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Today's Daf Yomi

March 30, 2016 | ื›ืณ ื‘ืื“ืจ ื‘ืณ ืชืฉืขืดื•

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Kiddushin 19

When a master marries the maidservant, does it effect marriage or betrothal? ย What functions as the money for betrothalย – is it the money that the father received for selling the daughter into slavery or is it the cancellation of theย rest of the period she was meant to be working for him? Can master marry off his minor son to the maidservant or does he needs to reach the age of maturity? ย Does the maidservant need to consent to the marriage?

ืžื™ ืฉืื ื™

is the matter different? In both cases she is fully released from her fatherโ€™s authority by Torah law, and therefore he should not be able to sell her again afterward.

ื•ืœืจื‘ ื ื—ืžืŸ ื‘ืจ ื™ืฆื—ืง ื“ืืžืจ ืืคื™ืœื• ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืžืขื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ืœืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื ื™ืชื ื• ื‘ืžืื™ ืžื•ืงื™ื ืœื” ืžื•ืงื™ื ืœื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืœืฉืคื—ื•ืช ืื—ืจ ืฉืคื—ื•ืช ื”ื•ื ื“ืœื ืžืฆื™ ืžื–ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื” ืื‘ืœ ืœืฉืคื—ื•ืช ืื—ืจ ืื™ืฉื•ืช ืžืฆื™ ืžื–ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื”

The Gemara asks: And according to the explanation of Rav Naแธฅman bar Yitzแธฅak, who says that even according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, the original money of the sale of the maidservant was given for the purpose of betrothal, in accordance with whose opinion does he establish the baraita that permits a father to sell his widowed daughter? After giving her in marriage a father may no longer sell his daughter into slavery. The Gemara explains: He establishes it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: It is for slavery after slavery that he is not able to sell her, but he is able to sell her into slavery after marriage.

ื‘ืขื™ ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ืžื”ื• ืฉืžื™ื™ืขื“ ืื“ื ืœื‘ื ื• ืงื˜ืŸ ื‘ื ื• ืืžืจ ืจื—ืžื ื ื‘ื ื• ื›ืœ ื“ื”ื• ืื• ื“ื™ืœืžื ื‘ื ื• ื“ื•ืžื™ื ื“ื™ื“ื™ื” ืžื” ื”ื•ื ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืืฃ ื‘ื ื• ื’ื“ื•ืœ

ยง Reish Lakish raises a dilemma: With regard to the possibility that a person can designate a Hebrew maidservant for his minor son, what is the halakha? The Gemara clarifies the sides of this dilemma. Does one learn from the verse: โ€œAnd if he designates her for his sonโ€ (Exodus 21:9), that the Merciful One states that this applies to any son, even if he is too young to be married? Or perhaps it means his son who is similar to him: Just as he is an adult man, so too, his son must be an adult man.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื–ื™ืจื ืชื ืฉืžืข ืื™ืฉ ืคืจื˜ ืœืงื˜ืŸ ืืฉืจ ื™ื ืืฃ ืืช ืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ืคืจื˜ ืœืืฉืช ืงื˜ืŸ ื•ืื™ ืืžืจืช ืžื™ื™ืขื“ ืื ื›ืŸ ืžืฆื™ื ื• ืื™ืฉื•ืช ืœืงื˜ืŸ

Rabbi Zeira said: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma from the verse: โ€œAnd the man who commits adultery with the wife of another man, even he that commits adultery with his neighborโ€™s wife, both the adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to deathโ€ (Leviticus 20:10). The Sages expounded that the term โ€œmanโ€ serves to exclude a minor who commits adultery. The phrase โ€œwho commits adultery with the wife of another manโ€ serves to exclude the wife of a minor, as the marriage of a minor is invalid. And if you say that a father can designate a wife for his minor son, and designation effects betrothal or marriage, we find that there is marriage for a minor.

ื•ืืœื ืžืื™ ืื™ื ื• ืžื™ื™ืขื“ ืืžืื™ ืงื ืžืžืขื˜ ืœื™ื” ืงืจื ืชื™ืคืฉื•ื˜ ืžื™ื ื” ื“ืžื™ื™ืขื“ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ื”ื›ื ื‘ื™ื‘ื ื‘ืŸ ืชืฉืข ืฉื ื™ื ื•ื™ื•ื ืื—ื“ ื”ื‘ื ืขืœ ื™ื‘ืžืชื• ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ

The Gemara challenges this proof: But rather, what will you say, that a master cannot designate a maidservant for his son who is a minor? If so, why does the verse exclude him? If the marriage of a minor is never valid, why is it necessary for the verse to exclude him? On the contrary, resolve from here that one can designate for his minor son. Rav Ashi said: One could say that here, when this verse excludes the wife of a minor, we are dealing with a yavam who is nine years and one day old who engaged in sexual intercourse with his yevama, and his intercourse is considered valid.

ื“ืžื“ืื•ืจื™ื™ืชื ื—ื–ื™ื ืœื™ื” ืžื”ื• ื“ืชื™ืžื ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืžื“ืื•ืจื™ื™ืชื ื—ื–ื™ื ืœื™ื” ื•ื‘ื™ืืชื• ื‘ื™ืื” ื”ื‘ื ืขืœื™ื” ืžืชื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ

The unique feature of this case is that by Torah law she is fit for him. The halakhot of levirate marriage do not stipulate the minimum age of the yavam. Sexual intercourse with a boy aged nine years and one day is legally considered intercourse, and therefore this verse is necessary, lest you say: Since by Torah law she is fit for him, and his sexual intercourse is considered proper intercourse; therefore, he acquires her and she is his wife in all regards. Consequently, one who engages in intercourse with her becomes liable for violating the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a married woman. Therefore, the verse teaches us that despite this consideration, she is not considered a full-fledged married woman.

ืžืื™ ื”ื•ื™ ืขืœื” ืชื ืฉืžืข ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืื™ื™ื‘ื• ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื ืื™ ืื™ืŸ ื™ืขื•ื“ ืืœื ื‘ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืื™ืŸ ื™ืขื•ื“ ืืœื ืžื“ืขืช ืชืจืชื™ ืžื” ื˜ืขื ืงืืžืจ ืžื” ื˜ืขื ืื™ืŸ ื™ืขื•ื“ ืืœื ื‘ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืœืคื™ ืฉืื™ืŸ ื™ืขื•ื“ ืืœื ืžื“ืขืช

The Gemara asks: Ultimately, what halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter of designation for a minor son? Come and hear, as Rabbi Aivu says that Rabbi Yannai says: Designation applies only to an adult man, and designation applies only with consent. The Gemara asks: Why is it necessary to teach these two halakhot with regard to this matter? It can be derived from the statement that designation requires consent that it applies only to an adult, as a minor is legally incapable of consent. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yannai is saying: What is the reason, i.e., what is the reason that designation applies only to an adult man? It is because designation applies only with consent.

ื•ืื™ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ืžืื™ ืžื“ืขืช ืžื“ืขืช ื“ื™ื“ื” ื“ืชื ื™ ืื‘ื™ื™ ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืื‘ื”ื• ืืฉืจ ืœื ื™ืขื“ื” ืžืœืžื“ ืฉืฆืจื™ืš ืœื™ืขื“ื”

And if you wish, say an alternative explanation. What is the meaning of the term: With consent? It means with her consent. As Abaye, son of Rabbi Abbahu, taught: The verse โ€œwho did not designate her [yeโ€™adah]โ€ (Exodus 21:8), teaches that he is required to inform her [yaโ€™adah].

ื”ื•ื ืชื ื™ ืœื” ื•ื”ื•ื ืืžืจ ืœื” ื‘ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ ื™ืขื•ื“ ื•ืืœื™ื‘ื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื“ืืžืจ ืžืขื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ืœืื• ืœืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื ื™ืชื ื• ืจื‘ ื ื—ืžืŸ ื‘ืจ ื™ืฆื—ืง ืืžืจ ืืคื™ืœื• ืชื™ืžื ืœืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื ื™ืชื ื• ืฉืื ื™ ื”ื›ื ื“ืืžืจ ืจื—ืžื ื ื™ืขื“ื”

He teaches it and he says it: This is referring to betrothal through designation, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: The original money of the sale of the maidservant was not given for the purpose of betrothal. For this reason, an additional act of betrothal must be performed with her consent. Rav Naแธฅman bar Yitzแธฅak said: Even if you say that the original money was given for betrothal, it is different here, as the Merciful One states โ€œdesignate her [yeโ€™adah].โ€ This unusual expression alludes to the halakha that this act must be performed with her consent.

ืžืื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื“ืชื ื™ื ื™ืขื“ื” ื•ื”ืคื“ื” ืฆืจื™ืš ืฉื™ื”ื ืฉื”ื•ืช ื‘ื™ื•ื ื›ื“ื™ ืคื“ื™ื™ื”

After mentioning the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, several times, the Gemara asks: What is the source in which the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, is stated? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: โ€œWho did not designate her, then he shall let her be redeemedโ€ (Exodus 21:8). This juxtaposition indicates that designation applies only when she can be redeemed. Consequently, if she is at the end of her service it is necessary that when he designates her there must be enough time remaining in the day for redemption. There must be sufficient time for her to be redeemed, and if only a short amount of time remains, during which she would be unable to perform work worth one peruta, the master does not have the option of redeeming her.

ืžื›ืืŸ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื ื™ืฉ ืฉื”ื•ืช ื‘ื™ื•ื ื›ื“ื™ ืœืขืฉื•ืช ืขืžื• ืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ื•ืื ืœืื• ืื™ื ื” ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืืœืžื ืงืกื‘ืจ ืžืขื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ืœืื• ืœืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื ื™ืชื ื•

From here Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: If there is enough time left in the day for her to perform work that is worth one peruta for him, she is betrothed, as he betroths her with the amount she owes him for her work, which is the value of one peruta. And if not, she is not betrothed. Apparently, he maintains that the original money of the sale of the maidservant was not given for the purpose of betrothal.

ืจื‘ ื ื—ืžืŸ ื‘ืจ ื™ืฆื—ืง ืืžืจ ืืคื™ืœื• ืชื™ืžื ืœืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื ื™ืชื ื• ืฉืื ื™ ื”ื›ื ื“ืืžืจ ืจื—ืžื ื ื•ื”ืคื“ื”

Rav Naแธฅman bar Yitzแธฅak said: Even if you say that the original money was given for betrothal, one can explain this halakha as follows: It is different here, as the Merciful One states by means of the juxtaposition: โ€œWho did not designate her, then he shall let her be redeemed,โ€ that by a Torah edict the designation must be performed at a stage when she can still be redeemed.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื ื—ืžืŸ ืื•ืžืจ ืื“ื ืœื‘ืชื• ืงื˜ื ื” ืฆืื™ ื•ืงื‘ืœื™ ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืš ืžื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื”

ยง Rava says that Rav Naแธฅman says: A person may say to his minor daughter: Go out and accept your betrothal, and when she accepts the betrothal it is as though she were appointed the fatherโ€™s agent for her betrothal, despite the fact she is not halakhically competent. From where is this derived? It is derived from that which Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda said.

ืœืื• ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืžืขื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ืœืื• ืœืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื ื™ืชื ื• ื•ื›ื™ ืžืฉื™ื™ืจ ื‘ื” ืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ื”ื•ื• ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ืœื ืฉื ื

The Gemara elaborates: Didnโ€™t Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, say that the original money of the sale of the maidservant was not given for the purpose of betrothal, and if enough time for her to perform work worth one peruta remains, it is a betrothal? This indicates that when the father sells his daughter he effectively appoints her as her own agent to receive her betrothal, if the master wishes to designate her for himself. At the time of the designation the father receives nothing, while the daughter accepts the value of one peruta for her work as betrothal. Here too, it is no different, and therefore a minor can accept her betrothal with the consent of her father.

ื•ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื ื—ืžืŸ ื”ืžืงื“ืฉ ื‘ืžืœื•ื” ืฉื™ืฉ ืขืœื™ื” ืžืฉื›ื•ืŸ ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืžื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืœืื• ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืžืขื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ืœืื• ืœืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื ื™ืชื ื• ื”ืื™ ื”ืœื•ืื” ื”ื™ื ื•ื”ื™ื ื’ื•ืคื ืžืฉื›ื•ืŸ ื”ื™ื

And Rava says that Rav Naแธฅman says: With regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan for which there is collateral, i.e., he relinquishes his claim to a loan that she owes him and he returns the collateral she gave him, she is betrothed. This is derived from that which Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said. Didnโ€™t Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, say that the original money of the sale of the maidservant was not given for the purpose of betrothal? If so, this daughterโ€™s requirement to serve is similar to a loan, as there is no actual money but only an obligation, and she herself is the collateral. In other words, her body is the security that the loan will be repaid.

