Kiddushin 23
זֶה פֵּירַשׁ לְמִיתָה, וְזֶה פֵּירַשׁ לְחַיִּים.
and this person, Rabbi Yehuda from India, departed to death, and that individual, Mar Zutra, departed to life by receiving a slave.
וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי קָטָן הֲוָה, וּדְלָא כְּאַבָּא שָׁאוּל, דְּתַנְיָא: גֵּר שֶׁמֵּת וּבִזְבְּזוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל נְכָסָיו, וְהָיוּ בָּהֶן עֲבָדִים, בֵּין גְּדוֹלִים בֵּין קְטַנִּים – קָנוּ עַצְמָן בְּנֵי חוֹרִין. אַבָּא שָׁאוּל אוֹמֵר: גְּדוֹלִים – קָנוּ עַצְמָן בְּנֵי חוֹרִין, קְטַנִּים – כׇּל הַמַּחְזִיק בָּהֶן זָכָה בָּהֶן.
And there are those who say that this slave was a minor, and Mar Zutra did not act in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a convert who dies without heirs and Jews plundered his property, as it is considered ownerless, and among his possessions were slaves, then, whether the slaves were adults or minors, they acquire ownership of themselves and become freemen, as they can acquire themselves from the ownerless property. Abba Shaul says: Adult slaves acquire ownership of themselves and become freemen. But with regard to minor slaves, anyone who takes possession of them acquires them. According to the opinion of Abba Shaul, Mar Zutra did not have to hasten to acquire the slave during Rabbi Yehuda’s lifetime before the slave would acquire himself. He could have waited until Rabbi Yehuda died before acquiring the slave.
וְקוֹנֶה עַצְמוֹ בְּכֶסֶף כּוּ׳ בְּכֶסֶף עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים. אִין, אֲבָל לֹא עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ. בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעְתּוֹ, מִכְּדֵי שְׁמַעְנָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר דְּאָמַר: חוֹב הוּא לְעֶבֶד שֶׁיֵּצֵא מִיַּד רַבּוֹ לְחֵירוּת. וּתְנֵינָא: זָכִין לָאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו, וְאֵין חָבִין לוֹ אֶלָּא בְּפָנָיו.
§ The mishna teaches that a slave can acquire himself by means of money, and Rabbi Meir rules that this money must be given by others. The Gemara comments: This ruling indicates that with money given by others, yes, the slave can be freed in this manner, but not by giving money himself. The Gemara inquires: With what are we dealing? If we say that this is referring to emancipating the Canaanite slave without his consent, that creates a difficulty. After all, we have heard that Rabbi Meir is the one who says: It is against the slave’s interest to leave his master’s authority for freedom, as he thereby loses out on certain benefits; and we learned in a baraita: One can act in a person’s interest in his absence, but one can act against a person’s interest only in his presence. How can one act against the slave’s interest and free him without his consent?
אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא מִדַּעְתּוֹ, וְהָא קָמַשְׁמַע לַן: עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים – אִין, עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ – לָא. אַלְמָא אֵין קִנְיָן לְעֶבֶד בְּלֹא רַבּוֹ.
Rather, it is obvious that this slave was freed with his consent, and the mishna teaches us this: With money given by others, yes, the slave can be freed in this manner, but by giving money himself, no, he cannot be freed in this manner, despite his consent. Evidently, a slave has no acquisition without his master. It is impossible for a slave to perform an independent act of acquisition, as everything acquired by him immediately belongs to his master. Consequently, he cannot be in possession of money with which he can acquire himself. Instead, the money must be given to his owner by somebody else.
אִי הָכִי, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: בִּשְׁטָר עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ. עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ – אִין, עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים – לָא. וְאִי מִדַּעְתּוֹ, עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים אַמַּאי לָא?
The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: He can be freed by means of a bill of manumission if he accepts it by himself. The Gemara analyzes this ruling: If he accepts it by himself, yes, but if it is accepted by others, no, he cannot acquire his freedom in this manner. And if this document is produced with the slave’s consent, as claimed above, why is it not effective if it is accepted by others?
