Ketubot 86

תיזיל ותיחלה לכתובתה דאמה לגבי אבוה ותירתה מיניה שמעה אזלה אחילתה

that she should go and forgive her mother’s marriage contract for her father, and she will subsequently inherit the sum of the marriage contract from him? The marriage contract is a document of the debt owed by her father to her mother. The daughter, who has inherited the document from her mother, can forgo her father’s obligation, so rendering nugatory the right of the purchasers. The father then retains the amount owed to the purchasers of the marriage contract, and his daughter will inherit that amount when he dies. The daughter heard this, and went and forgave her father’s obligation in the marriage contract, as recommended by Rav Naḥman.

אמר רב נחמן עשינו עצמינו כעורכי הדיינין מעיקרא מאי סבר ולבסוף מאי סבר מעיקרא סבר ומבשרך לא תתעלם ולבסוף סבר אדם חשוב שאני:

Rav Naḥman later said in regret: We have made ourselves like advisors of judges. We have acted like lawyers who give practical advice to litigants rather than like independent judges. The Gemara asks: At the outset, what did he hold when he intended the daughter to hear his advice, and ultimately, what did he hold that made him regret his action? The Gemara explains: At the outset, he held that the verse teaches: “And you should not hide yourself from your own flesh” (Isaiah 58:7), and therefore it is correct to give help and advice to relatives. And ultimately he held that in the case of an important person who must be very careful to avoid any impression of having favored his family in judgment, the situation is different.

גופא אמר שמואל המוכר שטר חוב לחבירו וחזר ומחלו מחול ואפילו יורש מוחל אמר רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע ואי פקח הוא מקרקש ליה זוזי וכתב ליה שטרא בשמיה:

Since the Gemara had previously mentioned a halakha stated by Shmuel, it turns its attention to the matter itself. Shmuel said: With regard to one who sells a promissory note to another, and the seller went back and forgave the debtor his debt, it is forgiven, since the debtor essentially had a non-transferable obligation to the creditor alone, and even the creditor’s heir can forgive the debt. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: And if the purchaser of the document is perspicacious, and is wary of such a ploy, he should jangle [mekarkesh] dinars in the debtor’s ears, i.e., he should pay the debtor or promise him money, and the debtor will write for him a new promissory note in the purchaser’s name, thereby preventing the latter from losing out.

אמר אמימר מאן דדאין דינא דגרמי מגבי ביה דמי שטרא מעליא מאן דלא דאין דינא דגרמי מגבי ביה דמי ניירא בעלמא

Ameimar said: One who judges cases of liability for indirect damage and maintains that someone whose actions cause damage is obligated to pay, even if he has not directly harmed another, collects in this case the value of the proper document. Since by forgiving the loan the creditor voided the document and caused the purchaser financial loss, he must compensate the purchaser for the amount recorded in the document. One who does not judge cases of liability for indirect damage collects in this case only the value of the paper on which the document was written.

הוה עובדא וכפייה רפרם לרב אשי ואגבי ביה כי כשורא לצלמי:

The Gemara relates that there was an incident like this one, and Rafram pressured Rav Ashi by means of verbal persuasion to render an unequivocal ruling in this matter, and Rav Ashi collected in this case as if he damaged a beam used for crafting a sculpture, i.e., the full value of the debt listed in the promissory note.

אמר אמימר משמיה דרב חמא האי מאן דאיכא עליה כתובת אשה ובעל חוב ואית ליה ארעא ואית ליה זוזי לבעל חוב מסלקינן ליה בזוזי לאשה מסלקינן לה בארעא האי כי דיניה והאי כי דיניה

Ameimar said in the name of Rav Ḥama: With regard to one who has incumbent upon himself the obligation of his wife’s marriage contract and also owes money to a creditor, and he possesses land and possesses money, the obligation to the creditor is settled with the payment of money, whereas the debt to the woman of her marriage contract is settled with the payment of land, this one in accordance with his law, and that one in accordance with her law. Since the creditor gave him money, it is fitting that he should receive ready cash in return. The woman, in contrast, did not give him anything but relied upon the lien on his land, so she is therefore given land.

ואי לא איכא אלא חד ארעא ולא חזיא אלא לחד לבעל חוב יהבינן ליה לאשה לא יהבינן לה מאי טעמא יותר ממה שהאיש רוצה לישא אשה רוצה להנשא

And if there is only one plot of land, and it is adequate for the payment of only one debt, we give it to the creditor, and we do not give it to the woman. What is the reason for this? Even more than a man wants to marry, a woman wants to be married. Women do not get married because they wish to receive their marriage contract. It is better to give preference to the creditor so that he will not lose out, so as not to discourage people from lending money.

אמר ליה רב פפא לרב חמא ודאי דאמריתו משמיה דרבא האי מאן דמסקי ביה זוזי ואית ליה ארעא ואתא בעל חוב וקא תבע מיניה ואמר ליה זיל שקול מארעא אמרינן ליה זיל זבין את ואייתי הב ליה אמר ליה לא

Rav Pappa said to Rav Ḥama: Is it correct that you say in the name of Rava: With regard to one who owes money and has land, and the creditor comes and demands from him his money, and the debtor says to him: Go and take the amount you are owed from the land, we say to him: Go and sell the land yourself and give him money? Rav Ḥama said to him: I did not say this in the name of Rava.

אימא לי גופא דעובדא היכי הוה אמר ליה תולה מעותיו בגוי הוה הוא עשה שלא כהוגן לפיכך עשו בו שלא כהוגן

Rav Pappa replied: Tell me the incident itself, what happened and what exactly occurred that caused this opinion to be attributed to Rava. Rav Ḥama said to him: The debtor was one who attached his money to a gentile. He possessed money, but he claimed that this money belonged to a gentile and therefore could not be demanded from him. This man acted improperly, and consequently, the Sages acted improperly with him by forcing him to sell the land.

אמר ליה רב כהנא לרב פפא לדידך דאמרת פריעת בעל חוב מצוה אמר לא ניחא לי דאיעביד מצוה מאי אמר ליה תנינא במה דברים אמורים במצות לא תעשה אבל במצות עשה כגון שאומרין לו עשה סוכה ואינו עושה לולב ואינו עושה

Rav Kahana said to Rav Pappa: According to your opinion, that you say the repayment of a creditor is a mitzva, if the debtor said: It is not amenable to me to perform a mitzva, what would be the halakha? If there is no obligation to repay a loan other than to perform a mitzva, then what happens if someone is not interested in performing the mitzva? He said to him: We already learned this halakha in a baraita: In what case is this statement said, that one is liable to receive forty lashes for committing a transgression? It is said with regard to negative mitzvot. However, with regard to positive mitzvot, for example, if the court says to someone: Perform the mitzva of the sukka, and he does not do so, or: Perform the mitzva of the palm branch, and he does not do so,

מכין אותו עד שתצא נפשו:

the court strikes him an unlimited number of times, even until his soul departs, in order to force him to perform the mitzva. The payment of a debt is a positive mitzva, and one who refuses to pay a debt can be compelled to do so in this manner.

בעא מיניה רמי בר חמא מרב חסדא הרי זה גיטיך ולא תתגרשי בו אלא לאחר שלשים יום והלכה והניחתו בצידי רשות הרבים מהו

§ Rami bar Ḥama inquired of Rav Ḥisda: If a man said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce but you are divorced with it only after thirty days, and she took the bill of divorce and went and placed it in the sides of the public domain, i.e., in a place that was open to the public domain but not an actual part of it, and the bill of divorce was still there after thirty days, what is the halakha? Is she divorced?

אמר ליה אינה מגורשת מדרב ושמואל דרב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו והוא שצבורין ומונחין ברשות הרבים וצידי רשות הרבים כרשות הרבים דמו

Rav Ḥisda said to him: She is not divorced. This halakha is learned from the opinion of Rav and Shmuel, as it is Rav and Shmuel who both say with regard to the mishna: Any of the creditors of a deceased person can seize items of his movable property provided that they are arranged in piles and placed in the public domain, as in that case the heirs of the deceased do not receive it as part of their inheritance. Similarly, the woman will not acquire the bill of divorce after thirty days if it is in that location. Rav Ḥisda adds: And the sides of the public domain are considered like the public domain.

