Kiddushin 80
לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בְּקׇדְשֵׁי הַגְּבוּל, אֲבָל בְּיוּחֲסִין – לֹא. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ בְּיוּחֲסִין.
The Sages taught that the children’s attachment to her proves that she is their mother only with regard to the consecrated items of the border, i.e., teruma, meaning that if she is the wife of a priest, her children may partake of teruma. But with regard to lineage, this proof is not relied upon, and her daughters may not marry priests. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If the children cling to her they are considered hers in all regards, even with regard to lineage.
וְאַזְדָּא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַלְקִין עַל הַחֲזָקוֹת, סוֹקְלִין וְשׂוֹרְפִין עַל הַחֲזָקוֹת, וְאֵין שׂוֹרְפִין תְּרוּמָה עַל הַחֲזָקוֹת.
The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Yoḥanan follows his standard line of reasoning, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The court flogs one about whom witnesses testify that he violated a prohibition on the basis of presumptive status, even if there is no testimony to definitively establish that the person violated a prohibition, as will be explained. Similarly, the court stones or burns one about whom witnesses testify that he violated a prohibition resulting in court-imposed capital punishment on the basis of presumptive status. But one does not burn teruma on the basis of presumptive status unless there is testimony that it became ritually impure.
מַלְקִין עַל הַחֲזָקוֹת – כְּרַב יְהוּדָה. דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: הוּחְזְקָה נִדָּה בִּשְׁכֵינוֹתֶיהָ, בַּעְלָהּ – לוֹקֶה עָלֶיהָ מִשּׁוּם נִדָּה.
How so? The court flogs one about whom witnesses testify that he violated a prohibition on the basis of presumptive status, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yehuda. As Rav Yehuda says: If a woman had among her neighbors the presumptive status of a menstruating woman, and witnesses testified that her husband engaged in sexual intercourse with her, he is flogged due to her status as a menstruating woman, and there is no need for testimony that she was a menstruating woman.
סוֹקְלִין וְשׂוֹרְפִין עַל הַחֲזָקוֹת – כִּדְרַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא. דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא: אִישׁ וְאִשָּׁה תִּינוֹק וְתִינוֹקֶת שֶׁהִגְדִּילוּ בְּתוֹךְ הַבַּיִת – נִסְקָלִין זֶה עַל זֶה, וְנִשְׂרָפִין זֶה עַל זֶה.
The court stones or burns one about whom witnesses testify that he violated a prohibition resulting in court-imposed capital punishment on the basis of presumptive status, in accordance with the opinion of Rabba bar Rav Huna. As Rabba bar Rav Huna says: With regard to a man and a woman and a boy and a girl who grew up together in one home as a single family, the presumption is that they are related, even absent witness testimony to that effect. Therefore, they are stoned due to engaging in intercourse with each other if the male child, now an adult, engages in intercourse with the woman, as it is considered incestuous sexual intercourse. And they are burned due to engaging in intercourse with each other if the man engages in intercourse with the female child, now an adult, since she is considered his wife’s daughter.
אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן פַּזִּי, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי מִשּׁוּם בַּר קַפָּרָא: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּאִשָּׁה שֶׁבָּאת לִירוּשָׁלַיִם וְתִינוֹק מוּרְכָּב לָהּ עַל כְּתֵיפָהּ, וְהִגְדִּילַתּוּ, וּבָא עָלֶיהָ, וֶהֱבִיאוּם לְבֵית דִּין וּסְקָלוּם. לֹא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁבְּנָהּ וַדַּאי, אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁכָּרוּךְ אַחֲרֶיהָ.
The Gemara cites a related incident: Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi says that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says in the name of bar Kappara: An incident occurred involving a woman who came to Jerusalem with a child riding on her shoulders, in the manner of a mother and a son, and she raised him, and he eventually engaged in intercourse with her. And they brought them to court and stoned them for violating the prohibition against a mother and son engaging in intercourse. This was not because he was definitely her son, as they had no testimony to that effect, but because he clung to her, and he therefore had the presumptive status of being her son.
