›ื ื‘ื™ื ื™ื™ื”ื•

Rava said yet another explanation of the disagreement in the baraita: The difference between them involves a case where one intended to ignite the lower coals and subsequently extinguish the upper coals, and instead he extinguished the upper ones and ignited the lower ones simultaneously. Since he performed the extinguishing first and did not perform it after he ignited as he had intended, the first tanna rules he is liable to bring only one sin offering. By contrast, Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, maintains there is no exemption for performing the prohibited labors in a different sequence than intended.

ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ืืžืจ ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉื ืชื›ื•ื™ืŸ ืœื›ื‘ื•ืช ื•ื”ื•ื‘ืขืจื• ืžืื™ืœื™ื”ืŸ ื•ืชื ื ืงืžื ืกื‘ืจ ืœื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืžืชื›ื•ื™ืŸ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืฆื“ื•ืง ืกื‘ืจ ืœื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื“ืืžืจ ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืžืชื›ื•ื™ืŸ ื—ื™ื™ื‘

Rav Ashi said another explanation: The baraita is referring to a case where he intended to extinguish a flame and he was not aware that the bottom coals would be kindled. Rather, they ignited by themselves, as he moved aside and extinguished the upper coals. And the first tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: If one commits an unintentional act, an action from which an unintended prohibited result ensues on Shabbat, as he did not intend to perform a prohibited labor, he is exempt. And Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: One who commits an unintentional act from which a prohibited labor inadvertently results is liable.

ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ื—ื•ืชื” ื’ื—ืœื™ื ื‘ืฉื‘ืช ืœื”ืชื—ืžื ื‘ื”ื ื•ื”ื•ื‘ืขืจื• ืžืื™ืœื™ื”ืŸ ืชื ื™ ื—ื“ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื•ืชื ื™ ืื™ื“ืš ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื”ื“ืชื ื™ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืงืกื‘ืจ ืžืœืื›ื” ืฉืื™ื ื” ืฆืจื™ื›ื” ืœื’ื•ืคื” ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืขืœื™ื” ื•ื”ื ื“ืชื ื ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืงืกื‘ืจ ืžืœืื›ื” ืฉืื™ื ื” ืฆืจื™ื›ื” ืœื’ื•ืคื” ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืขืœื™ื”

The Sages taught in a baraita: Concerning one who stokes coals on Shabbat with the intention to move them in order to be warmed by them, and they ignited by themselves; it is taught in one baraita that he is liable and it is taught in another baraita that he is exempt. The Gemara explains: The reason for that which is taught in the first baraita, i.e., that he is liable, is that this tanna holds that one who performs a labor on Shabbat that is not necessary for its own sake, i.e., he performs the labor for a purpose other than the direct result of the action, is held liable for it. And the reason for that which is taught in the second baraita, i.e., that he is exempt, is that he holds that one who performs a labor that is not necessary for its own sake is exempt from liability for it.

ื”ื“ืจืŸ ืขืœืš ืกืคืง ืื›ืœ ื—ืœื‘

 

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ืื›ืœ ื“ื ืฉื—ื™ื˜ื” ื‘ื‘ื”ืžื” ื‘ื—ื™ื” ื•ื‘ืขื•ืฃ ื‘ื™ืŸ ื˜ืžืื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ืŸ ื˜ื”ื•ืจื™ืŸ ื“ื ื ื—ื™ืจื” ื“ื ืขื™ืงื•ืจ ื“ื ื”ืงื–ื” ืฉื”ื ืฉืžื” ื™ื•ืฆืื” ื‘ื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืขืœื™ื•

MISHNA: If one consumed an olive-bulk of blood that spurted during the slaughter of a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird, whether it is a kosher or non-kosher species; or if one consumed blood that flowed after stabbing an animal or killing it in a manner other than by ritual slaughter, or blood that spurted after ripping the animalโ€™s windpipe or gullet, or blood that spurted during bloodletting with which the soul departs, one is liable to receive karet for consuming it intentionally or to bring a sin offering for consuming it unwittingly.

ื“ื ื”ื˜ื—ื•ืœ ื“ื ื”ืœื‘ ื“ื ื‘ื™ืฆื™ื ื“ื ื—ื’ื‘ื™ื ื“ื ื”ืชืžืฆื™ืช ืื™ืŸ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืขืœื™ื• ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืžื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื“ื ื”ืชืžืฆื™ืช

But with regard to blood of the spleen, blood of the heart, blood of eggs, blood of grasshoppers, or blood of exudate [tamtzit], i.e., that oozes from the neck of the animal after the initial spurt of its slaughter concludes,one is not liable for consuming it. Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable in the case of blood of exudate.

ื’ืžืณ ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื›ืœ ื“ื ืœื ืชืื›ืœื• ืฉื•ืžืข ืื ื™ ืืคื™ืœื• ื“ื ืžื”ืœื›ื™ ืฉืชื™ื ื“ื ื‘ื™ืฆื™ื ื“ื ื—ื’ื‘ื™ื ื“ื ื“ื’ื™ื ื”ื›ืœ ื‘ื›ืœืœ ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืœืขื•ืฃ ื•ืœื‘ื”ืžื”

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: โ€œAnd you shall consume no manner of bloodโ€ (Leviticus 7:26). I would derive from here that even with regard to the blood of bipeds, i.e., human beings, and the blood of eggs, the blood of grasshoppers, and the blood of fish, all these are included in the prohibition against consuming blood. Therefore, the verse states: โ€œWhether it is of bird or of animalโ€ (Leviticus 7:26).

ืžื” ืขื•ืฃ ื•ื‘ื”ืžื” ืžื™ื•ื—ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉื™ืฉ ื‘ื”ืŸ ื˜ื•ืžืื” ืงืœื” ื•ื˜ื•ืžืื” ื—ืžื•ืจื” ื•ื™ืฉ ื‘ื”ืŸ ืื™ืกื•ืจ ื•ื”ื™ืชืจ ื•ื”ืŸ ืžื™ืŸ ื‘ืฉืจ ืืฃ ื›ืœ ืฉื™ืฉ ื‘ื”ืŸ ื˜ื•ืžืื” ืงืœื”

The baraita explains the derivation from the verse: Just as birds and animals are unique in that they have the capacity for both a light form of ritual impurity, if they become impure after they are slaughtered, in which case they are considered impure food, and a severe form of impurity, if they die without valid ritual slaughter, and they have the possibility of being forbidden or permitted, and they are a type of meat, so too, everything that has the capacity for both a light form of impurity and a severe form of ritual impurity, and has the possibility of being forbidden or permitted, and is a type of meat, is included in the prohibition.

ืื•ืฆื™ื ื“ื ืžื”ืœื›ื™ ืฉืชื™ื ืฉื™ืฉ ื‘ื”ืŸ ื˜ื•ืžืื” ื—ืžื•ืจื” ื•ืื™ืŸ ื‘ื”ื ื˜ื•ืžืื” ืงืœื”

I will therefore exclude the blood of bipeds, as they have the capacity for a severe form of ritual impurity, i.e., the impurity of a corpse, but they do not have the capacity for a light form of ritual impurity, since the halakhot of the impurity of food do not apply to the human body.

Scroll To Top