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Today's Daf Yomi

September 10, 2019 | 讬壮 讘讗诇讜诇 转砖注状讟

  • Masechet Kiddushin is sponsored by Julie and Martin Mendelsohn in honor of their two children who were recently married

  • This month's learning聽is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of聽her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat聽Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.

  • Masechet Gittin is sponsored by Elaine and聽Saul聽Schreiber in honor of their daughter-in-law Daniela Schreiber on receiving her Master of Science in Marriage and Family Therapy.

  • Masechet Sotah is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag in honor of Dr. Bryna Levy who helped her fall deep in love with learning.

  • Masechet Nazir is sponsored by the family of Rabbi Howard Alpert, HaRav Tzvi Lipa ben Hillel, in honor of his first yahrzeit.

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

Keritot 20

Shmuel said one who acts unawares is exempt – three questions from sources聽are brought to contradict, including two from our mishna. In order to resolve one of the questions, Shmuel explain the case in the mishna differently – one intended one action but then forgot and went to do a different action but then accidentally ended up doing the first one. Also the debate between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri is explained in a few different ways. In light of Rava’s interpretation, a different braita is brought (regarding stoking coals on Shabbat) where Rava explains the issue to be the same as here – although others understand it differently. For what types of blood is one obligated with karet/sin offering? How is this derived from the verse in the Torah?


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诪转讬讘 专讘 讗讜砖注讬讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 砖讝讜专讬 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 注诇 讚讘专 砖讛讜讗 诪砖诐 讗讞讚 砖讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 注诇 讚讘专 砖讛讜讗 诪砖讜诐 砖谞讬 砖诪讜转 砖专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪讞讬讬讘 讞讟讗转 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 驻讜讟专


Rav Oshaya raises an objection from the mishna to Shmuel鈥檚 opinion that all agree that one who acts unawares on Shabbat is exempt: Rabbi Shimon Shezuri and Rabbi Shimon say: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree with regard to a case involving a matter where his lack of knowledge involves items from one category, as in that case they both agree he is liable. Rather, they disagree with regard to a case involving a matter where his lack of knowledge involves items from two categories, as in that case Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin offering, and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt.


讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讗讬 拽讗诪专 讚驻诇讬讙讬 讘谞转讻讜讬谉 诇诇拽讟 注谞讘讬诐 讜诇拽讟 转讗谞讬诐 砖讞讜专讜转 讜诇拽讟 诇讘谞讜转 注谞讘讬诐 讜转讗谞讬诐 砖讞讜专讜转 讜诇讘谞讜转 诪讗讬 谞讬讛讜 砖谞讬 砖诪讜转 讛讬讬谞讜 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 砖讝讜专讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讗讬 讗转讗 诇讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉


Rav Oshaya continues: And with regard to Rabbi Yehuda, about what matter is he saying that they disagree? If you say he maintains that they disagree in a case where one intended to pick grapes and he picked figs, or to pick black ones and he picked white ones, that is problematic. Rav Oshaya explains: Grapes and figs, black ones and white ones, what are they? Aren鈥檛 they two categories? If so, this is identical to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, who say that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree specifically with regard to a mistake involving two categories. If so, what is Rabbi Yehuda coming to teach us?


讗诇讗 诇讗讜 诪转注住拽 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 住讘专 诪转注住拽 讞讬讬讘 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 砖讝讜专讬 住讘专讬 诪转注住拽 驻讟讜专


Rav Oshaya concludes: Rather, is it not correct to say that that the difference between them is the halakha concerning one who performs a transgression while acting unawares? As Rabbi Yehuda holds that one who acts unawares when committing a transgression is liable, and Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri hold that one who acts unawares when committing a transgression is exempt. If so, the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda refutes Shmuel鈥檚 statement that all agree that one who acts unawares while performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat is exempt.


诇讗 诪转注住拽 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 驻讟讜专 讜讛讻讗 讘讛讗 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 砖讝讜专讬 住讘专 砖讻讞 诪诇拽讟 诪诇讘讜 讘砖诐 讗讞讚 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讞讬讬讘


The Gemara answers: No, this is not a refutation. In fact, everyone agrees that one who acts unawares is exempt. The difference between the opinions involves a case where the picker lost his train of thought. He initially intended to pick one item, then he forgot and thought that he wanted a different item, and subsequently he unwittingly picked the item he had initially intended to pick. And here it is with regard to this matter that they disagree: As Rabbi Shimon Shezuri holds that when the picker forgot his initial train of thought and instead thought he wanted a different fruit, and both fruits are of one category, all agree he is liable if he ends up unwittingly picking the fruit he initially intended to pick.


讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讘砖谞讬 砖诪讜转 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 住讘专 诇讗 砖谞讗 讘砖诐 讗讞讚 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 讘砖谞讬 砖诪讜转 驻诇讬讙讬


When do Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree? They disagree with regard to a case involving two categories, i.e., when the picker forgot his initial thought and instead thought he required a fruit of a different category. By contrast, Rabbi Yehuda holds that there is no difference between a case of one category and a case of two categories: In both cases they disagree, as Rabbi Yehoshua rules he is exempt because his action did not follow his current intention. But in a case where one acts fully unawares, all agree he is exempt.


专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讬拽讚诐 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜


The Gemara cites another answer: Rava said that the difference between them is with regard to a case where one intended to perform two transgressions in a specific order and he mistakenly performed the second transgression first. According to Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree with regard to a situation where one intended to pick two fruits of two different categories and he unwittingly picked them in the reverse order. In such a case Rabbi Yehoshua holds he is exempt. But when he intended to pick two pieces of fruit of the same category and he unwittingly reversed the order, Rabbi Yehoshua agrees he is liable. According to Rabbi Yehuda, whether the case involves one category or two categories, in both instances Rabbi Yehoshua holds that he is exempt.


讜讛转谞讬讗 讛讬讜 诇驻谞讬讜 砖转讬 谞专讜转 讚讜诇拽讜转 讗专讜讻讜转 讜谞转讻讜讬谉 诇讻讘讜转 讗转 讝讜 讜讻讬讘讛 讗转 讝讜 诇讛讚诇讬拽 讗转 讝讜 讜讛讚诇讬拽 讗转 讝讜 驻讟讜专 诇讛讚诇讬拽 讜诇讻讘讜转 讜讻讬讘讛 讜讛讚诇讬拽 讘谞砖讬诪讛 讗讞转 讞讬讬讘


With regard to Rava鈥檚 explanation, the Gemara cites a baraita that supports the claim that if one intended to perform two prohibited labors in one order and mistakenly reversed the order, he is exempt. And it is taught: If someone had before him two long candles that were lit, and he intended to extinguish this one and instead he extinguished that one, or if he intended to light this one and instead he lit that one, he is exempt. But in a case where he intended to light one and then extinguish the other, and instead he drew a breath and blew the flame from one candle to the other, as he accomplished his intention and extinguished one and lit the other, albeit with one breath, he is liable. This indicates that if he had not performed the two acts simultaneously, but in the reverse order, he is exempt.


驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 诇讗 讗讬转注讘讚 诪讞砖讘转讬讛 讚讛讗 诇讛讚诇讬拽 诪注讬拽专讗 讘注讬 讜诇讘住讜祝 诇讻讘讜转 讜讻讬 注讘讚 诪注砖讛 讻讬讘讛 讜讘住讜祝 讛讚诇讬拽 讛讜讗 讜讗讬诪讗 驻讟讜专 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 谞讛讬 讚讗拽讚讜诪讬 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪拽讚讬诐 讗讞讜专讬 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪讗讞专


With regard to the last ruling, the Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 this obvious? Since he accomplished his act as he had intended, he is clearly liable. The Gemara answers that the ruling is necessary, lest you say: He did not actually perform the labors in accordance with his thought, as he wanted to light one initially and ultimately to extinguish the other, but when he performed the action, it might be considered as though he first extinguished one and ultimately lit the other. And therefore one might say he is exempt. Consequently, the baraita teaches us that although he did not perform the lighting first, as he had intended, nevertheless he also did not perform the lighting after the extinguishing, as they occurred simultaneously. Since his action did not entirely contradict his intention, he is liable.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛讞讜转讛 讙讞诇讬诐 讘砖讘转 讞讬讬讘 讞讟讗转 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘专讘讬 爪讚讜拽 讞讬讬讘 砖转讬诐 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讜讗 诪讻讘讛 讗转 讛注诇讬讜谞讜转 讜诪讘注讬专 讗转 讛转讞转讜谞讜转 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讗讬 讚拽讗 诪讬讻讜讬谉 诇讻讘讜转 讜诇讛讘注讬专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚诪讗谉 讚驻讟专 讗诇讗 讚诇讗 拽讗 诪讻讜讬谉 诇讛讘注讬专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚诪讗谉 讚诪讞讬讬讘 转专转讬


The Sages taught in a baraita: One who stokes coals on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin offering. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok: He is liable to bring two sin offerings, because he extinguishes the upper coals that are moved to the bottom, due to lack of oxygen, and he ignites the bottom coals as he moves them to the top. The Gemara asks: What are we dealing with here? If it is a case where he intends to extinguish and kindle, what is the reason of the one who exempts him? Rather, it must be that he does not intend to kindle, but only to extinguish. If so, what is the reason of the one who deems him liable to bring two sin offerings?