וְאֵין שׂוֹרְפִין תְּרוּמָה עַל הַחֲזָקוֹת – דְּאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: שׂוֹרְפִין עַל הַחֲזָקוֹת, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אוֹמֵר: אֵין שׂוֹרְפִין. וְאָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ, דִּתְנַן: תִּינוֹק שֶׁנִּמְצָא בְּצַד הָעִיסָּה וּבָצֵק בְּיָדוֹ – רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְטַהֵר, וַחֲכָמִים מְטַמְּאִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ שֶׁל תִּינוֹק לְטַפֵּחַ.
Rabbi Yoḥanan stated: But one does not burn teruma on the basis of presumptive status. As Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: One burns teruma on the basis of presumptive status, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One does not burn teruma in this case. The Gemara comments: And they follow their standard lines of reasoning in this matter, as we learned in a mishna (Teharot 3:8): If a ritually impure child is found alongside ritually pure started dough, and he has risen dough in his hand that may have been removed from the larger portion of started dough, Rabbi Meir deems the started dough pure, since there is no proof the child touched it, as he might have been given the piece by someone else. And the Rabbis deem it impure, as they assume that he touched the started dough. The child is presumed to be impure because it is the manner of a child to handle [letappe’aḥ] items.
וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: מַאי טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר? קָסָבַר: רוֹב תִּינוֹקוֹת מְטַפְּחִין, וּמִיעוּט אֵין מְטַפְּחִין, וְעִיסָּה בְּחֶזְקַת טׇהֳרָה עוֹמֶדֶת, וּסְמוֹךְ מִיעוּטָא לַחֲזָקָה אִיתְּרַע לֵיהּ רוּבָּא. וְרַבָּנַן: מִיעוּטָא כְּמַאן דְּלֵיתֵיהּ דָּמֵי, רוּבָּא וַחֲזָקָה – רוּבָּא עֲדִיף.
And we discussed that case: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Meir? He holds that a majority of children handle items, in this case the dough, that are within reach, and a minority do not handle items within reach, and the dough itself retains a presumptive status of purity, since its impurity has not been definitively determined. And if one appends the minority of children who do not handle items within reach to the presumptive status of purity of the dough, the force of the majority of children who handle items within reach is weakened. Therefore, the dough is considered pure. And the Rabbis contend that in a case where the majority is followed, the minority is considered like it does not exist. Consequently, there is a conflict between the determining factors of the majority of impure children who handle items within reach and the presumptive status of purity of the dough. In that case, the majority takes precedence.
אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: זוֹ הִיא שֶׁשּׂוֹרְפִין עָלֶיהָ אֶת הַתְּרוּמָה. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֵין זוֹ חֲזָקָה שֶׁשּׂוֹרְפִין עָלֶיהָ תְּרוּמָה.
Reish Lakish says in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: This halakha of a child is an example of a presumption, i.e., that children handle items within reach, that one burns teruma based on it, since the Rabbis hold that it is sufficiently established that the dough has become impure to allow it to be burned. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is not the presumption that one burns teruma based on it. Rather, the dough is set aside and may be neither eaten nor burned.
אֶלָּא אֵיזוֹ חֲזָקָה לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן שֶׁשּׂוֹרְפִין עָלֶיהָ אֶת הַתְּרוּמָה? כְּדִתְנַן: עִיסָּה בְּתוֹךְ הַבַּיִת, וּשְׁרָצִים וּצְפַרְדְּעִים מִטַּפְּלִין שָׁם, וְנִמְצְאוּ חֲתִיכוֹת בָּעִיסָּה. אִם רוֹב שְׁרָצִים – טְמֵאָה. אִם רוֹב צְפַרְדְּעִים – טְהוֹרָה.
The Gemara asks: But if so, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, what is the presumption that one burns teruma based on it? The Gemara answers: As we learned in a baraita: In a case where started dough is in the house, and creeping animals, which impart impurity when dead, and frogs, which do not impart impurity, are also present there, and pieces of an unidentified creature were found in the started dough, if the majority of creatures in the house are creeping animals, the dough is impure, since the presumption is that the pieces are from a creeping animal. If the majority are frogs, it is pure.
תַּנְיָא כְּוָתֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שְׁנֵי דְּבָרִים אֵין בָּהֶם דַּעַת לִישָּׁאֵל, וַעֲשָׂאוּם חֲכָמִים כְּמָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶם דַּעַת לִישָּׁאֵל: תִּינוֹק, וְעוֹד אַחֶרֶת.
