Ketubot 35

מאי לאו אסון ממש לא דין אסון איכא דאמרי איתיביה רבי יוחנן לריש לקיש ולא יהיה אסון ענוש יענש מאי לאו דין אסון לא אסון ממש

Is this not referring to actual harm, i.e., the woman’s death? And the verse states that he pays only if she did not die, but if she died is he exempt, even if he was not forewarned? The Gemara answers: No, the verse can be explained to mean: If there is no sentence of harm. If the court does not actually sentence him to death, he pays the damages for the miscarried fetus. He is exempt from payment only if he is actually executed. Some say a different version of this exchange: Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish: “And yet no harm follow, he shall be punished” (Exodus 21:22); is this not referring to a sentence of harm? The Gemara answers: No, the verse can be explained to mean: If there is no actual harm.

אמר רבא ומי איכא למאן דאמר חייבי מיתות שוגגין חייבים והא תנא דבי חזקיה מכה אדם ומכה בהמה

Rava said: Is there anyone who said that those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive the death penalty are obligated to pay? But didn’t the Sage of the school of Ḥizkiyya teach: The verse speaks of one who smites a person, and the verse speaks of one who smites an animal. The two cases are juxtaposed in the verse “And one who smites an animal shall pay for it, and one who smites a person shall die” (Leviticus 24:21).

מה מכה בהמה לא חילקת בו בין בשוגג בין במזיד בין מתכוין לשאין מתכוין בין דרך ירידה לדרך עלייה לפוטרו ממון אלא לחייבו ממון אף מכה אדם לא תחלוק בו בין בשוגג בין במזיד בין מתכוין לשאין מתכוין בין דרך ירידה לדרך עלייה לחייבו ממון אלא לפוטרו ממון

Just as in the case of one who smites an animal, you did not distinguish between one who did so unwittingly and one who did so intentionally, between one who acted with intent and one who acted with no intent, between one who smites in the course of a downward motion and one who smites in the course of an upward motion, and in all those cases it is not to exempt him from paying money but rather to obligate him to pay money; so too, in the case of one who smites a person, do not distinguish between one who did so unwittingly and one who did so intentionally, between one who acted with intent and one who acted with no intent, between one who smites in the course of a downward motion and one who smites in the course of an upward motion. In all those cases as well it is not to obligate him to pay money but rather to exempt him from paying money. The halakha in both cases is unconditional; when he smites an animal he is always liable to pay and when he smites a person he is always exempt from payment, regardless of whether or not he is actually executed.

אלא כי אתא רבין אמר חייבי מיתות שוגגין כולי עלמא לא פליגי דפטורין כי פליגי בחייבי מלקות שוגגין ודבר אחר רבי יוחנן אמר חייב חייבי מיתות איתקוש חייבי מלקיות לא איתקוש ריש לקיש אמר פטור בפירוש ריבתה תורה חייבי מלקיות כחייבי מיתות

Rather, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: With regard to those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive the death penalty, everyone agrees that they are exempt, as per the derivation of the Sages of the school of Ḥizkiyya. When they disagree it is with regard to those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive lashes, and another matter, for which he is liable to pay money. Rabbi Yoḥanan said that he is obligated to pay, as those liable to receive the death penalty are juxtaposed to cases of monetary payment and are unconditionally exempt from payment. However, those liable to receive lashes are not juxtaposed. Therefore, in the case of one who is liable to receive lashes, unless one is actually flogged, he is obligated to pay for the damage he inflicted. Reish Lakish said: He is exempt, as the Torah explicitly included those liable to receive lashes, like those liable to receive the death penalty, and unconditionally exempted them from payment.

היכן ריבתה תורה אמר אביי אתיא רשע רשע רבא אמר אתיא מכה מכה אמר ליה רב פפא לרבא הי מכה אילימא ומכה בהמה ישלמנה ומכה אדם יומת האי בקטלא כתיב אלא האי מכה מכה נפש בהמה ישלמנה נפש תחת נפש וסמיך ליה ואיש כי יתן מום בעמיתו [כאשר עשה כן יעשה לו]

The Gemara asks: Where did the Torah include those liable to be flogged? Abaye said: It is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the term wicked in the verse “That he is wicked and liable to die” (Numbers 35:31), and the term wicked in the verse “That he is wicked and liable to be flogged” (Deuteronomy 25:2). Rava said: It is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the term smites in one verse and the term smites in another verse. Rav Pappa said to Rava: To which term smites are you referring? If we say that it is the verse “And one who smites an animal shall pay for it, and one who smites a person shall die” (Leviticus 24:21), clearly that is not so, as that is written with regard to death. Smiting a person in that verse is referring to murder. Rather, it is to this term smites that Rava is referring: “And he who smites an animal shall pay for it, a life for a life” (Leviticus 24:18), and juxtaposed to it, it is written: “And a man who places a blemish upon his counterpart, as he has done so shall be done to him” (Leviticus 24:19). The verses liken those liable to receive lashes to those obligated to pay money, from which it is derived that those liable to receive lashes are exempt from payment.

והאי לאו מכה היא אנן הכאה הכאה קאמרינן והא כי כתיב בחובל בחבירו הוא דכתיב וחובל בחבירו בר תשלומין הוא אם אינו ענין להכאה שיש בה שוה פרוטה תנהו ענין להכאה שאין בה שוה פרוטה

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But this term that appears in the latter verse is “places a blemish,” not smites. How, then, can one derive a verbal analogy? The Gemara answers: This is not a verbal analogy based on identical terms; rather, it is based on identical concepts. We are saying that it is a verbal analogy between smiting an animal in the first verse and smiting a person in the latter verse. The Gemara asks: However, when the second verse is written, it is written with regard to one who injures another, and one who injures another is subject to payment and not to lashes. This undermines the proof, as lashes are not mentioned in either verse. The Gemara answers: If it is not a matter of smiting that causes damage equivalent to the value of a peruta, in which case he would pay and would not be flogged, apply it to the matter of smiting that causes damage that is not equivalent to the value of a peruta. Since in that case there is no payment for the injury, one is flogged for striking that blow.

סוף סוף לאו בר תשלומין הוא לא צריכא דבהדי דמחייה קרע שיראין דיליה

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Ultimately, one who injured another and is flogged is not subject to payment, as he inflicted damage worth less than a peruta. How then can a principle be derived that one who is liable to receive lashes does not pay even when he is not actually flogged? The Gemara answers: The juxtaposition of the verses is necessary only with regard to a situation where at the same time that he struck him he tore his silk. In that case, where he performed a transgression for which he is liable to be flogged and is also liable to pay damages, it is derived that he would be exempt from paying damages even if he is not actually flogged.

אמר ליה רב חייא לרבא ולתנא דבי חזקיה דאמר מכה אדם ומכה בהמה ממאי דבחול כתיב וליכא לאיפלוגי דלמא בשבת כתיב דבבהמה גופה איכא לאיפלוגי

§ Rav Ḥiyya said to Rava: And according to the derivation of the tanna of the school of Ḥizkiyya, who said: The verse speaks of one who smites a person, and the verse speaks of one who smites an animal. From where does that tanna know that it is written with regard to a weekday and therefore there is no reason to distinguish between an unwitting and a purposeful sinner; perhaps this case is stated with regard to one who injured an animal on Shabbat, when concerning the animal itself there is reason to distinguish between one who did so unwittingly and one who did so intentionally. In the case of one who acted unwittingly, he is not liable to receive the death penalty and should therefore be obligated to pay, whereas one who acted intentionally is exempt from payment because he receives the death penalty for desecrating Shabbat. If so, there is no source to exempt from payment one who is not actually executed.

לא סלקא דעתך דכתיב ומכה בהמה ישלמנה ומכה אדם יומת היכי דמי אי דלא אתרו ביה מכה אדם אמאי יומת אלא פשיטא דאתרו ביה ואי בשבת מכה בהמה ישלמנה אלא לאו בחול

The Gemara answers: That notion should not enter your mind, as it is written: “And one who smites an animal shall pay for it, and one who smites a person shall die” (Leviticus 24:21). What are the circumstances discussed in this verse? If it is a case where the witnesses did not forewarn him, i.e., when one who smites a person is not forewarned, why should he be executed? There is no corporal punishment, neither lashes nor execution, without forewarning. Rather, it is obvious that they forewarned him. And if the verse is referring to one who sinned on Shabbat after forewarning, would one who smites an animal be obligated to pay for it? He is executed and certainly exempt from payment. Rather, isn’t the verse clearly referring to a case during the week?

אמר ליה רב פפא לאביי לרבה דאמר חידוש הוא שחידשה תורה בקנס ואף על גב דמיקטיל משלם מתניתין כמאן מוקים לה אי כרבי מאיר קשיא בתו אי כרבי נחוניא בן הקנה קשיא אחותו אי כרבי יצחק קשיא ממזרת

§ Rav Pappa said to Abaye: According to Rabba, who said: It is a novel element that the Torah innovated with regard to the halakhic category of fine, and even though he is executed he pays the fine; in accordance with whose opinion does Rabba establish the mishna? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, it is difficult; why is he exempt if he raped his daughter? According to Rabba, Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that even one liable to receive the death penalty pays the fine. If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana, it is difficult, as why does the mishna rule that he pays the fine for raping his sister? Rabbi Neḥunya holds that one liable to receive karet is exempt from the fine, like those liable to receive the death penalty. If the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak, who rules that lashes are not administered to those liable to receive karet and therefore they are obligated to pay the fine; however, one who is flogged is exempt from payment, it is difficult, as why did the mishna rule that he is obligated to pay the fine for raping a mamzeret, for which he is liable to receive lashes?

הניחא אי סבר לה כרבי יוחנן הוא נמי מתרץ לה כרבי יוחנן אלא אי סבר כריש לקיש היכי מתרץ לה על כרחך כרבי יוחנן סבירא ליה

This works out well if Rabba holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that one who did not receive forewarning is obligated to pay even if he performed a transgression for which he is liable to be flogged, as he can explain the mishna as well, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, that he is obligated to pay in cases where there was no forewarning. However, if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, that one who violated a prohibition for which one is liable to be flogged is exempt from payment even if he was not forewarned, how does he explain the mishna? The mishna does not correspond to any of the aforementioned opinions. The Gemara answers: You must say perforce that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan in this regard.

אמר ליה רב מתנא לאביי לריש לקיש דאמר בפירוש ריבתה תורה חייבי מלקיות כחייבי מיתות מאן תנא דפליג עליה דרבי נחוניא בן הקנה אי רבי מאיר אי רבי יצחק:

Rav Mattana said to Abaye: According to Reish Lakish, who said that the Torah explicitly included those who are liable to receive lashes and accorded them legal status like those who are liable to receive the death penalty, unconditionally exempting them from payment; who is the tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana and obligates one who is liable both to receive karet and to be flogged to pay, and the lashes do not exempt him from payment? The Gemara answers: He holds in accordance with either Rabbi Meir, who says that one who is liable to receive lashes is liable to pay a fine, or Rabbi Yitzḥak, who rules that those liable to receive karet are not flogged.

תנו רבנן עריות ושניות לעריות אין להן לא קנס ולא פיתוי הממאנת אין לה לא קנס ולא פיתוי איילונית אין לה לא קנס ולא פיתוי והיוצאת משום שם רע אין לה לא קנס ולא פיתוי

§ The Gemara turns its attention to a related issue. The Sages taught: Women who are forbidden relatives and secondary forbidden relatives receive neither payment of a fine for rape nor payment of a fine for seduction. Similarly, a girl who refuses to remain married to her husband receives neither payment of a fine for rape nor payment of a fine for seduction. Because she was married, she no longer has the presumptive status of a virgin. A sexually underdeveloped woman [ailonit] who will never reach puberty and therefore her legal status is not that of a young woman, receives neither payment of a fine for rape nor payment of a fine for seduction. And one who leaves her husband due to a bad reputation receives neither payment of a fine for rape nor payment of a fine for seduction.

מאי עריות ומאי שניות לעריות אילימא עריות

The Gemara elaborates. What is the meaning of forbidden relatives, and what is the meaning of secondary forbidden relatives in the context of this baraita? If we say that forbidden relatives means