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Today's Daf Yomi

May 15, 2015 | 讻状讜 讘讗讬讬专 转砖注状讛

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Ketubot 102

诇讗 讘砖讟专讬 驻住讬拽转讗 讜讻讚专讘 讙讬讚诇

The Gemara rejects this: No, the mishna is referring to a case of documents of stipulation that record the amounts that parents agree to provide to their son or daughter, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Giddel.

讚讗诪专 专讘 讙讬讚诇 讗诪专 专讘 讻诪讛 讗转讛 谞讜转谉 诇讘谞讱 讻讱 讜讻讱 讜讻诪讛 讗转讛 谞讜转谉 诇讘转讱 讻讱 讜讻讱 注诪讚讜 讜拽讬讚砖讜 拽谞讜 讛谉 讛谉 讛讚讘专讬诐 讛谞拽谞讬谉 讘讗诪讬专讛

As Rav Giddel said that Rav said: When two families negotiate the terms of marriage for their respective children, one side says to the other: How much do you give your son? And the second side answers: Such and such amount. How much do you give your daughter? And the first side responds: Such and such amount. Then, if the son and daughter arose and performed the betrothal, all of these obligations are acquired and therefore binding. These are among the things that are acquired through words alone, without the need for an additional act of acquisition. The mishna is referring to a document that records such an agreement.

转讗 砖诪注 讻转讘 诇讻讛谉 砖讗谞讬 讞讬讬讘 诇讱 讞诪砖 住诇注讬诐 讞讬讬讘 诇讬转谉 诇讜 讞诪砖 住诇注讬诐 讜讘谞讜 讗讬谞讜 驻讚讜讬

Come and hear another challenge to the opinion of Reish Lakish, based upon the following mishna (Bekhorot 51a): If he wrote to a priest with whom he wants to perform the redemption of his firstborn son: I am obligated to pay you five sela, then he is obligated to give him five sela and his son is not redeemed even once he pays the money. This baraita apparently supports the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan.

砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚诪砖讜注讘讚 诇讬讛 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗讬 讛讻讬 讗诪讗讬 讻转讘 讻讚讬 诇讘专专 诇讜 讻讛谉

The Gemara answers: It is different there, because he is obligated to give the five sela to him by Torah law in order to fulfill his obligation of redeeming his firstborn son, even without writing a contract. The Gemara asks: If that is so, why did he write the contract at all? The Gemara answers: In order to select for himself a specific priest with whom to perform the redemption of his son.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讘谞讜 讗诪讗讬 讗讬谞讜 驻讚讜讬 讻讚注讜诇讗 讚讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讚讘专 转讜专讛 驻讚讜讬 诇讻砖讬转谉 讜诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专讜 讘谞讜 讗讬谞讜 驻讚讜讬 讙讝讬专讛 砖诪讗 讬讗诪专讜 驻讜讚讬谉 讘砖讟专讜转

The Gemara asks: If that is so, why is his son not redeemed once he pays the money? The Gemara answers: This is in accordance with the opinion of Ulla. As Ulla said, by Torah law a son is redeemed when the father gives the money. And for what reason did the Sages say: His son is not redeemed? It is a rabbinic decree that was enacted lest people say that one can redeem a firstborn son with documents, i.e., by giving a document allowing the priest to collect a debt from a third party. This is not effective, since the Torah requires that one redeem his son with actual money.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讻转谞讗讬 注专讘 讛讬讜爪讗 讗讞专 讞讬转讜诐 砖讟专讜转 讙讜讘讛 诪谞讻住讬诐 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉

Rava said: The dispute between Rabbi Yo岣nan and Reish Lakish is like a dispute between tanna鈥檌m over the same matter in the following mishna (Bava Batra 175b): In a case where a guarantor appears after the signatures in contracts, i.e., someone wrote that he is a guarantor for a loan after the contract was signed, the creditor collects only from the unsold property of the guarantor. Since the guarantee is not viewed as though it were written in the document, it is like a loan by oral agreement, which is collected only from unsold property.

诪注砖讛 讘讗 诇驻谞讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜讗诪专 讙讜讘讛 诪谞讻住讬诐 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉 讗诪专 诇讜 讘谉 谞谞住 讗讬谞讜 讙讜讘讛 诇讗 诪谞讻住讬诐 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉 讜诇讗 诪谞讻住讬诐 诪砖讜注讘讚讬诐

An incident came before Rabbi Yishmael, and he said: The creditor collects from unsold property. Ben Nannas said to him: He does not collect from the guarantor at all; not from unsold property, nor from liened property that was sold, since what the guarantor wrote has no legal standing whatsoever.