ื•ื›ื™ ืžืฉื™ื™ืจ ื‘ื” ืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ื•ืžื™ื™ืขื“ ื”ื•ื• ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ืœื ืฉื ื

And yet if time for her to perform work worth one peruta remains, and he designates her, it is a betrothal. This shows that he can betroth her with a loan, i.e., the value of the remaining time of her servitude, for which she herself is collateral. Here too, it is no different, and in general one may betroth a woman with a loan for which there is collateral.

ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื›ื™ืฆื“ ืžืฆื•ืช ื™ืขื•ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืœื” ื‘ืคื ื™ ืฉื ื™ื ื”ืจื™ ืืช ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืœื™ ื”ืจื™ ืืช ืžืื•ืจืกืช ืœื™ ืืคื™ืœื• ื‘ืกื•ืฃ ืฉืฉ ื•ืืคื™ืœื• ืกืžื•ืš ืœืฉืงื™ืขืช ื”ื—ืžื” ื•ื ื•ื”ื’ ื‘ื” ืžื ื”ื’ ืื™ืฉื•ืช ื•ืื™ื ื• ื ื•ื”ื’ ื‘ื” ืžื ื”ื’ ืฉืคื—ื•ืช ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื•ืžืจ ืื ื™ืฉ ืฉื”ื•ืช ื‘ื™ื•ื ื›ื“ื™ ืœืขืฉื•ืช ืขืžื• ืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ื•ืื ืœืื• ืื™ื ื” ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช

ยง The Sages taught: How is the mitzva of designation performed? The master says to her before two witnesses: You are hereby betrothed [mekuddeshet] to me, or: You are hereby betrothed [meโ€™oreset] to me. The designation is effective even if he said this at the end of six years of work, and even if it is close to sunset on the last day of her term. And once he designates her he treats her in the manner of marriage and may not treat her in the manner of slavery. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: If there is enough time left in that day for her to perform for him work worth one peruta, she is betrothed, and if not, she is not betrothed.

ืžืฉืœ ืœืื•ืžืจ ืœืืฉื” ื”ืชืงื“ืฉื™ ืœื™ ืžืขื›ืฉื™ื• ืœืื—ืจ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ื•ื‘ื ืื—ืจ ื•ืงื™ื“ืฉื” ื‘ืชื•ืš ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ืฉืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืœืจืืฉื•ืŸ ืžืฉืœ ืœืžืืŸ

The baraita continues: This can be understood by way of a parable comparing this halakha to the halakha of one who says to a woman: Be betrothed to me from now after thirty days, and another man came and betrothed her within thirty days. In this case the halakha is that she is betrothed to the first man. The Gemara inquires: According to whom is this parable suggested? Of the two opinions cited in the baraita, whose opinion accords with the halakha in the case of the parable?

ืื™ืœื™ืžื ืžืฉืœ ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื”ื ืื ื™ืฉ ืฉื”ื•ืช ื‘ื™ื•ื ื›ื“ื™ ืœืขืฉื•ืช ืขืžื• ืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ื•ืื ืœืื• ืœื

If we say that the halakha in the case of the parable is compared to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, didnโ€™t he say: If there is enough time on that day for her to perform for him work worth one peruta, she is betrothed, and if not, she is not betrothed? Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, maintains that she is not considered betrothed conditionally when she is initially acquired as a Hebrew maidservant. Rather, the betrothal takes effect only when he designates her. This is evident from the fact that enough time must remain for her to perform work worth one peruta, as she is betrothed with that amount. If so, one cannot compare his ruling to the case of the parable, where the betrothal of the first was given before that of the second.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืื—ื ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื ืžืฉืœ ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ืคืฉื™ื˜ื

Rav Aแธฅa, son of Rava, said: The halakha in the case of the parable is compared to the opinion of the Rabbis, i.e., the first opinion cited in the baraita, who say that when she was initially acquired as a Hebrew maidservant it is as though he had betrothed her on condition that she would be retroactively betrothed whenever her master desired. This indicates that retroactive betrothal is possible. The Gemara asks: Isnโ€™t it obvious that this comparison is correct? Why would the baraita need to state a parable?

ืžื”ื• ื“ืชื™ืžื ื”ื ืœื ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืžืขื›ืฉื™ื• ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ

The Gemara explains: The baraita needs to state a parable lest you say that the Rabbis hold she is betrothed to the master even if the master did not say to the father that she is betrothed to him from now. The parable therefore teaches us that the case of the master is comparable to a case where the first man said to her: From now, and if the master did not state this term when acquiring her as a Hebrew maidservant, then she is not betrothed to him.

ืชื ื™ื ืื™ื“ืš ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืืช ื‘ืชื• ื•ื”ืœืš ื•ืงื™ื“ืฉื” ืœืื—ืจ ืฉื™ื—ืง ื‘ืื“ื•ืŸ ื•ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืœืฉื ื™ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ืื ืจืฆื” ืœื™ื™ืขื“ ืžื™ื™ืขื“

It is taught in another baraita: With regard to one who first sells his daughter as a Hebrew maidservant and then goes and betroths her to another man, he mocks the master, and she is betrothed to the second man. Although he sold her as a Hebrew maidservant, he can remove her from the authority of the master, and this is seen as mocking him. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: If the master wants to designate her, he can designate her, and the second manโ€™s betrothal is void.

ืžืฉืœ ืœืื•ืžืจ ืœืืฉื” ื”ืจื™ ืืช ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืœื™ ืœืื—ืจ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ื•ื‘ื ืื—ืจ ื•ืงื™ื“ืฉื” ื‘ืชื•ืš ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ืฉืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืœืฉื ื™ ืžืฉืœ ืœืžืืŸ

The baraita continues: This can be understood by way of a parable comparing this halakha to the halakha of one who says to a woman: Be betrothed to me after thirty days, and another man came and betrothed her within thirty days. In this case the halakha is that she is betrothed to the second man. The Gemara inquires: According to whom is this parable suggested? Of the two opinions cited in the baraita, whose opinion accords with the halakha in the case of the parable?

ืื™ืœื™ืžื ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ืืžืจื™ ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืื ืจืฆื” ืœื™ื™ืขื“ ืžื™ื™ืขื“

If we say that the halakha in the case of the parable is compared to the opinion of the Rabbis, donโ€™t the Rabbis say that if the master wants to designate her, he may designate her, and the second manโ€™s betrothal does not take effect? In the case of the parable, she is betrothed to the second man, and the first cannot prevent this.

