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Daf Yomi

October 2, 2023 | 讬状讝 讘转砖专讬 转砖驻状讚

  • Masechet Kiddushin is sponsored by Julie and Martin Mendelsohn in honor of their two children who were recently married

Kiddushin 50

Today’s daf is sponsored by Elana Kermaier in loving memory of her father Moshe Fox z”l, Moshe Yehuda ben haRav Binyamin v’Chaya Tzipora on his sixth yahrzeit. “Your love of nature and the outdoors made Sukkot your favorite holiday. We so much miss celebrating this chag with you in our Sukkah.”.

Today’s daf is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs in loving memory of Shira’s mother, Batya Rachel bat Yakov v’Rivkah, Brenda Katz, on her first yahrzeit.

If one sells a house with the intent to move to Israel but does not mention it as a condition of the sale and the move to Israel does not work out, can one cancel the sale of the house? Rava rules that “matters of the heart are not considered matters” and therefore the sale cannot be canceled. The sages bring five different sources to bring a source for this principle but the first four suggestions are rejected. Eventually, it is proven from a Mishna in Meila 6:1. A few other cases are mentioned regarding one who sold his house with the intent to move to Israel – in one case, he moved but then moved back as it didn’t work out and in another, he never moved. In the first case, Rava ruled and in the second, Rav Ashi ruled, but there were two different versions regarding each of the rulings. If a man appoints an agent to betroth his wife in a specific location, the betrothal is only effective if the agent does exactly as he was told. But if the man tells the agent to betroth her and specifies where the agent can find her, if he finds her somewhere else and betroths her there, the betrothal is effective. Why does this need to be specified here by betrothal and also in Gittin regarding marriage? If a man betroths a woman with a condition that she does not have vows she has taken upon herself or blemishes and she in fact does, the betrothal is ineffective. But if he did not betroth her with that condition and yet finds out once betrothed that she has vows or blemishes, he can divorce her without having to give her the ketuba money. If a betrothal takes place but the husband does not do it with the value of a pruta and then later sends gifts that were traditionally sent to the bride’s family after betrothal (sovlonot) to her house, the betrothal is ineffective as we assume the gifts were not meant for kiddushin. The Mishna lists three different types of cases where sending gifts would be ineffective – what is unique about each of the three cases that warranted each being mentioned? If the man only sent gifts (without a betrothal), do we need to be concerned that perhaps it was sent with the intent to betroth (or that there must have already been a betrothal – otherwise, why would he be sending the gifts)? Rav Huna and Raba hold that she is considered betrothed by safek (out of doubt) and will require a get before getting married to someone else. Two versions are brought about a discussion Raba and Abaye have regarding this ruling – in each version one supports and one disagrees. What does the Gemara conclude regarding this case? If one finds a ketuba of a woman in the marketplace and it is not known that she was betrothed, do we need to be strict and assume she must have been betrothed? On what does it depend? If one betrothed two women at the same time who are both forbidden to him on account of each other, such as a woman and her sister or a woman and her mother, neither betrothal is effective.

讬拽专讬讘 讗转讜 诪诇诪讚 砖讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 讬讻讜诇 讘注诇 讻专讞讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇专爪谞讜


With regard to one who pledges to bring a burnt-offering, the verse states: 鈥淚f his offering be a burnt-offering of the herd, he shall offer it a male without blemish; he shall bring it to the door of the Tent of Meeting, according to his will, before the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 1:3). The seemingly superfluous words 鈥渉e shall offer it鈥 teaches that they coerce him to bring the offering. I might have thought that it can be offered entirely against his will, by taking it from his possession and sacrificing it; therefore, the verse states: 鈥淎ccording to his will.鈥


讛讗 讻讬爪讚 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 专讜爪讛 讗谞讬 讜讗诪讗讬 讛讗 讘诇讘讬讛 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 讚讘专讬诐 砖讘诇讘 讗讬谞谉 讚讘专讬诐 讜讚讬诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗谞谉 住讛讚讬 讚谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讘讻驻专讛


How can these texts be reconciled? They coerce him until he says: I want to bring the offering. The Gemara asks: But why should this be effective; but in his heart it is not satisfactory for him to bring the offering, and it is not according to his will. Rather, is it not because we say: Unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters, and his intention is rendered irrelevant by his explicit statement? The Gemara rejects this: But perhaps there it is different, since it is clear to us that it is satisfactory for him to achieve atonement, despite his earlier statement to the contrary.


讗诇讗 诪住讬驻讗 讜讻谉 讗转讛 诪讜爪讗 讘讙讬讟讬 谞砖讬诐 讜砖讞专讜专讬 注讘讚讬诐 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 专讜爪讛 讗谞讬 讜讗诪讗讬 讛讗 讘诇讘讬讛 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 讚讘专讬诐 砖讘诇讘 讗讬谞谉 讚讘专讬诐 讜讚讬诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 诪砖讜诐 讚诪爪讜讛 诇砖诪讜注 讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐


Rather, the Gemara derives a proof from the latter clause of that same baraita: And similarly, you find with bills of divorce of women and bills of manumission of slaves that when the court rules that a man must divorce his wife or free his slave and he does not want to, they coerce him until he says: I want to divorce my wife, or: I want to free my slave. But why should this be effective; but in his heart it is not satisfactory for him to divorce her or to free him. Rather, is it not because we say that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters? The Gemara rejects this proof as well: But perhaps there it is different, because it is a mitzva to listen to the statements of the Sages, and the assumption is that when he is required to divorce his wife or free his slave, his true desire is to perform the mitzva.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪讛讻讗 讛诪拽讚砖 讗转 讛讗砖讛 讜讗诪专 讻住讘讜专 讛讬讬转讬 砖讛讬讗 讻讛谞转 讜讛专讬 讛讬讗 诇讜讬讛 诇讜讬讛 讜谞诪爪讗转 讻讛谞转 注谞讬讬讛 讜讛专讬 讛讬讗 注砖讬专讛 注砖讬专讛 讜讛专讬 讛讬讗 注谞讬讬讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 诪驻谞讬 砖诇讗 讛讟注转讜 讜讗诪讗讬 讛讗 拽讗诪专 讻住讘讜专 讛讬讬转讬 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 讚讘专讬诐 砖讘诇讘 讗讬谞谉 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讚诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚诇讞讜诪专讗


Rather, Rav Yosef says: The proof is from here (64a): In the case of one who betroths a woman and he said: I thought that she was the daughter of a priest, and she is in fact the daughter of a Levite; or I thought she was the daughter of a Levite, and she is found to be the daughter of a priest; I thought she was poor, and she is wealthy; or I thought she was wealthy, and she is poor, she is betrothed despite his mistaken assumption, because she did not mislead him. But why is she betrothed; but he said: I thought that she had a different characteristic, and he betrothed her with that in mind? Rather, it is because we say that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters. Abaye said to him: Perhaps it is different there, since the ruling there is that she requires a bill of divorce only as a stringency, and they are not definitively betrothed.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪讛讻讗 讘讻讜诇诐 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗诪专讛 讘诇讘讬 讛讬讛 诇讛转拽讚砖 诇讜 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 讻谉 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讗诪讗讬 讛讗 拽讗诪专讛 讘诇讘讬 讛讬讛 讜讚讬诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讻讬讜谉 讚讗转谞讬讛 诇讗讜 讻诇 讻诪讬谞讛 讚注拽专讗 诇讛 诇转谞讗讬讛


Rather, Abaye said that the proof is from here, from the mishna: And in all these cases, despite the fact that she later stated: I intended to become betrothed to him nevertheless, she is not betrothed. But why should her betrothal not take effect at all; but she said: I intended to become betrothed? This clause of the mishna teaches that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant. The Gemara rejects this proof: But perhaps it is different there, as, since he stipulated explicitly that a certain condition was true, it is not in her power to uproot his condition through thoughts alone.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讬谉 注讜讘讚讗 讛讜讛 讘讬 专讘 讞住讚讗 讜专讘 讞住讚讗 讘讬 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜驻砖讟讜讛 诪讛讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇砖诇讜讞讜 讛讘讗 诇讬 诪谉 讛讞诇讜谉 讗讜 诪谉 讛讚诇讜住拽诪讗 讜讛讘讬讗 诇讜 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗诪专 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 诇讗 讛讬讛 诇讬 讘诇讘讬 讗诇讗 注诇 讝讛 讻讬讜谉 砖讛讘讬讗 诇讜 诪讝讛 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 诪注诇 讜讗诪讗讬 讛讗 拽讗诪专 讘诇讘讬 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 讚讘专讬诐 砖讘诇讘 讗讬谞谉 讚讘专讬诐


Rather, Rav 岣yya bar Avin says: There was an incident of this kind in Rav 岣sda鈥檚 study hall, and Rav 岣sda brought the case to Rav Huna鈥檚 study hall, and they resolved it from this mishna (Me鈥檌la 21a): In the case of one who says to his agent: Bring me such and such an item from the window ledge or from the box [hadeluskema], forgetting that the item in question was consecrated property and any use of it would constitute misuse of consecrated property, and the agent brought it to him, then although at that point the owner said: My intention was that you bring the item only from this other place, once he brought the item to him from that place that he had mentioned, once the agent uses it the owner is liable for having misused consecrated property. But why should he be responsible; but he said: My intention was for the other place, so the agent did not fulfill his mission. Rather, is it not because we say that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters?


讜讚诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚诇诪讬驻讟专 谞驻砖讬讛 诪拽专讘谉 拽讗转讬


The Gemara rejects this: But perhaps it is different there, since it is suspected that he is coming to exempt himself from bringing an offering for his misuse by claiming that he intended a different item. Since there is cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place, his claim is not accepted. This cannot serve as a proof that in general, unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant.


讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诪专 诪讝讬讚 讛讜讛 诇讗 注讘讬讚 讗讬谞讬砖 讚诪砖讜讬 谞驻砖讬讛 专砖讬注讗


The Gemara responds: If all he wanted to do was exempt himself from the obligation to bring an offering, he could have said that the misuse was intentional, as one who misuses consecrated property intentionally is not obligated to bring an offering. Therefore, there is no cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place. The Gemara counters: It is not common for a person to place himself in the category of a wicked person by claiming to have committed a transgression intentionally. Therefore, once again, there is cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place.


讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇讜诪专 谞讝讻专转讬 讚转谞谉 谞讝讻专 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讜诇讗 谞讝讻专 砖诇讬讞 砖诇讬讞 诪注诇


The Gemara continues to ask: To exempt himself from the obligation to bring an offering, he could have said: After the agent left I remembered that it was consecrated property. Such a claim would also have rendered him exempt, as we learned in that same mishna (Me鈥檌la 21a): If one sent an agent to bring a particular item, and the owner remembered that it was consecrated and the agent did not remember but proceeded to fulfill his agency, it is the agent who has misused consecrated property and is liable to bring an offering, not the one who designated him, since the latter remembered and canceled the agency. There is no cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place. Therefore, the fact that this statement is not accepted can serve as a proof that in general, unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant.


讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚讝讘谞讬谞讛讜 诇谞讬讻住讬讛 讗讚注转讗 诇诪讬住拽 诇讗专注讗 讚讬砖专讗诇 住诇讬拽 讜诇讗 讗讬转讚专 诇讬讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 讻诇 讚住诇讬拽 讗讚注转讗 诇诪讬讚专 讛讜讗 讜讛讗 诇讗 讗讬转讚专 诇讬讛 讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗讚注转讗 诇诪讬住拽 讜讛讗 住诇讬拽 诇讬讛


The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who sold his property with the intention of ascending to Eretz Yisrael and explicitly stated this intention to the buyer. He ascended to Eretz Yisrael but he was not able to settle there. Upon his return to Babylonia, he sought to nullify the sale. Rava said: Whoever ascends to Eretz Yisrael does so with the intention of settling there, and as he was not able to settle there he can nullify the sale. There are those who say a different version, that Rava said the opposite: He intended to ascend to Eretz Yisrael, and he ascended, so he cannot nullify the sale.


讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚讝讘谞讬谞讛讜 诇谞讬讻住讬讛 讗讚注转讗 诇诪讬住拽 诇讗专抓 讬砖专讗诇 诇住讜祝 诇讗 住诇讬拽 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讗讬 讘注讬 住诇讬拽 讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗讬 讘注讬 诇讗 住诇讬拽 诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚讗讬转讬诇讬讚 讗讜谞住讗 讘讗讜专讞讗


The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was a certain man who sold his property with the intention of ascending to Eretz Yisrael, but ultimately he did not ascend there. Rav Ashi said: If he had wanted to do so, he could have ascended. Since the matter depended upon him, there are no grounds for nullifying the sale. There are those who say Rav Ashi said as follows: If he had wanted to do so, couldn鈥檛 he have ascended? Since nothing prevented him from leaving, the sale is not nullified. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the two versions of Rav Ashi鈥檚 statement? The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them in a case when circumstances beyond his control occurred along the way, preventing him from going. According to the first version of the statement of Rav Ashi, the sale is upheld; but according to the second version, where Rav Ashi responded in the form of a question, the implication is that if there actually had been something that prevented him from ascending, the sale would be nullified.


诪转谞讬壮 讛讗讜诪专 诇砖诇讜讞讜 爪讗 讜拽讚砖 诇讬 讗砖讛 驻诇讜谞讬转 讘诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讜讛诇讱 讜拽讚砖讛 讘诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讜拽讚砖讛 讘诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 讛专讬 讝讜 诪拽讜讚砖转


MISHNA: In the case of one who says to his agent: Go and betroth for me so-and-so in such and such a place, and the agent went and betrothed her in a different place, she is not betrothed, since he instructed that the betrothal take place in a particular location. But if he said: Go and betroth the woman for me, she is in such and such a place; and the agent betrothed her in a different place, she is betrothed, since he did not mean that the agent should betroth her specifically there, but was merely telling him where to find her.


讙诪壮 讜转谞谉 谞诪讬 讙讘讬 讙讬讟讬谉 讛讗讜诪专 转谞讜 讙讟 讝讛 诇讗砖转讬 讘诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讜谞转谞讜 诇讛 讘诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 驻住讜诇 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讜谞转谞讜 诇讛 讘诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 讻砖专


GEMARA: The Gemara comments: And we also learned in a mishna with regard to bills of divorce (Gittin 65a): With regard to one who says to his agents: Give this bill of divorce to my wife in such and such a place, and they gave it to her in another place, the divorce is invalid. If he said to them: She is in such and such a place, and they gave it to her in another place, it is valid.


讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讘诪拽讜诐 讚诇拽讜专讘讛 拽讗转讬 讘讛讗讬 讗转专讗 专讞诪讜 诇讬 讜诇讗 诪诪诇讬 诪讬诇讬 注诇讜讬 讘讛讗讬 讗转专讗 住谞讜 诇讬 诪诪诇讬 诪讬诇讬 注诇讜讬 讗讘诇 讙讘讬 讙讬讟讬谉 讚诇专讞讜拽讛 拽讗转讬 讗讬诪专 诇讗 讗讬讻驻转 诇讬讛


The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state this halakha with regard to both betrothal and divorce, because had the tanna taught us only with regard to betrothal, you might say: In a case when he is coming to draw her near to him through betrothal, he thinks: They love me in this place and will not say negative remarks about me, but they hate me in that place and will say negative remarks about me. Therefore, he told the agent to perform the betrothal in a certain place and is particular that it take place only there. But with regard to bills of divorce, when he is coming to distance her from him, you might say he does not care where the divorce itself is performed. The tanna therefore informs us that this is not the case.


讜讗讬 讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讘讛讗讬 讗转专讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚谞讬讘讝讬 讘讛讗讬 讗转专讗 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讗讘诇 讙讘讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 讗讬讻驻转 诇讬讛 爪专讬讻讗


And conversely, if the tanna had taught us only with regard to divorce, I would have said that he is particular only in the case of divorce, because in this place it is acceptable for him to degrade himself through divorce, whereas in that place it is not acceptable for him to do so; but with regard to betrothal, which involves no degradation, you might say he does not care where he betroths her. Therefore, it is necessary to state the halakha in both cases.


诪转谞讬壮 讛诪拽讚砖 讗转 讛讗砖讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讬谉 注诇讬讛 谞讚专讬诐 讜谞诪爪讗讜 注诇讬讛 谞讚专讬诐 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讻谞住讛 住转诐 讜谞诪爪讗讜 注诇讬讛 谞讚专讬诐 转爪讗 砖诇讗 讘讻转讜讘讛


MISHNA: In the case of one who betroths a woman on the condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, and it was found that there were vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, she is not betrothed, since his condition was not fulfilled. If he married her without specification, and it was found that there were vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, the marriage takes effect. Nevertheless, he has the right to divorce her, and she is divorced without receiving payment of her marriage contract, as it is assumed that he would not have married her had he known that she was limited by her vows.


注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讬谉 注诇讬讛 诪讜诪讬谉 讜谞诪爪讗讜 讘讛 诪讜诪讬谉 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讻谞住讛 住转诐 讜谞诪爪讗讜 讘讛 诪讜诪讬谉 转爪讗 砖诇讗 讘讻转讜讘讛 砖讻诇 讛诪讜诪讬谉 讛驻讜住诇讬谉 讘讻讛谞讬诐 驻讜住诇讬谉 讘谞砖讬诐


Similarly, if he betrothed her on the condition that there are no blemishes upon her, and she was discovered to have blemishes, she is not betrothed. In a case where he married her without specification and she was discovered to have blemishes, he has the right to divorce her, and she is divorced without receiving payment of her marriage contract. As to what is defined as a blemish, the rule is that all the blemishes that disqualify priests from performing the Temple service, as detailed in tractate Bekhorot, also disqualify women from receiving their marriage contract in case of divorce.


讙诪壮 讜转谞谉 谞诪讬 讙讘讬 讻转讜讘讜转 讻讬 讛讗讬 讙讜讜谞讗 讛讻讗 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讗讬爪讟专讬讻讗 诇讬讛 转谞讗 讻转讜讘讜转 讗讟讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讛转诐 讻转讜讘讜转 讗讬爪讟专讬讻讗 诇讬讛 转谞讗 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讗讟讜 讻转讜讘讜转


GEMARA: The Gemara comments: And we also learned a mishna like this with regard to the halakhot of marriage contracts, as the same mishna appears in tractate Ketubot (72b). The Gemara explains: Here it was necessary for the tanna to mention this halakha with regard to betrothal, and he taught the halakha of marriage contracts due to teaching the halakha of betrothal; there it was necessary for the tanna to mention this halakha with regard to marriage contracts, and he taught the halakha of betrothal due to teaching the halakha of marriage contracts.


诪转谞讬壮 讛诪拽讚砖 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讘砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 讗讜 讗砖讛 讗讞转 讘驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖砖诇讞 住讘诇讜谞讜转 诇讗讞专 诪讻讗谉


MISHNA: In the case of one who betroths two women together with an item worth one peruta, so that the value of each woman鈥檚 share was not worth one peruta, or who betroths one woman with an item worth less than one peruta, despite the fact that he later sent the traditional gifts [sivlonot] of a groom to the bride,


讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 砖诪讞诪转 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讛专讗砖讜谞讬诐 砖诇讞 讜讻谉 拽讟谉 砖拽讬讚砖


she is not betrothed, because he sent the gifts on account of the first betrothal, i.e., the item whose value to the woman was less than one peruta, and not to effect betrothal. And similarly, if there was a minor who betrothed a woman, and he sent her gifts after he became an adult, the assumption is that he sent them on account of his betrothal when he was still a minor, and since betrothal performed by a minor is of no account, she is not betrothed.


讙诪壮 讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 讗讬讬讚讬 讚拽讗 谞驻讬拽 诪诪讜谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讟注讬 讗讘诇 驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 讗讬诪讗 讬讜讚注 砖讗讬谉 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 转讜驻住讬谉 讘驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 讜讻讬 拽讗 诪砖讚专 住讘诇讜谞讜转 讗讚注转讗 讚拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 拽讗 诪砖讚专


GEMARA: And it is necessary for all these cases to be stated in the mishna, despite their apparent similarity. As, had the tanna taught us only the case of one who betroths two women with an item worth one peruta, we would have said: Since enough of his money for betrothal goes out, i.e., is spent, he errs and thinks that he can betroth two women with one peruta, and the gifts he later sends are not for the sake of betrothal. But if he betrothed a woman with an item worth less than one peruta, you might say: He knows that betrothal does not take effect with an item worth less than one peruta, and when he later sends gifts he sends them with the intention of betrothal, and she should consequently become betrothed with them. The mishna therefore teaches us that she is not betrothed even in that case.


讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讛谞讬 转专转讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讘讬谉 驻专讜讟讛 诇驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 诇讗 拽讬诐 诇讛讜 诇讗讬谞砖讬 讗讘诇 拽讟谉 砖拽讬讚砖 讛讻诇 讬讜讚注讬谉 砖讗讬谉 拽讬讚讜砖讬 拽讟谉 讻诇讜诐 讗讬诪讗 讻讬 拽讗 诪砖讚专 住讘诇讜谞讜转 讗讚注转讗 讚拽讬讚讜砖讬 拽讗 诪砖讚专 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉


And had he taught us only these two cases, we would have said that they were necessary because the difference in halakha between betrothal performed with an item worth one peruta and betrothal performed with an item worth less than one peruta is not established or clear to people, and as he might have thought in those cases that his initial betrothal was valid despite each woman receiving less than one peruta, the gifts he sent later were not sent for the sake of betrothal. But in the case of a minor who betroths a woman, everyone knows that the betrothal of a minor is nothing, and you might say that when he later sends gifts, he sends them for the sake of betrothal, and she is betrothed. The mishna therefore teaches us that the same halakha applies in this case as well.


讗讬转诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讞讜砖砖讬谉 诇住讘诇讜谞讜转 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讞讜砖砖讬谉 诇住讘诇讜谞讜转 讗诪专 专讘讛 讜诪讜转讘讬谞谉 讗砖诪注转讬谉 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖砖诇讞 住讘诇讜谞讜转 诇讗讞专 诪讻讗谉 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讛转诐 讻讚拽转谞讬 讟注诪讗 砖诪讞诪转 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讛专讗砖讜谞讬诐 砖诇讞


It was stated that amora鈥檌m discussed the following matter. Rav Huna says: One must be concerned about gifts. If a woman agreed to a betrothal and the prospective husband sent her gifts in the presence of witnesses, one must be concerned about the possibility that he sent them for the sake of betrothal. Therefore, the woman may not become betrothed to another man without first receiving a bill of divorce from this one. And Rabba similarly says that one must be concerned about gifts. Rabba says: And we raised an objection against this halakha of ours, as the mishna teaches: Even if he sent gifts later, she is not betrothed. Abaye said to him: There, in the mishna, the reason is as it teaches: Because he sent the gifts on account of the first betrothal. Therefore, there is no concern that he might have sent them for the sake of betrothal. But in this case, where he had not betrothed her beforehand, he might have intended to betroth her by sending her gifts.


讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诪专 专讘讛 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讻讚拽转谞讬 讟注诪讗 砖诪讞诪转 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讛专讗砖讜谞讬诐 砖诇讞 讛讻讗 讛讜讗 讚讟注讬 讛讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉


There are those who say a different version of this discussion. Rabba says: From where do I say this halakha, that one must be concerned about gifts? I have learned it from the reason she is not betrothed, as the mishna teaches: Because he sent the gifts on account of the first betrothal. This indicates that it is here that there is no concern for that he betrothed her, since he erred and thinks she is already betrothed to him by the first act of betrothal, and that there is no need to betroth her again. But generally, where this type of mistake is not possible, the sending of gifts does effect betrothal.


讜讗讘讬讬 诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 拽讗诪专 诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 讘注诇诪讗 讚诇讗 谞讞讬转 诇转讜专转 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讻诇诇 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讗 讚谞讞讬转 诇转讜专转 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讗讬诪讗 讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉


And Abaye rejects this proof, as perhaps the tanna of the mishna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. The mishna stated, for stylistic reasons, a halakha that it did not need to state, and it should be understood as follows: It is not necessary to state this halakha in general, in a case that does not involve a prior act of betrothal, when he had not entered the laws, i.e., begun the process, of betrothal at all, and it would never have entered his mind that the gifts should be considered to be for betrothal. Rather, even here in the case of the mishna, when he has already entered the laws of betrothal by attempting to betroth this woman with less than one peruta, one might say that the gifts should be considered given for the sake of betrothal. The tanna therefore teaches us that there is no concern for betrothal even in that case. It is thereby possible to object to this inference of Rabba.


诪讗讬 讛讜讬 注诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讘讗转专讗 讚诪拽讚砖讬 讜讛讚专 诪住讘诇讬 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诪住讘诇讬 讜讛讚专 诪拽讚砖讬 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉


The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about it; must one be concerned that the gifts might have been given for the sake of betrothal or not? The Gemara answers: Rav Pappa says: In a place where the custom is that men first betroth women and afterward send gifts we are concerned that he might already have betrothed her or is sending the gifts for the sake of betrothal, since that is the only situation in which gifts are typically sent. But in a place where men first send gifts and afterward betroth women we are not concerned that the gifts are for betrothal.


诪拽讚砖讬 讜讛讚专 诪住讘诇讬 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚专讜讘讗 诪拽讚砖讬 讜讛讚专 诪住讘诇讬 讜诪讬注讜讟讗 诪住讘诇讬 讜讛讚专 诪拽讚砖讬 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 谞讬讞讜砖 诇诪讬注讜讟讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉


The Gemara questions this: In a place where they betroth women and afterward send gifts, it is obvious that if a man sends a woman gifts he must already have betrothed her. The Gemara clarifies: No, it is necessary to teach this halakha due to a place where most men betroth women and afterward send gifts, and a minority of men send gifts and afterward betroth women. Lest you say we should be concerned about the minority and say she is not betrothed, Rav Pappa therefore teaches us that the behavior of the minority is not taken into account.


讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪专讘讗 讛讜讞讝拽 砖讟专 讻转讜讘讛 讘砖讜拽 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讜讻讬 诪驻谞讬 砖诪讞讝讬拽 砖讟专 讻转讜讘讛 讘砖讜拽 谞讞讝讬拽 讘讛 讻讗砖转 讗讬砖 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 注诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讘讗转专讗 讚诪拽讚砖讬 讜讛讚专 讻转讘讬 讻转讜讘讛 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 讻转讘讬 讜讛讚专 诪拽讚砖讬 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉


The Gemara discusses a related topic: Rav A岣 bar Rav Huna inquired of Rava: If a woman鈥檚 marriage contract was established, i.e., seen, by people in the marketplace, what is the halakha; is she assumed to be married? Rava said to him: And should we establish her as a married woman because a marriage contract was established in the marketplace? Since a marriage contract can be written by a man even before betrothal and without the woman鈥檚 consent, its existence does not prove that she is married. The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about it? The Gemara answers: Rav Ashi says: In a place where men first betroth women and afterward write a marriage contract, we are concerned that he had betrothed her; but in a place where they write the marriage contract first and afterward betroth women, we are not concerned.


诪拽讚砖讬 讜讛讚专 讻转讘讬 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚诇讗 砖讻讬讞 住驻专讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 住驻专讗 讛讜讗 讚讗转专诪讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉


The Gemara questions this: In a place where men first betroth women and afterward write the marriage contract it is obvious that there should be a concern that he has betrothed her. The Gemara clarifies: No, it is necessary to teach this halakha due to a place where a scribe is not commonly available. Lest you say that he wrote the marriage contract early because there was a scribe who happened to be there, and the prospective husband took the opportunity to avail himself of the scribe鈥檚 services while intending to perform the betrothal later, Rav Ashi therefore teaches us that there is no concern that he might have done so since the custom is to first betroth the woman.


诪转谞讬壮 讛诪拽讚砖 讗砖讛 讜讘转讛 讗讜 讗砖讛 讜讗讞讜转讛 讻讗讞转 讗讬谞谉 诪拽讜讚砖讜转 讜诪注砖讛 讘讞诪砖 谞砖讬诐 讜讘讛谉 砖转讬 讗讞讬讜转 讜诇讬拽讟 讗讚诐 讗讞讚 讻诇讻诇讛 砖诇 转讗谞讬诐 讜砖诇讛谉 讛讬转讛 讜砖诇 砖讘讬注讬转 讛讬转讛 讜讗诪专 讛专讬 讻讜诇讻诐 诪拽讜讚砖讜转 诇讬 讘讻诇讻诇讛 讝讜 讜拽讬讘诇讛 讗讞转 诪讛谉 注诇 讬讚讬 讻讜诇谉 讜讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 讗讬谉 讗讞讬讜转 诪拽讜讚砖讜转


MISHNA: In the case of one who betroths a woman and her daughter or a woman and her sister in one act of betrothal, by saying: You are both betrothed to me, neither of them is betrothed. And an incident occurred involving five women, and among them were two sisters, and one person gathered a basket of figs that were from their field, and the fruit was of the Sabbatical Year, and he said: You are hereby all betrothed to me with this basket, and one of them accepted it on behalf of all of them. And the Sages said: The sisters are not betrothed.


讙诪壮 诪谞讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讗诪专 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 讗砖讛 讗诇 讗讞转讛 诇讗 转拽讞 诇爪专专 讛转讜专讛 讗诪专讛 讘砖注讛 砖谞注砖讜 爪专讜转 讝讜 诇讝讜 诇讗 讬讛讗 诇讜 诇讬拽讜讞讬诐 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讗讞转 诪讛诐 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讗讬 讛讻讬 讛讬讬谞讜 讚讻转讬讘 讜谞讻专转讜 讛谞驻砖讜转 讛注砖转 诪拽专讘 注诪诐 讗讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诇讗 转驻住讬 讘讛 讻专转 诪讬 诪讞讬讬讘


GEMARA: With regard to the halakha that betrothal does not take effect if one betroths these two women simultaneously, the Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rami bar 岣ma said: It is as the verse states: 鈥淎nd you shall not take a woman to her sister, to be a rival to her鈥 (Leviticus 18:18). The Torah states: When he betroths them together so that they would become rival wives to one another, he will not be able to take, i.e., betroth, even one of them. Rava said to him: If so, how would you explain this, that it is written at the end of the passage: 鈥淲hoever shall do any of these abominations, even the souls that do them shall be cut off from among their people鈥 (Leviticus 18:29); if betrothal does not take effect with her, what renders him liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet]? If he is not betrothed to either woman, and he engages in intercourse with either one, he is not liable for karet, as this punishment is incurred for this sin only if he engaged in intercourse with the sister of his wife.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 拽专讗 讘讝讛 讗讞专 讝讛 讜诪转谞讬转讬谉 讻讚专讘讛 讚讗诪专 专讘讛 讻诇 砖讗讬谞讜 讘讝讛 讗讞专 讝讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讘转 讗讞转 讗讬谞讜


Rather, Rava says: The verse is discussing a case where he betrothed them consecutively. He first betrothed one sister and then engaged in intercourse with the other, which accounts for the punishment of karet. And the mishna is to be explained in accordance with the statement of Rabba, as Rabba says: Any matters that cannot be accomplished sequentially cannot be accomplished even if one performs them simultaneously. Here too, since he is unable to betroth the mother and daughter or the two sisters sequentially, his betrothal of both of them simultaneously does not take effect.


讙讜驻讗 讗诪专 专讘讛 讻诇 砖讗讬谞讜 讘讝讛 讗讞专 讝讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讘转 讗讞转 讗讬谞讜 讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讘讬讬


The Gemara analyzes the matter itself. Rabba says: Any matters that cannot be accomplished sequentially cannot be accomplished even if one performs them simultaneously. Abaye raised an objection to his opinion from a baraita (Tosefta, Demai 8:10):


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Kiddushin 50

讬拽专讬讘 讗转讜 诪诇诪讚 砖讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 讬讻讜诇 讘注诇 讻专讞讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇专爪谞讜


With regard to one who pledges to bring a burnt-offering, the verse states: 鈥淚f his offering be a burnt-offering of the herd, he shall offer it a male without blemish; he shall bring it to the door of the Tent of Meeting, according to his will, before the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 1:3). The seemingly superfluous words 鈥渉e shall offer it鈥 teaches that they coerce him to bring the offering. I might have thought that it can be offered entirely against his will, by taking it from his possession and sacrificing it; therefore, the verse states: 鈥淎ccording to his will.鈥


讛讗 讻讬爪讚 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 专讜爪讛 讗谞讬 讜讗诪讗讬 讛讗 讘诇讘讬讛 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 讚讘专讬诐 砖讘诇讘 讗讬谞谉 讚讘专讬诐 讜讚讬诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗谞谉 住讛讚讬 讚谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讘讻驻专讛


How can these texts be reconciled? They coerce him until he says: I want to bring the offering. The Gemara asks: But why should this be effective; but in his heart it is not satisfactory for him to bring the offering, and it is not according to his will. Rather, is it not because we say: Unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters, and his intention is rendered irrelevant by his explicit statement? The Gemara rejects this: But perhaps there it is different, since it is clear to us that it is satisfactory for him to achieve atonement, despite his earlier statement to the contrary.


讗诇讗 诪住讬驻讗 讜讻谉 讗转讛 诪讜爪讗 讘讙讬讟讬 谞砖讬诐 讜砖讞专讜专讬 注讘讚讬诐 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 专讜爪讛 讗谞讬 讜讗诪讗讬 讛讗 讘诇讘讬讛 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 讚讘专讬诐 砖讘诇讘 讗讬谞谉 讚讘专讬诐 讜讚讬诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 诪砖讜诐 讚诪爪讜讛 诇砖诪讜注 讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐


Rather, the Gemara derives a proof from the latter clause of that same baraita: And similarly, you find with bills of divorce of women and bills of manumission of slaves that when the court rules that a man must divorce his wife or free his slave and he does not want to, they coerce him until he says: I want to divorce my wife, or: I want to free my slave. But why should this be effective; but in his heart it is not satisfactory for him to divorce her or to free him. Rather, is it not because we say that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters? The Gemara rejects this proof as well: But perhaps there it is different, because it is a mitzva to listen to the statements of the Sages, and the assumption is that when he is required to divorce his wife or free his slave, his true desire is to perform the mitzva.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪讛讻讗 讛诪拽讚砖 讗转 讛讗砖讛 讜讗诪专 讻住讘讜专 讛讬讬转讬 砖讛讬讗 讻讛谞转 讜讛专讬 讛讬讗 诇讜讬讛 诇讜讬讛 讜谞诪爪讗转 讻讛谞转 注谞讬讬讛 讜讛专讬 讛讬讗 注砖讬专讛 注砖讬专讛 讜讛专讬 讛讬讗 注谞讬讬讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 诪驻谞讬 砖诇讗 讛讟注转讜 讜讗诪讗讬 讛讗 拽讗诪专 讻住讘讜专 讛讬讬转讬 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 讚讘专讬诐 砖讘诇讘 讗讬谞谉 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讚诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚诇讞讜诪专讗


Rather, Rav Yosef says: The proof is from here (64a): In the case of one who betroths a woman and he said: I thought that she was the daughter of a priest, and she is in fact the daughter of a Levite; or I thought she was the daughter of a Levite, and she is found to be the daughter of a priest; I thought she was poor, and she is wealthy; or I thought she was wealthy, and she is poor, she is betrothed despite his mistaken assumption, because she did not mislead him. But why is she betrothed; but he said: I thought that she had a different characteristic, and he betrothed her with that in mind? Rather, it is because we say that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters. Abaye said to him: Perhaps it is different there, since the ruling there is that she requires a bill of divorce only as a stringency, and they are not definitively betrothed.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪讛讻讗 讘讻讜诇诐 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗诪专讛 讘诇讘讬 讛讬讛 诇讛转拽讚砖 诇讜 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 讻谉 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讗诪讗讬 讛讗 拽讗诪专讛 讘诇讘讬 讛讬讛 讜讚讬诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讻讬讜谉 讚讗转谞讬讛 诇讗讜 讻诇 讻诪讬谞讛 讚注拽专讗 诇讛 诇转谞讗讬讛


Rather, Abaye said that the proof is from here, from the mishna: And in all these cases, despite the fact that she later stated: I intended to become betrothed to him nevertheless, she is not betrothed. But why should her betrothal not take effect at all; but she said: I intended to become betrothed? This clause of the mishna teaches that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant. The Gemara rejects this proof: But perhaps it is different there, as, since he stipulated explicitly that a certain condition was true, it is not in her power to uproot his condition through thoughts alone.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讬谉 注讜讘讚讗 讛讜讛 讘讬 专讘 讞住讚讗 讜专讘 讞住讚讗 讘讬 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜驻砖讟讜讛 诪讛讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇砖诇讜讞讜 讛讘讗 诇讬 诪谉 讛讞诇讜谉 讗讜 诪谉 讛讚诇讜住拽诪讗 讜讛讘讬讗 诇讜 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗诪专 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 诇讗 讛讬讛 诇讬 讘诇讘讬 讗诇讗 注诇 讝讛 讻讬讜谉 砖讛讘讬讗 诇讜 诪讝讛 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 诪注诇 讜讗诪讗讬 讛讗 拽讗诪专 讘诇讘讬 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 讚讘专讬诐 砖讘诇讘 讗讬谞谉 讚讘专讬诐


Rather, Rav 岣yya bar Avin says: There was an incident of this kind in Rav 岣sda鈥檚 study hall, and Rav 岣sda brought the case to Rav Huna鈥檚 study hall, and they resolved it from this mishna (Me鈥檌la 21a): In the case of one who says to his agent: Bring me such and such an item from the window ledge or from the box [hadeluskema], forgetting that the item in question was consecrated property and any use of it would constitute misuse of consecrated property, and the agent brought it to him, then although at that point the owner said: My intention was that you bring the item only from this other place, once he brought the item to him from that place that he had mentioned, once the agent uses it the owner is liable for having misused consecrated property. But why should he be responsible; but he said: My intention was for the other place, so the agent did not fulfill his mission. Rather, is it not because we say that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters?


讜讚诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚诇诪讬驻讟专 谞驻砖讬讛 诪拽专讘谉 拽讗转讬


The Gemara rejects this: But perhaps it is different there, since it is suspected that he is coming to exempt himself from bringing an offering for his misuse by claiming that he intended a different item. Since there is cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place, his claim is not accepted. This cannot serve as a proof that in general, unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant.


讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诪专 诪讝讬讚 讛讜讛 诇讗 注讘讬讚 讗讬谞讬砖 讚诪砖讜讬 谞驻砖讬讛 专砖讬注讗


The Gemara responds: If all he wanted to do was exempt himself from the obligation to bring an offering, he could have said that the misuse was intentional, as one who misuses consecrated property intentionally is not obligated to bring an offering. Therefore, there is no cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place. The Gemara counters: It is not common for a person to place himself in the category of a wicked person by claiming to have committed a transgression intentionally. Therefore, once again, there is cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place.


讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇讜诪专 谞讝讻专转讬 讚转谞谉 谞讝讻专 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讜诇讗 谞讝讻专 砖诇讬讞 砖诇讬讞 诪注诇


The Gemara continues to ask: To exempt himself from the obligation to bring an offering, he could have said: After the agent left I remembered that it was consecrated property. Such a claim would also have rendered him exempt, as we learned in that same mishna (Me鈥檌la 21a): If one sent an agent to bring a particular item, and the owner remembered that it was consecrated and the agent did not remember but proceeded to fulfill his agency, it is the agent who has misused consecrated property and is liable to bring an offering, not the one who designated him, since the latter remembered and canceled the agency. There is no cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place. Therefore, the fact that this statement is not accepted can serve as a proof that in general, unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant.


讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚讝讘谞讬谞讛讜 诇谞讬讻住讬讛 讗讚注转讗 诇诪讬住拽 诇讗专注讗 讚讬砖专讗诇 住诇讬拽 讜诇讗 讗讬转讚专 诇讬讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 讻诇 讚住诇讬拽 讗讚注转讗 诇诪讬讚专 讛讜讗 讜讛讗 诇讗 讗讬转讚专 诇讬讛 讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗讚注转讗 诇诪讬住拽 讜讛讗 住诇讬拽 诇讬讛


The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who sold his property with the intention of ascending to Eretz Yisrael and explicitly stated this intention to the buyer. He ascended to Eretz Yisrael but he was not able to settle there. Upon his return to Babylonia, he sought to nullify the sale. Rava said: Whoever ascends to Eretz Yisrael does so with the intention of settling there, and as he was not able to settle there he can nullify the sale. There are those who say a different version, that Rava said the opposite: He intended to ascend to Eretz Yisrael, and he ascended, so he cannot nullify the sale.


讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚讝讘谞讬谞讛讜 诇谞讬讻住讬讛 讗讚注转讗 诇诪讬住拽 诇讗专抓 讬砖专讗诇 诇住讜祝 诇讗 住诇讬拽 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讗讬 讘注讬 住诇讬拽 讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗讬 讘注讬 诇讗 住诇讬拽 诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚讗讬转讬诇讬讚 讗讜谞住讗 讘讗讜专讞讗


The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was a certain man who sold his property with the intention of ascending to Eretz Yisrael, but ultimately he did not ascend there. Rav Ashi said: If he had wanted to do so, he could have ascended. Since the matter depended upon him, there are no grounds for nullifying the sale. There are those who say Rav Ashi said as follows: If he had wanted to do so, couldn鈥檛 he have ascended? Since nothing prevented him from leaving, the sale is not nullified. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the two versions of Rav Ashi鈥檚 statement? The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them in a case when circumstances beyond his control occurred along the way, preventing him from going. According to the first version of the statement of Rav Ashi, the sale is upheld; but according to the second version, where Rav Ashi responded in the form of a question, the implication is that if there actually had been something that prevented him from ascending, the sale would be nullified.


诪转谞讬壮 讛讗讜诪专 诇砖诇讜讞讜 爪讗 讜拽讚砖 诇讬 讗砖讛 驻诇讜谞讬转 讘诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讜讛诇讱 讜拽讚砖讛 讘诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讜拽讚砖讛 讘诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 讛专讬 讝讜 诪拽讜讚砖转


MISHNA: In the case of one who says to his agent: Go and betroth for me so-and-so in such and such a place, and the agent went and betrothed her in a different place, she is not betrothed, since he instructed that the betrothal take place in a particular location. But if he said: Go and betroth the woman for me, she is in such and such a place; and the agent betrothed her in a different place, she is betrothed, since he did not mean that the agent should betroth her specifically there, but was merely telling him where to find her.


讙诪壮 讜转谞谉 谞诪讬 讙讘讬 讙讬讟讬谉 讛讗讜诪专 转谞讜 讙讟 讝讛 诇讗砖转讬 讘诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讜谞转谞讜 诇讛 讘诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 驻住讜诇 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讜谞转谞讜 诇讛 讘诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 讻砖专


GEMARA: The Gemara comments: And we also learned in a mishna with regard to bills of divorce (Gittin 65a): With regard to one who says to his agents: Give this bill of divorce to my wife in such and such a place, and they gave it to her in another place, the divorce is invalid. If he said to them: She is in such and such a place, and they gave it to her in another place, it is valid.


讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讘诪拽讜诐 讚诇拽讜专讘讛 拽讗转讬 讘讛讗讬 讗转专讗 专讞诪讜 诇讬 讜诇讗 诪诪诇讬 诪讬诇讬 注诇讜讬 讘讛讗讬 讗转专讗 住谞讜 诇讬 诪诪诇讬 诪讬诇讬 注诇讜讬 讗讘诇 讙讘讬 讙讬讟讬谉 讚诇专讞讜拽讛 拽讗转讬 讗讬诪专 诇讗 讗讬讻驻转 诇讬讛


The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state this halakha with regard to both betrothal and divorce, because had the tanna taught us only with regard to betrothal, you might say: In a case when he is coming to draw her near to him through betrothal, he thinks: They love me in this place and will not say negative remarks about me, but they hate me in that place and will say negative remarks about me. Therefore, he told the agent to perform the betrothal in a certain place and is particular that it take place only there. But with regard to bills of divorce, when he is coming to distance her from him, you might say he does not care where the divorce itself is performed. The tanna therefore informs us that this is not the case.


讜讗讬 讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讘讛讗讬 讗转专讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚谞讬讘讝讬 讘讛讗讬 讗转专讗 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讗讘诇 讙讘讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 讗讬讻驻转 诇讬讛 爪专讬讻讗


And conversely, if the tanna had taught us only with regard to divorce, I would have said that he is particular only in the case of divorce, because in this place it is acceptable for him to degrade himself through divorce, whereas in that place it is not acceptable for him to do so; but with regard to betrothal, which involves no degradation, you might say he does not care where he betroths her. Therefore, it is necessary to state the halakha in both cases.


诪转谞讬壮 讛诪拽讚砖 讗转 讛讗砖讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讬谉 注诇讬讛 谞讚专讬诐 讜谞诪爪讗讜 注诇讬讛 谞讚专讬诐 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讻谞住讛 住转诐 讜谞诪爪讗讜 注诇讬讛 谞讚专讬诐 转爪讗 砖诇讗 讘讻转讜讘讛


MISHNA: In the case of one who betroths a woman on the condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, and it was found that there were vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, she is not betrothed, since his condition was not fulfilled. If he married her without specification, and it was found that there were vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, the marriage takes effect. Nevertheless, he has the right to divorce her, and she is divorced without receiving payment of her marriage contract, as it is assumed that he would not have married her had he known that she was limited by her vows.


注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讬谉 注诇讬讛 诪讜诪讬谉 讜谞诪爪讗讜 讘讛 诪讜诪讬谉 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讻谞住讛 住转诐 讜谞诪爪讗讜 讘讛 诪讜诪讬谉 转爪讗 砖诇讗 讘讻转讜讘讛 砖讻诇 讛诪讜诪讬谉 讛驻讜住诇讬谉 讘讻讛谞讬诐 驻讜住诇讬谉 讘谞砖讬诐


Similarly, if he betrothed her on the condition that there are no blemishes upon her, and she was discovered to have blemishes, she is not betrothed. In a case where he married her without specification and she was discovered to have blemishes, he has the right to divorce her, and she is divorced without receiving payment of her marriage contract. As to what is defined as a blemish, the rule is that all the blemishes that disqualify priests from performing the Temple service, as detailed in tractate Bekhorot, also disqualify women from receiving their marriage contract in case of divorce.


讙诪壮 讜转谞谉 谞诪讬 讙讘讬 讻转讜讘讜转 讻讬 讛讗讬 讙讜讜谞讗 讛讻讗 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讗讬爪讟专讬讻讗 诇讬讛 转谞讗 讻转讜讘讜转 讗讟讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讛转诐 讻转讜讘讜转 讗讬爪讟专讬讻讗 诇讬讛 转谞讗 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讗讟讜 讻转讜讘讜转


GEMARA: The Gemara comments: And we also learned a mishna like this with regard to the halakhot of marriage contracts, as the same mishna appears in tractate Ketubot (72b). The Gemara explains: Here it was necessary for the tanna to mention this halakha with regard to betrothal, and he taught the halakha of marriage contracts due to teaching the halakha of betrothal; there it was necessary for the tanna to mention this halakha with regard to marriage contracts, and he taught the halakha of betrothal due to teaching the halakha of marriage contracts.


诪转谞讬壮 讛诪拽讚砖 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讘砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 讗讜 讗砖讛 讗讞转 讘驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖砖诇讞 住讘诇讜谞讜转 诇讗讞专 诪讻讗谉


MISHNA: In the case of one who betroths two women together with an item worth one peruta, so that the value of each woman鈥檚 share was not worth one peruta, or who betroths one woman with an item worth less than one peruta, despite the fact that he later sent the traditional gifts [sivlonot] of a groom to the bride,


讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 砖诪讞诪转 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讛专讗砖讜谞讬诐 砖诇讞 讜讻谉 拽讟谉 砖拽讬讚砖


she is not betrothed, because he sent the gifts on account of the first betrothal, i.e., the item whose value to the woman was less than one peruta, and not to effect betrothal. And similarly, if there was a minor who betrothed a woman, and he sent her gifts after he became an adult, the assumption is that he sent them on account of his betrothal when he was still a minor, and since betrothal performed by a minor is of no account, she is not betrothed.


讙诪壮 讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 讗讬讬讚讬 讚拽讗 谞驻讬拽 诪诪讜谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讟注讬 讗讘诇 驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 讗讬诪讗 讬讜讚注 砖讗讬谉 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 转讜驻住讬谉 讘驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 讜讻讬 拽讗 诪砖讚专 住讘诇讜谞讜转 讗讚注转讗 讚拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 拽讗 诪砖讚专


GEMARA: And it is necessary for all these cases to be stated in the mishna, despite their apparent similarity. As, had the tanna taught us only the case of one who betroths two women with an item worth one peruta, we would have said: Since enough of his money for betrothal goes out, i.e., is spent, he errs and thinks that he can betroth two women with one peruta, and the gifts he later sends are not for the sake of betrothal. But if he betrothed a woman with an item worth less than one peruta, you might say: He knows that betrothal does not take effect with an item worth less than one peruta, and when he later sends gifts he sends them with the intention of betrothal, and she should consequently become betrothed with them. The mishna therefore teaches us that she is not betrothed even in that case.


讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讛谞讬 转专转讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讘讬谉 驻专讜讟讛 诇驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 诇讗 拽讬诐 诇讛讜 诇讗讬谞砖讬 讗讘诇 拽讟谉 砖拽讬讚砖 讛讻诇 讬讜讚注讬谉 砖讗讬谉 拽讬讚讜砖讬 拽讟谉 讻诇讜诐 讗讬诪讗 讻讬 拽讗 诪砖讚专 住讘诇讜谞讜转 讗讚注转讗 讚拽讬讚讜砖讬 拽讗 诪砖讚专 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉


And had he taught us only these two cases, we would have said that they were necessary because the difference in halakha between betrothal performed with an item worth one peruta and betrothal performed with an item worth less than one peruta is not established or clear to people, and as he might have thought in those cases that his initial betrothal was valid despite each woman receiving less than one peruta, the gifts he sent later were not sent for the sake of betrothal. But in the case of a minor who betroths a woman, everyone knows that the betrothal of a minor is nothing, and you might say that when he later sends gifts, he sends them for the sake of betrothal, and she is betrothed. The mishna therefore teaches us that the same halakha applies in this case as well.


讗讬转诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讞讜砖砖讬谉 诇住讘诇讜谞讜转 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讞讜砖砖讬谉 诇住讘诇讜谞讜转 讗诪专 专讘讛 讜诪讜转讘讬谞谉 讗砖诪注转讬谉 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖砖诇讞 住讘诇讜谞讜转 诇讗讞专 诪讻讗谉 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讛转诐 讻讚拽转谞讬 讟注诪讗 砖诪讞诪转 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讛专讗砖讜谞讬诐 砖诇讞


It was stated that amora鈥檌m discussed the following matter. Rav Huna says: One must be concerned about gifts. If a woman agreed to a betrothal and the prospective husband sent her gifts in the presence of witnesses, one must be concerned about the possibility that he sent them for the sake of betrothal. Therefore, the woman may not become betrothed to another man without first receiving a bill of divorce from this one. And Rabba similarly says that one must be concerned about gifts. Rabba says: And we raised an objection against this halakha of ours, as the mishna teaches: Even if he sent gifts later, she is not betrothed. Abaye said to him: There, in the mishna, the reason is as it teaches: Because he sent the gifts on account of the first betrothal. Therefore, there is no concern that he might have sent them for the sake of betrothal. But in this case, where he had not betrothed her beforehand, he might have intended to betroth her by sending her gifts.


讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诪专 专讘讛 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讻讚拽转谞讬 讟注诪讗 砖诪讞诪转 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讛专讗砖讜谞讬诐 砖诇讞 讛讻讗 讛讜讗 讚讟注讬 讛讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉


There are those who say a different version of this discussion. Rabba says: From where do I say this halakha, that one must be concerned about gifts? I have learned it from the reason she is not betrothed, as the mishna teaches: Because he sent the gifts on account of the first betrothal. This indicates that it is here that there is no concern for that he betrothed her, since he erred and thinks she is already betrothed to him by the first act of betrothal, and that there is no need to betroth her again. But generally, where this type of mistake is not possible, the sending of gifts does effect betrothal.


讜讗讘讬讬 诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 拽讗诪专 诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 讘注诇诪讗 讚诇讗 谞讞讬转 诇转讜专转 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讻诇诇 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讗 讚谞讞讬转 诇转讜专转 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讗讬诪讗 讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉


And Abaye rejects this proof, as perhaps the tanna of the mishna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. The mishna stated, for stylistic reasons, a halakha that it did not need to state, and it should be understood as follows: It is not necessary to state this halakha in general, in a case that does not involve a prior act of betrothal, when he had not entered the laws, i.e., begun the process, of betrothal at all, and it would never have entered his mind that the gifts should be considered to be for betrothal. Rather, even here in the case of the mishna, when he has already entered the laws of betrothal by attempting to betroth this woman with less than one peruta, one might say that the gifts should be considered given for the sake of betrothal. The tanna therefore teaches us that there is no concern for betrothal even in that case. It is thereby possible to object to this inference of Rabba.


诪讗讬 讛讜讬 注诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讘讗转专讗 讚诪拽讚砖讬 讜讛讚专 诪住讘诇讬 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诪住讘诇讬 讜讛讚专 诪拽讚砖讬 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉


The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about it; must one be concerned that the gifts might have been given for the sake of betrothal or not? The Gemara answers: Rav Pappa says: In a place where the custom is that men first betroth women and afterward send gifts we are concerned that he might already have betrothed her or is sending the gifts for the sake of betrothal, since that is the only situation in which gifts are typically sent. But in a place where men first send gifts and afterward betroth women we are not concerned that the gifts are for betrothal.


诪拽讚砖讬 讜讛讚专 诪住讘诇讬 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚专讜讘讗 诪拽讚砖讬 讜讛讚专 诪住讘诇讬 讜诪讬注讜讟讗 诪住讘诇讬 讜讛讚专 诪拽讚砖讬 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 谞讬讞讜砖 诇诪讬注讜讟讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉


The Gemara questions this: In a place where they betroth women and afterward send gifts, it is obvious that if a man sends a woman gifts he must already have betrothed her. The Gemara clarifies: No, it is necessary to teach this halakha due to a place where most men betroth women and afterward send gifts, and a minority of men send gifts and afterward betroth women. Lest you say we should be concerned about the minority and say she is not betrothed, Rav Pappa therefore teaches us that the behavior of the minority is not taken into account.


讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪专讘讗 讛讜讞讝拽 砖讟专 讻转讜讘讛 讘砖讜拽 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讜讻讬 诪驻谞讬 砖诪讞讝讬拽 砖讟专 讻转讜讘讛 讘砖讜拽 谞讞讝讬拽 讘讛 讻讗砖转 讗讬砖 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 注诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讘讗转专讗 讚诪拽讚砖讬 讜讛讚专 讻转讘讬 讻转讜讘讛 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 讻转讘讬 讜讛讚专 诪拽讚砖讬 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉


The Gemara discusses a related topic: Rav A岣 bar Rav Huna inquired of Rava: If a woman鈥檚 marriage contract was established, i.e., seen, by people in the marketplace, what is the halakha; is she assumed to be married? Rava said to him: And should we establish her as a married woman because a marriage contract was established in the marketplace? Since a marriage contract can be written by a man even before betrothal and without the woman鈥檚 consent, its existence does not prove that she is married. The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about it? The Gemara answers: Rav Ashi says: In a place where men first betroth women and afterward write a marriage contract, we are concerned that he had betrothed her; but in a place where they write the marriage contract first and afterward betroth women, we are not concerned.


诪拽讚砖讬 讜讛讚专 讻转讘讬 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚诇讗 砖讻讬讞 住驻专讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 住驻专讗 讛讜讗 讚讗转专诪讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉


The Gemara questions this: In a place where men first betroth women and afterward write the marriage contract it is obvious that there should be a concern that he has betrothed her. The Gemara clarifies: No, it is necessary to teach this halakha due to a place where a scribe is not commonly available. Lest you say that he wrote the marriage contract early because there was a scribe who happened to be there, and the prospective husband took the opportunity to avail himself of the scribe鈥檚 services while intending to perform the betrothal later, Rav Ashi therefore teaches us that there is no concern that he might have done so since the custom is to first betroth the woman.


诪转谞讬壮 讛诪拽讚砖 讗砖讛 讜讘转讛 讗讜 讗砖讛 讜讗讞讜转讛 讻讗讞转 讗讬谞谉 诪拽讜讚砖讜转 讜诪注砖讛 讘讞诪砖 谞砖讬诐 讜讘讛谉 砖转讬 讗讞讬讜转 讜诇讬拽讟 讗讚诐 讗讞讚 讻诇讻诇讛 砖诇 转讗谞讬诐 讜砖诇讛谉 讛讬转讛 讜砖诇 砖讘讬注讬转 讛讬转讛 讜讗诪专 讛专讬 讻讜诇讻诐 诪拽讜讚砖讜转 诇讬 讘讻诇讻诇讛 讝讜 讜拽讬讘诇讛 讗讞转 诪讛谉 注诇 讬讚讬 讻讜诇谉 讜讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 讗讬谉 讗讞讬讜转 诪拽讜讚砖讜转


MISHNA: In the case of one who betroths a woman and her daughter or a woman and her sister in one act of betrothal, by saying: You are both betrothed to me, neither of them is betrothed. And an incident occurred involving five women, and among them were two sisters, and one person gathered a basket of figs that were from their field, and the fruit was of the Sabbatical Year, and he said: You are hereby all betrothed to me with this basket, and one of them accepted it on behalf of all of them. And the Sages said: The sisters are not betrothed.


讙诪壮 诪谞讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讗诪专 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 讗砖讛 讗诇 讗讞转讛 诇讗 转拽讞 诇爪专专 讛转讜专讛 讗诪专讛 讘砖注讛 砖谞注砖讜 爪专讜转 讝讜 诇讝讜 诇讗 讬讛讗 诇讜 诇讬拽讜讞讬诐 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讗讞转 诪讛诐 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讗讬 讛讻讬 讛讬讬谞讜 讚讻转讬讘 讜谞讻专转讜 讛谞驻砖讜转 讛注砖转 诪拽专讘 注诪诐 讗讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诇讗 转驻住讬 讘讛 讻专转 诪讬 诪讞讬讬讘


GEMARA: With regard to the halakha that betrothal does not take effect if one betroths these two women simultaneously, the Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rami bar 岣ma said: It is as the verse states: 鈥淎nd you shall not take a woman to her sister, to be a rival to her鈥 (Leviticus 18:18). The Torah states: When he betroths them together so that they would become rival wives to one another, he will not be able to take, i.e., betroth, even one of them. Rava said to him: If so, how would you explain this, that it is written at the end of the passage: 鈥淲hoever shall do any of these abominations, even the souls that do them shall be cut off from among their people鈥 (Leviticus 18:29); if betrothal does not take effect with her, what renders him liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet]? If he is not betrothed to either woman, and he engages in intercourse with either one, he is not liable for karet, as this punishment is incurred for this sin only if he engaged in intercourse with the sister of his wife.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 拽专讗 讘讝讛 讗讞专 讝讛 讜诪转谞讬转讬谉 讻讚专讘讛 讚讗诪专 专讘讛 讻诇 砖讗讬谞讜 讘讝讛 讗讞专 讝讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讘转 讗讞转 讗讬谞讜


Rather, Rava says: The verse is discussing a case where he betrothed them consecutively. He first betrothed one sister and then engaged in intercourse with the other, which accounts for the punishment of karet. And the mishna is to be explained in accordance with the statement of Rabba, as Rabba says: Any matters that cannot be accomplished sequentially cannot be accomplished even if one performs them simultaneously. Here too, since he is unable to betroth the mother and daughter or the two sisters sequentially, his betrothal of both of them simultaneously does not take effect.


讙讜驻讗 讗诪专 专讘讛 讻诇 砖讗讬谞讜 讘讝讛 讗讞专 讝讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讘转 讗讞转 讗讬谞讜 讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讘讬讬


The Gemara analyzes the matter itself. Rabba says: Any matters that cannot be accomplished sequentially cannot be accomplished even if one performs them simultaneously. Abaye raised an objection to his opinion from a baraita (Tosefta, Demai 8:10):


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