וְכִי תֵּימָא: מַאי עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ – אַף עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ, וְהָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: דְּגִיטּוֹ וְיָדוֹ בָּאִים כְּאֶחָד, וְהָא לָא תָּנֵי הָכִי, דְּתַנְיָא: בִּשְׁטָר עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ וְלֹא עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר!
The Gemara adds: And if you would say in response: What is the meaning of: If he accepts it by himself? This means that in addition to being freed if the bill of manumission is accepted by others, he can also be freed if he accepts it by himself, and according to this interpretation the mishna teaches us this, that his bill of manumission and his ability to acquire himself come simultaneously. In other words, although he did not have the legal power to acquire himself while he was still a slave, when he receives his bill of manumission he attains this ability at that same moment. The Gemara explains why this interpretation of the mishna is problematic: But Rabbi Meir did not teach this ruling, as it is taught in a baraita: A slave can be freed by means of a bill of manumission if he accepts it by himself, but not if it is accepted by others; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לְעוֹלָם שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעְתּוֹ, וְשָׁאנֵי כֶּסֶף, הוֹאִיל וְקָנֵי לֵיהּ בְּעַל כּוּרְחֵיהּ – מַקְנֵי לֵיהּ בְּעַל כּוּרְחֵיהּ.
Abaye said: Actually, according to Rabbi Meir the mishna is referring to a case where the master received money without the slave’s consent, and acquisition effected with the giving of money is different: Since it acquires him against his will from another master, as the slave’s consent is not necessary in that case, it likewise acquires him for himself against his will. His consent is not required, despite the fact that it is against his interest to be freed.
אִי הָכִי, שְׁטָר נָמֵי! הַאי שְׁטָרָא לְחוֹד וְהַאי שְׁטָרָא לְחוֹד.
The Gemara asks: If so, that the halakha that a slave can be freed with the giving of money without his consent is predicated on the halakha that he can be acquired by means of the giving of money to his previous master without his consent, he should also be freed with a document if it is accepted by others without his consent. The Gemara answers: This document is discrete, and this document is discrete, i.e., the comparison between the acquisition of a slave and his emancipation is invalid in the case of a document, as a document of sale is not similar to a bill of manumission.
הָכָא נָמֵי, הַאי כַּסְפָּא לְחוֹד וְהַאי כַּסְפָּא לְחוֹד? טִיבְעָא מִיהָא חַד הוּא.
The Gemara asks: Here too, this money is discrete and this money is discrete, as the money is given for a different purpose in the cases of acquisition and manumission. The Gemara answers: In any event, the coin itself is one, i.e., there is no noticeable difference between the coin used for acquisition of a slave and one that would be used for emancipating him. The same cannot be said with regard to documents, as particular texts serve specific purposes, and the same document could not be used for both acquiring a slave and emancipating him.
רָבָא אָמַר: כֶּסֶף – קַבָּלַת רַבּוֹ גָּרְמָה לוֹ, שְׁטָר – קַבָּלַת אֲחֵרִים גָּרְמָה לוֹ.
Rava said the following distinction: With regard to emancipation by means of money, his master’s receipt of the money causes him to be freed, not the giving of the money by others. Therefore, they are not considered to have harmed the slave without his consent. By contrast, in the case of a document, the receipt of the document by others on behalf of the slave causes him to be freed, and one can incur liability for another person only in his presence.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בְּכֶסֶף עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ. בְּכֶסֶף עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ – אִין, עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים – לָא. אַמַּאי? נְהִי נָמֵי דְּשֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעְתּוֹ, מִכְּדֵי שְׁמַעְנָא לְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן דְּאָמְרִי: זְכוּת הוּא שֶׁיֵּצֵא מִתַּחַת יָד רַבּוֹ לְחֵירוּת, וּתְנֵינָא: זָכִין לְאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו, וְאֵין חָבִין לוֹ אֶלָּא בְּפָנָיו.
§ The mishna teaches: And the Rabbis say: The slave can be freed by means of money given by himself. The Gemara analyzes this ruling: By means of money given by himself, yes, he can be emancipated in this manner, but with money given by others, no, he cannot be emancipated in this manner. The Gemara asks: Why not? Although this was indeed performed without the slave’s consent, after all, we heard that the Rabbis say: It is in a slave’s interest to go out from the master’s authority to freedom. And we learned in a baraita: One can act in a person’s interest in his absence, but one can act against a person’s interest only in his presence. Why, then, isn’t he freed when others give the money, considering that this change of status is to his advantage?