讗诪专 诇讜 诇诪讛 讗诪专 诇讜 讛专讬 砖讛讬讛 讞讜谞拽 讗转 讞讘讬专讜 讘砖讜拽 讜诪爪讗 讞讘讬专讜 讜讗诪专 诇讜 讛谞讞 诇讜 讜讗谞讬 讗转谉 诇讱 驻讟讜专 砖诇讗 注诇 讗诪讜谞转讜 讛诇讜讛讜

Rabbi Yishmael said to him: Why? Ben Nannas said to him: If someone was strangling another in the marketplace and demanding money that is owed to him, and a friend of the victim found him and said to the strangler: Leave him alone and I will give you what you are demanding from him, the friend of the victim is exempt from having to make any payment. This is because the creditor did not lend the money based on his trust in the friend of the victim, as the friend promised to repay the loan only after the money had been loaned. The same should apply in the case of the guarantor who comes after the contracts were already signed.

诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讚讗诪专 讻讘谉 谞谞住

Rava concludes: Let us say that Rabbi Yo岣nan stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, that the obligation that one accepts upon himself is binding, and Reish Lakish stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of ben Nannas.

讗诇讬讘讗 讚讘谉 谞谞住 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬

The Gemara responds: According to the opinion of ben Nannas, everyone agrees that if he wrote in a contract: I owe you one hundred dinars, he is not obligated to pay.

讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讻专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚砖讬讬讱 诇讬讛 诇砖讬注讘讜讚讗 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诇讗 砖讬讬讱 砖讬注讘讜讚讗 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

When they disagree, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Yo岣nan stated his ruling in accordance with the simple interpretation of the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. And Reish Lakish holds that Rabbi Yishmael states his opinion only there, in the case of the guarantor, which relates to an obligation of Torah law, since a guarantor is obligated by Torah law to pay. But here, where the case does not relate to an obligation of Torah law, as the man did not owe any money until he accepted this obligation upon himself, even Rabbi Yishmael would exempt him from paying.

讙讜驻讗 讗诪专 专讘 讙讬讚诇 讗诪专 专讘 讻诪讛 讗转讛 谞讜转谉 诇讘谞讱 讻讱 讜讻讱 讜讻诪讛 讗转讛 谞讜转谉 诇讘转讱 讻讱 讜讻讱 注诪讚讜 讜拽讬讚砖讜 拽谞讜 讛谉 讛谉 讛讚讘专讬诐 讛谞拽谞讬诐 讘讗诪讬专讛

搂 The Gemara continues to analyze the matter itself mentioned earlier: Rav Giddel said that Rav said: When two families negotiate the terms of marriage for their respective children and one side says to the other: How much do you give your son? And the second side answers: Such and such amount. How much do you give your daughter? And the first side responds: Such and such amount. Then, if the son and daughter arose and performed the betrothal, all of these obligations are acquired and therefore binding. These are among the things that are acquired through words alone, without the need for an additional act of acquisition. The mishna is referring to a document that records such an agreement.

讗诪专 专讘讗 诪住转讘专讗 诪讬诇转讗 讚专讘 讘讘转讜 谞注专讛 讚拽讗 诪讟讬 讛谞讗讛 诇讬讚讬讛 讗讘诇 讘讜讙专转 讚诇讗 诪讟讬 讛谞讗讛 诇讬讚讬讛 诇讗

Rava said: Rav鈥檚 statement is reasonable in a case of a father whose daughter is a young woman, since the father derives benefit from this betrothal. The money given by the groom for the betrothal, as well as the rights to the bride鈥檚 marriage contract, belongs to the father of the bride. Consequently, he accepts through verbal agreement alone the obligation to pay the money he specified. However, in the case of a grown woman, where the father does not derive benefit from the betrothal because the rights to the betrothal money and marriage contract belong to the woman herself, no, the father does not become obligated to pay the money he specified through verbal agreement alone.

讜讛讗诇讛讬诐 讗诪专 专讘 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讜讙专转 讚讗讬 诇讗 转讬诪讗 讛讻讬 讗讘讬 讛讘谉 诪讗讬 讛谞讗讛 讗转讗 诇讬讚讬讛 讗诇讗 讘讛讛讬讗 讛谞讗讛 讚拽诪讬讞转谞讬 讗讛讚讚讬 讙诪专讬 讜诪拽谞讬 诇讛讚讚讬

Rava continues: But by God! Rav said his ruling even with regard to a grown woman, as, if you do not say so, in the case of the father of the groom, what monetary benefit does he derive from the betrothal? Rather, it must be explained that in exchange for that benefit, i.e., that the groom and bride marry each other, the fathers fully transfer the rights to the respective payments to each other.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讚讘专讬诐 讛诇诇讜 谞讬转谞讜 诇讬讻转讘 讗讜 诇讗 谞讬转谞讜 诇讬讻转讘 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 谞讬转谞讜 诇讬讻转讘

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Are these matters, i.e., verbal agreements concerning an upcoming marriage, allowed to be written down afterward in a proper contract, or are they not allowed to be written down afterward in a proper contract? Rav Ashi said to him: They are not allowed to be written down.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讛驻拽讞讬谉 讛讬讜 讻讜转讘讬谉 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讝讜谉 讗转 讘转讱 讞诪砖 砖谞讬诐 讻诇 讝诪谉 砖讗转 注诪讬 诪讗讬 讻讜转讘讬谉 讗讜诪专讬诐

Ravina raised an objection to this from the mishna: The perspicacious ones would write an explicit stipulation into the agreement: I agree on the condition that I will sustain your daughter for five years only as long as you are with me. This indicates that one may document these verbal agreements. Rav Ashi responded: What is the meaning of the term write in this case? It means say.

讜拽专讬 诇讬讛 诇讗诪讬专讛 讻转讬讘讛 讗讬谉 讜讛转谞谉 讛讻讜转讘 诇讗砖转讜 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讘谞讻住讬讬讱 讜转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖转讜

Ravina continued to ask: Does the tanna refer to saying as writing? Rav Ashi replied: Yes. And so we learned in the mishna (83a): One who writes to his wife: I have no legal dealings or involvement in your properties, and Rabbi 岣yya taught in explanation, that it means: One who says to his wife. This proves that verbal agreements are sometimes referred to in the Mishna as writing.

转讗 砖诪注 讗讬谉 讻讜转讘讬谉 砖讟专讬 讗讬专讜住讬谉 讜谞砖讜讗讬谉 讗诇讗 诪讚注转 砖谞讬讛诐 讛讗 诪讚注转 砖谞讬讛诐 讻讜转讘讬谉 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 砖讟专讬 驻住讬拽转讗

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the following mishna (Bava Batra 167b): One writes documents of betrothal and marriage only with the consent of both of them. It may be derived from here that with the consent of both of them, one may write the documents. What, is it not that this mishna is discussing documents of stipulation that specify the agreements accepted by each side before the marriage?

诇讗 砖讟专讬 讗讬专讜住讬谉 诪诪砖 讻讚专讘 驻驻讗 讜专讘 砖专讘讬讗 讚讗讬转诪专 讻转讘讜 诇砖诪讛 讜砖诇讗 诪讚注转讛 专讘讛 讜专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专讬 诪拽讜讚砖转 专讘 驻驻讗 讜专讘 砖专讘讬讗 讗诪专讬 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转

The Gemara rejects this: No, the discussion concerns actual betrothal documents. In other words, in a case where a man betroths a woman by giving her a document that states: You are hereby betrothed to me, the document must be written with the consent of both the man and the woman, in accordance with the opinions of Rav Pappa and Rav Sherevya. As it was stated: If the husband wrote a betrothal document for the sake of a specific woman and gave it to her, but he wrote it without her consent, Rabba and Ravina say: She is betrothed to this man. Rav Pappa and Rav Sherevya say: She is not betrothed.

转讗 砖诪注 诪转讜 讘谞讜转讬讛谉 谞讬讝讜谞讜转 诪谞讻住讬诐 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉 讜讛讬讗 谞讬讝讜谞转 诪谞讻住讬诐 诪砖讜注讘讚讬诐 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讬讗 讻讘注诇转 讞讜讘

The Gemara suggests further: Come and hear another proof that verbal agreements may be written down, based upon the mishna: If the two husbands died, their daughters are sustained from unsold property, and she, their wife鈥檚 daughter, whom they agreed to sustain for five years, is sustained even from liened property that was sold. This is due to the fact that her legal status is like that of a creditor, given that they are contractually obligated to pay her. The fact that she is able to repossess liened property indicates that the agreement is recorded in a document.

讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘砖拽谞讜 诪讬讚讜

The Gemara rejects this proof: Here, we are dealing with a case where the woman acquired from each husband the right to her daughter鈥檚 sustenance, i.e., they performed an act of acquisition and did not suffice with a mere verbal agreement. Consequently, the agreement may be recorded in a document.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讘谞讜转 谞诪讬 讘砖拽谞讜 诇讝讜 讜诇讗 拽谞讜 诇讝讜

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that a proper mode of acquisition was employed, then let the husbands鈥 own daughters also repossess liened properties that were sold. The Gemara answers: The case is such where they acquired the right to receive sustenance for this daughter of the wife, and they did not acquire this right for that daughter, i.e., they did not perform an act of acquisition confirming their obligations to provide sustenance for their own daughters.

