Menachot 69

בכורים לפירא קא אמרינן למזבח קא אמרינן והא אכיל לה מזבח מפירי דהא שתא

that when we say the two loaves must come from the first fruits, the verse is referring to the new fruit crop grown this year? This is not so. Rather, we say that the two loaves must come from the first fruits sacrificed upon the altar this year. Therefore, even in Rabba’s case the two loaves cannot come from wheat, as the altar had already consumed from the fruit, i.e., the wheat used for the omer offering, of this year.

בעי רמי בר חמא שתי הלחם הנצה שריא או חנטה שרייה מאי הנצה ומאי חנטה אילימא הנצה דפירא וחנטה דפירא השתא השרשה שריא הנצה וחנטה מיבעיא

§ Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: With regard to the two loaves that permit the bringing of first fruit, are all fruit that are budding at the time of the sacrifice permitted, or are only fruit that has gone through formation permitted? The Gemara asks: What is meant here by budding and what is the meaning of formation? If we say that this is referring to the budding of the fruit and the formation of the fruit, this is difficult: Now that it is taught (70a) that even in the case of the grain taking root prior to the bringing of the two loaves, that grain is permitted by their sacrifice, is it necessary to discuss the budding or formation of fruit, which corresponds to a later stage than the taking root of grain?

אלא הנצה דעלה וחנטה דעלה מי הוי כי השרשה או לא תיקו

The Gemara answers: Rather, Rami bar Ḥama is referring to the budding of a fruit tree’s leaf and the formation of a fruit tree’s leaf. The question is whether the budding of the fruit tree’s leaves is like the taking root of grain, and therefore all the tree’s first fruit is permitted by the two loaves, or whether this budding is not similar to the taking root of grain, and therefore the tree’s fruit is not permitted by the two loaves. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בעי רבא בר רב חנן חטין שזרען בקרקע עומר מתירן או אין עומר מתירן היכי דמי אי דאשרוש תנינא אי דלא אשרוש תנינא

§ Rava bar Rav Ḥanan raises a dilemma: With regard to wheat kernels that one sowed in the ground, does the bringing of the omer offering permit them to be eaten or does the omer not permit them in consumption? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If this is referring to a case where the wheat kernel has already taken root prior to the bringing of the omer offering, we already learn this in a mishna. If it is referring to a case where the wheat stalk has not yet taken root, we already learn this in a mishna as well.

דתנן אם השרישו קודם לעומר עומר מתירן ואם לאו אסורין עד שיבא עומר הבא

The Gemara cites the source for this claim. As we learned in a mishna (70a): If crops took root before the sacrifice of the omer offering, the omer permits them to be eaten. And if not, i.e., they took root only after the sacrifice of the omer offering, they are prohibited until the next omer is sacrificed the following year.

לא צריכא דחצדינהו וזרעינהו קודם לעומר ואתא עומר וחליף עלייהו וקא מיבעיא ליה מהו לנקוטי ומיכל מינייהו כמאן דשדייא בכדא דמיא ושרינהו עומר או דלמא בטיל להו לגבי ארעא

The Gemara explains: No, Rava bar Rav Ḥanan’s dilemma is necessary only in a case where one reaped grain and sowed it again prior to the omer, and the time of the omer arrived and passed while the grain was in the ground but before it had taken root. And this is the dilemma that he raises: What is the halakha in such a case? Is it permitted to take these kernels and eat from them? Is their halakhic status considered like that of kernels cast into a jug, i.e., disconnected from the ground, and consequently the sacrifice of the omer offering renders their consumption permitted? Or perhaps he subordinated them to the ground, in which case their halakhic status is that of seeds that did not take root and are therefore prohibited.

יש להן אונאה או אין להן אונאה

Rava bar Rav Ḥanan raises another dilemma with regard to grains that were reaped and then sowed again: Does the halakha of exploitation apply to them in a case of a disparity of one-sixth between their sale price and their market value, which would render the exploiter obligated to refund the difference between the purchase price and the market value, or does the halakha of exploitation not apply to them? Since the halakhot of exploitation apply only to movable property, not to land, this matter depends on whether these grains are considered like detached movable property or whether they have been subordinated to the land.

