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Daf Yomi

September 23, 2023 | 讞壮 讘转砖专讬 转砖驻状讚

  • Masechet Kiddushin is sponsored by Julie and Martin Mendelsohn in honor of their two children who were recently married

Kiddushin 41

A woman and a man can each be present to effect the betrothal or they can each send messengers to effect the betrothal on their behalf. A father can betroth his daughter when she is a naara, even via a messenger. Why does the Mishna need to mention that the husband can do the betrothal himself? It is to teach that it is better for one to perform the mitzva themselves than to have someone do it on their behalf. Some people think it is forbidden to send a messenger as perhaps when he sees his wife after the betrothal, she will not find favor in his eyes and he will not want to marry her. This is not a concern for the woman as Reish Lakish understood that women would prefer always to be married than not married. The Mishna states that the father betroths the daughter when she is a naara, but not when she is a minor, even though he can also do it when she is a minor. They derive from here that a father should not betroth a woman so young as she should be at the age where she consents to the marriage. Can a messenger appoint another messenger? From where do we derive the concept of shlichut and that a messenger can ‘fill the shoes’ of the one who sent him/her and is considered as if the action was performed by the one who sent the messenger?

诇讗 注诇转讛 讘讬讚讜 讗诇讗 专讙讝谞讜转讗 讜诇讗讚诐 讟讜讘 诪讟注讬诪讬诐 讗讜转讜 诪驻专讬 诪注砖讬讜 讜讻诇 砖讗讬谞讜 诇讗 讘诪拽专讗 讜诇讗 讘诪砖谞讛 讜诇讗 讘讚专讱 讗专抓 讚讜专 讛谞讗讛 诪诪谞讜 砖谞讗诪专 讜讘诪讜砖讘 诇爪讬诐 诇讗 讬砖讘 诪讜砖讘讜 诪讜砖讘 诇爪讬诐


has managed to acquire only anger [ragzanuta], i.e., nothing beneficial comes through anger; in the end he is left with nothing but the anger itself. And a good person is given the fruit of his actions to taste. And with regard to any person who does not engage in the study of Bible, nor the study of Mishna, nor the desired mode of behavior, one should vow to not derive benefit from him, and one should have no contact with him, as it is stated: 鈥淣or sat in the seat of the scornful鈥 (Psalms 1:1). The seat of this person is certainly the seat of the scornful, as he is engaged in nothing but idle matters.


讛讚专谉 注诇讱 讛讗砖讛 谞拽谞讬转


May we return to you chapter 鈥渁 woman is acquired.鈥


讛讗讬砖 诪拽讚砖 讘讜 讜讘砖诇讜讞讜 讛讗砖讛 诪转拽讚砖转 讘讛 讜讘砖诇讜讞讛 讛讗讬砖 诪拽讚砖 讗转 讘转讜 讻砖讛讬讗 谞注专讛 讘讜 讜讘砖诇讜讞讜


MISHNA: A man can betroth a woman by himself or by means of his agent. Similarly, a woman can become betrothed by herself or by means of her agent. A man can betroth his daughter to a man when she is a young woman, either by himself or by means of his agent.


讙诪壮 讛砖转讗 讘砖诇讜讞讜 诪拽讚砖 讘讜 诪讬讘注讬讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪爪讜讛 讘讜 讬讜转专 诪讘砖诇讜讞讜 讻讬 讛讗 讚专讘 住驻专讗 诪讞专讬讱 专讬砖讗 专讘讗 诪诇讞 砖讬讘讜讟讗


GEMARA: The Gemara starts by questioning the need for the seemingly extraneous halakha stated in the mishna: Now that the mishna stated that one can betroth a woman by means of his agent, is it necessary to state that a man can betroth a woman by himself? Rav Yosef says: The mishna writes both halakhot to teach that although the betrothal is valid either way, it is more fitting that the mitzva be performed by the man himself than by means of his agent. This is like that story of Rav Safra, who would himself singe the head of an animal on Shabbat eve to prepare it to be eaten on Shabbat, and Rava, who would salt a turbot fish himself, to fulfill the mitzva to prepare for Shabbat, although this could have been done by others.


讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讘讛讗 讗讬住讜专讗 谞诪讬 讗讬转 讘讛 讻讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗住讜专 诇讗讚诐 砖讬拽讚砖 讗转 讛讗砖讛 注讚 砖讬专讗谞讛 砖诪讗 讬专讗讛 讘讛 讚讘专 诪讙讜谞讛 讜转转讙谞讛 注诇讬讜 讜专讞诪谞讗 讗诪专 讜讗讛讘转 诇专注讱 讻诪讜讱


There are those who say: With regard to this particular mitzva of betrothal, it also involves a prohibition, in accordance with that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is forbidden for a man to betroth a woman until he sees her, lest he see something repulsive in her after the betrothal, and she will become repugnant to him, which will cause him to hate her. And to prevent this violation of what the Merciful One states in the Torah: 鈥淎nd you shall love your neighbor as yourself鈥 (Leviticus 19:18), the Sages ruled that a man must betroth a woman in person, to ensure that he approves of her.


讜讻讬 讗讬转诪专 讚专讘 讬讜住祝 讗住讬驻讗 讗讬转诪专 讛讗砖讛 诪转拽讚砖转 讘讛 讜讘砖诇讜讞讛 讛砖转讗 讘砖诇讜讞讛 诪讬拽讚砖讗 讘讛 诪讬讘注讬讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪爪讜讛 讘讛 讬讜转专 诪讘砖诇讜讞讛 讻讬 讛讗 讚专讘 住驻专讗 诪讞专讬讱 专讬砖讗 专讘讗 诪诇讞 砖讬讘讜讟讗


And if there is a prohibition against a man betrothing a women by means of an agent, then when the statement of Rav Yosef was stated, that it is merely preferable that the betrothal be performed without an agent, it was stated with regard to the latter clause of the mishna: A woman can become betrothed by herself or by means of her agent. Now that the mishna stated that she can become betrothed by means of her agent, is it necessary to state that she can become betrothed by herself? It was in response to this that Rav Yosef says: It is more fitting that the mitzva be performed by the woman herself than by means of her agent. This is like that story of Rav Safra, who would himself singe the head of an animal on Shabbat eve to prepare it to be eaten on Shabbat, and Rava, who would himself salt a turbot fish.


讗讘诇 讘讛讗 讗讬住讜专讗 诇讬转 讘讛 讻讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讚讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讟讘 诇诪讬转讘 讟谉 讚讜 诪诇诪讬转讘 讗专诪诇讜


But in this case of a woman who appoints an agent, there is no prohibition, as that which Reish Lakish said. As Reish Lakish said: Women have a saying: It is better to sit as two bodies, i.e., be married, than to sit lonely like a widow. Once a woman has decided to marry, she will accept any husband whose betrothal her agent accepts on her behalf, and there is no concern that she will find her betrothed repulsive and violate the mitzva of loving one鈥檚 neighbor like oneself.


讛讗讬砖 诪拽讚砖 讗转 讘转讜 讻砖讛讬讗 谞注专讛 讻砖讛讬讗 谞注专讛 讗讬谉 讻砖讛讬讗 拽讟谞讛 诇讗 诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讜讗讬转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗住讜专 诇讗讚诐 砖讬拽讚砖 讗转 讘转讜 讻砖讛讬讗 拽讟谞讛 注讚 砖转讙讚诇 讜转讗诪专 讘驻诇讜谞讬 讗谞讬 专讜爪讛


The mishna teaches: A man can betroth his daughter to a man when she is a young woman. The Gemara infers: When she is a young woman, yes, he can betroth her; when she is a minor, no, he cannot betroth her. This statement supports the opinion of Rav, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, and some say it was said by Rabbi Elazar: It is prohibited for a person to betroth his daughter to a man when she is a minor, until such time that she grows up and says: I want to marry so-and-so. If a father betroths his daughter when she is a minor and incapable of forming an opinion of the husband, she may later find herself married to someone she does not like.


砖诇讬讞讜转 诪谞诇谉 讚转谞讬讗 讜砖诇讞 诪诇诪讚 砖讛讜讗 注讜砖讛 砖诇讬讞


搂 The mishna states that an agent has the power to effect betrothal. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that there is halakhic agency? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita: The Torah states with regard to one who divorces his wife: 鈥淭hat he writes her a bill of divorce, and gives it in her hand, and sends her [veshille岣h] out of his house鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1). The verse employs the verb: And he sends [veshilla岣]. The fact that the verse employs the term veshilla岣, as opposed to another verb denoting divorce, vegereshah, teaches that he can appoint an agent [shalia岣], as both words share the root shin, lamed, 岣t. The husband does not have to personally give his wife the bill of divorce.


讜砖诇讞讛 诪诇诪讚 砖讛讬讗 注讜砖讛 砖诇讬讞 讜砖诇讞 讜砖诇讞讛 诪诇诪讚 砖讛砖诇讬讞 注讜砖讛 砖诇讬讞


Additionally, the fact that the term 鈥渁nd he sends her [veshille岣h]鈥 can also be read as: And she sends [veshalle岣], teaches that she too can appoint an agent to accept her bill of divorce. Furthermore, in this same passage the verb is repeated in the phrases 鈥渁nd he sends,鈥 鈥渁nd he sends her鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1鈥3), which serves to teach that an agent can appoint another agent.


讗砖讻讞谉 讘讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诪谞诇谉 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讚讬诇讬祝 诪讙讬专讜砖讬谉 诪讛 诇讙讬专讜砖讬谉 砖讻谉 讬砖谞谉 讘注诇 讻专讞讛 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讬爪讗讛 讜讛讬转讛 诪拽讬砖 讛讜讬讛 诇讬爪讬讗讛 诪讛 讬爪讬讗讛 诪砖讜讬 砖诇讬讞 讗祝 讛讜讬讛 谞诪讬 诪砖讜讬 砖诇讬讞


The Gemara asks: We found a source for agency with regard to divorce; from where do we derive that there is agency with regard to betrothal? And if you would say that it is derived from divorce, i.e., just as a wife can be divorced from her husband by means of an agent, she can become betrothed to him in the same way, the two cases are not similar: What is unique about divorce is that it can be effected against her will, while betrothal cannot. Therefore, a means of effecting divorce cannot necessarily be used to effect betrothal. The Gemara answers: The verse states: 鈥淎nd she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another man鈥檚 wife鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:2). Because the verse juxtaposes becoming married to leaving a marriage, just as a husband can appoint an agent for the purpose of leaving a marriage, so too he can appoint an agent for the purpose of becoming married.


讜讗诇讗 讛讗 讚转谞谉 讛讗讜诪专 诇砖诇讜讞讜 爪讗 转专讜诐 转讜专诐 讻讚注转 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讜讗诐 讗讬谞讜 讬讜讚注 讚注转 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 转讜专诐 讘讘讬谞讜谞讬转 讗讞讚 诪讞诪砖讬诐


The Gemara objects: But there is that which we learned in a mishna (Terumot 4:4): In the case of one who says to his agent: Go out and separate teruma from my field鈥檚 produce for me, the agent must separate teruma in accordance with the mindset of the owner. He must separate the amount that he assumes the owner would want to give, as there is no fixed measure for the amount that one must set aside as teruma. A generous person would give as much as one-fortieth of the produce as teruma, while a stingy person would give one-sixtieth. And if he does not know the mindset of the owner, he separates an intermediate measure, which is one-fiftieth of the produce.


驻讬讞转 注砖专讛 讗讜 讛讜住讬祝 注砖专讛 转专讜诪转讜 转专讜诪讛 诪谞诇谉 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讚讬诇讬祝 诪讙讬专讜砖讬谉 诪讛 诇讙讬专讜砖讬谉 砖讻谉 讬砖谞谉 讞讜诇 讗诪专 拽专讗 讗转诐 讙诐 讗转诐 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讛砖诇讬讞


If the agent subtracted ten from the denominator and separated one-fortieth or added ten to the denominator and separated one-sixtieth, thereby giving more or less than the owner intended, his teruma is teruma. From where do we derive that one can appoint an agent to separate teruma? And if you would say that it is derived from divorce, one could argue: What is an aspect unique to divorce is that it is considered a non-sacred matter in relation to teruma and will have different halakhot, so one cannot learn from divorce that one can appoint an agent to separate teruma. The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to teruma: 鈥淪o you also shall set apart a gift unto the Lord of all your tithes鈥 (Numbers 18:28). Once the verse states 鈥測ou,鈥 the addition of the word 鈥渁lso鈥 in the term 鈥測ou also鈥 serves to include an agent.


讜谞讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 讘转专讜诪讛 讜谞讬转讜 讛谞讱 讜谞讙诪专讜 诪讬谞讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪驻专讱 砖讻谉 讬砖谞讛 讘诪讞砖讘讛


The Gemara asks: And let the Merciful One write in the passage concerning teruma that one can appoint an agent, and the halakha that one can appoint an agent to act on his behalf in these other matters, i.e., divorce and betrothal, can come and be derived from it. The Gemara answers: Agency in these matters cannot be derived in this manner because the derivation can be refuted: Separating teruma is different, in that it is able to be separated by mere thought. It is enough for one to decide that a certain portion of his produce shall be teruma to have that status take effect. Just as there is this leniency unique to separating teruma, perhaps the leniency that enables one to appoint an agent is also unique to separating teruma.


讜讛讗 讚转谞谉 讞讘讜专讛 砖讗讘讚 驻住讞讛 讜讗诪专讜 诇讗讞讚 爪讗 讜讘拽砖 讜砖讞讜讟 注诇讬谞讜 讜讛诇讱 讜诪爪讗 讜砖讞讟 讜讛谉 诇拽讞讜 讜砖讞讟讜 讗诐 砖诇讜 谞砖讞讟 专讗砖讜谉 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 诪砖诇讜 讜讛诐 讗讜讻诇讬诐 讜砖讜转讬诐 注诪讜


The Gemara further clarifies the source for agency: Generally, the Paschal offering was brought by a group of people together. But there is that which we learned in a mishna (Pesa岣m 98b): In the case of a group whose Paschal offering was lost before it was sacrificed, and they said to one member of the group: Go and search for our Paschal offering, and when you find it, slaughter it on our behalf; and this person went and found the lost animal and slaughtered it on behalf of the entire group, but meanwhile, despairing of his return, they took a different animal and slaughtered it as a Paschal offering, the halakha is as follows: If his Paschal offering was slaughtered first, he eats from his offering, and they eat and drink with him. This demonstrates that one can act as an agent to slaughter the Paschal offering.


诪谞诇谉 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讚讬诇讬祝 诪讛谞讱 诪讛 诇讛谞讱 砖讻谉 讬砖谞谉 讞讜诇 讗爪诇 拽讚砖讬诐


From where do we derive this halakha, that one can appoint an agent to slaughter an offering? And if you would say that it is derived from these other instances of agency, i.e., divorce and teruma, one could refute this derivation by saying: What is unique about these is that they are considered non-sacred matters relative to offerings, and perhaps offerings have their own set of halakhot.


谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讚专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 诪谞讬谉 砖砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜 砖谞讗诪专 讜砖讞讟讜 讗转讜 讻诇 拽讛诇 注讚转 讬砖专讗诇 讘讬谉 讛注专讘讬诐 讜讻讬 讻诇 讛拽讛诇 讻讜诇谉 砖讜讞讟讬谉 讜讛诇讗 讗讬谞讜 砖讜讞讟 讗诇讗 讗讞讚 讗诇讗 诪讻讗谉 砖砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜


The Gemara answers: He derives it from that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣 says, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣 says: From where is it derived that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is like that of himself? As it is stated with regard to the Paschal offering: 鈥淎nd the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon鈥 (Exodus 12:6). Is it so that the whole assembly slaughters the offering? But only one person from each group slaughters it. Rather, it can be derived from here that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is like that of himself.


谞讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 讘拽讚砖讬诐 讜谞讬转讬 讛谞讱 讜谞讬讙诪专讜 诪讬谞讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪驻专讱 诪讛 诇拽讚砖讬诐 砖讻谉 专讜讘 诪注砖讬讛谉 注诇 讬讚讬 砖诇讬讞


In light of that exposition, the Gemara asks: Let the Merciful One write in the Torah the halakha of an agent with regard to offerings, and these, i.e., agency in the cases of betrothal, divorce, and teruma, can come and be derived from it. The Gemara answers: Agency in these matters cannot be derived in this manner because the derivation can be refuted: What is unique about offerings is that the majority of their actions are performed by means of an agent. Since most of the sacrificial service is performed by priests, who serve as the agents of those bringing the offerings, the general halakha of agency cannot be derived from there.


讞讚讗 诪讞讚讗 诇讗 讗转讬讗 转讬转讬 讞讚讗 诪转专转讬 讛讬 转讬转讬


The Gemara continues to ask: For the reasons stated, the halakha of agency cannot be derived for any one of these from any other one of them. Still, derive one of these from the other two. The Gemara clarifies: Which of them will be derived from the others?


诇讗 谞讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 讘拽讚砖讬诐 讜转讬转讬 诪讛谞讱 诪讛 诇讛谞讱 砖讻谉 讬砖谞谉 讞讜诇 讗爪诇 拽讚砖讬诐 诇讗 谞讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 讘讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讜转讬转讬 诪讛谞讱 诪讛 诇讛谞讱 砖讻谉 讬砖谞谉 讘诪讞砖讘讛


If you say: Let the Merciful One not write the halakha of agency with regard to offerings and derive agency with regard to offerings from these, i.e., divorce and teruma, that derivation can be refuted: What is unique about these is that they are considered non-sacred matters relative to offerings, as even teruma is not sacred compared to offerings, and sacred procedures such as offerings may have their own halakhot. If you say: Let the Merciful One not write the halakha of agency with regard to divorce, and derive agency with regard to divorce from these, i.e., teruma and offerings, this too can be refuted: What is unique about these is they can be designated by means of thought, and therefore may be easier to effect than divorce.


讗诇讗 诇讗 诇讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 讘转专讜诪讛 讜转讬转讬 诪讛谞讱 讛讻讬 谞诪讬


Rather, it is the third derivation that is possible: Let the Merciful One not write the halakha of agency with regard to teruma, and derive agency from these, i.e., offerings and divorce. Although teruma is sacred, offerings are more sacred, and yet the halakha of agency applies to them. Although the separating of teruma can be accomplished by means of thought, as opposed to divorce, offerings can also be designated by means of thought. The Gemara answers: It is indeed so; this is the derivation for the applicability of agency to teruma.


讜讗诇讗 讗转诐 讙诐 讗转诐 诇诪讛 诇讬 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讙诐 讗转诐 诪讛 讗转诐 讘谞讬 讘专讬转 讗祝 砖诇讜讞讻诐 讘谞讬 讘专讬转


The Gemara asks: But then why do I need the derivation that once the verse states 鈥測ou,鈥 the addition of the word 鈥渁lso鈥 in the term 鈥測ou also鈥 serves to include an agent? The Gemara answers: It is necessary to function as the source of the statement of Rabbi Yannai, as Rabbi Yannai says that from the term 鈥測ou also,鈥 the following is derived: Just as you, those who appoint agents, are members of the covenant, i.e., Jews, so too, your agents must be members of the covenant. A gentile cannot separate teruma even if appointed as an agent by a Jew.


讛讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 拽专讗 诪讚专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 谞驻拽讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗讬谉 讛注讘讚 谞注砖讛 砖诇讬讞 诇拽讘诇 讙讟 诪讬讚 讘注诇讛 砖诇 讗砖讛 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谞讜 讘转讜专转 讙讬讟讬谉 讜拽讬讚讜砖讬谉


The Gemara asks: Why do I need a verse to teach this halakha? It is derived from that which Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says, as Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: A slave cannot become an agent to receive a bill of divorce from the hand of a woman鈥檚 husband on her behalf because he is not included in the laws of bills of divorce and betrothal. This indicates that there is a principle that if certain matters do not apply to a person, he cannot act as an agent with regard to those matters. Therefore, since gentiles are not commanded to separate teruma, they cannot be agents for its separation.


讗讬爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 注讘讚 讚诇讗讜 讘专 讛讬转讬专讗 讛讜讗 讻诇诇 讗讘诇 谞讻专讬 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗讬转讬讛 讘转专讜诪讛 讚谞驻砖讬讛 讚转谞谉 讛谞讻专讬 讜讛讻讜转讬 砖转专诪讜 转专讜诪转谉 转专讜诪讛 讗讬诪讗 砖诇讬讞 谞诪讬 注讘讬讚 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉


The Gemara answers: It was nevertheless necessary to derive this halakha for the case of teruma, because it cannot be derived from the statement of Rabbi Yo岣nan. This is as it might enter your mind to say: It is a slave who cannot serve as an agent to receive a bill of divorce, since he cannot release a woman by divorce at all; but a gentile, since he is included in his own teruma, as we learned in a mishna (Terumot 3:9): A gentile or a Samaritan who separated teruma from their own produce, their teruma is considered teruma, despite the fact that they are not obligated to do so, I will say that he can also be appointed as an agent. To counter this argument, the term 鈥測ou also鈥 teaches us that only members of the covenant can act as agents for separating teruma; gentiles cannot.


讜诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚驻讟专 讚转谞谉 转专讜诪转 谞讻专讬 诪讚诪注转 讜讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讛 讞讜诪砖 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 驻讜讟专 讗转诐 讙诐 讗转诐 诇诪讛 诇讬


The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Shimon, who exempts one from paying an additional penalty for the teruma of a gentile, this explanation cannot be stated. As we learned in a mishna (Terumot 3:9): If the teruma of a gentile gets mixed with regular produce, it is considered to be a mixture of teruma and non-sacred produce, and if a non-priest eats this mixture unwittingly he is liable to pay for it an additional one-fifth beyond its value, just as is the halakha with regard to one who unwittingly eats teruma. But Rabbi Shimon exempts him from paying the additional one-fifth, as he holds that the teruma of a gentile possesses no sanctity and is considered a mere gift to a priest. If so, if there is no need to learn the additional halakha that a gentile cannot act as an agent with regard to the separating of teruma, why do I need the derivation from 鈥測ou鈥 and 鈥測ou also鈥?


讗讬爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗诪专 诪专 讗转诐 讜诇讗 讗专讬住讬谉 讗转诐 讜诇讗 砖讜转驻讬谉 讗转诐 讜诇讗 讗驻讜讟专讜驻讜住 讗转诐 讜诇讗 讛转讜专诐 讗转 砖讗讬谞讜 砖诇讜 讗讬诪讗 讗转诐 讜诇讗 砖诇讜讞讻诐 谞诪讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉


The Gemara answers: It was necessary to state this additional term, as it might enter your mind to say: Since the Master says that the word 鈥測ou鈥 is interpreted as a limitation, it means that 鈥測ou,鈥 but not sharecroppers, can separate teruma, as a sharecropper cannot separate teruma from the produce of the owner of the field; 鈥測ou鈥 can separate teruma but not partners from shared property without the consent of the other; 鈥測ou鈥 can separate teruma but not a steward [apotropos] from the estate that he is administering; and 鈥測ou鈥 can separate teruma but not one who separates teruma from produce that is not his, you might also say: 鈥淵ou鈥 can separate teruma and not your agents. The verse therefore teaches us that 鈥測ou also鈥 indicates that one can appoint an agent to separate teruma.


讛谞讬讞讗 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 讗诇讗 诇专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 讚诪驻讬拽 诇讬讛 诇讛讗讬 拽专讗 诇讚专砖讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 诪谞讗 诇谉 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 讗讜诪专 诪谞讬谉 砖讻诇 讬砖专讗诇 讻讜诇谉 讬讜爪讗讬诐


The Gemara poses a question with regard to the basic derivation of the halakha of agency: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣, who explains that the verse: 鈥淎nd the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon鈥 (Exodus 12:6), teaches the halakha of agency with regard to offerings. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, who derives a different exposition from this verse, from where do we derive the halakha of agency with regard to offerings? As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yonatan says: From where do we derive that all of the Jews can fulfill their obligations


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Kiddushin 41

诇讗 注诇转讛 讘讬讚讜 讗诇讗 专讙讝谞讜转讗 讜诇讗讚诐 讟讜讘 诪讟注讬诪讬诐 讗讜转讜 诪驻专讬 诪注砖讬讜 讜讻诇 砖讗讬谞讜 诇讗 讘诪拽专讗 讜诇讗 讘诪砖谞讛 讜诇讗 讘讚专讱 讗专抓 讚讜专 讛谞讗讛 诪诪谞讜 砖谞讗诪专 讜讘诪讜砖讘 诇爪讬诐 诇讗 讬砖讘 诪讜砖讘讜 诪讜砖讘 诇爪讬诐


has managed to acquire only anger [ragzanuta], i.e., nothing beneficial comes through anger; in the end he is left with nothing but the anger itself. And a good person is given the fruit of his actions to taste. And with regard to any person who does not engage in the study of Bible, nor the study of Mishna, nor the desired mode of behavior, one should vow to not derive benefit from him, and one should have no contact with him, as it is stated: 鈥淣or sat in the seat of the scornful鈥 (Psalms 1:1). The seat of this person is certainly the seat of the scornful, as he is engaged in nothing but idle matters.


讛讚专谉 注诇讱 讛讗砖讛 谞拽谞讬转


May we return to you chapter 鈥渁 woman is acquired.鈥


讛讗讬砖 诪拽讚砖 讘讜 讜讘砖诇讜讞讜 讛讗砖讛 诪转拽讚砖转 讘讛 讜讘砖诇讜讞讛 讛讗讬砖 诪拽讚砖 讗转 讘转讜 讻砖讛讬讗 谞注专讛 讘讜 讜讘砖诇讜讞讜


MISHNA: A man can betroth a woman by himself or by means of his agent. Similarly, a woman can become betrothed by herself or by means of her agent. A man can betroth his daughter to a man when she is a young woman, either by himself or by means of his agent.


讙诪壮 讛砖转讗 讘砖诇讜讞讜 诪拽讚砖 讘讜 诪讬讘注讬讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪爪讜讛 讘讜 讬讜转专 诪讘砖诇讜讞讜 讻讬 讛讗 讚专讘 住驻专讗 诪讞专讬讱 专讬砖讗 专讘讗 诪诇讞 砖讬讘讜讟讗


GEMARA: The Gemara starts by questioning the need for the seemingly extraneous halakha stated in the mishna: Now that the mishna stated that one can betroth a woman by means of his agent, is it necessary to state that a man can betroth a woman by himself? Rav Yosef says: The mishna writes both halakhot to teach that although the betrothal is valid either way, it is more fitting that the mitzva be performed by the man himself than by means of his agent. This is like that story of Rav Safra, who would himself singe the head of an animal on Shabbat eve to prepare it to be eaten on Shabbat, and Rava, who would salt a turbot fish himself, to fulfill the mitzva to prepare for Shabbat, although this could have been done by others.


讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讘讛讗 讗讬住讜专讗 谞诪讬 讗讬转 讘讛 讻讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗住讜专 诇讗讚诐 砖讬拽讚砖 讗转 讛讗砖讛 注讚 砖讬专讗谞讛 砖诪讗 讬专讗讛 讘讛 讚讘专 诪讙讜谞讛 讜转转讙谞讛 注诇讬讜 讜专讞诪谞讗 讗诪专 讜讗讛讘转 诇专注讱 讻诪讜讱


There are those who say: With regard to this particular mitzva of betrothal, it also involves a prohibition, in accordance with that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is forbidden for a man to betroth a woman until he sees her, lest he see something repulsive in her after the betrothal, and she will become repugnant to him, which will cause him to hate her. And to prevent this violation of what the Merciful One states in the Torah: 鈥淎nd you shall love your neighbor as yourself鈥 (Leviticus 19:18), the Sages ruled that a man must betroth a woman in person, to ensure that he approves of her.


讜讻讬 讗讬转诪专 讚专讘 讬讜住祝 讗住讬驻讗 讗讬转诪专 讛讗砖讛 诪转拽讚砖转 讘讛 讜讘砖诇讜讞讛 讛砖转讗 讘砖诇讜讞讛 诪讬拽讚砖讗 讘讛 诪讬讘注讬讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪爪讜讛 讘讛 讬讜转专 诪讘砖诇讜讞讛 讻讬 讛讗 讚专讘 住驻专讗 诪讞专讬讱 专讬砖讗 专讘讗 诪诇讞 砖讬讘讜讟讗


And if there is a prohibition against a man betrothing a women by means of an agent, then when the statement of Rav Yosef was stated, that it is merely preferable that the betrothal be performed without an agent, it was stated with regard to the latter clause of the mishna: A woman can become betrothed by herself or by means of her agent. Now that the mishna stated that she can become betrothed by means of her agent, is it necessary to state that she can become betrothed by herself? It was in response to this that Rav Yosef says: It is more fitting that the mitzva be performed by the woman herself than by means of her agent. This is like that story of Rav Safra, who would himself singe the head of an animal on Shabbat eve to prepare it to be eaten on Shabbat, and Rava, who would himself salt a turbot fish.


讗讘诇 讘讛讗 讗讬住讜专讗 诇讬转 讘讛 讻讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讚讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讟讘 诇诪讬转讘 讟谉 讚讜 诪诇诪讬转讘 讗专诪诇讜


But in this case of a woman who appoints an agent, there is no prohibition, as that which Reish Lakish said. As Reish Lakish said: Women have a saying: It is better to sit as two bodies, i.e., be married, than to sit lonely like a widow. Once a woman has decided to marry, she will accept any husband whose betrothal her agent accepts on her behalf, and there is no concern that she will find her betrothed repulsive and violate the mitzva of loving one鈥檚 neighbor like oneself.


讛讗讬砖 诪拽讚砖 讗转 讘转讜 讻砖讛讬讗 谞注专讛 讻砖讛讬讗 谞注专讛 讗讬谉 讻砖讛讬讗 拽讟谞讛 诇讗 诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讜讗讬转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗住讜专 诇讗讚诐 砖讬拽讚砖 讗转 讘转讜 讻砖讛讬讗 拽讟谞讛 注讚 砖转讙讚诇 讜转讗诪专 讘驻诇讜谞讬 讗谞讬 专讜爪讛


The mishna teaches: A man can betroth his daughter to a man when she is a young woman. The Gemara infers: When she is a young woman, yes, he can betroth her; when she is a minor, no, he cannot betroth her. This statement supports the opinion of Rav, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, and some say it was said by Rabbi Elazar: It is prohibited for a person to betroth his daughter to a man when she is a minor, until such time that she grows up and says: I want to marry so-and-so. If a father betroths his daughter when she is a minor and incapable of forming an opinion of the husband, she may later find herself married to someone she does not like.


砖诇讬讞讜转 诪谞诇谉 讚转谞讬讗 讜砖诇讞 诪诇诪讚 砖讛讜讗 注讜砖讛 砖诇讬讞


搂 The mishna states that an agent has the power to effect betrothal. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that there is halakhic agency? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita: The Torah states with regard to one who divorces his wife: 鈥淭hat he writes her a bill of divorce, and gives it in her hand, and sends her [veshille岣h] out of his house鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1). The verse employs the verb: And he sends [veshilla岣]. The fact that the verse employs the term veshilla岣, as opposed to another verb denoting divorce, vegereshah, teaches that he can appoint an agent [shalia岣], as both words share the root shin, lamed, 岣t. The husband does not have to personally give his wife the bill of divorce.


讜砖诇讞讛 诪诇诪讚 砖讛讬讗 注讜砖讛 砖诇讬讞 讜砖诇讞 讜砖诇讞讛 诪诇诪讚 砖讛砖诇讬讞 注讜砖讛 砖诇讬讞


Additionally, the fact that the term 鈥渁nd he sends her [veshille岣h]鈥 can also be read as: And she sends [veshalle岣], teaches that she too can appoint an agent to accept her bill of divorce. Furthermore, in this same passage the verb is repeated in the phrases 鈥渁nd he sends,鈥 鈥渁nd he sends her鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1鈥3), which serves to teach that an agent can appoint another agent.


讗砖讻讞谉 讘讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诪谞诇谉 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讚讬诇讬祝 诪讙讬专讜砖讬谉 诪讛 诇讙讬专讜砖讬谉 砖讻谉 讬砖谞谉 讘注诇 讻专讞讛 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讬爪讗讛 讜讛讬转讛 诪拽讬砖 讛讜讬讛 诇讬爪讬讗讛 诪讛 讬爪讬讗讛 诪砖讜讬 砖诇讬讞 讗祝 讛讜讬讛 谞诪讬 诪砖讜讬 砖诇讬讞


The Gemara asks: We found a source for agency with regard to divorce; from where do we derive that there is agency with regard to betrothal? And if you would say that it is derived from divorce, i.e., just as a wife can be divorced from her husband by means of an agent, she can become betrothed to him in the same way, the two cases are not similar: What is unique about divorce is that it can be effected against her will, while betrothal cannot. Therefore, a means of effecting divorce cannot necessarily be used to effect betrothal. The Gemara answers: The verse states: 鈥淎nd she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another man鈥檚 wife鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:2). Because the verse juxtaposes becoming married to leaving a marriage, just as a husband can appoint an agent for the purpose of leaving a marriage, so too he can appoint an agent for the purpose of becoming married.


讜讗诇讗 讛讗 讚转谞谉 讛讗讜诪专 诇砖诇讜讞讜 爪讗 转专讜诐 转讜专诐 讻讚注转 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讜讗诐 讗讬谞讜 讬讜讚注 讚注转 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 转讜专诐 讘讘讬谞讜谞讬转 讗讞讚 诪讞诪砖讬诐


The Gemara objects: But there is that which we learned in a mishna (Terumot 4:4): In the case of one who says to his agent: Go out and separate teruma from my field鈥檚 produce for me, the agent must separate teruma in accordance with the mindset of the owner. He must separate the amount that he assumes the owner would want to give, as there is no fixed measure for the amount that one must set aside as teruma. A generous person would give as much as one-fortieth of the produce as teruma, while a stingy person would give one-sixtieth. And if he does not know the mindset of the owner, he separates an intermediate measure, which is one-fiftieth of the produce.


驻讬讞转 注砖专讛 讗讜 讛讜住讬祝 注砖专讛 转专讜诪转讜 转专讜诪讛 诪谞诇谉 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讚讬诇讬祝 诪讙讬专讜砖讬谉 诪讛 诇讙讬专讜砖讬谉 砖讻谉 讬砖谞谉 讞讜诇 讗诪专 拽专讗 讗转诐 讙诐 讗转诐 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讛砖诇讬讞


If the agent subtracted ten from the denominator and separated one-fortieth or added ten to the denominator and separated one-sixtieth, thereby giving more or less than the owner intended, his teruma is teruma. From where do we derive that one can appoint an agent to separate teruma? And if you would say that it is derived from divorce, one could argue: What is an aspect unique to divorce is that it is considered a non-sacred matter in relation to teruma and will have different halakhot, so one cannot learn from divorce that one can appoint an agent to separate teruma. The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to teruma: 鈥淪o you also shall set apart a gift unto the Lord of all your tithes鈥 (Numbers 18:28). Once the verse states 鈥測ou,鈥 the addition of the word 鈥渁lso鈥 in the term 鈥測ou also鈥 serves to include an agent.


讜谞讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 讘转专讜诪讛 讜谞讬转讜 讛谞讱 讜谞讙诪专讜 诪讬谞讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪驻专讱 砖讻谉 讬砖谞讛 讘诪讞砖讘讛


The Gemara asks: And let the Merciful One write in the passage concerning teruma that one can appoint an agent, and the halakha that one can appoint an agent to act on his behalf in these other matters, i.e., divorce and betrothal, can come and be derived from it. The Gemara answers: Agency in these matters cannot be derived in this manner because the derivation can be refuted: Separating teruma is different, in that it is able to be separated by mere thought. It is enough for one to decide that a certain portion of his produce shall be teruma to have that status take effect. Just as there is this leniency unique to separating teruma, perhaps the leniency that enables one to appoint an agent is also unique to separating teruma.


讜讛讗 讚转谞谉 讞讘讜专讛 砖讗讘讚 驻住讞讛 讜讗诪专讜 诇讗讞讚 爪讗 讜讘拽砖 讜砖讞讜讟 注诇讬谞讜 讜讛诇讱 讜诪爪讗 讜砖讞讟 讜讛谉 诇拽讞讜 讜砖讞讟讜 讗诐 砖诇讜 谞砖讞讟 专讗砖讜谉 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 诪砖诇讜 讜讛诐 讗讜讻诇讬诐 讜砖讜转讬诐 注诪讜


The Gemara further clarifies the source for agency: Generally, the Paschal offering was brought by a group of people together. But there is that which we learned in a mishna (Pesa岣m 98b): In the case of a group whose Paschal offering was lost before it was sacrificed, and they said to one member of the group: Go and search for our Paschal offering, and when you find it, slaughter it on our behalf; and this person went and found the lost animal and slaughtered it on behalf of the entire group, but meanwhile, despairing of his return, they took a different animal and slaughtered it as a Paschal offering, the halakha is as follows: If his Paschal offering was slaughtered first, he eats from his offering, and they eat and drink with him. This demonstrates that one can act as an agent to slaughter the Paschal offering.


诪谞诇谉 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讚讬诇讬祝 诪讛谞讱 诪讛 诇讛谞讱 砖讻谉 讬砖谞谉 讞讜诇 讗爪诇 拽讚砖讬诐


From where do we derive this halakha, that one can appoint an agent to slaughter an offering? And if you would say that it is derived from these other instances of agency, i.e., divorce and teruma, one could refute this derivation by saying: What is unique about these is that they are considered non-sacred matters relative to offerings, and perhaps offerings have their own set of halakhot.


谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讚专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 诪谞讬谉 砖砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜 砖谞讗诪专 讜砖讞讟讜 讗转讜 讻诇 拽讛诇 注讚转 讬砖专讗诇 讘讬谉 讛注专讘讬诐 讜讻讬 讻诇 讛拽讛诇 讻讜诇谉 砖讜讞讟讬谉 讜讛诇讗 讗讬谞讜 砖讜讞讟 讗诇讗 讗讞讚 讗诇讗 诪讻讗谉 砖砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜


The Gemara answers: He derives it from that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣 says, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣 says: From where is it derived that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is like that of himself? As it is stated with regard to the Paschal offering: 鈥淎nd the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon鈥 (Exodus 12:6). Is it so that the whole assembly slaughters the offering? But only one person from each group slaughters it. Rather, it can be derived from here that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is like that of himself.


谞讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 讘拽讚砖讬诐 讜谞讬转讬 讛谞讱 讜谞讬讙诪专讜 诪讬谞讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪驻专讱 诪讛 诇拽讚砖讬诐 砖讻谉 专讜讘 诪注砖讬讛谉 注诇 讬讚讬 砖诇讬讞


In light of that exposition, the Gemara asks: Let the Merciful One write in the Torah the halakha of an agent with regard to offerings, and these, i.e., agency in the cases of betrothal, divorce, and teruma, can come and be derived from it. The Gemara answers: Agency in these matters cannot be derived in this manner because the derivation can be refuted: What is unique about offerings is that the majority of their actions are performed by means of an agent. Since most of the sacrificial service is performed by priests, who serve as the agents of those bringing the offerings, the general halakha of agency cannot be derived from there.


讞讚讗 诪讞讚讗 诇讗 讗转讬讗 转讬转讬 讞讚讗 诪转专转讬 讛讬 转讬转讬


The Gemara continues to ask: For the reasons stated, the halakha of agency cannot be derived for any one of these from any other one of them. Still, derive one of these from the other two. The Gemara clarifies: Which of them will be derived from the others?


诇讗 谞讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 讘拽讚砖讬诐 讜转讬转讬 诪讛谞讱 诪讛 诇讛谞讱 砖讻谉 讬砖谞谉 讞讜诇 讗爪诇 拽讚砖讬诐 诇讗 谞讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 讘讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讜转讬转讬 诪讛谞讱 诪讛 诇讛谞讱 砖讻谉 讬砖谞谉 讘诪讞砖讘讛


If you say: Let the Merciful One not write the halakha of agency with regard to offerings and derive agency with regard to offerings from these, i.e., divorce and teruma, that derivation can be refuted: What is unique about these is that they are considered non-sacred matters relative to offerings, as even teruma is not sacred compared to offerings, and sacred procedures such as offerings may have their own halakhot. If you say: Let the Merciful One not write the halakha of agency with regard to divorce, and derive agency with regard to divorce from these, i.e., teruma and offerings, this too can be refuted: What is unique about these is they can be designated by means of thought, and therefore may be easier to effect than divorce.


讗诇讗 诇讗 诇讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 讘转专讜诪讛 讜转讬转讬 诪讛谞讱 讛讻讬 谞诪讬


Rather, it is the third derivation that is possible: Let the Merciful One not write the halakha of agency with regard to teruma, and derive agency from these, i.e., offerings and divorce. Although teruma is sacred, offerings are more sacred, and yet the halakha of agency applies to them. Although the separating of teruma can be accomplished by means of thought, as opposed to divorce, offerings can also be designated by means of thought. The Gemara answers: It is indeed so; this is the derivation for the applicability of agency to teruma.


讜讗诇讗 讗转诐 讙诐 讗转诐 诇诪讛 诇讬 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讙诐 讗转诐 诪讛 讗转诐 讘谞讬 讘专讬转 讗祝 砖诇讜讞讻诐 讘谞讬 讘专讬转


The Gemara asks: But then why do I need the derivation that once the verse states 鈥測ou,鈥 the addition of the word 鈥渁lso鈥 in the term 鈥測ou also鈥 serves to include an agent? The Gemara answers: It is necessary to function as the source of the statement of Rabbi Yannai, as Rabbi Yannai says that from the term 鈥測ou also,鈥 the following is derived: Just as you, those who appoint agents, are members of the covenant, i.e., Jews, so too, your agents must be members of the covenant. A gentile cannot separate teruma even if appointed as an agent by a Jew.


讛讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 拽专讗 诪讚专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 谞驻拽讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗讬谉 讛注讘讚 谞注砖讛 砖诇讬讞 诇拽讘诇 讙讟 诪讬讚 讘注诇讛 砖诇 讗砖讛 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谞讜 讘转讜专转 讙讬讟讬谉 讜拽讬讚讜砖讬谉


The Gemara asks: Why do I need a verse to teach this halakha? It is derived from that which Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says, as Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: A slave cannot become an agent to receive a bill of divorce from the hand of a woman鈥檚 husband on her behalf because he is not included in the laws of bills of divorce and betrothal. This indicates that there is a principle that if certain matters do not apply to a person, he cannot act as an agent with regard to those matters. Therefore, since gentiles are not commanded to separate teruma, they cannot be agents for its separation.


讗讬爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 注讘讚 讚诇讗讜 讘专 讛讬转讬专讗 讛讜讗 讻诇诇 讗讘诇 谞讻专讬 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗讬转讬讛 讘转专讜诪讛 讚谞驻砖讬讛 讚转谞谉 讛谞讻专讬 讜讛讻讜转讬 砖转专诪讜 转专讜诪转谉 转专讜诪讛 讗讬诪讗 砖诇讬讞 谞诪讬 注讘讬讚 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉


The Gemara answers: It was nevertheless necessary to derive this halakha for the case of teruma, because it cannot be derived from the statement of Rabbi Yo岣nan. This is as it might enter your mind to say: It is a slave who cannot serve as an agent to receive a bill of divorce, since he cannot release a woman by divorce at all; but a gentile, since he is included in his own teruma, as we learned in a mishna (Terumot 3:9): A gentile or a Samaritan who separated teruma from their own produce, their teruma is considered teruma, despite the fact that they are not obligated to do so, I will say that he can also be appointed as an agent. To counter this argument, the term 鈥測ou also鈥 teaches us that only members of the covenant can act as agents for separating teruma; gentiles cannot.


讜诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚驻讟专 讚转谞谉 转专讜诪转 谞讻专讬 诪讚诪注转 讜讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讛 讞讜诪砖 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 驻讜讟专 讗转诐 讙诐 讗转诐 诇诪讛 诇讬


The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Shimon, who exempts one from paying an additional penalty for the teruma of a gentile, this explanation cannot be stated. As we learned in a mishna (Terumot 3:9): If the teruma of a gentile gets mixed with regular produce, it is considered to be a mixture of teruma and non-sacred produce, and if a non-priest eats this mixture unwittingly he is liable to pay for it an additional one-fifth beyond its value, just as is the halakha with regard to one who unwittingly eats teruma. But Rabbi Shimon exempts him from paying the additional one-fifth, as he holds that the teruma of a gentile possesses no sanctity and is considered a mere gift to a priest. If so, if there is no need to learn the additional halakha that a gentile cannot act as an agent with regard to the separating of teruma, why do I need the derivation from 鈥測ou鈥 and 鈥測ou also鈥?


讗讬爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗诪专 诪专 讗转诐 讜诇讗 讗专讬住讬谉 讗转诐 讜诇讗 砖讜转驻讬谉 讗转诐 讜诇讗 讗驻讜讟专讜驻讜住 讗转诐 讜诇讗 讛转讜专诐 讗转 砖讗讬谞讜 砖诇讜 讗讬诪讗 讗转诐 讜诇讗 砖诇讜讞讻诐 谞诪讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉


The Gemara answers: It was necessary to state this additional term, as it might enter your mind to say: Since the Master says that the word 鈥測ou鈥 is interpreted as a limitation, it means that 鈥測ou,鈥 but not sharecroppers, can separate teruma, as a sharecropper cannot separate teruma from the produce of the owner of the field; 鈥測ou鈥 can separate teruma but not partners from shared property without the consent of the other; 鈥測ou鈥 can separate teruma but not a steward [apotropos] from the estate that he is administering; and 鈥測ou鈥 can separate teruma but not one who separates teruma from produce that is not his, you might also say: 鈥淵ou鈥 can separate teruma and not your agents. The verse therefore teaches us that 鈥測ou also鈥 indicates that one can appoint an agent to separate teruma.


讛谞讬讞讗 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 讗诇讗 诇专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 讚诪驻讬拽 诇讬讛 诇讛讗讬 拽专讗 诇讚专砖讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 诪谞讗 诇谉 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 讗讜诪专 诪谞讬谉 砖讻诇 讬砖专讗诇 讻讜诇谉 讬讜爪讗讬诐


The Gemara poses a question with regard to the basic derivation of the halakha of agency: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣, who explains that the verse: 鈥淎nd the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon鈥 (Exodus 12:6), teaches the halakha of agency with regard to offerings. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, who derives a different exposition from this verse, from where do we derive the halakha of agency with regard to offerings? As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yonatan says: From where do we derive that all of the Jews can fulfill their obligations


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