Kiddushin 34

ותפילין

And the donning of phylacteries (Deuteronomy 6:8), which are not worn at night or on Shabbat and Festivals, is also a positive, time-bound mitzva.

ואיזוהי מצות עשה שלא הזמן גרמא מזוזה מעקה אבידה ושילוח הקן

And what is a positive mitzva that is not time bound? Examples include the affixing of a mezuza (Deuteronomy 11:20), the construction of a parapet on a roof (Deuteronomy 22:8), returning a lost item (Deuteronomy 22:1–3), and the release of the mother bird from the nest, i.e., the mitzva of sending away a mother bird when one finds it sitting on chicks or eggs (Deuteronomy 22:6–7).

וכללא הוא הרי מצה שמחה הקהל דמצות עשה שהזמן גרמא ונשים חייבות ותו והרי תלמוד תורה פריה ורביה ופדיון הבן דלאו מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא הוא ונשים פטורות

The Gemara asks: But is this an established principle? But there are the mitzvot of eating matza on the first night of Passover (Exodus 23:15), of rejoicing on a Festival (Deuteronomy 16:9–11), and assembly on Sukkot following the Sabbatical Year (Deuteronomy 31:10–13). And each of these is a positive, time-bound mitzva, and yet women are obligated in them. And furthermore, one can raise a difficulty as follows: But there are the mitzvot of Torah study (Deuteronomy 6:7), procreation (Genesis 1:28), and redemption of the firstborn (Exodus 13:12–13), each of which is not a positive, time-bound mitzva, and yet women are exempt from them.

אמר רבי יוחנן אין למדין מן הכללות ואפילו במקום שנאמר בו חוץ

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One does not learn practical halakhot from general statements, i.e., when a general statement appears in a mishna and uses the term: All, it is not to be understood as an all-inclusive statement without exceptions. This is the case even in a place where it says: Except, to exclude a specific matter.

דתנן בכל מערבין ומשתתפין חוץ מן המים ומלח ותו ליכא והאיכא כמהין ופטריות אלא אין למדין מן הכללות ואפילו במקום שנאמר בו חוץ

A proof for this is as we learned in a mishna (Eiruvin 26b): One can establish a joining of houses in courtyards [eiruv ḥatzerot] and a joining of Shabbat boundaries [eiruv teḥumin], and similarly, one can merge courtyards to permit carrying in a joint alleyway on Shabbat. This can be done with all types of food except for water and salt. This is stated as a halakha with specific exceptions, and yet one can ask: Is there nothing else that cannot be used for an eiruv? But there are truffles and mushrooms, which also cannot be used for an eiruv, because they do not offer nourishment. Rather, conclude from this that one may not learn from general statements, even in a place where it says: Except.

ומצות עשה שהזמן גרמא נשים פטורות מנלן גמר מתפילין מה תפילין נשים פטורות אף כל מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא נשים פטורות ותפילין גמר לה מתלמוד תורה מה תלמוד תורה נשים פטורות אף תפילין נשים פטורות

§ The Gemara turns to the sources of this principle. From where do we derive that women are exempt from positive, time-bound mitzvot? It is derived by juxtaposition from the mitzva of phylacteries: Just as women are exempt from donning phylacteries, so too, women are exempt from all positive, time-bound mitzvot. And the exemption of women from donning phylacteries is derived from their exemption from Torah study: Just as women are exempt from Torah study, as derived from Deuteronomy 11:19, so too women are exempt from donning phylacteries, as the two issues are juxtaposed in the Torah (Deuteronomy 6:7–8).

ונקיש תפילין למזוזה תפילין לתלמוד תורה איתקיש בין בפרשה ראשונה בין בפרשה שניה תפילין למזוזה בפרשה שניה לא איתקיש

The Gemara asks: And let us say the opposite and juxtapose phylacteries to mezuza, which is also mentioned in that passage. Mezuza is a mitzva in which women are also obligated. Based on this comparison, women would be obligated in phylacteries as well. The Gemara answers: Phylacteries are juxtaposed to Torah study in both the first paragraph and in the second paragraph of Shema, whereas phylacteries are not juxtaposed to mezuza in the second paragraph. It is therefore preferable to compare phylacteries to Torah study.

ונקיש מזוזה לתלמוד תורה לא סלקא דעתך דכתיב למען ירבו ימיכם גברי בעי חיי נשי לא בעי חיי

The Gemara says: But if so, let us juxtapose mezuza to Torah study and say that women are also exempt from the obligation of a mezuza. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: This could not enter your mind, as it is written with regard to the mitzva of mezuza: “That your days may be multiplied” (Deuteronomy 11:21). Can it be said that men need life but women do not need life? Since the reward for the performance of the mitzva of mezuza is extended life, this mitzva applies to women as well.

והרי סוכה דמצות עשה שהזמן גרמא דכתיב בסכת תשבו שבעת ימים טעמא דכתב רחמנא האזרח להוציא את הנשים הא לאו הכי נשים חייבות

The Gemara further asks: But there is the mitzva of residing in a sukka, which is a positive, time-bound mitzva, as it is written: “In sukkot you shall reside seven days” (Leviticus 23:42), referring to seven specific days of the year. Nevertheless, the reason women are exempt from this mitzva is that the Merciful One writes in the continuation of the verse: “All the homeborn in Israel shall reside in sukkot.” The definite article “the” is an exclusion, and serves to exclude the women from the obligation to reside in a sukka. It may be derived from here that if that was not so, women would be obligated. This indicates that women do not receive a blanket exemption from every positive, time-bound mitzva.

אמר אביי איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא הואיל דכתיב בסכת תשבו תשבו כעין תדורו מה דירה איש ואשתו אף סוכה איש ואשתו

Abaye said: In the case of residing in a sukka a special verse was necessary to exempt women, as otherwise it might enter your mind to say that since it is written: “In sukkot you shall reside,” this means that you should reside as you dwell in your permanent home: Just as a man and his wife live together in a residence, so too, a man and his wife are obligated to reside together in a sukka.

ורבא אמר

And Rava said:

איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא נילף חמשה עשר חמשה עשר מחג המצות מה להלן נשים חייבות אף כאן נשים חייבות צריכא

It is necessary to state this verse for another reason, as it might enter your mind to say: Derive a verbal analogy with regard to Sukkot, where the verse states: “On the fifteenth day of this seventh month is the festival of Sukkot” (Leviticus 23:34), from Passover, where the verse states: “And on the fifteenth day of the same month is the festival of Passover” (Leviticus 23:6). One would then say that just as there women are obligated to eat matza on the first night of Passover, despite the fact that it is a time-bound mitzva, so too here, with regard to the mitzva of residing in the sukka, women are obligated. Therefore it was necessary for the verse to use the term “the homeborn” to exclude women from the obligation to reside in a sukka.

והרי ראיה דמצות עשה שהזמן גרמא וטעמא דכתב רחמנא זכורך להוציא הנשים הא לאו הכי נשים חייבות

The Gemara further asks: But there is the mitzva of appearance, i.e., the obligation to bring a burnt-offering on pilgrimage Festivals, which is a positive, time-bound mitzva. And the reason women are exempt from this obligation is that the Merciful One writes, with regard to this mitzva: “Three times in the year all of your males shall appear before the Lord God” (Exodus 23:17), which serves to exclude women. It may be derived from here that if that were not so, women would be obligated. This indicates that women are not necessarily exempt from every positive, time-bound mitzva.

איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא נילף ראיה ראיה מהקהל

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the verse to teach the halakha in this case as well, as it might enter your mind to say: Derive a verbal analogy with regard to appearance, where the verse states: Three times in the year all of your males shall appear,” from the appearance stated with regard to the mitzva of assembly, about which the verse states: “When all of Israel come to appear before the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 31:11). One would then say that just as women are obligated in the mitzva of assembly, so too they should be obligated to appear on a pilgrimage Festival. It is therefore necessary for the Torah to state explicitly that women are exempt from the mitzva of appearance on a pilgrimage Festival.

ואדילפינן מתפילין לפטורא נילף משמחה לחיובא אמר אביי אשה בעלה משמחה

With regard to the primary proof for the principle that women are exempt from positive, time-bound mitzvot, the Gemara asks: But before deriving the halakha from phylacteries, to exempt women from all positive, time-bound mitzvot, derive it from the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival, in which women are obligated, to obligate women in all these mitzvot. Abaye said: The mitzva of rejoicing does not apply directly to women. Rather, a woman is rendered joyful by her husband, i.e., the mitzva is for him to gladden her on a Festival.

אלמנה מאי איכא למימר בשרויה אצלו

The Gemara asks: What can be said with regard to a widow, who no longer has a husband but is nevertheless obligated to be joyful on a Festival, as it is written: “And you shall rejoice before the Lord your God, you…and the widow” (Deuteronomy 16:11)? The Gemara answers that the mitzva does not apply directly to a widow; rather, it applies to the men with whom she is present, i.e., they have an obligation to ensure that widows rejoice on the Festivals.