אדרבה מגורשת מדרב נחמן דאמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה האומר לחבירו משוך פרה זו ולא תהיה קנויה לך עד לאחר שלשים יום קנה ואפילו עומדת באגם מאי לאו היינו אגם והיינו צידי רשות הרבים לא אגם לחוד וצידי רשות הרבים לחוד

Rami bar Ḥama responded: On the contrary, she is divorced, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: With regard to one who says to his friend: Go and pull this cow now and it will be acquired by you only after thirty days, he has acquired the cow. And this is true even if the cow was standing after those thirty days in an ownerless meadow [agam]. Since the acquisition began properly at the start of the thirty-day period, it applies even after the thirty-day period. What, is it not the case that this is the halakha of a meadow and this is also the halakha of the sides of the public domain, as the two places have a similar status? Rav Ḥisda rejects this argument: No, the case of a meadow is discrete, and the case of the sides of the public domain is discrete, as the latter is considered an actual part of the public domain, and an ownerless meadow is not.

איכא דאמרי אמר ליה מגורשת מדרב נחמן וצידי רשות הרבים כאגם דמי אדרבה אינה מגורשת מדרב ושמואל מאי לאו היינו רשות הרבים והיינו צידי רשות הרבים לא רשות הרבים לחוד וצידי רשות הרבים לחוד:

Some say a different version of the dispute between Rami bar Ḥama and Rav Ḥisda, in which Rav Ḥisda said to Rami bar Ḥama: She is divorced, based on the ruling of Rav Naḥman pertaining to acquiring a cow, and the sides of the public domain are considered like a meadow. In this version, it was Rami bar Ḥama who replied: On the contrary, she is not divorced, as can be learned from the opinion of Rav and Shmuel pertaining to seizing objects in the public domain. What, is it not the case that this is the halakha of the public domain and this is similarly the halakha of the sides of the public domain? Rav Ḥisda responded: No, the public domain is discrete and the sides of the public domain are discrete.

מתני׳ המושיב את אשתו חנוונית או שמינה אפוטרופיא הרי זה משביעה כל זמן שירצה רבי אליעזר אומר אפילו על פילכה ועל עיסתה:

MISHNA: If there is one who establishes his wife as a storekeeper in his store, or if he appointed her as a steward to handle his property and workers, this one, i.e., the husband, can administer an oath to her, having her state that she did not appropriate any of his possessions, whenever he wants. Rabbi Eliezer says: He can administer an oath even with regard to the products of her spindle and for her dough, which are matters related to the household, and not her function as a storekeeper.

גמ׳ איבעיא להו רבי אליעזר על ידי גלגול קאמר או לכתחלה קאמר

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: When Rabbi Eliezer says that a husband can administer an oath to her with regard to any item, is he saying that this is by means of extension of an oath, i.e., once he administers an oath to her in her capacity as his storekeeper he can extend the oath to cover other matters, or, is he saying that he can administer an oath to her ab initio?

תא שמע אמרו לו לרבי אליעזר אין אדם דר עם נחש בכפיפה אי אמרת בשלמא לכתחלה שפיר אלא אי אמרת על ידי גלגול מאי נפקא לה מינה

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution from a baraita: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Eliezer: A person does not reside in a basket with a snake. A woman is not expected to live with a husband who constantly suspects her of stealing. The Gemara explains: Granted, if you say that Rabbi Eliezer is referring to an oath administered ab initio, the Rabbis spoke well. However, if you say that the husband can administer an oath only by means of an extension of an oath, what difference does it make to her? As she must take an oath with regard to matters that concern the store, it does not cause any greater difficulty for her to take an oath with regard to the household matters.

דאמרה ליה כיון דקדייקת בתראי כולי האי לא מצינא דאדור בהדך

The Gemara refutes this argument, as it is possible that she says to him: Since you are so exacting with me, I cannot live with you. Even if there is no additional oath, the sentiment engendered by his demand is grounds for dissatisfaction, and there is no proof that Rabbi Eliezer holds that he can administer an oath to her ab initio.

תא שמע הרי שלא פטר את אשתו מן הנדר ומן השבועה והושיבה חנוונית או שמינה אפוטרופיא הרי זה משביעה כל זמן שירצה לא הושיבה חנוונית ולא מינה אפוטרופיא אינו יכול להשביעה

The Gemara suggests another proof. Come and hear a proof from a baraita: With regard to one who did not exempt his wife in the marriage contract from a vow and from an oath, and he established her as his storekeeper or appointed her as his steward, he can administer an oath to her whenever he wants. If he did not establish her as his storekeeper or appoint her as his steward, he cannot administer an oath to her.

רבי אליעזר אומר אף על פי שלא הושיבה חנוונית ולא מינה אפוטרופיא הרי זה משביעה כל זמן שירצה שאין לך אשה שלא נעשית אפוטרופיא שעה אחת בחיי בעלה על פילכה ועל עיסתה אמרו לו אין אדם דר עם נחש בכפיפה שמע מינה לכתחלה שמע מינה:

The baraita continues: Rabbi Eliezer says: Although he did not establish her as his storekeeper or appoint her as his steward, he can administer an oath to her whenever he wants, as you have no wife who did not become a steward for one hour in her husband’s lifetime at least for her spindle and for her dough. The Rabbis said to him: A person does not reside in a basket with a snake. One can conclude from this that according to Rabbi Eliezer a husband can administer an oath to his wife with regard to her conduct, even ab initio. The Gemara concludes: Conclude from it that it is so.

מתני׳ כתב לה נדר ושבועה אין לי עליך אין יכול להשביעה אבל משביע הוא את יורשיה ואת הבאים ברשותה

MISHNA: If one wrote to his wife in the marriage contract: I do not have the right to administer a vow or an oath upon you, he cannot administer an oath to her. However, he can administer an oath to her heirs, and to those who come on her authority, either as her representatives or because they purchased her marriage contract.

נדר ושבועה אין לי עליך ועל יורשיך ועל הבאים ברשותך אינו יכול להשביעה לא היא ולא יורשיה ולא את הבאים ברשותה אבל יורשיו משביעין אותה ואת יורשיה ואת הבאים ברשותה

If the husband wrote: I do not have the right to administer a vow or an oath upon you, or upon your heirs, or upon those who come on your authority, he cannot administer an oath to her; not to her, nor her heirs, nor those who come on her authority. But the husband’s heirs can administer an oath to her, and to her heirs, and to those who come on her authority.

נדר ושבועה אין לי ולא ליורשי ולא לבאים ברשותי עליך ועל יורשיך ועל הבאים ברשותיך אינו יכול להשביעה לא הוא ולא יורשיו ולא הבאים ברשותו לא אותה ולא יורשיה ולא הבאים ברשותה

If he wrote: Neither I, nor my heirs, nor those who come on my authority have the right to administer a vow or an oath upon you, or upon your heirs, or upon those who come on your authority, he cannot administer an oath to her or to them; not he, nor his heirs, nor those who come on his authority may administer an oath, not to her, nor to her heirs, nor to those who come on her authority.

הלכה מקבר בעלה לבית אביה או שחזרה לבית חמיה ולא נעשית אפוטרופיא אין היורשין משביעין אותה ואם נעשית אפוטרופיא היורשין משביעין אותה על העתיד לבא ואין משביעין אותה על מה שעבר:

If a woman who was exempted from an oath by her husband went from her husband’s grave, immediately after her husband’s death, to her father’s house, without handling her late husband’s property, or in a case where she returned to her father-in-law’s house and did not become a steward over the property at all throughout this period, then the heirs cannot administer an oath to her with regard to her actions in their father’s lifetime, as the husband exempted her from an oath to the heirs. And if she became a steward, the heirs may administer an oath to her about the future, i.e., anything she did with the property after the death of her husband, but they cannot administer an oath to her with regard to what took place in the past, during her husband’s lifetime.

גמ׳ שבועה מאי עבידתה אמר רב יהודה אמר רב

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the purpose of an oath? What oath can he administer to her that caused him to add this condition to her marriage contract? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: