Kiddushin 63

לא תסגיר עבד אל אדניו רבי אומר בלוקח עבד על מנת לשחררו הכתוב מדבר היכי דמי אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק כגון דכתב ליה לכשאקחך הרי עצמך קנוי לך מעכשיו

With regard to the verse: “You shall not deliver a slave to his master” (Deuteronomy 23:16), Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse is speaking of one who acquires a slave, not to enslave him but in order to emancipate him. The court may not deliver the slave to this master, as this master has no right to enslave him. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: For example, if the new master wrote to the slave in his bill of manumission: When I will purchase you, you are hereby acquired to yourself from now. In that case the slave acquires himself from that moment, despite the fact that the buyer does not own him. This shows that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that a person can transfer an item that has not yet entered the world, as one can emancipate his slave before acquiring him.

רבי מאיר דתניא האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי לאחר שאתגייר לאחר שתתגיירי לאחר שאשתחרר לאחר שתשתחררי לאחר שימות בעליך לאחר שתמות אחותיך לאחר שיחלוץ לך יבמיך אינה מקודשת רבי מאיר אומר מקודשת רבי יוחנן הסנדלר אומר אינה מקודשת

Rabbi Meir also holds that one can transfer an entity that has not yet come into the world, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after I convert, or: After you convert, or: After I am emancipated, or: After you are emancipated, or: After your husband dies, or: After your sister dies, or: After your yavam performs ḥalitza for you, she is not betrothed. Rabbi Meir disagrees and says: She is betrothed. Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar says: She is not betrothed.

רבי יהודה הנשיא אומר מקודשת ומה טעם אמרו אינה מקודשת משום איבה

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that in some of these cases, by Torah law she is betrothed. And for what reason did the Sages say she is not betrothed? Due to enmity. Giving betrothal to a married woman that will take effect after her husband dies can engender enmity between the woman and her husband. Giving betrothal to one sister that depends on the death of the other can engender enmity between the sisters. Nevertheless, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintain that one can betroth a woman who is currently forbidden to him.

ונחשוב נמי רבי יהודה הנשיא היינו רבי היינו רבי יהודה הנשיא

The Gemara asks: And let us also count Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi among those who maintain that a person can acquire an entity that has not yet come into the world. The reason it asks is that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is merely called Rabbi above. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is the same as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi; they are one person.

ונחשוב נמי רבי עקיבא דתניא קונם שאני עושה לפיך אין צריך להפר

The Gemara asks: And let us also count Rabbi Akiva, as it is taught in a mishna (see Nedarim 85a): If a woman stated a vow to her husband: I will not produce anything for you, including the work that she is obligated to do for him according to the terms of her marriage contract, as that is konam, i.e., forbidden like an offering, for me, her husband need not nullify the vow at all. It is automatically void, since she is obligated to perform those tasks.

רבי עקיבא אומר יפר שמא תעדיף עליו יתר מן הראוי לו האיתמר עלה אמר רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע באומרת יקדשו ידי לעושיהם וידים איתנהו בעולם

Rabbi Akiva says: He should nevertheless nullify the vow, as perhaps she will exceed the required amount of work and do more for him than is fitting for him to receive. If she does more than the fixed amount of work that a woman is obligated to perform for her husband, the vow will be valid with respect to the excess to which he is not legally entitled, and he might inadvertently come to benefit from something that is forbidden to him. That excess is an entity that has not yet come into the world. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Wasn’t it already stated with regard to this ruling that Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says: This is referring to a woman who says: Let my hands be sanctified to their Maker? She sanctifies her actual hands, and these hands exist in the world; therefore the vow takes effect.

מתני׳ האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי על מנת שאדבר עליך לשלטון ואעשה עמך כפועל דבר עליה לשלטון ועשה עמה כפועל מקודשת ואם לאו אינה מקודשת

MISHNA: With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will speak in your favor to the authorities, e.g., to help her address some legal matter, or: On the condition that I will act for you as a laborer, if he spoke in her favor to the authorities or acted for her as a laborer, she is betrothed. But if not, she is not betrothed.

גמ׳ אמר ריש לקיש והוא שנתן לה שוה פרוטה ובשכר לא והתניא בשכר שהרכבתיך על החמור שהושבתיך בקרון או בספינה אינה מקודשת

GEMARA: Reish Lakish says: And this halakha applies only if he gave her an item worth one peruta at the time of the betrothal. She is not betrothed via his recommendation to the authorities or via the work itself, as these are merely conditions appended to the betrothal. The Gemara asks: And is she not betrothed by the monetary value of his recommendation or action? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that if one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me by the monetary value you received when I had you ride on a donkey, or: By the monetary value you received when I had you sit on a wagon [karon], or: By the monetary value you received when I had you ride in a boat, she is not betrothed, as she has already done the action and therefore owes him this debt, and one cannot betroth a woman with a loan.

בשכר שארכיבך על החמור שאושיבך בקרון או בספינה מקודשת וכי תימא הכא נמי בדיהב לה שוה פרוטה והא בשכר קאמר

But if he says to her: By the monetary value you will receive when I will have you ride on a donkey, or: By the monetary value you will receive when I will have you sit on a wagon, or: By the monetary value you will receive when I will have you ride in a boat, she is betrothed. And if you would say that here too, it is referring to a case where he gave her an item worth one peruta, the baraita says: By the monetary value, which indicates that she is betrothed via this sum.

ועוד תניא שב עמי בצוותא ואקדש לך שחוק לפני רקוד לפני עשה כדימוס הזה שמין אם יש בו שוה פרוטה מקודשת ואם לאו אינה מקודשת וכי תימא הכא נמי בדיהב לה שוה פרוטה והא שמין אותו קאמר תיובתא דריש לקיש

And furthermore, it is taught in a baraita that if a woman says to a man: Sit together with me and I will be betrothed to you, or: Perform entertainment before me, or: Dance before me, or: Perform work for me like this layer [dimus] of a building, the court appraises the monetary value of his action. If the action he performs for her is worth the value of one peruta, she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed. And if you would say that here too, it is referring to a case where he gave her an item worth one peruta, and the betrothal is with that; but the baraita says: The court appraises it. If this were merely a condition, there would be no need for an appraisal. Isn’t this a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish?

אמר לך ריש לקיש האי תנא ברא סבר אינה לשכירות אלא לבסוף ותנא דידן סבר ישנה לשכירות מתחילה ועד סוף

The Gemara answers that Reish Lakish could have said to you: This tanna of the baraita maintains that the obligation to pay a person’s wage is incurred only at the end of the period for which he was hired. Consequently, she is betrothed via money rather than by a loan. And the tanna of our mishna maintains that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end. Since the debt accumulates throughout the duration that the service is performed, by the time he has finished the work she owes him the entire sum, and a debt cannot be used for a betrothal.

ומאי דוחקיה דריש לקיש לאוקמיה למתניתין בישנה לשכירות מתחילה ועד סוף ובדיהב לה

The Gemara asks: And what forces Reish Lakish to establish the mishna in accordance with the opinion that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end, and that it is referring to a case where he gave her the value of one peruta? Why does he reject the possibility that the mishna is referring to one who did not give an extra peruta, and instead he betrothed her with the value of the service he performed, in accordance with the opinion that the obligation to pay a person’s wage is incurred only at the end of the period for which he was hired?

אמר רבא מתניתין קשיתיה מאי איריא דתני על מנת ניתני בשכר אלא שמע מינה כל על מנת היכא דיהב לה הוא

The Gemara replies: Rava said that the mishna was difficult for Reish Lakish: Why does the tanna specifically teach: On the condition? Let him teach: By the monetary value, as stated in the baraita. Rather, conclude from it that any statement of: On the condition, is referring to a stipulation, and therefore the mishna must be dealing with a case where he has already given her the value of one peruta. Consequently, the value of his service cannot be the money for the betrothal itself, and instead serves as a later condition.

מתני׳ על מנת שירצה אבא רצה האב מקודשת ואם לאו אינה מקודשת מת האב הרי זו מקודשת מת הבן מלמדין האב לומר שאינו רוצה

MISHNA: With regard to one who betroths a woman and says to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that my father will want this betrothal, if his father wants it, she is betrothed; but if not, she is not betrothed. If the father dies, she is betrothed, despite the fact that he did not reveal his wishes. If the son dies, one instructs the father to say that he does not want the betrothal, so that the betrothal will never have taken effect, thereby enabling her to avoid the requirement of levirate marriage.

גמ׳ מאי על מנת שירצה אבא אילימא עד דאמר אבא אין אימא מציעתא מת האב הרי זו מקודשת והא לא אמר אין אלא

GEMARA: What is the meaning of: On the condition that my father will want this betrothal? If we say it means they are not married until his father says yes, indicating his agreement, then say the middle clause of the mishna: If the father dies, she is betrothed. But how can she be betrothed? After all, he did not say yes, and the condition was not fulfilled. Rather,

על מנת שישתוק אבא אימא סיפא מת הבן מלמדין את האב לומר שאינו רוצה אמאי והא שתיק אלא אמר לה על מנת שלא ימחה אבא

the phrase: On the condition that my father wants this betrothal, means: On the condition that my father will remain silent and will not object when he hears of the betrothal. But if this is the case, say the last clause of the mishna: If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not want the betrothal. Why should this matter? After all, he remained silent when he first heard about it. Clearly his mere silence does not constitute agreement. Rather, one must say that the phrase: On the condition that my father wants this betrothal, means that he said to her: On the condition that my father will not object to this betrothal at any point in time.

רישא בחד טעמא ומציעתא וסיפא בחד טעמא אמר רבי ינאי אין אמר ריש לקיש שמע מינה לדרבי ינאי דחקינן ומוקמינן מתניתין בתרי טעמא ואליבא דחד תנא ולא מוקמינן בתרי תנאי ובחד טעמא

The Gemara asks: Wouldn’t this mean that the first clause of the mishna describes one reason, i.e., one set of circumstances, and the middle clause and last clause describe one other reason? Rabbi Yannai said: Yes, this is so. Reish Lakish said: Conclude from his statement that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yannai one forces a mishna to be explained as following two reasons, and in accordance with the opinion of one tanna, rather than establishing a mishna as following the opinions of two tanna’im and one reason. In other words, an interpretation that maintains the unified attribution of one mishna is preferable, even if one is thereby forced to say that it addresses different situations.

רב יוסף בר אמי אמר לעולם חד טעמא הוא ומאי על מנת שירצה אבא על מנת שלא ימחה אבא מכאן ועד שלשים יום

Rav Yosef bar Ami said: Actually, the entire mishna is addressing one reason, i.e., one case, and what is the meaning of: On the condition that my father wants the betrothal? It means: On the condition that my father will not object from now and until thirty days have elapsed. His silence for thirty days indicates his acceptance of the betrothal.

מתני׳ קדשתי את בתי ואיני יודע למי קידשתיה ובא אחד ואמר אני קידשתיה נאמן זה אמר אני קידשתיה וזה אמר אני קידשתיה שניהם נותנים גט ואם רצו אחד נותן גט ואחד כונס

MISHNA: With regard to a man who said: I betrothed my minor daughter to someone but I do not know to whom I betrothed her, and one man came forward and said: I betrothed her, his claim is deemed credible. If two men stepped forward and this one said: I betrothed her, and that one said: I betrothed her, they must both give her a bill of divorce to render it permitted for her to marry anyone else. And if they so desire, one of them gives her a bill of divorce and the other one may marry her.

גמ׳ אמר רב נאמן ליתן גט ואין נאמן לכנוס נאמן ליתן גט אין אדם חוטא ולא לו ואין נאמן לכנוס אימא יצרו תוקפו

GEMARA: Rav says: When the mishna states that the claim of one who says that he betrothed this girl is deemed credible, it means that he is deemed credible to the extent that he may give her a bill of divorce, but he is not deemed credible to marry her. He is deemed credible to give her a bill of divorce, as there is a presumption that a person sins only for his own benefit. No one is suspected of sinning when he does not stand to gain from it. Since he is not allowed to marry her himself, we do not say that he lied without purpose. But he is not deemed credible to marry her, as we say that his inclination might have overcome him, leading him to falsely claim that he is the one who betrothed her.

רב אסי אמר אף נאמן לכנוס ומודה רב אסי באומרת נתקדשתי ואיני יודעת למי נתקדשתי ובא אחד ואמר קידשתיה שאין נאמן לכנוס

Rav Asi disagrees with Rav’s interpretation of the mishna and says: He is deemed credible even to marry her, as he would not dare to lie directly to the father of the girl he claims to have betrothed. And Rav Asi concedes in the case of a woman who says: I became betrothed but I do not know to whom I became betrothed, and one man came and said: I betrothed her, that he is not deemed credible to marry her. In this situation she might have agreed to collude with him, as the Gemara will explain.

תנן רצו אחד נותן גט ואחד כונס תיובתא דרב אמר לך רב שאני התם דכיון דאיכא אחר בהדיה אירתותי מירתת

The Gemara raises a difficulty: We learned in the mishna that if they so desire, one of them gives her a bill of divorce and the other one may marry her. This is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav, who says that he may not marry her. The Gemara answers: Rav could have said to you: There, in our mishna, it is different, as, since there is another person with him also claiming to have betrothed her, he is afraid to lie.

תניא כוותיה דרב אסי קידשתי את בתי ואיני יודע למי קידשתיה ובא אחד ואמר קידשתיה אף נאמן לכנוס כנסה ובא אחר ואמר אני קדשתיה לא כל הימנו לאוסרה עליו

The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Asi: If a man said: I have betrothed my daughter to someone but I do not know to whom I betrothed her, and one person came forward and said: I betrothed her, he is deemed credible even to marry her. If that person married her, and another man came forward and said: It was I who betrothed her, it is not within the second man’s power to prohibit her to her husband.

האשה שאמרה נתקדשתי ואיני יודעת למי נתקדשתי ובא אחד ואמר אני קידשתי אין נאמן לכנוס מפני שהיא מחפה עליו

The baraita cites another case: With regard to a woman who said: I became betrothed but I do not know to whom I became betrothed, and one man came and said: I betrothed her, he is not deemed credible to marry her. Why not? Because she is protecting him. Perhaps she decided only now that she wants to marry him and is therefore identifying him as the man who betrothed her, although she knows it was someone else. The same suspicions do not arise in the case of a father, who has no inclinations in this regard.

איבעיא להו מהו לסקול על ידו רב אמר אין סוקלין ורב אסי אמר סוקלין

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of the mishna, where the father claims to have betrothed his daughter to someone, what is the halakha with regard to stoning based on the father’s account? Is a father who says: I betrothed my daughter, deemed credible to the extent that she is stoned as an adulteress if she engages in sexual intercourse with someone? Rav says the court does not stone her, and Rav Asi says the court stones her.

רב אמר אין סוקלין כי הימניה רחמנא לאב לאיסורא לקטלא לא הימניה רב אסי אמר סוקלין לכולה מילתיה הימניה רחמנא לאב אמר רב אסי ומודינא באומרת נתקדשתי שאין סוקלים

The Gemara elaborates: Rav said that the court does not stone her, because when the Merciful One deems the father credible when he says he betrothed his daughter, this is referring only to the prohibition against her marrying anyone else. By contrast, with regard to killing her, the Torah did not deem him credible. Rav Asi said: The court stones her, as the Merciful One deems the father credible with regard to all matters, including the death penalty. Rav Asi says: And I concede in the case of a woman who says: I became betrothed, that the court does not stone her on the basis of her own admission.

ואמר רב אסי הני שמעתתא דידי מרפסן איגרי השתא ומה במקום שאם בא לכנוס כונס אמרת סוקלים מקום שאם בא לכנוס אין כונס אינו דין שסוקלין

And Rav Asi says: These halakhot of mine are roof breakers, i.e., they are difficult and incomprehensible. Rav Asi explains: Now, in a case where a father said: I have betrothed my daughter to someone but I do not know to whom, where if someone came to marry her he is deemed credible and may marry her, which means you say that the court then stones her on the basis of the father’s testimony if she later commits adultery, is it not logical that the court should stone her in a case where a woman said: I became betrothed but I do not know to whom, thereby prohibiting herself to everyone to the extent that if someone came to marry her he may not marry her?

ולא היא לאב הימניה רחמנא לדידה לא הימנה

But that is not so, i.e., Rav Asi’s rulings are in fact reasonable: The Merciful One deems credible a father who says that his daughter is betrothed, and therefore she can even be stoned, but the Torah did not deem her, i.e., the woman herself, credible in this regard. She does not receive a special degree of credibility, and although she can declare herself a forbidden item, i.e., she can render herself forbidden to all men, as far as punishment is concerned her claim is treated by a court in accordance with the regular rules of evidence.

ורב חסדא אמר אחד זה ואחד זה אין סוקלין ואזדא רב חסדא לטעמיה דאמר רב חסדא בני זה בן תשע שנים ויום אחד בתי זו בת שלש שנים ויום אחד נאמן לקרבן אבל לא למכות ולא לעונשין

And Rav Ḥisda said: Both in this case, when the father says: I betrothed my daughter, and in that case, when she herself says: I became betrothed, the court does not stone her. The Gemara comments: And Rav Ḥisda follows his standard line of reasoning, as Rav Ḥisda says that if a father declared: This son of mine is nine years and one day old, or: This daughter of mine is three years and one day old, and the son engaged in intercourse with a woman forbidden to him, or the daughter engaged in intercourse with a man forbidden to her, he is deemed credible concerning his children’s ages with regard to the requirement for the adult to bring an offering if they performed the act unwittingly, but not with regard to their receiving the punishment of lashes and not with regard to other punishments.

תניא כוותיה דרב חסדא בני זה בן שלש עשרה שנה ויום אחד בתי זו בת שתים עשרה שנה ויום אחד

The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda that if one said: This son of mine is thirteen years and one day old, or: This daughter of mine is twelve years and one day old,