ונילף מהקהל משום דהוה מצה והקהל שני כתובים הבאים כאחד וכל שני כתובים הבאין כאחד אין מלמדים

The Gemara asks: But why not derive that women are obligated in all positive, time-bound mitzvot from the mitzva of assembly, in which women are explicitly obligated despite the fact that it is a time-bound mitzva. The Gemara answers: One cannot derive in this manner, because the verses concerning matza and assembly are two verses that come as one, i.e., to teach the same matter, that women are obligated in these mitzvot despite the fact that these are positive, time-bound mitzvot. And there is a principle that any two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent that applies to other cases. Rather, the two instances are considered exceptions.

אי הכי תפילין וראיה נמי שני כתובים הבאים כאחד ואין מלמדים צריכי דאי כתב רחמנא תפילין ולא כתב ראיה הוה אמינא נילף ראיה ראיה מהקהל

The Gemara asks: If so, the verses concerning phylacteries and appearance are also two verses that come as one, as they both indicate that women are exempt from positive, time-bound mitzvot, and therefore the verses do not teach a precedent. The Gemara answers: These are not considered as two verses that come as one, as both are necessary, each for its own reason. As, if the Merciful One had written that women are exempt from donning phylacteries and had not written that they are exempt from the mitzva of appearance, I would say: Derive a verbal analogy to obligate women from the verse stated with regard to appearance from the appearance stated with regard to the mitzva of assembly. Therefore, it is necessary for the Torah to teach that women are exempt from the mitzva of appearance.

ואי כתב רחמנא ראיה ולא כתב תפילין הוה אמינא אקיש תפילין למזוזה צריכא

And if the Merciful One had written that women are exempt from appearance, and had not written that they are exempt from donning phylacteries, I would say: I will compare phylacteries to mezuza, which would mean that women are obligated in the mitzva of phylacteries. Therefore, it is necessary to state this halakha for both phylacteries and appearance, and they are not two verses that come as one.

אי הכי מצה והקהל נמי צריכי למאי צריכי בשלמא אי כתב רחמנא הקהל ולא כתב מצה הוה אמינא נילף חמשה עשר חמשה עשר מחג הסוכות

The Gemara asks: If so, the verses concerning matza and assembly are also necessary, each for its own reason, and they are not two verses that come as one either. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: For what purpose are both of them necessary? Granted, if the Merciful One had written that women are obligated in the mitzva of assembly but had not written that they are obligated in eating matza, I would say: Derive a verbal analogy with regard to Passover, where the verse states: “And on the fifteenth day of the same month is the festival of Passover” (Leviticus 23:6), from Sukkot, where the verse states: “On the fifteenth day of this seventh month is the festival of Sukkot” (Leviticus 23:34), teaching that women are exempt from eating matza, just as they are exempt from residing in a sukka. Therefore, it is necessary for a verse to teach that women are obligated in eating matza.

אלא ניכתוב רחמנא מצה ולא בעי הקהל ואנא אמינא טפלים חייבים נשים לא כל שכן הילכך הוה להו שני כתובים הבאים כאחד ואין מלמדים

But let the Merciful One write that women are obligated in eating matza, and it would not be necessary to state the same halakha with regard to assembly, and I would say on my own: If children are obligated in assembly, as is stated explicitly in the verse “Assemble the people, the men and the women and the children” (Deuteronomy 31:12), are women not all the more so obligated? Therefore, as it is explicitly stated that women are obligated in assembly, the verses concerning matza and assembly are two verses that come as one, and consequently do not teach a precedent.

הניחא למאן דאמר אין מלמדין אלא למאן דאמר מלמדין מאי איכא למימר

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says as a principle that two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent. But according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, what can be said?

ותו מצות עשה שלא הזמן גרמא נשים חייבות מנלן דיליף ממורא מה מורא נשים חייבות אף כל מצות עשה שלא הזמן גרמא נשים חייבות

And furthermore, one can ask: From where do we derive that women are obligated in positive mitzvot that are not time bound? The Gemara answers that one derives this from the mitzva of fearing one’s mother and father: Just as women are obligated in the mitzva of fear (Leviticus 19:3), so too, women are obligated in every positive mitzva that is not time bound.

ונילף מתלמוד תורה משום דהוה ליה תלמוד תורה ופריה ורביה שני כתובים הבאים כאחד וכל שני כתובים הבאים כאחד אין מלמדים

The Gemara asks: But why not derive the opposite from Torah study: Just as women are exempt from Torah study, so too they should be exempt from all positive mitzvot that are not time bound. The Gemara answers: One cannot derive an exemption for women from their exemption from Torah study, because Torah study and procreation are two verses that come as one, as in both cases women are exempt, despite the fact that these are not time-bound mitzvot. And any two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent.