Kiddushin 64
נֶאֱמָן לִנְדָרִים, וְלַחֲרָמִים, וּלְהֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת וְלַעֲרָכִים, אֲבָל לֹא לְמַכּוֹת וְלָעוֹנָשִׁין.
the father is deemed credible concerning the ages of his children with regard to vows, i.e., any vow they make is valid; and with regard to dedications, i.e., if they consecrate an item by saying it should be dedicated to God; and with regard to consecrations and with regard to valuations, i.e., vows to donate to the Temple treasury the fixed valuation of oneself or others. In all these cases their vows are valid. But the father is not deemed credible with regard to lashes of the court, or with regard to other corporal punishments for transgressions they have committed, as the testimony of one witness, especially that of a family member, is insufficient for this purpose.
מַתְנִי׳ ״קִדַּשְׁתִּי אֶת בִּתִּי״, ״קִדַּשְׁתִּיהָ וְגֵרַשְׁתִּיהָ כְּשֶׁהִיא קְטַנָּה״, וַהֲרֵי הִיא קְטַנָּה – נֶאֱמָן. ״קִדַּשְׁתִּיהָ וְגֵרַשְׁתִּיהָ כְּשֶׁהִיא קְטַנָּה״, וַהֲרֵי הִיא גְּדוֹלָה – אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן. נִשְׁבֵּית וּפְדִיתִיהָ, בֵּין שֶׁהִיא קְטַנָּה בֵּין שֶׁהִיא גְּדוֹלָה – אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן.
MISHNA: If a father says: I betrothed my minor daughter to someone, or: I betrothed her to someone and accepted her divorce when she was a minor girl, and she is still a minor girl at the time of this statement, he is deemed credible to render her forbidden to all other men as a married woman, or to a priest as a divorced woman. But if he says: I betrothed her to someone and accepted her divorce when she was a minor, and she is an adult woman at the time of his declaration, his statement is not deemed credible. Likewise, if he says: She was taken captive and I redeemed her, he is not deemed credible to disqualify her from marrying a priest whether she was a minor girl or an adult woman.
גְּמָ׳ מַאי שְׁנָא רֵישָׁא וּמַאי שְׁנָא סֵיפָא? רֵישָׁא בִּידֵיהּ, סֵיפָא לָאו בִּידֵיהּ.
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause of the mishna and what is different in the latter clause? Why is the father deemed credible when she is a minor but not when she is an adult or to testify that she was taken captive? The Gemara answers: In the first clause it is still in his power to betroth her, and therefore he is deemed credible when he says that he did so earlier. By contrast, in the latter clause it is not in his power to betroth her, as one cannot betroth his adult daughter. Likewise, as it is not permitted for him to disqualify her by handing her over to a gentile, either when she is a minor or when she is an adult, he is not deemed credible when he says that she was taken captive.
וְלָא? וַהֲרֵי בְּיָדוֹ לְהַשִּׂיאָהּ לְחָלָל, דְּקָא פָסְלַהּ מִכְּהוּנָּה!
The Gemara asks: But does a father not have the power to disqualify his daughter? But it is in his power to marry off his minor daughter to a ḥalal, i.e., the son of a priest who married a woman prohibited to him, which thereby disqualifies her from marrying into the priesthood. The father should therefore be deemed credible when he claims that she was taken captive.
הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא, כְּרַבִּי דּוֹסְתַּאי בֶּן יְהוּדָה דְּאָמַר: בְּנוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל מִקְוֵה טׇהֳרָה לַחֲלָלִין.
The Gemara responds: This is not difficult, as one can say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Dostai ben Yehuda, who says: The daughters of Israelites are a ritual bath of purity for individuals of ḥalal status. In other words, an Israelite woman who marries a ḥalal purifies their children, i.e., renders their children fit, in that any daughter born to them is qualified to marry a priest. Similarly, the woman herself does not become disqualified by her intercourse with the ḥalal, and she may marry a priest if her husband dies. If so, a father does not have the power to disqualify his daughter from marrying into the priesthood.
וַהֲרֵי בְּיָדוֹ לְהַשִּׂיאָהּ לְמַמְזֵר! כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּאָמַר: אֵין קִדּוּשִׁין תּוֹפְסִין בְּחַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין.
The Gemara challenges: But it is in the father’s power to marry her off to a mamzer, thereby disqualifying her from the priesthood. The Gemara answers: This tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says: Betrothal does not take effect even with those women with whom one is only liable for violating a prohibition of engaging in intercourse and not a more severe prohibition that would render one liable for karet or capital punishment, so betrothal does not take effect with a mamzer.
הֲרֵי בְּיָדוֹ לְהַשִּׂיאָהּ אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, וּכְרַבִּי סִימַאי, דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי סִימַאי אוֹמֵר: מִן הַכֹּל עוֹשֶׂה רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא מַמְזֵר, חוּץ מֵאַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, שֶׁהֲרֵי אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: ״לֹא יִקָּח… וְלֹא יְחַלֵּל״: – חִלּוּלִים עוֹשֶׂה, וְאֵין עוֹשֶׂה מַמְזֵרִים.
The Gemara further challenges: But it is in the father’s power to marry her off as a widow to a High Priest, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Simai, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Simai says: In all cases Rabbi Akiva deems the child a mamzer, i.e., he considers the offspring of all forbidden acts of intercourse to be mamzerim, apart from a widow to a High Priest, as the Torah stated with regard to a High Priest: “A widow…shall he not take…and he shall not profane [yeḥallel] his seed” (Leviticus 21:14–15). From this verse it is derived: He renders his children ḥalalim by means of this relationship, but he does not render them mamzerim. Since this act of intercourse does not produce mamzerim, Rabbi Akiva agrees that betrothal is effective in this case.
כְּרַבִּי יְשֵׁבָב, דְּאָמַר: בּוֹאוּ וְנִצְוַוח עַל עֲקִיבָא בֶּן יוֹסֵף שֶׁהָיָה אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁאֵין לוֹ בִּיאָה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל הַוָּלָד מַמְזֵר.
The Gemara answers: The tanna of the mishna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yeshevav, who says: Come, let us shout at Akiva ben Yosef, who would say: In every case where a Jew may not engage in intercourse with a particular woman, and he does so, the offspring that results from this union is a mamzer. This indicates that according to Rabbi Akiva all acts of forbidden intercourse produce mamzerim. Consequently, betrothal is of no effect in the case of any prohibition, including a widow to a High Priest, which means that a father cannot disqualify his daughter from the priesthood.
הָנִיחָא לְרַבִּי יְשֵׁבָב אִי לְטַעְמֵיהּ דְּנַפְשֵׁיהּ – שַׁפִּיר. אֶלָּא אִי לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִטַּעְמָא דְּרַבִּי סִימַאי קָאָתֵי, הֲרֵי בְּיָדוֹ לְהַשִּׂיאָהּ לְחַיָּיבֵי עֲשֵׂה!
The Gemara asks: This mishna can work out well even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yeshevav if he states a reasoning of his own, i.e., he states an independent statement critical of Rabbi Akiva’s ruling that the child of any illicit union is a mamzer. Then, the ruling of the mishna is well, as it is a categorical statement that applies to all illicit unions. But if he comes to exclude the reason of Rabbi Simai, i.e., he means to take issue with the ruling of Rabbi Akiva in the specific case mentioned by Rabbi Simai, that of a widow to a High Priest, then Rabbi Yeshevav too concedes that according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, betrothal does take effect in a case where a positive mitzva is violated by the betrothal. Accordingly, it is in the father’s power to marry her to those with whom intercourse renders them liable for the violation of positive mitzvot, as Rabbi Akiva’s principle does not include cases of this kind.
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי וְתִסְבְּרַאּ רֵישָׁא מִשּׁוּם דִּבְיָדוֹ הוּא? נְהִי דִּבְיָדוֹ לְקַדְּשָׁהּ, בְּיָדוֹ לְגָרְשָׁהּ? וְעוֹד, אִילּוּ אֲמַר הַאי דְּלָא נִיחָא [לֵיהּ] בְּגַוַּהּ מִי מָצֵי מְקַדֵּשׁ [לַהּ] נִיהֲלֵיהּ בְּעַל כֻּרְחֵיהּ?
Rav Ashi says: And how can you understand it that way? Can it be that the reason for the halakha in the first clause of the mishna is because it is in his power? Although it is in his power to betroth her, is it in his power to divorce her? And furthermore, if this one, the prospective husband, says that it is not satisfactory for him to betroth her, can her father betroth her to him against his will? A father cannot betroth his daughter to whomever he chooses without taking the man’s wishes into account.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: רֵישָׁא רַחֲמָנָא הֵימְנֵיהּ, כְּרַב הוּנָא, דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: מִנַּיִן לְאָב שֶׁנֶּאֱמָן לֶאֱסוֹר אֶת בִּתּוֹ מִן הַתּוֹרָה? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אֶת בִּתִּי נָתַתִּי לָאִישׁ הַזֶּה״, ״לָאִישׁ״ – אֲסָרָהּ, ״הַזֶּה״ – הִתִּירָהּ.
Rather, Rav Ashi says: In the first clause of the mishna, the reason is that the Merciful One believes him, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna says that Rav says: From where is it derived that a father is deemed credible to render his daughter forbidden as a betrothed woman by Torah law? As it is stated: “I gave my daughter to this man [la’ish hazzeh]” (Deuteronomy 22:16). When the father said that he married her to “the man [la’ish],” he rendered her forbidden to all men. When he then said “this [hazzeh],” he rendered her permitted to this specific man, her husband.
בְּנִישּׂוּאִין הֵימְנֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא לְאָב, בִּשְׁבוּיָיה לָא הֵימְנֵיהּ.
Rav Ashi explains the ruling of the mishna: The Merciful One deems the father credible with regard to marriage, whereas He does not deem him credible with regard to a captive. The Torah did not grant a father any special credibility with regard to the claim that his daughter was taken captive.
מַתְנִי׳ מִי שֶׁאָמַר בִּשְׁעַת מִיתָתוֹ ״יֵשׁ לִי בָּנִים״ – נֶאֱמָן. ״יֵשׁ לִי אַחִים״ – אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן.
MISHNA: With regard to one who said at the time of his death: I have children, in which case his wife does not require levirate marriage after his death, he is deemed credible. But if he said on his deathbed: I have brothers, indicating that it is prohibited for her to marry anyone else until one of his brothers performs ḥalitza with her after his death, he is not deemed credible.
גְּמָ׳ אַלְמָא נֶאֱמָן לְהַתִּיר וְאֵין נֶאֱמָן לֶאֱסוֹר. נֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי נָתָן,
GEMARA: Apparently, one can infer from the mishna that a husband is deemed credible to render his wife permitted but he is not deemed credible to render her forbidden. The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan?
דְּתַנְיָא: בִּשְׁעַת קִידּוּשִׁין אָמַר יֵשׁ לוֹ בָּנִים, בִּשְׁעַת מִיתָה אָמַר אֵין לוֹ בָּנִים, בִּשְׁעַת קִידּוּשִׁין אָמַר אֵין לוֹ אַחִים, בִּשְׁעַת מִיתָה אָמַר יֵשׁ לוֹ אַחִים – נֶאֱמָן לְהַתִּיר וְאֵין נֶאֱמָן לֶאֱסוֹר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי. רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: אַף נֶאֱמָן לֶאֱסוֹר.
As it is taught in a baraita: If someone said at the time of his betrothal that he has children, but at the time of his death he said that he does not have children; or if he said at the time of betrothal that he does not have brothers, and at the time of death he said he has brothers, in both cases he is deemed credible to render her permitted, i.e., to release her from the obligation of levirate marriage on the basis of his first statement, but he is not deemed credible to render her forbidden based on his last claim. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Natan says: He is deemed credible even to render her forbidden.
אָמַר רָבָא: שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, כֵּיוָן דְּבִשְׁעַת מִיתָה קָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ, אֵימָא קוּשְׁטָא קָאָמַר. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וְלָאו כָּל דְּכֵן הוּא? הַשְׁתָּא, וּמָה הָתָם דְּקָא מַרַע לֵיהּ לְדִבּוּרֵיהּ, אָמְרַתְּ קוּשְׁטָא קָאָמַר, מַתְנִיתִין, דְּלָא קָא מַרַע לֵיהּ לְדִבּוּרֵיהּ, לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
Rava says: There, in the baraita, it is different, since at the time of his death he retracted his initial statement. Therefore, one can say that it is likely that he spoke the truth. In general, however, he is not deemed credible to render her forbidden. Abaye said to him: And isn’t it all the more so that he should be deemed credible in this case? Abaye elaborates: Now consider, if there, where he weakens his previous statement, as he now says the opposite of his earlier claim, nevertheless you say that he spoke the truth, in the case of the mishna, where he does not weaken his earlier statement, as he had issued no prior claim about having or lacking children or brothers, is it not all the more so that he should be deemed credible?
אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא מוּחְזָק לַן בְּאַחֵי וְלָא מוּחְזָק לַן בִּבְנֵי, דְּאָמְרִינַן: כֵּיוָן דְּלָא מוּחְזָק לַן בִּבְנֵי וְלָא בְּאַחֵי אָמַר: ״יֵשׁ לִי בָּנִים״ – נֶאֱמָן, ״יֵשׁ לִי אַחִים״ – אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן. לָאו כֹּל כְּמִינֵּיהּ דְּאָסַר לַהּ אַכּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא. בָּרַיְיתָא
Rather, Abaye said: The mishna is referring to a case where we do not have a presumptive status with regard to possible brothers of his, and likewise we do not have a presumptive status with regard to his children. The court has no prior knowledge as to whether the dying man has brothers or children. As we say: Since we do not have presumptive status with regard to either children or brothers, if he said: I have children, he is deemed credible, whereas if he said: I have brothers, he is not deemed credible. Why? It is not in his power to render her forbidden to everyone, counter to the presumption that he has no brothers. By contrast, the baraita is referring to
דְּמוּחְזָק לַן בְּאַחֵי וְלָא מוּחְזָק לַן בִּבְנֵי, דְּאָמְרִינַן: ״מָה לִי לְשַׁקֵּר״: מַאי קָאָמַר, לְמִיפְטְרַהּ מִיָּבָם? מָצֵי אֲמַר: פָּטַרְנָא לִךְ בְּגִיטָּא.
a case where we have a presumptive status that he has brothers, but we do not have a presumptive status that he has children, although no full-fledged testimony has been submitted for either claim. As in that case we say and apply the logic of: Why would I lie? In other words, if he were lying he would have stated a more credible claim or performed an action achieving the desired result. The Gemara explains: For what reason is he saying that he has children or that he has no brothers, if not to exempt her from a yavam? But if so, he can say to her instead: I exempt you by means of a bill of divorce. Consequently, it can be assumed that he is telling the truth when he says that he has children.
רַבִּי סָבַר: ״מָה לִי לְשַׁקֵּר״ כִּי עֵדִים דָּמֵי, וְאָתוּ עֵדִים עָקְרִי חֲזָקָה. וְרַבִּי נָתָן סָבַר: ״מָה לִי לְשַׁקֵּר״ כִּי חֲזָקָה דָּמֵי, לָא אַתְיָא חֲזָקָה וְעָקְרָה חֲזָקָה לִגְמָרֵי.
In light of the above explanation, the Gemara clarifies the dispute in the baraita. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that the claim of: Why would I lie, is considered like the testimony of witnesses, and witnesses can come and uproot a presumption. Therefore, he does not have the power to contradict his previous claim and say that he has no children and render her forbidden at the time of his death. And Rabbi Natan maintains that: Why would I lie, is considered like a presumption, and a presumption cannot come and uproot another presumption entirely. As a result, he is deemed credible even for the purpose of rendering her forbidden, i.e., if he says at the time of his death that he has no children, the earlier presumption that he had brothers, but no children, is reinstated.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת בִּתּוֹ סְתָם – אֵין הַבּוֹגְרוֹת בַּכְּלָל. מִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ שְׁתֵּי כִּיתֵּי בָנוֹת מִשְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים, וְאָמַר: ״קִדַּשְׁתִּי אֶת בִּתִּי הַגְּדוֹלָה, וְאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ אִם גְּדוֹלָה שֶׁבַּגְּדוֹלוֹת, אוֹ גְּדוֹלָה שֶׁבַּקְּטַנּוֹת, אוֹ קְטַנָּה שֶׁבַּגְּדוֹלוֹת שֶׁהִיא גְּדוֹלָה מִן הַגְּדוֹלוֹת שֶׁבַּקְּטַנּוֹת״ – כּוּלָּן אֲסוּרוֹת חוּץ מִן הַקְּטַנָּה שֶׁבַּקְּטַנּוֹת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: כּוּלָּן מוּתָּרוֹת, חוּץ מִן הַגְּדוֹלָה שֶׁבַּגְּדוֹלוֹת.
MISHNA: In the case of one who betroths his daughter to a man without specification, i.e., without specifying which daughter he meant, the grown women are not included among those who might be betrothed, since he does not have the right to betroth them. With regard to one who has two groups of daughters from two women, i.e., one group of daughters from each wife, and he said: I betrothed my elder daughter to someone but I do not know if I meant the eldest of the older group of daughters, or the eldest of the younger group of daughters, or the youngest of the older group, who is nevertheless older than the eldest of the younger group, all the daughters are forbidden, except for the youngest of the younger group. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: Despite the uncertainty, they are all permitted except for the eldest of the older group, as one who says elder without further specification means the oldest of them all.
״קִדַּשְׁתִּי אֶת בִּתִּי הַקְּטַנָּה, וְאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ אִם קְטַנָּה שֶׁבַּקְּטַנּוֹת, אוֹ קְטַנָּה שֶׁבַּגְּדוֹלוֹת, אוֹ גְּדוֹלָה שֶׁבַּקְּטַנּוֹת שֶׁהִיא קְטַנָּה מִן הַקְּטַנּוֹת שֶׁבַּגְּדוֹלוֹת״ – כּוּלָּן אֲסוּרוֹת חוּץ מִן הַגְּדוֹלָה שֶׁבַּגְּדוֹלוֹת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: כּוּלָּן מוּתָּרוֹת, חוּץ מִן הַקְּטַנָּה שֶׁבַּקְּטַנּוֹת.
Similarly, if one said: I betrothed my younger daughter, but I do not know if I meant the youngest of the younger group, or the youngest of the older group, or the eldest of the younger group who is younger than the youngest of the older group, they are all forbidden, except for the eldest of the older group. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: They are all permitted except for the youngest of the younger group.
גְּמָ׳ הָא קְטַנּוֹת בַּכְּלָל,
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From the ruling of the mishna, that one who betroths his daughter without further specification certainly did not betroth an adult daughter, it may be inferred that all minor girls are included in the uncertainty if he had more than one.
שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ: קִידּוּשִׁין שֶׁאֵין מְסוּרִים לְבִיאָה, הָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין! הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, כְּשֶׁאֵין שָׁם אֶלָּא גְּדוֹלָה וּקְטַנָּה.
One can learn from the mishna that betrothal that is not given to consummation, i.e., where the husband may not consummate the marriage, in this case because each of the women might not be his wife but his wife’s sister, is nevertheless considered betrothal to the extent that each of the women requires a bill of divorce to render her permitted to marry someone else. This contradicts the opinion of Rava that betrothal that is not given to consummation does not take effect at all. The Gemara rejects this: Here we are dealing with a case in which there are only two daughters, an adult woman and a minor girl.
וְהָא ״בּוֹגְרוֹת״ קָתָנֵי! מַאי בּוֹגְרוֹת – בּוֹגְרוֹת דְּעָלְמָא.
The Gemara questions this explanation: But the mishna teaches: Grown women, in the plural. The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of grown women? The mishna is not referring to a father who has more than one adult daughter. Rather, it means grown women in general. In other words, whenever men betroth one of their daughters, their daughters who are grown women are not under consideration.
פְּשִׁיטָא, בּוֹגְרוֹת מַאי עֲבִידְתַּיְיהוּ? הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, דְּשַׁוִּיתֵיהּ שָׁלִיחַ, מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: כִּי מְקַבֵּל קִידּוּשֵׁי אַדַּעְתָּא דִידַהּ קָא מְקַבֵּל, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: לָא שָׁבֵיק אִינִישׁ מִידֵּי דְּאִית לֵיהּ הֲנָאָה מִינֵּיהּ, וְעָבֵיד מִידֵּי דְּלֵית לֵיהּ הֲנָאָה מִינֵּיהּ.
The Gemara asks a different question: This halakha is obvious, as what are grown women doing in this context, i.e., how could it be suggested that a father could betroth to a man his daughter who is a grown woman? His authority extends only to his minor daughters. The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where the adult daughter appointed her father as her agent to accept her betrothal, and he proceeds to betroth one of his daughters without specifying which one. Lest you say with regard to this situation that when he accepts the betrothal he accepts it with his adult daughter in mind, as he is her agent, the mishna teaches us that a person does not put aside a matter from which he derives benefit, i.e., the betrothal of his minor daughter, where he keeps the money, and perform a matter from which he does not derive benefit, i.e., the betrothal of his adult daughter, where she keeps the money.
מִי לָא עָסְקִינַן דְּאָמְרָה לֵיהּ: ״קִדּוּשַׁיי לָךְ״? אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, לָא שָׁבֵיק אִינִישׁ מִצְוָה דְּרַמְיָא עֲלֵיהּ וְעָבֵיד מִצְוָה דְּלָא רַמְיָא עֲלֵיהּ.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Are we not dealing even with a case where the daughter says to him: As reward for fulfilling your agency, my betrothal money shall belong to you? This would mean that the father derives benefit from the betrothal of his adult daughter as well. The Gemara counters: Even so, a person does not put aside a mitzva that is imposed upon him, i.e., the betrothal of his minor daughter, to perform a mitzva that is not directly imposed upon him, the betrothal of his adult daughter. Since she is of age, her betrothal is her own responsibility.
מִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ שְׁתֵּי כִּיתֵּי בָנוֹת. וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן קַמַּיְיתָא, בְּהָךְ קָאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר דְּכֵיוָן דְּאִיכָּא זוּטְרָא מִינַּהּ לְהָךְ גְּדוֹלָה קָרֵי לַהּ,
§ The mishna taught: With regard to one who has two groups of daughters and betrothed the elder of them, but was unsure which one he meant, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei dispute which of them is betrothed. The mishna adds that the same dispute applies if he betrothed his younger daughter. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state this halakha in both cases, as had the mishna taught us only that the tanna’im disagree with regard to the first case, one might have claimed that in this case Rabbi Meir says that they are all prohibited except for the youngest daughter of the younger group. The reason is that since there is one younger than her, he calls any daughter who is not the youngest: Elder.
אֲבָל בְּהָא, אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי דִּ״קְטַנָּה״ – לְהָךְ קְטַנָּה דְּכוּלְּהוּ קָרֵי לַהּ. וְאִי אִיתְּמַר בְּהָא, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי, אֲבָל בְּהָךְ, אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, צְרִיכָא.
But in this case of one who betroths his younger daughter, say that he concedes to Rabbi Yosei that a father calls only that one who is the youngest of all: Younger, as a father prefers to call his daughters: Elder, whenever possible. And conversely, if the halakha was stated only with regard to this case, that of a younger daughter, one might have said that Rabbi Yosei says his opinion only in this case, for the above reason. But in that case of an elder daughter, you might say that he concedes to Rabbi Meir. Consequently, it is necessary for the mishna to specify both cases.
לְמֵימְרָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: מַחֵית אִינִישׁ נַפְשֵׁיהּ לִסְפֵיקָא, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי סָבַר: לָא מַחֵית אִינִישׁ לִסְפֵיקָא. וְהָאִיפְכָּא שָׁמְעִינַן לְהוּ, דִּתְנַן: הַנּוֹדֵר ״עַד הַפֶּסַח״ – אָסוּר עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ, ״עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא פֶּסַח״ – אָסוּר עַד שֶׁיֵּצֵא,
The Gemara asks a question with regard to these opinions: Is this to say that Rabbi Meir maintains: A person places himself in a situation of uncertainty, i.e., people issue statements and accept upon themselves obligations that are not clearly defined, and Rabbi Yosei maintains that a person does not place himself in a situation of uncertainty, as one has only well-defined situations in mind? But haven’t we learned that these two tanna’im state the opposite opinions, as we learned in a mishna (Nedarim 60a): If one takes a vow that wine is forbidden to him until Passover, it is forbidden to him until Passover arrives. If he said: Until it will be Passover, it is forbidden to him until Passover ends.
״עַד פְּנֵי פֶסַח״ – רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אָסוּר עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיֵּצֵא.
The mishna continues: If he said: Until before Passover, Rabbi Meir says: It is forbidden to him until Passover arrives. Rabbi Yosei says: It is forbidden to him until it ends. This indicates that Rabbi Meir holds that one does not put himself into a situation of uncertainty, as despite his mention of the presence of Passover, which might be referring to any of the days of the Festival, he does not mean one of the days of Passover itself but until the arrival of the Festival, whereas Rabbi Yosei claims that his words apply to each of the days of Passover, due to uncertainty. This is the opposite of the above interpretation of the mishna concerning a man who betroths his daughter.
אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בַּר אַבְדִּימִי אָמַר רַב: מוּחְלֶפֶת הַשִּׁיטָה. וְהָתַנְיָא: זֶה הַכְּלָל: כֹּל שֶׁזְּמַנּוֹ קָבוּעַ, וְאָמַר: ״עַד פְּנֵי״ – רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיָּצָא, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ.
Rabbi Ḥanina bar Avdimi says that Rav says: The attribution of the opinions is reversed, i.e., the rulings of the respective tanna’im in that mishna in Nedarim must be switched so that they accord with the mishna here. And it is taught likewise in a baraita that this is the principle: With regard to any vow that has a fixed time, i.e., it applies until a set date, and one said: Until before that date, Rabbi Meir says that the vow lasts until that date ends; Rabbi Yosei says: Until it arrives. The opinions in this baraita are in accordance with the suggested emendation.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מַחֲלוֹקֶת בִּשְׁתֵּי כִּיתֵּי בָנוֹת, אֲבָל בְּכַת אַחַת – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל גְּדוֹלָה מַמָּשׁ, קְטַנָּה מַמָּשׁ, אֶמְצָעִית בִּשְׁמָהּ קָרֵי לַהּ.
Abaye said: This dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei applies to two groups of girls, as Rabbi Meir maintains that all of them can be called: Elder, except for the youngest of the younger group. But with regard to one group, i.e., if all the daughters share the same mother, everyone agrees that when the father says: Elder, he means the actual eldest one, and when he says: Younger, he means the actual youngest daughter. As for the middle daughter, she is called neither elder nor younger; rather, he calls her by her name.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַדָּא בַּר מַתְנָה לְאַבָּיֵי: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה,
Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Abaye: If that is so,