讜诪讗讬 驻住拽讗 讗讬讛讬 讚讛讜讗讬 讘砖注转 拽谞讬谉 诪讛谞讬 诇讛 拽谞讬谉 讘谞讜转 讚诇讗 讛讜讜 讘砖注转 拽谞讬谉 诇讗 诪讛谞讬 诇讛讜 拽谞讬谉

The Gemara asks: What makes it necessary to say that the case is one in which an acquisition was made on behalf of the wife鈥檚 daughter and not on behalf of the husbands鈥 own daughters? The Gemara answers: She, the wife鈥檚 daughter from a previous marriage, was present at the time of the transaction when her mother was wed. Consequently, for her the transaction is effective. With regard to the daughters of the husbands, who were born after their parents鈥 marriage and were not present at the time of the transaction, for them the transaction is not effective.

诪讬 诇讗 注住拽讬谞谉 讚讛讜讗讬 讘砖注转 拽谞讬谉 讜讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讻讙讜谉 讚讙专砖讛 讜讗讛讚专讛

The Gemara asks: Are we not also dealing with a situation where the husband鈥檚 daughters were present at the time of the transaction? And what are the circumstances that would allow for such a reality? This could occur in a situation such as where each one divorced his wife and then took her back, and they had a daughter from their first marriage.

讗诇讗 讗讬讛讬 讚诇讬转讗 讘转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诪讛谞讬 诇讛 拽谞讬谉 讘谞讜转 讚讗讬转谞讛讜 讘转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诇讗 诪讛谞讬 诇讛讜 拽谞讬谉

Rather, the distinction is as follows: She, the wife鈥檚 daughter, is not included in the stipulation of the court requiring a husband to support his daughters. Consequently, for her the transaction is effective. However, with regard to the husband鈥檚 own daughters, who are included in the stipulation of the court, for them the transaction is not effective.

诪讙专注 讙专注讬 讗诇讗 讘谞讜转讬讜 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬转谞讛讜 讘转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬诪专 爪专专讬 讗转驻住讬谞讛讜

The Gemara wonders about this: Because they are included in the stipulation of the court they are worse off? On the contrary, since the stipulation of the court demands that they be supported, they should wield more power. Rather, this is the reason that his own daughters do not collect from liened property: Since they are included in the stipulation of the court, and it is therefore the norm for fathers to take care to provide their support, say that their father gave them bundles of money while he was still alive. Due to this concern, they cannot repossess liened property. However, in the case of the wife鈥檚 daughter, who is not included in the stipulation of the court, there is no concern that the husband gave her anything prior to his death.

诇讗 讬讗诪专 讛专讗砖讜谉 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讝讗转 讗讜诪专转 讘转 讗爪诇 讗诪讛

搂 We learned in the mishna that the first husband may not say that he will provide his wife鈥檚 daughter with support only when she is with him. Rather, he must bring the sustenance to her in the place where her mother lives. Rav 岣sda said: That is to say that in a case of divorce, a daughter lives with her mother.

诪诪讗讬 讚讘讙讚讜诇讛 注住拽讬谞谉 讚诇诪讗 讘拽讟谞讛 注住拽讬谞谉 讜诪砖讜诐 诪注砖讛 砖讛讬讛

The Gemara asks: From where do we know that we are dealing with a case of an adult woman and there is a general guideline that in cases of divorce, a girl lives with her mother? Perhaps we are dealing with a case of a minor girl, and she lives with her mother because of concern for her safety, due to an incident that occurred.

讚转谞讬讗 诪讬 砖诪转 讜讛谞讬讞 讘谉 拽讟谉 诇讗诪讜 讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬讛讗 讙讚诇 讗爪诇谞讜 讜讗诪讜 讗讜诪专转 讬讛讗 讘谞讬 讙讚诇 讗爪诇讬 诪谞讬讞讬谉 讗讜转讜 讗爪诇 讗诪讜 讜讗讬谉 诪谞讬讞讬谉 讗讜转讜 讗爪诇 专讗讜讬 诇讬讜专砖讜 诪注砖讛 讛讬讛 讜砖讞讟讜讛讜 注专讘 讛驻住讞

As it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who died and left a minor son to the care of his mother, and the heirs of the father say: The son should grow up with us, and his mother says: My son should grow up with me, the halakha is that one leaves the child with his mother, and one does not leave the child with one who is fit to inherit from him, i.e., the father鈥檚 heirs. An incident occurred, and the boy lived with his father鈥檚 heirs, and they slaughtered him on the eve of Passover. So too, a minor girl is not left in the care of those who are obligated to sustain her and who have a financial interest in her demise.