专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讜专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讜讬讬讛讜 讻讙讜谉 砖谞转讻讜讬谉 诇讻讘讜转 讛注诇讬讜谞讜转 讻讚讬 诇讛讘注讬专 讗转 讛转讞转讜谞讜转 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 拽住讘专 诪拽诇拽诇 讘讛讘注专讛 驻讟讜专 讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘专讘讬 爪讚讜拽 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谞驻讞 砖谞讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 谞转讙诇转讛 讟注诪讗 砖诇 讛诇讻讛 讝讜


Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi 岣nina both say in explanation: The baraita is referring to a case where a blacksmith needed the coals on top and he therefore intended to extinguish the upper coals, and in order to do that he knew he would ignite the bottom ones. The tanna鈥檌m disagree with regard to an undesired act of kindling on Shabbat, which is tantamount to a destructive act. As, the first tanna holds that one who produces an undesired or destructive outcome when he performs the labor of kindling is exempt, and Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says he is liable. And similarly, Rabbi Yo岣nan says: That disagreement was taught with regard to the case of a blacksmith. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Until it was taught that the case involves a blacksmith, the reason for this halakha was not revealed.


讗诪讬 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讜专讘 讞谞谞讬讗 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讜讬讬讛讜


Ami bar Avin and Rav 岣nanya bar Avin both say another explanation:


讻讙讜谉 砖谞转讻讜讬谉 诇讻讘讜转 讜诇讛讘注讬专 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 讛讘注专讛 诇诇讗讜 讬爪讗转


This is referring to a case where he intended both to extinguish and to kindle. The Torah singles out the labor of kindling on Shabbat, as it is written: 鈥淵ou shall not kindle fire in all your dwelling places on the day of Shabbat鈥 (Exodus 35:3). The Sages disagree with regard to the interpretation of this verse. As the first tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: Kindling was singled out from the general category of prohibited labors in order to teach that it is unlike other labors, teaching that it is a regular prohibition, i.e., it is punishable only with lashes and does not entail karet or stoning for an intentional transgression, or a sin offering for an unwitting transgression. Consequently, he is not liable to bring a sin offering for the kindling.


讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘专讘讬 爪讚讜拽 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 谞转谉 讚讗诪专 讛讘注专讛 诇讞诇拽 讬爪讗转


And Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, who says: Kindling was singled out in the Torah to divide the various primary categories of labor and to establish liability for the performance of each of them. According to this opinion, the prescribed punishments for kindling are the same as for the rest of the prohibited labors.


专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讛拽讚讬诐 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜


Rava said yet another explanation of the disagreement in the baraita: The difference between them involves a case where one intended to ignite the lower coals and subsequently extinguish the upper coals, and instead he extinguished the upper ones and ignited the lower ones simultaneously. Since he performed the extinguishing first and did not perform it after he ignited as he had intended, the first tanna rules he is liable to bring only one sin offering. By contrast, Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, maintains there is no exemption for performing the prohibited labors in a different sequence than intended.


专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讻讙讜谉 砖谞转讻讜讬谉 诇讻讘讜转 讜讛讜讘注专讜 诪讗讬诇讬讛谉 讜转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚讗诪专 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 驻讟讜专 讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘专讘讬 爪讚讜拽 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 讞讬讬讘


Rav Ashi said another explanation: The baraita is referring to a case where he intended to extinguish a flame and he was not aware that the bottom coals would be kindled. Rather, they ignited by themselves, as he moved aside and extinguished the upper coals. And the first tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: If one commits an unintentional act, an action from which an unintended prohibited result ensues on Shabbat, as he did not intend to perform a prohibited labor, he is exempt. And Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: One who commits an unintentional act from which a prohibited labor inadvertently results is liable.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛讞讜转讛 讙讞诇讬诐 讘砖讘转 诇讛转讞诪诐 讘讛诐 讜讛讜讘注专讜 诪讗讬诇讬讛谉 转谞讬 讞讚讗 讞讬讬讘 讜转谞讬 讗讬讚讱 驻讟讜专 讛讚转谞讬讗 讞讬讬讘 拽住讘专 诪诇讗讻讛 砖讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 诇讙讜驻讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇讬讛 讜讛讗 讚转谞讗 驻讟讜专 拽住讘专 诪诇讗讻讛 砖讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 诇讙讜驻讛 驻讟讜专 注诇讬讛


The Sages taught in a baraita: Concerning one who stokes coals on Shabbat with the intention to move them in order to be warmed by them, and they ignited by themselves; it is taught in one baraita that he is liable and it is taught in another baraita that he is exempt. The Gemara explains: The reason for that which is taught in the first baraita, i.e., that he is liable, is that this tanna holds that one who performs a labor on Shabbat that is not necessary for its own sake, i.e., he performs the labor for a purpose other than the direct result of the action, is held liable for it. And the reason for that which is taught in the second baraita, i.e., that he is exempt, is that he holds that one who performs a labor that is not necessary for its own sake is exempt from liability for it.


讛讚专谉 注诇讱 住驻拽 讗讻诇 讞诇讘



诪转谞讬壮 讗讻诇 讚诐 砖讞讬讟讛 讘讘讛诪讛 讘讞讬讛 讜讘注讜祝 讘讬谉 讟诪讗讬谉 讘讬谉 讟讛讜专讬谉 讚诐 谞讞讬专讛 讚诐 注讬拽讜专 讚诐 讛拽讝讛 砖讛谞砖诪讛 讬讜爪讗讛 讘讜 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讜


MISHNA: If one consumed an olive-bulk of blood that spurted during the slaughter of a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird, whether it is a kosher or non-kosher species; or if one consumed blood that flowed after stabbing an animal or killing it in a manner other than by ritual slaughter, or blood that spurted after ripping the animal鈥檚 windpipe or gullet, or blood that spurted during bloodletting with which the soul departs, one is liable to receive karet for consuming it intentionally or to bring a sin offering for consuming it unwittingly.


讚诐 讛讟讞讜诇 讚诐 讛诇讘 讚诐 讘讬爪讬诐 讚诐 讞讙讘讬诐 讚诐 讛转诪爪讬转 讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讞讬讬讘 讘讚诐 讛转诪爪讬转


But with regard to blood of the spleen, blood of the heart, blood of eggs, blood of grasshoppers, or blood of exudate [tamtzit], i.e., that oozes from the neck of the animal after the initial spurt of its slaughter concludes,one is not liable for consuming it. Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable in the case of blood of exudate.


讙诪壮 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讻诇 讚诐 诇讗 转讗讻诇讜 砖讜诪注 讗谞讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讚诐 诪讛诇讻讬 砖转讬诐 讚诐 讘讬爪讬诐 讚诐 讞讙讘讬诐 讚诐 讚讙讬诐 讛讻诇 讘讻诇诇 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇注讜祝 讜诇讘讛诪讛


GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淎nd you shall consume no manner of blood鈥 (Leviticus 7:26). I would derive from here that even with regard to the blood of bipeds, i.e., human beings, and the blood of eggs, the blood of grasshoppers, and the blood of fish, all these are included in the prohibition against consuming blood. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淲hether it is of bird or of animal鈥 (Leviticus 7:26).


诪讛 注讜祝 讜讘讛诪讛 诪讬讜讞讚讬谉 砖讬砖 讘讛谉 讟讜诪讗讛 拽诇讛 讜讟讜诪讗讛 讞诪讜专讛 讜讬砖 讘讛谉 讗讬住讜专 讜讛讬转专 讜讛谉 诪讬谉 讘砖专 讗祝 讻诇 砖讬砖 讘讛谉 讟讜诪讗讛 拽诇讛


The baraita explains the derivation from the verse: Just as birds and animals are unique in that they have the capacity for both a light form of ritual impurity, if they become impure after they are slaughtered, in which case they are considered impure food, and a severe form of impurity, if they die without valid ritual slaughter, and they have the possibility of being forbidden or permitted, and they are a type of meat, so too, everything that has the capacity for both a light form of impurity and a severe form of ritual impurity, and has the possibility of being forbidden or permitted, and is a type of meat, is included in the prohibition.


讗讜爪讬讗 讚诐 诪讛诇讻讬 砖转讬诐 砖讬砖 讘讛谉 讟讜诪讗讛 讞诪讜专讛 讜讗讬谉 讘讛诐 讟讜诪讗讛 拽诇讛


I will therefore exclude the blood of bipeds, as they have the capacity for a severe form of ritual impurity, i.e., the impurity of a corpse, but they do not have the capacity for a light form of ritual impurity, since the halakhot of the impurity of food do not apply to the human body.

