Kiddushin 7
וְאֶקַּדֵּשׁ לָךְ״ – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, מִדִּין עָרֵב. עָרֵב, לָאו אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא מָטֵי הֲנָאָה לִידֵיהּ – קָא מְשַׁעְבֵּיד נַפְשֵׁיהּ, הַאי אִיתְּתָא נָמֵי, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא מָטֵי הֲנָאָה לִידַהּ – קָא מְשַׁעְבְּדָא וּמַקְנְיָא נַפְשַׁהּ.
and I will be betrothed to you by means of these one hundred dinars that you give to that individual, she is betrothed, as derived from the halakha of a guarantor. How so? With regard to a guarantor, is it not the case that he commits himself to repaying the debt even though he receives no benefit, as the money from the loan is given to the debtor? And with regard to this woman too, even though she receives no benefit, as the one hundred dinars are given to someone else, nevertheless she commits and transfers herself to the man who gives the money.
״הֵילָךְ מָנֶה וְהִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִפְלוֹנִי״ – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, מִדִּין עֶבֶד כְּנַעֲנִי. עֶבֶד כְּנַעֲנִי, לָאו אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא קָא חָסֵר וְלָא מִידֵּי – קָא קָנֵי נַפְשֵׁיהּ, הַאי גַּבְרָא נָמֵי, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא קָא חָסֵר וְלָא מִידֵּי – קָא קָנֵי לַהּ לְהַאי אִיתְּתָא.
The Gemara discusses a similar case: If a man gives one hundred dinars to a woman and says to her: Here are one hundred dinars for you, and with this money you become betrothed to so-and-so, she is betrothed, as derived from the halakha of emancipating a Canaanite slave. With regard to a Canaanite slave, is it not the case that he acquires himself and is freed when someone gives his master money to emancipate the slave, even though he loses nothing of his own? With regard to this man too, i.e., the third party, even though he loses nothing of his own, he acquires this woman by means of the other man’s payment.
״תֵּן מָנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי וְאֶקַּדֵּשׁ אֲנִי לוֹ״ – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, מִדִּין שְׁנֵיהֶם. עָרֵב, לָאו אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא קָא מָטֵי הֲנָאָה לִידֵיהּ – קָא מְשַׁעְבֵּד נַפְשֵׁיהּ, הַאי אִיתְּתָא נָמֵי, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא קָא מָטֵי הֲנָאָה לִידַהּ – קָא מַקְנְיָא נַפְשַׁהּ.
The Gemara discusses a similar case: A woman says to a man: Give one hundred dinars to so-and-so and I will be betrothed to him. If he gives the money, she is betrothed, as is derived from a combination of the halakha of both of these cases, that of a guarantor and a Canaanite slave. How so? With regard to a guarantor, is it not the case that he commits himself to repaying the debt even though he receives no benefit? With regard to this woman too, even though she receives no benefit, nevertheless she commits and transfers herself.
מִי דָּמֵי? עָרֵב, הַאי דְּקָא קָנֵי לֵיהּ קָא חָסַר מָמוֹנָא, הַאי גַּבְרָא קָא קָנֵי לַהּ לְהַאי אִיתְּתָא וְלָא קָא חָסַר וְלָא מִידֵּי! עֶבֶד כְּנַעֲנִי יוֹכִיחַ, דְּלָא קָא חָסַר מָמוֹנָא וְקָא קָנֵי נַפְשֵׁיהּ.
This consideration alone is insufficient, as one could still ask: Are these cases comparable? In the case of a guarantor, the one who acquires the item in question, which in this case is the commitment of the guarantor, is the one who loses money when he gives the loan. By contrast, in the situation at hand, this man, the third party, acquires the woman and loses nothing of his own. Therefore, the Gemara comments: The emancipating of a Canaanite slave can prove it, as he does not lose his own money and nevertheless he acquires himself.
מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם הָךְ דְּקָא מַקְנֵי קָא קָנֵי, הָכָא הַאי אִיתְּתָא קָא מַקְנְיָא נַפְשַׁהּ וְלָא קָא קָנְיָא וְלָא מִידֵּי! עָרֵב יוֹכִיחַ, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא קָא מָטֵי הֲנָאָה לִידֵיהּ מְשַׁעְבֵּד נַפְשֵׁיהּ.
This consideration alone is insufficient, as one could still ask: Are these cases comparable? There, with regard to a slave, the one who transfers ownership is the one who acquires it, as the master transfers ownership of the slave to the slave, and he himself acquires the money from the donor. Here, this woman transfers herself and she does not acquire anything. Rather, in this regard the case of a guarantor can prove it, as even though he receives no benefit from the creditor, nevertheless, he commits himself, just like the woman in this case. In this manner one can derive that the woman is betrothed in this case from a combination of those two halakhot.
בָּעֵי רָבָא: ״הֵילָךְ מָנֶה וְאֶקַּדֵּשׁ אֲנִי לָךְ״ מַהוּ? אָמַר מָר זוּטְרָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְמָר זוּטְרָא: אִם כֵּן, הָוֵה לֵיהּ נְכָסִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶם אַחְרָיוּת נִקְנִין עִם נְכָסִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם אַחְרָיוּת,
Rava raises a dilemma: If a woman said to a man: Here are one hundred dinars and I will be betrothed to you, what is the halakha? Mar Zutra said in the name of Rav Pappa: She is betrothed. Rav Ashi said to Mar Zutra: If so, this is an example of a case in which property that serves as a guarantee is acquired with property that is not guaranteed. Land is property that serves as a guarantee, and, as derived by way of a verbal analogy, the same applies to people. Money is property that does not serve as a guarantee. Through his acquisition of the money, this man acquires the woman as well.
וַאֲנַן אִיפְּכָא תְּנַן: נְכָסִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם אַחְרָיוּת נִקְנִין עִם נְכָסִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶם אַחְרָיוּת בְּכֶסֶף בִּשְׁטָר וּבַחֲזָקָה! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִי סָבְרַתְּ דְּאָמְרָה לֵיהּ ״אַגַּב״? הָכָא בְּאָדָם חָשׁוּב עָסְקִינַן, דִּבְהָהִיא הֲנָאָה דְּקָא מְקַבֵּל מַתָּנָה מִינַּהּ גָּמְרָה וּמַקְנְיָא לֵיהּ נַפְשַׁהּ.
Rav Ashi asks: But we learned the opposite in a mishna (26a): Property that does not serve as a guarantee can be acquired with property that serves as a guarantee through giving money, through giving a document, or through taking possession of them. By contrast, property that serves as a guarantee cannot be acquired by means of acquiring property that does not serve as a guarantee. Mar Zutra said to Rav Ashi: Do you maintain that she wants her acquisition to be performed by means of money, i.e., he will acquire her as well through monetary acquisition? Not so, as here we are dealing with an important man, as, due to the benefit she receives from the fact that he consents to accept a gift from her, she agrees to transfer herself to him.
אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: וְכֵן לְעִנְיַן מָמוֹנָא. וּצְרִיכָא,
The Gemara reverts back to the earlier discussion with regard to the derivation from the cases of a guarantor and a Canaanite slave. It was also stated in the name of Rava: And similarly, with regard to monetary matters, one can conduct a valid acquisition in the modes derived from the cases of a guarantor and a Canaanite slave. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state this halakha with regard to both betrothal and monetary acquisitions.
דְּאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן קִידּוּשִׁין, מִשּׁוּם דְּהָא אִיתְּתָא נִיחָא לַהּ בְּכׇל דְּהוּ כִּדְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: ״טָב לְמֵיתַב טַן דּוּ מִלְּמֵיתַב אַרְמְלוּ.״ אֲבָל מָמוֹנָא – אֵימָא לָא.
The Gemara elaborates: As, had he taught us only the case of betrothal, one would have said that this halakha applies specifically in that case, because a woman is amenable to be betrothed with any form of benefit, in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish. As Reish Lakish said: There is a popular saying among women: It is better to sit as two bodies, i.e., be married, than to sit alone like a widow. A woman prefers any type of husband to being left alone. Consequently, she would be willing to commit herself to betrothal by any form of benefit. But with regard to monetary matters, one might say that these types of unusual acquisitions are not effective.
וְאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן מָמוֹנָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיתְיְהִיב לִמְחִילָּה, אֲבָל קִידּוּשִׁין, אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא.
And conversely, if he had taught us only that this is the halakha with regard to monetary matters, one might have said that it applies solely to a case of this kind, because a monetary claim can be waived. One can relinquish his claim to money that is in someone else’s possession without receiving anything in return. But with regard to betrothal, which does not entirely depend on the will and agreement of the woman, as she must actually receive her betrothal money, one might say that the halakhot of a guarantor and a Canaanite slave are not comparable to this case. Therefore, it is necessary to state that this is the halakha in both cases.
אָמַר רָבָא: ״הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי לְחֶצְיִי״ – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. ״חֶצְיֵיךְ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי״ – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרָבָא: מַאי שְׁנָא ״חֶצְיֵיךְ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי״ דְּאֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת – ״אִשָּׁה״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא וְלֹא חֲצִי אִשָּׁה, הָכִי נָמֵי – ״אִישׁ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא וְלֹא חֲצִי אִישׁ!
§ Rava says that if a man says to a woman: Be betrothed to half of me, she is betrothed. But if he said to her: Half of you is betrothed to me, she is not betrothed. Abaye said to Rava: What is different between the two cases that if he says: Half of you is betrothed to me, she is not betrothed? Is it because the Merciful One states: “When a man takes a woman, and marries her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), indicating he must take “a woman,” and not half a woman? So too, the Merciful One states: “A man,” and not half a man.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם, אִיתְּתָא לְבֵי תְרֵי לָא חַזְיָא, אֶלָּא גַּבְרָא מִי לָא חֲזֵי לְבֵי תְרֵי? וְהָכִי קָאָמַר לַהּ – דְּאִי בָּעֵינָא לְמִינְסַב אַחֲרִיתִי – נָסֵיבְנָא.
Rava said to Abaye: How can these cases be compared? There, a woman is not eligible for two men. If one attempts to betroth half a woman it means he wants to leave her other half for someone else. This is impossible, as a woman cannot be married to two men. But isn’t a man eligible to marry two women? And when he declares: Be betrothed to half of me, this is what he is saying to her: If I wish to marry another woman, I will marry another woman.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב מָרִי לְרָבִינָא: וְנִיפְשְׁטוּ לַהּ קִידּוּשֵׁי בְּכוּלַּהּ! מִי לָא תַּנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר: ״רַגְלָהּ שֶׁל זוֹ עוֹלָה״ – תְּהֵא כּוּלָּהּ עוֹלָה?
Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: But in a case where he says to her: Half of you is betrothed to me, let the betrothal spread through all of her, and she will be completely betrothed. Isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Temura 1:5) that if one says about an animal: The leg of this animal is a burnt-offering, all of it is a burnt-offering, as the sanctity of the leg spreads throughout the animal’s entire body?
וַאֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵין כּוּלָּהּ עוֹלָה, הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּמַקְדִּישׁ דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין הַנְּשָׁמָה תְּלוּיָה בּוֹ, אֲבָל מַקְדִּישׁ דָּבָר שֶׁהַנְּשָׁמָה תְּלוּיָה בּוֹ – הָוְיָא כּוּלָּהּ עוֹלָה.
Mar Zutra adds: And even according to the one who says that it is not entirely a burnt-offering, that statement applies only where he consecrated the leg of the animal, which is not a matter upon which the animal’s life depends. It is possible for an animal to survive the removal of a leg. But if one consecrates a matter upon which the animal’s life depends, everyone agrees that all of it is a burnt-offering. Here too, as the woman cannot survive without half of her body, why doesn’t the betrothal spread throughout all of her?
מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם – בְּהֵמָה, הָכָא – דַּעַת אַחֶרֶת.
The Gemara rejects this opinion: Is it comparable? There, in the case of the animal, it involves a creature without intellectual capacity. Here, the issue depends on another mind, that of the woman herself. The woman must indicate that she wants the betrothal to be effective.
הָא לָא דָּמְיָא אֶלָּא לְהָא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּהֵמָה שֶׁל שְׁנֵי שׁוּתָּפִין, הִקְדִּישׁ חֶצְיָהּ וְחָזַר וּלְקָחָהּ וְהִקְדִּישָׁהּ – קְדוֹשָׁה, וְאֵינָהּ קְרֵיבָה,
This case is comparable only to that halakha which Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to an animal that belongs to two partners, if one of them consecrated the half of it that belonged to him, and he goes back and acquires the other half from his partner and consecrates the other half, it is consecrated, despite the fact that it was consecrated on two separate occasions. But although it is consecrated, it may not be sacrificed, because when he first sanctified it the animal was not fit to be sacrificed. The consecration does not spread throughout the entire animal without the consent of the other partner. This flaw cannot be remedied and the animal is permanently disqualified from being sacrificed as an offering.
וְעוֹשָׂה תְּמוּרָה, וּתְמוּרָתָהּ כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהּ.
But, as it is consecrated now, this is enough to render a non-sacred animal that is exchanged with it a substitute. If one exchanges this animal with another, non-consecrated, animal, the second animal becomes consecrated as well. And yet its substitution is like it, i.e., it too is consecrated but may not be sacrificed either.
שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תְּלָת:
The Gemara comments: One can learn from the statement three halakhot.
שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים נִדְחִים,
Conclude from it that living things can be permanently deferred. Not only an offering that has already been slaughtered, but also a living animal that has been separated as an offering for which it is disqualified, is permanently deferred from being sacrificed on the altar. Likewise here, when he consecrated only half of it, the animal cannot be offered and is rejected. This ruling is in opposition to the claim that only slaughtered animals are permanently rejected.
וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ דָּחוּי מֵעִיקָּרָא הָוֵי דָּחוּי, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ יֵשׁ דִּחוּי בְּדָמִים.
And furthermore, learn from it that deferral at the outset, i.e., a condition disqualifying the animal from being sacrificed that was present when the animal was first consecrated, is considered a permanent deferral. One does not say that the halakha of deferral applies only to an animal that was eligible to be sacrificed at the time it was consecrated and later was deferred. And learn from it that there is deferral not only with regard to an offering itself, but also with regard to monetary value, i.e., deferral applies even to an animal whose value was consecrated. In this case, half of an animal is not consecrated to be sacrificed as an offering, and yet it can still be permanently deferred from the altar.
בָּעֵי רָבָא: ״חֶצְיֵיךְ בַּחֲצִי פְרוּטָה, וְחֶצְיֵיךְ בַּחֲצִי פְרוּטָה״ מַהוּ? כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר לַהּ ״חֲצִי פְרוּטָה״ – פַּסְקַהּ, אוֹ דִילְמָא מוֹנֶה וְהוֹלֵךְ הוּא?
§ Rava raises a dilemma: If a man says to a woman: Half of you is betrothed with half of one peruta, and half of you with half of one peruta, what is the halakha? Does one say that since he said to her: Half of one peruta, he has divided his statement? In other words, by specifying half of one peruta he intended the betrothal to be performed in two stages, with one half-peruta for each stage, and half of one peruta does not effect betrothal. Or perhaps he was counting toward the full sum of the betrothal money, and intends for the betrothal to take effect at one time.
אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר מוֹנֶה וְהוֹלֵךְ הוּא, ״חֶצְיֵיךְ בִּפְרוּטָה וְחֶצְיֵיךְ בִּפְרוּטָה״ מַהוּ? כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר לַהּ בִּפְרוּטָה וּפְרוּטָה – פַּסְקַהּ לְמִילְּתֵיהּ, אוֹ דִילְמָא כֹּל בְּיוֹמֵיהּ מוֹנֶה וְהוֹלֵךְ הוּא?
And if you say that in that case it is considered as though he were counting, then if he said to her: Half of you is betrothed with one peruta and half of you with one peruta, what is the halakha? Does one say that since he said to her: With one peruta and one peruta, he divided his statement and intended to betroth her two halves separately, and one cannot betroth half a woman? Or perhaps anything that he does on that day is considered as if he were counting, i.e., since he intended to complete the action that day it is as though she were betrothed with two perutot.
אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר כֹּל בְּיוֹמֵיהּ מוֹנֶה וְהוֹלֵךְ הוּא, ״חֶצְיֵיךְ בִּפְרוּטָה הַיּוֹם וְחֶצְיֵיךְ בִּפְרוּטָה לְמָחָר״ מַהוּ? כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר לַהּ לְמָחָר – פַּסְקַהּ, אוֹ דִילְמָא הָכִי קָאָמַר לַהּ: ״קִדּוּשִׁין מַתְחֲלוּ מֵהָאִידָּנָא וּמִגְמָר לָא נִיגְמְרוּ עַד לִמְחַר״?
And if you say that everything he does on that day is considered as if he were counting, then if he said to her: Half of you is betrothed with one peruta today, and half of you is betrothed with one peruta tomorrow, what is the halakha? Does one say that since he said to her: Tomorrow, he has divided his statement, which prevents the days from being combined, or perhaps this is what he is saying to her: The betrothal begins from now, and it will not be completed until tomorrow.
״שְׁנֵי חֲצָיַיִךְ בִּפְרוּטָה״ מַהוּ? הָכָא וַדַּאי בְּחַד זִימְנָא קָאָמַר לַהּ, אוֹ דִילְמָא אֵין אִשָּׁה מִתְקַדֶּשֶׁת לַחֲצָאִין כְּלָל? תֵּיקוּ.
Rava further inquires: If he said to her: Your two halves are betrothed with one peruta, what is the halakha? Here, he certainly spoke to her at one time, i.e., he did not divide his statement into two, and therefore it should be a valid betrothal, or perhaps a woman may not be betrothed in halves at all. No resolution was found for any of these questions, and therefore the Gemara says that the dilemmas shall stand unresolved.
בָּעֵי רָבָא: ״שְׁתֵּי בְנוֹתֶיךָ לִשְׁנֵי בָנַי בִּפְרוּטָה״ מַהוּ? בָּתַר נוֹתֵן וּמְקַבֵּל אָזְלִינַן וְהָאִיכָּא מָמוֹנָא, אוֹ דִילְמָא בָּתַר דִּידְהוּ אָזְלִינַן וְהָא לֵיכָּא? תֵּיקוּ.
Rava raises another dilemma. If one man said to another: Let your two daughters be betrothed to my two sons with one peruta, what is the halakha? The Gemara explains the two sides of the dilemma: Do we follow the giver and recipient, and as the giver bestows one peruta and the recipient receives one peruta there is money here, since one peruta is considered money and therefore the betrothal is valid. Or perhaps we follow them, i.e., those affected by the issue, in this case the sons and the daughters, and there is not one peruta for each of these individuals, and therefore the betrothal is not valid? This problem is also left unanswered, and therefore the Gemara says that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
בָּעֵי רַב פָּפָּא: ״בִּתְּךָ וּפָרָתְךָ בִּפְרוּטָה״ מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן בִּתְּךָ בַּחֲצִי פְרוּטָה וּפָרָתְךָ בַּחֲצִי פְרוּטָה, אוֹ דִילְמָא בִּתְּךָ בִּפְרוּטָה וּפָרָתְךָ בִּמְשִׁיכָה? תֵּיקוּ.
Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: If one man said to another: I hereby acquire your daughter and your cow with one peruta, what is the halakha? Do we say that he meant: Your daughter should be betrothed with half of one peruta and your cow purchased with half of one peruta? In that case neither the betrothal nor the acquisition take effect. Or perhaps he meant: Your daughter should be betrothed with one peruta and your cow should be acquired by pulling? No satisfactory answer was found in this case either, and the Gemara says that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
בָּעֵי רַב אָשֵׁי: ״בִּתְּךָ וְקַרְקָעֲךָ בִּפְרוּטָה״ מַהוּ? בִּתְּךָ בַּחֲצִי פְרוּטָה וְקַרְקָעֲךָ בַּחֲצִי פְרוּטָה, אוֹ דִילְמָא בִּתְּךָ בִּפְרוּטָה וְקַרְקָעֲךָ בַּחֲזָקָה? תֵּיקוּ.
Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: If he said: I hereby acquire your daughter and your land with one peruta, what is the halakha? Does this mean: Your daughter should be betrothed with half of one peruta and your land should be acquired with half of one peruta? Or perhaps it means: Your daughter should be betrothed with one peruta and your land should be acquired through the act of taking possession? This question is also left unanswered, and the Gemara again says that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּאקַדֵּישׁ בְּשִׁירָאֵי, רַבָּה אָמַר: לָא צְרִיכִי שׁוּמָא. רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: צְרִיכִי שׁוּמָא. אִי דְּאָמַר לַהּ בְּכֹל דְּהוּ, כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּלָא צְרִיכִי שׁוּמָא.
§ The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who betrothed a woman with silk [beshira’ei] garments. Rabba said: An appraisal of the value of the garments is not necessary, as they are certainly worth more than one peruta. Rav Yosef said: An appraisal of the value of the garments is necessary, and as the man did not determine the value of the silk garments before the betrothal, the betrothal is invalid. The Gemara comments: If he said to her that she should become betrothed to him by any amount, regardless of the value of the silk garments, everyone agrees that the garments do not require appraisal, as they are undoubtedly worth more than one peruta.
אִי דְּאָמַר לַהּ ״חַמְשִׁין״ וְלָא שָׁווּ חַמְשִׁין – הָא לָא שָׁווּ. כִּי פְּלִיגִי, דְּאָמַר ״חַמְשִׁין״ וְשָׁווּ חַמְשִׁין. רַבָּה אָמַר: לָא צְרִיכִי שׁוּמָא, דְּהָא שָׁווּ חַמְשִׁין. רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: צְרִיכִי שׁוּמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּאִיתְּתָא לָא בְּקִיאָה בְּשׁוּמָא לָא סָמְכָה דַּעְתַּהּ.
Conversely, if he said to her that they are worth fifty dinars, and they are not worth fifty dinars, then everyone agrees that the betrothal is not valid, as they are not worth the amount he specified. They disagree when he said that they are worth fifty dinars, and in actuality they are worth fifty dinars. Rabba said: An appraisal of the value of the garments is not necessary before the betrothal, as they are worth fifty dinars. Rav Yosef said: An appraisal of the value of the garments is necessary, because the woman herself is not an expert in appraisal and she does not rely on his assessment. Since she is unsure if the garments are actually worth fifty dinars as he claimed, she does not agree to be betrothed.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי בְּכֹל דְּהוּ נָמֵי פְּלִיגִי. רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: שָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף הֲרֵי הוּא כְּכֶסֶף, מָה כֶּסֶף דְּקִיץ –
There are those who say that even in a case where he says to her: Be betrothed to me with these silk garments, whatever they are worth, the amora’im disagree with regard to the halakha. The reason for the dispute in this case is as follows. Rav Yosef said: An item worth money is like money in every way. Just as money is set, i.e., it has a clearly defined value,
