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Today's Daf Yomi

May 9, 2016 | 讗壮 讘讗讬讬专 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Kiddushin 59

Study Guide Kiddushin 59. One asks a friend to betroth a woman and the friend betroths the woman for himself. 聽Even though he acted inappropriately, the betrothal is valid. 聽If one betroths a woman upon condition that the betrothal will be valid in 30 days and before that period elapses, someone else betroths her, the betrothal is valid. 聽The gemara discusses whether or not the woman can change her mind within the 30 day period. 聽It is the basis for a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish about whether聽one’s word can be cancelled by a new statement or if one already said something, it can’t be cancelled by just speech. 聽Two versions of Reish Lakish are brought – in one version he thinks words can cancel words but not words with a prartial (even though incomplete) act. 聽In the other, he thinks that words cannot cancel words.


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讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讛转诐 讚拽转谞讬 讛讗讜诪专 诇砖诇讜讞讜

and what is different there, in the previous chapter (50a), that the tanna teaches: With regard to one who says to his agent, go and betroth a certain woman for me in such and such a place, and he went and betrothed her in a different place, she is not betrothed? Why does the mishna there label him an agent, and here it labels him simply another?

讛讻讗 专讘讜转讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讜讛转诐 专讘讜转讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讛讻讗 专讘讜转讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗讬 转谞讗 砖诇讜讞讜 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 砖诇讜讞讜 讛讜讗 讚讛讜讬 专诪讗讬 讚住诪讻讛 讚注转讬讛 住讘专 注讘讚 诇讬 砖诇讬讞讜转讬 讗讘诇 讞讘讬专讜 讚诇讗 住诪讻讛 讚注转讬讛 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 诇讬讛讜讬 专诪讗讬

The Gemara answers: Here the mishna teaches us a novel element and there it teaches us a novel element, through its use of these terms. The Gemara elaborates: The mishna here teaches us a novel element, as had it taught: His agent, I would say that it is his agent who is considered a scoundrel in that case, as one who sends an agent relies upon him, thinking: He will perform my agency for me, since he was sent for that purpose. But with regard to the use of the term: Another, who was not appointed and upon whom he does not rely, as he is not his agent, you might say that he should not be considered a scoundrel.

讛转诐 专讘讜转讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗讬 转谞讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讞讘讬专讜 讛讜讗 讚讻讬 拽讚砖讛 讘诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讚住讘专 诇讗 讟专讞 讗讘诇 砖诇讜讞讜 讚讟专讞 讗讬诪讗 诪专讗讛 诪拽讜诐 讛讜讗 诇讜 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

Similarly, the mishna there teaches us a novel element, as had it taught: One who says to another, I would say that it is in the case of another that she is not betrothed if he betrothed her in a different place, as he thinks that this person would not go to the trouble of looking for her elsewhere, and therefore he authorized him to betroth the woman only in that particular place. But with regard to his agent, who is assumed to take special trouble to fulfill his agency, you might say he is merely showing him the place where she is likely to be found, and she is betrothed in any case. The mishna therefore teaches us that even when he appointed an agent she is not betrothed if he does not find her in the place the putative husband specified.

专讘讬谉 讞住讬讚讗 讗讝讬诇 诇拽讚讜砖讬 诇讬讛 讗讬转转讗 诇讘专讬讛 拽讬讚砖讛 诇谞驻砖讬讛 讜讛转谞讬讗 诪讛 砖注砖讛 注砖讜讬 讗诇讗 砖谞讛讙 讘讜 诪谞讛讙 专诪讗讜转 诇讗 讬讛讘讜讛 谞讬讛诇讬讛 讗讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讗讜讚讜注讬 住讘专 讗讚讛讻讬 讜讛讻讬 讗转讗 讗讬谞讬砖 讗讞专讬谞讗 诪拽讚砖 诇讛

The Gemara relates: Ravin the Pious was appointed an agent and went to betroth a woman to his son, but in the end he betrothed her to himself. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn鈥檛 it taught in the aforementioned baraita: What he did is done, but he has treated him in a deceitful manner? How could a pious individual act in this fashion? The Gemara answers: The woman鈥檚 family would not give her to the son, and agreed only to let her marry the father. The Gemara further asks: Even so, before betrothing her he should have first informed his son that they refuse to let her marry him. The Gemara explains that Ravin thought: In the meantime, while I am busy reporting back to my son, someone else will come and betroth her.

专讘讛 讘专 讘专 讞谞讛 讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 讝讜讝讬 诇专讘 讗诪专 讝讘谞讛 谞讬讛诇讬 诇讛讗讬 讗专注讗 讗讝诇 讝讘谞讛 诇谞驻砖讬讛 讜讛转谞讬讗 诪讛 砖注砖讛 注砖讜讬 讗诇讗 砖谞讛讙 讘讜 诪谞讛讙 专诪讗讜转 讘讗讙讗 讚讗诇讬诪讬 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇专讘 谞讛讙讬 讘讬讛 讻讘讜讚 诇专讘讛 讘专 讘专 讞谞讛 诇讗 谞讛讙讬 讘讬讛 讻讘讜讚 讗讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讗讜讚讜注讬 住讘专 讗讚讛讻讬 讜讛讻讬 讗转讗 讗讬谞讬砖 讗讞专讬谞讗 讝讘讬谉 诇讛

The Gemara relates a similar story: Rabba bar bar 岣na gave money to Rav and said: Purchase this land for me. Rav went and purchased it for himself. The Gemara asks: But isn鈥檛 it taught in the baraita with regard to an agent who acts in this manner: What he did is done, but he has treated him in a deceitful manner? The Gemara answers: The land was located in a valley inhabited by violent men, who treated Rav with respect and were prepared to sell the land to him, but who did not treat Rabba bar bar 岣na with respect. As in the case of Ravin, the Gemara questions this behavior: Nevertheless, Rav should have informed him. The Gemara responds that Rav thought: In the meantime someone else will come and purchase the land.

专讘 讙讬讚诇 讛讜讛 诪讛驻讬讱 讘讛讛讬讗 讗专注讗 讗讝诇 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讝讘谞讛 讗讝诇 专讘 讙讬讚诇 拽讘诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讗讝诇 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讜拽讘诇讬讛 诇专讘 讬爪讞拽 谞驻讞讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛诪转谉 注讚 砖讬注诇讛 讗爪诇谞讜 诇专讙诇 讻讬 住诇讬拽 讗砖讻讞讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 注谞讬 诪讛驻讱 讘讞专专讛 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜谞讟诇讛 讛讬诪谞讜 诪讗讬

The Gemara further relates: Rav Giddel was engaging in the acquisition of a certain plot of land. In the meantime Rabbi Abba went and purchased it. Rav Giddel went and complained about Rabbi Abba to Rabbi Zeira. Rabbi Zeira went and complained about Rabbi Abba to Rav Yitz岣k Nappa岣. Rav Yitz岣k Nappa岣 said to him: Wait until Rabbi Abba ascends to visit us for the pilgrimage Festival, when all come to hear the Festival sermon, on which occasion we can discuss this matter with him. When Rabbi Abba ascended Rav Yitz岣k Nappa岣 found him and said to him: If a pauper is engaging in the acquisition of a loaf of bread that he found, and another came and took it from him, what is the halakha?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 谞拽专讗 专砖注 讜讗诇讗 诪专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 注讘讚 讛讻讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 讛讜讛 讬讚注谞讗 讛砖转讗 谞诪讬 谞讬转讘讛 谞讬讛诇讬讛 诪专 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讝讘讜谞讬 诇讗 诪讝讘谞讬谞讗 诇讛 讚讗专注讗 拽诪讬讬转讗 讛讬讗 讜诇讗 诪住诪谞讗 诪讬诇转讗 讗讬 讘注讬 讘诪转谞讛 谞讬砖拽诇讬讛

Rabbi Abba said to him: The one who took it away is called wicked. Rabbi Yitz岣k Nappa岣 replied: But if so, what is the reason that the Master acted this way? Rav Giddel was negotiating the purchase of this land and you purchased it. Rabbi Abba said to him: I did not know that Rav Giddel was trying to acquire the land. Rabbi Yitz岣k Nappa岣 retorted: Now too, the Master should give it to him, since you have been made aware that he submitted the first offer. Rabbi Abba said to him: As for selling, I will not sell it, as it is the first land I have ever purchased, and this matter of selling one鈥檚 first acquisition is not a good omen. If he wants to accept it as a gift, let him take it.

专讘 讙讬讚诇 诇讗 谞讞讬转 诇讛 讚讻转讬讘 讜砖讜谞讗 诪转谞转 讬讞讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讗 诇讗 谞讞讬转 诇讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讛驻讬讱 讘讛 专讘 讙讬讚诇 诇讗 诪专 谞讞讬转 诇讛 讜诇讗 诪专 谞讞讬转 诇讛 讜诪讬转拽专讬讗 讗专注讗 讚专讘谞谉

Rav Giddel did not descend to claim this plot of land, as it is written: 鈥淏ut he who hates gifts shall live鈥 (Proverbs 15:27), and therefore he did not wish to accept the land as a gift. Rabbi Abba also did not descend to it, because Rav Giddel was already engaging in the acquisition of it when he acquired the land. In this manner, this Sage did not descend to take the plot of land, and that Sage did not descend to take care of it, and it was called the land of the Sages.

讜讻谉 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讛转拽讚砖讬 诇讬 讻讜壮 诇讗 讘讗 讗讞专 讜拽讬讚砖讛 讘转讜讱 砖诇砖讬诐 诪讛讜 专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖谞转讗讻诇讜 讛诪注讜转

搂 The mishna teaches: And similarly, with regard to one who says to a woman: Be betrothed to me after thirty days, and another came and betrothed her within this period, she is betrothed to the second man. The Gemara asks: In a case where another did not come and betroth her within the thirty days, what is the halakha? Rav and Shmuel both say: She is betrothed after thirty days, even if the money he gave for her betrothal has been used before the end of this period, as the betrothal takes effect from when the money is given.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讛谞讬 讝讜讝讬 诇讗 诇诪诇讜讛 讚诪讜 讜诇讗 诇驻拽讚讜谉 讚诪讜

The Gemara clarifies: What is the reason that she is betrothed despite the lack of money at the end of the thirty days? The Gemara explains that these dinars given for her betrothal are not comparable to a loan, nor are they comparable to a deposit that was transferred into her possession and subsequently lost. In both of these cases she would not be betrothed.

诇驻拽讚讜谉 诇讗 讚诪讜 驻拽讚讜谉 讘专砖讜转讗 讚诪专讗 拽讗 诪转讗讻诇讬 讜讛谞讬 讘专砖讜转讗 讚讬讚讛 拽讗 诪转讗讻诇讬 诇诪诇讜讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 讚诪讜 诪诇讜讛 诇讛讜爪讗讛 谞讬转谞讛 讛谞讬 讘转讜专转 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讬讛讘讬谞讛讜 谞讬讛诇讛

The Gemara elaborates: They are not comparable to a deposit, as a deposit is used in its owner鈥檚 possession, i.e., any loss is incurred by the owner, whereas these are used in her own possession, as he gave her the money to keep. These dinars are also not comparable to a loan; a loan is given for spending and therefore no money remains at the time of the betrothal, whereas these dinars were given to her from the outset for the purpose of betrothal.

诇讗 讘讗 讗讞专 讜拽讬讚砖讛 讜讞讝专讛 讘讛 诪讛讜 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讞讜讝专转 讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 讚讬讘讜专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 讗讬谞讛 讞讜讝专转 诇讗 讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 讚讬讘讜专

The Gemara asks: If another did not come and betroth her, and she retracted her consent to the betrothal within thirty days, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yo岣nan said: She can retract her consent. Why? This statement, by which she changes her mind, comes and nullifies her previous statement when she agreed to the betrothal. Reish Lakish said: She cannot retract her consent, as her second statement does not come and nullify her previous statement.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讘讬讟诇 讗诐 注讚 砖诇讗 转专诐 讘讬讟诇 讗讬谉 转专讜诪转讜 转专讜诪讛 讜讛讗 讛讻讗 讚讚讬讘讜专 讜讚讬讘讜专 讛讜讗 讜拽讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 讚讬讘讜专 砖讗谞讬 谞转讬谞转 诪注讜转 诇讬讚 讗砖讛 讚讻讬 诪注砖讛 讚诪讜 讜诇讗 讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 诪注砖讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from a mishna (Terumot 3:4): In a case where someone appointed an agent to separate teruma from his produce on his behalf, and he subsequently canceled the agency, the halakha depends on the following: If he canceled the appointment before the agent separated the teruma, his teruma is not teruma. And here it is a case involving one statement and a second statement, as the owner of the produce appointed the agent and rescinded his appointment by speech. This shows that a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement. Reish Lakish replied: Giving money to a woman is different, as it is considered like an action, and a mere statement does not come and nullify the action of the transfer of money.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讛砖讜诇讞 讙讟 诇讗砖转讜 讜讛讙讬注 讘砖诇讬讞 讗讜 砖砖诇讞 讗讞专讬讜 砖诇讬讞 讜讗诪专 诇讜 讙讟 砖谞转转讬 诇讱 讘讟诇 讛讜讗 讛专讬 讝讛 讘讟诇 讜讛讗 谞转讬谞转 讙讟 诇讬讚 砖诇讬讞 讚讻讬 谞转讬谞转 诪注讜转 诇讬讚 讗砖讛 讚诪讬 讜拽转谞讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讘讟诇

Rabbi Yo岣nan raised a further objection to Reish Lakish: With regard to one who sends a bill of divorce to his wife, and later the husband encountered the agent or sent another agent after him and in this manner said to him: The bill of divorce that I gave you is nullified, it is thereby nullified. And giving a bill of divorce to an agent is considered to be like giving money to a woman, and yet this baraita teaches that it is nullified, which indicates that speech can override even an action.

讛转诐 谞诪讬 讻诇 讻诪讛 讚诇讗 诪讟讗 讙讬讟讗 诇讬讚讛 讚讬讘讜专 讜讚讬讘讜专 讛讜讗 讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 讚讬讘讜专

Reish Lakish answered: There too, as long as the bill of divorce has not reached the woman鈥檚 hand it is considered a case of one statement and a second statement. There is no halakhic significance to the transmitting of a bill of divorce to an agent, as only its delivery to the wife is considered an action. Therefore, the act of transferring the bill of divorce to the agent is of no consequence and in this particular case a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讻诇 讛讻诇讬诐 讬讜专讚讬谉 诇讬讚讬 讟讜诪讗转谉 讘诪讞砖讘讛 讜讗讬谉 注讜诇讬诐 诪讬讚讬 讟讜诪讗转谉 讗诇讗 讘砖讬谞讜讬 诪注砖讛

Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yo岣nan: All vessels descend into their state of contracting ritual impurity by means of thought. Although an unfinished vessel cannot become ritually impure, if the craftsman decided not to work on it any further, it immediately assumes the status of a completed vessel and can become ritually impure. But they ascend from their state of ritual impurity only by means of a change resulting from an action. A ritually impure vessel, once it undergoes physical change, is no longer ritually impure.

诪注砖讛 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 诪注砖讛 讜诪讬讚 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讞砖讘讛 讗讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗讛 诇讗 诪讬讚 诪注砖讛 讜诇讗 诪讬讚 诪讞砖讘讛 讘砖诇诪讗 诪讬讚 诪注砖讛 诇讗 诪驻拽讛 讚诇讗 讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 诪注砖讛 讗诇讗 诪讬讚 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讬讛讗 转驻讬拽

An action undertaken to improve the vessel negates both the status created by an earlier action that supposedly completed the vessel and the status created by the thought not to perform more work on the vessel. In that case the vessel cannot contract ritual impurity until the craftsman has finished working on it. By contrast, a thought to improve the vessel negates neither status created by action nor status created by thought. Reish Lakish finds this difficult for the following reason: Granted, thought does not negate action, as a statement does not come and nullify action. But it should at least offset thought. This halakha indicates that a statement does not nullify a previous statement.

砖讗谞讬 诪讞砖讘讛 讚讟讜诪讗讛 讚讻讬 诪注砖讛 讚诪讬 讜讻讚专讘 驻驻讗 讚专讘 驻驻讗 专诪讬 讻转讬讘 讻讬 讬转谉 讜拽专讬谞谉 讻讬 讬转谉 讛讗 讻讬爪讚

The Gemara answers: Thought in the case of ritual impurity is different, as it is considered like action, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa raises a contradiction: With regard to the halakha that produce must become wet in order for it to contract ritual impurity, the verse states: 鈥淏ut if water is placed [vekhi yuttan] upon the seed, and any part of a carcass falls upon it, it is impure鈥 (Leviticus 11:38). The word yuttan is written defective, and is written as if it says ki yitten. Accordingly, this would mean that one must actively place the water on the produce. Yet we read it, based on the tradition as to its correct pronunciation, ki yuttan,鈥 which includes any situation where the produce becomes wet. How so? How can the way the verse is written and the way it is read be reconciled?

讻讬 讬转谉 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讻讬 讬转谉 诪讛 讬转谉 讚谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讗祝 讬转谉 讚谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛

Rav Pappa explains that the standard of 鈥渋f water is placed [ki yuttan]鈥 is similar to: If one places [ki yitten]; just as the term places [yitten] indicates that it is satisfactory to the owner for the produce to become wet, as he himself is placing the water, so too, the term 鈥渋s placed [yuttan]鈥 means that it is satisfactory to the owner that the produce becomes wet, despite the fact that he did not place the water himself. This is proof that thought is equivalent to action with regard to ritual impurity, as if one is satisfied with the produce becoming wet it is considered as though he actively placed the water himself. By the same reasoning, thought which renders a vessel susceptible to ritual impurity is powerful enough to require an action to counteract its effect.

专讘 讝讘讬讚 诪转谞讬 诇讛讗 砖诪注转转讗 讗讛讗 讜讻谉 讛讬讗 砖谞转谞讛 专砖讜转 诇砖诇讜讞讛 诇拽讚砖讛 讜讛诇讻讛 讛讬讗 讜拽讚砖讛 讗转 注爪诪讛 讗诐 砖诇讛 拽讚诪讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讜讗诐 砖诇 砖诇讜讞讛 拽讚诪讜 讗讬谉 拽讬讚讜砖讬讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉

The Gemara presents another version of the discussion: Rav Zevid taught this dispute with regard to this halakha: And similarly, in a case where she gave permission to her agent to accept betrothal for her and she subsequently went and accepted betrothal herself from someone else, if her betrothal came first, her betrothal is a valid betrothal, but if the betrothal of her agent came first, her betrothal is not a betrothal.

诇讗 拽讚砖讛 讗转 注爪诪讛 讜讞讝专讛 讘讛 诪讛讜 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讞讜讝专转 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 讗讬谞讛 讞讜讝专转 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讞讜讝专转 讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 讚讬讘讜专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 讗讬谞讛 讞讜讝专转 诇讗 讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 讚讬讘讜专

The Sages discuss this halakha: If she did not accept betrothal herself and retracted her appointment of the agent, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yo岣nan says: She can retract her appointment; and Reish Lakish says: She cannot retract her appointment. The Gemara clarifies their respective opinions. Rabbi Yo岣nan said: She can retract her appointment, as a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement, by which she appointed the agent. Reish Lakish said: She cannot retract her appointment, as a statement does not come and nullify a previous statement.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讘讬讟诇 讗诐 注讚 砖诇讗 转专诐 讘讬讟诇 讗讬谉 转专讜诪转讜 转专讜诪讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖拽讚诐 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讜转专诐 讗转 讻专讬讜 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诪注砖讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from the aforementioned mishna (Terumot 3:4) with regard to one who appointed an agent to separate teruma on his behalf and subsequently canceled the agency: If he canceled the appointment before the agent separated teruma, his teruma is not teruma. This shows that a statement nullifies a previous statement. Rava says: With what are we dealing here? With a case where the homeowner preceded the agent and separated teruma from his heap himself, which is an action, and an action certainly nullifies a statement.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讻诇 讛讻诇讬诐 讬讜专讚讬诐 诇讬讚讬 讟讜诪讗转谉 讘诪讞砖讘讛 讜讗讬谉 注讜诇讬谉 诪讟讜诪讗转谉 讗诇讗 讘砖讬谞讜讬 诪注砖讛 诪注砖讛 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 诪注砖讛 讜诪讬讚 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讞砖讘讛 讗讬谞讛 诪讜爪讬讗讛 诇讗 诪讬讚 诪注砖讛 讜诇讗 诪讬讚 诪讞砖讘讛 讘砖诇诪讗 诪讬讚 诪注砖讛 诇讗 诪驻拽讛 诇讗 讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 诪注砖讛 讗诇讗 诪讬讚 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讬讛讗 转驻讬拽

Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yo岣nan: All vessels descend into their state of contracting ritual impurity by means of thought. But they ascend from their state of ritual impurity only by means of a change resulting from an action. An action undertaken to improve the vessel negates both the status created by an earlier action that supposedly completed the vessel and the status created by the thought not to perform more work on the vessel. By contrast, a thought to improve the vessel negates neither status created by action nor status created by thought. Reish Lakish explains his objection: Granted, thought does not negate action, as a statement does not come and nullify action. But it should at least offset thought.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖讗谞讬 诪讞砖讘讛 讚讟讜诪讗讛 讚讻讬 诪注砖讛 讚诪讬 讜讻讚专讘 驻驻讗 讚专讘 驻驻讗 专诪讬 讻转讬讘 讻讬 讬转谉 讜拽专讬谞谉 讻讬 讬转谉 讛讗 讻讬爪讚 讻讬 讬转谉 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讬转谉 诪讛 讬转谉 讚谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讗祝 讬转谉 谞诪讬 讚谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan said to Reish Lakish: Thought in the case of ritual impurity is different, as it is considered like action, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa raises a contradiction: The word yuttan is written defective, and is written as if it says ki yitten. Yet we read it ki yuttan.鈥 How so? The standard of 鈥渋f water is placed [ki yuttan]鈥 is similar to: If one places [ki yitten]; just as the term places [yitten] indicates that it is satisfactory to the owner for the produce to become wet, as he himself is placing the water, so too, the term 鈥渋s placed [yuttan]鈥 means that it is satisfactory to the owner that the produce becomes wet, despite the fact that he did not place the water himself.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讛砖讜诇讞 讙讟 诇讗砖转讜 讜讛讙讬注 讘砖诇讬讞 讗讜 砖砖诇讞 讗讞专讬讜 砖诇讬讞 讜讗诪专 诇讜 讙讟 砖谞转转讬 诇讱 讘讟诇 讛讜讗 讛专讬 讝讛 讘讟诇 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 转讬讜讘转讗

Rabbi Yo岣nan raised an objection to Reish Lakish: With regard to one who sends a bill of divorce to his wife, and later the husband encountered the agent or sent another agent after him and in this manner said to him: The bill of divorce that I gave you is nullified, it is thereby nullified. This indicates that the appointment of an agent can be nullified even by a statement. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish is in fact a conclusive refutation.

讜讛讬诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讘拽诪讬讬转讗 讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 砖讗谞讬 谞转讬谞转 诪注讜转 诇讬讚 讗砖讛 讚讻诪注砖讛 讚诪讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 讚讬讘讜专

The Gemara adds: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, and this is even according to the first version of their dispute, with regard to a woman who retracts from her betrothal after accepting the money for it. And even though there is room to say that giving money to a woman for betrothal is different, as it is considered like an action, even so, a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement with regard to her consent to the betrothal, provided that the betrothal has yet to take effect.

拽砖讬讗 讛讬诇讻转讗 讗讛讬诇讻转讗 讗诪专转 讛讬诇讻转讗 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 讛讬诇讻转讗 讻专讘 谞讞诪谉 讚讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 诪讛讜 砖讬讞讝讜专 讜讬讙专砖 讘讜

The Gemara asks: The halakha recorded here is difficult with regard to the halakha recorded elsewhere. You said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, and yet we maintain that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Na岣an. As a dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha in the case of a bill of divorce sent by an agent that the husband nullified before it was received by his wife? Can the husband return and divorce his wife with the very same bill of divorce?

专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 讞讜讝专 讜诪讙专砖 讘讜 专讘 砖砖转 讗诪专 讗讬谞讜 讞讜讝专 讜诪讙专砖 讘讜 讜拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 讛讬诇讻转讗 讻讜转讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 谞讛讬 讚讘讟诇讬讛 诪转讜专转 砖诇讬讞 诪转讜专转 讙讟 诇讗 讘讟诇讬讛

Rav Na岣an says: He can return and divorce her with it, and Rav Sheshet says: He cannot return and divorce her with it. And we maintain that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Na岣an in this case. By contrast, according to the ruling of Rabbi Yo岣nan, since the husband has nullified the bill of divorce it should no longer be valid. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as, although the husband has nullified the agent from his status as an agent, he has not nullified the bill of divorce itself from its status as a bill of divorce.

诪拽讜讚砖转 诇砖谞讬 讗诪专 专讘 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇砖谞讬 诇注讜诇诐 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇砖谞讬 注讚 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 诇讗讞专 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 驻拽注讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬 砖谞讬 讜讙诪专讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬 专讗砖讜谉

搂 The mishna teaches that if a man betroths a woman and stipulates that the betrothal will take effect in thirty days鈥 time and another man betroths her within that period, she is betrothed to the second man. Rav says: She is betrothed to the second forever, i.e., the betrothal is fully effective, and Shmuel says: She is betrothed to the second until the thirty days pass. After thirty days have passed, the betrothal of the second lapses, and the earlier betrothal of the first man is completed.

讬转讬讘 专讘 讞住讚讗 讜拽讗 拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬 砖谞讬 讘诪讗讬 驻拽注讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪专 讗专讬砖讗 诪转谞讬 诇讛 讜拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗住讬驻讗 诪转谞讬 诇讛 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛

Rav 岣sda sat and found this difficult: By what means is the betrothal of the second man abrogated? When the second betrothal took effect, the first betrothal was not yet in effect. Why, then, is the second betrothal abrogated? Rav Yosef said to him: The Master teaches this dispute with regard to the first clause of the mishna, and therefore he finds it difficult, whereas Rav Yehuda teaches it with regard to the latter clause of the mishna, and consequently he does not find it difficult.

诪注讻砖讬讜 讜诇讗讞专 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讜讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇注讜诇诐 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讗诇讗 注讚 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 诇讗讞专 砖诇砖讬诐 驻拽注讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬 砖谞讬 讜讙诪专讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬 专讗砖讜谉

Rav Yehuda鈥檚 version of the dispute is as follows: The mishna teaches that if the first man says to her: You are hereby betrothed to me from now and after thirty days, and another man betrothed her within those thirty days, there is uncertainty whether she is betrothed or whether she is not betrothed. Rav says: This means that there is uncertainty whether she is betrothed or whether she is not betrothed forever, and her only option is to receive a bill of divorce from both men. And Shmuel says: There is uncertainty whether she is betrothed or whether she is not betrothed only until thirty days have elapsed, whereas after thirty days the betrothal of the second is abrogated, and the betrothal of the first is completed.

诇专讘 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛 讗讬 转谞讗讛 讛讜讗讬 讗讬 讞讝专讛 讛讜讗讬 诇砖诪讜讗诇 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讚转谞讗讛 讛讜讗讬

The Gemara explains their respective opinions: Rav is uncertain what the first man meant. Is it a condition, i.e., the man is saying: If I do not change my mind within thirty days, you are betrothed to me from now, or is it a retraction, that is, he immediately retracted after he said: From now, in favor of a betrothal that will take effect only after thirty days have elapsed. This uncertainty remains even after the end of the thirty days. It is obvious to Shmuel that it is a condition. Consequently, the uncertainty whether or not she is betrothed to the second man applies during the thirty-day period, as the first man might yet change his mind. After the completion of thirty days, the betrothal from the first man retroactively takes effect from the moment he gave it, and therefore the betrothal of the second man is abrogated.

讜讘驻诇讜讙转讗 讚讛谞讬 转谞讗讬 讚转谞讬讗 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讙讟 讜讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讻讝讛 讙讟

The Gemara comments: And Rav and Shmuel disagree in the dispute between these tanna鈥檌m. As it is taught in a baraita: If one says to his wife upon giving her a bill of divorce that it should take effect: From today and after my death, there is uncertainty whether it is a valid bill of divorce or whether it is not a valid bill of divorce. This is the statement of the Rabbis. The Rabbis are uncertain whether he meant that the bill of divorce should take effect retroactively from that moment, in which case it is valid; or whether he changed his mind and meant for it to take effect only after his death, which would mean that it is not a valid bill of divorce. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A document like this is a valid bill of divorce. The husband meant his statement as a condition that the bill of divorce should, after his death, take effect retroactively from now, and therefore it is a valid bill of divorce.

讜谞讬诪讗 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘谞谉 讜谞讬诪讗 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬诇讜 讗诪专 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘谞谉 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讛转诐 讚诇专讞讜拽讛 拽讗转讬 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚诇拽专讜讘讛 拽讗转讬 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讛 诇讬讛 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讚转谞讗讛 讛讜讗讬

The Gemara asks: And let Rav, instead of explaining his own opinion, say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and let Shmuel say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara answers: It is necessary for Rav and Shmuel to state their disagreement explicitly. As had Rav merely said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, I would say: There, in the case of a bill of divorce, when he comes to distance her from himself, one can say that he has changed his mind with regard to the divorce. But here, in the case of betrothal, when he comes to draw her near, you might say that Rav concedes to Shmuel that it is certainly a condition, as he wants to betroth her as soon as possible.

讜讗讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讛转诐 讛讜讗 讚讗讬谉 讙讟 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚讬砖 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诇讗讞专 砖诇砖讬诐 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讬讛 诇专讘 爪专讬讻讗

And conversely, had Shmuel said only that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, I would say: It is in that case there that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said it is a valid bill of divorce, as there is no bill of divorce after death, and therefore it is unlikely that he changed his mind and attempted to give a bill of divorce that will take effect only after the death of the husband. But here, where there is the possibility of betrothal after thirty days, and he might well have intended to retract the betrothal, you might say that Shmuel concedes to Rav. Consequently, it was necessary to state the dispute between Rav and Shmuel concerning betrothal in explicit terms.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讜诇讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘 讘讗 讗讞讚 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讬 诪注讻砖讬讜 讜诇讗讞专 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讬 诪注讻砖讬讜 讜诇讗讞专 注砖专讬诐 讬讜诐

Abaye said: And according to the reasoning of Rav, if one man came and said the following ambiguous statement to her: You are hereby betrothed to me from now and after thirty days. And another man came during these thirty days and said to her: You are hereby betrothed to me from now and after twenty days,

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Kiddushin 59

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Kiddushin 59

讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讛转诐 讚拽转谞讬 讛讗讜诪专 诇砖诇讜讞讜

and what is different there, in the previous chapter (50a), that the tanna teaches: With regard to one who says to his agent, go and betroth a certain woman for me in such and such a place, and he went and betrothed her in a different place, she is not betrothed? Why does the mishna there label him an agent, and here it labels him simply another?

讛讻讗 专讘讜转讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讜讛转诐 专讘讜转讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讛讻讗 专讘讜转讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗讬 转谞讗 砖诇讜讞讜 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 砖诇讜讞讜 讛讜讗 讚讛讜讬 专诪讗讬 讚住诪讻讛 讚注转讬讛 住讘专 注讘讚 诇讬 砖诇讬讞讜转讬 讗讘诇 讞讘讬专讜 讚诇讗 住诪讻讛 讚注转讬讛 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 诇讬讛讜讬 专诪讗讬

The Gemara answers: Here the mishna teaches us a novel element and there it teaches us a novel element, through its use of these terms. The Gemara elaborates: The mishna here teaches us a novel element, as had it taught: His agent, I would say that it is his agent who is considered a scoundrel in that case, as one who sends an agent relies upon him, thinking: He will perform my agency for me, since he was sent for that purpose. But with regard to the use of the term: Another, who was not appointed and upon whom he does not rely, as he is not his agent, you might say that he should not be considered a scoundrel.

讛转诐 专讘讜转讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗讬 转谞讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讞讘讬专讜 讛讜讗 讚讻讬 拽讚砖讛 讘诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讚住讘专 诇讗 讟专讞 讗讘诇 砖诇讜讞讜 讚讟专讞 讗讬诪讗 诪专讗讛 诪拽讜诐 讛讜讗 诇讜 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

Similarly, the mishna there teaches us a novel element, as had it taught: One who says to another, I would say that it is in the case of another that she is not betrothed if he betrothed her in a different place, as he thinks that this person would not go to the trouble of looking for her elsewhere, and therefore he authorized him to betroth the woman only in that particular place. But with regard to his agent, who is assumed to take special trouble to fulfill his agency, you might say he is merely showing him the place where she is likely to be found, and she is betrothed in any case. The mishna therefore teaches us that even when he appointed an agent she is not betrothed if he does not find her in the place the putative husband specified.

专讘讬谉 讞住讬讚讗 讗讝讬诇 诇拽讚讜砖讬 诇讬讛 讗讬转转讗 诇讘专讬讛 拽讬讚砖讛 诇谞驻砖讬讛 讜讛转谞讬讗 诪讛 砖注砖讛 注砖讜讬 讗诇讗 砖谞讛讙 讘讜 诪谞讛讙 专诪讗讜转 诇讗 讬讛讘讜讛 谞讬讛诇讬讛 讗讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讗讜讚讜注讬 住讘专 讗讚讛讻讬 讜讛讻讬 讗转讗 讗讬谞讬砖 讗讞专讬谞讗 诪拽讚砖 诇讛

The Gemara relates: Ravin the Pious was appointed an agent and went to betroth a woman to his son, but in the end he betrothed her to himself. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn鈥檛 it taught in the aforementioned baraita: What he did is done, but he has treated him in a deceitful manner? How could a pious individual act in this fashion? The Gemara answers: The woman鈥檚 family would not give her to the son, and agreed only to let her marry the father. The Gemara further asks: Even so, before betrothing her he should have first informed his son that they refuse to let her marry him. The Gemara explains that Ravin thought: In the meantime, while I am busy reporting back to my son, someone else will come and betroth her.

专讘讛 讘专 讘专 讞谞讛 讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 讝讜讝讬 诇专讘 讗诪专 讝讘谞讛 谞讬讛诇讬 诇讛讗讬 讗专注讗 讗讝诇 讝讘谞讛 诇谞驻砖讬讛 讜讛转谞讬讗 诪讛 砖注砖讛 注砖讜讬 讗诇讗 砖谞讛讙 讘讜 诪谞讛讙 专诪讗讜转 讘讗讙讗 讚讗诇讬诪讬 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇专讘 谞讛讙讬 讘讬讛 讻讘讜讚 诇专讘讛 讘专 讘专 讞谞讛 诇讗 谞讛讙讬 讘讬讛 讻讘讜讚 讗讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讗讜讚讜注讬 住讘专 讗讚讛讻讬 讜讛讻讬 讗转讗 讗讬谞讬砖 讗讞专讬谞讗 讝讘讬谉 诇讛

The Gemara relates a similar story: Rabba bar bar 岣na gave money to Rav and said: Purchase this land for me. Rav went and purchased it for himself. The Gemara asks: But isn鈥檛 it taught in the baraita with regard to an agent who acts in this manner: What he did is done, but he has treated him in a deceitful manner? The Gemara answers: The land was located in a valley inhabited by violent men, who treated Rav with respect and were prepared to sell the land to him, but who did not treat Rabba bar bar 岣na with respect. As in the case of Ravin, the Gemara questions this behavior: Nevertheless, Rav should have informed him. The Gemara responds that Rav thought: In the meantime someone else will come and purchase the land.

专讘 讙讬讚诇 讛讜讛 诪讛驻讬讱 讘讛讛讬讗 讗专注讗 讗讝诇 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讝讘谞讛 讗讝诇 专讘 讙讬讚诇 拽讘诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讗讝诇 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讜拽讘诇讬讛 诇专讘 讬爪讞拽 谞驻讞讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛诪转谉 注讚 砖讬注诇讛 讗爪诇谞讜 诇专讙诇 讻讬 住诇讬拽 讗砖讻讞讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 注谞讬 诪讛驻讱 讘讞专专讛 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜谞讟诇讛 讛讬诪谞讜 诪讗讬

The Gemara further relates: Rav Giddel was engaging in the acquisition of a certain plot of land. In the meantime Rabbi Abba went and purchased it. Rav Giddel went and complained about Rabbi Abba to Rabbi Zeira. Rabbi Zeira went and complained about Rabbi Abba to Rav Yitz岣k Nappa岣. Rav Yitz岣k Nappa岣 said to him: Wait until Rabbi Abba ascends to visit us for the pilgrimage Festival, when all come to hear the Festival sermon, on which occasion we can discuss this matter with him. When Rabbi Abba ascended Rav Yitz岣k Nappa岣 found him and said to him: If a pauper is engaging in the acquisition of a loaf of bread that he found, and another came and took it from him, what is the halakha?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 谞拽专讗 专砖注 讜讗诇讗 诪专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 注讘讚 讛讻讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 讛讜讛 讬讚注谞讗 讛砖转讗 谞诪讬 谞讬转讘讛 谞讬讛诇讬讛 诪专 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讝讘讜谞讬 诇讗 诪讝讘谞讬谞讗 诇讛 讚讗专注讗 拽诪讬讬转讗 讛讬讗 讜诇讗 诪住诪谞讗 诪讬诇转讗 讗讬 讘注讬 讘诪转谞讛 谞讬砖拽诇讬讛

Rabbi Abba said to him: The one who took it away is called wicked. Rabbi Yitz岣k Nappa岣 replied: But if so, what is the reason that the Master acted this way? Rav Giddel was negotiating the purchase of this land and you purchased it. Rabbi Abba said to him: I did not know that Rav Giddel was trying to acquire the land. Rabbi Yitz岣k Nappa岣 retorted: Now too, the Master should give it to him, since you have been made aware that he submitted the first offer. Rabbi Abba said to him: As for selling, I will not sell it, as it is the first land I have ever purchased, and this matter of selling one鈥檚 first acquisition is not a good omen. If he wants to accept it as a gift, let him take it.

专讘 讙讬讚诇 诇讗 谞讞讬转 诇讛 讚讻转讬讘 讜砖讜谞讗 诪转谞转 讬讞讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讗 诇讗 谞讞讬转 诇讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讛驻讬讱 讘讛 专讘 讙讬讚诇 诇讗 诪专 谞讞讬转 诇讛 讜诇讗 诪专 谞讞讬转 诇讛 讜诪讬转拽专讬讗 讗专注讗 讚专讘谞谉

Rav Giddel did not descend to claim this plot of land, as it is written: 鈥淏ut he who hates gifts shall live鈥 (Proverbs 15:27), and therefore he did not wish to accept the land as a gift. Rabbi Abba also did not descend to it, because Rav Giddel was already engaging in the acquisition of it when he acquired the land. In this manner, this Sage did not descend to take the plot of land, and that Sage did not descend to take care of it, and it was called the land of the Sages.

讜讻谉 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讛转拽讚砖讬 诇讬 讻讜壮 诇讗 讘讗 讗讞专 讜拽讬讚砖讛 讘转讜讱 砖诇砖讬诐 诪讛讜 专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖谞转讗讻诇讜 讛诪注讜转

搂 The mishna teaches: And similarly, with regard to one who says to a woman: Be betrothed to me after thirty days, and another came and betrothed her within this period, she is betrothed to the second man. The Gemara asks: In a case where another did not come and betroth her within the thirty days, what is the halakha? Rav and Shmuel both say: She is betrothed after thirty days, even if the money he gave for her betrothal has been used before the end of this period, as the betrothal takes effect from when the money is given.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讛谞讬 讝讜讝讬 诇讗 诇诪诇讜讛 讚诪讜 讜诇讗 诇驻拽讚讜谉 讚诪讜

The Gemara clarifies: What is the reason that she is betrothed despite the lack of money at the end of the thirty days? The Gemara explains that these dinars given for her betrothal are not comparable to a loan, nor are they comparable to a deposit that was transferred into her possession and subsequently lost. In both of these cases she would not be betrothed.

诇驻拽讚讜谉 诇讗 讚诪讜 驻拽讚讜谉 讘专砖讜转讗 讚诪专讗 拽讗 诪转讗讻诇讬 讜讛谞讬 讘专砖讜转讗 讚讬讚讛 拽讗 诪转讗讻诇讬 诇诪诇讜讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 讚诪讜 诪诇讜讛 诇讛讜爪讗讛 谞讬转谞讛 讛谞讬 讘转讜专转 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讬讛讘讬谞讛讜 谞讬讛诇讛

The Gemara elaborates: They are not comparable to a deposit, as a deposit is used in its owner鈥檚 possession, i.e., any loss is incurred by the owner, whereas these are used in her own possession, as he gave her the money to keep. These dinars are also not comparable to a loan; a loan is given for spending and therefore no money remains at the time of the betrothal, whereas these dinars were given to her from the outset for the purpose of betrothal.

诇讗 讘讗 讗讞专 讜拽讬讚砖讛 讜讞讝专讛 讘讛 诪讛讜 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讞讜讝专转 讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 讚讬讘讜专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 讗讬谞讛 讞讜讝专转 诇讗 讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 讚讬讘讜专

The Gemara asks: If another did not come and betroth her, and she retracted her consent to the betrothal within thirty days, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yo岣nan said: She can retract her consent. Why? This statement, by which she changes her mind, comes and nullifies her previous statement when she agreed to the betrothal. Reish Lakish said: She cannot retract her consent, as her second statement does not come and nullify her previous statement.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讘讬讟诇 讗诐 注讚 砖诇讗 转专诐 讘讬讟诇 讗讬谉 转专讜诪转讜 转专讜诪讛 讜讛讗 讛讻讗 讚讚讬讘讜专 讜讚讬讘讜专 讛讜讗 讜拽讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 讚讬讘讜专 砖讗谞讬 谞转讬谞转 诪注讜转 诇讬讚 讗砖讛 讚讻讬 诪注砖讛 讚诪讜 讜诇讗 讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 诪注砖讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from a mishna (Terumot 3:4): In a case where someone appointed an agent to separate teruma from his produce on his behalf, and he subsequently canceled the agency, the halakha depends on the following: If he canceled the appointment before the agent separated the teruma, his teruma is not teruma. And here it is a case involving one statement and a second statement, as the owner of the produce appointed the agent and rescinded his appointment by speech. This shows that a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement. Reish Lakish replied: Giving money to a woman is different, as it is considered like an action, and a mere statement does not come and nullify the action of the transfer of money.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讛砖讜诇讞 讙讟 诇讗砖转讜 讜讛讙讬注 讘砖诇讬讞 讗讜 砖砖诇讞 讗讞专讬讜 砖诇讬讞 讜讗诪专 诇讜 讙讟 砖谞转转讬 诇讱 讘讟诇 讛讜讗 讛专讬 讝讛 讘讟诇 讜讛讗 谞转讬谞转 讙讟 诇讬讚 砖诇讬讞 讚讻讬 谞转讬谞转 诪注讜转 诇讬讚 讗砖讛 讚诪讬 讜拽转谞讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讘讟诇

Rabbi Yo岣nan raised a further objection to Reish Lakish: With regard to one who sends a bill of divorce to his wife, and later the husband encountered the agent or sent another agent after him and in this manner said to him: The bill of divorce that I gave you is nullified, it is thereby nullified. And giving a bill of divorce to an agent is considered to be like giving money to a woman, and yet this baraita teaches that it is nullified, which indicates that speech can override even an action.

讛转诐 谞诪讬 讻诇 讻诪讛 讚诇讗 诪讟讗 讙讬讟讗 诇讬讚讛 讚讬讘讜专 讜讚讬讘讜专 讛讜讗 讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 讚讬讘讜专

Reish Lakish answered: There too, as long as the bill of divorce has not reached the woman鈥檚 hand it is considered a case of one statement and a second statement. There is no halakhic significance to the transmitting of a bill of divorce to an agent, as only its delivery to the wife is considered an action. Therefore, the act of transferring the bill of divorce to the agent is of no consequence and in this particular case a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讻诇 讛讻诇讬诐 讬讜专讚讬谉 诇讬讚讬 讟讜诪讗转谉 讘诪讞砖讘讛 讜讗讬谉 注讜诇讬诐 诪讬讚讬 讟讜诪讗转谉 讗诇讗 讘砖讬谞讜讬 诪注砖讛

Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yo岣nan: All vessels descend into their state of contracting ritual impurity by means of thought. Although an unfinished vessel cannot become ritually impure, if the craftsman decided not to work on it any further, it immediately assumes the status of a completed vessel and can become ritually impure. But they ascend from their state of ritual impurity only by means of a change resulting from an action. A ritually impure vessel, once it undergoes physical change, is no longer ritually impure.

诪注砖讛 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 诪注砖讛 讜诪讬讚 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讞砖讘讛 讗讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗讛 诇讗 诪讬讚 诪注砖讛 讜诇讗 诪讬讚 诪讞砖讘讛 讘砖诇诪讗 诪讬讚 诪注砖讛 诇讗 诪驻拽讛 讚诇讗 讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 诪注砖讛 讗诇讗 诪讬讚 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讬讛讗 转驻讬拽

An action undertaken to improve the vessel negates both the status created by an earlier action that supposedly completed the vessel and the status created by the thought not to perform more work on the vessel. In that case the vessel cannot contract ritual impurity until the craftsman has finished working on it. By contrast, a thought to improve the vessel negates neither status created by action nor status created by thought. Reish Lakish finds this difficult for the following reason: Granted, thought does not negate action, as a statement does not come and nullify action. But it should at least offset thought. This halakha indicates that a statement does not nullify a previous statement.

砖讗谞讬 诪讞砖讘讛 讚讟讜诪讗讛 讚讻讬 诪注砖讛 讚诪讬 讜讻讚专讘 驻驻讗 讚专讘 驻驻讗 专诪讬 讻转讬讘 讻讬 讬转谉 讜拽专讬谞谉 讻讬 讬转谉 讛讗 讻讬爪讚

The Gemara answers: Thought in the case of ritual impurity is different, as it is considered like action, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa raises a contradiction: With regard to the halakha that produce must become wet in order for it to contract ritual impurity, the verse states: 鈥淏ut if water is placed [vekhi yuttan] upon the seed, and any part of a carcass falls upon it, it is impure鈥 (Leviticus 11:38). The word yuttan is written defective, and is written as if it says ki yitten. Accordingly, this would mean that one must actively place the water on the produce. Yet we read it, based on the tradition as to its correct pronunciation, ki yuttan,鈥 which includes any situation where the produce becomes wet. How so? How can the way the verse is written and the way it is read be reconciled?

讻讬 讬转谉 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讻讬 讬转谉 诪讛 讬转谉 讚谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讗祝 讬转谉 讚谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛

Rav Pappa explains that the standard of 鈥渋f water is placed [ki yuttan]鈥 is similar to: If one places [ki yitten]; just as the term places [yitten] indicates that it is satisfactory to the owner for the produce to become wet, as he himself is placing the water, so too, the term 鈥渋s placed [yuttan]鈥 means that it is satisfactory to the owner that the produce becomes wet, despite the fact that he did not place the water himself. This is proof that thought is equivalent to action with regard to ritual impurity, as if one is satisfied with the produce becoming wet it is considered as though he actively placed the water himself. By the same reasoning, thought which renders a vessel susceptible to ritual impurity is powerful enough to require an action to counteract its effect.

专讘 讝讘讬讚 诪转谞讬 诇讛讗 砖诪注转转讗 讗讛讗 讜讻谉 讛讬讗 砖谞转谞讛 专砖讜转 诇砖诇讜讞讛 诇拽讚砖讛 讜讛诇讻讛 讛讬讗 讜拽讚砖讛 讗转 注爪诪讛 讗诐 砖诇讛 拽讚诪讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讜讗诐 砖诇 砖诇讜讞讛 拽讚诪讜 讗讬谉 拽讬讚讜砖讬讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉

The Gemara presents another version of the discussion: Rav Zevid taught this dispute with regard to this halakha: And similarly, in a case where she gave permission to her agent to accept betrothal for her and she subsequently went and accepted betrothal herself from someone else, if her betrothal came first, her betrothal is a valid betrothal, but if the betrothal of her agent came first, her betrothal is not a betrothal.

诇讗 拽讚砖讛 讗转 注爪诪讛 讜讞讝专讛 讘讛 诪讛讜 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讞讜讝专转 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 讗讬谞讛 讞讜讝专转 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讞讜讝专转 讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 讚讬讘讜专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 讗讬谞讛 讞讜讝专转 诇讗 讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 讚讬讘讜专

The Sages discuss this halakha: If she did not accept betrothal herself and retracted her appointment of the agent, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yo岣nan says: She can retract her appointment; and Reish Lakish says: She cannot retract her appointment. The Gemara clarifies their respective opinions. Rabbi Yo岣nan said: She can retract her appointment, as a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement, by which she appointed the agent. Reish Lakish said: She cannot retract her appointment, as a statement does not come and nullify a previous statement.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讘讬讟诇 讗诐 注讚 砖诇讗 转专诐 讘讬讟诇 讗讬谉 转专讜诪转讜 转专讜诪讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖拽讚诐 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讜转专诐 讗转 讻专讬讜 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诪注砖讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from the aforementioned mishna (Terumot 3:4) with regard to one who appointed an agent to separate teruma on his behalf and subsequently canceled the agency: If he canceled the appointment before the agent separated teruma, his teruma is not teruma. This shows that a statement nullifies a previous statement. Rava says: With what are we dealing here? With a case where the homeowner preceded the agent and separated teruma from his heap himself, which is an action, and an action certainly nullifies a statement.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讻诇 讛讻诇讬诐 讬讜专讚讬诐 诇讬讚讬 讟讜诪讗转谉 讘诪讞砖讘讛 讜讗讬谉 注讜诇讬谉 诪讟讜诪讗转谉 讗诇讗 讘砖讬谞讜讬 诪注砖讛 诪注砖讛 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 诪注砖讛 讜诪讬讚 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讞砖讘讛 讗讬谞讛 诪讜爪讬讗讛 诇讗 诪讬讚 诪注砖讛 讜诇讗 诪讬讚 诪讞砖讘讛 讘砖诇诪讗 诪讬讚 诪注砖讛 诇讗 诪驻拽讛 诇讗 讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 诪注砖讛 讗诇讗 诪讬讚 诪讞砖讘讛 诪讬讛讗 转驻讬拽

Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yo岣nan: All vessels descend into their state of contracting ritual impurity by means of thought. But they ascend from their state of ritual impurity only by means of a change resulting from an action. An action undertaken to improve the vessel negates both the status created by an earlier action that supposedly completed the vessel and the status created by the thought not to perform more work on the vessel. By contrast, a thought to improve the vessel negates neither status created by action nor status created by thought. Reish Lakish explains his objection: Granted, thought does not negate action, as a statement does not come and nullify action. But it should at least offset thought.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖讗谞讬 诪讞砖讘讛 讚讟讜诪讗讛 讚讻讬 诪注砖讛 讚诪讬 讜讻讚专讘 驻驻讗 讚专讘 驻驻讗 专诪讬 讻转讬讘 讻讬 讬转谉 讜拽专讬谞谉 讻讬 讬转谉 讛讗 讻讬爪讚 讻讬 讬转谉 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讬转谉 诪讛 讬转谉 讚谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讗祝 讬转谉 谞诪讬 讚谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan said to Reish Lakish: Thought in the case of ritual impurity is different, as it is considered like action, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa raises a contradiction: The word yuttan is written defective, and is written as if it says ki yitten. Yet we read it ki yuttan.鈥 How so? The standard of 鈥渋f water is placed [ki yuttan]鈥 is similar to: If one places [ki yitten]; just as the term places [yitten] indicates that it is satisfactory to the owner for the produce to become wet, as he himself is placing the water, so too, the term 鈥渋s placed [yuttan]鈥 means that it is satisfactory to the owner that the produce becomes wet, despite the fact that he did not place the water himself.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讛砖讜诇讞 讙讟 诇讗砖转讜 讜讛讙讬注 讘砖诇讬讞 讗讜 砖砖诇讞 讗讞专讬讜 砖诇讬讞 讜讗诪专 诇讜 讙讟 砖谞转转讬 诇讱 讘讟诇 讛讜讗 讛专讬 讝讛 讘讟诇 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 转讬讜讘转讗

Rabbi Yo岣nan raised an objection to Reish Lakish: With regard to one who sends a bill of divorce to his wife, and later the husband encountered the agent or sent another agent after him and in this manner said to him: The bill of divorce that I gave you is nullified, it is thereby nullified. This indicates that the appointment of an agent can be nullified even by a statement. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish is in fact a conclusive refutation.

讜讛讬诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讘拽诪讬讬转讗 讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 砖讗谞讬 谞转讬谞转 诪注讜转 诇讬讚 讗砖讛 讚讻诪注砖讛 讚诪讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 讗转讬 讚讬讘讜专 讜诪讘讟诇 讚讬讘讜专

The Gemara adds: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, and this is even according to the first version of their dispute, with regard to a woman who retracts from her betrothal after accepting the money for it. And even though there is room to say that giving money to a woman for betrothal is different, as it is considered like an action, even so, a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement with regard to her consent to the betrothal, provided that the betrothal has yet to take effect.

拽砖讬讗 讛讬诇讻转讗 讗讛讬诇讻转讗 讗诪专转 讛讬诇讻转讗 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 讛讬诇讻转讗 讻专讘 谞讞诪谉 讚讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 诪讛讜 砖讬讞讝讜专 讜讬讙专砖 讘讜

The Gemara asks: The halakha recorded here is difficult with regard to the halakha recorded elsewhere. You said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, and yet we maintain that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Na岣an. As a dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha in the case of a bill of divorce sent by an agent that the husband nullified before it was received by his wife? Can the husband return and divorce his wife with the very same bill of divorce?

专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 讞讜讝专 讜诪讙专砖 讘讜 专讘 砖砖转 讗诪专 讗讬谞讜 讞讜讝专 讜诪讙专砖 讘讜 讜拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 讛讬诇讻转讗 讻讜转讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 谞讛讬 讚讘讟诇讬讛 诪转讜专转 砖诇讬讞 诪转讜专转 讙讟 诇讗 讘讟诇讬讛

Rav Na岣an says: He can return and divorce her with it, and Rav Sheshet says: He cannot return and divorce her with it. And we maintain that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Na岣an in this case. By contrast, according to the ruling of Rabbi Yo岣nan, since the husband has nullified the bill of divorce it should no longer be valid. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as, although the husband has nullified the agent from his status as an agent, he has not nullified the bill of divorce itself from its status as a bill of divorce.

诪拽讜讚砖转 诇砖谞讬 讗诪专 专讘 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇砖谞讬 诇注讜诇诐 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇砖谞讬 注讚 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 诇讗讞专 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 驻拽注讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬 砖谞讬 讜讙诪专讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬 专讗砖讜谉

搂 The mishna teaches that if a man betroths a woman and stipulates that the betrothal will take effect in thirty days鈥 time and another man betroths her within that period, she is betrothed to the second man. Rav says: She is betrothed to the second forever, i.e., the betrothal is fully effective, and Shmuel says: She is betrothed to the second until the thirty days pass. After thirty days have passed, the betrothal of the second lapses, and the earlier betrothal of the first man is completed.

讬转讬讘 专讘 讞住讚讗 讜拽讗 拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬 砖谞讬 讘诪讗讬 驻拽注讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪专 讗专讬砖讗 诪转谞讬 诇讛 讜拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗住讬驻讗 诪转谞讬 诇讛 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛

Rav 岣sda sat and found this difficult: By what means is the betrothal of the second man abrogated? When the second betrothal took effect, the first betrothal was not yet in effect. Why, then, is the second betrothal abrogated? Rav Yosef said to him: The Master teaches this dispute with regard to the first clause of the mishna, and therefore he finds it difficult, whereas Rav Yehuda teaches it with regard to the latter clause of the mishna, and consequently he does not find it difficult.

诪注讻砖讬讜 讜诇讗讞专 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讜讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇注讜诇诐 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讗诇讗 注讚 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 诇讗讞专 砖诇砖讬诐 驻拽注讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬 砖谞讬 讜讙诪专讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬 专讗砖讜谉

Rav Yehuda鈥檚 version of the dispute is as follows: The mishna teaches that if the first man says to her: You are hereby betrothed to me from now and after thirty days, and another man betrothed her within those thirty days, there is uncertainty whether she is betrothed or whether she is not betrothed. Rav says: This means that there is uncertainty whether she is betrothed or whether she is not betrothed forever, and her only option is to receive a bill of divorce from both men. And Shmuel says: There is uncertainty whether she is betrothed or whether she is not betrothed only until thirty days have elapsed, whereas after thirty days the betrothal of the second is abrogated, and the betrothal of the first is completed.

诇专讘 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛 讗讬 转谞讗讛 讛讜讗讬 讗讬 讞讝专讛 讛讜讗讬 诇砖诪讜讗诇 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讚转谞讗讛 讛讜讗讬

The Gemara explains their respective opinions: Rav is uncertain what the first man meant. Is it a condition, i.e., the man is saying: If I do not change my mind within thirty days, you are betrothed to me from now, or is it a retraction, that is, he immediately retracted after he said: From now, in favor of a betrothal that will take effect only after thirty days have elapsed. This uncertainty remains even after the end of the thirty days. It is obvious to Shmuel that it is a condition. Consequently, the uncertainty whether or not she is betrothed to the second man applies during the thirty-day period, as the first man might yet change his mind. After the completion of thirty days, the betrothal from the first man retroactively takes effect from the moment he gave it, and therefore the betrothal of the second man is abrogated.

讜讘驻诇讜讙转讗 讚讛谞讬 转谞讗讬 讚转谞讬讗 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讙讟 讜讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讻讝讛 讙讟

The Gemara comments: And Rav and Shmuel disagree in the dispute between these tanna鈥檌m. As it is taught in a baraita: If one says to his wife upon giving her a bill of divorce that it should take effect: From today and after my death, there is uncertainty whether it is a valid bill of divorce or whether it is not a valid bill of divorce. This is the statement of the Rabbis. The Rabbis are uncertain whether he meant that the bill of divorce should take effect retroactively from that moment, in which case it is valid; or whether he changed his mind and meant for it to take effect only after his death, which would mean that it is not a valid bill of divorce. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A document like this is a valid bill of divorce. The husband meant his statement as a condition that the bill of divorce should, after his death, take effect retroactively from now, and therefore it is a valid bill of divorce.

讜谞讬诪讗 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘谞谉 讜谞讬诪讗 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬诇讜 讗诪专 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘谞谉 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讛转诐 讚诇专讞讜拽讛 拽讗转讬 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚诇拽专讜讘讛 拽讗转讬 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讛 诇讬讛 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讚转谞讗讛 讛讜讗讬

The Gemara asks: And let Rav, instead of explaining his own opinion, say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and let Shmuel say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara answers: It is necessary for Rav and Shmuel to state their disagreement explicitly. As had Rav merely said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, I would say: There, in the case of a bill of divorce, when he comes to distance her from himself, one can say that he has changed his mind with regard to the divorce. But here, in the case of betrothal, when he comes to draw her near, you might say that Rav concedes to Shmuel that it is certainly a condition, as he wants to betroth her as soon as possible.

讜讗讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讛转诐 讛讜讗 讚讗讬谉 讙讟 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚讬砖 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诇讗讞专 砖诇砖讬诐 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讬讛 诇专讘 爪专讬讻讗

And conversely, had Shmuel said only that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, I would say: It is in that case there that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said it is a valid bill of divorce, as there is no bill of divorce after death, and therefore it is unlikely that he changed his mind and attempted to give a bill of divorce that will take effect only after the death of the husband. But here, where there is the possibility of betrothal after thirty days, and he might well have intended to retract the betrothal, you might say that Shmuel concedes to Rav. Consequently, it was necessary to state the dispute between Rav and Shmuel concerning betrothal in explicit terms.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讜诇讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘 讘讗 讗讞讚 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讬 诪注讻砖讬讜 讜诇讗讞专 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讬 诪注讻砖讬讜 讜诇讗讞专 注砖专讬诐 讬讜诐

Abaye said: And according to the reasoning of Rav, if one man came and said the following ambiguous statement to her: You are hereby betrothed to me from now and after thirty days. And another man came during these thirty days and said to her: You are hereby betrothed to me from now and after twenty days,

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