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืื—ื ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื ืžืฉืœ ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืคืฉื™ื˜ื

Rather, Rav Aแธฅa, son of Rava, said: The halakha in the case of the parable is compared to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara asks: Isnโ€™t it obvious that this comparison is correct? Why would the baraita need to state a parable?

ืžื”ื• ื“ืชื™ืžื ื”ื ืœื ืืžืจ ืœื” ืœืื—ืจ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ

The Gemara explains: The baraita needs to state a parable lest you say that the case of the Hebrew maidservant is different, as he did not say to her when he acquired her: After thirty days. One might argue that the reason Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that she is not betrothed to the master is that he did not state when he acquired her that she should be designated at a specific time in the future, but if he would have stated this at the time he acquired her as a Hebrew maidservant, the designation would then take effect. By comparing this case to the case of the parable, the baraita teaches us that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, would hold that the designation does not take effect even if the master had said at the time of the acquisition that designation should take effect in thirty days, provided that her father betroths her to another in the interim.

ืชื ื™ื ืื™ื“ืš ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืืช ื‘ืชื• ื•ืคืกืง ืขืœ ืžื ืช ืฉืœื ืœื™ื™ืขื“ ื ืชืงื™ื™ื ื”ืชื ืื™ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ืื ืจืฆื” ืœื™ื™ืขื“ ืžื™ื™ืขื“ ืžืคื ื™ ืฉื”ืชื ื” ืขืœ ืžื” ืฉื›ืชื•ื‘ ื‘ืชื•ืจื” ื•ื›ืœ ื”ืžืชื ื” ืขืœ ืžื” ืฉื›ืชื•ื‘ ื‘ืชื•ืจื” ืชื ืื• ื‘ื˜ืœ

ยง It is taught in another baraita: With regard to one who sells his daughter and stipulates with the buyer that the sale applies on the condition that he does not designate her, the condition stands. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: If the master wants to designate her he may designate her, because the father stipulated counter to that which is written in the Torah, as the Torah permits the designation of a Hebrew maidservant. And with regard to anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void.

ื•ืœืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืชื ืื• ืงื™ื™ื ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ื”ืื•ืžืจ ืœืืฉื” ื”ืจื™ ืืช ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืœื™ ืขืœ ืžื ืช ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœืš ืขืœื™ ืฉืืจ ื›ืกื•ืช ื•ืขื•ื ื” ื”ืจื™ ื–ื• ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ื•ืชื ืื• ื‘ื˜ืœ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื•ืžืจ ื‘ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉื‘ืžืžื•ืŸ ืชื ืื• ืงื™ื™ื

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, does his condition stand in that case? But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: One who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that you do not have against me any claims of food, clothing, and conjugal rights, she is betrothed and his condition is void; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to monetary matters, e.g., food and clothing, his condition stands. This indicates that Rabbi Meir maintains that one cannot stipulate counter to that which is written in the Torah.

ืืžืจ ื—ื–ืงื™ื” ืฉืื ื™ ื”ื›ื ื“ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืœืืžื” ืคืขืžื™ื ืฉืื™ื ื• ืžื•ื›ืจื” ืืœื ืœืืžื” ื‘ืœื‘ื“

แธคizkiyya said: It is different here, as the verse states: โ€œAnd if a man sells his daughter as a maidservantโ€ (Exodus 21:7), from which it is derived: There are times when he sells her only as a maidservant, not for the sake of marriage. This indicates that the designation of a maidservant is not a Torah obligation but is optional. Therefore, one can issue a stipulation that runs counter to the master designating her.

ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ืื™ ืœืืžื” ืžืื™ ืขื‘ื“ื™ ืœื™ื” ื”ืื™ ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื”ื• ืœื›ื“ืชื ื™ื ืœืืžื” ืžืœืžื“ ืฉืžื•ื›ืจื” ืœืคืกื•ืœื™ื

The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, what do they do with this phrase: โ€œAs a maidservantโ€? How do they interpret it? The Gemara answers: This expression is necessary for them for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states โ€œas a maidservant.โ€ This teaches that he can sell her to people of flawed lineage, e.g., a mamzer, whom she is prohibited from marrying but whose betrothal is effective.

ื•ื”ืœื ื“ื™ืŸ ื”ื•ื ืื ืžืงื“ืฉื” ืœืคืกื•ืœื™ื ืœื ื™ืžื›ืจื ื” ืœืคืกื•ืœื™ื ืžื” ืœืžืงื“ืฉื” ืœืคืกื•ืœื™ื ืฉื›ืŸ ืื“ื ืžืงื“ืฉ ืืช ื‘ืชื• ื›ืฉื”ื™ื ื ืขืจื” ื™ืžื›ืจื ื” ืœืคืกื•ืœื™ื ืฉืื™ืŸ ืื“ื ืžื•ื›ืจ ืืช ื‘ืชื• ื›ืฉื”ื™ื ื ืขืจื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืœืืžื” ืžืœืžื“ ืฉืžื•ื›ืจื” ืœืคืกื•ืœื™ืŸ

The baraita asks: Why is it necessary to derive that halakha from the verse? But could this not be derived through logical inference: If her father can betroth her to people of flawed lineage, can he not sell her to people of flawed lineage? The baraita answers: The verse is necessary, as what is unique about betrothal to people of flawed lineage is that a person can betroth his daughter even when she is a young woman, i.e., between the ages of twelve and twelve and a half. Therefore, one cannot learn from this that he can also sell her to people of flawed lineage because that case is different, as a person cannot sell his daughter when she is a young woman. The halakha that a person can betroth his daughter even when she is a young woman demonstrates that the rights that a father has with regard to his daughterโ€™s betrothal are more extensive than his right to sell her. Therefore, the verse states โ€œas a maidservant,โ€ which teaches that he can, in fact, sell her to disqualified people.

ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ืื ืœืœืžื“ ืฉืžื•ื›ืจื” ืœืคืกื•ืœื™ืŸ ื”ืจื™ ื›ื‘ืจ ื ืืžืจ ืื ืจืขื” ื‘ืขื™ื ื™ ืื“ื ื™ื” ืฉืจืขื” ื‘ื ื™ืฉื•ืื™ื” ืžื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืœืืžื” ืžืœืžื“ ืฉืžื•ื›ืจื”

The baraita continues: Rabbi Eliezer says: If that verse serves to teach that he can sell her to people of flawed lineage, it is unnecessary, as it is already stated: โ€œIf she does not please her master, who designated herโ€ (Exodus 21:8). This indicates that she is displeasing in her marriage, i.e., marriage to him was forbidden, and yet the sale is valid. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states โ€œas a maidservantโ€? This teaches that he can sell her

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Kiddushin 19

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Kiddushin 19

ืžื™ ืฉืื ื™

is the matter different? In both cases she is fully released from her fatherโ€™s authority by Torah law, and therefore he should not be able to sell her again afterward.

ื•ืœืจื‘ ื ื—ืžืŸ ื‘ืจ ื™ืฆื—ืง ื“ืืžืจ ืืคื™ืœื• ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืžืขื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ืœืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื ื™ืชื ื• ื‘ืžืื™ ืžื•ืงื™ื ืœื” ืžื•ืงื™ื ืœื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืœืฉืคื—ื•ืช ืื—ืจ ืฉืคื—ื•ืช ื”ื•ื ื“ืœื ืžืฆื™ ืžื–ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื” ืื‘ืœ ืœืฉืคื—ื•ืช ืื—ืจ ืื™ืฉื•ืช ืžืฆื™ ืžื–ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื”

The Gemara asks: And according to the explanation of Rav Naแธฅman bar Yitzแธฅak, who says that even according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, the original money of the sale of the maidservant was given for the purpose of betrothal, in accordance with whose opinion does he establish the baraita that permits a father to sell his widowed daughter? After giving her in marriage a father may no longer sell his daughter into slavery. The Gemara explains: He establishes it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: It is for slavery after slavery that he is not able to sell her, but he is able to sell her into slavery after marriage.

ื‘ืขื™ ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ืžื”ื• ืฉืžื™ื™ืขื“ ืื“ื ืœื‘ื ื• ืงื˜ืŸ ื‘ื ื• ืืžืจ ืจื—ืžื ื ื‘ื ื• ื›ืœ ื“ื”ื• ืื• ื“ื™ืœืžื ื‘ื ื• ื“ื•ืžื™ื ื“ื™ื“ื™ื” ืžื” ื”ื•ื ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืืฃ ื‘ื ื• ื’ื“ื•ืœ

ยง Reish Lakish raises a dilemma: With regard to the possibility that a person can designate a Hebrew maidservant for his minor son, what is the halakha? The Gemara clarifies the sides of this dilemma. Does one learn from the verse: โ€œAnd if he designates her for his sonโ€ (Exodus 21:9), that the Merciful One states that this applies to any son, even if he is too young to be married? Or perhaps it means his son who is similar to him: Just as he is an adult man, so too, his son must be an adult man.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื–ื™ืจื ืชื ืฉืžืข ืื™ืฉ ืคืจื˜ ืœืงื˜ืŸ ืืฉืจ ื™ื ืืฃ ืืช ืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ืคืจื˜ ืœืืฉืช ืงื˜ืŸ ื•ืื™ ืืžืจืช ืžื™ื™ืขื“ ืื ื›ืŸ ืžืฆื™ื ื• ืื™ืฉื•ืช ืœืงื˜ืŸ

Rabbi Zeira said: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma from the verse: โ€œAnd the man who commits adultery with the wife of another man, even he that commits adultery with his neighborโ€™s wife, both the adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to deathโ€ (Leviticus 20:10). The Sages expounded that the term โ€œmanโ€ serves to exclude a minor who commits adultery. The phrase โ€œwho commits adultery with the wife of another manโ€ serves to exclude the wife of a minor, as the marriage of a minor is invalid. And if you say that a father can designate a wife for his minor son, and designation effects betrothal or marriage, we find that there is marriage for a minor.

ื•ืืœื ืžืื™ ืื™ื ื• ืžื™ื™ืขื“ ืืžืื™ ืงื ืžืžืขื˜ ืœื™ื” ืงืจื ืชื™ืคืฉื•ื˜ ืžื™ื ื” ื“ืžื™ื™ืขื“ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ื”ื›ื ื‘ื™ื‘ื ื‘ืŸ ืชืฉืข ืฉื ื™ื ื•ื™ื•ื ืื—ื“ ื”ื‘ื ืขืœ ื™ื‘ืžืชื• ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ

The Gemara challenges this proof: But rather, what will you say, that a master cannot designate a maidservant for his son who is a minor? If so, why does the verse exclude him? If the marriage of a minor is never valid, why is it necessary for the verse to exclude him? On the contrary, resolve from here that one can designate for his minor son. Rav Ashi said: One could say that here, when this verse excludes the wife of a minor, we are dealing with a yavam who is nine years and one day old who engaged in sexual intercourse with his yevama, and his intercourse is considered valid.

ื“ืžื“ืื•ืจื™ื™ืชื ื—ื–ื™ื ืœื™ื” ืžื”ื• ื“ืชื™ืžื ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืžื“ืื•ืจื™ื™ืชื ื—ื–ื™ื ืœื™ื” ื•ื‘ื™ืืชื• ื‘ื™ืื” ื”ื‘ื ืขืœื™ื” ืžืชื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ืืฉืช ืื™ืฉ ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ

The unique feature of this case is that by Torah law she is fit for him. The halakhot of levirate marriage do not stipulate the minimum age of the yavam. Sexual intercourse with a boy aged nine years and one day is legally considered intercourse, and therefore this verse is necessary, lest you say: Since by Torah law she is fit for him, and his sexual intercourse is considered proper intercourse; therefore, he acquires her and she is his wife in all regards. Consequently, one who engages in intercourse with her becomes liable for violating the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a married woman. Therefore, the verse teaches us that despite this consideration, she is not considered a full-fledged married woman.

ืžืื™ ื”ื•ื™ ืขืœื” ืชื ืฉืžืข ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืื™ื™ื‘ื• ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื ืื™ ืื™ืŸ ื™ืขื•ื“ ืืœื ื‘ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืื™ืŸ ื™ืขื•ื“ ืืœื ืžื“ืขืช ืชืจืชื™ ืžื” ื˜ืขื ืงืืžืจ ืžื” ื˜ืขื ืื™ืŸ ื™ืขื•ื“ ืืœื ื‘ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืœืคื™ ืฉืื™ืŸ ื™ืขื•ื“ ืืœื ืžื“ืขืช

The Gemara asks: Ultimately, what halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter of designation for a minor son? Come and hear, as Rabbi Aivu says that Rabbi Yannai says: Designation applies only to an adult man, and designation applies only with consent. The Gemara asks: Why is it necessary to teach these two halakhot with regard to this matter? It can be derived from the statement that designation requires consent that it applies only to an adult, as a minor is legally incapable of consent. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yannai is saying: What is the reason, i.e., what is the reason that designation applies only to an adult man? It is because designation applies only with consent.

