Ketubot 69
תְּלָה לֵיהּ רַב לְרַבִּי בֵּינֵי חִטֵּי: הָאַחִין שֶׁשִּׁיעְבְּדוּ, מַהוּ? הֲוָה יָתֵיב רַבִּי חִיָּיא קַמֵּיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מָכְרוּ אוֹ מִשְׁכְּנוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? בֵּין מָכְרוּ בֵּין שֶׁמִּשְׁכְּנוּ — מוֹצִיאִין לְפַרְנָסָה וְאֵין מוֹצִיאִין לִמְזוֹנוֹת!
§ Rav attached the following question for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi between the lines of a letter he sent him: With respect to brothers who mortgaged a certain property, what is the halakha? Is this property subject to seizure, if need be, for the benefit of the daughters’ dowries? Rabbi Ḥiyya was sitting before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi when the letter arrived. He said to him: What is meant in the question? Did they sell the property or did they pledge it as a guarantee, so that it has not yet been transferred? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, said to him: What difference does it make? Whether they sold it or pledged it, the court may appropriate the property for support for the daughters’ dowries, but the court may not appropriate it for their sustenance.
וְרַב, אִי מָכְרוּ קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ, נִכְתּוֹב לֵיהּ מָכְרוּ? אִי מִשְׁכְּנוּ קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ, נִכְתּוֹב לֵיהּ מִשְׁכְּנוּ?!
The Gemara asks: And as for Rav himself, if he is raising a dilemma about a case in which they sold the property, let him write explicitly that he is asking about an instance in which they sold the property. And if he is raising a dilemma about a case in which they pledged the property, let him write explicitly that he is asking about an instance in which they pledged the property. Why does Rav instead employ an ambiguous term?
רַב תַּרְוַיְיהוּ קָמִבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ וְסָבַר: אִי כָּתֵיבְנָא לֵיהּ מָכְרוּ, הָא נִיחָא אִי שָׁלַח לִי דְּמוֹצִיאִין — כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן מִשְׁכְּנוּ. אִי שָׁלַח לִי אֵין מוֹצִיאִין — אַכַּתִּי מִשְׁכְּנוּ קָמִיבַּעְיָא לִי.
The Gemara answers: Rav was raising a dilemma about both cases and thought: If I write to him that they sold the property, then it works out well if he sends back to me the ruling that the court may appropriate the sold property for the daughters’ dowries. In that case, I would also understand that all the more so, if the brothers merely pledged the property, the court would appropriate it for the dowry. But if he sends to me the reply that the court does not appropriate sold property, still the case in which they pledged the property will be a dilemma for me.
אִי כָּתֵיבְנָא לֵיהּ מִשְׁכְּנוּ, אִי שָׁלַח לִי דְּאֵין מוֹצִיאִין — כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן מָכְרוּ. אִי שָׁלַח לִי מוֹצִיאִין, אַכַּתִּי מָכְרוּ קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לִי. אֶכְתּוֹב לֵיהּ שִׁיעְבְּדוּ, דְּמַשְׁמַע הָכִי וּמַשְׁמַע הָכִי.
Alternatively, if I write to him that the brothers pledged it, then if he sends to me the response that the court does not appropriate it, I can infer that all the more so if the brothers sold it we do not collect from the buyer. And if he sends me the response that the court does appropriate the land for the daughters’ dowries, still the case in which they sold the property will be a dilemma for me. Therefore, I will write to him that they mortgaged it, which implies this meaning and it implies that one, and in this way I will receive a complete answer to my question.
וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה אֵין מוֹצִיאִין. אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, לָא שְׁמִיעַ לֵיהּ הָא דְּרַבִּי, וְאִי שְׁמִיעַ לֵיהּ הֲוָה מְקַבֵּל לֵיהּ, אוֹ דִלְמָא: שְׁמִיעַ לֵיהּ וְלָא מְקַבֵּל לֵיהּ?
And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Whether it is this or whether it is that, the court does not appropriate assigned or sold properties for either the support or sustenance of the daughters. A dilemma was raised before them: Is it that Rabbi Yoḥanan did not hear this ruling of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but had he heard it, he would have accepted it? Or, perhaps, is it that even if he had heard it, he would not have accepted it?
תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאִתְּמַר: מִי שֶׁמֵּת וְהִנִּיחַ שְׁתֵּי בָּנוֹת וּבֵן, וְקָדְמָה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וְנָטְלָה עִישּׂוּר נְכָסִים, וְלֹא הִסְפִּיקָה שְׁנִיָּה לִגְבּוֹת עַד שֶׁמֵּת הַבֵּן,
The Gemara proposes an answer, indicated by a dispute of amora’im: Come and hear a proof, as it was stated that amora’im disputed a certain case. The Sages debated the halakha with regard to one who died and left behind two daughters and a son, and the first daughter advanced and took one-tenth of the estate for her dowry, but the second daughter did not have enough time to collect her one-tenth before the son died. When the daughters divide the remaining assets, are they divided equally, or does the second daughter receive a slightly larger sum, commensurate with an additional portion earmarked for the dowry that she has not yet collected?
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שְׁנִיָּה וִיתְּרָה. אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא, גְּדוֹלָה מִזּוֹ אָמְרוּ: מוֹצִיאִין לְפַרְנָסָה וְאֵין מוֹצִיאִין לִמְזוֹנוֹת, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ שְׁנִיָּה וִיתְּרָה?!
Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The second daughter forfeited her right to an equal one-tenth of the estate for a dowry. No specific funds are separated from the estate as a dowry before the inheritance is divided equally among the daughters. Rabbi Ḥanina said: The Sages said something even greater than this with respect to her support: The court appropriates liened property for support, but it does not appropriate it for sustenance. And yet would you, Rabbi Yoḥanan, say that the second daughter forfeited her right to collect even when the property is not liened? It cannot be that her support is diminished merely because of her brother’s death.
וְאִם אִיתָא, נֵימָא לֵיהּ: מַאן אַמְרַהּ? וְדִלְמָא לְעוֹלָם לָא שְׁמִיעַ לֵיהּ, וְכִי שְׁמִיעַ לֵיהּ — קַבֵּיל, וְשָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאִיכָּא רְוַוח בֵּיתָא.
The Gemara understands that there is evidence within the exchange that Rabbi Yoḥanan knew Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion and nevertheless ruled against it. And if it is so, that Rabbi Yoḥanan never heard the ruling of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, then let Rabbi Yoḥanan say to Rabbi Ḥanina: Who stated that, that property is appropriated for the dowry? Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan must have known and rejected Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s ruling. The Gemara rejects the proof: And perhaps he actually did not hear it; but had he heard it, he would have accepted it. And Rabbi Yoḥanan ruled as he did because it is different there, in the case in which the son died, since there is abundance in the house. Since the second daughter receives half of all the inheritance, she is not concerned about the one-tenth of the estate.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יֵימַר לְרַב אָשֵׁי: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, אַשְׁכְּחָה מְצִיאָה בְּעָלְמָא, דְּאִיכָּא רְוַוח בֵּיתָא — הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָא יָהֲבִינַן לַהּ עִישּׂוּר נְכָסִים?! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא רְוַוח בֵּיתָא מֵהָנֵי נִכְסֵי קָאָמֵינָא.
Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: If that is so, according to that logic, then if she had found a generic lost object, as there is abundance in the house due to the value of the newly found article, so too would we not give her one-tenth of the estate? Since finding a lost object, or similarly, being independently wealthy, does not actually change her right to collect her full dowry, it stands to reason that she should collect the full dowry even when she inherits half of the remaining estate. He said to him: I would say this is true of abundance in the house that comes from these properties of the estate. Because the matter depends upon her share of the inheritance, when she commands a sizeable portion of the inheritance, she does not quibble over the one-tenth of the inheritance earmarked for her dowry. However, if she has other resources unrelated to the inheritance, her independent wealth cannot diminish her share of the inheritance with respect to the dowry.
אָמַר אַמֵּימָר: בַּת יוֹרֶשֶׁת הָוְיָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְאַמֵּימָר: אִילּוּ בָּעֵי לְסַלּוֹקַהּ בְּזוּזֵי, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָא מָצֵי לְסַלּוֹקַהּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין. אִי בָּעֵי לְסַלּוֹקַהּ בַּחֲדָא אַרְעָא, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָא מָצֵי מְסַלֵּק לַהּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין.