The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: There is a principle that when a possible case of impurity cannot be verified, even if it occurred in a private domain, where generally cases of uncertain impurity are deemed impure, it is deemed pure. Two things do not have the capacity to be questioned, i.e., one cannot verify what happened through investigation. Yet in these two cases, the Sages deemed them as things that have the capacity to be questioned and rendered them impure in cases of uncertainty in a private domain. The two cases are that of a child and an additional halakha.
תִּינוֹק – הָא דַּאֲמַרַן. וְעוֹד אַחֶרֶת מַאי הִיא? עִיסָּה בְּתוֹךְ הַבַּיִת, וְתַרְנְגוֹלִים וּמַשְׁקִים טְמֵאִים שָׁם, וְנִמְצְאוּ
The case of a child is that which we said concerning a child holding some dough discovered alongside a larger piece of dough. All of the dough is deemed impure, since the child cannot be asked whether or not he rendered the dough impure. And what is the additional one? If pure, started dough was located inside the house, and chickens and impure liquids were present there, and there were found to be
נִקּוּרִים נִקּוּרִים בָּעִיסָּה – תּוֹלִין, לֹא אוֹכְלִין וְלֹא שׂוֹרְפִין.
small holes in the dough where the chickens had pecked it, in that case the dough is held in suspension; it is neither eaten nor burned, since the chickens may have drunk from the impure liquids before they pecked at the dough but there is no proof of this. Despite this being a case where they cannot be asked, which generally would result in the dough being deemed pure, here it is deemed impure due to the uncertainty. The fact that in the second case of the baraita it is not deemed to be definitely impure supports the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that in the case of the child the status of the dough also remains a matter of uncertainty.
אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בְּמַשְׁקִים לְבָנִים, אֲבָל בְּמַשְׁקִים אֲדוּמִּים – אִם אִיתָא דִּנְקִיר מִידָּע יְדִיעַ. וְדִילְמָא בְּלַעְתִּינְהוּ עִיסָּה?
Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: They taught this halakha only in a case of white liquid, when the appearance of the peck marks provides no proof of whether the chickens had previously drunk from the liquid, but in a case of red, impure liquid, if it is so that they had pecked, it would be known that they had drunk from the liquid, since the peck marks would be colored red. The Gemara asks: Even if the liquid were red and there were no red marks on the dough, how can one say definitively that they did not peck? Perhaps the dough absorbed the liquid, leaving no identifiable mark?
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: דָּבָר זֶה שָׁמַע בְּרִיבִּי, וּפֵירוּשׁוֹ לֹא שָׁמַע: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בְּמַשְׁקִים צְלוּלִים, שֶׁבָּבוּאָה שֶׁל תִּינוֹק נִיכָּר בָּהֶ[ן], אֲבָל מַשְׁקִים עֲכוּרִים – לֹא.
Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The Distinguished, i.e., Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, heard this matter, but he did not hear its interpretation, and he should have supplied an additional detail: They taught this halakha only in a case of clear liquid, which can be absorbed in the dough without leaving a stain. What is meant by clear? It means that in which the reflection [bavua] of a child is recognizable when he peers into it. But in a case of murky liquid, this halakha was not stated, since the liquid would have left a mark.
מַתְנִי׳ לֹא יִתְיַיחֵד אָדָם עִם שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים, אֲבָל אִשָּׁה אַחַת מִתְיַיחֶדֶת עִם שְׁנֵי אֲנָשִׁים. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אַף אִישׁ אֶחָד מִתְיַיחֵד עִם שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים בִּזְמַן שֶׁאִשְׁתּוֹ עִמּוֹ, וְיָשֵׁן עִמָּהֶם בְּפוּנְדְּקִי, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאִשְׁתּוֹ מְשַׁמַּרְתּוֹ. מִתְיַיחֵד אָדָם עִם אִמּוֹ וְעִם בִּתּוֹ וְיָשֵׁן עִמָּהֶם בְּקֵירוּב בָּשָׂר. וְאִם הִגְדִּילוּ – זוֹ יְשֵׁנָה בִּכְסוּתָהּ וְזֶה יָשֵׁן בִּכְסוּתוֹ.
MISHNA: A man may not be secluded with two women lest he sin with them, but one woman may be secluded with two men. Rabbi Shimon says: Even one man may be secluded with two women when his wife is with him, and in that situation he may even sleep in the same inn with two women, because his wife guards him from sinning with them. They further said that a man may be secluded with his mother, and with his daughter, and sleep alongside them with bodily contact without clothes, since there is no concern that they will engage in sexual intercourse. And when they, the son or daughter, have grown up, this one sleeps in her garment and that one sleeps in his garment, but they may share a bed.
גְּמָ׳ מַאי טַעְמָא? תְּנָא דְּבֵי אֵלִיָּהוּ: הוֹאִיל וְנָשִׁים דַּעְתָּן קַלּוֹת עֲלֵיהֶן.
GEMARA: What is the reason that a man may not be secluded with two women, but a woman may be secluded with two men? The school of Eliyahu taught: Since women are of light mind they are more easily seduced.
מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: רֶמֶז לְיִחוּד מִן הַתּוֹרָה מִנַּיִן – שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי יְסִיתְךָ אָחִיךָ בֶן אִמֶּךָ״.
The Gemara asks: From where are these matters, that it is prohibited for a man to be secluded with women, derived? Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: From where is there an allusion from the Written Torah to the prohibition against seclusion? As it is stated concerning one who incites others to idolatrous worship: “If your brother, the son of your mother, entices you” (Deuteronomy 13:7).
וְכִי בֶּן אֵם מֵסִית, בֶּן אָב אֵינוֹ מֵסִית? אֶלָּא לוֹמַר לָךְ: בֵּן מִתְיַיחֵד עִם אִמּוֹ, וְאָסוּר לְהִתְיַיחֵד עִם כׇּל עֲרָיוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה.
Rabbi Yishmael considers why the Torah uses the example of “the son of your mother.” But is it only the son of a mother who entices? Doesn’t the son of a father entice? Rather, the verse means to say to you: A son may be secluded with his mother. Consequently, if a woman has two sons from two different husbands, they will both stay close to her. The Torah therefore uses the example of “the son of your mother” because half-brothers who share a mother become close to each other. By contrast, half-brothers who share a father will not become close, since one’s father’s wife who is not one’s mother is a forbidden relative. And it is prohibited to be secluded with those with whom relations are forbidden by the Torah.
פְּשָׁטֵיהּ דִּקְרָא בְּמַאי כְּתִיב? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר. לָא מִיבַּעְיָא בֶּן אָב, דְּסָנֵי לֵיהּ וְעָיֵיץ לֵיהּ עֵצוֹת רָעוֹת, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ בֶּן אֵם, דְּלָא סָנֵי לֵיהּ – אֵימָא צָיְיתִי לֵיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
Since this verse merely alludes to the prohibition against seclusion, the Gemara asks: With regard to what is the plain meaning of the verse written, i.e., in the context of enticement to idolatrous worship, why does it emphasize “the son of your mother”? Abaye said: The verse is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to state that one should not be enticed by the son of a father, who hates him due to their rivalry for their father’s inheritance and therefore gives him bad advice. Rather, the same is true even of the son of a mother, who does not hate him, since they are not rivals for the same inheritance, as each inherits from his own father. One might therefore say that he should listen to him and accept his advice. The verse consequently teaches us that he should pay no heed to his enticements.
נֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּאַבָּא שָׁאוּל, דְּתַנְיָא: כׇּל שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם – יוֹצֵא בְּחֵיק, וְנִקְבָּר בְּאִשָּׁה אַחַת וּשְׁנֵי אֲנָשִׁים, אֲבָל לֹא בְּאִישׁ אֶחָד וּשְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים. אַבָּא שָׁאוּל אוֹמֵר: אַף בְּאִישׁ אֶחָד וּשְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים.
The Gemara comments: Shall we say the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, as it is taught in a baraita: If a child dies any time during the first thirty days after his birth, he is not given a proper funeral but is carried out held in their bosom, not on a bier, and buried by one woman and two men. But he may not be buried by one man and two women, due to the prohibition against seclusion. Abba Shaul says: He may even be buried by one man and two women. This indicates that Abba Shaul deems it permitted for a man to be secluded with two women.
אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא אַבָּא שָׁאוּל, בִּשְׁעַת אֲנִינוּת תְּבִיר יִצְרֵיהּ.
The Gemara rejects this: You can even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, as he permits it only in the case of the baraita, because at the time of acute mourning, i.e., immediately after a close relative has died, one’s inclination to sin is broken, and there is no concern that he might come to sin.
וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: ״מַה יִּתְאוֹנֵן אָדָם חָי גֶּבֶר עַל חֲטָאָיו״ – אֲפִילּוּ בִּשְׁעַת אֲנִינוּתוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם יִצְרוֹ מִתְגַּבֵּר עָלָיו. וְאַבָּא שָׁאוּל? כִּי כְּתִיב הָהוּא – בְּמִתְרַעֵם עַל מִדּוֹתָיו כְּתִיב, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: מָה יִתְרַעֵם עַל מִדּוֹתָיו, וְכִי גָּבַר עַל חֲטָאָיו? דַּיּוֹ חַיִּים שֶׁנָּתַתִּי לוֹ!
And the Rabbis, who render seclusion forbidden even then, hold in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzḥak says as follows with regard to the verse: “Why does a living man complain, a powerful man due to his sins?” (Lamentations 3:39): Even at the time of a person’s acute mourning, his inclination to sin overpowers him. The Gemara asks: And how does Abba Shaul explain this verse? The Gemara answers: When that was written, it was written with regard to one who complains about God’s ways. And this is what the verse is saying: Why does one complain about God’s ways and claim that he has been treated unjustly? Has he overpowered his sins? God responds: The life I have given him is sufficient for him, and he deserves no more.
וְרַבָּנַן? כִּי הָהוּא מַעֲשֶׂה דְּהַהִיא אִיתְּתָא דַּהֲוָה עוֹבָדָא וְאַפֵּיקְתֵּיהּ.
And the Rabbis are concerned about the possibility of sin even in times of acute mourning, like that incident involving a certain woman, as there was an incident where she removed her husband from his grave. When visiting her husband’s grave, she engaged in intercourse with a man who was tasked with guarding the body of one executed by the king. Meanwhile, that body was taken, and she suggested that they disinter her husband so that the guard could claim that he fulfilled his task properly. This demonstrates that even at a time of mourning one may succumb to temptation.
אֲבָל אִשָּׁה אַחַת. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בִּכְשֵׁרִים, אֲבָל בִּפְרוּצִים – אֲפִילּוּ בֵּי עַשְׂרָה נָמֵי לָא. הֲוָה מַעֲשֶׂה, וְהוֹצִיאוּהָ עֲשָׂרָה בַּמִּטָּה. אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: תִּדַּע, דְּמִיחַבְּרִי בֵּי עַשְׂרָה וְגָנְבִי כְּשׁוּרָא וְלָא מִיכַּסְפִי מֵהֲדָדֵי.
§ The mishna teaches: But one woman may be secluded with two men. Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: They taught this halakha only with regard to men of fit morals, but with regard to those steeped in sexual immorality, she may not be secluded even with ten men. There was an incident where ten men carried out a woman on a bier, as though she were dead, and engaged in intercourse with her. Rav Yosef says: Know that this is so, since ten people will join together and steal a heavy beam without being ashamed before one another. Similarly, several men can join together for a licentious act without shame.
נֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: מוֹסְרִין לוֹ שְׁנֵי תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים, שֶׁמָּא יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ בַּדֶּרֶךְ. תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים – אֵין, אִינָשֵׁי דְּעָלְמָא – לָא? שָׁאנֵי תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים דְּיָדְעִי
The Gemara suggests: Shall we say the following mishna (Sota 7a) supports him: It was taught with regard to one who is bringing his wife, whom he suspects of having committed adultery [sota], to the Temple to perform the ritual of the bitter water, that they provide him with two Torah scholars to accompany them lest he engage in sexual intercourse with her along the way, as until the ritual has been performed she remains forbidden to her husband? It can be inferred from here: Two Torah scholars, yes; their presence will assure that no one will engage in forbidden intercourse. Regular men, no; there is still a concern that they may engage in intercourse. This indicates that ordinary people are not relied upon with regard to seclusion with a woman. The Gemara rejects this proof: The reason there is a need for them to be Torah scholars is that Torah scholars are different, in that they know