ื•ืื™ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ืžืื™ ืžื“ืขืช ืžื“ืขืช ื“ื™ื“ื” ื“ืชื ื™ ืื‘ื™ื™ ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืื‘ื”ื• ืืฉืจ ืœื ื™ืขื“ื” ืžืœืžื“ ืฉืฆืจื™ืš ืœื™ืขื“ื”

And if you wish, say an alternative explanation. What is the meaning of the term: With consent? It means with her consent. As Abaye, son of Rabbi Abbahu, taught: The verse โ€œwho did not designate her [yeโ€™adah]โ€ (Exodus 21:8), teaches that he is required to inform her [yaโ€™adah].

ื”ื•ื ืชื ื™ ืœื” ื•ื”ื•ื ืืžืจ ืœื” ื‘ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ ื™ืขื•ื“ ื•ืืœื™ื‘ื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื“ืืžืจ ืžืขื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ืœืื• ืœืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื ื™ืชื ื• ืจื‘ ื ื—ืžืŸ ื‘ืจ ื™ืฆื—ืง ืืžืจ ืืคื™ืœื• ืชื™ืžื ืœืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื ื™ืชื ื• ืฉืื ื™ ื”ื›ื ื“ืืžืจ ืจื—ืžื ื ื™ืขื“ื”

He teaches it and he says it: This is referring to betrothal through designation, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: The original money of the sale of the maidservant was not given for the purpose of betrothal. For this reason, an additional act of betrothal must be performed with her consent. Rav Naแธฅman bar Yitzแธฅak said: Even if you say that the original money was given for betrothal, it is different here, as the Merciful One states โ€œdesignate her [yeโ€™adah].โ€ This unusual expression alludes to the halakha that this act must be performed with her consent.

ืžืื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื“ืชื ื™ื ื™ืขื“ื” ื•ื”ืคื“ื” ืฆืจื™ืš ืฉื™ื”ื ืฉื”ื•ืช ื‘ื™ื•ื ื›ื“ื™ ืคื“ื™ื™ื”

After mentioning the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, several times, the Gemara asks: What is the source in which the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, is stated? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: โ€œWho did not designate her, then he shall let her be redeemedโ€ (Exodus 21:8). This juxtaposition indicates that designation applies only when she can be redeemed. Consequently, if she is at the end of her service it is necessary that when he designates her there must be enough time remaining in the day for redemption. There must be sufficient time for her to be redeemed, and if only a short amount of time remains, during which she would be unable to perform work worth one peruta, the master does not have the option of redeeming her.

ืžื›ืืŸ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื ื™ืฉ ืฉื”ื•ืช ื‘ื™ื•ื ื›ื“ื™ ืœืขืฉื•ืช ืขืžื• ืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ื•ืื ืœืื• ืื™ื ื” ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืืœืžื ืงืกื‘ืจ ืžืขื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ืœืื• ืœืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื ื™ืชื ื•

From here Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: If there is enough time left in the day for her to perform work that is worth one peruta for him, she is betrothed, as he betroths her with the amount she owes him for her work, which is the value of one peruta. And if not, she is not betrothed. Apparently, he maintains that the original money of the sale of the maidservant was not given for the purpose of betrothal.

ืจื‘ ื ื—ืžืŸ ื‘ืจ ื™ืฆื—ืง ืืžืจ ืืคื™ืœื• ืชื™ืžื ืœืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื ื™ืชื ื• ืฉืื ื™ ื”ื›ื ื“ืืžืจ ืจื—ืžื ื ื•ื”ืคื“ื”

Rav Naแธฅman bar Yitzแธฅak said: Even if you say that the original money was given for betrothal, one can explain this halakha as follows: It is different here, as the Merciful One states by means of the juxtaposition: โ€œWho did not designate her, then he shall let her be redeemed,โ€ that by a Torah edict the designation must be performed at a stage when she can still be redeemed.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื ื—ืžืŸ ืื•ืžืจ ืื“ื ืœื‘ืชื• ืงื˜ื ื” ืฆืื™ ื•ืงื‘ืœื™ ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืš ืžื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื”

ยง Rava says that Rav Naแธฅman says: A person may say to his minor daughter: Go out and accept your betrothal, and when she accepts the betrothal it is as though she were appointed the fatherโ€™s agent for her betrothal, despite the fact she is not halakhically competent. From where is this derived? It is derived from that which Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda said.

ืœืื• ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืžืขื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ืœืื• ืœืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื ื™ืชื ื• ื•ื›ื™ ืžืฉื™ื™ืจ ื‘ื” ืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ื”ื•ื• ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ืœื ืฉื ื

The Gemara elaborates: Didnโ€™t Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, say that the original money of the sale of the maidservant was not given for the purpose of betrothal, and if enough time for her to perform work worth one peruta remains, it is a betrothal? This indicates that when the father sells his daughter he effectively appoints her as her own agent to receive her betrothal, if the master wishes to designate her for himself. At the time of the designation the father receives nothing, while the daughter accepts the value of one peruta for her work as betrothal. Here too, it is no different, and therefore a minor can accept her betrothal with the consent of her father.

ื•ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื ื—ืžืŸ ื”ืžืงื“ืฉ ื‘ืžืœื•ื” ืฉื™ืฉ ืขืœื™ื” ืžืฉื›ื•ืŸ ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืžื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืœืื• ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืžืขื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ืœืื• ืœืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื ื™ืชื ื• ื”ืื™ ื”ืœื•ืื” ื”ื™ื ื•ื”ื™ื ื’ื•ืคื ืžืฉื›ื•ืŸ ื”ื™ื

And Rava says that Rav Naแธฅman says: With regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan for which there is collateral, i.e., he relinquishes his claim to a loan that she owes him and he returns the collateral she gave him, she is betrothed. This is derived from that which Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said. Didnโ€™t Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, say that the original money of the sale of the maidservant was not given for the purpose of betrothal? If so, this daughterโ€™s requirement to serve is similar to a loan, as there is no actual money but only an obligation, and she herself is the collateral. In other words, her body is the security that the loan will be repaid.

ื•ื›ื™ ืžืฉื™ื™ืจ ื‘ื” ืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ื•ืžื™ื™ืขื“ ื”ื•ื• ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ืœื ืฉื ื

And yet if time for her to perform work worth one peruta remains, and he designates her, it is a betrothal. This shows that he can betroth her with a loan, i.e., the value of the remaining time of her servitude, for which she herself is collateral. Here too, it is no different, and in general one may betroth a woman with a loan for which there is collateral.

ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื›ื™ืฆื“ ืžืฆื•ืช ื™ืขื•ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืœื” ื‘ืคื ื™ ืฉื ื™ื ื”ืจื™ ืืช ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืœื™ ื”ืจื™ ืืช ืžืื•ืจืกืช ืœื™ ืืคื™ืœื• ื‘ืกื•ืฃ ืฉืฉ ื•ืืคื™ืœื• ืกืžื•ืš ืœืฉืงื™ืขืช ื”ื—ืžื” ื•ื ื•ื”ื’ ื‘ื” ืžื ื”ื’ ืื™ืฉื•ืช ื•ืื™ื ื• ื ื•ื”ื’ ื‘ื” ืžื ื”ื’ ืฉืคื—ื•ืช ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื•ืžืจ ืื ื™ืฉ ืฉื”ื•ืช ื‘ื™ื•ื ื›ื“ื™ ืœืขืฉื•ืช ืขืžื• ืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ื•ืื ืœืื• ืื™ื ื” ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช

ยง The Sages taught: How is the mitzva of designation performed? The master says to her before two witnesses: You are hereby betrothed [mekuddeshet] to me, or: You are hereby betrothed [meโ€™oreset] to me. The designation is effective even if he said this at the end of six years of work, and even if it is close to sunset on the last day of her term. And once he designates her he treats her in the manner of marriage and may not treat her in the manner of slavery. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: If there is enough time left in that day for her to perform for him work worth one peruta, she is betrothed, and if not, she is not betrothed.

ืžืฉืœ ืœืื•ืžืจ ืœืืฉื” ื”ืชืงื“ืฉื™ ืœื™ ืžืขื›ืฉื™ื• ืœืื—ืจ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ื•ื‘ื ืื—ืจ ื•ืงื™ื“ืฉื” ื‘ืชื•ืš ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ืฉืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืœืจืืฉื•ืŸ ืžืฉืœ ืœืžืืŸ

The baraita continues: This can be understood by way of a parable comparing this halakha to the halakha of one who says to a woman: Be betrothed to me from now after thirty days, and another man came and betrothed her within thirty days. In this case the halakha is that she is betrothed to the first man. The Gemara inquires: According to whom is this parable suggested? Of the two opinions cited in the baraita, whose opinion accords with the halakha in the case of the parable?

ืื™ืœื™ืžื ืžืฉืœ ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื”ื ืื ื™ืฉ ืฉื”ื•ืช ื‘ื™ื•ื ื›ื“ื™ ืœืขืฉื•ืช ืขืžื• ืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ื•ืื ืœืื• ืœื

If we say that the halakha in the case of the parable is compared to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, didnโ€™t he say: If there is enough time on that day for her to perform for him work worth one peruta, she is betrothed, and if not, she is not betrothed? Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, maintains that she is not considered betrothed conditionally when she is initially acquired as a Hebrew maidservant. Rather, the betrothal takes effect only when he designates her. This is evident from the fact that enough time must remain for her to perform work worth one peruta, as she is betrothed with that amount. If so, one cannot compare his ruling to the case of the parable, where the betrothal of the first was given before that of the second.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืื—ื ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื ืžืฉืœ ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ืคืฉื™ื˜ื

Rav Aแธฅa, son of Rava, said: The halakha in the case of the parable is compared to the opinion of the Rabbis, i.e., the first opinion cited in the baraita, who say that when she was initially acquired as a Hebrew maidservant it is as though he had betrothed her on condition that she would be retroactively betrothed whenever her master desired. This indicates that retroactive betrothal is possible. The Gemara asks: Isnโ€™t it obvious that this comparison is correct? Why would the baraita need to state a parable?

ืžื”ื• ื“ืชื™ืžื ื”ื ืœื ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืžืขื›ืฉื™ื• ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ

The Gemara explains: The baraita needs to state a parable lest you say that the Rabbis hold she is betrothed to the master even if the master did not say to the father that she is betrothed to him from now. The parable therefore teaches us that the case of the master is comparable to a case where the first man said to her: From now, and if the master did not state this term when acquiring her as a Hebrew maidservant, then she is not betrothed to him.

ืชื ื™ื ืื™ื“ืš ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืืช ื‘ืชื• ื•ื”ืœืš ื•ืงื™ื“ืฉื” ืœืื—ืจ ืฉื™ื—ืง ื‘ืื“ื•ืŸ ื•ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืœืฉื ื™ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ืื ืจืฆื” ืœื™ื™ืขื“ ืžื™ื™ืขื“

It is taught in another baraita: With regard to one who first sells his daughter as a Hebrew maidservant and then goes and betroths her to another man, he mocks the master, and she is betrothed to the second man. Although he sold her as a Hebrew maidservant, he can remove her from the authority of the master, and this is seen as mocking him. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: If the master wants to designate her, he can designate her, and the second manโ€™s betrothal is void.

ืžืฉืœ ืœืื•ืžืจ ืœืืฉื” ื”ืจื™ ืืช ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืœื™ ืœืื—ืจ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ื•ื‘ื ืื—ืจ ื•ืงื™ื“ืฉื” ื‘ืชื•ืš ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ืฉืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืœืฉื ื™ ืžืฉืœ ืœืžืืŸ

The baraita continues: This can be understood by way of a parable comparing this halakha to the halakha of one who says to a woman: Be betrothed to me after thirty days, and another man came and betrothed her within thirty days. In this case the halakha is that she is betrothed to the second man. The Gemara inquires: According to whom is this parable suggested? Of the two opinions cited in the baraita, whose opinion accords with the halakha in the case of the parable?

ืื™ืœื™ืžื ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ืืžืจื™ ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืื ืจืฆื” ืœื™ื™ืขื“ ืžื™ื™ืขื“

If we say that the halakha in the case of the parable is compared to the opinion of the Rabbis, donโ€™t the Rabbis say that if the master wants to designate her, he may designate her, and the second manโ€™s betrothal does not take effect? In the case of the parable, she is betrothed to the second man, and the first cannot prevent this.

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืื—ื ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื ืžืฉืœ ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืคืฉื™ื˜ื

Rather, Rav Aแธฅa, son of Rava, said: The halakha in the case of the parable is compared to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara asks: Isnโ€™t it obvious that this comparison is correct? Why would the baraita need to state a parable?

ืžื”ื• ื“ืชื™ืžื ื”ื ืœื ืืžืจ ืœื” ืœืื—ืจ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ

The Gemara explains: The baraita needs to state a parable lest you say that the case of the Hebrew maidservant is different, as he did not say to her when he acquired her: After thirty days. One might argue that the reason Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that she is not betrothed to the master is that he did not state when he acquired her that she should be designated at a specific time in the future, but if he would have stated this at the time he acquired her as a Hebrew maidservant, the designation would then take effect. By comparing this case to the case of the parable, the baraita teaches us that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, would hold that the designation does not take effect even if the master had said at the time of the acquisition that designation should take effect in thirty days, provided that her father betroths her to another in the interim.

ืชื ื™ื ืื™ื“ืš ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืืช ื‘ืชื• ื•ืคืกืง ืขืœ ืžื ืช ืฉืœื ืœื™ื™ืขื“ ื ืชืงื™ื™ื ื”ืชื ืื™ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ืื ืจืฆื” ืœื™ื™ืขื“ ืžื™ื™ืขื“ ืžืคื ื™ ืฉื”ืชื ื” ืขืœ ืžื” ืฉื›ืชื•ื‘ ื‘ืชื•ืจื” ื•ื›ืœ ื”ืžืชื ื” ืขืœ ืžื” ืฉื›ืชื•ื‘ ื‘ืชื•ืจื” ืชื ืื• ื‘ื˜ืœ

ยง It is taught in another baraita: With regard to one who sells his daughter and stipulates with the buyer that the sale applies on the condition that he does not designate her, the condition stands. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: If the master wants to designate her he may designate her, because the father stipulated counter to that which is written in the Torah, as the Torah permits the designation of a Hebrew maidservant. And with regard to anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void.

ื•ืœืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืชื ืื• ืงื™ื™ื ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ื”ืื•ืžืจ ืœืืฉื” ื”ืจื™ ืืช ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืœื™ ืขืœ ืžื ืช ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœืš ืขืœื™ ืฉืืจ ื›ืกื•ืช ื•ืขื•ื ื” ื”ืจื™ ื–ื• ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ื•ืชื ืื• ื‘ื˜ืœ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื•ืžืจ ื‘ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉื‘ืžืžื•ืŸ ืชื ืื• ืงื™ื™ื

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, does his condition stand in that case? But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: One who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that you do not have against me any claims of food, clothing, and conjugal rights, she is betrothed and his condition is void; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to monetary matters, e.g., food and clothing, his condition stands. This indicates that Rabbi Meir maintains that one cannot stipulate counter to that which is written in the Torah.

ืืžืจ ื—ื–ืงื™ื” ืฉืื ื™ ื”ื›ื ื“ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืœืืžื” ืคืขืžื™ื ืฉืื™ื ื• ืžื•ื›ืจื” ืืœื ืœืืžื” ื‘ืœื‘ื“

แธคizkiyya said: It is different here, as the verse states: โ€œAnd if a man sells his daughter as a maidservantโ€ (Exodus 21:7), from which it is derived: There are times when he sells her only as a maidservant, not for the sake of marriage. This indicates that the designation of a maidservant is not a Torah obligation but is optional. Therefore, one can issue a stipulation that runs counter to the master designating her.

ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ืื™ ืœืืžื” ืžืื™ ืขื‘ื“ื™ ืœื™ื” ื”ืื™ ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื”ื• ืœื›ื“ืชื ื™ื ืœืืžื” ืžืœืžื“ ืฉืžื•ื›ืจื” ืœืคืกื•ืœื™ื

The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, what do they do with this phrase: โ€œAs a maidservantโ€? How do they interpret it? The Gemara answers: This expression is necessary for them for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states โ€œas a maidservant.โ€ This teaches that he can sell her to people of flawed lineage, e.g., a mamzer, whom she is prohibited from marrying but whose betrothal is effective.

ื•ื”ืœื ื“ื™ืŸ ื”ื•ื ืื ืžืงื“ืฉื” ืœืคืกื•ืœื™ื ืœื ื™ืžื›ืจื ื” ืœืคืกื•ืœื™ื ืžื” ืœืžืงื“ืฉื” ืœืคืกื•ืœื™ื ืฉื›ืŸ ืื“ื ืžืงื“ืฉ ืืช ื‘ืชื• ื›ืฉื”ื™ื ื ืขืจื” ื™ืžื›ืจื ื” ืœืคืกื•ืœื™ื ืฉืื™ืŸ ืื“ื ืžื•ื›ืจ ืืช ื‘ืชื• ื›ืฉื”ื™ื ื ืขืจื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืœืืžื” ืžืœืžื“ ืฉืžื•ื›ืจื” ืœืคืกื•ืœื™ืŸ

The baraita asks: Why is it necessary to derive that halakha from the verse? But could this not be derived through logical inference: If her father can betroth her to people of flawed lineage, can he not sell her to people of flawed lineage? The baraita answers: The verse is necessary, as what is unique about betrothal to people of flawed lineage is that a person can betroth his daughter even when she is a young woman, i.e., between the ages of twelve and twelve and a half. Therefore, one cannot learn from this that he can also sell her to people of flawed lineage because that case is different, as a person cannot sell his daughter when she is a young woman. The halakha that a person can betroth his daughter even when she is a young woman demonstrates that the rights that a father has with regard to his daughterโ€™s betrothal are more extensive than his right to sell her. Therefore, the verse states โ€œas a maidservant,โ€ which teaches that he can, in fact, sell her to disqualified people.

ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ืื ืœืœืžื“ ืฉืžื•ื›ืจื” ืœืคืกื•ืœื™ืŸ ื”ืจื™ ื›ื‘ืจ ื ืืžืจ ืื ืจืขื” ื‘ืขื™ื ื™ ืื“ื ื™ื” ืฉืจืขื” ื‘ื ื™ืฉื•ืื™ื” ืžื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืœืืžื” ืžืœืžื“ ืฉืžื•ื›ืจื”

The baraita continues: Rabbi Eliezer says: If that verse serves to teach that he can sell her to people of flawed lineage, it is unnecessary, as it is already stated: โ€œIf she does not please her master, who designated herโ€ (Exodus 21:8). This indicates that she is displeasing in her marriage, i.e., marriage to him was forbidden, and yet the sale is valid. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states โ€œas a maidservantโ€? This teaches that he can sell her

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