§ With regard to the fundamental right of daughters to receive the support of the dowry from the estate, Ameimar said: A daughter is considered an inheritor. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: According to your opinion, if another inheritor wants to remove her from among the inheritors by giving her money instead of inherited property, is he indeed unable to remove her? May she insist on receiving actual property from the estate for the purpose of her dowry? He said to him: Yes, she may insist on inherited property. Rav Ashi continued to ask Ameimar: If he wants to remove her by giving her one specific piece of land, is he also unable to remove her, since, as an inheritor, she has the right to collect portions of all the property? He said to him: Yes, he is limited in this way. She may insist on her right to inherit from the entire property.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: בַּת — בַּעֲלַת חוֹב הָוְיָא. וְאַף אַמֵּימָר הֲדַר בֵּיהּ, דְּאָמַר רַב מִנְיוֹמֵי בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נִיחוּמִי: הֲוָה קָאֵימְנָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּאַמֵּימָר, וַאֲתַאי הַאי אִיתְּתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ, דַּהֲוָת קָא בָּעֲיָא עִישּׂוּר נְכָסִים. וַחֲזֵיתֵיהּ לְדַעְתֵּיהּ דְּאִי בָּעֵי לְסַלּוֹקַהּ בְּזוּזֵי הֲוָה מְסַלֵּק לַהּ. דְּשָׁמְעִי מֵאַחֵי דַּהֲווֹ קָאָמְרִי לַהּ: אִילּוּ הֲוָה לַן זוּזֵי, סַלֵּיקְנָא בְּזוּזֵי וְאִישְׁתִּיק, וְלָא אֲמַר לְהוּ וְלָא מִידֵּי.
In contrast to Ameimar, Rav Ashi said: A daughter is legally considered a creditor with regard to the inheritance, and the inheritors may insist that they will provide her support by any means, without giving her a share of the actual inheritance. The Gemara notes: And even Ameimar retracted his opinion that she is an inheritor, as Rav Minyumi, son of Rav Niḥumi, said: I was standing in front of Ameimar, and this woman came before him, as she was asking for one-tenth of her father’s estate. And I saw that his opinion was that if the inheritor wants to remove her by giving her money, he may remove her, as I heard from the woman’s brothers that they were saying to her: If we had sufficient money, we would pay your claims and remove you with our own money. And Ameimar was silent and did not say anything to them. Since Ameimar did not object to their suggestion in principle, evidently he agreed that her status was that of a creditor, who may be repaid in cash.
וְהַשְׁתָּא דְּאָמְרַתְּ בַּעֲלַת חוֹב הָוְיָא: דְּאַבָּא אוֹ דְאַחֵי? לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? לְמִיגְבֵּא לְבֵינוֹנִית שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁבוּעָה, וְזִיבּוּרִית בִּשְׁבוּעָה.
The Gemara comments: And now that you have reached a conclusion and said that the daughter is functionally a creditor, is she a creditor of the father or of the brothers? The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha is there a practical difference? Either way, as the father has died, she receives her support from the estate. The Gemara answers: There is a difference with respect to collecting intermediate-quality land without an oath and inferior-quality land with an oath. If she is the father’s creditor, she may collect from the estate only the inferior-quality land with an oath. If, however, she is the brothers’ direct creditor, she may collect her claim in the same manner as standard creditors, collecting intermediate-quality land without an oath.
מַאי? תָּא שְׁמַע דְּרָבִינָא אַגְבְּיַהּ לְבַרְתֵּיהּ דְּרַב אָשֵׁי מִמָּר בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אָשֵׁי בֵּינוֹנִית, וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁבוּעָה. מִבְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב סַמָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אָשֵׁי זִבּוּרִית, בִּשְׁבוּעָה.
What is the halakha? Whose creditor is she? The Gemara responds: Come and hear a proof, as Ravina provided one-tenth of the estate for the daughter of Rav Ashi from two sources. From Mar, son of Rav Ashi, Ravina gave her intermediate-quality land without an oath. He collected another portion of the property from the orphan son of Rav Sama, son of Rav Ashi, who was an inheritor of the same estate from his grandfather. This portion was provided of inferior-quality land, with an oath. Since, with regard to the property that Rav Ashi’s daughter was collecting from an orphan, Ravina required an oath and allowed her to collect only low-grade land, it appears that Ravina treated the daughter as the creditor of the sons and not of the father.