讗诐 讻谉 诇讬转谞讬 诇诪拽讜诐 砖讛讬讗

The Gemara answers: If that is so, let the mishna teach that the husband must bring the sustenance to the place where she, the daughter, is located.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Ketubot 102

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Ketubot 102

诇讗 讘砖讟专讬 驻住讬拽转讗 讜讻讚专讘 讙讬讚诇

The Gemara rejects this: No, the mishna is referring to a case of documents of stipulation that record the amounts that parents agree to provide to their son or daughter, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Giddel.

讚讗诪专 专讘 讙讬讚诇 讗诪专 专讘 讻诪讛 讗转讛 谞讜转谉 诇讘谞讱 讻讱 讜讻讱 讜讻诪讛 讗转讛 谞讜转谉 诇讘转讱 讻讱 讜讻讱 注诪讚讜 讜拽讬讚砖讜 拽谞讜 讛谉 讛谉 讛讚讘专讬诐 讛谞拽谞讬谉 讘讗诪讬专讛

As Rav Giddel said that Rav said: When two families negotiate the terms of marriage for their respective children, one side says to the other: How much do you give your son? And the second side answers: Such and such amount. How much do you give your daughter? And the first side responds: Such and such amount. Then, if the son and daughter arose and performed the betrothal, all of these obligations are acquired and therefore binding. These are among the things that are acquired through words alone, without the need for an additional act of acquisition. The mishna is referring to a document that records such an agreement.

转讗 砖诪注 讻转讘 诇讻讛谉 砖讗谞讬 讞讬讬讘 诇讱 讞诪砖 住诇注讬诐 讞讬讬讘 诇讬转谉 诇讜 讞诪砖 住诇注讬诐 讜讘谞讜 讗讬谞讜 驻讚讜讬

Come and hear another challenge to the opinion of Reish Lakish, based upon the following mishna (Bekhorot 51a): If he wrote to a priest with whom he wants to perform the redemption of his firstborn son: I am obligated to pay you five sela, then he is obligated to give him five sela and his son is not redeemed even once he pays the money. This baraita apparently supports the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan.

砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚诪砖讜注讘讚 诇讬讛 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗讬 讛讻讬 讗诪讗讬 讻转讘 讻讚讬 诇讘专专 诇讜 讻讛谉

The Gemara answers: It is different there, because he is obligated to give the five sela to him by Torah law in order to fulfill his obligation of redeeming his firstborn son, even without writing a contract. The Gemara asks: If that is so, why did he write the contract at all? The Gemara answers: In order to select for himself a specific priest with whom to perform the redemption of his son.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讘谞讜 讗诪讗讬 讗讬谞讜 驻讚讜讬 讻讚注讜诇讗 讚讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讚讘专 转讜专讛 驻讚讜讬 诇讻砖讬转谉 讜诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专讜 讘谞讜 讗讬谞讜 驻讚讜讬 讙讝讬专讛 砖诪讗 讬讗诪专讜 驻讜讚讬谉 讘砖讟专讜转

The Gemara asks: If that is so, why is his son not redeemed once he pays the money? The Gemara answers: This is in accordance with the opinion of Ulla. As Ulla said, by Torah law a son is redeemed when the father gives the money. And for what reason did the Sages say: His son is not redeemed? It is a rabbinic decree that was enacted lest people say that one can redeem a firstborn son with documents, i.e., by giving a document allowing the priest to collect a debt from a third party. This is not effective, since the Torah requires that one redeem his son with actual money.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讻转谞讗讬 注专讘 讛讬讜爪讗 讗讞专 讞讬转讜诐 砖讟专讜转 讙讜讘讛 诪谞讻住讬诐 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉

Rava said: The dispute between Rabbi Yo岣nan and Reish Lakish is like a dispute between tanna鈥檌m over the same matter in the following mishna (Bava Batra 175b): In a case where a guarantor appears after the signatures in contracts, i.e., someone wrote that he is a guarantor for a loan after the contract was signed, the creditor collects only from the unsold property of the guarantor. Since the guarantee is not viewed as though it were written in the document, it is like a loan by oral agreement, which is collected only from unsold property.

诪注砖讛 讘讗 诇驻谞讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜讗诪专 讙讜讘讛 诪谞讻住讬诐 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉 讗诪专 诇讜 讘谉 谞谞住 讗讬谞讜 讙讜讘讛 诇讗 诪谞讻住讬诐 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉 讜诇讗 诪谞讻住讬诐 诪砖讜注讘讚讬诐

An incident came before Rabbi Yishmael, and he said: The creditor collects from unsold property. Ben Nannas said to him: He does not collect from the guarantor at all; not from unsold property, nor from liened property that was sold, since what the guarantor wrote has no legal standing whatsoever.

讗诪专 诇讜 诇诪讛 讗诪专 诇讜 讛专讬 砖讛讬讛 讞讜谞拽 讗转 讞讘讬专讜 讘砖讜拽 讜诪爪讗 讞讘讬专讜 讜讗诪专 诇讜 讛谞讞 诇讜 讜讗谞讬 讗转谉 诇讱 驻讟讜专 砖诇讗 注诇 讗诪讜谞转讜 讛诇讜讛讜

Rabbi Yishmael said to him: Why? Ben Nannas said to him: If someone was strangling another in the marketplace and demanding money that is owed to him, and a friend of the victim found him and said to the strangler: Leave him alone and I will give you what you are demanding from him, the friend of the victim is exempt from having to make any payment. This is because the creditor did not lend the money based on his trust in the friend of the victim, as the friend promised to repay the loan only after the money had been loaned. The same should apply in the case of the guarantor who comes after the contracts were already signed.

诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讚讗诪专 讻讘谉 谞谞住

Rava concludes: Let us say that Rabbi Yo岣nan stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, that the obligation that one accepts upon himself is binding, and Reish Lakish stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of ben Nannas.

讗诇讬讘讗 讚讘谉 谞谞住 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬

The Gemara responds: According to the opinion of ben Nannas, everyone agrees that if he wrote in a contract: I owe you one hundred dinars, he is not obligated to pay.

讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讻专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚砖讬讬讱 诇讬讛 诇砖讬注讘讜讚讗 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诇讗 砖讬讬讱 砖讬注讘讜讚讗 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

When they disagree, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Yo岣nan stated his ruling in accordance with the simple interpretation of the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. And Reish Lakish holds that Rabbi Yishmael states his opinion only there, in the case of the guarantor, which relates to an obligation of Torah law, since a guarantor is obligated by Torah law to pay. But here, where the case does not relate to an obligation of Torah law, as the man did not owe any money until he accepted this obligation upon himself, even Rabbi Yishmael would exempt him from paying.

讙讜驻讗 讗诪专 专讘 讙讬讚诇 讗诪专 专讘 讻诪讛 讗转讛 谞讜转谉 诇讘谞讱 讻讱 讜讻讱 讜讻诪讛 讗转讛 谞讜转谉 诇讘转讱 讻讱 讜讻讱 注诪讚讜 讜拽讬讚砖讜 拽谞讜 讛谉 讛谉 讛讚讘专讬诐 讛谞拽谞讬诐 讘讗诪讬专讛

搂 The Gemara continues to analyze the matter itself mentioned earlier: Rav Giddel said that Rav said: When two families negotiate the terms of marriage for their respective children and one side says to the other: How much do you give your son? And the second side answers: Such and such amount. How much do you give your daughter? And the first side responds: Such and such amount. Then, if the son and daughter arose and performed the betrothal, all of these obligations are acquired and therefore binding. These are among the things that are acquired through words alone, without the need for an additional act of acquisition. The mishna is referring to a document that records such an agreement.

讗诪专 专讘讗 诪住转讘专讗 诪讬诇转讗 讚专讘 讘讘转讜 谞注专讛 讚拽讗 诪讟讬 讛谞讗讛 诇讬讚讬讛 讗讘诇 讘讜讙专转 讚诇讗 诪讟讬 讛谞讗讛 诇讬讚讬讛 诇讗

Rava said: Rav鈥檚 statement is reasonable in a case of a father whose daughter is a young woman, since the father derives benefit from this betrothal. The money given by the groom for the betrothal, as well as the rights to the bride鈥檚 marriage contract, belongs to the father of the bride. Consequently, he accepts through verbal agreement alone the obligation to pay the money he specified. However, in the case of a grown woman, where the father does not derive benefit from the betrothal because the rights to the betrothal money and marriage contract belong to the woman herself, no, the father does not become obligated to pay the money he specified through verbal agreement alone.

讜讛讗诇讛讬诐 讗诪专 专讘 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讜讙专转 讚讗讬 诇讗 转讬诪讗 讛讻讬 讗讘讬 讛讘谉 诪讗讬 讛谞讗讛 讗转讗 诇讬讚讬讛 讗诇讗 讘讛讛讬讗 讛谞讗讛 讚拽诪讬讞转谞讬 讗讛讚讚讬 讙诪专讬 讜诪拽谞讬 诇讛讚讚讬

Rava continues: But by God! Rav said his ruling even with regard to a grown woman, as, if you do not say so, in the case of the father of the groom, what monetary benefit does he derive from the betrothal? Rather, it must be explained that in exchange for that benefit, i.e., that the groom and bride marry each other, the fathers fully transfer the rights to the respective payments to each other.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讚讘专讬诐 讛诇诇讜 谞讬转谞讜 诇讬讻转讘 讗讜 诇讗 谞讬转谞讜 诇讬讻转讘 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 谞讬转谞讜 诇讬讻转讘

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Are these matters, i.e., verbal agreements concerning an upcoming marriage, allowed to be written down afterward in a proper contract, or are they not allowed to be written down afterward in a proper contract? Rav Ashi said to him: They are not allowed to be written down.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讛驻拽讞讬谉 讛讬讜 讻讜转讘讬谉 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讝讜谉 讗转 讘转讱 讞诪砖 砖谞讬诐 讻诇 讝诪谉 砖讗转 注诪讬 诪讗讬 讻讜转讘讬谉 讗讜诪专讬诐

Ravina raised an objection to this from the mishna: The perspicacious ones would write an explicit stipulation into the agreement: I agree on the condition that I will sustain your daughter for five years only as long as you are with me. This indicates that one may document these verbal agreements. Rav Ashi responded: What is the meaning of the term write in this case? It means say.

讜拽专讬 诇讬讛 诇讗诪讬专讛 讻转讬讘讛 讗讬谉 讜讛转谞谉 讛讻讜转讘 诇讗砖转讜 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讘谞讻住讬讬讱 讜转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖转讜

Ravina continued to ask: Does the tanna refer to saying as writing? Rav Ashi replied: Yes. And so we learned in the mishna (83a): One who writes to his wife: I have no legal dealings or involvement in your properties, and Rabbi 岣yya taught in explanation, that it means: One who says to his wife. This proves that verbal agreements are sometimes referred to in the Mishna as writing.

转讗 砖诪注 讗讬谉 讻讜转讘讬谉 砖讟专讬 讗讬专讜住讬谉 讜谞砖讜讗讬谉 讗诇讗 诪讚注转 砖谞讬讛诐 讛讗 诪讚注转 砖谞讬讛诐 讻讜转讘讬谉 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 砖讟专讬 驻住讬拽转讗

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the following mishna (Bava Batra 167b): One writes documents of betrothal and marriage only with the consent of both of them. It may be derived from here that with the consent of both of them, one may write the documents. What, is it not that this mishna is discussing documents of stipulation that specify the agreements accepted by each side before the marriage?

诇讗 砖讟专讬 讗讬专讜住讬谉 诪诪砖 讻讚专讘 驻驻讗 讜专讘 砖专讘讬讗 讚讗讬转诪专 讻转讘讜 诇砖诪讛 讜砖诇讗 诪讚注转讛 专讘讛 讜专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专讬 诪拽讜讚砖转 专讘 驻驻讗 讜专讘 砖专讘讬讗 讗诪专讬 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转

The Gemara rejects this: No, the discussion concerns actual betrothal documents. In other words, in a case where a man betroths a woman by giving her a document that states: You are hereby betrothed to me, the document must be written with the consent of both the man and the woman, in accordance with the opinions of Rav Pappa and Rav Sherevya. As it was stated: If the husband wrote a betrothal document for the sake of a specific woman and gave it to her, but he wrote it without her consent, Rabba and Ravina say: She is betrothed to this man. Rav Pappa and Rav Sherevya say: She is not betrothed.

转讗 砖诪注 诪转讜 讘谞讜转讬讛谉 谞讬讝讜谞讜转 诪谞讻住讬诐 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉 讜讛讬讗 谞讬讝讜谞转 诪谞讻住讬诐 诪砖讜注讘讚讬诐 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讬讗 讻讘注诇转 讞讜讘

The Gemara suggests further: Come and hear another proof that verbal agreements may be written down, based upon the mishna: If the two husbands died, their daughters are sustained from unsold property, and she, their wife鈥檚 daughter, whom they agreed to sustain for five years, is sustained even from liened property that was sold. This is due to the fact that her legal status is like that of a creditor, given that they are contractually obligated to pay her. The fact that she is able to repossess liened property indicates that the agreement is recorded in a document.

讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘砖拽谞讜 诪讬讚讜

The Gemara rejects this proof: Here, we are dealing with a case where the woman acquired from each husband the right to her daughter鈥檚 sustenance, i.e., they performed an act of acquisition and did not suffice with a mere verbal agreement. Consequently, the agreement may be recorded in a document.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讘谞讜转 谞诪讬 讘砖拽谞讜 诇讝讜 讜诇讗 拽谞讜 诇讝讜

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that a proper mode of acquisition was employed, then let the husbands鈥 own daughters also repossess liened properties that were sold. The Gemara answers: The case is such where they acquired the right to receive sustenance for this daughter of the wife, and they did not acquire this right for that daughter, i.e., they did not perform an act of acquisition confirming their obligations to provide sustenance for their own daughters.

讜诪讗讬 驻住拽讗 讗讬讛讬 讚讛讜讗讬 讘砖注转 拽谞讬谉 诪讛谞讬 诇讛 拽谞讬谉 讘谞讜转 讚诇讗 讛讜讜 讘砖注转 拽谞讬谉 诇讗 诪讛谞讬 诇讛讜 拽谞讬谉

The Gemara asks: What makes it necessary to say that the case is one in which an acquisition was made on behalf of the wife鈥檚 daughter and not on behalf of the husbands鈥 own daughters? The Gemara answers: She, the wife鈥檚 daughter from a previous marriage, was present at the time of the transaction when her mother was wed. Consequently, for her the transaction is effective. With regard to the daughters of the husbands, who were born after their parents鈥 marriage and were not present at the time of the transaction, for them the transaction is not effective.

诪讬 诇讗 注住拽讬谞谉 讚讛讜讗讬 讘砖注转 拽谞讬谉 讜讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讻讙讜谉 讚讙专砖讛 讜讗讛讚专讛

The Gemara asks: Are we not also dealing with a situation where the husband鈥檚 daughters were present at the time of the transaction? And what are the circumstances that would allow for such a reality? This could occur in a situation such as where each one divorced his wife and then took her back, and they had a daughter from their first marriage.

讗诇讗 讗讬讛讬 讚诇讬转讗 讘转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诪讛谞讬 诇讛 拽谞讬谉 讘谞讜转 讚讗讬转谞讛讜 讘转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诇讗 诪讛谞讬 诇讛讜 拽谞讬谉

Rather, the distinction is as follows: She, the wife鈥檚 daughter, is not included in the stipulation of the court requiring a husband to support his daughters. Consequently, for her the transaction is effective. However, with regard to the husband鈥檚 own daughters, who are included in the stipulation of the court, for them the transaction is not effective.

诪讙专注 讙专注讬 讗诇讗 讘谞讜转讬讜 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬转谞讛讜 讘转谞讗讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬诪专 爪专专讬 讗转驻住讬谞讛讜

The Gemara wonders about this: Because they are included in the stipulation of the court they are worse off? On the contrary, since the stipulation of the court demands that they be supported, they should wield more power. Rather, this is the reason that his own daughters do not collect from liened property: Since they are included in the stipulation of the court, and it is therefore the norm for fathers to take care to provide their support, say that their father gave them bundles of money while he was still alive. Due to this concern, they cannot repossess liened property. However, in the case of the wife鈥檚 daughter, who is not included in the stipulation of the court, there is no concern that the husband gave her anything prior to his death.

诇讗 讬讗诪专 讛专讗砖讜谉 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讝讗转 讗讜诪专转 讘转 讗爪诇 讗诪讛

搂 We learned in the mishna that the first husband may not say that he will provide his wife鈥檚 daughter with support only when she is with him. Rather, he must bring the sustenance to her in the place where her mother lives. Rav 岣sda said: That is to say that in a case of divorce, a daughter lives with her mother.

诪诪讗讬 讚讘讙讚讜诇讛 注住拽讬谞谉 讚诇诪讗 讘拽讟谞讛 注住拽讬谞谉 讜诪砖讜诐 诪注砖讛 砖讛讬讛

The Gemara asks: From where do we know that we are dealing with a case of an adult woman and there is a general guideline that in cases of divorce, a girl lives with her mother? Perhaps we are dealing with a case of a minor girl, and she lives with her mother because of concern for her safety, due to an incident that occurred.

讚转谞讬讗 诪讬 砖诪转 讜讛谞讬讞 讘谉 拽讟谉 诇讗诪讜 讬讜专砖讬 讛讗讘 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬讛讗 讙讚诇 讗爪诇谞讜 讜讗诪讜 讗讜诪专转 讬讛讗 讘谞讬 讙讚诇 讗爪诇讬 诪谞讬讞讬谉 讗讜转讜 讗爪诇 讗诪讜 讜讗讬谉 诪谞讬讞讬谉 讗讜转讜 讗爪诇 专讗讜讬 诇讬讜专砖讜 诪注砖讛 讛讬讛 讜砖讞讟讜讛讜 注专讘 讛驻住讞

As it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who died and left a minor son to the care of his mother, and the heirs of the father say: The son should grow up with us, and his mother says: My son should grow up with me, the halakha is that one leaves the child with his mother, and one does not leave the child with one who is fit to inherit from him, i.e., the father鈥檚 heirs. An incident occurred, and the boy lived with his father鈥檚 heirs, and they slaughtered him on the eve of Passover. So too, a minor girl is not left in the care of those who are obligated to sustain her and who have a financial interest in her demise.

讗诐 讻谉 诇讬转谞讬 诇诪拽讜诐 砖讛讬讗

The Gemara answers: If that is so, let the mishna teach that the husband must bring the sustenance to the place where she, the daughter, is located.

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