There is a case where Rabbi Yehoshua agrees with Rabban Gamliel – if one is in possession of land and says to the other claimant, “It was your father’s but I purchased it from him,” the claim is accepted, as “the mouth that forbade (admitted that it belonged to the other) is the mouth that permitted (but I purchased it).” This is true only if there were no witnesses attesting to the fact that it originally belonged to his father. In the first case in the Mishna, regarding a woman whose ketuba is lost and she claims she was a virgin and should get 200 zuz and the husband claims she was not and only gets 100, the ruling is that only is she brings witnesses, can we accept her claim. Is this not according to Rabban Gamliel or would he agree with Rabbi Yehoshua in this case? Can one prove from the language of the second case “Rabbi Yehoshua admits” that in the first case, Rabban Gamliel agreed with Rabbi Yehoshua? No! As that language is referring back to the previous chapter. To which case in the previous chapter? Why does Rabbi Yehoshua agree in our Mishna that since there is a migo (since a better claim could have been made and it wasn’t, it is likely they are telling the truth), we can accept the claim, but in the case in Chapter One, he does not accept a migo claim? If we assume that most women are virgins, why do we need witnesses? If her ketuba is lost, why aren’t we concerned that she is claiming her ketuba for the second time after she already collected it in a court earlier and now is lying that her ketuba is lost? Two answers are given. What were other customs that were practiced at the wedding of a virgin?
This month’s learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Gali, Shim, Zoe, Zachy and Yehuda in loving memory of Judith Rosenfeld Hochstadter, Gittel bat Kreindel v’Binyamin BenZion on her second yahrzeit. “Her curiosity, humor, intellect and devout nature continues to inspire and hold us accountable. We miss her and think of her in all our pursuits, especially in our Hadran learning, where she would be glad to know that she didn’t have to boil more than 1 egg at a time!!”
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This month’s learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Gali, Shim, Zoe, Zachy and Yehuda in loving memory of Judith Rosenfeld Hochstadter, Gittel bat Kreindel v’Binyamin BenZion on her second yahrzeit. “Her curiosity, humor, intellect and devout nature continues to inspire and hold us accountable. We miss her and think of her in all our pursuits, especially in our Hadran learning, where she would be glad to know that she didn’t have to boil more than 1 egg at a time!!”
Ketubot 16
שֶׁהַפֶּה שֶׁאָסַר — הוּא הַפֶּה שֶׁהִתִּיר. וְאִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁהִיא שֶׁל אָבִיו, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״לְקַחְתִּיהָ הֵימֶנּוּ״ — אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן.
This is so, as the mouth that prohibited, i.e., claimed that the field had belonged to the other’s father, is the mouth that permitted, i.e., claimed that he purchased the field. Even if he had not admitted that it had belonged to the other’s father, the field would have remained in his possession. Therefore, his claim is accepted. However, if there are witnesses that the field belonged to his father, and the one who has the field in his possession says: I purchased it from him, he is not deemed credible and his claim is rejected.
גְּמָ׳ טַעְמָא דְּאִיכָּא עֵדִים, הָא לֵיכָּא עֵדִים — בַּעַל מְהֵימַן, לֵימָא תְּנַן סְתָמָא דְּלָא כְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל? דְּאִי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, הָא אָמַר אִיהִי מְהֵימְנָא!
GEMARA: The Gemara infers: The reason that the bride’s claim is accepted is specifically due to the fact that there are witnesses that she went out of her father’s house to the wedding with a hinnuma. However, if there are no witnesses, the husband is deemed credible. Let us say that the unattributed ruling that we learned in the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, as, if the ruling was according to Rabban Gamliel, didn’t he say that she is deemed credible?
אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הָתָם אֶלָּא בְּבָרִי וְשֶׁמָּא. אֲבָל הָכָא בְּבָרִי וּבָרִי — לָא אָמַר.
The Gemara answers: Even if you will say that the ruling in the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, Rabban Gamliel stated his opinion only there, in a case where the claim of the bride is certain and the claim of the groom is uncertain, as the groom does not know what actually happened. However, here, in a case where the claim of the bride is certain and the claim of the groom is also certain, as he is certain that he married her as a widow, Rabban Gamliel did not say that her claim is deemed credible.
וּדְקָאָרֵי לַהּ, מַאי קָאָרֵי לַהּ? הָא בָּרִי וּבָרִי הוּא! כֵּיוָן דְּרוֹב נָשִׁים בְּתוּלוֹת נִישָּׂאוֹת, כִּי בָרִי וְשֶׁמָּא דָּמֵי.
The Gemara asks: And he who asked the question, why did he ask it? The cases are clearly different, as this is a case of a certain claim and a certain claim. The Gemara answers: Since most women are married as virgins, one might have thought that the legal status in this case is like that of a case of a certain claim and an uncertain claim, as her claim is supported by a majority of cases.
וְהָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי, ״וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ״: אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא אַיְירִי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בְּמוֹדֶה — שַׁפִּיר. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ לָא אַיְירִי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בְּמוֹדֶה — רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לְמַאן מוֹדֵה?
And it also stands to reason that the first clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, who concedes that without witnesses the woman’s claim is not deemed credible, despite the fact that the case is comparable to one of a certain claim and an uncertain claim, as the mishna teaches: And Rabbi Yehoshua concedes. Granted, if you say that Rabban Gamliel is speaking in the first clause of the mishna and he concedes that even though it is similar to a case of certain and uncertain, her claim is not accepted, it works out well. Rabban Gamliel concedes to Rabbi Yehoshua in the first clause of the mishna and the mishna cites a case where Rabbi Yehoshua concedes to Rabban Gamliel. However, if you say that Rabban Gamliel is not speaking in the first clause of the mishna and he does not concede, to whom does Rabbi Yehoshua concede in the latter clause?
מִי סָבְרַתְּ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אַהַאי פִּירְקִין קָאֵי? אַמִּגּוֹ קָאֵי, וְאַפִּירְקִין קַמָּא קָאֵי.
The Gemara rejects that proof: Do you think that the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua is in reference to a mishna in this chapter? Actually, it is in reference to the principle of miggo, and it is in reference to the first chapter. Rabbi Yehoshua is saying that although he does not accept the claim supported by a miggo in the first chapter, here he accepts the claim supported by the principle: The mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted, which is based on the same reasoning as miggo, i.e., the fact that he could have made a more advantageous claim lends credibility to the less advantageous claim. In this case, he could have remained silent and the field would have remained in his possession. If challenged, he could have claimed that the field was his. Therefore, his less advantageous claim, that the field was not originally his but he purchased it from the father of the claimant, is accepted.
אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַהָא: הָיְתָה מְעוּבֶּרֶת, וְאָמְרוּ לָהּ ״מָה טִיבוֹ שֶׁל עוּבָּר זֶה״. ״מֵאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי וְכֹהֵן הוּא״, רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמְרִים: נֶאֱמֶנֶת, רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: לֹא מִפִּיהָ אָנוּ חַיִּין — הָתָם מַאי מִגּוֹ אִיכָּא? הֲרֵי כְּרֵיסָהּ בֵּין שִׁינֶּיהָ.
The Gemara elaborates: In reference to which case in the first chapter did Rabbi Yehoshua make his statement? If you say that it is in reference to this case (13a): If a single woman was pregnant, and people said to her: What is the nature of that fetus, and she says to them: It is from a man called so-and-so and he is a priest, Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is not based on the statement emerging from her mouth that we conduct our lives. There, what miggo is there lending credibility to her claim? In that case, her belly is between her teeth, i.e., her pregnancy is conspicuous, and consequently she does not have the option of making the more advantageous claim that she did not engage in intercourse.
אֶלָּא אַהָא: רָאוּהָ מְדַבֶּרֶת עִם אֶחָד, וְאָמְרוּ לָהּ: ״מָה טִיבוֹ שֶׁל אִישׁ זֶה״. ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי וְכֹהֵן הוּא״, רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמְרִים: נֶאֱמֶנֶת, רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: לֹא מִפִּיהָ אָנוּ חַיִּין. הָתָם מַאי מִגּוֹ אִיכָּא? הָנִיחָא לִזְעֵירִי דְּאָמַר: מַאי ״מְדַבֶּרֶת״ — נִסְתְּרָה, מִגּוֹ דְּאִי בָּעֲיָא אָמְרָה לֹא נִבְעַלְתִּי, וְקָאָמְרָה נִבְעַלְתִּי — מְהֵימְנָא. אֶלָּא לְרַב אַסִּי, דְּאָמַר מַאי ״מְדַבֶּרֶת״ — נִבְעֶלֶת, מַאי מִגּוֹ אִיכָּא?
Rather, it is in reference to this case (13a): If people saw a woman speaking to one man, and they said to her: What is the nature of this man? And she said to them: He is a man called so-and-so and he is a priest, Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is not based on the statement emerging from her mouth that we conduct our lives. Again this is challenged: There, what miggo is there? This works out well according to Ze’eiri, who said: What is the meaning of speaking mentioned in the mishna? It means that she secluded herself with a man. In this case there is a miggo. Since, if she wished to lie, she could have said: I did not engage in intercourse at all, and instead she said: I engaged in intercourse with a man of unflawed lineage. Therefore, she is deemed credible according to Rabban Gamliel. However, according to Rav Asi, who said: What is the meaning of speaking? It means that she engaged in intercourse, what miggo is there? There was no better claim available to her.
וְאֶלָּא אַהָא: הִיא אוֹמֶרֶת מוּכַּת עֵץ אֲנִי, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: לֹא כִי, אֶלָּא דְּרוּסַת אִישׁ אַתְּ. רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמְרִים: נֶאֱמֶנֶת, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: לֹא מִפִּיהָ אָנוּ חַיִּין — הָתָם מַאי מִגּוֹ אִיכָּא?
Rather, it is in reference to this case (13a), where she says: I am one whose hymen was ruptured by wood, and the groom says: No; rather, you are one who was trampled by a man. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is not on the basis of the statement emerging from her mouth that we conduct our lives. There, what miggo is there?
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, דְּאָמַר: בְּמָנֶה וְלֹא כְּלוּם — מִגּוֹ דְּאִי בָּעֲיָא אָמְרָה: ״מוּכַּת עֵץ אֲנִי תַּחְתֶּיךָ״, וְאִית לַהּ מָאתַיִם, וְקָאָמְרָה: מֵעִיקָּרָא, דְּלֵית לַהּ אֶלָּא מָנֶה, מְהֵימְנָא. אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּאָמַר: בְּמָאתַיִם וּמָנֶה. מַאי מִגּוֹ אִיכָּא?
Granted, according to Rabbi Elazar, who said that the bride claims that she is entitled to a marriage contract of one hundred dinars, and the groom claims that she is entitled to nothing at all, as in that case, there is a miggo. Since, if she wished to lie, she could have said: I am one whose hymen was ruptured by wood under your authority after betrothal, and she would have been entitled to two hundred dinars, as she was a virgin at betrothal. And therefore, when she says that her hymen was already ruptured initially, prior to betrothal, when she is entitled to only one hundred dinars, she is deemed credible. However, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: The bride claims that she is entitled to a marriage contract of two hundred dinars; and the groom claims that that she is entitled to a marriage contract of one hundred dinars, what miggo is there? Her claim is the most advantageous claim available to her.
אֶלָּא אַהָא: הַנּוֹשֵׂא אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וְלֹא מָצָא לָהּ בְּתוּלִים, הִיא אוֹמֶרֶת: ״מִשֶּׁאֵרַסְתַּנִי נֶאֱנַסְתִּי, וְנִסְתַּחֲפָה שָׂדֵהוּ״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא כִי, אֶלָּא עַד שֶׁלֹּא אֵירַסְתִּיךְ״.
Rather, it is in reference to this case (12b): One who marries a woman and did not find her hymen intact, and she says: After you betrothed me, I was raped and his field was inundated, i.e., it is attributable to your own misfortune. And he says: No; rather, you were raped before I betrothed you, and my transaction was a mistaken transaction.
רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמְרִים: נֶאֱמֶנֶת, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: לֹא מִפִּיהָ אָנוּ חַיִּין. דְּמִגּוֹ דְּאִי בָּעֲיָא אָמְרָה ״מוּכַּת עֵץ אֲנִי תַּחְתֶּיךָ״, דְּלָא קָא פָסְלָה נַפְשָׁהּ מִכְּהוּנָּה. וְקָאָמְרָה: ״נֶאֱנַסְתִּי״, דְּקָא פָּסְלָה נַפְשָׁהּ מִכְּהוּנָּה, מִשּׁוּם הָכִי קָאָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל דִּמְהֵימְנָא. וְקָאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לְרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: בְּהַאי מִגּוֹ דְּהָכָא — מוֹדֵינָא לָךְ, בְּהָהוּא מִגּוֹ דְּהָתָם — פְּלִיגְנָא עִילָּווֹךְ.
Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is not based on the statement emerging from her mouth that we conduct our lives, as, in that case there is a miggo. Since, if she wished to lie, she could have said: I am one whose hymen was ruptured by wood under your jurisdiction after betrothal, which is a more advantageous claim, because she does not thereby disqualify herself from marrying into the priesthood. But she said: I was raped after betrothal, which is a less advantageous claim, because she disqualified herself from the priesthood. Therefore, Rabban Gamliel says that she is deemed credible. And Rabbi Yehoshua says to Rabban Gamliel: With regard to this miggo in the mishna here, I concede to you that the miggo is effective. With regard to that miggo there in the first chapter, I disagree with you.
מִכְּדִי הַאי מִגּוֹ וְהַאי מִגּוֹ, מַאי שְׁנָא הַאי מִגּוֹ מֵהַאי מִגּוֹ? הָכָא — אֵין שׁוֹר שָׁחוּט לְפָנֶיךָ. הָתָם — הֲרֵי שׁוֹר שָׁחוּט לְפָנֶיךָ.
The Gemara asks: But after all, this is a case of miggo and that is a case of miggo. In what way, in the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, is this miggo different from that miggo? The Gemara answers: Here, in the case of contested ownership of the field, there is no slaughtered ox before you, i.e., there is no reason to question his claim of ownership, as the field is in his possession. However, there, in the case of the woman who was found not to be a virgin, there is a slaughtered ox before you, i.e., there is reason to question her virginity, and it is only in response to that question that she makes her claim. Therefore, although it is supported by a miggo, Rabbi Yehoshua does not accept her claim.
וְכֵיוָן דְּרוֹב נָשִׁים בְּתוּלוֹת נִישָּׂאוֹת, כִּי לָא אָתוּ עֵדִים מַאי הָוֵי! אָמַר רָבִינָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר רוֹב נָשִׁים בְּתוּלוֹת נִישָּׂאוֹת, וּמִיעוּט אַלְמָנוֹת, וְכׇל הַנִּשֵּׂאת בְּתוּלָה — יֵשׁ לָהּ קוֹל,
§ The Gemara resumes discussion of the inference that it drew at the outset with regard to witnesses that the bride was a virgin. And since the Gemara established earlier that the woman’s claim is supported by the fact that most women are married as virgins, if witnesses did not come, what of it? That majority should be sufficient to establish that she married as a virgin. Ravina said: It is because there is room to say that although most women are married as virgins and a minority of women marry as widows or non-virgins, there is an additional presumption: The marriage of anyone who is married as a virgin generates publicity,
וְזוֹ, הוֹאִיל וְאֵין לָהּ קוֹל — אִיתְּרַע לֵהּ רוּבָּא.
and with regard to this woman, because her marriage did not generate publicity, the effect of the majority is undermined.
אִי כׇּל הַנִּשֵּׂאת בְּתוּלָה יֵשׁ לָהּ קוֹל — כִּי אֲתוֹ עֵדִים, מַאי הָוֵי? הָנָךְ סָהֲדֵי שַׁקָּרֵי נִינְהוּ! אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבִינָא: רוֹב הַנִּשֵּׂאת בְּתוּלָה יֵשׁ לָהּ קוֹל, וְזוֹ הוֹאִיל וְאֵין לָהּ קוֹל — אִיתְּרַע לֵהּ רוּבָּא.
The Gemara asks: If in fact, the marriage of anyone who is married as a virgin generates publicity, and the marriage of this woman did not generate publicity, when witnesses come, what of it? These are false witnesses, as their testimony runs counter to the presumption governing all marriages. Rather, Ravina said that it is not a universal presumption, but a majority. The marriage of most women who are married as virgins generates publicity, but for this woman, since her marriage did not generate publicity, the effect of the majority is undermined. Therefore, the testimony that she went out of her father’s house to her wedding with a hinnuma overrides the lack of publicity.
אִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁיָּצְתָה בְּהִינוּמָא וְכוּ׳. וְלֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא מַפְּקָא עֵדִים בְּהַאי בֵּי דִינָא, וְגָבְיָא, וַהֲדַר מַפְּקָא לַהּ לִכְתוּבָה בְּהַאי בֵּית דִּין, וְגָבְיָא בַּהּ? אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת כּוֹתְבִין שׁוֹבָר. רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין כּוֹתְבִין כְּתוּבָּה עָסְקִינַן.
§ It was stated in the mishna: If there are witnesses that she went out of her father’s house to her wedding with a hinnuma, or with her hair uncovered, in a manner typical of virgins, payment of her marriage contract is two hundred dinars. The Gemara asks: And since she collects payment without producing her marriage contract, let us be concerned that she might produce witnesses in this court and collect payment, and then produce her marriage contract in that other court and collect with it payment a second time. Rabbi Abbahu said: This indicates that one writes a receipt indicating that the woman received payment. Were the woman to attempt to collect payment of her marriage contract a second time, her husband would produce the receipt. Rav Pappa said: We are dealing in the mishna with a place where one does not write a marriage contract. It is only in a case where there is no concern lest she produce her marriage contract that she collects payment based on the testimony of witnesses.
וְאִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַבָּרַיְיתָא: אִיבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ, הִטְמִינָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ, נִשְׂרְפָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ, רָקְדוּ לְפָנֶיהָ, שָׂחֲקוּ לְפָנֶיהָ, הֶעֱבִירוּ לְפָנֶיהָ כּוֹס שֶׁל בְּשׂוֹרָה, אוֹ מַפָּה שֶׁל בְּתוּלִים. אִם יֵשׁ לָהּ עֵדִים בְּאֶחָד מִכׇּל אֵלּוּ — כְּתוּבָּתָהּ מָאתַיִם.
And there are some who teach the dispute between Rabbi Abbahu and Rav Pappa with regard to the baraita that says: In a case where a woman lost her marriage contract or concealed her marriage contract and she claims that she is unable to find it; or her marriage contract was burned, and there is no proof with regard to the sum to which she is entitled; or practices performed exclusively at the weddings of virgins were performed at her wedding, e.g., people danced before her, or played before her, or passed before her a cup of good tidings or a cloth of virginity; if she has witnesses with regard to any one of these practices, her marriage contract is two hundred dinars.
וְלֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא מַפְּקָא עֵדִים בְּהַאי בֵּית דִּין וְגָבְיָא, וַהֲדַר מַפְּקָא לִכְתוּבָּתָהּ בְּהַאי בֵּית דִּין וְגָבְיָא בַּהּ! אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת כּוֹתְבִין שׁוֹבָר. רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין כּוֹתְבִין כְּתוּבָּה עָסְקִינַן.
The Gemara asks: And since she collects payment without producing her marriage contract, let us be concerned that she might produce witnesses in this court and collect payment, and then produce her marriage contract in that other court and collect payment with it a second time. Rabbi Abbahu said: This indicates that one writes a receipt indicating that the woman received payment. Were the woman to attempt to collect payment of her marriage contract a second time, her husband would produce the receipt. Rav Pappa said: We are dealing in the mishna with a place where one does not write a marriage contract.
וְהָא ״אִיבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ״ קָתָנֵי! דִּכְתַב לַהּ אִיהוּ. סוֹף סוֹף מַפְּקָא לַהּ וְגָבְיָא בַּהּ! מַאי ״אִיבְּדָה״ — אִיבְּדָה בָּאוּר.
The Gemara asks: But how could Rav Pappa say that the baraita is dealing with a place where one does not write a marriage contract? Isn’t it taught in that baraita: If a woman lost her marriage contract? The Gemara answers: The baraita is referring to a case where her husband wrote her a marriage contract contrary to the local custom. The Gemara asks: If he wrote her a marriage contract, the concern remains that ultimately she will produce the marriage contract and collect payment with it a second time. The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of lost? The woman lost her marriage contract in the fire. In that case, there is no longer any concern.
אִי הָכִי הַיְינוּ ״נִשְׂרְפָה״? וְעוֹד: הִטְמִינָה, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? וְתוּ: אִיבְּדָה לְמָה לִי? אֶלָּא: כֹּל אִיבְּדָה — כִּי הִטְמִינָה בְּפָנֵינוּ דָּמֵי, וְלָא יָהֲבִינַן לַהּ עַד דְּאָמְרִי עֵדִים נִשְׂרְפָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ.
The Gemara asks: If so, that is the case of: Her marriage contract was burned, listed separately in the baraita. And furthermore, what is there to say with regard to the case of concealed, where the concern that she will collect payment twice remains? And furthermore, if burned comes to explain the meaning of lost, why do I need the baraita to list the case of lost at all? It would have been sufficient for the baraita to mention the case of a burned marriage contract. Rather, the meaning of the baraita is: The legal status of any case where the woman claims that she lost her marriage contract is like that of a case where she concealed it before us, and we give her payment of her marriage contract only when the witnesses say that her marriage contract was burned. Otherwise, even if witnesses testify that the practices characteristic of the wedding of a virgin were performed at her wedding, she does not collect payment of her marriage contract.
מַאן דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַבָּרַיְיתָא — כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן אַמַּתְנִיתִין. וּמַאן דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַמַּתְנִיתִין — אֲבָל אַבָּרַיְיתָא לָא, כִּי קוּשְׁיָא.
The Gemara notes: The one who teaches this dispute between Rabbi Abbahu and Rav Pappa with regard to the baraita, all the more so would he teach it with regard to the mishna. Applying Rav Pappa’s opinion to the mishna does not necessitate the emendation and reinterpretation necessitated by its application to the baraita. However, the one who teaches this dispute with regard to the mishna would not teach it then with regard to the baraita, in accordance with the difficulty raised there, as the plain meaning of the baraita is that it is a place where one writes a marriage contract.
אִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים כּוּ׳. וְלֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא מַפְּקָא עֵדֵי הִינּוּמָא בְּהַאי בֵּית דִּין וְגָבְיָא, וַהֲדַר מַפְּקָא עֵדֵי הִינּוּמָא בְּבֵי דִינָא אַחֲרִינָא וְגָבְיָא! בְּמָקוֹם דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר וַדַּאי כָּתְבִינַן שׁוֹבָר.
With regard to that same passage in the mishna: If there are witnesses that she went out of her father’s house to her wedding with a hinnuma, or with her hair uncovered, in a manner typical of virgins, payment of her marriage contract is two hundred dinars, the Gemara asks: But let us be concerned lest she first produce witnesses that she went out with a hinnuma, in this court, and collect payment, and then produce witnesses that she went out with a hinnuma, in that court, and collect payment a second time. The Gemara answers: In a place where it is not possible to guarantee that she will not collect her marriage contract more than once in any other way, certainly we write a receipt, even according to the opinion that as a rule, one does not write a receipt.
הֶעֱבִירוּ לְפָנֶיהָ כּוֹס שֶׁל בְּשׂוֹרָה. מַאי ״כּוֹס שֶׁל בְּשׂוֹרָה״? אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: כּוֹס יַיִן שֶׁל תְּרוּמָה מַעֲבִירִין לְפָנֶיהָ. כְּלוֹמַר: רְאוּיָה הָיְתָה זוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל בִּתְרוּמָה. מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב פָּפָּא: אַטּוּ אַלְמָנָה מִי לָא אָכְלָה בִּתְרוּמָה? אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: זוֹ רֵאשִׁית, כִּתְרוּמָה רֵאשִׁית.
§ It is taught in that baraita: Or passed before her a cup of good tidings. The Gemara asks: What is a cup of good tidings? Rav Adda bar Ahava says: A cup of teruma wine is passed before the virgin bride, meaning that this woman would have been eligible to eat teruma had she married a priest. Rav Pappa strongly objects to this: Is that to say that a widow does not eat teruma if she marries a priest? Clearly she does. Therefore, what is the proof from teruma that she is a virgin? Rather, Rav Pappa says: The cup of teruma is passed before her to indicate that this bride is first, as she has not yet engaged in intercourse, like teruma that is the first gift separated from the produce.
תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: חָבִית שֶׁל יַיִן מַעֲבִירִין לְפָנֶיהָ. אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: בְּתוּלָה — מַעֲבִירִין לְפָנֶיהָ סְתוּמָה, בְּעוּלָה — מַעֲבִירִין לְפָנֶיהָ פְּתוּחָה. אַמַּאי? נִיעַבַּר קַמֵּי בְּתוּלָה וְקַמֵּי בְּעוּלָה לָא נִיעַבַּר כְּלָל! זִימְנִין דְּתָפְסָה מָאתַיִם, וְאָמְרָה: אֲנָא בְּתוּלָה הֲוַאי, וְהַאי דְּלָא עַבַּרוּ קַמַּאי — אִתְּנוֹסֵי הוּא דְּאִתְּנִיסוּ.