וְכִי תֵּימָא: מַאי עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ – אַף עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ, וְקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּיֵשׁ קִנְיָן לְעֶבֶד בְּלֹא רַבּוֹ – אִי הָכִי, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: בִּשְׁטָר עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים – וְלֹא עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ, וְהָא קַיְימָא לַן דְּגִיטּוֹ וְיָדוֹ בָּאִין כְּאֶחָד?
And if you would say: What is the meaning of the phrase: By means of money given by himself? This means that not only can he be redeemed by means of money given to others but he can be redeemed even by means of money given to himself, and it teaches us that a slave has the ability to receive an acquisition without his master. If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: He can be freed by means of a bill of manumission if it is accepted by others. This indicates: If it is accepted by others but not if he accepts it by himself. And yet we maintain that according to the Rabbis his bill of manumission and his ability to acquire his freedom come simultaneously. If so, why can’t he be freed through a document he accepts by himself?
וְכִי תֵּימָא: מַאי עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים – אַף עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים, וְהָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דִּזְכוּת הוּא לְעֶבֶד שֶׁיֵּצֵא מִיַּד רַבּוֹ לְחֵירוּת, אִי הָכִי, נְעָרְבִינְהוּ וְנִיתְנִינְהוּ: בְּכֶסֶף וּבִשְׁטָר בֵּין עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים בֵּין עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ!
And if you would say: What is the meaning of: If it is accepted by others? This means that not only can he be emancipated if he accepts the bill of manumission by himself, but he can even be freed if it is accepted by others, and the mishna teaches us this: That it is in a slave’s interest to go out from the master’s authority to freedom. If so, there is no difference between emancipation by means of money and emancipation by means of a document, and therefore let us combine them and teach them together and say: A slave can be freed by means of money and by means of a bill of manumission, whether by others or whether by himself.
אֶלָּא: בְּכֶסֶף – בֵּין עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים בֵּין עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ, בִּשְׁטָר – עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים וְלֹא עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר הוּא, דְּתַנְיָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: אַף בִּשְׁטָר עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים וְלֹא עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ. וְשָׁלֹשׁ מַחְלוֹקוֹת בַּדָּבָר.
Rather, it is clear that there is a difference between money and a document. When he is emancipated by means of money, a slave can be freed whether by means of money given by others or whether by means of money given by himself. In the case of a bill of manumission, he can be emancipated if it is accepted by others but not if he accepts it by himself. And this latter clause is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: A slave can also be freed with a bill of manumission if it is accepted by others but not if he accepts it by himself. And there are three disputes with regard to the matter. There are the opinions of Rabbi Meir, the Rabbis, and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.
אָמַר רַבָּה: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר – גָּמַר ״לָהּ״ ״לָהּ״ מֵאִשָּׁה: מָה אִשָּׁה עַד שֶׁיּוֹצִיא גֵּט לִרְשׁוּת שֶׁאֵינָהּ שֶׁלּוֹ, אַף עֶבֶד נָמֵי עַד שֶׁיּוֹצִיא גֵּט לִרְשׁוּת שֶׁאֵינָהּ שֶׁלּוֹ.
Rabba said: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar? He derives this by means of a verbal analogy, understanding the meaning of “to her [lah],” written with regard to a maidservant in the verse: “Nor was freedom given to her” (Leviticus 19:20), from the meaning of “for her [lah],” written with regard to a wife: “And he writes for her a bill of divorce” (Deuteronomy 24:3). Just as a woman is not divorced until the husband moves the bill of divorce from his domain to a domain that is not his, and the bill of divorce is ineffective as long as it remains in his domain; so too, a slave is not freed unless the master moves the bill of manumission to a domain that is not his. Since the slave belongs to him, the document will remain the master’s even if he gives it to the slave. Therefore, he can be freed by means of a document only through other people who receive the document on his behalf.
בָּעֵי רַבָּה:
Rabba raises a dilemma:
לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר, עֶבֶד כְּנַעֲנִי מַהוּ שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ לְקַבֵּל גִּיטּוֹ מִיָּד רַבּוֹ? כֵּיוָן דְּגָמַר ״לָהּ״ ״לָהּ״ מֵאִשָּׁה, כְּאִשָּׁה,
According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, in the case of a Canaanite slave, what is the halakha with regard to the possibility that a slave can appoint an agent to accept his bill of manumission from the hand of his master? Does one say that since Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar derives the verbal analogy of “lah” and “lah” from a woman, which teaches that a slave can be freed with a document, therefore, a slave is also like a woman in that he too can appoint an agent?
אוֹ דִילְמָא אִשָּׁה דְּאִיהִי מָצֵי מְקַבֶּלֶת גִּיטָּהּ – שָׁלִיחַ נָמֵי מָצֵי מְשַׁוְּיָא. עֶבֶד דְּאִיהוּ לָא מְקַבֵּל גִּיטֵּיהּ – שָׁלִיחַ נָמֵי לָא מָצֵי מְשַׁוֵּי. בָּתַר דְּבַעְיָא הֲדַר פַּשְׁטַהּ: ״לָהּ״ ״לָהּ״ מֵאִשָּׁה, כְּאִשָּׁה.
Or perhaps, in the case of a woman, as she can accept her bill of divorce herself, she can also appoint an agent, whereas a slave is different, as he cannot accept his bill of manumission himself, and consequently he cannot appoint an agent either. After raising the dilemma, Rabba subsequently resolved it: Since Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar derives the verbal analogy of “lah” and “lah” from a woman, a slave is also treated like a woman with regard to his ability to appoint an agent.
וְאֶלָּא הָא דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: הָנֵי כָּהֲנֵי שְׁלוּחֵי דְרַחֲמָנָא נִינְהוּ. דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ שְׁלוּחֵי דִידַן נִינְהוּ, מִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דַּאֲנַן לָא מָצֵינַן עָבְדִינַן וְאִינְהוּ מָצֵי עָבְדִי?
The Gemara comments: But consider that which Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says with regard to the service in the Temple: These priests are the agents of the Merciful One, i.e., they perform the Temple service as the emissaries of God. As if it enters your mind that they are our agents, is there anything that we cannot do but agents can do on our behalf? Since it is prohibited for non-priests to serve in the Temple, priests cannot be considered the agents of the Jewish people.
וְלָא?! וְהָא עַבְדָּא, דְּאִיהוּ לָא מָצֵי מְקַבֵּל גִּיטֵּיהּ וּשְׁלִיחַ מָצֵי מְשַׁוֵּי!
This statement leads to the following question: But is it not true that an agent can be appointed to perform a task that cannot be done by the one who sent him? But according to Rava’s conclusion there is the case of a slave, who is unable to accept his bill of manumission himself, and yet he can appoint an agent to receive it for him.
וְלָא הִיא, יִשְׂרָאֵל לָא שָׁיְכִי בְּתוֹרַת קׇרְבָּנוֹת כְּלָל, עֶבֶד שָׁיֵיךְ בְּגִיטִּין. דְּתַנְיָא: נִרְאִין הַדְּבָרִים שֶׁהָעֶבֶד מְקַבֵּל גִּיטּוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ מִיַּד רַבּוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ, אֲבָל לֹא מִיַּד רַבּוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: And that is not so. The difference between the cases is that an Israelite is not involved in the halakhot of offerings at all, as a non-priest is never permitted to sacrifice offerings. By contrast, a slave is somewhat involved in bills of manumission, as it is taught in a baraita: It seems that a slave can accept the bill of manumission of another slave from the hand of the master of that other slave. But he cannot accept a bill of manumission from the hand of his own master, who wishes to free another of his slaves. In this case there is no acquisition, as the document has not left the master’s property, as anything given to a slave is considered the property of his master. With regard to the issue at hand, since a slave can accept a bill of manumission, at least on behalf of another slave, the halakhot of these documents are relevant to him, and therefore he can appoint an agent to receive his bill of manumission.
וּבִלְבַד שֶׁיְּהֵא הַכֶּסֶף מִשֶּׁל אֲחֵרִים. נֵימָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: אֵין קִנְיָן לְעֶבֶד בְּלֹא רַבּוֹ, וְאֵין קִנְיָן לְאִשָּׁה בְּלֹא בַּעְלָהּ. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: יֵשׁ קִנְיָן לְעֶבֶד בְּלֹא רַבּוֹ, וְיֵשׁ קִנְיָן לְאִשָּׁה בְּלֹא בַּעְלָהּ.