שְׁלַח לֵיהּ רַב נְחֶמְיָה בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף לְרַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא זוּטָא מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא: כִּי אָתְיָא הָא אִיתְּתָא לְקַמָּךְ, אַגְבְּיַהּ עִישּׂוּר נִכְסֵי אֲפִילּוּ מֵאִיצְטְרוֹבְלָא. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: כִּי הֲוֵינַן בֵּי רַב כָּהֲנָא, הֲוָה מַגְבֵּינַן אֲפִילּוּ מֵעַמְלָא דְבֵיתֵי.
The Gemara records a number of related incidents. Rav Neḥemya, son of Rav Yosef, sent a message to Rabba bar Rav Huna the Small, of Neharde’a: When this woman bearing this letter comes before you, provide her one-tenth of her father’s estate, providing a percentage even of the land upon which sits the millstone [itzterubela], as this is also real estate. Rav Ashi said: When we were students in Rav Kahana’s house, we would collect the one-tenth of the estate for the dowry even from the income from the rental fees for houses in the estate. Since this money is earned from the real estate itself, it too is considered in calculating the appropriate dowry.
שְׁלַח לֵיהּ רַב עָנָן לְרַב הוּנָא: הוּנָא חַבְרִין, שְׁלָם! כִּי אָתְיָא הָא אִיתְּתָא לְקַמָּךְ אַגְבְּיַהּ עִישּׂוּר נִכְסֵי. הֲוָה יָתֵיב רַב שֵׁשֶׁת קַמֵּיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: זִיל אֵימָא לֵיהּ: וּבְשַׁמְתָּא יְהֵא מַאן דְּלָא אָמַר לֵיהּ: ״עָנָן עָנָן! מִמְּקַרְקְעֵי אוֹ מִמִּטַּלְטְלִי?״ וּ״מַאן יָתֵיב בֵּי מַרְזֵיחָא בְּרֵישָׁא?״
The Gemara recounts an interaction between Rav Anan and Rav Huna. Rav Anan sent the following letter to Rav Huna: Huna, our friend, we wish you peace. When this woman bearing this letter comes before you, provide her one-tenth of her father’s estate. Rav Sheshet was sitting before him, and Rav Huna said to him: Go and say to Rav Anan my reply. Knowing that Rav Sheshet may be hesitant to relay the sharp language of the reply, Rav Huna cautioned him: And whoever does not say to him my exact words is in a state of excommunication: Anan, Anan, should the one-tenth be provided from real estate or from movable property? And, incidentally, tell me who sits at the head in the house of a marzeiḥa?
אֲזַל רַב שֵׁשֶׁת לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב עָנָן, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מָר רַבָּה, וְרַב הוּנָא רַבֵּיהּ דְּרַבָּה, וְשַׁמּוֹתֵי שַׁמֵּית מַאן דְּלָא אָמַר לֵיהּ, וְאִי לָאו דְּשַׁמֵּית, לָא הֲוָה קָאָמֵינָא: ״עָנָן, עָנָן, מִמְּקַרְקְעֵי אוֹ מִמִּטַּלְטְלִי? וּמַאן יָתֵיב בֵּי מַרְזֵיחָא בְּרֵישָׁא?״
Rav Sheshet went before Rav Anan and reverentially said to him, addressing him in the third person: My Master is a teacher, but Rav Huna is the teacher of the teacher. Moreover, he readily excommunicates whoever does not say to him, i.e., to you, my teacher, his precise message, and if it were not that he would excommunicate me, I would not say his words: Anan, Anan, should the one-tenth be provided from real estate or from movable property? And, incidentally, tell me who sits at the head in the house of a marzeiḥa?