It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: The custom is that one passes a barrel of wine before her. Rav Adda bar Ahava said: One passes a sealed barrel of wine before a virgin, and one passes an open barrel of wine before a non-virgin. The Gemara asks: Why is that necessary? Let us pass the sealed barrel before the virgin, and before the non-virgin let us not pass a barrel at all. Why is it necessary to publicize the fact that she is a non-virgin? The Gemara explains: It is necessary, as, at times there could be a case where a non-virgin unilaterally seized two hundred dinars as payment for her marriage contract and said: I was a virgin, and the fact that they did not pass a sealed barrel before me was due to circumstances beyond their control. In order to prevent deceit of that kind, an open barrel is passed before the non-virgin, so that people will remember that she is not a virgin.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: כֵּיצַד מְרַקְּדִין לִפְנֵי הַכַּלָּה? בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים:
§ The Sages taught: How does one dance before the bride, i.e., what does one recite while dancing at her wedding? Beit Shammai say:
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Ketubot 16
שֶׁהַפֶּה שֶׁאָסַר — הוּא הַפֶּה שֶׁהִתִּיר. וְאִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁהִיא שֶׁל אָבִיו, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״לְקַחְתִּיהָ הֵימֶנּוּ״ — אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן.
This is so, as the mouth that prohibited, i.e., claimed that the field had belonged to the other’s father, is the mouth that permitted, i.e., claimed that he purchased the field. Even if he had not admitted that it had belonged to the other’s father, the field would have remained in his possession. Therefore, his claim is accepted. However, if there are witnesses that the field belonged to his father, and the one who has the field in his possession says: I purchased it from him, he is not deemed credible and his claim is rejected.
גְּמָ׳ טַעְמָא דְּאִיכָּא עֵדִים, הָא לֵיכָּא עֵדִים — בַּעַל מְהֵימַן, לֵימָא תְּנַן סְתָמָא דְּלָא כְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל? דְּאִי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, הָא אָמַר אִיהִי מְהֵימְנָא!
GEMARA: The Gemara infers: The reason that the bride’s claim is accepted is specifically due to the fact that there are witnesses that she went out of her father’s house to the wedding with a hinnuma. However, if there are no witnesses, the husband is deemed credible. Let us say that the unattributed ruling that we learned in the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, as, if the ruling was according to Rabban Gamliel, didn’t he say that she is deemed credible?
אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הָתָם אֶלָּא בְּבָרִי וְשֶׁמָּא. אֲבָל הָכָא בְּבָרִי וּבָרִי — לָא אָמַר.
The Gemara answers: Even if you will say that the ruling in the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, Rabban Gamliel stated his opinion only there, in a case where the claim of the bride is certain and the claim of the groom is uncertain, as the groom does not know what actually happened. However, here, in a case where the claim of the bride is certain and the claim of the groom is also certain, as he is certain that he married her as a widow, Rabban Gamliel did not say that her claim is deemed credible.
וּדְקָאָרֵי לַהּ, מַאי קָאָרֵי לַהּ? הָא בָּרִי וּבָרִי הוּא! כֵּיוָן דְּרוֹב נָשִׁים בְּתוּלוֹת נִישָּׂאוֹת, כִּי בָרִי וְשֶׁמָּא דָּמֵי.
The Gemara asks: And he who asked the question, why did he ask it? The cases are clearly different, as this is a case of a certain claim and a certain claim. The Gemara answers: Since most women are married as virgins, one might have thought that the legal status in this case is like that of a case of a certain claim and an uncertain claim, as her claim is supported by a majority of cases.
וְהָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי, ״וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ״: אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא אַיְירִי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בְּמוֹדֶה — שַׁפִּיר. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ לָא אַיְירִי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בְּמוֹדֶה — רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לְמַאן מוֹדֵה?
And it also stands to reason that the first clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, who concedes that without witnesses the woman’s claim is not deemed credible, despite the fact that the case is comparable to one of a certain claim and an uncertain claim, as the mishna teaches: And Rabbi Yehoshua concedes. Granted, if you say that Rabban Gamliel is speaking in the first clause of the mishna and he concedes that even though it is similar to a case of certain and uncertain, her claim is not accepted, it works out well. Rabban Gamliel concedes to Rabbi Yehoshua in the first clause of the mishna and the mishna cites a case where Rabbi Yehoshua concedes to Rabban Gamliel. However, if you say that Rabban Gamliel is not speaking in the first clause of the mishna and he does not concede, to whom does Rabbi Yehoshua concede in the latter clause?
מִי סָבְרַתְּ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אַהַאי פִּירְקִין קָאֵי? אַמִּגּוֹ קָאֵי, וְאַפִּירְקִין קַמָּא קָאֵי.
The Gemara rejects that proof: Do you think that the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua is in reference to a mishna in this chapter? Actually, it is in reference to the principle of miggo, and it is in reference to the first chapter. Rabbi Yehoshua is saying that although he does not accept the claim supported by a miggo in the first chapter, here he accepts the claim supported by the principle: The mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted, which is based on the same reasoning as miggo, i.e., the fact that he could have made a more advantageous claim lends credibility to the less advantageous claim. In this case, he could have remained silent and the field would have remained in his possession. If challenged, he could have claimed that the field was his. Therefore, his less advantageous claim, that the field was not originally his but he purchased it from the father of the claimant, is accepted.
אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַהָא: הָיְתָה מְעוּבֶּרֶת, וְאָמְרוּ לָהּ ״מָה טִיבוֹ שֶׁל עוּבָּר זֶה״. ״מֵאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי וְכֹהֵן הוּא״, רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמְרִים: נֶאֱמֶנֶת, רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: לֹא מִפִּיהָ אָנוּ חַיִּין — הָתָם מַאי מִגּוֹ אִיכָּא? הֲרֵי כְּרֵיסָהּ בֵּין שִׁינֶּיהָ.
The Gemara elaborates: In reference to which case in the first chapter did Rabbi Yehoshua make his statement? If you say that it is in reference to this case (13a): If a single woman was pregnant, and people said to her: What is the nature of that fetus, and she says to them: It is from a man called so-and-so and he is a priest, Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is not based on the statement emerging from her mouth that we conduct our lives. There, what miggo is there lending credibility to her claim? In that case, her belly is between her teeth, i.e., her pregnancy is conspicuous, and consequently she does not have the option of making the more advantageous claim that she did not engage in intercourse.