  • Masechet Kiddushin is sponsored by Julie and Martin Mendelsohn in honor of their two children who were recently married

  • This month's learning聽is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of聽her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat聽Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.

  • Masechet Gittin is sponsored by Elaine and聽Saul聽Schreiber in honor of their daughter-in-law Daniela Schreiber on receiving her Master of Science in Marriage and Family Therapy.

  • Masechet Sotah is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag in honor of Dr. Bryna Levy who helped her fall deep in love with learning.

  • Masechet Nazir is sponsored by the family of Rabbi Howard Alpert, HaRav Tzvi Lipa ben Hillel, in honor of his first yahrzeit.

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

  • Masechet Yevamot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag and family in memory of her grandparents, Leo and Esther Aaron. "They always stressed the importance of a Torah life, mesorah and family. May their memory always be a blessing for their children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great grandchildren".

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Keritot 20

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Keritot 20

诪转讬讘 专讘 讗讜砖注讬讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 砖讝讜专讬 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 注诇 讚讘专 砖讛讜讗 诪砖诐 讗讞讚 砖讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 注诇 讚讘专 砖讛讜讗 诪砖讜诐 砖谞讬 砖诪讜转 砖专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪讞讬讬讘 讞讟讗转 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 驻讜讟专


Rav Oshaya raises an objection from the mishna to Shmuel鈥檚 opinion that all agree that one who acts unawares on Shabbat is exempt: Rabbi Shimon Shezuri and Rabbi Shimon say: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree with regard to a case involving a matter where his lack of knowledge involves items from one category, as in that case they both agree he is liable. Rather, they disagree with regard to a case involving a matter where his lack of knowledge involves items from two categories, as in that case Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin offering, and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt.


讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讗讬 拽讗诪专 讚驻诇讬讙讬 讘谞转讻讜讬谉 诇诇拽讟 注谞讘讬诐 讜诇拽讟 转讗谞讬诐 砖讞讜专讜转 讜诇拽讟 诇讘谞讜转 注谞讘讬诐 讜转讗谞讬诐 砖讞讜专讜转 讜诇讘谞讜转 诪讗讬 谞讬讛讜 砖谞讬 砖诪讜转 讛讬讬谞讜 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 砖讝讜专讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讗讬 讗转讗 诇讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉


Rav Oshaya continues: And with regard to Rabbi Yehuda, about what matter is he saying that they disagree? If you say he maintains that they disagree in a case where one intended to pick grapes and he picked figs, or to pick black ones and he picked white ones, that is problematic. Rav Oshaya explains: Grapes and figs, black ones and white ones, what are they? Aren鈥檛 they two categories? If so, this is identical to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, who say that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree specifically with regard to a mistake involving two categories. If so, what is Rabbi Yehuda coming to teach us?


讗诇讗 诇讗讜 诪转注住拽 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 住讘专 诪转注住拽 讞讬讬讘 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 砖讝讜专讬 住讘专讬 诪转注住拽 驻讟讜专


Rav Oshaya concludes: Rather, is it not correct to say that that the difference between them is the halakha concerning one who performs a transgression while acting unawares? As Rabbi Yehuda holds that one who acts unawares when committing a transgression is liable, and Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri hold that one who acts unawares when committing a transgression is exempt. If so, the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda refutes Shmuel鈥檚 statement that all agree that one who acts unawares while performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat is exempt.


诇讗 诪转注住拽 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 驻讟讜专 讜讛讻讗 讘讛讗 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 砖讝讜专讬 住讘专 砖讻讞 诪诇拽讟 诪诇讘讜 讘砖诐 讗讞讚 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讞讬讬讘


The Gemara answers: No, this is not a refutation. In fact, everyone agrees that one who acts unawares is exempt. The difference between the opinions involves a case where the picker lost his train of thought. He initially intended to pick one item, then he forgot and thought that he wanted a different item, and subsequently he unwittingly picked the item he had initially intended to pick. And here it is with regard to this matter that they disagree: As Rabbi Shimon Shezuri holds that when the picker forgot his initial train of thought and instead thought he wanted a different fruit, and both fruits are of one category, all agree he is liable if he ends up unwittingly picking the fruit he initially intended to pick.


讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讘砖谞讬 砖诪讜转 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 住讘专 诇讗 砖谞讗 讘砖诐 讗讞讚 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 讘砖谞讬 砖诪讜转 驻诇讬讙讬


When do Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree? They disagree with regard to a case involving two categories, i.e., when the picker forgot his initial thought and instead thought he required a fruit of a different category. By contrast, Rabbi Yehuda holds that there is no difference between a case of one category and a case of two categories: In both cases they disagree, as Rabbi Yehoshua rules he is exempt because his action did not follow his current intention. But in a case where one acts fully unawares, all agree he is exempt.


专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讬拽讚诐 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜


The Gemara cites another answer: Rava said that the difference between them is with regard to a case where one intended to perform two transgressions in a specific order and he mistakenly performed the second transgression first. According to Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree with regard to a situation where one intended to pick two fruits of two different categories and he unwittingly picked them in the reverse order. In such a case Rabbi Yehoshua holds he is exempt. But when he intended to pick two pieces of fruit of the same category and he unwittingly reversed the order, Rabbi Yehoshua agrees he is liable. According to Rabbi Yehuda, whether the case involves one category or two categories, in both instances Rabbi Yehoshua holds that he is exempt.


讜讛转谞讬讗 讛讬讜 诇驻谞讬讜 砖转讬 谞专讜转 讚讜诇拽讜转 讗专讜讻讜转 讜谞转讻讜讬谉 诇讻讘讜转 讗转 讝讜 讜讻讬讘讛 讗转 讝讜 诇讛讚诇讬拽 讗转 讝讜 讜讛讚诇讬拽 讗转 讝讜 驻讟讜专 诇讛讚诇讬拽 讜诇讻讘讜转 讜讻讬讘讛 讜讛讚诇讬拽 讘谞砖讬诪讛 讗讞转 讞讬讬讘


With regard to Rava鈥檚 explanation, the Gemara cites a baraita that supports the claim that if one intended to perform two prohibited labors in one order and mistakenly reversed the order, he is exempt. And it is taught: If someone had before him two long candles that were lit, and he intended to extinguish this one and instead he extinguished that one, or if he intended to light this one and instead he lit that one, he is exempt. But in a case where he intended to light one and then extinguish the other, and instead he drew a breath and blew the flame from one candle to the other, as he accomplished his intention and extinguished one and lit the other, albeit with one breath, he is liable. This indicates that if he had not performed the two acts simultaneously, but in the reverse order, he is exempt.


驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 诇讗 讗讬转注讘讚 诪讞砖讘转讬讛 讚讛讗 诇讛讚诇讬拽 诪注讬拽专讗 讘注讬 讜诇讘住讜祝 诇讻讘讜转 讜讻讬 注讘讚 诪注砖讛 讻讬讘讛 讜讘住讜祝 讛讚诇讬拽 讛讜讗 讜讗讬诪讗 驻讟讜专 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 谞讛讬 讚讗拽讚讜诪讬 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪拽讚讬诐 讗讞讜专讬 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪讗讞专


With regard to the last ruling, the Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 this obvious? Since he accomplished his act as he had intended, he is clearly liable. The Gemara answers that the ruling is necessary, lest you say: He did not actually perform the labors in accordance with his thought, as he wanted to light one initially and ultimately to extinguish the other, but when he performed the action, it might be considered as though he first extinguished one and ultimately lit the other. And therefore one might say he is exempt. Consequently, the baraita teaches us that although he did not perform the lighting first, as he had intended, nevertheless he also did not perform the lighting after the extinguishing, as they occurred simultaneously. Since his action did not entirely contradict his intention, he is liable.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛讞讜转讛 讙讞诇讬诐 讘砖讘转 讞讬讬讘 讞讟讗转 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘专讘讬 爪讚讜拽 讞讬讬讘 砖转讬诐 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讜讗 诪讻讘讛 讗转 讛注诇讬讜谞讜转 讜诪讘注讬专 讗转 讛转讞转讜谞讜转 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讗讬 讚拽讗 诪讬讻讜讬谉 诇讻讘讜转 讜诇讛讘注讬专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚诪讗谉 讚驻讟专 讗诇讗 讚诇讗 拽讗 诪讻讜讬谉 诇讛讘注讬专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚诪讗谉 讚诪讞讬讬讘 转专转讬


The Sages taught in a baraita: One who stokes coals on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin offering. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok: He is liable to bring two sin offerings, because he extinguishes the upper coals that are moved to the bottom, due to lack of oxygen, and he ignites the bottom coals as he moves them to the top. The Gemara asks: What are we dealing with here? If it is a case where he intends to extinguish and kindle, what is the reason of the one who exempts him? Rather, it must be that he does not intend to kindle, but only to extinguish. If so, what is the reason of the one who deems him liable to bring two sin offerings?


专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讜专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讜讬讬讛讜 讻讙讜谉 砖谞转讻讜讬谉 诇讻讘讜转 讛注诇讬讜谞讜转 讻讚讬 诇讛讘注讬专 讗转 讛转讞转讜谞讜转 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 拽住讘专 诪拽诇拽诇 讘讛讘注专讛 驻讟讜专 讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘专讘讬 爪讚讜拽 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谞驻讞 砖谞讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 谞转讙诇转讛 讟注诪讗 砖诇 讛诇讻讛 讝讜


Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi 岣nina both say in explanation: The baraita is referring to a case where a blacksmith needed the coals on top and he therefore intended to extinguish the upper coals, and in order to do that he knew he would ignite the bottom ones. The tanna鈥檌m disagree with regard to an undesired act of kindling on Shabbat, which is tantamount to a destructive act. As, the first tanna holds that one who produces an undesired or destructive outcome when he performs the labor of kindling is exempt, and Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says he is liable. And similarly, Rabbi Yo岣nan says: That disagreement was taught with regard to the case of a blacksmith. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Until it was taught that the case involves a blacksmith, the reason for this halakha was not revealed.


讗诪讬 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讜专讘 讞谞谞讬讗 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讜讬讬讛讜


Ami bar Avin and Rav 岣nanya bar Avin both say another explanation:


讻讙讜谉 砖谞转讻讜讬谉 诇讻讘讜转 讜诇讛讘注讬专 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 讛讘注专讛 诇诇讗讜 讬爪讗转


This is referring to a case where he intended both to extinguish and to kindle. The Torah singles out the labor of kindling on Shabbat, as it is written: 鈥淵ou shall not kindle fire in all your dwelling places on the day of Shabbat鈥 (Exodus 35:3). The Sages disagree with regard to the interpretation of this verse. As the first tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: Kindling was singled out from the general category of prohibited labors in order to teach that it is unlike other labors, teaching that it is a regular prohibition, i.e., it is punishable only with lashes and does not entail karet or stoning for an intentional transgression, or a sin offering for an unwitting transgression. Consequently, he is not liable to bring a sin offering for the kindling.


讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘专讘讬 爪讚讜拽 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 谞转谉 讚讗诪专 讛讘注专讛 诇讞诇拽 讬爪讗转


And Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, who says: Kindling was singled out in the Torah to divide the various primary categories of labor and to establish liability for the performance of each of them. According to this opinion, the prescribed punishments for kindling are the same as for the rest of the prohibited labors.


专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讛拽讚讬诐 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜


Rava said yet another explanation of the disagreement in the baraita: The difference between them involves a case where one intended to ignite the lower coals and subsequently extinguish the upper coals, and instead he extinguished the upper ones and ignited the lower ones simultaneously. Since he performed the extinguishing first and did not perform it after he ignited as he had intended, the first tanna rules he is liable to bring only one sin offering. By contrast, Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, maintains there is no exemption for performing the prohibited labors in a different sequence than intended.


专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讻讙讜谉 砖谞转讻讜讬谉 诇讻讘讜转 讜讛讜讘注专讜 诪讗讬诇讬讛谉 讜转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚讗诪专 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 驻讟讜专 讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘专讘讬 爪讚讜拽 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 讞讬讬讘


Rav Ashi said another explanation: The baraita is referring to a case where he intended to extinguish a flame and he was not aware that the bottom coals would be kindled. Rather, they ignited by themselves, as he moved aside and extinguished the upper coals. And the first tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: If one commits an unintentional act, an action from which an unintended prohibited result ensues on Shabbat, as he did not intend to perform a prohibited labor, he is exempt. And Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: One who commits an unintentional act from which a prohibited labor inadvertently results is liable.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛讞讜转讛 讙讞诇讬诐 讘砖讘转 诇讛转讞诪诐 讘讛诐 讜讛讜讘注专讜 诪讗讬诇讬讛谉 转谞讬 讞讚讗 讞讬讬讘 讜转谞讬 讗讬讚讱 驻讟讜专 讛讚转谞讬讗 讞讬讬讘 拽住讘专 诪诇讗讻讛 砖讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 诇讙讜驻讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇讬讛 讜讛讗 讚转谞讗 驻讟讜专 拽住讘专 诪诇讗讻讛 砖讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 诇讙讜驻讛 驻讟讜专 注诇讬讛


