Today's Daf Yomi
July 21, 2022 | כ״ב בתמוז תשפ״ב
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This month's learning is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.
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Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.
Ketubot 15
Rav assumes that the Mishna ruled that the story of the rape in the Mishna took place on the day of the shuk in Tzippori when there were not only a majority of Jews in the city but also a majority of Jews passing through to sell their wares and the ruling followed Rabbi Yehoshua who ruled that in a case where there are two majorities, we can assume the rapist was Jewish and the woman can marry a kohen. The majority of those who pass through the city should be enough to permit the woman to marry a kohen as they are a passing majority, as opposed to the majority of the city which is set in its place and therefore, regular laws of majority do not apply. However, the rabbis made a decree not to permit passed on a majority of passersby so that we don’t come to accidentally permit based on the majority of the city’s inhabitants. This is different from law of nine kosher stores and one non-kosher store and there is a piece of meat that we are unsure from which store it came. If a piece of meat is on the street, we follow the majority of stores and permit it, even though we only have one majority. The reason for the stringency in our case if because the rabbis were strict when it came to who kohanim can marry. Rabbi Zeira held that when an item is in its place (like a piece of meat was purchased from one of the stores and we don’t know from which one), we cannot follow rules of majority – instead, we say it is either kosher or not kosher – 50/50 chance, both to be strict and to be lenient, depending on the case. The Gemara finds a case where we rule leniently. They bring a verse from the Torah Devarim 19:11 as the source for this rule. Rav Chiya bar Ashi says that Rav ruled like Rabbi Yosi that the girl who was raped was permitted to marry a kohen. Rav Chanan bar Rava says in the name of Rav that it was a unique case and one cannot learn halacha from there to permit based on a majority. Rabbi Yirmia assumes at this point that Rav Chiya bar Ashi held that Rav ruled like Rabbi Yosi even in the case of only one majority and raises a difficulty against this from a statement Rav himself made regarding the Mishna in Machshirin 2:7 indicating that for marriage with a kohen, one needs two majorities. However, the Gemara reminds him that Rav himself understood that the case where Rabbi Yosi ruled was one with two majorities. If so, then Rav Chanan in the name of Rav must be ruling more leniently – in which case, he holds that Rabbi Yosi permitted only based on two majorities in this particular case, but in general, one majority is enough. This understanding does not fit in with the statement Rav made regarding the Mishna in Machshirin. The Gemara explains that Rav Chanan must have not held by Rav’s explanation of the Mishna that it was in the day of the market, but held that there was only one majority and that’s why the ruling here was unique – as otherwise, one would need two majorities. The Gemara delves into Shmuel understanding of the Mishna in Machshirin as well. If after death or divorce, the woman does not have her ketuba in hand and she and the husband make different claims regarding whether she was a virgin when she married and whether her ketuba was 200 zuz or 100, how do we resolve this?
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בקרונות של ציפורי היה מעשה וכדרבי אמי דאמר רבי אמי והוא שהיתה סיעה של בני אדם כשרין עוברת לשם וכדרבי ינאי דאמר רבי ינאי נבעלת בקרונות כשרה לכהונה
The incident transpired among the wagons [keronot] in the marketplace of Tzippori on the market day, and this halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ami, as Rabbi Ami said: And this is the ruling only in a case where there was a contingent of men of unflawed lineage passing there. Due to the fact that both the lineage of the majority of the people of the city where the girl was raped and the lineage of the majority of the passersby is unflawed, the rape is attributed to a man of unflawed lineage. And this ruling is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yannai, as Rabbi Yannai said: If she engaged in intercourse in the wagons, she is fit to marry a member of the priesthood.
בקרונות סלקא דעתך אלא נבעלת בשעת קרונות כשרה לכהונה אבל פירש אחד מציפורי ובעל הולד שתוקי
The Gemara asks: Does it enter your mind to say that the woman was raped in the wagons, in the crowded area of the marketplace where business is conducted? Rather, Rabbi Yannai is saying that if she was forced to engage in intercourse at the time of the wagons, i.e., when the convoys pass, she is fit to marry a member of the priesthood. However, if one individual, whose lineage is unknown, left Tzippori and engaged in intercourse with a woman, the child is a shetuki and deemed unfit to marry into the priesthood even though the majority of the inhabitants of city are of unflawed lineage.
כי הא דכי אתא רב דימי אמר זעירי אמר רבי חנינא ואמרי לה אמר זעירי אמר רבי חנינא הולכין אחר רוב העיר ואין הולכין אחר רוב סיעה
The Gemara notes: That is similar to this statement that when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, Ze’eiri said that Rabbi Ḥanina said, and some say directly that Ze’eiri said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: One follows the flawed lineage of the majority of the people in the city and one does not follow the unflawed lineage of the majority of the traveling contingent, and the woman who engaged in intercourse with a member of the itinerant contingent is deemed unfit to marry into the priesthood.
כלפי לייא הני ניידי והני קביעי וקיימי
The Gemara asks: On the contrary [kelapei layya], the opposite is logical. These members of the contingent are moving, and in that case the principle is that one follows the majority. And these people of the city are fixed and standing in one place, and in that case the principle is that even if the lineage of the majority is unflawed, the uncertainty is treated as if it were equally balanced.
אלא הולכין אחר רוב העיר והוא דאיכא רוב סיעה בהדה ואין הולכין אחר רוב העיר גרידתא ולא אחר רוב סיעה גרידתא מאי טעמא גזרה רוב סיעה אטו רוב העיר
Rather, this is what Rabbi Yannai is saying: One follows the lineage of the majority of the city, and that is specifically in a case where there is a majority of men of unflawed lineage in the passing contingent together with the city’s unflawed majority. In that case, from both perspectives the intercourse can be attributed to a man of unflawed lineage. However, neither does one follow the unflawed lineage of the majority of the city alone, nor does he follow the unflawed lineage of the majority of the contingent alone. What is the reason that one does not follow the lineage of the majority of the moving contingent? It is because the Sages issued a decree not to follow the majority of the contingent due to the majority of the city, where one does not follow the majority.
ורוב העיר נמי אי דקא אזלי אינהו לגבה כל דפריש מרובא פריש לא צריכא דקא אזלא איהי לגבייהו דהוה ליה קבוע ואמר רבי זירא כל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה דמי
The Gemara asks: But aren’t there cases where one follows the majority of the city as well, as, if one of the residents of the city goes out of the city to her and rapes her, the principle is: The legal status of any item that is separated from the group is that of one separated from the majority? Therefore, there is no reason to issue a decree. The Gemara answers: The decree is necessary only due to a case where she went into the city to them, in which case the rapist is an indistinguishable member of a fixed set, and Rabbi Zeira said: The legal status of uncertainty with regard to any item fixed in its place is that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, and one does not follow the majority.
ומי בעינן תרי רובי והתניא תשע חנויות כולן מוכרות בשר שחוטה ואחת מוכרת בשר נבלה ולקח מאחת מהן ואינו יודע מאי זה מהן לקח ספיקו אסור ובנמצא הלך אחר הרוב
The Gemara questions the statement of Rabbi Ami: And do we require two majorities to overcome the minority? Isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to nine stores in a city, all of which sell kosher meat from a slaughtered animal, and one other store that sells meat from unslaughtered animal carcasses, and a person bought meat from one of the stores and he does not know from which store he bought the meat, in this case of uncertainty, the meat is prohibited. The legal status of uncertainty with regard to any item fixed in its place is that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, and one does not follow the majority. This baraita continues: And in the case of meat found in the street, outside the stores, follow the majority of stores that sell kosher meat. In other words, the meat is kosher.
וכי תימא בשאין דלתות מדינה נעולות דקא אתי לה רובא מעלמא והא אמר רבי זירא אף על פי שדלתות מדינה נעולות מעלה עשו ביוחסין
And if you would say that one follows the majority only in a case where the gates of the city are unlocked, where the meat could have come to the city from the majority of kosher meat outside the city and only by combining that majority with the majority of kosher meat stores inside the city, creating two majorities, is the meat ruled kosher; but didn’t Rabbi Zeira say: Even if the city gates are locked, one follows the majority and the meat is kosher even without a double majority? The Gemara answers: The Sages require two majorities only in cases such as establishing the identity of the child’s father, because they established a higher standard with regard to matters of lineage. However, in other cases, e.g., concerning kosher meat, a single majority is sufficient.
גופא אמר רבי זירא כל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה דמי בין לקולא בין לחומרא
§ In terms of the matter itself, Rabbi Zeira said: The legal status of uncertainty with regard to any item fixed in its place is that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, both when it leads to leniency, e.g., in a case where, were one to follow the majority, the ruling would be stringent, and when it leads to stringency, e.g., in a case where, were one to follow the majority, the ruling would be lenient.
מנא ליה לרבי זירא הא אילימא מתשע חנויות כולן מוכרות בשר שחוטה ואחת בשר נבלה ולקח מאחת מהן ואינו יודע מאיזה מהן לקח ספיקו אסור ובנמצא הלך אחר הרוב התם לחומרא
The Gemara asks: From where does Rabbi Zeira learn that the legal status of uncertainty with regard to any item fixed in its place is that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, both when it leads to leniency and when it leads to stringency? If we say that it is derived from the case of nine stores in a city, all of which sell kosher meat from a slaughtered animal, and one other store that sells meat from unslaughtered animal carcasses, and a person bought meat from one of the stores and he does not know from which store he bought the meat, in this case of uncertainty the meat is prohibited. And in the case of meat found in the street, outside the stores, follow the majority of stores that sell kosher meat, and therefore the meat would be kosher. There, in the first case, ruling it an equally balanced uncertainty is a stringency, as there is a majority of kosher stores.
אלא מתשעה צפרדעים ושרץ אחד ביניהם ונגע באחד מהן ואינו יודע באיזה מהן נגע ספיקו טמא התם נמי לחומרא
Rather, Rabbi Zeira learns that halakha from a different baraita. If there were nine frogs, which is a creeping animal that does not impart ritual impurity while alive or when dead, and one ritually impure creeping animal, whose carcass imparts ritual impurity, among them, and a person touched one of the ten creatures, and he does not know which of them he touched, in this case of uncertainty the person is ritually impure. There too, ruling it an equally balanced uncertainty is a stringency, as the majority of the creeping animals do not impart impurity.
אלא מתשעה שרצים וצפרדע אחד ביניהם ונגע באחד מהן ואינו יודע באיזה מהן נגע ברשות היחיד ספיקו טמא ברשות הרבים ספיקו טהור
Rather, Rabbi Zeira learns that halakha from the continuation of that baraita. If there are nine creeping animals, whose carcasses impart ritual impurity, and one frog among them, and a person touched one of them, and he does not know which of them he touched, if it was in the private domain, in this case of uncertainty the person is ritually impure, as all cases of uncertainty with regard to ritual impurity are ruled impure in the private domain. This is derived from the case of sota. However, in the public domain, in that case of uncertainty the person is ritually pure. Although contact with a creeping animal from the majority would render him ritually impure, since the uncertainty is with regard to a fixed group, its legal status is that of an equally balanced uncertainty, and in the public domain he is ritually pure. Rabbi Zeira learns that halakha from this case of leniency.
ומדאורייתא מנא לן אמר קרא וארב לו וקם עליו עד שיתכוין לו ורבנן אמרי דבי רבי ינאי פרט לזורק אבן לגו
After citing a tannaitic source for Rabbi Zeira’s opinion, the Gemara asks: And from where in the Torah do we derive that the legal status of any item fixed in its place is like that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, both when it leads to leniency and when it leads to stringency? It is derived from the verse that states with regard to a murderer: “And lie in wait for him, and rise up against him” (Deuteronomy 19:11), indicating that one is liable only in a case where he intends to kill him. One who intended to kill one person and inadvertently killed another is exempt from punishment. And how do the Rabbis, who hold that one is liable in that case, interpret that verse? The Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai say: It excludes the case of one who throws a stone into a crowd and did not intend to kill a specific person.
היכי דמי אילימא דאיכא תשעה גוים ואחד ישראל ביניהם ותיפוק ליה דרובא גוים נינהו אי נמי פלגא ופלגא ספק נפשות להקל
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of the case where he threw the stone and is exempt? If we say that there are nine gentiles in the crowd and one Jew among them, even without the verse, let him derive the exemption from the fact that they are a majority of gentiles. Alternatively, even if we say that half of the ten people are considered gentiles and half are considered Jews, let him derive the exemption from the principle: In a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation, the halakha is lenient.
לא צריכא דאיכא תשעה ישראלים וגוי אחד ביניהם דהוה ליה גוי קבוע וכל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה דמי
The Gemara answers: No, the verse is necessary only in a case where there are nine Jews and one gentile among them. Were the ruling to follow the majority the one who threw the stone would be liable. But in that case, because the gentile is fixed among them, and the legal status of any item fixed in its place is like that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, he is exempt, based on the principle: In a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation, the halakha is lenient. Apparently, even in cases of Torah law in which the result would be a leniency, i.e., exemption from the death penalty for murder, the legal status of any item fixed in its place is like that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced.
איתמר רב חייא בר אשי אמר רב הלכה כרבי יוסי ורב חנן בר רבא אמר רב הוראת שעה היתה
§ With regard to the matter of following the majority in cases of lineage, it was stated that there is an amoraic dispute: Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei in the mishna, and it is permitted for the young girl who was raped to marry a priest. And Rav Ḥanan bar Rava said that Rav said: That was a provisional edict issued in exigent circumstances. However, typically, with regard to matters of lineage two majorities are required.
מתיב רבי ירמיה וליוחסין לא בעינן תרי רובי והתנן
Rav Yirmeya raised an objection to the ruling of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi, who apparently ruled that even in cases where there is one majority the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei: And in matters of lineage, do we not require two majorities, a majority of the city’s inhabitants and a majority of the passing contingent? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Makhshirin 2:7):
מצא בה תינוק מושלך אם רוב גוים גוי אם רוב ישראל ישראל מחצה על מחצה ישראל
If there is a city in which both Jews and gentiles reside, and one found an unidentified, abandoned baby in the city, if there is a majority of gentiles in the city the baby is deemed a gentile; if there is a majority of Jews in the city the baby is deemed a Jew. If half the population is gentile and half Jewish, the baby is deemed a Jew.
ואמר רב לא שנו אלא להחיותו אבל ליוחסין לא ושמואל אמר לפקח עליו את הגל
And Rav said with regard to this mishna: The Sages taught that if there is a majority of Jews in the city the baby is deemed a Jew only with regard to sustaining him; however, with regard to lineage, e.g., marrying him to a Jewish woman, no, he is not deemed a Jew based on the majority and would require conversion. And Shmuel said: It was taught that he is deemed a Jew in order to create an opening in a heap of debris on his behalf on Shabbat, i.e., desecrating Shabbat in order to save his life. Apparently, contrary to the ruling of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi, Rav holds that a single majority is insufficient to deem him Jewish in matters of lineage.
אשתמיטתיה הא דאמר רב יהודה אמר רב בקרונות של צפורי הוה מעשה
The Gemara answers: Rav Yirmeya overlooked that which Rav Yehuda said that Rav said with regard to the mishna: The incident of the rape of the young girl transpired among the wagons in the marketplace of Tzippori, and there were two majorities; the majority of the inhabitants of the city and the majority of the passing contingent. Therefore, when Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi ruled that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, i.e., that the young girl may marry a priest, it was in a case of two majorities.
ולרב חנן בר רבא דאמר הוראת שעה היתה קשיא הא מאן דמתני הא לא מתני הא
The Gemara asks: And if the case in the mishna is one of two majorities, according to Rav Ḥanan bar Rava who said in the name of Rav: That was a provisional edict issued in exigent circumstances, meaning that two majorities were required in that case but typically one majority is sufficient, it is difficult. Didn’t Rav say that in matters of lineage one majority is insufficient? The Gemara answers: That is not difficult. The one who teaches this, that the ruling in our mishna was a provisional edict, does not teach that statement that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said that the incident took place among the wagons in the marketplace of Tzippori. Rather, he holds that there was a single majority and nevertheless, due to exigent circumstances, the girl was permitted to marry into the priesthood, although generally two majorities are required in cases of lineage.
גופא מצא בה תינוק מושלך אם רוב גוים גוי אם רוב ישראל ישראל מחצה על מחצה ישראל אמר רב לא שנו אלא להחיותו אבל ליוחסין לא ושמואל אמר לפקח עליו את הגל
§ Apropos the case of the abandoned baby, the Gemara analyzes the matter itself: If there is a city in which both Jews and gentiles reside, and one found an unidentified, abandoned baby in the city, if there is a majority of gentiles in the city the baby is deemed a gentile. If there is a majority of Jews in the city the baby is deemed a Jew. If half the population is gentile and half Jewish, the baby is deemed a Jew. Rav said: The Sages taught that the baby is deemed a Jew only with regard to sustaining him; however, with regard to lineage, no. And Shmuel said: It was taught that he is deemed a Jew in order to create an opening in a heap of debris on his behalf on Shabbat.
ומי אמר שמואל הכי והאמר רב יוסף אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל אין הולכין בפיקוח נפש אחר הרוב אלא כי איתמר דשמואל ארישא אתמר אם רוב גוים גוי אמר שמואל ולפקח עליו את הגל אינו כן
The Gemara asks: And did Shmuel say that? But didn’t Rav Yosef say that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: One does not follow the majority in matters involving saving a life? Even if there is the slightest concern that the life of a Jew may be in danger, one takes all steps necessary to save him, even on Shabbat. Rather, when the statement of Shmuel was stated with regard to saving a life it was stated concerning the first clause of the mishna: If there is a majority of gentiles in the city the baby is deemed a gentile. Shmuel said: And with regard to creating an opening in a heap of debris on his behalf [lefake’aḥ alav et hagal] on Shabbat, that is not so. Even if there is a gentile majority in the city, one does not follow the majority in cases involving the saving of a life.
אם רוב גוים גוי למאי הלכתא אמר רב פפא להאכילו נבילות
The mishna continues: If there is a majority of gentiles the baby is deemed a gentile. The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha was this stated? Rav Pappa said: It was stated in order to feed the baby animal carcasses, i.e., non-kosher food.
אם רוב ישראל ישראל למאי הלכתא אמר רב פפא להחזיר לו אבידה
And it is taught in the mishna: If there is a majority of Jews the baby is deemed a Jew. The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha was this stated? Rav Pappa said: It was stated in order to return lost property to him, as one is required to return lost property to a Jew.
מחצה על מחצה ישראל למאי הלכתא אמר ריש לקיש לנזקין היכי דמי אי נימא דנגחיה תורא דידן לתורא דידיה לימא ליה אייתי ראיה דישראל את ושקול
And it is taught in the mishna: If half the population is gentile and half Jewish, the baby is deemed a Jew. The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha was this stated? Reish Lakish said: It was stated with regard to damages. In terms of payment of damages, the courts judge him as a Jew. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say that our ox, one belonging to a Jew, gored his ox, one belonging to a person of uncertain status, and he claims that he should be compensated for the damages as a Jew, let the owner of the ox that gored say to him: Bring proof that you are a Jew, and take payment. Due to the uncertainty surrounding his status, he is unable to produce any proof.
לא צריכא דנגחיה תורא דידיה לתורא דידן פלגא משלם ואידך פלגא אמר להו אייתי ראיה דלאו ישראל אנא ואתן לכון:
Rather, this halakha is necessary only in a case where his ox gored our ox, one belonging to a Jew. In that case, there is no question that he pays half the damage, which is the payment when an innocuous ox belonging to a Jew gores an ox belonging to a Jew. And with regard to the other half, which the owner of the gored ox is claiming, asserting that this person of uncertain status is a gentile and therefore liable to pay full damages, the owner of the ox that gored can say to the claimants: Bring proof that I am not a Jew and I will give you payment of the other half of the damages. It is with regard to that case that Reish Lakish ruled that in a case of uncertainty, the baby has the presumptive status of a Jew, and it is incumbent upon the claimant to prove otherwise.
הדרן עלך בתולה נשאת
May we return to you “A virgin is wedded.”
האשה שנתארמלה או שנתגרשה היא אומרת בתולה נשאתני והוא אומר לא כי אלא אלמנה נשאתיך אם יש עדים שיצאת בהינומא וראשה פרוע כתובתה מאתים רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אומר אף חילוק קליות ראיה
MISHNA: With regard to a woman who was widowed or divorced, and is now claiming payment of her marriage contract that is not before the court, and she says: You married me as a virgin, who is entitled to two hundred dinars, and he says: No; rather, I married you as a widow, who is entitled to one hundred dinars, then, if there are witnesses that she went out of her father’s house to her wedding with a hinnuma or with her hair uncovered, in a manner typical of virgins, payment of her marriage contract is two hundred dinars. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: Even testimony that there was distribution of roasted grain, which was customary at weddings of virgins, constitutes proof that she is a virgin.
ומודה רבי יהושע באומר לחבירו שדה זו של אביך היתה ולקחתיה הימנו שהוא נאמן
Several disputes between Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua were cited previously with regard to the credibility accorded to the respective claims of parties to a dispute. Based on one of those disputes, the tanna adds: And Rabbi Yehoshua concedes in a case where one says to another: This field, which is currently in my possession, belonged to your father and I purchased it from him, that he is deemed credible, and his entire claim is accepted. The court accepts not only his admission that it once belonged to the other’s father, but also his statement that he purchased it.
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This month's learning is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.
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Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.
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Ketubot 15
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בקרונות של ציפורי היה מעשה וכדרבי אמי דאמר רבי אמי והוא שהיתה סיעה של בני אדם כשרין עוברת לשם וכדרבי ינאי דאמר רבי ינאי נבעלת בקרונות כשרה לכהונה
The incident transpired among the wagons [keronot] in the marketplace of Tzippori on the market day, and this halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ami, as Rabbi Ami said: And this is the ruling only in a case where there was a contingent of men of unflawed lineage passing there. Due to the fact that both the lineage of the majority of the people of the city where the girl was raped and the lineage of the majority of the passersby is unflawed, the rape is attributed to a man of unflawed lineage. And this ruling is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yannai, as Rabbi Yannai said: If she engaged in intercourse in the wagons, she is fit to marry a member of the priesthood.
בקרונות סלקא דעתך אלא נבעלת בשעת קרונות כשרה לכהונה אבל פירש אחד מציפורי ובעל הולד שתוקי
The Gemara asks: Does it enter your mind to say that the woman was raped in the wagons, in the crowded area of the marketplace where business is conducted? Rather, Rabbi Yannai is saying that if she was forced to engage in intercourse at the time of the wagons, i.e., when the convoys pass, she is fit to marry a member of the priesthood. However, if one individual, whose lineage is unknown, left Tzippori and engaged in intercourse with a woman, the child is a shetuki and deemed unfit to marry into the priesthood even though the majority of the inhabitants of city are of unflawed lineage.
כי הא דכי אתא רב דימי אמר זעירי אמר רבי חנינא ואמרי לה אמר זעירי אמר רבי חנינא הולכין אחר רוב העיר ואין הולכין אחר רוב סיעה
The Gemara notes: That is similar to this statement that when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, Ze’eiri said that Rabbi Ḥanina said, and some say directly that Ze’eiri said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: One follows the flawed lineage of the majority of the people in the city and one does not follow the unflawed lineage of the majority of the traveling contingent, and the woman who engaged in intercourse with a member of the itinerant contingent is deemed unfit to marry into the priesthood.
כלפי לייא הני ניידי והני קביעי וקיימי
The Gemara asks: On the contrary [kelapei layya], the opposite is logical. These members of the contingent are moving, and in that case the principle is that one follows the majority. And these people of the city are fixed and standing in one place, and in that case the principle is that even if the lineage of the majority is unflawed, the uncertainty is treated as if it were equally balanced.
אלא הולכין אחר רוב העיר והוא דאיכא רוב סיעה בהדה ואין הולכין אחר רוב העיר גרידתא ולא אחר רוב סיעה גרידתא מאי טעמא גזרה רוב סיעה אטו רוב העיר
Rather, this is what Rabbi Yannai is saying: One follows the lineage of the majority of the city, and that is specifically in a case where there is a majority of men of unflawed lineage in the passing contingent together with the city’s unflawed majority. In that case, from both perspectives the intercourse can be attributed to a man of unflawed lineage. However, neither does one follow the unflawed lineage of the majority of the city alone, nor does he follow the unflawed lineage of the majority of the contingent alone. What is the reason that one does not follow the lineage of the majority of the moving contingent? It is because the Sages issued a decree not to follow the majority of the contingent due to the majority of the city, where one does not follow the majority.
ורוב העיר נמי אי דקא אזלי אינהו לגבה כל דפריש מרובא פריש לא צריכא דקא אזלא איהי לגבייהו דהוה ליה קבוע ואמר רבי זירא כל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה דמי
The Gemara asks: But aren’t there cases where one follows the majority of the city as well, as, if one of the residents of the city goes out of the city to her and rapes her, the principle is: The legal status of any item that is separated from the group is that of one separated from the majority? Therefore, there is no reason to issue a decree. The Gemara answers: The decree is necessary only due to a case where she went into the city to them, in which case the rapist is an indistinguishable member of a fixed set, and Rabbi Zeira said: The legal status of uncertainty with regard to any item fixed in its place is that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, and one does not follow the majority.
ומי בעינן תרי רובי והתניא תשע חנויות כולן מוכרות בשר שחוטה ואחת מוכרת בשר נבלה ולקח מאחת מהן ואינו יודע מאי זה מהן לקח ספיקו אסור ובנמצא הלך אחר הרוב
The Gemara questions the statement of Rabbi Ami: And do we require two majorities to overcome the minority? Isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to nine stores in a city, all of which sell kosher meat from a slaughtered animal, and one other store that sells meat from unslaughtered animal carcasses, and a person bought meat from one of the stores and he does not know from which store he bought the meat, in this case of uncertainty, the meat is prohibited. The legal status of uncertainty with regard to any item fixed in its place is that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, and one does not follow the majority. This baraita continues: And in the case of meat found in the street, outside the stores, follow the majority of stores that sell kosher meat. In other words, the meat is kosher.
וכי תימא בשאין דלתות מדינה נעולות דקא אתי לה רובא מעלמא והא אמר רבי זירא אף על פי שדלתות מדינה נעולות מעלה עשו ביוחסין
And if you would say that one follows the majority only in a case where the gates of the city are unlocked, where the meat could have come to the city from the majority of kosher meat outside the city and only by combining that majority with the majority of kosher meat stores inside the city, creating two majorities, is the meat ruled kosher; but didn’t Rabbi Zeira say: Even if the city gates are locked, one follows the majority and the meat is kosher even without a double majority? The Gemara answers: The Sages require two majorities only in cases such as establishing the identity of the child’s father, because they established a higher standard with regard to matters of lineage. However, in other cases, e.g., concerning kosher meat, a single majority is sufficient.
גופא אמר רבי זירא כל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה דמי בין לקולא בין לחומרא
§ In terms of the matter itself, Rabbi Zeira said: The legal status of uncertainty with regard to any item fixed in its place is that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, both when it leads to leniency, e.g., in a case where, were one to follow the majority, the ruling would be stringent, and when it leads to stringency, e.g., in a case where, were one to follow the majority, the ruling would be lenient.
מנא ליה לרבי זירא הא אילימא מתשע חנויות כולן מוכרות בשר שחוטה ואחת בשר נבלה ולקח מאחת מהן ואינו יודע מאיזה מהן לקח ספיקו אסור ובנמצא הלך אחר הרוב התם לחומרא
The Gemara asks: From where does Rabbi Zeira learn that the legal status of uncertainty with regard to any item fixed in its place is that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, both when it leads to leniency and when it leads to stringency? If we say that it is derived from the case of nine stores in a city, all of which sell kosher meat from a slaughtered animal, and one other store that sells meat from unslaughtered animal carcasses, and a person bought meat from one of the stores and he does not know from which store he bought the meat, in this case of uncertainty the meat is prohibited. And in the case of meat found in the street, outside the stores, follow the majority of stores that sell kosher meat, and therefore the meat would be kosher. There, in the first case, ruling it an equally balanced uncertainty is a stringency, as there is a majority of kosher stores.
אלא מתשעה צפרדעים ושרץ אחד ביניהם ונגע באחד מהן ואינו יודע באיזה מהן נגע ספיקו טמא התם נמי לחומרא
Rather, Rabbi Zeira learns that halakha from a different baraita. If there were nine frogs, which is a creeping animal that does not impart ritual impurity while alive or when dead, and one ritually impure creeping animal, whose carcass imparts ritual impurity, among them, and a person touched one of the ten creatures, and he does not know which of them he touched, in this case of uncertainty the person is ritually impure. There too, ruling it an equally balanced uncertainty is a stringency, as the majority of the creeping animals do not impart impurity.
אלא מתשעה שרצים וצפרדע אחד ביניהם ונגע באחד מהן ואינו יודע באיזה מהן נגע ברשות היחיד ספיקו טמא ברשות הרבים ספיקו טהור
Rather, Rabbi Zeira learns that halakha from the continuation of that baraita. If there are nine creeping animals, whose carcasses impart ritual impurity, and one frog among them, and a person touched one of them, and he does not know which of them he touched, if it was in the private domain, in this case of uncertainty the person is ritually impure, as all cases of uncertainty with regard to ritual impurity are ruled impure in the private domain. This is derived from the case of sota. However, in the public domain, in that case of uncertainty the person is ritually pure. Although contact with a creeping animal from the majority would render him ritually impure, since the uncertainty is with regard to a fixed group, its legal status is that of an equally balanced uncertainty, and in the public domain he is ritually pure. Rabbi Zeira learns that halakha from this case of leniency.