אֶלָּא אַהָא: רָאוּהָ מְדַבֶּרֶת עִם אֶחָד, וְאָמְרוּ לָהּ: ״מָה טִיבוֹ שֶׁל אִישׁ זֶה״. ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי וְכֹהֵן הוּא״, רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמְרִים: נֶאֱמֶנֶת, רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: לֹא מִפִּיהָ אָנוּ חַיִּין. הָתָם מַאי מִגּוֹ אִיכָּא? הָנִיחָא לִזְעֵירִי דְּאָמַר: מַאי ״מְדַבֶּרֶת״ — נִסְתְּרָה, מִגּוֹ דְּאִי בָּעֲיָא אָמְרָה לֹא נִבְעַלְתִּי, וְקָאָמְרָה נִבְעַלְתִּי — מְהֵימְנָא. אֶלָּא לְרַב אַסִּי, דְּאָמַר מַאי ״מְדַבֶּרֶת״ — נִבְעֶלֶת, מַאי מִגּוֹ אִיכָּא?
Rather, it is in reference to this case (13a): If people saw a woman speaking to one man, and they said to her: What is the nature of this man? And she said to them: He is a man called so-and-so and he is a priest, Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is not based on the statement emerging from her mouth that we conduct our lives. Again this is challenged: There, what miggo is there? This works out well according to Ze’eiri, who said: What is the meaning of speaking mentioned in the mishna? It means that she secluded herself with a man. In this case there is a miggo. Since, if she wished to lie, she could have said: I did not engage in intercourse at all, and instead she said: I engaged in intercourse with a man of unflawed lineage. Therefore, she is deemed credible according to Rabban Gamliel. However, according to Rav Asi, who said: What is the meaning of speaking? It means that she engaged in intercourse, what miggo is there? There was no better claim available to her.
וְאֶלָּא אַהָא: הִיא אוֹמֶרֶת מוּכַּת עֵץ אֲנִי, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: לֹא כִי, אֶלָּא דְּרוּסַת אִישׁ אַתְּ. רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמְרִים: נֶאֱמֶנֶת, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: לֹא מִפִּיהָ אָנוּ חַיִּין — הָתָם מַאי מִגּוֹ אִיכָּא?
Rather, it is in reference to this case (13a), where she says: I am one whose hymen was ruptured by wood, and the groom says: No; rather, you are one who was trampled by a man. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is not on the basis of the statement emerging from her mouth that we conduct our lives. There, what miggo is there?
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, דְּאָמַר: בְּמָנֶה וְלֹא כְּלוּם — מִגּוֹ דְּאִי בָּעֲיָא אָמְרָה: ״מוּכַּת עֵץ אֲנִי תַּחְתֶּיךָ״, וְאִית לַהּ מָאתַיִם, וְקָאָמְרָה: מֵעִיקָּרָא, דְּלֵית לַהּ אֶלָּא מָנֶה, מְהֵימְנָא. אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּאָמַר: בְּמָאתַיִם וּמָנֶה. מַאי מִגּוֹ אִיכָּא?
Granted, according to Rabbi Elazar, who said that the bride claims that she is entitled to a marriage contract of one hundred dinars, and the groom claims that she is entitled to nothing at all, as in that case, there is a miggo. Since, if she wished to lie, she could have said: I am one whose hymen was ruptured by wood under your authority after betrothal, and she would have been entitled to two hundred dinars, as she was a virgin at betrothal. And therefore, when she says that her hymen was already ruptured initially, prior to betrothal, when she is entitled to only one hundred dinars, she is deemed credible. However, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: The bride claims that she is entitled to a marriage contract of two hundred dinars; and the groom claims that that she is entitled to a marriage contract of one hundred dinars, what miggo is there? Her claim is the most advantageous claim available to her.
אֶלָּא אַהָא: הַנּוֹשֵׂא אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וְלֹא מָצָא לָהּ בְּתוּלִים, הִיא אוֹמֶרֶת: ״מִשֶּׁאֵרַסְתַּנִי נֶאֱנַסְתִּי, וְנִסְתַּחֲפָה שָׂדֵהוּ״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא כִי, אֶלָּא עַד שֶׁלֹּא אֵירַסְתִּיךְ״.
Rather, it is in reference to this case (12b): One who marries a woman and did not find her hymen intact, and she says: After you betrothed me, I was raped and his field was inundated, i.e., it is attributable to your own misfortune. And he says: No; rather, you were raped before I betrothed you, and my transaction was a mistaken transaction.
רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמְרִים: נֶאֱמֶנֶת, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: לֹא מִפִּיהָ אָנוּ חַיִּין. דְּמִגּוֹ דְּאִי בָּעֲיָא אָמְרָה ״מוּכַּת עֵץ אֲנִי תַּחְתֶּיךָ״, דְּלָא קָא פָסְלָה נַפְשָׁהּ מִכְּהוּנָּה. וְקָאָמְרָה: ״נֶאֱנַסְתִּי״, דְּקָא פָּסְלָה נַפְשָׁהּ מִכְּהוּנָּה, מִשּׁוּם הָכִי קָאָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל דִּמְהֵימְנָא. וְקָאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לְרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: בְּהַאי מִגּוֹ דְּהָכָא — מוֹדֵינָא לָךְ, בְּהָהוּא מִגּוֹ דְּהָתָם — פְּלִיגְנָא עִילָּווֹךְ.
Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is not based on the statement emerging from her mouth that we conduct our lives, as, in that case there is a miggo. Since, if she wished to lie, she could have said: I am one whose hymen was ruptured by wood under your jurisdiction after betrothal, which is a more advantageous claim, because she does not thereby disqualify herself from marrying into the priesthood. But she said: I was raped after betrothal, which is a less advantageous claim, because she disqualified herself from the priesthood. Therefore, Rabban Gamliel says that she is deemed credible. And Rabbi Yehoshua says to Rabban Gamliel: With regard to this miggo in the mishna here, I concede to you that the miggo is effective. With regard to that miggo there in the first chapter, I disagree with you.
מִכְּדִי הַאי מִגּוֹ וְהַאי מִגּוֹ, מַאי שְׁנָא הַאי מִגּוֹ מֵהַאי מִגּוֹ? הָכָא — אֵין שׁוֹר שָׁחוּט לְפָנֶיךָ. הָתָם — הֲרֵי שׁוֹר שָׁחוּט לְפָנֶיךָ.
The Gemara asks: But after all, this is a case of miggo and that is a case of miggo. In what way, in the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, is this miggo different from that miggo? The Gemara answers: Here, in the case of contested ownership of the field, there is no slaughtered ox before you, i.e., there is no reason to question his claim of ownership, as the field is in his possession. However, there, in the case of the woman who was found not to be a virgin, there is a slaughtered ox before you, i.e., there is reason to question her virginity, and it is only in response to that question that she makes her claim. Therefore, although it is supported by a miggo, Rabbi Yehoshua does not accept her claim.
וְכֵיוָן דְּרוֹב נָשִׁים בְּתוּלוֹת נִישָּׂאוֹת, כִּי לָא אָתוּ עֵדִים מַאי הָוֵי! אָמַר רָבִינָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר רוֹב נָשִׁים בְּתוּלוֹת נִישָּׂאוֹת, וּמִיעוּט אַלְמָנוֹת, וְכׇל הַנִּשֵּׂאת בְּתוּלָה — יֵשׁ לָהּ קוֹל,
§ The Gemara resumes discussion of the inference that it drew at the outset with regard to witnesses that the bride was a virgin. And since the Gemara established earlier that the woman’s claim is supported by the fact that most women are married as virgins, if witnesses did not come, what of it? That majority should be sufficient to establish that she married as a virgin. Ravina said: It is because there is room to say that although most women are married as virgins and a minority of women marry as widows or non-virgins, there is an additional presumption: The marriage of anyone who is married as a virgin generates publicity,
וְזוֹ, הוֹאִיל וְאֵין לָהּ קוֹל — אִיתְּרַע לֵהּ רוּבָּא.
and with regard to this woman, because her marriage did not generate publicity, the effect of the majority is undermined.
אִי כׇּל הַנִּשֵּׂאת בְּתוּלָה יֵשׁ לָהּ קוֹל — כִּי אֲתוֹ עֵדִים, מַאי הָוֵי? הָנָךְ סָהֲדֵי שַׁקָּרֵי נִינְהוּ! אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבִינָא: רוֹב הַנִּשֵּׂאת בְּתוּלָה יֵשׁ לָהּ קוֹל, וְזוֹ הוֹאִיל וְאֵין לָהּ קוֹל — אִיתְּרַע לֵהּ רוּבָּא.
The Gemara asks: If in fact, the marriage of anyone who is married as a virgin generates publicity, and the marriage of this woman did not generate publicity, when witnesses come, what of it? These are false witnesses, as their testimony runs counter to the presumption governing all marriages. Rather, Ravina said that it is not a universal presumption, but a majority. The marriage of most women who are married as virgins generates publicity, but for this woman, since her marriage did not generate publicity, the effect of the majority is undermined. Therefore, the testimony that she went out of her father’s house to her wedding with a hinnuma overrides the lack of publicity.
אִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁיָּצְתָה בְּהִינוּמָא וְכוּ׳. וְלֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא מַפְּקָא עֵדִים בְּהַאי בֵּי דִינָא, וְגָבְיָא, וַהֲדַר מַפְּקָא לַהּ לִכְתוּבָה בְּהַאי בֵּית דִּין, וְגָבְיָא בַּהּ? אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת כּוֹתְבִין שׁוֹבָר. רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין כּוֹתְבִין כְּתוּבָּה עָסְקִינַן.
§ It was stated in the mishna: If there are witnesses that she went out of her father’s house to her wedding with a hinnuma, or with her hair uncovered, in a manner typical of virgins, payment of her marriage contract is two hundred dinars. The Gemara asks: And since she collects payment without producing her marriage contract, let us be concerned that she might produce witnesses in this court and collect payment, and then produce her marriage contract in that other court and collect with it payment a second time. Rabbi Abbahu said: This indicates that one writes a receipt indicating that the woman received payment. Were the woman to attempt to collect payment of her marriage contract a second time, her husband would produce the receipt. Rav Pappa said: We are dealing in the mishna with a place where one does not write a marriage contract. It is only in a case where there is no concern lest she produce her marriage contract that she collects payment based on the testimony of witnesses.
וְאִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַבָּרַיְיתָא: אִיבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ, הִטְמִינָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ, נִשְׂרְפָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ, רָקְדוּ לְפָנֶיהָ, שָׂחֲקוּ לְפָנֶיהָ, הֶעֱבִירוּ לְפָנֶיהָ כּוֹס שֶׁל בְּשׂוֹרָה, אוֹ מַפָּה שֶׁל בְּתוּלִים. אִם יֵשׁ לָהּ עֵדִים בְּאֶחָד מִכׇּל אֵלּוּ — כְּתוּבָּתָהּ מָאתַיִם.
And there are some who teach the dispute between Rabbi Abbahu and Rav Pappa with regard to the baraita that says: In a case where a woman lost her marriage contract or concealed her marriage contract and she claims that she is unable to find it; or her marriage contract was burned, and there is no proof with regard to the sum to which she is entitled; or practices performed exclusively at the weddings of virgins were performed at her wedding, e.g., people danced before her, or played before her, or passed before her a cup of good tidings or a cloth of virginity; if she has witnesses with regard to any one of these practices, her marriage contract is two hundred dinars.
וְלֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא מַפְּקָא עֵדִים בְּהַאי בֵּית דִּין וְגָבְיָא, וַהֲדַר מַפְּקָא לִכְתוּבָּתָהּ בְּהַאי בֵּית דִּין וְגָבְיָא בַּהּ! אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת כּוֹתְבִין שׁוֹבָר. רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין כּוֹתְבִין כְּתוּבָּה עָסְקִינַן.
The Gemara asks: And since she collects payment without producing her marriage contract, let us be concerned that she might produce witnesses in this court and collect payment, and then produce her marriage contract in that other court and collect payment with it a second time. Rabbi Abbahu said: This indicates that one writes a receipt indicating that the woman received payment. Were the woman to attempt to collect payment of her marriage contract a second time, her husband would produce the receipt. Rav Pappa said: We are dealing in the mishna with a place where one does not write a marriage contract.
וְהָא ״אִיבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ״ קָתָנֵי! דִּכְתַב לַהּ אִיהוּ. סוֹף סוֹף מַפְּקָא לַהּ וְגָבְיָא בַּהּ! מַאי ״אִיבְּדָה״ — אִיבְּדָה בָּאוּר.