The Sages taught in a baraita: Concerning one who stokes coals on Shabbat with the intention to move them in order to be warmed by them, and they ignited by themselves; it is taught in one baraita that he is liable and it is taught in another baraita that he is exempt. The Gemara explains: The reason for that which is taught in the first baraita, i.e., that he is liable, is that this tanna holds that one who performs a labor on Shabbat that is not necessary for its own sake, i.e., he performs the labor for a purpose other than the direct result of the action, is held liable for it. And the reason for that which is taught in the second baraita, i.e., that he is exempt, is that he holds that one who performs a labor that is not necessary for its own sake is exempt from liability for it.


讛讚专谉 注诇讱 住驻拽 讗讻诇 讞诇讘



诪转谞讬壮 讗讻诇 讚诐 砖讞讬讟讛 讘讘讛诪讛 讘讞讬讛 讜讘注讜祝 讘讬谉 讟诪讗讬谉 讘讬谉 讟讛讜专讬谉 讚诐 谞讞讬专讛 讚诐 注讬拽讜专 讚诐 讛拽讝讛 砖讛谞砖诪讛 讬讜爪讗讛 讘讜 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讜


MISHNA: If one consumed an olive-bulk of blood that spurted during the slaughter of a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird, whether it is a kosher or non-kosher species; or if one consumed blood that flowed after stabbing an animal or killing it in a manner other than by ritual slaughter, or blood that spurted after ripping the animal鈥檚 windpipe or gullet, or blood that spurted during bloodletting with which the soul departs, one is liable to receive karet for consuming it intentionally or to bring a sin offering for consuming it unwittingly.


讚诐 讛讟讞讜诇 讚诐 讛诇讘 讚诐 讘讬爪讬诐 讚诐 讞讙讘讬诐 讚诐 讛转诪爪讬转 讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讞讬讬讘 讘讚诐 讛转诪爪讬转


But with regard to blood of the spleen, blood of the heart, blood of eggs, blood of grasshoppers, or blood of exudate [tamtzit], i.e., that oozes from the neck of the animal after the initial spurt of its slaughter concludes,one is not liable for consuming it. Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable in the case of blood of exudate.


讙诪壮 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讻诇 讚诐 诇讗 转讗讻诇讜 砖讜诪注 讗谞讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讚诐 诪讛诇讻讬 砖转讬诐 讚诐 讘讬爪讬诐 讚诐 讞讙讘讬诐 讚诐 讚讙讬诐 讛讻诇 讘讻诇诇 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇注讜祝 讜诇讘讛诪讛


GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淎nd you shall consume no manner of blood鈥 (Leviticus 7:26). I would derive from here that even with regard to the blood of bipeds, i.e., human beings, and the blood of eggs, the blood of grasshoppers, and the blood of fish, all these are included in the prohibition against consuming blood. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淲hether it is of bird or of animal鈥 (Leviticus 7:26).


诪讛 注讜祝 讜讘讛诪讛 诪讬讜讞讚讬谉 砖讬砖 讘讛谉 讟讜诪讗讛 拽诇讛 讜讟讜诪讗讛 讞诪讜专讛 讜讬砖 讘讛谉 讗讬住讜专 讜讛讬转专 讜讛谉 诪讬谉 讘砖专 讗祝 讻诇 砖讬砖 讘讛谉 讟讜诪讗讛 拽诇讛


The baraita explains the derivation from the verse: Just as birds and animals are unique in that they have the capacity for both a light form of ritual impurity, if they become impure after they are slaughtered, in which case they are considered impure food, and a severe form of impurity, if they die without valid ritual slaughter, and they have the possibility of being forbidden or permitted, and they are a type of meat, so too, everything that has the capacity for both a light form of impurity and a severe form of ritual impurity, and has the possibility of being forbidden or permitted, and is a type of meat, is included in the prohibition.


讗讜爪讬讗 讚诐 诪讛诇讻讬 砖转讬诐 砖讬砖 讘讛谉 讟讜诪讗讛 讞诪讜专讛 讜讗讬谉 讘讛诐 讟讜诪讗讛 拽诇讛


I will therefore exclude the blood of bipeds, as they have the capacity for a severe form of ritual impurity, i.e., the impurity of a corpse, but they do not have the capacity for a light form of ritual impurity, since the halakhot of the impurity of food do not apply to the human body.

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