היכי דמי אילימא דאמר ליה שדאי בה שיתא ואתו סהדי ואמרי דלא שדא בה אלא חמשה והאמר רבא כל דבר שבמדה ושבמשקל ושבמנין אפילו פחות מכדי אונאה חוזר

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say that one said: I sowed six kav of grain in the field, and witnesses came and said that he sowed only five kav in it, that is difficult: But doesn’t Rava say: With regard to any item that is otherwise subject to the halakhot of exploitation, and it is sold by measure, or by weight, or by number, even if the disparity was less than the measure of exploitation in the transaction, the transaction is reversed. A disparity of one-sixth between the value of an item and its price constitutes exploitation only in cases where there is room for error in assessing the value of an item. In a case where the sale item is easily quantifiable, any deviation from the designated quantity results in a nullification of the transaction, even if the sale item in question is subordinate to the ground.

אלא דאמר ליה שדאי בה כדבעי לה ואתו סהדי ואמרי דלא שדא בה כדבעי לה יש להן אונאה דכמאן דשדייא בכדא דמיא ויש להן אונאה או דלמא בטיל להו לגבי ארעא

Rather, it is a case where the seller said: I cast kernels in the field as required, without quantifying the measure of the kernels that he cast, and witnesses came and said that he did not cast kernels in the field as required. Are they subject to the halakhot of exploitation, as the halakhic status of these kernels is like that of kernels cast into a jug, and they are subject to the halakhot of exploitation? Or, perhaps the laborer subordinated them to the ground, in which case they have the status of land, which is not subject to the halakhot of exploitation.

נשבעין עליהן או אין נשבעין עליהן כדשדייא בכדא דמיא וכמטלטלי דמו ונשבעין עליהן או דלמא בטיל להו אגב ארעא וכמקרקעי דמו ואין נשבעין עליהן תיקו

Rava bar Rav Ḥanan raises yet another dilemma with regard to grains that were reaped and then sowed again. The halakha is that one does not take oaths with regard to claims on land. Consequently, if one admitted to part of a claim with regard to such grain, which generally obligates him in an oath, does he take an oath with regard to the kernels or does he not take an oath with regard to the kernels? Is their halakhic status like that of kernels cast into a jug, and they are like movable property and one takes an oath with regard to them? Or, perhaps he subordinated them to the ground, and they are like land and one does not take an oath with regard to them. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בעי רמי בר חמא חטין שבגללי בקר ושעורין שבגללי בהמה מהו למאי אילימא לטמויי טומאת אוכלין תנינא חטין שברעי בקר ושעורין שבגללי בהמה חישב עליהן לאכילה אין מטמא טומאת אוכלין לקטן לאכילה מטמא טומאת אוכלין

§ Rami bar Ḥama raises another dilemma: With regard to wheat kernels that are found in the dung of cattle, or barley kernels found in the dung of an animal, what is the halakha? The Gemara asks: With regard to what issue was this dilemma raised? If we say it was with regard to their capacity to become susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, we already learn this in a baraita, as it is taught: If one found wheat kernels in the dung of cattle or barley kernels in the dung of animals, they do not become susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. But if he collected them for eating, they do become susceptible to the ritual impurity of food.

אלא למנחות פשיטא דלא הקריבהו נא לפחתך הירצך או הישא פניך

The Gemara provides another suggestion: Rather, perhaps Rami bar Ḥama’s dilemma is referring to the use of these kernels for meal offerings. The Gemara rejects this: It is obvious that they may not be used for meal offerings, as it is written with regard to those who offer inferior items to the Temple: “Present it now unto your governor; will he be pleased with you or show you favor? Says the Lord of hosts” (Malachi 1:8). Any item that one would not feel comfortable bringing to a governor or local ruler may certainly not be brought to the Temple.

לא צריכא דנקטינהו וזרעינהו וקא בעי לאיתויי מנחות מינייהו מאי משום דמאיסותא הוא וכיון דזרעינהו אזדא למאיסותייהו או דלמא משום כחישותא הוא והשתא נמי כחושה תיקו

The Gemara explains: No; it is necessary to raise the dilemma in a case where one collected these kernels and sowed them in the ground, and now he wants to bring meal offerings from them. What is the halakha? Is the reason one may not use them initially for meal offerings because they are disgusting, and since he sowed them again their disgusting quality has left? Or perhaps they were initially disqualified because they are considered weakened after having been digested by an animal. And if so, even the grains that have now grown after they were replanted are also weakened, like the kernels that gave rise to them. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בעי רמי בר חמא פיל שבלע כפיפה מצרית והקיאה דרך בית הרעי מהו למאי

Rami bar Ḥama raises yet another dilemma: In the case of an elephant that swallowed an Egyptian wicker basket and excreted it intact along with its waste, what is the halakha? The Gemara asks: With regard to what matter was this dilemma raised?

אילימא למבטל טומאתה תנינא כל הכלים יורדין לידי טומאתן במחשבה ואין עולין מטומאתן אלא בשינוי מעשה

If we say that the dilemma was raised with regard to a case where the wicker basket was ritually impure and the question is if its ritual impurity is nullified by the elephant swallowing it, we already learn in a mishna (Kelim 25:9): All vessels descend into their state of ritual impurity by means of thought. Although an unfinished vessel cannot become ritually impure, if the craftsman decided not to finish it, it immediately assumes the halakhic status of a completed vessel and can become ritually impure. But they ascend from their state of ritual impurity only by means of a change resulting from an action. A ritually impure vessel, once it undergoes physical change, is no longer ritually impure. Therefore, as the wicker basket remained intact without physical change, it is clear that it remains ritually impure.

לא צריכא דבלע הוצין ועבדינהו כפיפה מצרית מי הוה עיכול הוה ליה

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to raise this dilemma in a case where the elephant had swallowed ends of palm leaves [hutzin] whole, and after the leaves were excreted one made them into an Egyptian wicker basket. The dilemma is as follows: Is this considered digestion, and therefore the basket prepared from the leaves is

ככלי גללים ככלי אדמה ואין מקבלין טומאה דאמר מר כלי אבנים וכלי גללים וכלי אדמה אין מקבלין טומאה לא מדברי תורה ולא מדברי סופרים או דלמא לא הוי עיכול

like dung vessels and like earth vessels, and these are not susceptible to ritual impurity, as the Master said: Stone vessels and dung vessels and earth vessels are not susceptible to ritual impurity, neither by Torah law nor by rabbinic law? Or perhaps this is not considered digestion, as these palm leaves remained intact, and therefore the vessel prepared from them is susceptible to ritual impurity like any other wooden vessel.

תפשוט ליה מהא דאמר עולא משום רבי שמעון בר יהוצדק מעשה ובלעו זאבים שני תינוקות בעבר הירדן ובא מעשה לפני חכמים וטהרו את הבשר

The Gemara suggests: Resolve the dilemma from that which Ulla says in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yehotzadak: An incident occurred in which wolves swallowed two children and excreted them on the east bank of the Jordan, and the incident came before the Sages for a ruling. They were asked whether the remains of the children were ritually impure even after they had passed through the animal’s digestive tract, and they deemed the flesh ritually pure, as it is no longer considered human flesh but wolf excrement. Similarly, the swallowed palm leaves should be considered like elephant dung and therefore the basket made from them should not be susceptible to ritual impurity.

שאני בשר דרכיך ולפשוט מסיפא וטמאו את העצמות שאני עצמות דאקושי טפי

The Gemara rejects this resolution: That case of flesh is different, as flesh is soft and digestible. Palm leaves, by contrast, are hard and not easily digested. The Gemara suggests: But in that case, let us resolve the dilemma from the last clause of the account of that incident: The Sages ruled that flesh was ritually pure, but they deemed the intact bones ritually impure. The bones, which are a harder substance than the flesh, are not considered digested. Likewise, the hard palm leaves should also not be considered digested, and the wicker basket fashioned from them should be susceptible to ritual impurity. The Gemara answers: The case of bones is different, as they are harder. Therefore, one cannot cite a proof from here with regard to palm leaves, which are a comparatively softer substance.

בעי רבי זירא חיטין שירדו בעבים מהו למאי אי למנחות אמאי לא אלא לשתי הלחם מאי

§ Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma: With regard to wheat that fell from the clouds, what is the halakha? The Gemara asks: With regard to what issue was this dilemma raised? If it is referring to using this wheat for meal offerings, why not? There should be no problem with using the wheat, since wheat for meal offerings does not have to come from Eretz Yisrael. Rather, the dilemma is whether this wheat can be used for the offering of the two loaves on Shavuot. What is the halakha?

ממושבתיכם אמר רחמנא לאפוקי דחוצה לארץ דלא אבל דעבים שפיר דמי או דלמא ממושבתיכם דווקא ואפילו דעבים נמי לא

The Gemara explains the two possibilities. The verse states: “You shall bring out of your dwellings two wave-loaves of two-tenths of an ephah; they shall be of fine flour, they shall be baked with leaven, for first fruits to the Lord” (Leviticus 23:17). When the Merciful One states: “Out of your dwellings,” does this serve to exclude wheat that came from outside Eretz Yisrael, teaching that it may not be used for the two loaves; but wheat that fell from the clouds is permitted? Or perhaps the verse means specifically: “Out of your dwellings,” i.e., only from Eretz Yisrael; and if so, even wheat that fell from the clouds is also not acceptable.

ומי איכא כי האי גוונא אין כדעדי טייעא נחיתא ליה רום כיזבא חיטי בתלתא פרסי

With regard to this dilemma, the Gemara asks: But is there a case like this? Is it possible for wheat to fall from the clouds? The Gemara answers: Yes, as in an incident involving Adi the Arab [taya’a], about whom it is related that it rained down on him wheat of a height of one handbreadth spread over an area of three parasangs.

בעי רבי שמעון בן פזי שיבולת שהביאה שליש קודם לעומר ועקרה ושתלה לאחר העומר והוסיפה מהו בתר עיקר אזלינן ושרייה עומר או דלמא בתר תוספת אזלינן ועד שיבא עומר הבא

§ Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi raises a dilemma: In a case where one had an ear of grain that reached one-third of its growth prior to the bringing of the omer offering, and then he uprooted it and planted it again after the omer, and then it added to its growth, what is the halakha? Do we follow the original growth, which was permitted by the omer offering, and therefore the additional growth is also permitted? Or perhaps we follow the additional growth, which was not permitted by the omer, as it grew afterward. And if so, it will remain prohibited until the next omer offering is brought.

תפשוט ליה מהא דאמר רבי אבהו אמר רבי יוחנן ילדה שסבכה בזקנה ובה פירות אפילו הוסיף במאתים אסור

The Gemara suggests: Resolve the dilemma from that which Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to a young vine within three years of its planting, whose fruits are prohibited as orla, that one grafted onto an old, permitted vine, and there were fruits on the younger vine, even if the older vine added two hundred parts of growth to the existing fruit, it is still prohibited. The two hundred permitted parts, which are generally sufficient to nullify one part of orla, are ineffective in this case, because the subsequent additional growth is considered subordinate to the original prohibited growth. This proves that we follow the original growth, and therefore in Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi’s case the original growth that was permitted by the omer should render the entire plant, including the subsequent growth, permitted in consumption.

ואמר רבי שמואל בר נחמני אמר רבי יונתן בצל ששתלו בכרם ונעקר הכרם אפילו הוסיף במאתים אסור

The Gemara cites another proof from a similar case. And likewise Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: With regard to an onion that one planted in a vineyard, creating a forbidden mixture of food crops in a vineyard, and the vineyard was subsequently uprooted, so that most of the onion grew in a permitted manner, even if the onion added two hundred parts of growth, the onion is prohibited. The reason the entire onion is prohibited is apparently because we follow the original growth, which is forbidden.

היא גופה קא מיבעיא ליה מפשט פשיטא להו לרבנן דבתר עיקר אזלינן לא שנא לקולא ולא שנא לחומרא או דלמא ספוקי מספקא להו ולחומרא אמרינן לקולא לא אמרינן תיקו

The Gemara states that these proofs are inconclusive, as that itself is what Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi raises as a dilemma: Is it entirely obvious to the Sages that we follow the main growth, and there is no difference whether this leads to a leniency or whether it leads to a stringency? Or perhaps they are uncertain about the matter, and therefore they rule that when it leads to a stringency, e.g., prohibiting the additional growth of orla fruit or the additional growth of an onion that had grown in a vineyard, we say that we follow the original growth, but when it leads to a leniency, such as allowing the consumption of grain after the omer, we do not say that we follow the original growth. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בעי רבה לענין מעשר מאי היכי דמי כגון

§ In connection to the previous discussion with regard to an ear of grain that had grown one-third prior to the omer and was subsequently uprooted and replanted, Rabba raises a dilemma: With regard to the obligation to tithe, what is the halakha of such grain? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? The circumstances involve a case where