Kiddushin 60
וּבָא אַחֵר וְאָמַר לָהּ: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי מֵעַכְשָׁיו וּלְאַחַר עֲשָׂרָה יָמִים״, מֵרִאשׁוֹן וּמֵאַחֲרוֹן – צְרִיכָה גֵּט, מֵאֶמְצָעִי – אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה גֵּט.
and another man came and said to her: You are hereby betrothed to me from now and after ten days, she requires a bill of divorce from the first man and last man, but she does not require a bill of divorce from the middle one.
מָה נַפְשָׁךְ – אִי תְּנָאָה הֲוַאי, דְּקַמָּא קִידּוּשֵׁי, דְּהָנָךְ לָאו קִידּוּשֵׁי. אִי חֲזָרָה הֲוַאי, דְּבָתְרָא קִידּוּשֵׁי, דְּהָנָךְ לָאו קִידּוּשֵׁי.
Abaye explains: This is the halakha whichever way you look at this case: If this expression is a condition that she should be betrothed from now if he does not retract within thirty days, the betrothal of the first man is a betrothal, whereas the betrothals of those other men are not betrothals. If it is a retraction, i.e., if after saying: From now, he changed his mind and delayed the moment of betrothal, then only that betrothal of the last one is a betrothal, whereas the betrothals of those first two men are not betrothals, as they both postponed their betrothals to a later date. Either way, the betrothal of the middle man is of no consequence.
פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הַאי לִישָּׁנָא מַשְׁמַע תְּנָאָה וּמַשְׁמַע חֲזָרָה וְתִיבְעֵי גִּיטָּא מִכֹּל חַד וְחַד, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara asks: It is obvious that this is the case; what is the novelty of Abaye’s statement? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that this formulation means a condition and also means a retraction, and therefore she should require a bill of divorce from each and every one of them, including the middle man, due to the uncertainty. It is possible the first man retracted while the second one imposed a condition, in which case only the betrothal of the second person takes effect. Abaye therefore teaches us that according to the opinion of Rav, the uncertainty concerns the meaning of this expression itself, and there is no uncertainty with regard to the intention of each individual person who says this formula. Consequently, there is no possibility that this woman is betrothed to the middle man.
עוּלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֲפִילּוּ מֵאָה תּוֹפְסִין בָּהּ. וְכֵן אָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֲפִילּוּ מֵאָה תּוֹפְסִין בָּהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַמֵּי לְרַבִּי אַסִּי: אַסְבְּרַהּ לָךְ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שַׁוּוֹ נַפְשַׁיְהוּ כִּי שִׁרְגָּא דְלִיבְנֵי, דְּכֹל חַד וְחַד רְוָחָא לְחַבְרֵיהּ שְׁבַק.
Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even if one hundred betrothed her in this manner, their betrothal is effective with regard to her. And similarly, Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even the betrothal of one hundred is effective with regard to her. Rav Mesharshiyya, son of Rav Ami, said to Rabbi Asi: I will explain to you the reason of Rabbi Yoḥanan: These one hundred men have rendered themselves like a row [sheraga] of bricks, each and every one of whom leaves a gap for the other. Since there is a period of time before the betrothal of each man takes effect, another betrothal can intervene in the meantime.
מֵתִיב רַב חֲנִינָא: ״מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה״ – גֵּט וְאֵינוֹ גֵּט, וְאִם מֵת – חוֹלֶצֶת וְלֹא מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת.
Rav Ḥanina raises an objection to this ruling from a baraita: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, there is uncertainty whether it is a valid bill of divorce or whether it is not a valid bill of divorce. And therefore if he dies she performs ḥalitza, but does not enter into levirate marriage. Since she might not be divorced, the obligation of levirate marriage applies to her, but in practice she cannot perform levirate marriage in case she was in fact divorced and is thereby forbidden to her late husband’s brother, a transgression which is punishable by karet.
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַב – מְסַיְּיעָא לֵיהּ, לִשְׁמוּאֵל נָמֵי: הָא מַנִּי – רַבָּנַן הִיא, וַאֲנַן דְּאָמְרִי כְּרַבִּי.
Rav Ḥanina explains his objection: Granted, according to the opinion of Rav, the baraita supports him, as Rav maintains that the meaning of this expression is uncertain. According to the opinion of Shmuel as well, although he claims that the phrase is a condition rather than a retraction, he can explain as follows: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who claim in that case that it is uncertain if she is divorced, and I, Shmuel, say my ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר שִׁיּוּרָא הָוֵי, כֹּל גִּיטָּא דִּמְשַׁיַּיר בַּהּ וְלָא כְּלוּם הוּא. יַבּוֹמֵי מְיַיבֵּם!
But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that this is a phrase that leaves room for additional betrothals, in a case where he uses this phrase with regard to a bill of divorce, this should not be the halakha, as there is a principle: Any bill of divorce that leaves a remnant of the marital bond is not worth anything, as a bill of divorce must completely sever the marital bond between the husband and the wife. If this bond is not fully severed, she is not divorced. Therefore, her late husband’s brother should be allowed to enter into levirate marriage with her.
אָמַר רָבָא: גֵּט לְהוֹצִיא, וּמִיתָה לְהוֹצִיא, מַה שֶּׁשִּׁיֵּיר גֵּט, גְּמָרַתּוּ מִיתָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: מִי דָּמֵי? גֵּט מוֹצִיאה מֵרְשׁוּת יָבָם, מִיתָה מַכְנֶסֶת לִרְשׁוּת יָבָם!
Rava said: Since a bill of divorce serves to remove a wife from her husband, and death also serves to remove her and dissolve their marital ties, permitting the woman to remarry, one can say that whatever part is left over from that bill of divorce is nevertheless completed by death, and therefore there is a complete act of severance. Abaye said to him: Are the two comparable; can these stages be viewed as completing one another? A bill of divorce removes her not only from her husband’s authority but also from the authority of the yavam, as a divorced woman does not perform levirate marriage, whereas death brings her into the authority of the yavam, because it renders her obligated in levirate marriage.
אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָתָם טַעְמָא מַאי? גְּזֵירָה ״מִשּׁוּם מֵהַיּוֹם אִם מַתִּי״ – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט.
Rather, Abaye said: One must reject the above explanation, and ask what is the reason there for the concern about that bill of divorce, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan? It is not because the bill of divorce is in any way valid. Rather, it is a rabbinic decree due to the case of one who says to his wife: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today if I die. Everyone agrees that this is a bill of divorce that goes into effect from that day if he dies. Since one might confuse the two cases, the Sages decreed that if one says: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today and after my death, the bill of divorce is considered valid to the extent that the woman does not enter into levirate marriage.
וְנִגְזוֹר ״מֵהַיּוֹם אִם מַתִּי״ דְּתַחְלוֹץ, אַטּוּ ״מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה״! אִם אַתָּה אוֹמֵר חוֹלֶצֶת – מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת.
The Gemara asks: But let us also issue a decree in a case where he said: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today if I die, that she should perform ḥalitza, due to its similarity to a bill of divorce that includes the stipulation: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today and after my death. The Gemara answers: The Sages do not require her to perform ḥalitza, as, if you say that she performs ḥalitza, people will mistakenly think that the yavam performed ḥalitza because he did not want to marry her, and if he had wanted to she could have entered into levirate marriage. In fact, she is divorced and is forbidden to the yavam, and a decree of this kind could mislead people and result in a later transgression.
הָכָא נָמֵי אִם אַתָּה אוֹמֵר חוֹלֶצֶת – מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת! תִּתְיַיבֵּם וְאֵין בְּכָךְ כְּלוּם, חֲשָׁשָׁא דְרַבָּנַן הוּא.
The Gemara asks: Here too, in the case of where he says: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today and after my death, if you say that she performs ḥalitza, people will mistakenly say that she could have entered into levirate marriage. The Gemara answers: This concern is not important, as let her perform levirate marriage and there is no problem with that. The fact that she is treated as a divorcée and is forbidden to the brother-in-law is merely a concern of the Sages, who enacted a decree due to the similarity of the case where one says: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today if I die, whereas it is in fact not a bill of divorce and it is permitted for her to enter into levirate marriage.
מַתְנִי׳ הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֶתֵּן לִךְ מָאתַיִם זוּז״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְהוּא יִתֵּן. ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֶתֵּן לִךְ מִכָּאן וְעַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״, נָתַן לָהּ בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְאִם לָאו – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.
MISHNA: With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me with this peruta on the condition that I will give you two hundred dinars, she is betrothed immediately and he shall give her the money. If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I will give you a particular sum of money from now and until thirty days, if he gave the money to her within thirty days she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed.
״עַל מְנָת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי מָאתַיִם זוּז״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְיֵשׁ לוֹ. ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאַרְאֵךְ מָאתַיִם זוּז״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְיַרְאֶה לָהּ. וְאִם הֶרְאָה עַל הַשֻּׁלְחָן – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.
If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I have two hundred dinars, she is betrothed if he has this sum. If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I will show you two hundred dinars, she is betrothed, and he shall show the money to her. And if he is a moneychanger and shows her money belonging to others on the moneychangers’ table, she is not betrothed, as his statement means that he will show her money of his own.
גְּמָ׳ אִיתְּמַר, רַב הוּנָא אָמַר: ״וְהוּא יִתֵּן״. רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר: ״לִכְשֶׁיִּתֵּן״. רַב הוּנָא אָמַר: ״וְהוּא יִתֵּן״ תְּנָאָה הָוֵי, מְקַיֵּים תְּנָאָה וְאָזֵיל. רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר: ״לִכְשֶׁיִּתֵּן״ לְכִי יָהֵיב הָווּ קִידּוּשֵׁי, הַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא לָא הָווּ קִידּוּשֵׁי.
GEMARA: It was stated that the amora’im disagreed with regard to the text of this mishna: Rav Huna says that it reads: And he shall give, i.e., it is a valid betrothal from the outset, and the man is obligated to give her the promised amount. Rav Yehuda says that the correct version of the mishna is: When he gives, meaning that the betrothal takes effect only when he actually gives her the money. The Gemara elaborates: Rav Huna says that the phrase: And he shall give, indicates that this is a condition stipulated by the man, which means that the woman is immediately betrothed and he merely proceeds to fulfill the condition. Rav Yehuda says that the mishna reads: When he gives, which indicates that when he will give the money it will be a betrothal, but for now at least it is not a betrothal.
מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ שֶׁפָּשְׁטָה יָדָהּ וְקִבְּלָה קִידּוּשִׁין מֵאַחֵר. לְרַב הוּנָא לָא הָווּ קִידּוּשֵׁי, לְרַב יְהוּדָה הָווּ קִידּוּשֵׁי.
The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the explanations of Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda? Both agree that if he does not give her the money she is not betrothed. The Gemara answers: The difference between them is in a case where she extended her hand and accepted betrothal from another man during the period between the initial betrothal and the delivery of the money. According to the opinion of Rav Huna the betrothal of the second man is not a valid betrothal, as he maintains that when the first man gives her the money the betrothal takes effect retroactively from the time of his earlier statement. According to the opinion of Rav Yehuda, the betrothal of the second man is a valid betrothal, as the betrothal of the first man does not take effect until after he actually gives her the money.
וּתְנַן נָמֵי גַּבֵּי גִיטִּין כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא: הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּתְּנִי לִי מָאתַיִם זוּז״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת, וְהִיא תִּתֵּן. אִיתְּמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר: ״וְהִיא תִּתֵּן״. רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר: ״לִכְשֶׁתִּתֵּן״. רַב הוּנָא אָמַר: ״וְהִיא תִּתֵּן״, תְּנָאָה הָוֵי, מְקַיְּימָא תְּנָאָה וְאָזְלָה. רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר: ״לִכְשֶׁתִּתֵּן״, לְכִי יָהֲבָה לֵיהּ הוּא דְּהָוֵי גֵּט, הַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא לָא הָוֵי גֵּט.
The Gemara comments: And we also learned a mishna concerning bills of divorce like this case (Gittin 74a): With regard to one who says to a woman: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, she is divorced and she shall give him the two hundred dinars. It was stated that the amora’im disputed the correct version of this statement. Rav Huna says: And she shall give; Rav Yehuda says: When she gives. The reasons are as stated above in the discussion about betrothal: Rav Huna says: And she shall give, as it is a condition, and therefore she proceeds to fulfill the condition. Rav Yehuda says: When she gives, as when she will give the money to him it will be a valid bill of divorce, but now, in any event, it is not a valid bill of divorce.
מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ שֶׁנִּתְקָרַע הַגֵּט אוֹ שֶׁאָבַד, לְרַב הוּנָא הָוֵי גֵּט, לְרַב יְהוּדָה לָא הָוֵי גֵּט.
What is the difference between the explanations of Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda? Even Rav Huna agrees that she cannot marry someone else until she gives him the money. Until that point the bill of divorce does not come into effect and she remains married to the first man. The Gemara answers: The difference between them is in a case where the bill of divorce was torn or lost after she received it but before she gave him the money. According to the opinion of Rav Huna it is a valid bill of divorce, as the divorce takes effect from the moment he gives her the document. According to the opinion of Rav Yehuda it is not a valid bill of divorce, as he maintains that the bill of divorce goes into effect only later, which is impossible as it is either torn or lost.
וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן גַּבֵּי קִידּוּשִׁין, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַב הוּנָא, מִשּׁוּם דִּלְקָרוֹבַהּ קָאָתֵי, אֲבָל גֵּירוּשִׁין, דִּלְרַחוֹקַהּ קָאָתֵי, אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַב יְהוּדָה.
The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state both disputes, the one with regard to betrothal and the one with regard to divorce, as neither halakha could be derived from the other. As had it taught us only that the two Sages disagree with regard to betrothal, one might have said that it is there that Rav Huna says that the betrothal takes effect immediately, despite the fact that he must still give her the money, because betrothal comes to draw her near to him. Therefore, it is likely that he meant for the betrothal to take immediate effect. But with regard to divorce, when he comes to distance her, you might say that Rav Huna concedes to Rav Yehuda that the divorce comes into effect only from the moment she gives him the money.
וְאִי אִיתְּמַר בְּהָךְ: בְּהָךְ קָאָמַר רַב הוּנָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיהוּ לָא כְּסִיף לֵיהּ לְמִתְבְּעַהּ, אֲבָל הָכָא, דְּאִיהִי כְּסִיפָא לַהּ לְמִיתְבְּעֵיהּ אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַב יְהוּדָה, צְרִיכָא.
And conversely, if the dispute had been stated only with regard to this case concerning a bill of divorce, one might have claimed that Rav Huna says that the bill of divorce comes into immediate effect only in this situation, because he is not ashamed to demand the money from her whenever he wants, and therefore he divorces her immediately. But here, concerning a betrothal, when she is ashamed to claim the money from him, you might say that Rav Huna concedes to Rav Yehuda that the woman does not accept the betrothal until she actually receives the money. It is therefore necessary for the dispute to be stated in both cases.
מֵיתִיבִי: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּתְּנִי לִי מָאתַיִם זוּז״, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּתְקָרַע הַגֵּט אוֹ שֶׁאָבַד – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת, לְאַחֵר לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא עַד שֶׁתִּתֵּן.
The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Yehuda from a baraita (Tosefta, Gittin 5:5): If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, even if the bill of divorce was torn or lost she is divorced. But she may not marry another man until she gives him the money. This ruling apparently accords with Rav Huna’s opinion that the bill of divorce goes into immediate effect from the moment it is given.
וְעוֹד תַּנְיָא: אָמַר לָהּ ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּתְּנִי לִי מָאתַיִם זוּז״ וָמֵת, נָתְנָה – אֵין זְקוּקָה לַיָּבָם, לֹא נָתְנָה – זְקוּקָה לְיָבָם. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: נוֹתֶנֶת לְאָחִיו אוֹ לְאָבִיו אוֹ לְאֶחָד מִן הַקְּרוֹבִים.
And it is further taught in a baraita: With regard to a man who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, and he died childless, if she gave him the money she is not bound by a levirate bond to the yavam, as she is already divorced. But if she did not give him the money she is bound by a levirate bond to the yavam. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If she did not give it to her husband during his lifetime she may give the money to her late husband’s brother, or to his father, or to one of the relatives who inherit from him, and by doing so she fulfills the condition and is retroactively divorced.
עַד כָּאן לָא פְּלִיגִי אֶלָּא דְּמָר סָבַר: ״לִי וְלֹא לְיוֹרְשַׁיי״, וּמָר סָבַר: ״אֲפִילּוּ לְיוֹרְשַׁיי״, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא מִיהָא תְּנָאָה הָוֵי, תְּיוּבְתָּא דְרַב יְהוּדָה!
The Gemara analyzes this ruling: The tanna’im disagree only with regard to the following: One Sage, the first tanna, holds that by the phrase: On the condition that you will give me, he meant: To me specifically but not to my heirs. Consequently, if she does not give the money to him she is not divorced, as she cannot fulfill the condition by giving the money to his heirs. And one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that the husband meant: Even to my heirs. In any event, everyone agrees that it is a condition and the divorce takes effect from the moment the bill of divorce is given. This is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehuda.
אָמַר לָךְ רַב יְהוּדָה: הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי הִיא. דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַבִּי: כׇּל הָאוֹמֵר ״עַל מְנָת״ כְּאוֹמֵר ״מֵעַכְשָׁיו״ דָּמֵי, וּפְלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ. וַאֲנָא דַּאֲמַרִי כְּרַבָּנַן.
The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda could say to you: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states that the agreement will take effect retroactively from now, even though the condition is fulfilled only later on. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that the phrase: On the condition, indicates that an action should take effect now provided that a certain action is fulfilled later. And the Rabbis disagree with him, claiming that this expression does not mean that the action should take immediate effect, but only from when the condition is fulfilled. And Rav Yehuda would conclude by adding: And I spoke in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַבִּי: כׇּל הָאוֹמֵר ״עַל מְנָת״ כְּאוֹמֵר ״מֵעַכְשָׁיו״ דָּמֵי. אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: כִּי הֲוֵינַן בְּבָבֶל הֲוָה אָמְרִינַן: הָא דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַבִּי: כׇּל הָאוֹמֵר ״עַל מְנָת״ כְּאוֹמֵר ״מֵעַכְשָׁיו״ דָּמֵי, פְּלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ.
The Gemara analyzes the matter itself. Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states that the agreement will take effect retroactively from now, even though the condition is fulfilled only later on. Rabbi Zeira said: When we were in Babylonia we would say: With regard to that which Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states that the agreement will take effect retroactively from now, that is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion, but the Rabbis disagree with him.
כִּי סָלְקִי לְהָתָם אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ לְרַבִּי אַסִּי דְּיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר לַהּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּאוֹמֵר ״עַל מְנָת״ כְּאוֹמֵר ״מֵעַכְשָׁיו״ דָּמֵי, לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אֶלָּא: ״מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה״.
When I ascended to there, to Eretz Yisrael, I found Rabbi Asi sitting and saying the following ruling in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: All concede that with regard to one who says to his wife: On the condition, he is like one who states that the divorce will take effect retroactively from now. They disagreed only with regard to one who said to his wife: From today and after my death, whether he is considered to have added a condition or to have retracted from his initial statement.
וְהָתַנְיָא: ״מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה״ – גֵּט וְאֵינוֹ גֵּט, דִּבְרֵי חֲכָמִים. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: כָּזֶה גֵּט.
And it is taught in a baraita that if one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, it is uncertain whether it is a valid bill of divorce or whether it is not a valid bill of divorce. This is the statement of the Rabbis. The Rabbis are uncertain whether he has changed his mind from his initial intention of giving the document that day, and now wishes to give a bill of divorce after his death, which is not effective, or whether he was merely adding a condition that the bill of divorce should take effect from today only when he dies. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A document like this is a valid bill of divorce.
וּלְרַב יְהוּדָה, דְּאָמַר בְּ״עַל מְנָת״ נָמֵי פְּלִיגִי, אַדְּמִיפַּלְגִי בְּ״מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה״ – נִיפְלְגֵי בְּ״עַל מְנָת״?
The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rav Yehuda, who said that the tanna’im also disagree with regard to one who says to his wife: On the condition, instead of disagreeing with regard to the case where one says to his wife: From today and after my death, let them disagree with regard to a case where the husband used the expression: On the condition.
לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחַ דְּרַבִּי, דְּ״מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה״ נָמֵי הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט. וְנִיפְלְגִי בְּ״עַל מְנָת״, לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחַ דְּרַבָּנַן! כֹּחַ דְּהֶיתֵּירָא עֲדִיף.
The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda maintains that they disagree over both cases, and the baraita taught the dispute in this manner to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who maintains that even if the husband says to his wife: From today and after my death, this is also a valid bill of divorce. The Gemara asks: And let them disagree with regard to a husband who says to his wife: On the condition, to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that it is not a valid bill of divorce even in that case. The Gemara answers: It is preferable to emphasize the power of leniency. It is always better to formulate a dispute in a manner that emphasizes the extent of the lenient opinion.
״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֶתֵּן לְךָ מִכָּאן וְכוּ׳״. פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: לָאו תְּנָאָה הוּא, וּלְזָרוֹזֵיהּ קָאָמְרָ[ה], קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
§ The mishna teaches: With regard to one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will give you a particular sum of money from now and until thirty days have elapsed, if he gives her the money within the allotted time she is betrothed. The Gemara questions the need for this ruling: It is obvious that this is the case. The Gemara explains: This ruling is necessary, lest you say that the specified time period is not a proper condition, and he said so only to motivate himself to prove the sincerity of his intentions. The mishna therefore teaches us that the time period is an essential part of his condition, and if he fails to give her the money within this period the betrothal is void.
״עַל מְנָת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי מָאתַיִם זוּז״ וְכוּ׳. וְנֵיחוּשׁ שֶׁמָּא יֵשׁ לוֹ! וְעוֹד, תַּנְיָא: חָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא יֵשׁ לוֹ!
The mishna further teaches that if he says to her: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I have two hundred dinars, if he in fact possesses the specified amount, she is betrothed, but if he does not, she is not betrothed. The Gemara asks: And let us be concerned that perhaps he has this sum, although he fails to show it to her. How can his betrothal be nullified if there is no conclusive evidence that he does not have the money? And furthermore, it is taught in a baraita that we are concerned that perhaps he has the money.
לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא בְּקִידּוּשֵׁי וַדַּאי, הָא בְּקִידּוּשֵׁי סָפֵק.
The Gemara answers: It is not difficult, as this case, in the mishna, is referring to a definite betrothal, which is not established in this case, as he has failed to demonstrate that he has the funds. By contrast, that case, in the baraita, is referring to an uncertain betrothal. The betrothal cannot be entirely disregarded, as he might have the money after all.
״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאַרְאֵךְ מָאתַיִם זוּז״ וְכוּ׳. תָּנָא: לֹא נִתְכַּוְּנָה אֶלָּא לִרְאוֹת מִשֶּׁלּוֹ. וְאִם הֶרְאָה לָהּ עַל הַשֻּׁלְחָן – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. פְּשִׁיטָא! לָא צְרִיכָא דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּנָקֵט דְּמֵי בְּעִיסְקָא.
The mishna teaches that if a man says to her: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will show you two hundred dinars, she is betrothed and he must show her the money. A Sage taught (Tosefta 3:6): This woman intended to see only his own money, not simply to be shown any two hundred dinars. With regard to the subsequent ruling of the mishna: And if he showed her the money on the table she is not betrothed, the Gemara comments: This is obvious, as the woman wants to see his own money. The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to teach that even if he holds somebody else’s money as part of a joint business venture, nevertheless, as the money does not actually belong to him he has failed to fulfill the condition.
מַתְנִי׳ ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בֵּית כּוֹר עָפָר״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְיֵשׁ לוֹ. ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״, אִם יֵשׁ לוֹ בְּאוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְאִם לָאו – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאַרְאֵךְ בֵּית כּוֹר עָפָר״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְיַרְאֶנָּה. וְאִם הֶרְאָהּ בַּבִּקְעָה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.
MISHNA: With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I possess tillable land of a beit kor of earth, she is betrothed, provided that he possesses such land. If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I possess land in such and such a place, if he possesses land in that place she is betrothed, but if not she is not betrothed. If he said to her: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will show you a beit kor of earth, she is betrothed, and he shall show her. And if he showed her land in a valley, i.e., a field that does not belong to him among other fields, she is not betrothed.
גְּמָ׳ וְנֵיחוּשׁ שֶׁמָּא יֵשׁ לוֹ! וְעוֹד, תַּנְיָא: חָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא יֵשׁ לוֹ! לָא קַשְׁיָא. הָא בְּקִידּוּשֵׁי וַדַּאי, הָא בְּקִידּוּשֵׁי סָפֵק.
GEMARA: With regard to the statement of the mishna that she is betrothed only if he actually possesses a beit kor of earth, the Gemara asks: And let us be concerned that perhaps he in fact possesses land of this size. And furthermore, it is explicitly taught in a baraita that we are concerned in this situation that perhaps he possesses land of this size. The Gemara answers: It is not difficult, as this case, the one in the mishna, is referring to a definite betrothal, which has not yet been established because he has not proven he owns a field of this kind; and that case, the one in the baraita, is referring to an uncertain betrothal.
לְמָה לִי לְמִיתְנֵא גַּבֵּי אַרְעָא וּלְמָה לִי לְמִיתְנֵא גַּבֵּי זוּזֵי! צְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן גַּבֵּי זוּזֵי, מִשּׁוּם דַּעֲבִידִי אִינָשֵׁי דְּמַצְנְעִי. אֲבָל אַרְעָא, אֵימָא: אִי דְּאִית לֵיהּ אַרְעָא – קָלָא אִית לֵיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara asks: Why do I need this mishna to teach this halakha with regard to land, and why do I also need the previous mishna to teach the same ruling with regard to money? There is no clear difference between the two cases. The Gemara answers: It is necessary to state the halakha in both cases, as had one mishna taught us this halakha only with regard to money one might have said that it is only in that case that it is uncertain whether she is betrothed, because people tend to hide their money, and therefore his financial status might not be well known. But in the case of land, you might say that if he had land this fact would generate publicity, as one cannot hide land. The mishna therefore teaches us that it is also possible for him to own land without people being aware of it.
״עַל מְנָת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״, אִם יֵשׁ לוֹ וְכוּ׳. פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: אֲמַר לַהּ: מַאי נָפְקָא לָךְ מִינַּהּ, אֲנָא טָרַחְנָא וּמַיְיתֵינָא! קָמַשְׁמַע לַן.
§ The mishna teaches: If one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I possess land in such and such a place, if he possesses land in that place she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed. The Gemara questions the need for this ruling: It is obvious that if he does not possess land in that place she is not betrothed, as that was precisely his condition. The Gemara explains that this ruling is necessary lest you say that he can say to her: What difference does it make to you whether the field is in that location or elsewhere, as even if it is farther away I will go to the trouble of bringing the produce from the field to our house, so what loss have you incurred? The mishna therefore teaches us that despite this claim the betrothal is invalid, due to his failure to fulfill the condition.
״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאַרְאֵךְ בֵּית כּוֹר עָפָר״. תָּאנָא: לֹא נִתְכַּוְּונָה זוֹ אֶלָּא לִרְאוֹת מִשֶּׁלּוֹ. וְאִם הֶרְאָהּ בַּבִּקְעָה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. פְּשִׁיטָא! לָא צְרִיכָא דְּנָקֵיט בְּדִיסְתּוּרָא.
§ The mishna further teaches: If a one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will show you a beit kor of earth, she is betrothed, provided that he possesses such land. A Sage taught (Tosefta 3:6): The woman intended to see only his own land. The mishna further teaches: And if he showed her a plot of land in a valley, she is not betrothed. The Gemara asks: This is obvious; after all, this land does not belong to him. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where he maintains the field as a sharecropper [distora], i.e., he owns a share in it. Nevertheless, as the land does not belong to him she did not have this field in mind, and consequently she is not betrothed.
גַּבֵּי הֶקְדֵּשׁ תְּנַן:
The Gemara comments: With regard to consecrated property, we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 25a):