אֲזַל רַב עָנָן לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּמָר עוּקְבָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: חֲזִי מָר הֵיכִי שְׁלַח לִי רַב הוּנָא ״עָנָן עָנָן״, וְעוֹד ״מַרְזֵיחָא״ דִּשְׁלַח לִי [לָא יָדַעְנָא] מַאי נִיהוּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִימָּא לִי אִיזִי
Rav Anan went before Mar Ukva to consult with him about Rav Huna’s reply. He said to him: Let the Master see how Rav Huna sent me an offensive message, addressing me as Anan, Anan. Moreover, with regard to this word marzeiḥa in the letter that he sent me, I do not know what it is. Mar Ukva said to him: Say to me, my friend [izi],
גּוּפָא דְעוֹבָדָא הֵיכִי הֲוָה? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָכִי וְהָכִי הֲוָה מַעֲשֶׂה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: גַּבְרָא דְּלָא יָדַע מַאי נִיהוּ ״מַרְזֵיחָא״, שָׁלַח לֵיהּ לְרַב הוּנָא ״הוּנָא חַבְרִין״?! מַאי ״מַרְזֵיחָא״ — אֵבֶל, דִּכְתִיב: ״כֹּה אָמַר ה׳ אַל תָּבֹא בֵּית מַרְזֵחַ וְגוֹ׳״.
how the incident itself happened. What are the particulars of your exchange that brought about this end result? He said to him: Such and such was the incident, and Rav Anan related the details to Mar Ukva. He said to him: A man who does not know what a marzeiḥa is sends a letter to Rav Huna addressing him as Huna, our friend? It is not your place to take such liberties in your correspondence with him, and Rav Huna was justifiably offended. The Gemara explains: What is a marzeiḥa? A mourner, as it is written: “For so says the Lord: Enter not into the house of mourning [marze’aḥ], neither go to lament, neither bemoan them” (Jeremiah 16:5).
אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: מִנַּיִן לָאָבֵל שֶׁמֵּיסֵב בָּרֹאשׁ — שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אֶבְחַר דַּרְכָּם וְאֵשֵׁב רֹאשׁ וְאֶשְׁכּוֹן כְּמֶלֶךְ בַּגְּדוּד כַּאֲשֶׁר אֲבֵלִים יְנַחֵם״. יְנַחֵם אֲחֵרִים מַשְׁמַע! אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: ״יִנָּחֵם״ כְּתִיב.
Rabbi Abbahu said concerning the same topic: From where is it derived that a mourner sits at the head? As it is stated: “I chose out their way, and sat as chief, and dwelt as a king in the army, as one that would comfort [yenaḥem] the mourners” (Job 29:25). The Gemara challenges the proof: The word yenaḥem implies one comforting others and not the mourner being comforted. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Since it is written without vowels, the word can be read as if it were written “would be comforted [yinnaḥem],” which describes the mourner who is being comforted.
מָר זוּטְרָא אָמַר, מֵהָכָא: ״וְסָר מִרְזַח סְרוּחִים״. מַר וָזַח — נַעֲשֶׂה שַׂר לִסְרוּחִים.
Mar Zutra said: That the mourner sits at the head may be derived from here: “And the revelry [mirzaḥ] of those who stretched themselves shall pass away [sar]” (Amos 6:7). The word mirzaḥ may alternatively be read as two distinct words: Bitter [mar] and flustered [zaḥ], and the word sar has a homonym that means ruler. Read this way, the verse indicates: One who is bitter and flustered, i.e., the mourner, is made the ruler of those who sit, i.e., the visitors who come to comfort him and sit with him. Therefore, he sits at the head.
אָמַר רָבָא, הִלְכְתָא: מִמְּקַרְקְעֵי וְלָא מִמִּטַּלְטְלִי, בֵּין לִמְזוֹנֵי, בֵּין לִכְתוּבָּה, בֵּין לְפַרְנָסָה.
The Gemara reports the conclusion of the earlier discussion: Rava said: The halakha is that one may collect from the inheritors from real estate and not from movable property, whether for sustenance, whether for the marriage contract, or whether for support, referring to the dowry.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמַּשְׁלִישׁ מָעוֹת לְבִתּוֹ, וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת: נֶאֱמָן בַּעְלִי עָלַי — יַעֲשֶׂה הַשָּׁלִישׁ מַה שֶּׁהוּשְׁלַשׁ בְּיָדוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: וְכִי אֵינָהּ אֶלָּא שָׂדֶה, וְהִיא רוֹצָה לְמוֹכְרָהּ, הֲרֵי הִיא מְכוּרָה מֵעַכְשָׁיו. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים: בִּגְדוֹלָה. אֲבָל בִּקְטַנָּה — אֵין מַעֲשֵׂה קְטַנָּה כְּלוּם.
MISHNA: With regard to one who transfers money by means of a third party for his daughter to purchase a field after she marries, is the daughter allowed to assert control over the money? If she says after she marries: My husband is trustworthy for me, so give him the money to buy the property for me, her wishes are not honored. The third party should execute the agency that was entrusted in his power; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: The daughter has authority: And were it only a field and she wanted to sell it, it could be sold immediately. Just as she would have authority to control the field, she may control the money assigned for her. The mishna qualifies: In what case is this statement said? With respect to an adult woman. But with respect to a minor girl, any action of a minor girl is nothing from a legal standpoint; a minor would have no authority in this matter.
גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַמַּשְׁלִישׁ מָעוֹת לַחֲתָנוֹ לִיקַּח מֵהֶן שָׂדֶה לְבִתּוֹ, וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת: יִנָּתְנוּ לְבַעְלִי, מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין — הָרְשׁוּת בְּיָדָהּ, מִן הָאֵירוּסִין — יַעֲשֶׂה הַשָּׁלִישׁ מַה שֶּׁהוּשְׁלַשׁ בְּיָדוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: הַגְּדוֹלָה, בֵּין מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין וּבֵין מִן הָאֵירוּסִין — הָרְשׁוּת בְּיָדָהּ. קְטַנָּה, בֵּין מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין בֵּין מִן הָאֵירוּסִין — יַעֲשֶׂה הַשָּׁלִישׁ מַה שֶּׁהוּשְׁלַשׁ בְּיָדוֹ.
GEMARA: The Sages taught in the Tosefta (6:9): In the case of one who transfers money by means of a third party for his son-in-law, in order to purchase with it a field for his daughter, and she says: Let the money be given directly to my husband to invest as he sees fit, whether or not the court heeds her depends upon the circumstances. If she makes her appeal from the beginning of the marriage and onward, she has the authority to dictate the terms. If she makes her appeal from the time of the betrothal until the marriage, the third party should execute the agency that was entrusted in his power; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: With respect to the adult woman, whether the statement is from the marriage or from the betrothal, she has authority. In the case of a minor girl, whether from the time of the marriage or from the betrothal, the third party should execute the agency that was entrusted in his power.
מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִילֵימָא קְטַנָּה מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ, דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר הָרְשׁוּת בְּיָדָהּ, וַאֲתָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְמֵימַר אֲפִילּוּ מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין נָמֵי: גְּדוֹלָה אִין, קְטַנָּה לָא.
The Gemara clarifies: In the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, what is the practical difference between them? If we say: The practical difference between them pertains to the authority of a minor girl from the time of the marriage and onward, as Rabbi Meir holds she has authority, and Rabbi Yosei comes to say that also, even from the time of the marriage, yes, an adult woman may dictate terms, but a minor girl may not, this answer is untenable.
אֵימָא סֵיפָא: אֲבָל בִּקְטַנָּה — אֵין מַעֲשֵׂה קְטַנָּה כְּלוּם. הָא מַאן קָתָנֵי לַהּ? אִילֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי, הָא מֵרֵישָׁא שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: וְכִי אֵינָהּ אֶלָּא שָׂדֶה וְהִיא רוֹצָה לְמוֹכְרָהּ, הֲרֵי הִיא מְכוּרָה מֵעַכְשָׁיו. גְּדוֹלָה דְּבַת זְבִינֵי — אִין, קְטַנָּה דְּלָאו בַּת זְבִינֵי הִיא — לָא!
The Gemara explains: Say the latter clause of the mishna: But with respect to a minor girl, any action of a minor girl is nothing. But who teaches this? If we say it is Rabbi Yosei, but you already learn this principle from the first clause, as Rabbi Yosei said: And were it only a field and she wanted to sell it, it could be sold immediately. This is true of adults: In the case of an adult woman, who is capable of selling, yes, her sale is valid. However, in the case a minor girl, who is not capable of selling, no, her sale is invalid.
אֶלָּא רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, וְחַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: יַעֲשֶׂה הַשָּׁלִישׁ מַה שֶּׁהוּשְׁלַשׁ בְּיָדוֹ. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — מִן הָאֵירוּסִין, אֲבָל מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין — הָרְשׁוּת בְּיָדָהּ. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — בִּגְדוֹלָה, אֲבָל בִּקְטַנָּה — אֵין מַעֲשֵׂה קְטַנָּה כְּלוּם. אֶלָּא גְּדוֹלָה מִן הָאֵירוּסִין אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.
Rather, the latter clause is the opinion of Rabbi Meir. And the mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: The third party should execute the agency that was entrusted in his power. In what case is this statement said? From the betrothal. However, from the marriage she has the authority to dictate terms. In what case is this statement said? For an adult woman. However, for a minor girl, any action of a minor girl is nothing. Rabbi Meir agrees that a minor does not have the authority to transfer the money to her husband. What, then, is the practical difference between them? Rather, the practical difference between them is with regard to an adult woman from the time of betrothal until the marriage. Rabbi Meir holds that before marriage, she does not have the authority, and Rabbi Yosei holds that she does.
אִיתְּמַר, רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, רָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר.
It was stated that the matter was debated by amora’im: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
אִילְפָא תְּלָא נַפְשֵׁיהּ בְּאִיסְקַרְיָא דְּמָכוּתָא, אֲמַר: אִיכָּא דְּאָתֵי דְּאָמַר לִי מִילְּתָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא וְרַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא וְלָא פָּשֵׁיטְנָא לֵיהּ מִמַּתְנִיתִין, נָפֵילְנָא מֵאִסְקַרְיָא וְטָבַעְנָא.
§ Once, it was decided to appoint Rabbi Yoḥanan to be head of the yeshiva over another candidate, the Sage Ilfa, because the latter was not in the vicinity. Suspecting that some would interpret this appointment as a sign that he was less qualified than Rabbi Yoḥanan, Ilfa suspended himself from the mast [iskarya] of a ship [makhuta]. He said: If there is someone who comes, who tells me a matter taught in a baraita of the school of Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi Oshaya, and I do not resolve it and demonstrate that the same teaching can be derived from a mishna, I will fall from the mast and drown.
אֲתָא הָהוּא סָבָא תְּנָא לֵיהּ: הָאוֹמֵר ״תְּנוּ שֶׁקֶל לְבָנַי בְּשַׁבָּת״, וּרְאוּיִן לִיתֵּן לָהֶם סֶלַע — נוֹתְנִין לָהֶם סֶלַע. וְאִם אָמַר ״אַל תִּתְּנוּ לָהֶם אֶלָּא שֶׁקֶל״ — אֵין נוֹתְנִין לָהֶם אֶלָּא שֶׁקֶל. וְאִם אָמַר ״אִם מֵתוּ יִירְשׁוּ אֲחֵרִים תַּחְתֵּיהֶם״, בֵּין שֶׁאָמַר ״תְּנוּ״, בֵּין שֶׁאָמַר ״אַל תִּתְּנוּ״ — אֵין נוֹתְנִים לָהֶם אֶלָּא שֶׁקֶל.
A certain older man came and taught before him (Tosefta 6:10): With regard to one who says upon his deathbed: Give a shekel to my sons for each week, the court assesses the sons’ needs. And if it is appropriate that the court gives them a sela, which is worth two shekels, the court gives them a sela. Had the father known they would need the additional money, he would not have begrudged them. But if he said: Give them only a shekel, the court gives them only a shekel. Because their father spoke explicitly, there is no room to question his intentions. If they need more, they should take charitable aid. And if he said: If they die without inheritors, others should inherit in their stead, then whether he said: Give a shekel or whether he said: Don’t give more than a shekel, the court gives them only a shekel, since it is clear that he wants the inheritance to be doled out in such a way that it will remain intact for whoever will receive it. The older man asked Ilfa where this halakha is indicated in the Mishna.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָא מַנִּי?
Ilfa said to him: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita?
