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Today's Daf Yomi

September 26, 2023 | 讬状讗 讘转砖专讬 转砖驻状讚

  • Masechet Kiddushin is sponsored by Julie and Martin Mendelsohn in honor of their two children who were recently married

Kiddushin 44

Today’s daf is sponsored in honor of Dahlia and Jack Levy on the marriage of their son, Amitai to Shirli Noiman.聽

There is a disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis about whether a naara can accept her own get or only her father can. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about whether the debate between them is also for kiddushin or do they both agree that the father must accept the kiddushin. What is the reason for Rabbi Yochanan who distinguishes between divorce and kiddushin? A braita states that a naara can accept maamar (which is like kiddushin for a yevama). How is this braita explained according to both Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish’s positions? Our Mishna can also be used to raise a difficulty with Reish Lakish’s position as only the father can appoint a messenger, not the naara. The first suggestion is to associate our Mishna with Rabbi Yehuda’s position. However, this suggestion is rejected as the next Mishna does not follow Rabbi Yehuda’s position. The conclusion is that both Mishnayot follow Rabbi Shimon who must hold like Rabbi Yehuda regarding the issue of the naara. Rabbi Avin testified that he was in the beit midrash when the rabbis voted to accept Rabbi Yochanan’s position against Reish Lakish and permit only a father to accept the betrothal of a naara. Rava asked Rav Nachman: if a naara can accept her get, can she appoint an agent to accept it on her behalf or is it only the father that can do that? On what exactly is Rava’s deliberation based? Rav Nachman answered that a naara cannot appoint an agent to accept her get. They raise a difficulty against his ruling from a Mishna in Gittin, but resolve it. If a minor girl accepted a betrothal on her own and when her father heard, he was silent, is that an indication that he accepted her actions and the betrothal is valid on a Torah level or not? Shmuel and Ulla disagree regarding this case.

拽讟谞讛 诪谉 讛讗讬专讜住讬谉 讗讬谉 注讜砖讬诐 讘讛 诪讗诪专 讗诇讗 诪讚注转 讗讘讬讛 讜讛谞注专讛 讘讬谉 诪讚注转 注爪诪讛 讘讬谉 诪讚注转 讗讘讬讛 (诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉)


If a minor girl was widowed after her betrothal, a surviving brother of her betrothed can perform levirate betrothal only with the consent of her father. And in the case of a young woman, he can do so either with her consent [mida鈥檃t atzmah] or with the consent of her father, unlike the halakha with regard to standard betrothal. This indicates that a young woman can accept levirate betrothal on her own, despite the fact that it removes her from her father鈥檚 authority.


讗诇讗 讗讬 讗讬转诪专 讛讻讬 讗讬转诪专 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谞谉 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讚诪讚注转讛 讗讘讬讛 讜诇讗 讛讬讗 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讚讘注诇 讻专讞讛 讘讬谉 讛讬讗 讘讬谉 讗讘讬讛


Rather, if it was stated, it was stated like this: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, says: What is the reason of Rabbi Yo岣nan, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis? With regard to betrothal, which takes effect only with the consent of the one who accepts the betrothal, her father can accept it but not her, since betrothal requires his approval. With regard to a bill of divorce, which can be given without her consent, either she or her father can receive it.


讛专讬 诪讗诪专 讚诪讚注转讛 讜拽转谞讬 讘讬谉 讛讬讗 讜讘讬谉 讗讘讬讛 讛转诐 讘诪讗诪专 讚讘注诇 讻专讞讛 讜专讘讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 讛注讜砖讛 诪讗诪专 讘讬讘诪转讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讛 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 拽谞讛 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 拽谞讛


The Gemara asks: But isn鈥檛 levirate betrothal valid only with her consent, like other betrothals, and yet it teaches in the baraita that either she or her father can accept it? The Gemara answers: There it is referring to levirate betrothal that is performed against her will, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As it is taught in a baraita: If a yavam performs levirate betrothal with his yevama without her consent, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The yavam acquires her. And the Rabbis say: He does not acquire her.


诪讗讬 讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讙诪专 诪讘讬讗讛 讚讬讘诪讛 诪讛 讘讬讗讛 讚讬讘诪讛 讘注诇 讻专讞讛 讗祝 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讘注诇 讻专讞讛 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讬诇驻讬谞谉 诪拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诪讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讚诪讚注转讛 讗祝 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讚诪讚注转讛


The Gemara clarifies: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? He derives the halakha of levirate betrothal from the halakha of sexual intercourse that a yavam engages in with a yevama: Just as intercourse with the yevama renders her acquired even if it is done against her will, so too here, in the case of levirate betrothal, the yavam can betroth her against her will. And the Rabbis hold that we derive the halakha of levirate betrothal from standard betrothal: Just as betrothal can be performed only with her consent, so too here, levirate betrothal can be performed only with her consent.


讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 专讘讬 住讘专 诪讬诇讬 讚讬讘诪讛 诪讬讘诪讛 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诪拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝


The Gemara clarifies: With regard to what do they disagree? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that one should derive matters involving a yevama from other matters involving a yevama, and the marriage between a yevama and a yavam can be formalized against her will. And the Rabbis hold that one should derive matters involving betrothal from the halakhot of betrothal, as levirate betrothal is structured like standard betrothal in other respects.


讛讻讬 谞诪讬 诪住转讘专讗 讻讚拽讗 诪转专抓 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讗诇讗 谞讬诪讗 转讬讛讜讬 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 诇讱 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 砖转讬 讬讚讬诐 讝讜讻讜转 讻讗讞转


The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable to rule with regard to betrothal as Rabbi Yo岣nan explains, that only the father can accept betrothal, from the fact that it teaches in the latter clause of the baraita that with regard to levirate betrothal, in the case of a young woman, the yavam can perform it either with her consent or with the consent of her father, unlike the halakha with regard to standard betrothal. This indicates that she can be betrothed in standard betrothal only with her father鈥檚 agreement. The Gemara asks: Then shall we say that this should be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish, who holds that according to the Rabbis a young woman can also accept her own betrothal? The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish could have said to you: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: Two hands do not acquire an item as one.


讗讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讙讬专讜砖讬谉 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讗讬谉 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讗讬讬讚讬 讚转谞讗 诪讗诪专 讚讚诪讬 诇拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 转谞讗 谞诪讬 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉


The Gemara asks: If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, why does the baraita state: Unlike the halakha with regard to standard betrothal? It should have stated: Unlike the halakha with regard to divorce, as Rabbi Yehuda stated his opinion in the mishna with regard to divorce, not betrothal. The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so, it should have referred to divorce, but since it taught the halakha of levirate betrothal, which is similar to betrothal, it also taught: Unlike the halakha with regard to standard betrothal.


讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪讗诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讝拽讜拽讛 讜注讜诪讚转 讛砖转讗 讚讗转讬转 诇讛讻讬 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 谞诪讬 诇讗 转讬拽砖讬 诇讱 诪注讬拽专讗 砖讗谞讬 诪讗诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讝拽讜拽讛 讜注讜诪讚转


The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, in what way is levirate betrothal different from divorce? Why can a young woman accept the former but not receive a bill of divorce, when both levirate betrothal and divorce can be performed without her consent? The Gemara answers: The halakha of levirate betrothal is different. Since she is bonded to the yavam and standing in wait for him, acceptance of the betrothal money by the yevama suffices to effect the levirate betrothal. The Gemara comments: Now that you have arrived at this explanation, the statement of Rabbi Yo岣nan also should not pose a difficulty for you from the outset. One cannot question his statement with regard to the Rabbis鈥 opinion in the case of betrothal. Levirate betrothal is different, since the yevama is bonded to the yavam and standing in wait for him.


转谞谉 讛讗讬砖 诪拽讚砖 讗转 讘转讜 讻砖讛讬讗 谞注专讛 讘讜 讜讘砖诇讜讞讜 讘讜 讜讘砖诇讜讞讜 讗讬谉 讘讛 讜讘砖诇讜讞讛 诇讗 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 诇讱 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讛讗 谞诪讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗


We learned in the mishna that a man can betroth his daughter to a man when she is a young woman, by himself or by means of his agent. The Gemara analyzes this: Yes, he can betroth her by himself or by means of his agent, but no, she cannot become betrothed by herself or by means of her agent. This is a conclusive refutation of Reish Lakish, who holds that according to the opinion of the Rabbis a young woman can accept her own betrothal. The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish could have said to you: This mishna too is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.


讜诪讬 诪爪讬转 诪讜拽诪转 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜讛拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讛转拽讚砖讬 诇讬 讘转诪专讛 讝讜 讛转拽讚砖讬 诇讬 讘讝讜 讜讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讗谉 转谞讗 讛转拽讚砖讬 讛转拽讚砖讬


The Gemara asks: But can you establish this mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? But the last clause, in the following mishna (46b), teaches: In the case of one who says to a woman: Be betrothed to me with this date and adds: Be betrothed to me with that date, she is betrothed only if one of them is worth one peruta on its own. And we say: Who is the tanna who taught that the two dates are valued separately only if he said: Become betrothed and: Become betrothed, in a separate statement when giving each date, but that if he said: Become betrothed, only once, the value of the two dates are added together?


讜讗诪专 专讘讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 砖讘讜注讛 诇讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚


And Rabba said: It is Rabbi Shimon, who says that one is not liable to bring multiple offerings for taking false oaths to multiple people in the same utterance. For example, if one says: I take an oath that I do not have your item, nor yours, nor yours, he brings a single offering. This is the halakha unless one states an expression of an oath to each and every one of the plaintiffs, by stating: I take an oath I do not have yours; I take an oath I do not have yours, in which case he brings multiple offerings. Consequently, the tanna of this mishna is Rabbi Shimon, not Rabbi Yehuda.


讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜讘驻专讟讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讜诪讬 住讘专 诇讛


And if you would say that the tanna of the entire mishna concerning betrothal is Rabbi Yehuda, and that with regard to the specification of separate oaths he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, this cannot be. But does he in fact hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon with regard to the specification of separate oaths?


讜讛转谞讬讗 讝讛 讛讻诇诇 讻诇诇 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 驻专讟 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 砖讘讜注讛 诇讗 诇讱 诇讗 诇讱 诇讗 诇讱 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 诇讗 诇讱 诇讗 诇讱 诇讗 诇讱 讜诇讗 诇讱 砖讘讜注讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 砖讘讜注讛 诇讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚


But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: This is the principle with regard to one鈥檚 liability to bring offerings for a false oath: If he included all the statements in one oath he is liable for only one oath, but if he specified them, he is liable for each and every one; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one said: I take an oath that I do not have your deposit, nor yours, nor yours, nor yours, and he was found to have taken a false oath, he is liable to bring an offering for each and every one. Rabbi Eliezer says: If he said: I do not have yours, nor yours, nor yours, and nor yours, I take an oath, then he is liable for each and every one. Since he stated the oath at the end, it refers back to each element of his statement. Rabbi Shimon says: He is liable to bring more than one offering only if he states an expression of an oath for each and every one. This indicates that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with Rabbi Shimon with regard to the question of when oaths are considered distinct.


讗诇讗 讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讬讗 讜讘砖诇讬讞讜转 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛


Rather, the Gemara explains in the opposite manner: The tanna of the entire mishna concerning betrothal is Rabbi Shimon, and with regard to the halakha of agency he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, that only the father of a young woman can appoint an agent to accept her betrothal or receive her bill of divorce.


专讘讬 讗住讬 诇讗 注诇 诇讘讬 诪讚专砖讗 讗砖讻讞讬讛 诇专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讗诪讜专 讛讗讬讚谞讗 讘讬 诪讚专砖讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗祝 讗谞讗 诇讗 注讬讬诇 专讘讬 讗讘讬谉 讛讜讗 讚注讬讬诇 讜讗诪专 讞讘专讜转讗 讻讜诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜爪讜讜讞 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讻讬 讻专讜讻讬讗 讜讬爪讗讛 讜讛讬转讛 讜诇讬讻讗 讚讗砖讙讞 讘讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讬谉 讘专 住诪讻讗 讛讜讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬谉 讻诪讬谉 讬诪讗 诇讟讬讙谞讬 讛讜讗


The Gemara relates: One day Rabbi Asi did not go to the study hall. He found Rabbi Zeira and said to him: What was said today in the study hall? Rabbi Zeira said to him: I too did not go, but Rabbi Avin is the one who went, and he said: The entire coterie sided with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan that there is a difference between betrothal and divorce in the case of a young woman. And Reish Lakish screamed at them like a crane: Doesn鈥檛 the verse state: 鈥淎nd she departs out of his house and goes and becomes another man鈥檚 wife鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:2), juxtaposing the halakhot of divorce and betrothal? But no one paid any attention to him. Rabbi Asi said to him: Is Rabbi Avin reliable? Can one be sure that he transmitted an accurate report? Rabbi Zeira said to him: Yes, in this case he can be trusted, since the elapsed time was only like the interval between catching a fish from the sea and bringing it to a frying pan [tignei].


讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讗谞讗 诇讗 专讘讬 讗讘讬谉 讘专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讜诇讗 专讘讬 讗讘讬谉 讘专 讻讛谞讗 讗诇讗 专讘讬 讗讘讬谉 住转诐 诇诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诪讬谞讛 诇诪讬专诪讗 讚讬讚讬讛 讗讚讬讚讬讛


Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k says: When I quote this statement, I do not state it in the name of Rabbi Avin, son of Rabbi 岣yya, nor Rabbi Avin bar Kahana, but in the name of Rabbi Avin, without specification. The Gemara asks: What difference is there? Why does it matter which Rabbi Avin is cited as the source of this statement? The Gemara answers: It would matter if one were to raise a contradiction between one of his rulings and another one of his rulings. If there were to be a conflicting opinion attributed to a specific Rabbi Avin, e.g., Rabbi Avin, son of Rabbi 岣yya, it would not be a true contradiction, as this statement might have been issued by a different Rabbi Avin.


讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉


Rava asked Rav Na岣an:


谞注专讛 诪讛讜 砖转注砖讛 砖诇讬讞 诇拽讘诇 讙讬讟讛 诪讬讚 讘注诇讛 讻讬讚 讗讘讬讛 讚诪讬讗 讗讜 讻讞爪专 讗讘讬讛 讚诪讬讗 讻讬讚 讗讘讬讛 讚诪讬讗 诪讛 讗讘讬讛 诪砖讜讬 砖诇讬讞 讗祝 讛讬讗 谞诪讬 诪砖讜讬 砖诇讬讞 讗讜 讚讬诇诪讗 讻讞爪专 讗讘讬讛 讚诪讬讗 讜注讚 讚诪讟讬讗 讙讬讟讗 诇讬讚讛 诇讗 诪讬讙专砖讛


According to the Rabbis, who hold that a young woman can accept her own bill of divorce, what is the halakha with regard to the ability of a young woman to appoint an agent to receive her bill of divorce from the hand of her husband? The Gemara explains the two sides of this question: Since a young woman is under her father鈥檚 jurisdiction, is she, with regard to acquisitions, considered like an extension of her father鈥檚 hand, or is she considered like her father鈥檚 courtyard? The Gemara clarifies: She might be considered like her father鈥檚 hand, and just as her father can appoint an agent, so too she can appoint an agent. Or perhaps she is considered like her father鈥檚 courtyard, and therefore she is not divorced until the bill of divorce actually reaches her possession, as a courtyard cannot appoint an agent, but it can receive a bill of divorce, in the sense that a bill of divorce thrown in his courtyard is considered to be in his possession.


讜诪讬 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讗 讛讗 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讗 讻转讘 讙讟 讜谞转谞讜 讘讬讚 注讘讚讛 讬砖谉 讜诪砖诪专转讜 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 谞讬注讜专 讗讬谞讜 讙讟 谞讬注讜专 讗诪讗讬 讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讚讛讜讬讗 诇讛 讞爪专 诪砖转诪专转 砖诇讗 诇讚注转讛 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讻讞爪专 讗讘讬讛 讚诪讬讗 讻讬 诪讟讗 讙讬讟讛 诇讬讚讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 转讬讙专砖 讚讛讜讬讗 诇讛 讞爪专 讛诪砖转诪专转 砖诇讗 诇讚注转 讗讘讬讛


The Gemara asks: And is Rava uncertain about this matter? But doesn鈥檛 Rava say: If one wrote a bill of divorce and placed it in the hand of his wife鈥檚 slave, who is sleeping, but she is guarding him, then it is a valid bill of divorce. If the slave was awake, then it is not a valid bill of divorce. Why is it not a valid bill of divorce if he is awake? It is because the slave is for her a courtyard that is not consciously secured by her, i.e., when the slave is awake, he is not fully controlled by her. And if it enters your mind that a young woman is considered like her father鈥檚 courtyard, then even when the bill of divorce reaches her possession she should not be divorced, since she is like a courtyard that is not consciously secured by her father.


讗诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讚讻讬 讬讚 讗讘讬讛 讚诪讬讗 讜讛讻讬 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 诪讬 讗诇讬诪讗 讻讬讚 讗讘讬讛 诇砖讜讬讛 讗讬讛讬 砖诇讬讞 讗讜 诇讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬谉 注讜砖讛 砖诇讬讞


Rather, it is actually obvious to Rava that a young woman is considered like her father鈥檚 hand and not like his courtyard, and this is what he was asking: Is she just as strong as her father鈥檚 hand, to the extent that she can appoint an agent, or not? Rav Na岣an said to him: She cannot appoint an agent.


讗讬转讬讘讬讛 拽讟谞讛 砖讗诪专讛 讛转拽讘诇 诇讬 讙讬讟讬 讗讬谞讜 讙讟 注讚 砖讬讙讬注 讙讟 诇讬讚讛 讛讗 谞注专讛 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘砖讗讬谉 诇讛 讗讘


Rava raised an objection to him from a mishna (Gittin 65a): In the case of a minor girl who said to an agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until the bill of divorce reaches her possession, since a minor is not considered halakhically competent and cannot appoint an agent. Rava inferred from this: But in the case of a young woman, it is a bill of divorce, which indicates that a young woman can appoint an agent. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? With a situation where she does not have a father, and she can appoint an agent since she is of age and is under her own authority. But a betrothed young woman whose father is still alive is under his authority and cannot appoint an agent.


讛讗 诪讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讗诐 讗诪专 讗讘讬讛 爪讗 讜拽讘诇 讙讟 诇讘转讬 讗诐 专爪讛 讘注诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 诇讗 讬讞讝讜专 诪讻诇诇 讚专讬砖讗 讘讚讬砖 诇讛 讗讘 注住拽讬谞谉 讞住讜专讬 诪讬讞住专讗 讜讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 拽讟谞讛 砖讗诪专讛 讛转拽讘诇 诇讬 讙讬讟讬 讗讬谞讜 讙讟 注讚 砖讬讙讬注 讙讟 诇讬讚讛 讛讗 谞注专讛 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讻砖讗讬谉 诇讛 讗讘 讗讘诇 讬砖 诇讛 讗讘 讜讗诪专 讗讘讬讛 爪讗 讜拽讘诇 诇讘转讬 讙讬讟讛 讜专讜爪讛 讘注诇 诇讞讝讜专 诇讗 讬讞讝讜专


The Gemara asks: But from the fact that the latter clause of that same mishna teaches: If her father said to an agent: Go out and receive a bill of divorce for my daughter, then if the husband seeks to retract his decision after he has given the bill of divorce to the agent he cannot retract it, since it is as though the bill of divorce reached her possession, by inference, one can say that in the first clause we are dealing with a case where she has a father. The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: In the case of a minor girl who said: Receive my bill of divorce for me, it is not a bill of divorce until the bill of divorce reaches her possession. But in the case of a young woman, it is a bill of divorce as soon as it reaches her agent鈥檚 possession. In what case is this statement said? It is said when she does not have a father. But if she has a father, and her father said to an agent: Go out and receive my daughter鈥檚 bill of divorce on her behalf, and the husband seeks to retract his decision, he cannot retract it.


讗讬转诪专 拽讟谞讛 砖谞转拽讚砖讛 砖诇讗 诇讚注转 讗讘讬讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 讜爪专讬讻讛 诪讬讗讜谉 讗诪专 拽专谞讗 讚讘专讬诐 讘讙讜 讗诐 讙讟 诇诪讛 诪讬讗讜谉 讗诐 诪讬讗讜谉 诇诪讛 讙讟


It was stated that amora鈥檌m disagreed in the case of a minor who became betrothed without her father鈥檚 consent. Shmuel says: If her husband seeks to divorce her she requires a bill of divorce to sever the marriage, and she also requires refusal, which annuls a betrothal that is valid by rabbinic law but not by Torah law. Karna says: There are puzzling matters included within this statement, since it is self-contradictory: If she needs a bill of divorce, and the betrothal is evidently treated as a proper betrothal, why does she require refusal? Conversely, if she requires refusal, indicating that her betrothal was of no consequence by Torah law, why does she require a bill of divorce?


讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 讛讗 诪专 注讜拽讘讗 讜讘讬 讚讬谞讬讛 讘讻驻专讬 讗驻讻讜讛 砖讚专讜讛 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讛讗诇讛讬诐 爪专讬讻讗 讙讟 讜爪专讬讻讛 诪讬讗讜谉 讜讞住 诇讬讛 诇讝专注讬讛 讚讗讘讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讚谞讬诪讗 讛讻讬


The Sages said to him: Now that Mar Ukva and his court are in the town of Kafrei, let us pose the question to them. Furthermore, they reversed the names of the respective opinions of Shmuel and Karna and sent the question before Rav. He said to the messengers in the form of an oath: By God! She requires a bill of divorce and she requires refusal. And God forbid that the seed of Abba bar Abba, i.e., Shmuel, should say such a thing, that she does not require both.


讜讟注诪讗 诪讗讬 讗诪专 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 砖诪讗 谞转专爪讛 讛讗讘 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 爪专讬讻讛 诪讬讗讜谉 砖诪讗 诇讗 谞转专爪讛 讛讗讘 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讜讬讗诪专讜 讗讬谉 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 转讜驻住讬谉 讘讗讞讜转讛


The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that there is a need for both a bill of divorce and refusal? Rav A岣, son of Rav Ika, said: She requires a bill of divorce because perhaps the father desired the betrothal, which would mean it would take effect retroactively. She also requires refusal because perhaps the father did not desire the betrothal, and it did not take effect. If she receives only a bill of divorce, and her former husband proceeds to betroth her sister, people will say that the betrothal does not take effect with her sister. The halakha is that betrothal can take effect with the sister of one鈥檚 wife or former wife only after the first wife has died. She is therefore required to perform refusal, to indicate that the validity of her betrothal was uncertain. If he later betroths her sister, he would be required to divorce her due to the uncertainty if this second betrothal took effect.


讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讜讛讜讗 砖砖讚讻讜


Rav Na岣an said: And this concern that the father of a minor might later state that he desired her betrothal is relevant only when they arranged the match before she betrothed herself, as in that case it is likely that the father desired the betrothal.


注讜诇讗 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讬讗讜谉 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚砖讬讚讻讜 诪讗谉 讚诪转谞讬 讛讗 诇讗 诪转谞讬 讛讗 讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诪专 注讜诇讗 拽讟谞讛 砖谞转拽讚砖讛 砖诇讗 诇讚注转 讗讘讬讛 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讬讗讜谉 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛


The Gemara quotes another opinion. Ulla said: If a minor accepted betrothal without her father鈥檚 consent, her betrothal does not take effect, and she does not even require refusal. The Gemara asks: Does Ulla鈥檚 statement apply even though they arranged the match? The Gemara answers: He who teaches this does not teach that. The one who cited Ulla鈥檚 statement does not hold that Shmuel鈥檚 ruling applies only in the case of an arranged match, rather it applies in all cases. According to this opinion, Ulla stated his halakha only in a case where the match was not arranged. There are those who say that Ulla says: If a minor became betrothed without her father鈥檚 consent, she does not even require refusal, including a case where the match was arranged.


诪转讬讘 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讜讻讜诇谉 讗诐 诪转讜 讗讜 诪讬讗谞讜 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讜 讗讜 砖谞诪爪讗讜 讗讬讬诇讜谞讬转 爪专讜转讬讛谉 诪讜转专讜转


Rav Kahana raises an objection: The mishna in Yevamot (2a) teaches that if a potential yevama is in one of the fifteen categories of women forbidden to the yavam as a relative, not only is she forbidden to him, but he also may not perform levirate marriage with any of her rival wives. The Sages then clarified this halakha: And if, before the husband had died, any of those forbidden women had died, or had performed refusal; or had been divorced; or had been found to be a sexually underdeveloped woman [ailonit], who is incapable of bearing children, then her rival wives are permitted to the yavam.


讚拽讚砖讛 诪讗谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚拽讚砖讛 讗讘讬讛 讘诪讬讗讜谉 住讙讬 诇讛 讙讟 诪注诇讬讗 讘注讬讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讚拽讚砖讛 讗讬讛讬 谞驻砖讛 讜拽转谞讬 讚讘注讬讗 诪讬讗讜谉


Rav Kahana focuses on the case of one who performed refusal: With regard to this refusal that she performed, what type of betrothal did it follow? When she was betrothed by whom? If we say that her father betrothed her to the brother who died, is refusal alone enough for her to dissolve the marriage? Doesn鈥檛 she require a proper bill of divorce? Rather, is it not referring to a case where she betrothed herself when she was a minor, and the mishna nevertheless teaches that she requires refusal. This presents a difficulty for Ulla, who holds that she does not need even refusal.


讛讜讗 诪讜转讬讘 诇讛 讜讛讜讗 诪驻专拽 诇讛 讻讙讜谉 砖谞注砖讛 诇讛 诪注砖讛 讬转讜诪讛 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘


The Gemara comments: Rav Kahana raised the objection and he resolved it: The mishna refers to a case where she became like an orphan in her father鈥檚 lifetime, i.e., her father betrothed her to a man, and she was subsequently widowed or divorced while still a minor. In that case, the same halakha as that of an orphan applies to her, in that her father does not have the right to betroth her again, although he is still alive. If she then would betroth herself, her betrothal is not effective by Torah law, because she is still a minor. It does take effect by rabbinic law, and she can annul that marriage by performing refusal. This would not be a question for Ulla, as he stated his ruling in a case where it was the first betrothal of the minor.


诪转讬讘 专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 讗讬谉 诪讜讻专讛 诇拽专讜讘讬诐 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗诪专讜 诪讜讻专讛 诇拽专讜讘讬诐


Rav Hamnuna raises an objection: It is taught in a baraita with regard to a Hebrew maidservant: A father cannot sell his minor daughter as a Hebrew maidservant to her relatives because the Torah requires that the one who purchases a maidservant be able to marry her. The Sages said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: He can sell her even to her relatives, as sometimes a Hebrew maidservant serves only in that capacity, without marrying the master.


  • Masechet Kiddushin is sponsored by Julie and Martin Mendelsohn in honor of their two children who were recently married

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Kiddushin 44

拽讟谞讛 诪谉 讛讗讬专讜住讬谉 讗讬谉 注讜砖讬诐 讘讛 诪讗诪专 讗诇讗 诪讚注转 讗讘讬讛 讜讛谞注专讛 讘讬谉 诪讚注转 注爪诪讛 讘讬谉 诪讚注转 讗讘讬讛 (诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉)


If a minor girl was widowed after her betrothal, a surviving brother of her betrothed can perform levirate betrothal only with the consent of her father. And in the case of a young woman, he can do so either with her consent [mida鈥檃t atzmah] or with the consent of her father, unlike the halakha with regard to standard betrothal. This indicates that a young woman can accept levirate betrothal on her own, despite the fact that it removes her from her father鈥檚 authority.


讗诇讗 讗讬 讗讬转诪专 讛讻讬 讗讬转诪专 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谞谉 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讚诪讚注转讛 讗讘讬讛 讜诇讗 讛讬讗 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讚讘注诇 讻专讞讛 讘讬谉 讛讬讗 讘讬谉 讗讘讬讛


Rather, if it was stated, it was stated like this: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, says: What is the reason of Rabbi Yo岣nan, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis? With regard to betrothal, which takes effect only with the consent of the one who accepts the betrothal, her father can accept it but not her, since betrothal requires his approval. With regard to a bill of divorce, which can be given without her consent, either she or her father can receive it.


讛专讬 诪讗诪专 讚诪讚注转讛 讜拽转谞讬 讘讬谉 讛讬讗 讜讘讬谉 讗讘讬讛 讛转诐 讘诪讗诪专 讚讘注诇 讻专讞讛 讜专讘讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 讛注讜砖讛 诪讗诪专 讘讬讘诪转讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讛 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 拽谞讛 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 拽谞讛


The Gemara asks: But isn鈥檛 levirate betrothal valid only with her consent, like other betrothals, and yet it teaches in the baraita that either she or her father can accept it? The Gemara answers: There it is referring to levirate betrothal that is performed against her will, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As it is taught in a baraita: If a yavam performs levirate betrothal with his yevama without her consent, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The yavam acquires her. And the Rabbis say: He does not acquire her.


诪讗讬 讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讙诪专 诪讘讬讗讛 讚讬讘诪讛 诪讛 讘讬讗讛 讚讬讘诪讛 讘注诇 讻专讞讛 讗祝 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讘注诇 讻专讞讛 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讬诇驻讬谞谉 诪拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诪讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讚诪讚注转讛 讗祝 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讚诪讚注转讛


The Gemara clarifies: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? He derives the halakha of levirate betrothal from the halakha of sexual intercourse that a yavam engages in with a yevama: Just as intercourse with the yevama renders her acquired even if it is done against her will, so too here, in the case of levirate betrothal, the yavam can betroth her against her will. And the Rabbis hold that we derive the halakha of levirate betrothal from standard betrothal: Just as betrothal can be performed only with her consent, so too here, levirate betrothal can be performed only with her consent.


讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 专讘讬 住讘专 诪讬诇讬 讚讬讘诪讛 诪讬讘诪讛 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诪拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝


The Gemara clarifies: With regard to what do they disagree? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that one should derive matters involving a yevama from other matters involving a yevama, and the marriage between a yevama and a yavam can be formalized against her will. And the Rabbis hold that one should derive matters involving betrothal from the halakhot of betrothal, as levirate betrothal is structured like standard betrothal in other respects.


讛讻讬 谞诪讬 诪住转讘专讗 讻讚拽讗 诪转专抓 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讗诇讗 谞讬诪讗 转讬讛讜讬 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 诇讱 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 砖转讬 讬讚讬诐 讝讜讻讜转 讻讗讞转


The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable to rule with regard to betrothal as Rabbi Yo岣nan explains, that only the father can accept betrothal, from the fact that it teaches in the latter clause of the baraita that with regard to levirate betrothal, in the case of a young woman, the yavam can perform it either with her consent or with the consent of her father, unlike the halakha with regard to standard betrothal. This indicates that she can be betrothed in standard betrothal only with her father鈥檚 agreement. The Gemara asks: Then shall we say that this should be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish, who holds that according to the Rabbis a young woman can also accept her own betrothal? The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish could have said to you: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: Two hands do not acquire an item as one.


讗讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讙讬专讜砖讬谉 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讗讬谉 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讗讬讬讚讬 讚转谞讗 诪讗诪专 讚讚诪讬 诇拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 转谞讗 谞诪讬 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉


The Gemara asks: If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, why does the baraita state: Unlike the halakha with regard to standard betrothal? It should have stated: Unlike the halakha with regard to divorce, as Rabbi Yehuda stated his opinion in the mishna with regard to divorce, not betrothal. The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so, it should have referred to divorce, but since it taught the halakha of levirate betrothal, which is similar to betrothal, it also taught: Unlike the halakha with regard to standard betrothal.


讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪讗诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讝拽讜拽讛 讜注讜诪讚转 讛砖转讗 讚讗转讬转 诇讛讻讬 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 谞诪讬 诇讗 转讬拽砖讬 诇讱 诪注讬拽专讗 砖讗谞讬 诪讗诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讝拽讜拽讛 讜注讜诪讚转


The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, in what way is levirate betrothal different from divorce? Why can a young woman accept the former but not receive a bill of divorce, when both levirate betrothal and divorce can be performed without her consent? The Gemara answers: The halakha of levirate betrothal is different. Since she is bonded to the yavam and standing in wait for him, acceptance of the betrothal money by the yevama suffices to effect the levirate betrothal. The Gemara comments: Now that you have arrived at this explanation, the statement of Rabbi Yo岣nan also should not pose a difficulty for you from the outset. One cannot question his statement with regard to the Rabbis鈥 opinion in the case of betrothal. Levirate betrothal is different, since the yevama is bonded to the yavam and standing in wait for him.


转谞谉 讛讗讬砖 诪拽讚砖 讗转 讘转讜 讻砖讛讬讗 谞注专讛 讘讜 讜讘砖诇讜讞讜 讘讜 讜讘砖诇讜讞讜 讗讬谉 讘讛 讜讘砖诇讜讞讛 诇讗 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 诇讱 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讛讗 谞诪讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗


We learned in the mishna that a man can betroth his daughter to a man when she is a young woman, by himself or by means of his agent. The Gemara analyzes this: Yes, he can betroth her by himself or by means of his agent, but no, she cannot become betrothed by herself or by means of her agent. This is a conclusive refutation of Reish Lakish, who holds that according to the opinion of the Rabbis a young woman can accept her own betrothal. The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish could have said to you: This mishna too is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.


讜诪讬 诪爪讬转 诪讜拽诪转 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜讛拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讛转拽讚砖讬 诇讬 讘转诪专讛 讝讜 讛转拽讚砖讬 诇讬 讘讝讜 讜讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讗谉 转谞讗 讛转拽讚砖讬 讛转拽讚砖讬


The Gemara asks: But can you establish this mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? But the last clause, in the following mishna (46b), teaches: In the case of one who says to a woman: Be betrothed to me with this date and adds: Be betrothed to me with that date, she is betrothed only if one of them is worth one peruta on its own. And we say: Who is the tanna who taught that the two dates are valued separately only if he said: Become betrothed and: Become betrothed, in a separate statement when giving each date, but that if he said: Become betrothed, only once, the value of the two dates are added together?


讜讗诪专 专讘讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 砖讘讜注讛 诇讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚


And Rabba said: It is Rabbi Shimon, who says that one is not liable to bring multiple offerings for taking false oaths to multiple people in the same utterance. For example, if one says: I take an oath that I do not have your item, nor yours, nor yours, he brings a single offering. This is the halakha unless one states an expression of an oath to each and every one of the plaintiffs, by stating: I take an oath I do not have yours; I take an oath I do not have yours, in which case he brings multiple offerings. Consequently, the tanna of this mishna is Rabbi Shimon, not Rabbi Yehuda.


讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜讘驻专讟讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讜诪讬 住讘专 诇讛


And if you would say that the tanna of the entire mishna concerning betrothal is Rabbi Yehuda, and that with regard to the specification of separate oaths he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, this cannot be. But does he in fact hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon with regard to the specification of separate oaths?


讜讛转谞讬讗 讝讛 讛讻诇诇 讻诇诇 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 驻专讟 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 砖讘讜注讛 诇讗 诇讱 诇讗 诇讱 诇讗 诇讱 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 诇讗 诇讱 诇讗 诇讱 诇讗 诇讱 讜诇讗 诇讱 砖讘讜注讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 砖讘讜注讛 诇讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚


But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: This is the principle with regard to one鈥檚 liability to bring offerings for a false oath: If he included all the statements in one oath he is liable for only one oath, but if he specified them, he is liable for each and every one; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one said: I take an oath that I do not have your deposit, nor yours, nor yours, nor yours, and he was found to have taken a false oath, he is liable to bring an offering for each and every one. Rabbi Eliezer says: If he said: I do not have yours, nor yours, nor yours, and nor yours, I take an oath, then he is liable for each and every one. Since he stated the oath at the end, it refers back to each element of his statement. Rabbi Shimon says: He is liable to bring more than one offering only if he states an expression of an oath for each and every one. This indicates that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with Rabbi Shimon with regard to the question of when oaths are considered distinct.


讗诇讗 讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讬讗 讜讘砖诇讬讞讜转 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛


Rather, the Gemara explains in the opposite manner: The tanna of the entire mishna concerning betrothal is Rabbi Shimon, and with regard to the halakha of agency he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, that only the father of a young woman can appoint an agent to accept her betrothal or receive her bill of divorce.


专讘讬 讗住讬 诇讗 注诇 诇讘讬 诪讚专砖讗 讗砖讻讞讬讛 诇专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讗诪讜专 讛讗讬讚谞讗 讘讬 诪讚专砖讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗祝 讗谞讗 诇讗 注讬讬诇 专讘讬 讗讘讬谉 讛讜讗 讚注讬讬诇 讜讗诪专 讞讘专讜转讗 讻讜诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜爪讜讜讞 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讻讬 讻专讜讻讬讗 讜讬爪讗讛 讜讛讬转讛 讜诇讬讻讗 讚讗砖讙讞 讘讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讬谉 讘专 住诪讻讗 讛讜讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬谉 讻诪讬谉 讬诪讗 诇讟讬讙谞讬 讛讜讗


The Gemara relates: One day Rabbi Asi did not go to the study hall. He found Rabbi Zeira and said to him: What was said today in the study hall? Rabbi Zeira said to him: I too did not go, but Rabbi Avin is the one who went, and he said: The entire coterie sided with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan that there is a difference between betrothal and divorce in the case of a young woman. And Reish Lakish screamed at them like a crane: Doesn鈥檛 the verse state: 鈥淎nd she departs out of his house and goes and becomes another man鈥檚 wife鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:2), juxtaposing the halakhot of divorce and betrothal? But no one paid any attention to him. Rabbi Asi said to him: Is Rabbi Avin reliable? Can one be sure that he transmitted an accurate report? Rabbi Zeira said to him: Yes, in this case he can be trusted, since the elapsed time was only like the interval between catching a fish from the sea and bringing it to a frying pan [tignei].


讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讗谞讗 诇讗 专讘讬 讗讘讬谉 讘专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讜诇讗 专讘讬 讗讘讬谉 讘专 讻讛谞讗 讗诇讗 专讘讬 讗讘讬谉 住转诐 诇诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诪讬谞讛 诇诪讬专诪讗 讚讬讚讬讛 讗讚讬讚讬讛


Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k says: When I quote this statement, I do not state it in the name of Rabbi Avin, son of Rabbi 岣yya, nor Rabbi Avin bar Kahana, but in the name of Rabbi Avin, without specification. The Gemara asks: What difference is there? Why does it matter which Rabbi Avin is cited as the source of this statement? The Gemara answers: It would matter if one were to raise a contradiction between one of his rulings and another one of his rulings. If there were to be a conflicting opinion attributed to a specific Rabbi Avin, e.g., Rabbi Avin, son of Rabbi 岣yya, it would not be a true contradiction, as this statement might have been issued by a different Rabbi Avin.


讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉


Rava asked Rav Na岣an:


谞注专讛 诪讛讜 砖转注砖讛 砖诇讬讞 诇拽讘诇 讙讬讟讛 诪讬讚 讘注诇讛 讻讬讚 讗讘讬讛 讚诪讬讗 讗讜 讻讞爪专 讗讘讬讛 讚诪讬讗 讻讬讚 讗讘讬讛 讚诪讬讗 诪讛 讗讘讬讛 诪砖讜讬 砖诇讬讞 讗祝 讛讬讗 谞诪讬 诪砖讜讬 砖诇讬讞 讗讜 讚讬诇诪讗 讻讞爪专 讗讘讬讛 讚诪讬讗 讜注讚 讚诪讟讬讗 讙讬讟讗 诇讬讚讛 诇讗 诪讬讙专砖讛


According to the Rabbis, who hold that a young woman can accept her own bill of divorce, what is the halakha with regard to the ability of a young woman to appoint an agent to receive her bill of divorce from the hand of her husband? The Gemara explains the two sides of this question: Since a young woman is under her father鈥檚 jurisdiction, is she, with regard to acquisitions, considered like an extension of her father鈥檚 hand, or is she considered like her father鈥檚 courtyard? The Gemara clarifies: She might be considered like her father鈥檚 hand, and just as her father can appoint an agent, so too she can appoint an agent. Or perhaps she is considered like her father鈥檚 courtyard, and therefore she is not divorced until the bill of divorce actually reaches her possession, as a courtyard cannot appoint an agent, but it can receive a bill of divorce, in the sense that a bill of divorce thrown in his courtyard is considered to be in his possession.


讜诪讬 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讗 讛讗 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讗 讻转讘 讙讟 讜谞转谞讜 讘讬讚 注讘讚讛 讬砖谉 讜诪砖诪专转讜 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 谞讬注讜专 讗讬谞讜 讙讟 谞讬注讜专 讗诪讗讬 讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讚讛讜讬讗 诇讛 讞爪专 诪砖转诪专转 砖诇讗 诇讚注转讛 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讻讞爪专 讗讘讬讛 讚诪讬讗 讻讬 诪讟讗 讙讬讟讛 诇讬讚讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 转讬讙专砖 讚讛讜讬讗 诇讛 讞爪专 讛诪砖转诪专转 砖诇讗 诇讚注转 讗讘讬讛


The Gemara asks: And is Rava uncertain about this matter? But doesn鈥檛 Rava say: If one wrote a bill of divorce and placed it in the hand of his wife鈥檚 slave, who is sleeping, but she is guarding him, then it is a valid bill of divorce. If the slave was awake, then it is not a valid bill of divorce. Why is it not a valid bill of divorce if he is awake? It is because the slave is for her a courtyard that is not consciously secured by her, i.e., when the slave is awake, he is not fully controlled by her. And if it enters your mind that a young woman is considered like her father鈥檚 courtyard, then even when the bill of divorce reaches her possession she should not be divorced, since she is like a courtyard that is not consciously secured by her father.


讗诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讚讻讬 讬讚 讗讘讬讛 讚诪讬讗 讜讛讻讬 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 诪讬 讗诇讬诪讗 讻讬讚 讗讘讬讛 诇砖讜讬讛 讗讬讛讬 砖诇讬讞 讗讜 诇讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬谉 注讜砖讛 砖诇讬讞


Rather, it is actually obvious to Rava that a young woman is considered like her father鈥檚 hand and not like his courtyard, and this is what he was asking: Is she just as strong as her father鈥檚 hand, to the extent that she can appoint an agent, or not? Rav Na岣an said to him: She cannot appoint an agent.


讗讬转讬讘讬讛 拽讟谞讛 砖讗诪专讛 讛转拽讘诇 诇讬 讙讬讟讬 讗讬谞讜 讙讟 注讚 砖讬讙讬注 讙讟 诇讬讚讛 讛讗 谞注专讛 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘砖讗讬谉 诇讛 讗讘


Rava raised an objection to him from a mishna (Gittin 65a): In the case of a minor girl who said to an agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until the bill of divorce reaches her possession, since a minor is not considered halakhically competent and cannot appoint an agent. Rava inferred from this: But in the case of a young woman, it is a bill of divorce, which indicates that a young woman can appoint an agent. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? With a situation where she does not have a father, and she can appoint an agent since she is of age and is under her own authority. But a betrothed young woman whose father is still alive is under his authority and cannot appoint an agent.


讛讗 诪讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讗诐 讗诪专 讗讘讬讛 爪讗 讜拽讘诇 讙讟 诇讘转讬 讗诐 专爪讛 讘注诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 诇讗 讬讞讝讜专 诪讻诇诇 讚专讬砖讗 讘讚讬砖 诇讛 讗讘 注住拽讬谞谉 讞住讜专讬 诪讬讞住专讗 讜讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 拽讟谞讛 砖讗诪专讛 讛转拽讘诇 诇讬 讙讬讟讬 讗讬谞讜 讙讟 注讚 砖讬讙讬注 讙讟 诇讬讚讛 讛讗 谞注专讛 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讻砖讗讬谉 诇讛 讗讘 讗讘诇 讬砖 诇讛 讗讘 讜讗诪专 讗讘讬讛 爪讗 讜拽讘诇 诇讘转讬 讙讬讟讛 讜专讜爪讛 讘注诇 诇讞讝讜专 诇讗 讬讞讝讜专


The Gemara asks: But from the fact that the latter clause of that same mishna teaches: If her father said to an agent: Go out and receive a bill of divorce for my daughter, then if the husband seeks to retract his decision after he has given the bill of divorce to the agent he cannot retract it, since it is as though the bill of divorce reached her possession, by inference, one can say that in the first clause we are dealing with a case where she has a father. The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: In the case of a minor girl who said: Receive my bill of divorce for me, it is not a bill of divorce until the bill of divorce reaches her possession. But in the case of a young woman, it is a bill of divorce as soon as it reaches her agent鈥檚 possession. In what case is this statement said? It is said when she does not have a father. But if she has a father, and her father said to an agent: Go out and receive my daughter鈥檚 bill of divorce on her behalf, and the husband seeks to retract his decision, he cannot retract it.


讗讬转诪专 拽讟谞讛 砖谞转拽讚砖讛 砖诇讗 诇讚注转 讗讘讬讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 讜爪专讬讻讛 诪讬讗讜谉 讗诪专 拽专谞讗 讚讘专讬诐 讘讙讜 讗诐 讙讟 诇诪讛 诪讬讗讜谉 讗诐 诪讬讗讜谉 诇诪讛 讙讟


It was stated that amora鈥檌m disagreed in the case of a minor who became betrothed without her father鈥檚 consent. Shmuel says: If her husband seeks to divorce her she requires a bill of divorce to sever the marriage, and she also requires refusal, which annuls a betrothal that is valid by rabbinic law but not by Torah law. Karna says: There are puzzling matters included within this statement, since it is self-contradictory: If she needs a bill of divorce, and the betrothal is evidently treated as a proper betrothal, why does she require refusal? Conversely, if she requires refusal, indicating that her betrothal was of no consequence by Torah law, why does she require a bill of divorce?


讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 讛讗 诪专 注讜拽讘讗 讜讘讬 讚讬谞讬讛 讘讻驻专讬 讗驻讻讜讛 砖讚专讜讛 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讛讗诇讛讬诐 爪专讬讻讗 讙讟 讜爪专讬讻讛 诪讬讗讜谉 讜讞住 诇讬讛 诇讝专注讬讛 讚讗讘讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讚谞讬诪讗 讛讻讬


The Sages said to him: Now that Mar Ukva and his court are in the town of Kafrei, let us pose the question to them. Furthermore, they reversed the names of the respective opinions of Shmuel and Karna and sent the question before Rav. He said to the messengers in the form of an oath: By God! She requires a bill of divorce and she requires refusal. And God forbid that the seed of Abba bar Abba, i.e., Shmuel, should say such a thing, that she does not require both.


讜讟注诪讗 诪讗讬 讗诪专 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 砖诪讗 谞转专爪讛 讛讗讘 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 爪专讬讻讛 诪讬讗讜谉 砖诪讗 诇讗 谞转专爪讛 讛讗讘 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讜讬讗诪专讜 讗讬谉 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 转讜驻住讬谉 讘讗讞讜转讛


The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that there is a need for both a bill of divorce and refusal? Rav A岣, son of Rav Ika, said: She requires a bill of divorce because perhaps the father desired the betrothal, which would mean it would take effect retroactively. She also requires refusal because perhaps the father did not desire the betrothal, and it did not take effect. If she receives only a bill of divorce, and her former husband proceeds to betroth her sister, people will say that the betrothal does not take effect with her sister. The halakha is that betrothal can take effect with the sister of one鈥檚 wife or former wife only after the first wife has died. She is therefore required to perform refusal, to indicate that the validity of her betrothal was uncertain. If he later betroths her sister, he would be required to divorce her due to the uncertainty if this second betrothal took effect.


讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讜讛讜讗 砖砖讚讻讜


Rav Na岣an said: And this concern that the father of a minor might later state that he desired her betrothal is relevant only when they arranged the match before she betrothed herself, as in that case it is likely that the father desired the betrothal.


注讜诇讗 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讬讗讜谉 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚砖讬讚讻讜 诪讗谉 讚诪转谞讬 讛讗 诇讗 诪转谞讬 讛讗 讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诪专 注讜诇讗 拽讟谞讛 砖谞转拽讚砖讛 砖诇讗 诇讚注转 讗讘讬讛 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讬讗讜谉 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛


The Gemara quotes another opinion. Ulla said: If a minor accepted betrothal without her father鈥檚 consent, her betrothal does not take effect, and she does not even require refusal. The Gemara asks: Does Ulla鈥檚 statement apply even though they arranged the match? The Gemara answers: He who teaches this does not teach that. The one who cited Ulla鈥檚 statement does not hold that Shmuel鈥檚 ruling applies only in the case of an arranged match, rather it applies in all cases. According to this opinion, Ulla stated his halakha only in a case where the match was not arranged. There are those who say that Ulla says: If a minor became betrothed without her father鈥檚 consent, she does not even require refusal, including a case where the match was arranged.


诪转讬讘 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讜讻讜诇谉 讗诐 诪转讜 讗讜 诪讬讗谞讜 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讜 讗讜 砖谞诪爪讗讜 讗讬讬诇讜谞讬转 爪专讜转讬讛谉 诪讜转专讜转


Rav Kahana raises an objection: The mishna in Yevamot (2a) teaches that if a potential yevama is in one of the fifteen categories of women forbidden to the yavam as a relative, not only is she forbidden to him, but he also may not perform levirate marriage with any of her rival wives. The Sages then clarified this halakha: And if, before the husband had died, any of those forbidden women had died, or had performed refusal; or had been divorced; or had been found to be a sexually underdeveloped woman [ailonit], who is incapable of bearing children, then her rival wives are permitted to the yavam.


讚拽讚砖讛 诪讗谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚拽讚砖讛 讗讘讬讛 讘诪讬讗讜谉 住讙讬 诇讛 讙讟 诪注诇讬讗 讘注讬讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讚拽讚砖讛 讗讬讛讬 谞驻砖讛 讜拽转谞讬 讚讘注讬讗 诪讬讗讜谉


Rav Kahana focuses on the case of one who performed refusal: With regard to this refusal that she performed, what type of betrothal did it follow? When she was betrothed by whom? If we say that her father betrothed her to the brother who died, is refusal alone enough for her to dissolve the marriage? Doesn鈥檛 she require a proper bill of divorce? Rather, is it not referring to a case where she betrothed herself when she was a minor, and the mishna nevertheless teaches that she requires refusal. This presents a difficulty for Ulla, who holds that she does not need even refusal.


讛讜讗 诪讜转讬讘 诇讛 讜讛讜讗 诪驻专拽 诇讛 讻讙讜谉 砖谞注砖讛 诇讛 诪注砖讛 讬转讜诪讛 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘


The Gemara comments: Rav Kahana raised the objection and he resolved it: The mishna refers to a case where she became like an orphan in her father鈥檚 lifetime, i.e., her father betrothed her to a man, and she was subsequently widowed or divorced while still a minor. In that case, the same halakha as that of an orphan applies to her, in that her father does not have the right to betroth her again, although he is still alive. If she then would betroth herself, her betrothal is not effective by Torah law, because she is still a minor. It does take effect by rabbinic law, and she can annul that marriage by performing refusal. This would not be a question for Ulla, as he stated his ruling in a case where it was the first betrothal of the minor.


诪转讬讘 专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 讗讬谉 诪讜讻专讛 诇拽专讜讘讬诐 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗诪专讜 诪讜讻专讛 诇拽专讜讘讬诐


Rav Hamnuna raises an objection: It is taught in a baraita with regard to a Hebrew maidservant: A father cannot sell his minor daughter as a Hebrew maidservant to her relatives because the Torah requires that the one who purchases a maidservant be able to marry her. The Sages said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: He can sell her even to her relatives, as sometimes a Hebrew maidservant serves only in that capacity, without marrying the master.


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