The Gemara asks: But how could Rav Pappa say that the baraita is dealing with a place where one does not write a marriage contract? Isn’t it taught in that baraita: If a woman lost her marriage contract? The Gemara answers: The baraita is referring to a case where her husband wrote her a marriage contract contrary to the local custom. The Gemara asks: If he wrote her a marriage contract, the concern remains that ultimately she will produce the marriage contract and collect payment with it a second time. The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of lost? The woman lost her marriage contract in the fire. In that case, there is no longer any concern.
אִי הָכִי הַיְינוּ ״נִשְׂרְפָה״? וְעוֹד: הִטְמִינָה, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? וְתוּ: אִיבְּדָה לְמָה לִי? אֶלָּא: כֹּל אִיבְּדָה — כִּי הִטְמִינָה בְּפָנֵינוּ דָּמֵי, וְלָא יָהֲבִינַן לַהּ עַד דְּאָמְרִי עֵדִים נִשְׂרְפָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ.
The Gemara asks: If so, that is the case of: Her marriage contract was burned, listed separately in the baraita. And furthermore, what is there to say with regard to the case of concealed, where the concern that she will collect payment twice remains? And furthermore, if burned comes to explain the meaning of lost, why do I need the baraita to list the case of lost at all? It would have been sufficient for the baraita to mention the case of a burned marriage contract. Rather, the meaning of the baraita is: The legal status of any case where the woman claims that she lost her marriage contract is like that of a case where she concealed it before us, and we give her payment of her marriage contract only when the witnesses say that her marriage contract was burned. Otherwise, even if witnesses testify that the practices characteristic of the wedding of a virgin were performed at her wedding, she does not collect payment of her marriage contract.
מַאן דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַבָּרַיְיתָא — כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן אַמַּתְנִיתִין. וּמַאן דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַמַּתְנִיתִין — אֲבָל אַבָּרַיְיתָא לָא, כִּי קוּשְׁיָא.
The Gemara notes: The one who teaches this dispute between Rabbi Abbahu and Rav Pappa with regard to the baraita, all the more so would he teach it with regard to the mishna. Applying Rav Pappa’s opinion to the mishna does not necessitate the emendation and reinterpretation necessitated by its application to the baraita. However, the one who teaches this dispute with regard to the mishna would not teach it then with regard to the baraita, in accordance with the difficulty raised there, as the plain meaning of the baraita is that it is a place where one writes a marriage contract.
אִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים כּוּ׳. וְלֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא מַפְּקָא עֵדֵי הִינּוּמָא בְּהַאי בֵּית דִּין וְגָבְיָא, וַהֲדַר מַפְּקָא עֵדֵי הִינּוּמָא בְּבֵי דִינָא אַחֲרִינָא וְגָבְיָא! בְּמָקוֹם דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר וַדַּאי כָּתְבִינַן שׁוֹבָר.
With regard to that same passage in the mishna: If there are witnesses that she went out of her father’s house to her wedding with a hinnuma, or with her hair uncovered, in a manner typical of virgins, payment of her marriage contract is two hundred dinars, the Gemara asks: But let us be concerned lest she first produce witnesses that she went out with a hinnuma, in this court, and collect payment, and then produce witnesses that she went out with a hinnuma, in that court, and collect payment a second time. The Gemara answers: In a place where it is not possible to guarantee that she will not collect her marriage contract more than once in any other way, certainly we write a receipt, even according to the opinion that as a rule, one does not write a receipt.
הֶעֱבִירוּ לְפָנֶיהָ כּוֹס שֶׁל בְּשׂוֹרָה. מַאי ״כּוֹס שֶׁל בְּשׂוֹרָה״? אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: כּוֹס יַיִן שֶׁל תְּרוּמָה מַעֲבִירִין לְפָנֶיהָ. כְּלוֹמַר: רְאוּיָה הָיְתָה זוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל בִּתְרוּמָה. מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב פָּפָּא: אַטּוּ אַלְמָנָה מִי לָא אָכְלָה בִּתְרוּמָה? אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: זוֹ רֵאשִׁית, כִּתְרוּמָה רֵאשִׁית.
§ It is taught in that baraita: Or passed before her a cup of good tidings. The Gemara asks: What is a cup of good tidings? Rav Adda bar Ahava says: A cup of teruma wine is passed before the virgin bride, meaning that this woman would have been eligible to eat teruma had she married a priest. Rav Pappa strongly objects to this: Is that to say that a widow does not eat teruma if she marries a priest? Clearly she does. Therefore, what is the proof from teruma that she is a virgin? Rather, Rav Pappa says: The cup of teruma is passed before her to indicate that this bride is first, as she has not yet engaged in intercourse, like teruma that is the first gift separated from the produce.
תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: חָבִית שֶׁל יַיִן מַעֲבִירִין לְפָנֶיהָ. אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: בְּתוּלָה — מַעֲבִירִין לְפָנֶיהָ סְתוּמָה, בְּעוּלָה — מַעֲבִירִין לְפָנֶיהָ פְּתוּחָה. אַמַּאי? נִיעַבַּר קַמֵּי בְּתוּלָה וְקַמֵּי בְּעוּלָה לָא נִיעַבַּר כְּלָל! זִימְנִין דְּתָפְסָה מָאתַיִם, וְאָמְרָה: אֲנָא בְּתוּלָה הֲוַאי, וְהַאי דְּלָא עַבַּרוּ קַמַּאי — אִתְּנוֹסֵי הוּא דְּאִתְּנִיסוּ.
It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: The custom is that one passes a barrel of wine before her. Rav Adda bar Ahava said: One passes a sealed barrel of wine before a virgin, and one passes an open barrel of wine before a non-virgin. The Gemara asks: Why is that necessary? Let us pass the sealed barrel before the virgin, and before the non-virgin let us not pass a barrel at all. Why is it necessary to publicize the fact that she is a non-virgin? The Gemara explains: It is necessary, as, at times there could be a case where a non-virgin unilaterally seized two hundred dinars as payment for her marriage contract and said: I was a virgin, and the fact that they did not pass a sealed barrel before me was due to circumstances beyond their control. In order to prevent deceit of that kind, an open barrel is passed before the non-virgin, so that people will remember that she is not a virgin.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: כֵּיצַד מְרַקְּדִין לִפְנֵי הַכַּלָּה? בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים:
§ The Sages taught: How does one dance before the bride, i.e., what does one recite while dancing at her wedding? Beit Shammai say:
