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Today's Daf Yomi

May 10, 2016 | 讘壮 讘讗讬讬专 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Kiddushin 60

Study Guide Kiddushin 60. If one betroths a woman and says from today and after 30 days, what was his intent? 聽3 different opinions are brought and comparisons are made to the parallel situation in a divorce. 聽If one conditions the betrothal on his giving her money, the betrothal takes affect as long as he gives her the money. 聽There is a debate among Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda about whether the betrothal takes effect immediately (assuming the money is given down the road) or only when the money is actually given. 聽Again, a comparison is made to a parallel case with a divorce.


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讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讬 诪注讻砖讬讜 讜诇讗讞专 注砖专讛 讬诪讬诐 诪专讗砖讜谉 讜诪讗讞专讜谉 爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 诪讗诪爪注讬 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讙讟

and another man came and said to her: You are hereby betrothed to me from now and after ten days, she requires a bill of divorce from the first man and last man, but she does not require a bill of divorce from the middle one.

诪讛 谞驻砖讱 讗讬 转谞讗讛 讛讜讗讬 讚拽诪讗 拽讬讚讜砖讬 讚讛谞讱 诇讗讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬 讗讬 讞讝专讛 讛讜讗讬 讚讘转专讗 拽讬讚讜砖讬 讚讛谞讱 诇讗讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬

Abaye explains: This is the halakha whichever way you look at this case: If this expression is a condition that she should be betrothed from now if he does not retract within thirty days, the betrothal of the first man is a betrothal, whereas the betrothals of those other men are not betrothals. If it is a retraction, i.e., if after saying: From now, he changed his mind and delayed the moment of betrothal, then only that betrothal of the last one is a betrothal, whereas the betrothals of those first two men are not betrothals, as they both postponed their betrothals to a later date. Either way, the betrothal of the middle man is of no consequence.

驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讛讗讬 诇讬砖谞讗 诪砖诪注 转谞讗讛 讜诪砖诪注 讞讝专讛 讜转讬讘注讬 讙讬讟讗 诪讻诇 讞讚 讜讞讚 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara asks: It is obvious that this is the case; what is the novelty of Abaye鈥檚 statement? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that this formulation means a condition and also means a retraction, and therefore she should require a bill of divorce from each and every one of them, including the middle man, due to the uncertainty. It is possible the first man retracted while the second one imposed a condition, in which case only the betrothal of the second person takes effect. Abaye therefore teaches us that according to the opinion of Rav, the uncertainty concerns the meaning of this expression itself, and there is no uncertainty with regard to the intention of each individual person who says this formula. Consequently, there is no possibility that this woman is betrothed to the middle man.

注讜诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讗讛 转讜驻住讬谉 讘讛 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗住讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讗讛 转讜驻住讬谉 讘讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 诪砖专砖讬讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗诪讬 诇专讘讬 讗住讬 讗住讘专讛 诇讱 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 砖讜讜 谞驻砖讬讛 讻讬 砖专讙讗 讚诇讬讘谞讬 讚讻诇 讞讚 讜讞讚 专讜讞讗 诇讞讘专讬讛 砖讘拽

Ulla says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Even if one hundred betrothed her in this manner, their betrothal is effective with regard to her. And similarly, Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Even the betrothal of one hundred is effective with regard to her. Rav Mesharshiyya, son of Rav Ami, said to Rabbi Asi: I will explain to you the reason of Rabbi Yo岣nan: These one hundred men have rendered themselves like a row [sheraga] of bricks, each and every one of whom leaves a gap for the other. Since there is a period of time before the betrothal of each man takes effect, another betrothal can intervene in the meantime.

诪转讬讘 专讘 讞谞讬谞讗 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讙讟 讜讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讜讗诐 诪转 讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转

Rav 岣nina raises an objection to this ruling from a baraita: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, there is uncertainty whether it is a valid bill of divorce or whether it is not a valid bill of divorce. And therefore if he dies she performs 岣litza, but does not enter into levirate marriage. Since she might not be divorced, the obligation of levirate marriage applies to her, but in practice she cannot perform levirate marriage in case she was in fact divorced and is thereby forbidden to her late husband鈥檚 brother, a transgression which is punishable by karet.

讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘 诪住讬讬注讗 诇讬讛 诇砖诪讜讗诇 谞诪讬 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘谞谉 讛讬讗 讜讗谞谉 讚讗诪专讬 讻专讘讬

Rav 岣nina explains his objection: Granted, according to the opinion of Rav, the baraita supports him, as Rav maintains that the meaning of this expression is uncertain. According to the opinion of Shmuel as well, although he claims that the phrase is a condition rather than a retraction, he can explain as follows: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who claim in that case that it is uncertain if she is divorced, and I, Shmuel, say my ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

讗诇讗 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讗诪专 砖讬讜专讗 讛讜讬 讻诇 讙讬讟讗 讚诪砖讬讬专 讘讛 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐 讛讜讗 讬讘讜诪讬 诪讬讬讘诐

But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, who said that this is a phrase that leaves room for additional betrothals, in a case where he uses this phrase with regard to a bill of divorce, this should not be the halakha, as there is a principle: Any bill of divorce that leaves a remnant of the marital bond is not worth anything, as a bill of divorce must completely sever the marital bond between the husband and the wife. If this bond is not fully severed, she is not divorced. Therefore, her late husband鈥檚 brother should be allowed to enter into levirate marriage with her.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讙讟 诇讛讜爪讬讗 讜诪讬转讛 诇讛讜爪讬讗 诪讛 砖砖讬讬专 讙讟 讙诪专转讜 诪讬转讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪讬 讚诪讬 讙讟 诪讜爪讬讗讛 诪专砖讜转 讬讘诐 诪讬转讛 诪讻谞住讛 诇专砖讜转 讬讘诐

Rava said: Since a bill of divorce serves to remove a wife from her husband, and death also serves to remove her and dissolve their marital ties, permitting the woman to remarry, one can say that whatever part is left over from that bill of divorce is nevertheless completed by death, and therefore there is a complete act of severance. Abaye said to him: Are the two comparable; can these stages be viewed as completing one another? A bill of divorce removes her not only from her husband鈥檚 authority but also from the authority of the yavam, as a divorced woman does not perform levirate marriage, whereas death brings her into the authority of the yavam, because it renders her obligated in levirate marriage.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛转诐 讟注诪讗 诪讗讬 讙讝讬专讛 诪砖讜诐 诪讛讬讜诐 讗诐 诪转讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟

Rather, Abaye said: One must reject the above explanation, and ask what is the reason there for the concern about that bill of divorce, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan? It is not because the bill of divorce is in any way valid. Rather, it is a rabbinic decree due to the case of one who says to his wife: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today if I die. Everyone agrees that this is a bill of divorce that goes into effect from that day if he dies. Since one might confuse the two cases, the Sages decreed that if one says: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today and after my death, the bill of divorce is considered valid to the extent that the woman does not enter into levirate marriage.

讜谞讙讝讜专 诪讛讬讜诐 讗诐 诪转讬 讚转讞诇讜抓 讗讟讜 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讗诐 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 讞讜诇爪转 诪转讬讬讘诪转

The Gemara asks: But let us also issue a decree in a case where he said: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today if I die, that she should perform 岣litza, due to its similarity to a bill of divorce that includes the stipulation: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today and after my death. The Gemara answers: The Sages do not require her to perform 岣litza, as, if you say that she performs 岣litza, people will mistakenly think that the yavam performed 岣litza because he did not want to marry her, and if he had wanted to she could have entered into levirate marriage. In fact, she is divorced and is forbidden to the yavam, and a decree of this kind could mislead people and result in a later transgression.

讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讗诐 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 讞讜诇爪转 诪转讬讬讘诪转 转转讬讬讘诐 讜讗讬谉 讘讻讱 讻诇讜诐 讞砖砖讗 讚专讘谞谉 讛讜讗

The Gemara asks: Here too, in the case of where he says: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today and after my death, if you say that she performs 岣litza, people will mistakenly say that she could have entered into levirate marriage. The Gemara answers: This concern is not important, as let her perform levirate marriage and there is no problem with that. The fact that she is treated as a divorc茅e and is forbidden to the brother-in-law is merely a concern of the Sages, who enacted a decree due to the similarity of the case where one says: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today if I die, whereas it is in fact not a bill of divorce and it is permitted for her to enter into levirate marriage.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讬 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗转谉 诇讱 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讛专讬 讝讜 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讛讜讗 讬转谉 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗转谉 诇讱 诪讻讗谉 讜注讚 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 谞转谉 诇讛 讘转讜讱 砖诇砖讬诐 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转

MISHNA: With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me with this peruta on the condition that I will give you two hundred dinars, she is betrothed immediately and he shall give her the money. If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I will give you a particular sum of money from now and until thirty days, if he gave the money to her within thirty days she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed.

注诇 诪谞转 砖讬砖 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讛专讬 讝讜 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讬砖 诇讜 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗专讗讱 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讛专讬 讝讜 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讬专讗讛 诇讛 讜讗诐 讛专讗讛 注诇 讛砖诇讞谉 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转

If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I have two hundred dinars, she is betrothed if he has this sum. If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I will show you two hundred dinars, she is betrothed, and he shall show the money to her. And if he is a moneychanger and shows her money belonging to others on the moneychangers鈥 table, she is not betrothed, as his statement means that he will show her money of his own.

讙诪壮 讗讬转诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讜讛讜讗 讬转谉 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讻砖讬转谉 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讜讛讜讗 讬转谉 转谞讗讛 讛讜讬 诪拽讬讬诐 转谞讗讛 讜讗讝讬诇 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讻砖讬转谉 诇讻讬 讬讛讬讘 讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬 讛砖转讗 诪讬讛讗 诇讗 讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬

GEMARA: It was stated that the amora鈥檌m disagreed with regard to the text of this mishna: Rav Huna says that it reads: And he shall give, i.e., it is a valid betrothal from the outset, and the man is obligated to give her the promised amount. Rav Yehuda says that the correct version of the mishna is: When he gives, meaning that the betrothal takes effect only when he actually gives her the money. The Gemara elaborates: Rav Huna says that the phrase: And he shall give, indicates that this is a condition stipulated by the man, which means that the woman is immediately betrothed and he merely proceeds to fulfill the condition. Rav Yehuda says that the mishna reads: When he gives, which indicates that when he will give the money it will be a betrothal, but for now at least it is not a betrothal.

诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 砖驻砖讟讛 讬讚讛 讜拽讘诇讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诪讗讞专 诇专讘 讛讜谞讗 诇讗 讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬 诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the explanations of Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda? Both agree that if he does not give her the money she is not betrothed. The Gemara answers: The difference between them is in a case where she extended her hand and accepted betrothal from another man during the period between the initial betrothal and the delivery of the money. According to the opinion of Rav Huna the betrothal of the second man is not a valid betrothal, as he maintains that when the first man gives her the money the betrothal takes effect retroactively from the time of his earlier statement. According to the opinion of Rav Yehuda, the betrothal of the second man is a valid betrothal, as the betrothal of the first man does not take effect until after he actually gives her the money.

讜转谞谉 谞诪讬 讙讘讬 讙讬讟讬谉 讻讬 讛讗讬 讙讜讜谞讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讛专讬 讝讜 诪讙讜专砖转 讜讛讬讗 转转谉 讗讬转诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讜讛讬讗 转转谉 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讻砖转转谉 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讜讛讬讗 转转谉 转谞讗讛 讛讜讬 诪拽讬讬诪讗 转谞讗讛 讜讗讝诇讛 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讻砖转转谉 诇讻讬 讬讛讬讘讛 诇讬讛 讛讜讗 讚讛讜讬 讙讟 讛砖转讗 诪讬讛讗 诇讗 讛讜讬 讙讟

The Gemara comments: And we also learned a mishna concerning bills of divorce like this case (Gittin 74a): With regard to one who says to a woman: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, she is divorced and she shall give him the two hundred dinars. It was stated that the amora鈥檌m disputed the correct version of this statement. Rav Huna says: And she shall give; Rav Yehuda says: When she gives. The reasons are as stated above in the discussion about betrothal: Rav Huna says: And she shall give, as it is a condition, and therefore she proceeds to fulfill the condition. Rav Yehuda says: When she gives, as when she will give the money to him it will be a valid bill of divorce, but now, in any event, it is not a valid bill of divorce.

诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 砖谞转拽专注 讛讙讟 讗讜 砖讗讘讚 诇专讘 讛讜谞讗 讛讜讬 讙讟 诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 诇讗 讛讜讬 讙讟

What is the difference between the explanations of Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda? Even Rav Huna agrees that she cannot marry someone else until she gives him the money. Until that point the bill of divorce does not come into effect and she remains married to the first man. The Gemara answers: The difference between them is in a case where the bill of divorce was torn or lost after she received it but before she gave him the money. According to the opinion of Rav Huna it is a valid bill of divorce, as the divorce takes effect from the moment he gives her the document. According to the opinion of Rav Yehuda it is not a valid bill of divorce, as he maintains that the bill of divorce goes into effect only later, which is impossible as it is either torn or lost.

讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇拽专讜讘讛 拽讗转讬 讗讘诇 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讚诇专讞拽讛 拽讗转讬 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state both disputes, the one with regard to betrothal and the with regard to divorce, as neither halakha could be derived from the other. As had it taught us only that the two Sages disagree with regard to betrothal, one might have said that it is there that Rav Huna says that the betrothal takes effect immediately, despite the fact that he must still give her the money, because betrothal comes to draw her near to him. Therefore, it is likely that he meant for the betrothal to take immediate effect. But with regard to divorce, when he comes to distance her, you might say that Rav Huna concedes to Rav Yehuda that the divorce comes into effect only from the moment she gives him the money.

讜讗讬 讗讬转诪专 讘讛讱 讘讛讱 拽讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讛讜 诇讗 讻住讬祝 诇讬讛 诇诪转讘注讛 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚讗讬讛讬 讻住讬驻讗 诇讛 诇诪讬转讘注讬讛 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 爪专讬讻讗

And conversely, if the dispute had been stated only with regard to this case concerning a bill of divorce, one might have claimed that Rav Huna says that the bill of divorce comes into immediate effect only in this situation, because he is not ashamed to demand the money from her whenever he wants, and therefore he divorces her immediately. But here, concerning a betrothal, when she is ashamed to claim the money from him, you might say that Rav Huna concedes to Rav Yehuda that the woman does not accept the betrothal until she actually receives the money. It is therefore necessary for the dispute to be stated in both cases.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖谞转拽专注 讛讙讟 讗讜 砖讗讘讚 讛专讬 讝讜 诪讙讜专砖转 诇讗讞专 诇讗 转谞砖讗 注讚 砖转转谉

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Yehuda from a baraita (Tosefta, Gittin 5:5): If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, even if the bill of divorce was torn or lost she is divorced. But she may not marry another man until she gives him the money. This ruling apparently accords with Rav Huna鈥檚 opinion that the bill of divorce goes into immediate effect from the moment it is given.

讜注讜讚 转谞讬讗 讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讜诪转 谞转谞讛 讗讬谉 讝拽讜拽讛 诇讬讘诐 诇讗 谞转谞讛 讝拽讜拽讛 诇讬讘诐 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 谞讜转谞转 诇讗讞讬讜 讗讜 诇讗讘讬讜 讗讜 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛拽专讜讘讬诐

And it is further taught in a baraita: With regard to a man who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, and he died childless, if she gave him the money she is not bound by a levirate bond to the yavam, as she is already divorced. But if she did not give him the money she is bound by a levirate bond to the yavam. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If she did not give it to her husband during his lifetime she may give the money to her late husband鈥檚 brother, or to his father, or to one of the relatives who inherit from him, and by doing so she fulfills the condition and is retroactively divorced.

注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讗 讚诪专 住讘专 诇讬 讜诇讗 诇讬讜专砖讬讬 讜诪专 住讘专 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讬讜专砖讬讬 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诪讬讛讗 转谞讗讛 讛讜讬 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara analyzes this ruling: The tanna鈥檌m disagree only with regard to the following: One Sage, the first tanna, holds that by the phrase: On the condition that you will give me, he meant: To me specifically but not to my heirs. Consequently, if she does not give the money to him she is not divorced, as she cannot fulfill the condition by giving the money to his heirs. And one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that the husband meant: Even to my heirs. In any event, everyone agrees that it is a condition and the divorce takes effect from the moment the bill of divorce is given. This is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehuda.

讗诪专 诇讱 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讗讜诪专 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬 讜驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 注诇讬讛 讜讗谞讗 讚讗诪专讬 讻专讘谞谉

The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda could say to you: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states that the agreement will take effect retroactively from now, even though the condition is fulfilled only later on. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that the phrase: On the condition, indicates that an action should take effect now provided that a certain action is fulfilled later. And the Rabbis disagree with him, claiming that this expression does not mean that the action should take immediate effect, but only from when the condition is fulfilled. And Rav Yehuda would conclude by adding: And I spoke in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

讙讜驻讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讗讜诪专 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讻讬 讛讜讬谞谉 讘讘讘诇 讛讜讛 讗诪专讬谞谉 讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讗讜诪专 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 注诇讬讛

The Gemara analyzes the matter itself. Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states that the agreement will take effect retroactively from now, even though the condition is fulfilled only later on. Rabbi Zeira said: When we were in Babylonia we would say: With regard to that which Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states that the agreement will take effect retroactively from now, that is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi鈥檚 opinion, but the Rabbis disagree with him.

讻讬 住诇拽讬 诇讛转诐 讗砖讻讞讬讛 诇专讘讬 讗住讬 讚讬转讬讘 讜拽讗诪专 诇讛 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 讘讗讜诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讗讜诪专 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛

When I ascended to there, to Eretz Yisrael, I found Rabbi Asi sitting and saying the following ruling in the name of Rabbi Yo岣nan: All concede that with regard to one who says to his wife: On the condition, he is like one who states that the divorce will take effect retroactively from now. They disagreed only with regard to one who said to his wife: From today and after my death, whether he is considered to have added a condition or to have retracted from his initial statement.

讜讛转谞讬讗 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讙讟 讜讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讻讝讛 讙讟

And it is taught in a baraita that if one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, it is uncertain whether it is a valid bill of divorce or whether it is not a valid bill of divorce. This is the statement of the Rabbis. The Rabbis are uncertain whether he has changed his mind from his initial intention of giving the document that day, and now wishes to give a bill of divorce after his death, which is not effective, or whether he was merely adding a condition that the bill of divorce should take effect from today only when he dies. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A document like this is a valid bill of divorce.

讜诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 讘注诇 诪谞转 谞诪讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讗讚诪讬驻诇讙讬 讘诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 谞讬驻诇讙讬 讘注诇 诪谞转

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rav Yehuda, who said that the tanna鈥檌m also disagree with regard to one who says to his wife: On the condition, instead of disagreeing with regard to the case where one says to his wife: From today and after my death, let them disagree with regard to a case where the husband used the expression: On the condition.

诇讛讜讚讬注讱 讻讞 讚专讘讬 讚诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 谞诪讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讜谞讬驻诇讙讬 讘注诇 诪谞转 诇讛讜讚讬注讱 讻讞 讚专讘谞谉 讻讞 讚讛讬转讬专讗 注讚讬祝

The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda maintains that they disagree over both cases, and the baraita taught the dispute in this manner to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who maintains that even if the husband says to his wife: From today and after my death, this is also a valid bill of divorce. The Gemara asks: And let them disagree with regard to a husband who says to his wife: On the condition, to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that it is not a valid bill of divorce even in that case. The Gemara answers: It is preferable to emphasize the power of leniency. It is always better to formulate a dispute in a manner that emphasizes the extent of the lenient opinion.

注诇 诪谞转 砖讗转谉 诇讱 诪讻讗谉 讜讻讜壮 驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 诇讗讜 转谞讗讛 讛讜讗 讜诇讝专讜讝讬讛 拽讗诪专 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

搂 The mishna teaches: With regard to one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will give you a particular sum of money from now and until thirty days have elapsed, if he gives her the money within the allotted time she is betrothed. The Gemara questions the need for this ruling: It is obvious that this is the case. The Gemara explains: This ruling is necessary, lest you say that the specified time period is not a proper condition, and he said so only to motivate himself to prove the sincerity of his intentions. The mishna therefore teaches us that the time period is an essential part of his condition, and if he fails to give her the money within this period the betrothal is void.

注诇 诪谞转 砖讬砖 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讜讻讜壮 讜谞讬讞讜砖 砖诪讗 讬砖 诇讜 讜注讜讚 转谞讬讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 砖诪讗 讬砖 诇讜

The mishna further teaches that if he says to her: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I have two hundred dinars, if he in fact possesses the specified amount, she is betrothed, but if he does not, she is not betrothed. The Gemara asks: And let us be concerned that perhaps he has this sum, although he fails to show it to her. How can his betrothal be nullified if there is no conclusive evidence that he does not have the money? And furthermore, it is taught in a baraita that we are concerned that perhaps he has the money.

诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬 讜讚讗讬 讛讗 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬 住驻拽

The Gemara answers: It is not difficult, as this case, in the mishna, is referring to a definite betrothal, which is not established in this case, as he has failed to demonstrate that he has the funds. By contrast, that case, in the baraita, is referring to an uncertain betrothal. The betrothal cannot be entirely disregarded, as he might have the money after all.

注诇 诪谞转 砖讗专讗讱 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讜讻讜壮 转谞讗 诇讗 谞转讻讜谞讛 讗诇讗 诇专讗讜转 诪砖诇讜 讜讗诐 讛专讗讛 诇讛 注诇 讛砖诇讞谉 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚谞拽讟 讚诪讬 讘注讬住拽讗

The mishna teaches that if a man says to her: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will show you two hundred dinars, she is betrothed and he must show her the money. A Sage taught (Tosefta 3:6): This woman intended to see only his own money, not simply to be shown any two hundred dinars. With regard to the subsequent ruling of the mishna: And if he showed her the money on the table she is not betrothed, the Gemara comments: This is obvious, as the woman wants to see his own money. The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to teach that even if he holds somebody else鈥檚 money as part of a joint business venture, nevertheless, as the money does not actually belong to him he has failed to fulfill the condition.

诪转谞讬壮 注诇 诪谞转 砖讬砖 诇讬 讘讬转 讻讜专 注驻专 讛专讬 讝讜 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讬砖 诇讜 注诇 诪谞转 砖讬砖 诇讬 讘诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讗诐 讬砖 诇讜 讘讗讜转讜 诪拽讜诐 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗专讗讱 讘讬转 讻讜专 注驻专 讛专讬 讝讜 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讬专讗谞讛 讜讗诐 讛专讗讛 讘讘拽注讛 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转

MISHNA: With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I possess tillable land of a beit kor of earth, she is betrothed, provided that he possesses such land. If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I possess land in such and such a place, if he possesses land in that place she is betrothed, but if not she is not betrothed. If he said to her: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will show you a beit kor of earth, she is betrothed, and he shall show her. And if he showed her land in a valley, i.e., a field that does not belong to him among other fields, she is not betrothed.

讙诪壮 讜谞讬讞讜砖 砖诪讗 讬砖 诇讜 讜注讜讚 转谞讬讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 砖诪讗 讬砖 诇讜 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬 讜讚讗讬 讛讗 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬 住驻拽

GEMARA: With regard to the statement of the mishna that she is betrothed only if he actually possesses a beit kor of earth, the Gemara asks: And let us be concerned that perhaps he in fact possesses land of this size. And furthermore, it is explicitly taught in a baraita that we are concerned in this situation that perhaps he possesses land of this size. The Gemara answers: It is not difficult, as this case, the one in the mishna, is referring to a definite betrothal, which has not yet been established because he has not proven he owns a field of this kind; and that case, the one in the baraita, is referring to an uncertain betrothal.

诇诪讛 诇讬 诇诪讬转谞讗 讙讘讬 讗专注讗 讜诇诪讛 诇讬 诇诪讬转谞讗 讙讘讬 讝讜讝讬 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 讝讜讝讬 诪砖讜诐 讚注讘讬讚讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讚诪爪谞注讬 讗讘诇 讗专注讗 讗讬诪讗 讗讬 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讗专注讗 拽诇讗 讗讬转 诇讬讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara asks: Why do I need this mishna to teach this halakha with regard to land, and why do I also need the previous mishna to teach the same ruling with regard to money? There is no clear difference between the two cases. The Gemara answers: It is necessary to state the halakha in both cases, as had one mishna taught us this halakha only with regard to money one might have said that it is only in that case that it is uncertain whether she is betrothed, because people tend to hide their money, and therefore his financial status might not be well known. But in the case of land, you might say that if he had land this fact would generate publicity, as one cannot hide land. The mishna therefore teaches us that it is also possible for him to own land without people being aware of it.

注诇 诪谞转 砖讬砖 诇讬 讘诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讗诐 讬砖 诇讜 讜讻讜壮 驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讗诪专 诇讛 诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诇讱 诪讬谞讛 讗谞讗 讟专讞谞讗 讜诪讬讬转讬谞讗 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉

搂 The mishna teaches: If one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I possess land in such and such a place, if he possesses land in that place she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed. The Gemara questions the need for this ruling: It is obvious that if he does not possess land in that place she is not betrothed, as that was precisely his condition. The Gemara explains that this ruling is necessary lest you say that he can say to her: What difference does it make to you whether the field is in that location or elsewhere, as even if it is farther away I will go to the trouble of bringing the produce from the field to our house, so what loss have you incurred? The mishna therefore teaches us that despite this claim the betrothal is invalid, due to his failure to fulfill the condition.

注诇 诪谞转 砖讗专讗讱 讘讬转 讻讜专 注驻专 转讗谞讗 诇讗 谞转讻讜讜谞讛 讝讜 讗诇讗 诇专讗讜转 诪砖诇讜 讜讗诐 讛专讗讛 讘讘拽注讛 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚谞拽讬讟 讘讚讬住转讜专讗

搂 The mishna further teaches: If a one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will show you a beit kor of earth, she is betrothed, provided that he possesses such land. A Sage taught (Tosefta 3:6): The woman intended to see only his own land. The mishna further teaches: And if he showed her a plot of land in a valley, she is not betrothed. The Gemara asks: This is obvious; after all, this land does not belong to him. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where he maintains the field as a sharecropper [distora], i.e., he owns a share in it. Nevertheless, as the land does not belong to him she did not have this field in mind, and consequently she is not betrothed.

讙讘讬 讛拽讚砖 转谞谉

The Gemara comments: With regard to consecrated property, we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 25a):

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Kiddushin 60

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Kiddushin 60

讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讬 诪注讻砖讬讜 讜诇讗讞专 注砖专讛 讬诪讬诐 诪专讗砖讜谉 讜诪讗讞专讜谉 爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 诪讗诪爪注讬 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讙讟

and another man came and said to her: You are hereby betrothed to me from now and after ten days, she requires a bill of divorce from the first man and last man, but she does not require a bill of divorce from the middle one.

诪讛 谞驻砖讱 讗讬 转谞讗讛 讛讜讗讬 讚拽诪讗 拽讬讚讜砖讬 讚讛谞讱 诇讗讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬 讗讬 讞讝专讛 讛讜讗讬 讚讘转专讗 拽讬讚讜砖讬 讚讛谞讱 诇讗讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬

Abaye explains: This is the halakha whichever way you look at this case: If this expression is a condition that she should be betrothed from now if he does not retract within thirty days, the betrothal of the first man is a betrothal, whereas the betrothals of those other men are not betrothals. If it is a retraction, i.e., if after saying: From now, he changed his mind and delayed the moment of betrothal, then only that betrothal of the last one is a betrothal, whereas the betrothals of those first two men are not betrothals, as they both postponed their betrothals to a later date. Either way, the betrothal of the middle man is of no consequence.

驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讛讗讬 诇讬砖谞讗 诪砖诪注 转谞讗讛 讜诪砖诪注 讞讝专讛 讜转讬讘注讬 讙讬讟讗 诪讻诇 讞讚 讜讞讚 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara asks: It is obvious that this is the case; what is the novelty of Abaye鈥檚 statement? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that this formulation means a condition and also means a retraction, and therefore she should require a bill of divorce from each and every one of them, including the middle man, due to the uncertainty. It is possible the first man retracted while the second one imposed a condition, in which case only the betrothal of the second person takes effect. Abaye therefore teaches us that according to the opinion of Rav, the uncertainty concerns the meaning of this expression itself, and there is no uncertainty with regard to the intention of each individual person who says this formula. Consequently, there is no possibility that this woman is betrothed to the middle man.

注讜诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讗讛 转讜驻住讬谉 讘讛 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗住讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讗讛 转讜驻住讬谉 讘讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 诪砖专砖讬讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗诪讬 诇专讘讬 讗住讬 讗住讘专讛 诇讱 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 砖讜讜 谞驻砖讬讛 讻讬 砖专讙讗 讚诇讬讘谞讬 讚讻诇 讞讚 讜讞讚 专讜讞讗 诇讞讘专讬讛 砖讘拽

Ulla says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Even if one hundred betrothed her in this manner, their betrothal is effective with regard to her. And similarly, Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Even the betrothal of one hundred is effective with regard to her. Rav Mesharshiyya, son of Rav Ami, said to Rabbi Asi: I will explain to you the reason of Rabbi Yo岣nan: These one hundred men have rendered themselves like a row [sheraga] of bricks, each and every one of whom leaves a gap for the other. Since there is a period of time before the betrothal of each man takes effect, another betrothal can intervene in the meantime.

诪转讬讘 专讘 讞谞讬谞讗 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讙讟 讜讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讜讗诐 诪转 讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转

Rav 岣nina raises an objection to this ruling from a baraita: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, there is uncertainty whether it is a valid bill of divorce or whether it is not a valid bill of divorce. And therefore if he dies she performs 岣litza, but does not enter into levirate marriage. Since she might not be divorced, the obligation of levirate marriage applies to her, but in practice she cannot perform levirate marriage in case she was in fact divorced and is thereby forbidden to her late husband鈥檚 brother, a transgression which is punishable by karet.

讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘 诪住讬讬注讗 诇讬讛 诇砖诪讜讗诇 谞诪讬 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘谞谉 讛讬讗 讜讗谞谉 讚讗诪专讬 讻专讘讬

Rav 岣nina explains his objection: Granted, according to the opinion of Rav, the baraita supports him, as Rav maintains that the meaning of this expression is uncertain. According to the opinion of Shmuel as well, although he claims that the phrase is a condition rather than a retraction, he can explain as follows: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who claim in that case that it is uncertain if she is divorced, and I, Shmuel, say my ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

讗诇讗 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讗诪专 砖讬讜专讗 讛讜讬 讻诇 讙讬讟讗 讚诪砖讬讬专 讘讛 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐 讛讜讗 讬讘讜诪讬 诪讬讬讘诐

But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, who said that this is a phrase that leaves room for additional betrothals, in a case where he uses this phrase with regard to a bill of divorce, this should not be the halakha, as there is a principle: Any bill of divorce that leaves a remnant of the marital bond is not worth anything, as a bill of divorce must completely sever the marital bond between the husband and the wife. If this bond is not fully severed, she is not divorced. Therefore, her late husband鈥檚 brother should be allowed to enter into levirate marriage with her.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讙讟 诇讛讜爪讬讗 讜诪讬转讛 诇讛讜爪讬讗 诪讛 砖砖讬讬专 讙讟 讙诪专转讜 诪讬转讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪讬 讚诪讬 讙讟 诪讜爪讬讗讛 诪专砖讜转 讬讘诐 诪讬转讛 诪讻谞住讛 诇专砖讜转 讬讘诐

Rava said: Since a bill of divorce serves to remove a wife from her husband, and death also serves to remove her and dissolve their marital ties, permitting the woman to remarry, one can say that whatever part is left over from that bill of divorce is nevertheless completed by death, and therefore there is a complete act of severance. Abaye said to him: Are the two comparable; can these stages be viewed as completing one another? A bill of divorce removes her not only from her husband鈥檚 authority but also from the authority of the yavam, as a divorced woman does not perform levirate marriage, whereas death brings her into the authority of the yavam, because it renders her obligated in levirate marriage.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛转诐 讟注诪讗 诪讗讬 讙讝讬专讛 诪砖讜诐 诪讛讬讜诐 讗诐 诪转讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟

Rather, Abaye said: One must reject the above explanation, and ask what is the reason there for the concern about that bill of divorce, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan? It is not because the bill of divorce is in any way valid. Rather, it is a rabbinic decree due to the case of one who says to his wife: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today if I die. Everyone agrees that this is a bill of divorce that goes into effect from that day if he dies. Since one might confuse the two cases, the Sages decreed that if one says: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today and after my death, the bill of divorce is considered valid to the extent that the woman does not enter into levirate marriage.

讜谞讙讝讜专 诪讛讬讜诐 讗诐 诪转讬 讚转讞诇讜抓 讗讟讜 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讗诐 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 讞讜诇爪转 诪转讬讬讘诪转

The Gemara asks: But let us also issue a decree in a case where he said: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today if I die, that she should perform 岣litza, due to its similarity to a bill of divorce that includes the stipulation: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today and after my death. The Gemara answers: The Sages do not require her to perform 岣litza, as, if you say that she performs 岣litza, people will mistakenly think that the yavam performed 岣litza because he did not want to marry her, and if he had wanted to she could have entered into levirate marriage. In fact, she is divorced and is forbidden to the yavam, and a decree of this kind could mislead people and result in a later transgression.

讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讗诐 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 讞讜诇爪转 诪转讬讬讘诪转 转转讬讬讘诐 讜讗讬谉 讘讻讱 讻诇讜诐 讞砖砖讗 讚专讘谞谉 讛讜讗

The Gemara asks: Here too, in the case of where he says: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today and after my death, if you say that she performs 岣litza, people will mistakenly say that she could have entered into levirate marriage. The Gemara answers: This concern is not important, as let her perform levirate marriage and there is no problem with that. The fact that she is treated as a divorc茅e and is forbidden to the brother-in-law is merely a concern of the Sages, who enacted a decree due to the similarity of the case where one says: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today if I die, whereas it is in fact not a bill of divorce and it is permitted for her to enter into levirate marriage.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讬 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗转谉 诇讱 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讛专讬 讝讜 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讛讜讗 讬转谉 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗转谉 诇讱 诪讻讗谉 讜注讚 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 谞转谉 诇讛 讘转讜讱 砖诇砖讬诐 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转

MISHNA: With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me with this peruta on the condition that I will give you two hundred dinars, she is betrothed immediately and he shall give her the money. If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I will give you a particular sum of money from now and until thirty days, if he gave the money to her within thirty days she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed.

注诇 诪谞转 砖讬砖 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讛专讬 讝讜 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讬砖 诇讜 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗专讗讱 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讛专讬 讝讜 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讬专讗讛 诇讛 讜讗诐 讛专讗讛 注诇 讛砖诇讞谉 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转

If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I have two hundred dinars, she is betrothed if he has this sum. If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I will show you two hundred dinars, she is betrothed, and he shall show the money to her. And if he is a moneychanger and shows her money belonging to others on the moneychangers鈥 table, she is not betrothed, as his statement means that he will show her money of his own.

讙诪壮 讗讬转诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讜讛讜讗 讬转谉 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讻砖讬转谉 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讜讛讜讗 讬转谉 转谞讗讛 讛讜讬 诪拽讬讬诐 转谞讗讛 讜讗讝讬诇 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讻砖讬转谉 诇讻讬 讬讛讬讘 讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬 讛砖转讗 诪讬讛讗 诇讗 讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬

GEMARA: It was stated that the amora鈥檌m disagreed with regard to the text of this mishna: Rav Huna says that it reads: And he shall give, i.e., it is a valid betrothal from the outset, and the man is obligated to give her the promised amount. Rav Yehuda says that the correct version of the mishna is: When he gives, meaning that the betrothal takes effect only when he actually gives her the money. The Gemara elaborates: Rav Huna says that the phrase: And he shall give, indicates that this is a condition stipulated by the man, which means that the woman is immediately betrothed and he merely proceeds to fulfill the condition. Rav Yehuda says that the mishna reads: When he gives, which indicates that when he will give the money it will be a betrothal, but for now at least it is not a betrothal.

诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 砖驻砖讟讛 讬讚讛 讜拽讘诇讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 诪讗讞专 诇专讘 讛讜谞讗 诇讗 讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬 诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the explanations of Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda? Both agree that if he does not give her the money she is not betrothed. The Gemara answers: The difference between them is in a case where she extended her hand and accepted betrothal from another man during the period between the initial betrothal and the delivery of the money. According to the opinion of Rav Huna the betrothal of the second man is not a valid betrothal, as he maintains that when the first man gives her the money the betrothal takes effect retroactively from the time of his earlier statement. According to the opinion of Rav Yehuda, the betrothal of the second man is a valid betrothal, as the betrothal of the first man does not take effect until after he actually gives her the money.

讜转谞谉 谞诪讬 讙讘讬 讙讬讟讬谉 讻讬 讛讗讬 讙讜讜谞讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讛专讬 讝讜 诪讙讜专砖转 讜讛讬讗 转转谉 讗讬转诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讜讛讬讗 转转谉 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讻砖转转谉 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 讜讛讬讗 转转谉 转谞讗讛 讛讜讬 诪拽讬讬诪讗 转谞讗讛 讜讗讝诇讛 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇讻砖转转谉 诇讻讬 讬讛讬讘讛 诇讬讛 讛讜讗 讚讛讜讬 讙讟 讛砖转讗 诪讬讛讗 诇讗 讛讜讬 讙讟

The Gemara comments: And we also learned a mishna concerning bills of divorce like this case (Gittin 74a): With regard to one who says to a woman: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, she is divorced and she shall give him the two hundred dinars. It was stated that the amora鈥檌m disputed the correct version of this statement. Rav Huna says: And she shall give; Rav Yehuda says: When she gives. The reasons are as stated above in the discussion about betrothal: Rav Huna says: And she shall give, as it is a condition, and therefore she proceeds to fulfill the condition. Rav Yehuda says: When she gives, as when she will give the money to him it will be a valid bill of divorce, but now, in any event, it is not a valid bill of divorce.

诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 砖谞转拽专注 讛讙讟 讗讜 砖讗讘讚 诇专讘 讛讜谞讗 讛讜讬 讙讟 诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 诇讗 讛讜讬 讙讟

What is the difference between the explanations of Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda? Even Rav Huna agrees that she cannot marry someone else until she gives him the money. Until that point the bill of divorce does not come into effect and she remains married to the first man. The Gemara answers: The difference between them is in a case where the bill of divorce was torn or lost after she received it but before she gave him the money. According to the opinion of Rav Huna it is a valid bill of divorce, as the divorce takes effect from the moment he gives her the document. According to the opinion of Rav Yehuda it is not a valid bill of divorce, as he maintains that the bill of divorce goes into effect only later, which is impossible as it is either torn or lost.

讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇拽专讜讘讛 拽讗转讬 讗讘诇 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讚诇专讞拽讛 拽讗转讬 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state both disputes, the one with regard to betrothal and the with regard to divorce, as neither halakha could be derived from the other. As had it taught us only that the two Sages disagree with regard to betrothal, one might have said that it is there that Rav Huna says that the betrothal takes effect immediately, despite the fact that he must still give her the money, because betrothal comes to draw her near to him. Therefore, it is likely that he meant for the betrothal to take immediate effect. But with regard to divorce, when he comes to distance her, you might say that Rav Huna concedes to Rav Yehuda that the divorce comes into effect only from the moment she gives him the money.

讜讗讬 讗讬转诪专 讘讛讱 讘讛讱 拽讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讛讜 诇讗 讻住讬祝 诇讬讛 诇诪转讘注讛 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚讗讬讛讬 讻住讬驻讗 诇讛 诇诪讬转讘注讬讛 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 爪专讬讻讗

And conversely, if the dispute had been stated only with regard to this case concerning a bill of divorce, one might have claimed that Rav Huna says that the bill of divorce comes into immediate effect only in this situation, because he is not ashamed to demand the money from her whenever he wants, and therefore he divorces her immediately. But here, concerning a betrothal, when she is ashamed to claim the money from him, you might say that Rav Huna concedes to Rav Yehuda that the woman does not accept the betrothal until she actually receives the money. It is therefore necessary for the dispute to be stated in both cases.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖谞转拽专注 讛讙讟 讗讜 砖讗讘讚 讛专讬 讝讜 诪讙讜专砖转 诇讗讞专 诇讗 转谞砖讗 注讚 砖转转谉

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Yehuda from a baraita (Tosefta, Gittin 5:5): If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, even if the bill of divorce was torn or lost she is divorced. But she may not marry another man until she gives him the money. This ruling apparently accords with Rav Huna鈥檚 opinion that the bill of divorce goes into immediate effect from the moment it is given.

讜注讜讚 转谞讬讗 讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转转谞讬 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讜诪转 谞转谞讛 讗讬谉 讝拽讜拽讛 诇讬讘诐 诇讗 谞转谞讛 讝拽讜拽讛 诇讬讘诐 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 谞讜转谞转 诇讗讞讬讜 讗讜 诇讗讘讬讜 讗讜 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛拽专讜讘讬诐

And it is further taught in a baraita: With regard to a man who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, and he died childless, if she gave him the money she is not bound by a levirate bond to the yavam, as she is already divorced. But if she did not give him the money she is bound by a levirate bond to the yavam. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If she did not give it to her husband during his lifetime she may give the money to her late husband鈥檚 brother, or to his father, or to one of the relatives who inherit from him, and by doing so she fulfills the condition and is retroactively divorced.

注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讗 讚诪专 住讘专 诇讬 讜诇讗 诇讬讜专砖讬讬 讜诪专 住讘专 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讬讜专砖讬讬 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诪讬讛讗 转谞讗讛 讛讜讬 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara analyzes this ruling: The tanna鈥檌m disagree only with regard to the following: One Sage, the first tanna, holds that by the phrase: On the condition that you will give me, he meant: To me specifically but not to my heirs. Consequently, if she does not give the money to him she is not divorced, as she cannot fulfill the condition by giving the money to his heirs. And one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that the husband meant: Even to my heirs. In any event, everyone agrees that it is a condition and the divorce takes effect from the moment the bill of divorce is given. This is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehuda.

讗诪专 诇讱 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讗讜诪专 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬 讜驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 注诇讬讛 讜讗谞讗 讚讗诪专讬 讻专讘谞谉

The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda could say to you: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states that the agreement will take effect retroactively from now, even though the condition is fulfilled only later on. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that the phrase: On the condition, indicates that an action should take effect now provided that a certain action is fulfilled later. And the Rabbis disagree with him, claiming that this expression does not mean that the action should take immediate effect, but only from when the condition is fulfilled. And Rav Yehuda would conclude by adding: And I spoke in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

讙讜驻讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讗讜诪专 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讻讬 讛讜讬谞谉 讘讘讘诇 讛讜讛 讗诪专讬谞谉 讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讗讜诪专 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 注诇讬讛

The Gemara analyzes the matter itself. Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states that the agreement will take effect retroactively from now, even though the condition is fulfilled only later on. Rabbi Zeira said: When we were in Babylonia we would say: With regard to that which Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states that the agreement will take effect retroactively from now, that is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi鈥檚 opinion, but the Rabbis disagree with him.

讻讬 住诇拽讬 诇讛转诐 讗砖讻讞讬讛 诇专讘讬 讗住讬 讚讬转讬讘 讜拽讗诪专 诇讛 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 讘讗讜诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讗讜诪专 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛

When I ascended to there, to Eretz Yisrael, I found Rabbi Asi sitting and saying the following ruling in the name of Rabbi Yo岣nan: All concede that with regard to one who says to his wife: On the condition, he is like one who states that the divorce will take effect retroactively from now. They disagreed only with regard to one who said to his wife: From today and after my death, whether he is considered to have added a condition or to have retracted from his initial statement.

讜讛转谞讬讗 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讙讟 讜讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讻讝讛 讙讟

And it is taught in a baraita that if one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, it is uncertain whether it is a valid bill of divorce or whether it is not a valid bill of divorce. This is the statement of the Rabbis. The Rabbis are uncertain whether he has changed his mind from his initial intention of giving the document that day, and now wishes to give a bill of divorce after his death, which is not effective, or whether he was merely adding a condition that the bill of divorce should take effect from today only when he dies. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A document like this is a valid bill of divorce.

讜诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 讘注诇 诪谞转 谞诪讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讗讚诪讬驻诇讙讬 讘诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 谞讬驻诇讙讬 讘注诇 诪谞转

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rav Yehuda, who said that the tanna鈥檌m also disagree with regard to one who says to his wife: On the condition, instead of disagreeing with regard to the case where one says to his wife: From today and after my death, let them disagree with regard to a case where the husband used the expression: On the condition.

诇讛讜讚讬注讱 讻讞 讚专讘讬 讚诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 谞诪讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讜谞讬驻诇讙讬 讘注诇 诪谞转 诇讛讜讚讬注讱 讻讞 讚专讘谞谉 讻讞 讚讛讬转讬专讗 注讚讬祝

The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda maintains that they disagree over both cases, and the baraita taught the dispute in this manner to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who maintains that even if the husband says to his wife: From today and after my death, this is also a valid bill of divorce. The Gemara asks: And let them disagree with regard to a husband who says to his wife: On the condition, to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that it is not a valid bill of divorce even in that case. The Gemara answers: It is preferable to emphasize the power of leniency. It is always better to formulate a dispute in a manner that emphasizes the extent of the lenient opinion.

注诇 诪谞转 砖讗转谉 诇讱 诪讻讗谉 讜讻讜壮 驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 诇讗讜 转谞讗讛 讛讜讗 讜诇讝专讜讝讬讛 拽讗诪专 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

搂 The mishna teaches: With regard to one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will give you a particular sum of money from now and until thirty days have elapsed, if he gives her the money within the allotted time she is betrothed. The Gemara questions the need for this ruling: It is obvious that this is the case. The Gemara explains: This ruling is necessary, lest you say that the specified time period is not a proper condition, and he said so only to motivate himself to prove the sincerity of his intentions. The mishna therefore teaches us that the time period is an essential part of his condition, and if he fails to give her the money within this period the betrothal is void.

注诇 诪谞转 砖讬砖 诇讬 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讜讻讜壮 讜谞讬讞讜砖 砖诪讗 讬砖 诇讜 讜注讜讚 转谞讬讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 砖诪讗 讬砖 诇讜

The mishna further teaches that if he says to her: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I have two hundred dinars, if he in fact possesses the specified amount, she is betrothed, but if he does not, she is not betrothed. The Gemara asks: And let us be concerned that perhaps he has this sum, although he fails to show it to her. How can his betrothal be nullified if there is no conclusive evidence that he does not have the money? And furthermore, it is taught in a baraita that we are concerned that perhaps he has the money.

诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬 讜讚讗讬 讛讗 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬 住驻拽

The Gemara answers: It is not difficult, as this case, in the mishna, is referring to a definite betrothal, which is not established in this case, as he has failed to demonstrate that he has the funds. By contrast, that case, in the baraita, is referring to an uncertain betrothal. The betrothal cannot be entirely disregarded, as he might have the money after all.

注诇 诪谞转 砖讗专讗讱 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 讜讻讜壮 转谞讗 诇讗 谞转讻讜谞讛 讗诇讗 诇专讗讜转 诪砖诇讜 讜讗诐 讛专讗讛 诇讛 注诇 讛砖诇讞谉 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚谞拽讟 讚诪讬 讘注讬住拽讗

The mishna teaches that if a man says to her: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will show you two hundred dinars, she is betrothed and he must show her the money. A Sage taught (Tosefta 3:6): This woman intended to see only his own money, not simply to be shown any two hundred dinars. With regard to the subsequent ruling of the mishna: And if he showed her the money on the table she is not betrothed, the Gemara comments: This is obvious, as the woman wants to see his own money. The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to teach that even if he holds somebody else鈥檚 money as part of a joint business venture, nevertheless, as the money does not actually belong to him he has failed to fulfill the condition.

诪转谞讬壮 注诇 诪谞转 砖讬砖 诇讬 讘讬转 讻讜专 注驻专 讛专讬 讝讜 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讬砖 诇讜 注诇 诪谞转 砖讬砖 诇讬 讘诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讗诐 讬砖 诇讜 讘讗讜转讜 诪拽讜诐 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗专讗讱 讘讬转 讻讜专 注驻专 讛专讬 讝讜 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讬专讗谞讛 讜讗诐 讛专讗讛 讘讘拽注讛 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转

MISHNA: With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I possess tillable land of a beit kor of earth, she is betrothed, provided that he possesses such land. If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I possess land in such and such a place, if he possesses land in that place she is betrothed, but if not she is not betrothed. If he said to her: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will show you a beit kor of earth, she is betrothed, and he shall show her. And if he showed her land in a valley, i.e., a field that does not belong to him among other fields, she is not betrothed.

讙诪壮 讜谞讬讞讜砖 砖诪讗 讬砖 诇讜 讜注讜讚 转谞讬讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 砖诪讗 讬砖 诇讜 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬 讜讚讗讬 讛讗 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬 住驻拽

GEMARA: With regard to the statement of the mishna that she is betrothed only if he actually possesses a beit kor of earth, the Gemara asks: And let us be concerned that perhaps he in fact possesses land of this size. And furthermore, it is explicitly taught in a baraita that we are concerned in this situation that perhaps he possesses land of this size. The Gemara answers: It is not difficult, as this case, the one in the mishna, is referring to a definite betrothal, which has not yet been established because he has not proven he owns a field of this kind; and that case, the one in the baraita, is referring to an uncertain betrothal.

诇诪讛 诇讬 诇诪讬转谞讗 讙讘讬 讗专注讗 讜诇诪讛 诇讬 诇诪讬转谞讗 讙讘讬 讝讜讝讬 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 讝讜讝讬 诪砖讜诐 讚注讘讬讚讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讚诪爪谞注讬 讗讘诇 讗专注讗 讗讬诪讗 讗讬 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讗专注讗 拽诇讗 讗讬转 诇讬讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara asks: Why do I need this mishna to teach this halakha with regard to land, and why do I also need the previous mishna to teach the same ruling with regard to money? There is no clear difference between the two cases. The Gemara answers: It is necessary to state the halakha in both cases, as had one mishna taught us this halakha only with regard to money one might have said that it is only in that case that it is uncertain whether she is betrothed, because people tend to hide their money, and therefore his financial status might not be well known. But in the case of land, you might say that if he had land this fact would generate publicity, as one cannot hide land. The mishna therefore teaches us that it is also possible for him to own land without people being aware of it.

注诇 诪谞转 砖讬砖 诇讬 讘诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讗诐 讬砖 诇讜 讜讻讜壮 驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讗诪专 诇讛 诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诇讱 诪讬谞讛 讗谞讗 讟专讞谞讗 讜诪讬讬转讬谞讗 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉

搂 The mishna teaches: If one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I possess land in such and such a place, if he possesses land in that place she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed. The Gemara questions the need for this ruling: It is obvious that if he does not possess land in that place she is not betrothed, as that was precisely his condition. The Gemara explains that this ruling is necessary lest you say that he can say to her: What difference does it make to you whether the field is in that location or elsewhere, as even if it is farther away I will go to the trouble of bringing the produce from the field to our house, so what loss have you incurred? The mishna therefore teaches us that despite this claim the betrothal is invalid, due to his failure to fulfill the condition.

注诇 诪谞转 砖讗专讗讱 讘讬转 讻讜专 注驻专 转讗谞讗 诇讗 谞转讻讜讜谞讛 讝讜 讗诇讗 诇专讗讜转 诪砖诇讜 讜讗诐 讛专讗讛 讘讘拽注讛 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚谞拽讬讟 讘讚讬住转讜专讗

搂 The mishna further teaches: If a one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will show you a beit kor of earth, she is betrothed, provided that he possesses such land. A Sage taught (Tosefta 3:6): The woman intended to see only his own land. The mishna further teaches: And if he showed her a plot of land in a valley, she is not betrothed. The Gemara asks: This is obvious; after all, this land does not belong to him. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where he maintains the field as a sharecropper [distora], i.e., he owns a share in it. Nevertheless, as the land does not belong to him she did not have this field in mind, and consequently she is not betrothed.

讙讘讬 讛拽讚砖 转谞谉

The Gemara comments: With regard to consecrated property, we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 25a):

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