ומדאורייתא מנא לן אמר קרא וארב לו וקם עליו עד שיתכוין לו ורבנן אמרי דבי רבי ינאי פרט לזורק אבן לגו
After citing a tannaitic source for Rabbi Zeira’s opinion, the Gemara asks: And from where in the Torah do we derive that the legal status of any item fixed in its place is like that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, both when it leads to leniency and when it leads to stringency? It is derived from the verse that states with regard to a murderer: “And lie in wait for him, and rise up against him” (Deuteronomy 19:11), indicating that one is liable only in a case where he intends to kill him. One who intended to kill one person and inadvertently killed another is exempt from punishment. And how do the Rabbis, who hold that one is liable in that case, interpret that verse? The Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai say: It excludes the case of one who throws a stone into a crowd and did not intend to kill a specific person.
היכי דמי אילימא דאיכא תשעה גוים ואחד ישראל ביניהם ותיפוק ליה דרובא גוים נינהו אי נמי פלגא ופלגא ספק נפשות להקל
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of the case where he threw the stone and is exempt? If we say that there are nine gentiles in the crowd and one Jew among them, even without the verse, let him derive the exemption from the fact that they are a majority of gentiles. Alternatively, even if we say that half of the ten people are considered gentiles and half are considered Jews, let him derive the exemption from the principle: In a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation, the halakha is lenient.
לא צריכא דאיכא תשעה ישראלים וגוי אחד ביניהם דהוה ליה גוי קבוע וכל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה דמי
The Gemara answers: No, the verse is necessary only in a case where there are nine Jews and one gentile among them. Were the ruling to follow the majority the one who threw the stone would be liable. But in that case, because the gentile is fixed among them, and the legal status of any item fixed in its place is like that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, he is exempt, based on the principle: In a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation, the halakha is lenient. Apparently, even in cases of Torah law in which the result would be a leniency, i.e., exemption from the death penalty for murder, the legal status of any item fixed in its place is like that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced.
איתמר רב חייא בר אשי אמר רב הלכה כרבי יוסי ורב חנן בר רבא אמר רב הוראת שעה היתה
§ With regard to the matter of following the majority in cases of lineage, it was stated that there is an amoraic dispute: Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei in the mishna, and it is permitted for the young girl who was raped to marry a priest. And Rav Ḥanan bar Rava said that Rav said: That was a provisional edict issued in exigent circumstances. However, typically, with regard to matters of lineage two majorities are required.
מתיב רבי ירמיה וליוחסין לא בעינן תרי רובי והתנן
Rav Yirmeya raised an objection to the ruling of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi, who apparently ruled that even in cases where there is one majority the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei: And in matters of lineage, do we not require two majorities, a majority of the city’s inhabitants and a majority of the passing contingent? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Makhshirin 2:7):
מצא בה תינוק מושלך אם רוב גוים גוי אם רוב ישראל ישראל מחצה על מחצה ישראל
If there is a city in which both Jews and gentiles reside, and one found an unidentified, abandoned baby in the city, if there is a majority of gentiles in the city the baby is deemed a gentile; if there is a majority of Jews in the city the baby is deemed a Jew. If half the population is gentile and half Jewish, the baby is deemed a Jew.
ואמר רב לא שנו אלא להחיותו אבל ליוחסין לא ושמואל אמר לפקח עליו את הגל
And Rav said with regard to this mishna: The Sages taught that if there is a majority of Jews in the city the baby is deemed a Jew only with regard to sustaining him; however, with regard to lineage, e.g., marrying him to a Jewish woman, no, he is not deemed a Jew based on the majority and would require conversion. And Shmuel said: It was taught that he is deemed a Jew in order to create an opening in a heap of debris on his behalf on Shabbat, i.e., desecrating Shabbat in order to save his life. Apparently, contrary to the ruling of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi, Rav holds that a single majority is insufficient to deem him Jewish in matters of lineage.
אשתמיטתיה הא דאמר רב יהודה אמר רב בקרונות של צפורי הוה מעשה
The Gemara answers: Rav Yirmeya overlooked that which Rav Yehuda said that Rav said with regard to the mishna: The incident of the rape of the young girl transpired among the wagons in the marketplace of Tzippori, and there were two majorities; the majority of the inhabitants of the city and the majority of the passing contingent. Therefore, when Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi ruled that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, i.e., that the young girl may marry a priest, it was in a case of two majorities.
ולרב חנן בר רבא דאמר הוראת שעה היתה קשיא הא מאן דמתני הא לא מתני הא
The Gemara asks: And if the case in the mishna is one of two majorities, according to Rav Ḥanan bar Rava who said in the name of Rav: That was a provisional edict issued in exigent circumstances, meaning that two majorities were required in that case but typically one majority is sufficient, it is difficult. Didn’t Rav say that in matters of lineage one majority is insufficient? The Gemara answers: That is not difficult. The one who teaches this, that the ruling in our mishna was a provisional edict, does not teach that statement that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said that the incident took place among the wagons in the marketplace of Tzippori. Rather, he holds that there was a single majority and nevertheless, due to exigent circumstances, the girl was permitted to marry into the priesthood, although generally two majorities are required in cases of lineage.
גופא מצא בה תינוק מושלך אם רוב גוים גוי אם רוב ישראל ישראל מחצה על מחצה ישראל אמר רב לא שנו אלא להחיותו אבל ליוחסין לא ושמואל אמר לפקח עליו את הגל
§ Apropos the case of the abandoned baby, the Gemara analyzes the matter itself: If there is a city in which both Jews and gentiles reside, and one found an unidentified, abandoned baby in the city, if there is a majority of gentiles in the city the baby is deemed a gentile. If there is a majority of Jews in the city the baby is deemed a Jew. If half the population is gentile and half Jewish, the baby is deemed a Jew. Rav said: The Sages taught that the baby is deemed a Jew only with regard to sustaining him; however, with regard to lineage, no. And Shmuel said: It was taught that he is deemed a Jew in order to create an opening in a heap of debris on his behalf on Shabbat.
ומי אמר שמואל הכי והאמר רב יוסף אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל אין הולכין בפיקוח נפש אחר הרוב אלא כי איתמר דשמואל ארישא אתמר אם רוב גוים גוי אמר שמואל ולפקח עליו את הגל אינו כן
The Gemara asks: And did Shmuel say that? But didn’t Rav Yosef say that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: One does not follow the majority in matters involving saving a life? Even if there is the slightest concern that the life of a Jew may be in danger, one takes all steps necessary to save him, even on Shabbat. Rather, when the statement of Shmuel was stated with regard to saving a life it was stated concerning the first clause of the mishna: If there is a majority of gentiles in the city the baby is deemed a gentile. Shmuel said: And with regard to creating an opening in a heap of debris on his behalf [lefake’aḥ alav et hagal] on Shabbat, that is not so. Even if there is a gentile majority in the city, one does not follow the majority in cases involving the saving of a life.
אם רוב גוים גוי למאי הלכתא אמר רב פפא להאכילו נבילות
The mishna continues: If there is a majority of gentiles the baby is deemed a gentile. The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha was this stated? Rav Pappa said: It was stated in order to feed the baby animal carcasses, i.e., non-kosher food.
אם רוב ישראל ישראל למאי הלכתא אמר רב פפא להחזיר לו אבידה
And it is taught in the mishna: If there is a majority of Jews the baby is deemed a Jew. The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha was this stated? Rav Pappa said: It was stated in order to return lost property to him, as one is required to return lost property to a Jew.
מחצה על מחצה ישראל למאי הלכתא אמר ריש לקיש לנזקין היכי דמי אי נימא דנגחיה תורא דידן לתורא דידיה לימא ליה אייתי ראיה דישראל את ושקול
And it is taught in the mishna: If half the population is gentile and half Jewish, the baby is deemed a Jew. The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha was this stated? Reish Lakish said: It was stated with regard to damages. In terms of payment of damages, the courts judge him as a Jew. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say that our ox, one belonging to a Jew, gored his ox, one belonging to a person of uncertain status, and he claims that he should be compensated for the damages as a Jew, let the owner of the ox that gored say to him: Bring proof that you are a Jew, and take payment. Due to the uncertainty surrounding his status, he is unable to produce any proof.
לא צריכא דנגחיה תורא דידיה לתורא דידן פלגא משלם ואידך פלגא אמר להו אייתי ראיה דלאו ישראל אנא ואתן לכון:
Rather, this halakha is necessary only in a case where his ox gored our ox, one belonging to a Jew. In that case, there is no question that he pays half the damage, which is the payment when an innocuous ox belonging to a Jew gores an ox belonging to a Jew. And with regard to the other half, which the owner of the gored ox is claiming, asserting that this person of uncertain status is a gentile and therefore liable to pay full damages, the owner of the ox that gored can say to the claimants: Bring proof that I am not a Jew and I will give you payment of the other half of the damages. It is with regard to that case that Reish Lakish ruled that in a case of uncertainty, the baby has the presumptive status of a Jew, and it is incumbent upon the claimant to prove otherwise.
הדרן עלך בתולה נשאת
May we return to you “A virgin is wedded.”
האשה שנתארמלה או שנתגרשה היא אומרת בתולה נשאתני והוא אומר לא כי אלא אלמנה נשאתיך אם יש עדים שיצאת בהינומא וראשה פרוע כתובתה מאתים רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אומר אף חילוק קליות ראיה
MISHNA: With regard to a woman who was widowed or divorced, and is now claiming payment of her marriage contract that is not before the court, and she says: You married me as a virgin, who is entitled to two hundred dinars, and he says: No; rather, I married you as a widow, who is entitled to one hundred dinars, then, if there are witnesses that she went out of her father’s house to her wedding with a hinnuma or with her hair uncovered, in a manner typical of virgins, payment of her marriage contract is two hundred dinars. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: Even testimony that there was distribution of roasted grain, which was customary at weddings of virgins, constitutes proof that she is a virgin.
ומודה רבי יהושע באומר לחבירו שדה זו של אביך היתה ולקחתיה הימנו שהוא נאמן
Several disputes between Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua were cited previously with regard to the credibility accorded to the respective claims of parties to a dispute. Based on one of those disputes, the tanna adds: And Rabbi Yehoshua concedes in a case where one says to another: This field, which is currently in my possession, belonged to your father and I purchased it from him, that he is deemed credible, and his entire claim is accepted. The court accepts not only his admission that it once belonged to the other’s father, but also his statement that he purchased it.