§ The mishna teaches that according to Rabbi Meir the slave can be freed by means of money given by others, while the Rabbis hold that he can be freed by means of money given by himself, provided that the money he gives belongs to others. The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that they disagree with regard to this principle, and that Rabbi Meir maintains: There is no acquisition for a slave without his master, i.e., a slave has no personal property and therefore his master immediately owns whatever the slave acquires, which means a slave cannot receive his redemption money himself. And similarly there is no acquisition for a woman without her husband. And the Rabbis maintain: There is acquisition for a slave without his master, and there is acquisition for a woman without her husband.
אָמַר רַבָּה אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אֵין קִנְיָן לְעֶבֶד בְּלֹא רַבּוֹ, וְאֵין קִנְיָן לְאִשָּׁה בְּלֹא בַּעְלָהּ. וְהָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, דְּאַקְנִי לֵיהּ אַחֵר מָנֶה, וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין לְרַבָּךְ רְשׁוּת בּוֹ״.
Rabba said that Rav Sheshet said: Everyone agrees that there is no acquisition for a slave without his master, and there is no acquisition for a woman without her husband, and so, with what are we dealing here? This is a unique case in which another individual transferred one hundred dinars to a slave and said to him: I am giving this to you on the condition that your master has no rights to it.
רַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: כִּי אָמַר לֵיהּ ״קְנִי״ – קָנֵי עֶבֶד וְקָנֵי רַבֵּיהּ. וְכִי אָמַר לֵיהּ ״עַל מְנָת״ – לֹא כְּלוּם קָאָמַר לֵיהּ. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ ״עַל מְנָת״ – אַהֲנִי לֵיהּ תְּנָאֵיהּ.
The Gemara clarifies the two opinions according to this explanation. Rabbi Meir maintains that when this third party said to the Canaanite slave: Acquire the money, the slave acquires it and his master immediately acquires it. And when he said to him: On the condition that your master has no rights to it, he has said nothing to him, i.e., his condition is ineffective. And the Rabbis maintain that since he said to him: On the condition, his condition is effective and the master does not acquire the money. Therefore, the slave owns this money, with which he can redeem himself.
וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר: כֹּל כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּקָנֵי עֶבֶד וְקָנֵי רַבֵּיהּ, וְהָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, כְּגוֹן דְּאַקְנִי לֵיהּ אַחֵר מָנֶה וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁתֵּצֵא בּוֹ לְחֵירוּת״.
And Rabbi Elazar said: In a case like this, everyone agrees that the slave acquires the money, and his master automatically acquires that which was acquired by the slave. And with what are we dealing here, in the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Meir? This is referring to a case where another person transferred one hundred dinars to him and said to him: On the condition that you are emancipated with it.
רַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: כִּי אֲמַר לֵיהּ ״קְנִי״ – קָנֵי עֶבֶד וְקָנֵי רַבֵּיהּ. וְכִי אֲמַר לֵיהּ ״עַל מְנָת״ – לֹא כְּלוּם קָאָמַר לֵיהּ. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: לְדִידֵיהּ נָמֵי הָא לָא קָא מַקְנֵי לֵיהּ, דְּהָא לָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ אֶלָּא ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁתֵּצֵא בּוֹ לְחֵירוּת״.
The Gemara explains the dispute according to this interpretation. Rabbi Meir maintains that when he said to him: Acquire the money, the slave acquires it, and his master immediately acquires the one hundred dinars from him. And when he said to him: On the condition, he has said nothing to him. And the Rabbis maintain: He does not transfer the money to the slave himself, as he said to him only: On the condition that you are emancipated with it. In other words, he gave it to the slave only for him to hand over the money to his master for his emancipation. His condition is valid and the slave is emancipated.
וּרְמִי דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר אַדְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, וּרְמִי דְּרַבָּנַן אַדְּרַבָּנַן, דְּתַנְיָא:
And the Gemara raises a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Meir and a second statement of Rabbi Meir, and it raises a contradiction between one statement of the Rabbis and a second statement of the Rabbis. As it is taught in a baraita:
