Menachot 79

Menachot 79

שְׁחָטָהּ וְנִמְצֵאת בַּעֲלַת מוּם – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: קָדַשׁ, רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: לֹא קָדַשׁ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

If one slaughtered the thanks offering and it was discovered that it is a blemished animal, Rabbi Eliezer says: The loaves were consecrated, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: The loaves were not consecrated. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir, consistent with the dispute appearing in the mishna.

אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ עַל שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ וְנִמְצֵאת טְרֵיפָה – שֶׁלֹּא קָדַשׁ, וְעַל חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – שֶׁקָּדַשׁ, וְעַל בַּעַל מוּם – שֶׁלֹּא קָדַשׁ. וְעַל מָה נֶחְלְקוּ? עַל חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, שֶׁרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: קָדַשׁ, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: לֹא קָדַשׁ.

The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree with regard to a case where he slaughtered the thanks offering and it was discovered that it is a tereifa, as all agree that it was not consecrated; and they did not disagree with regard to a case where he slaughtered the thanks offering with the intent to partake of it or to burn the sacrificial portions beyond its designated time, as all agree that it was consecrated; and they did not disagree with regard to a case where he slaughtered the thanks offering and it was discovered that it is a blemished animal, as all agree that it was not consecrated. And with regard to what case did they disagree? They disagree with regard to a case where he slaughtered the thanks offering with the intent to partake of it or to burn the sacrificial portions outside its designated area, as Rabbi Eliezer says: It was consecrated, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It was not consecrated.

אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: הוֹאִיל וְחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ פָּסוּל, וְחוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ פָּסוּל, מָה חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – קָדַשׁ, אַף חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – קָדַשׁ. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: הוֹאִיל וְחוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ פָּסוּל, וּבַעַל מוּם פָּסוּל, מָה בַּעַל מוּם – לֹא קָדַשׁ, אַף חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – לֹא קָדַשׁ.

The baraita continues: In explanation of his opinion, Rabbi Eliezer said: Since an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time is disqualified and an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area is disqualified, it is reasonable that just as in the case of intent to partake of it beyond its time the loaves were consecrated, so too in the case of intent to partake of it outside its area the loaves were consecrated. Rabbi Yehoshua said: Since an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area is disqualified and an offering discovered to be a blemished animal is disqualified, it is reasonable that just as in the case of a blemished animal the loaves were not consecrated, so too in the case of intent to partake of it outside its area the loaves were not consecrated.

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: אֲנִי דִּמִּיתִיהוּ לְחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, וְאַתָּה דִּמִּיתוֹ לְבַעַל מוּם, נִרְאֶה לְמִי דּוֹמֶה – אִם דּוֹמֶה לְחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, נְדוּנֶנּוּ מֵחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, אִם דּוֹמֶה לְבַעַל מוּם, נְדוּנֶנּוּ מִבַּעַל מוּם.

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: I compared an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area to an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time, and you compared it to an offering discovered to be a blemished animal. Let us consider to which it is similar. If it is similar to an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time, we will deduce its halakha from that of an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time. If it is similar to an offering discovered to be a blemished animal, we will deduce its halakha from that of an offering discovered to be a blemished animal.

הִתְחִיל רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לָדוּן: דָּנִין פְּסוּל מַחְשָׁבָה מִפְּסוּל מַחְשָׁבָה, וְאֵין דָּנִין פְּסוּל מַחְשָׁבָה מִפְּסוּל הַגּוּף.

Rabbi Eliezer began to reason: We deduce the halakha with regard to a disqualification due to improper intention from that of a disqualification due to an improper intention, i.e., the halakha with regard to one who slaughters the animal with intent to partake of it outside its designated area should be deduced from the halakha with regard to one who slaughters it with the intent to partake of it outside its designated time. And we do not deduce the halakha with regard to a disqualification due to improper intention from that of a disqualification due to a blemish in the physical body of the offering.

הִתְחִיל רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לָדוּן: דָּנִין פְּסוּל שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת, מִפְּסוּל שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת, וְאַל יוֹכִיחַ חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, שֶׁפְּסוּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ כָּרֵת. וְעוֹד, נְדוּנֶנּוּ מִשֶּׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, שֶׁפְּסוּל מַחְשָׁבָה וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת.

Rabbi Yehoshua began to reason to the contrary: We deduce the halakha with regard to a disqualification that does not include liability for excision from the World-to-Come [karet], i.e., an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area, from that of a disqualification that does not include liability for karet, i.e., an offering discovered to be a blemished animal. And the halakha with regard to an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time should not be brought as proof, as it is a disqualification that includes liability for karet. And furthermore, even according to Rabbi Eliezer, who says that we deduce the halakha from a disqualification due to improper intention, let us deduce the halakha from that of an offering slaughtered not for its sake, as it is a disqualification due to improper intention and it also does not include liability for karet, and the loaves of such an offering were not consecrated.

וְשָׁתַק רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.

The baraita concludes: And Rabbi Eliezer was silent, conceding to Rabbi Yehoshua. In any event, it is clear in the baraita that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, מַאי שְׁנָא שְׁחָטָהּ וְנִמְצֵאת טְרֵיפָה, דְּהָוֵי פְּסוּלוֹ קוֹדֶם שְׁחִיטָה, וּמַאי שְׁנָא שְׁחָטָהּ וְנִמְצֵאת בַּעֲלַת מוּם, דְּלָא הָוֵי פְּסוּלוֹ קוֹדֶם שְׁחִיטָה?

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that if the thanks offering was slaughtered and discovered to be a tereifa the loaves were not consecrated, but if it was discovered to be a blemished animal Rabbi Eliezer holds that the loaves were consecrated, what is different if he slaughtered it and it was discovered to be a tereifa such that it is considered a case where its disqualification precedes its slaughter, and the loaves were not consecrated; and what is different if he slaughtered it and it was discovered to be a blemished animal such that it is not considered a case where its disqualification precedes its slaughter, and the loaves were consecrated according to Rabbi Eliezer?

בְּדוּקִּין שֶׁבָּעַיִן, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּאָמַר: אִם עָלוּ לֹא יֵרְדוּ. וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: כִּי אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אִם עָלוּ לֹא יֵרְדוּ – בִּפְסוּלָא דְּגוּפֵיהּ, אֲבָל לְקַדּוֹשֵׁי לֶחֶם – לָא.

The Gemara responds: Rabbi Meir is referring to a blemish on the cornea of the eye, and his ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said with regard to this type of blemish: Although animals with such a blemish are disqualified as an offering ab initio, if they ascended the altar they shall not descend, and they are sacrificed on the altar. The Gemara adds: And Rabbi Yehoshua, who holds that if the animal is discovered to be blemished the loaves are not consecrated, says: When Rabbi Akiva said that if they ascended the altar, they shall not descend, he was referring to the disqualification of the offering itself, i.e., that once it ascended it shall not descend. But with regard to the consecration of the loaves through the slaughter of such an animal, he did not say this.

אִיתְּמַר: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ חוּץ לִזְמַנָּהּ, אִם עָלְתָה – לֹא תֵּרֵד. חוּץ לִמְקוֹמָהּ, רָבָא אָמַר: תֵּרֵד, רַבָּה אָמַר: לֹא תֵּרֵד.

§ The Gemara continues to discuss the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua in the baraita: It was stated: With regard to a sin offering that one slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time, if it ascended the altar it shall not descend. If one slaughtered it with intent to partake of it outside its designated area, Rava says: It shall descend and shall not be burned, and Rabba says: It shall not descend.

רָבָא כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, וְרַבָּה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.

The Gemara suggests: Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who deduces the halakha with regard to a thanks offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area from that of an offering discovered to have a blemish. Accordingly, just as a blemished sin offering descends from the altar even if it has already ascended, so too a sin offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area descends. And Rabba holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who deduces the halakha with regard to a thanks offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area from that of an offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time. Accordingly, just as a sin offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time does not descend from the altar, so too a sin offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area does not descend.

וַהֲדַר בֵּיהּ רַבָּה לְגַבֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, מִדַּהֲדַר בֵּיהּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְגַבֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ.

And Rabba retracted his opinion in favor of the opinion of Rava and ruled that a sin offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area descends from the altar, since Rabbi Eliezer retracted his opinion in favor of the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, as the baraita teaches that he was silent and accepted the reasoning of Rabbi Yehoshua. Accordingly, the halakha with regard to an animal slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area should be deduced from that of an offering discovered to have a blemish.

וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אַף עַל גַּב דַּהֲדַר בֵּיהּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְגַבֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, רַבָּה לְגַבֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא לָא הֲדַר בֵּיהּ. הָתָם הוּא דְּקָאָמַר לֵיהּ: נְדוּנֶנּוּ מִשֶּׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, אֲבָל הָכָא, אִי דָּיְינַתְּ לֵיהּ מִשֶּׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – אִם עָלְתָה לֹא תֵּרֵד.

And there are those who say: Even though Rabbi Eliezer retracted his opinion in favor of the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, Rabba did not retract his opinion in favor of the opinion of Rava, because there, with regard to the consecration of the loaves of the thanks offering, Rabbi Eliezer conceded to Rabbi Yehoshua because Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Let us deduce its halakha from that of an offering slaughtered not for its sake. But here, if you deduce its halakha from that of an offering slaughtered not for its sake, then the halakha should be that if it ascended the altar it shall not descend.

שְׁחָטָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ [וְכוּ׳]. אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: שְׁבַק תַּנָּא דִידַן אֵיל נָזִיר דִּשְׁכִיחַ, וְנָקֵיט אֵיל הַמִּילּוּאִים? וְתַנָּא דִּידַן – עִיקַּר מִילְּתָא נָקֵט.

§ The mishna teaches: If one slaughtered the thanks offering not for its sake, and likewise, if one slaughtered the ram of inauguration not for its sake, and likewise, if one slaughtered the communal peace offering of two sheep that accompany the two loaves on Shavuot not for their sake, the loaves were not consecrated. Rav Pappa said in bewilderment: Why does the tanna of our mishna omit the case of the loaves of the nazirite’s ram, which is common and is also not consecrated if the ram was slaughtered not for its sake, and teach instead the ram of the inauguration of the Tabernacle, which was brought only by the Jewish people in the wilderness? The Gemara responds: And what is the reasoning of the tanna of our mishna? He taught the ram of the inauguration because it was the primary matter, i.e., it was the first offering to be brought with loaves.

מַתְנִי׳ הַנְּסָכִים שֶׁקָּדְשׁוּ בִּכְלִי וְנִמְצָא זֶבַח פָּסוּל, אִם יֵשׁ זֶבַח אַחֵר – יַקְרִיבוּ עִמּוֹ, וְאִם לָאו – יִפָּסְלוּ בְּלִינָה.

MISHNA: In a case where the libations that accompany the offerings were sanctified in a service vessel when the animal was slaughtered and the offering was discovered to be unfit, if there is another offering that was slaughtered and requires libations, the libations should be sacrificed with that offering; and if not, they should be disqualified by being left overnight, and then burned.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר זְעֵירִי: אֵין הַנְּסָכִים מִתְקַדְּשִׁין אֶלָּא בִּשְׁחִיטַת הַזֶּבַח. מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר קְרָא: ״זֶבַח וּנְסָכִים״.

GEMARA: With regard to statement of the mishna concerning a case where the libations of an animal offering were consecrated and the animal was then discovered to be unfit, Ze’eiri says: Libations are sanctified only upon the slaughter of the offering. What is the reason for this? The verse states: “To bring an offering made by fire unto the Lord, a burnt offering, and a meal offering, a sacrifice, and libations, each on its own day” (Leviticus 23:37), indicating that the libations complement the offering and are consecrated only upon its slaughter.

תְּנַן: הַנְּסָכִים שֶׁקָּדְשׁוּ בִּכְלִי וְנִמְצָא זֶבַח פָּסוּל – אִם יֵשׁ זֶבַח אַחֵר, יִקְרְבוּ עִמּוֹ; וְאִם לָאו – יִפָּסְלוּ בְּלִינָה.

The Gemara poses a difficulty to the statement of Ze’eiri from that which we learned in the mishna: In a case where the libations were sanctified in a service vessel when the animal was slaughtered and the offering was discovered to be unfit, if there is another offering that was slaughtered and requires libations, the libations should be sacrificed with that offering; and if not, they should be disqualified by being left overnight, and then burned.

מַאי לָאו דְּאִיפְּסִיל בִּשְׁחִיטָה? לָא, דְּאִיפְּסִיל בִּזְרִיקָה.

What, is it not so that the mishna is referring to a case where the offering became unfit through its slaughter, and consequently the libations were not sanctified by the slaughter of the offering? Why, then, must the libations be left overnight in order to disqualify them? Evidently, the libations are sanctified upon being placed in a service vessel and not upon the slaughter of the offering, in contradiction to the statement of Ze’eiri. The Gemara rejects this: No, the mishna is referring to an offering that became unfit through the sprinkling of the blood; the libations were sanctified upon the slaughter of the offering, and therefore they must be disqualified by being left overnight.

כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי, דְּאָמַר: שְׁנֵי דְּבָרִים הַמַּתִּירִין מַעֲלִין זֶה בְּלֹא זֶה.

The Gemara seeks to clarify: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: If an offering has two factors that permit it for consumption or for sacrifice, they can each elevate it to sanctified status without the other. Accordingly, although the slaughter of the animal and the sprinkling of its blood are both permitting factors for the libations, the libations were sanctified through the slaughter of the animal, despite the fact that the animal became unfit through the sprinkling of its blood.

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁקִּיבֵּל דָּמָן בְּכוֹס וְנִשְׁפַּךְ.

The Gemara rejects this: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and holds that both permitting factors must be performed in order to confer sanctity upon the libations, the mishna can still be explained as follows: Here, we are dealing with a case where the priest collected its blood in the cup for the purpose of sprinkling it on the altar, but the blood spilled out of the cup and could not be sprinkled. Nevertheless, the libations were sanctified, as the blood was fit for sprinkling upon the altar.

וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר לַהּ כְּוָותֵיהּ דַּאֲבוּהּ, דְּאָמַר: כׇּל הָעוֹמֵד לִזְרוֹק כְּזָרוּק דָּמֵי.

And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds in accordance with the opinion of his father in this matter, as Rabbi Shimon said: Any blood of an offering that stands fit to be sprinkled upon the altar is considered as if it were already sprinkled. Accordingly, although the blood was spilled after it was collected in the cup and was not actually sprinkled, it is nevertheless considered as if it were sprinkled.

אָמַר מָר: אִם יֵשׁ זֶבַח אַחֵר יִקְרְבוּ עִמּוֹ, וְהָא אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: שֶׁמֶן שֶׁהִפְרִישׁוֹ לְשׁוּם מִנְחָה זוֹ – פָּסוּל לְשׁוּם מִנְחָה אַחֶרֶת! אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: לֵב בֵּית דִּין מַתְנֶה עֲלֵיהֶם, אִם הוּצְרְכוּ – הוּצְרְכוּ, וְאִם לָאו – יְהוּ לְזֶבַח אַחֵר.

§ The Master said in the mishna: If there is another offering that was slaughtered and requires libations, the libations should be sacrificed with that offering. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rav Ḥisda say that oil that one separated for the sake of this one meal offering is unfit to be brought for the sake of another meal offering? Likewise, shouldn’t libations separated for one offering be unfit for sacrifice with another offering? Rabbi Yannai says: The court tacitly stipulates concerning the libations that if they were required for the offering for which they were separated, they were required and are brought with that offering. But if not, e.g., where the offering was disqualified, they should be brought with another offering.

אִי הָכִי, שֶׁמֶן נָמֵי? שֶׁמֶן גּוּפַהּ דְּמִנְחָה הוּא.

The Gemara asks: If that is so, then shouldn’t it be that the court tacitly stipulates concerning the oil as well? The Gemara responds: The oil is part of the meal offering itself and cannot be brought for the sake of another meal offering, whereas the libations merely accompany the offering and are not an integral part of it.

וְלַיתְנוֹ עֲלֵיהֶן דְּנִיפְּקוּ לְחוּלִּין? גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יֹאמְרוּ: מוֹצִיאִין מִכְּלֵי שָׁרֵת לַחוֹל.

The Gemara challenges: If it is so that the court tacitly stipulates concerning the libations, then let the court tacitly stipulate concerning them that if the offering they are meant to accompany is disqualified, they shall emerge to non-sacred status altogether. The Gemara responds: It is a rabbinic decree that the court does not tacitly make this stipulation, lest people who are unaware of such a stipulation see that an item that was previously sanctified has become non-sacred, and they will mistakenly say: One may remove sanctified items from service vessels to become non-sacred.

הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי, גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יֹאמְרוּ: נְסָכִים שֶׁהִפְרִישָׁן לְשׁוּם זֶבַח זֶה – כְּשֵׁרִין לְשׁוּם זֶבַח אַחֵר!

The Gemara objects: If the Sages did not tacitly make such a stipulation because they were concerned that people might mistakenly conclude that items that were already consecrated in service vessels can become non-sacred, then now as well, where the court tacitly stipulates that the libations should be sacrificed with another offering, let there be a rabbinic decree against such a stipulation, lest people say: Libations that one separated for the sake of one offering are fit for the sake of a different offering ab initio.

הָתָנֵי מַתִּתְיָה בֶּן יְהוּדָה, כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה זֶבַח זָבוּחַ בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה.

The Gemara responds: Mattitya ben Yehuda teaches that the mishna is referring specifically to a case where there was another offering that was slaughtered at the same time. In such a case, there is no concern that people will reach this mistaken conclusion, as one who sees that the libations are sacrificed immediately with the other offering will simply assume that they were separated for the sake of that offering from the outset.

אֲבָל אֵין זֶבַח זָבוּחַ בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה, מַאי? נִפְסָל בְּלִינָה? אַדְּתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אִם לָאו יִפָּסְלוּ בְּלִינָה, לִיפְלוֹג וְלִיתְנֵי בְּדִידַהּ: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? שֶׁהָיָה זֶבַח זָבוּחַ בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה, אֲבָל אֵין זֶבַח זָבוּחַ בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה – לֹא.

The Gemara objects to this: According to the explanation of Mattitya ben Yehuda, it can be inferred from the mishna that if there is another offering that was slaughtered at the same time, then the libations are sacrificed with that offering; but if there is not another offering that was slaughtered at the same time, then what should be done with the libations? They should be disqualified by being left overnight. If so, rather than teaching in the latter clause of the mishna: And if there is not another offering that requires libations, they should be disqualified by being left overnight; let the tanna distinguish and teach the distinction within the case itself as follows: In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where there was another offering that was slaughtered at the same time. But if there is not another offering that was slaughtered at the same time, the libations are not sacrificed with another offering.

הָכִי נָמֵי קָא אָמַר: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? שֶׁהָיָה זֶבַח זָבוּחַ בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה, אֲבָל אֵין זֶבַח זָבוּחַ בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה – נַעֲשָׂה כְּמִי שֶׁנִּפְסְלוּ בְּלִינָה, וּפְסוּלִין.

The Gemara responds: That is also what the tanna of the mishna is saying: In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where there was another offering that was slaughtered at the same time. But if there is not another offering that was slaughtered at the same time, the libations are immediately considered as if they were disqualified by being left overnight, and they are disqualified.

וּמִי אִית לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר לֵב בֵּית דִּין מַתְנֶה עֲלֵיהֶן?

The Gemara explained above that the mishna is also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and that he holds in accordance with the opinion of his father that any blood that stands fit to be sprinkled is considered as if it has been sprinkled. The Gemara also explained that the mishna allows for the sacrifice of the libations with another offering because the court tacitly stipulates that the libations should be brought with another offering if the first offering becomes disqualified. In light of this, the Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, i.e., the father of Rabbi Elazar, accept the principle that the court tacitly stipulates concerning the libations?

וְהָא אָמַר רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין, אָמַר רַב עַמְרָם, אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: תְּמִידִין שֶׁלֹּא הוּצְרְכוּ לַצִּיבּוּר – לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אֵין נִפְדִּין תְּמִימִים, לְדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים נִפְדִּין תְּמִימִים.

But didn’t Rav Idi bar Avin say that Rav Amram said that Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to animals that were designated as daily offerings but that in the end were not needed for use by the public, and have inherent sanctity, how shall they be redeemed? According to the statement of Rabbi Shimon, they may not be redeemed as long as they are unblemished, since they retain the status of offerings. But according to the statement of the Rabbis, they may be redeemed even when they are unblemished, as the court initially stipulates that if they are not needed they will not assume the status of an offering. Since Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the Rabbis, it may be inferred that according to Rabbi Shimon, one does not say that the court tacitly stipulates concerning the offerings.

שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאִית לְהוּ תַּקַּנְתָּא בִּרְעִיָּיה.

The Gemara responds: In general, Rabbi Shimon holds that the court stipulates concerning them. And it is different there, in the case of the daily offerings, because they have an alternative arrangement through which their total loss may be avoided, as they may be left in the field to graze until they develop a blemish, at which point they may be sold. Since there is no arrangement for the libations save for sacrificing them with another offering, even Rabbi Shimon holds that the court stipulates concerning them.

מַתְנִי׳ וְלַד תּוֹדָה וּתְמוּרָתָהּ, הִפְרִישׁ תּוֹדָה וְאָבְדָה וְהִפְרִישׁ אַחֶרֶת תַּחְתֶּיהָ – אֵינָהּ טְעוּנָה לֶחֶם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְהִקְרִיב עַל זֶבַח הַתּוֹדָה״ – הַתּוֹדָה טְעוּנָה לֶחֶם, וְלֹא וְלָדָהּ וְלֹא חִילּוּפָהּ וְלֹא תְּמוּרָתָהּ טְעוּנִין לֶחֶם.

MISHNA: With regard to the offspring of an animal designated as a thanks offering, or an animal that is its substitute; or in a case where one separated an animal as a thanks offering and it was lost and he separated another in its stead, and the first animal was then found, in all three cases, the second animal, i.e., the offspring, the substitute, or the replacement, is sacrificed, but it does not require the bringing of accompanying loaves. This is as it is stated: “If he sacrifices it for a thanks offering, then he shall sacrifice with the thanks offering unleavened cakes mingled with oil, and unleavened wafers spread with oil, and cakes mingled with oil, of fine flour poached” (Leviticus 7:12). The verse indicates that the initial thanks offering requires loaves, but neither its offspring, nor its replacement, nor its substitute requires loaves.

גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מַהוּ אוֹמֵר ״תּוֹדָה יַקְרִיב״? ״אִם עַל תּוֹדָה יַקְרִיב״ – מִנַּיִן לְמַפְרִישׁ תּוֹדָתוֹ וְאָבְדָה, וְהִפְרִישׁ אַחֶרֶת תַּחְתֶּיהָ, וְנִמְצֵאת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה, וַהֲרֵי שְׁתֵּיהֶן עוֹמְדוֹת – מִנַּיִן שֶׁאֵיזֶה מֵהֶן שֶׁיִּרְצֶה יַקְרִיב וְלַחְמָהּ עִמָּהּ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״הַתּוֹדָה יַקְרִיב״.

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: What is it that the verse teaches when it states: He sacrifices for a thanks offering? The verse states: If he sacrifices for a thanks offering. From where is it derived that with regard to one who separated an animal as his thanks offering and it was lost and he separated another in its stead, and the first animal was then found, and now they both stand fit to be sacrificed, from where is it derived that he may sacrifice whichever one of them he wishes, and its loaves are brought along with it? The verse states that he shall sacrifice the thanks offering, i.e., as long as he sacrifices some thanks offering.

יָכוֹל שֶׁתְּהֵא שְׁנִיָּה טְעוּנָה לֶחֶם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״יַקְרִיבֶנּוּ״ – אֶחָד וְלֹא שְׁנַיִם. אַחַר שֶׁרִיבָּה הַכָּתוּב וּמִיעֵט, מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת וְלָדוֹת וַחֲלִיפוֹת וּתְמוּרוֹת לְהַקְרָבָה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אִם עַל תּוֹדָה״. יָכוֹל יְהוּ טְעוּנוֹת לֶחֶם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״וְהִקְרִיב עַל זֶבַח הַתּוֹדָה״ – תּוֹדָה טְעוּנָה לֶחֶם, וְלֹא וְלָדָהּ וְלֹא חִילּוּפָהּ וְלֹא תְּמוּרָתָהּ טְעוּנִין לֶחֶם.

The baraita continues: One might have thought that the second animal also requires loaves to be brought with it. Therefore, the verse states: “He sacrifices it,” indicating that only one thanks offering requires loaves, but not two. Since the verse included the second animal as fit for sacrifice and excluded it from the requirement to bring loaves with it, from where is it derived that the verse also includes a thanks offering’s offspring, replacements, and substitutes as fit for sacrifice? From the fact that the verse states: “If for a thanks offering,” one might have thought that they would require loaves to be brought with them. Therefore, the verse states: “Then he shall sacrifice with the thanks offering,” indicating that the initial thanks offering itself requires loaves, but neither its offspring, nor its replacement, nor its substitute requires loaves.

שְׁלַח רַב חֲנִינָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא לְאַחַר כַּפָּרָה, אֲבָל לִפְנֵי כַפָּרָה – טְעוּנִין לֶחֶם.

§ With regard to the offspring, substitute, and replacement of a thanks offering, the Gemara relates: Rav Ḥanina sent a letter from Eretz Yisrael to the Sages in Babylonia containing the following statement in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: The mishna taught that the offspring, replacement, and substitute do not require loaves only in a case where they were sacrificed after the owner achieved atonement, i.e., where the initial thanks offering was already sacrificed with its loaves; but if they were sacrificed before he achieved atonement, they require loaves.

הָוֵי בַּהּ רַב עַמְרָם: אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֲלִיפֵי תּוֹדַת חוֹבָה – אִי לִפְנֵי כַפָּרָה, תְּנֵינָא! אִי לְאַחַר כַּפָּרָה, תְּנֵינָא!

Rav Amram discussed this halakha sent in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan and asked: To which halakha in the mishna is this referring? If we say that Rabbi Yoḥanan is referring to the replacement for an obligatory thanks offering, then there is no novelty in his statement. If his intention is to teach that where the thanks offering was found before the owner achieved atonement with its replacement, the replacement requires loaves, we already learned this in the baraita, as it states: He may sacrifice whichever one of them he wishes, and its loaves are brought along with it. And if his intention is to teach that where the thanks offering was found after the owner achieved atonement with the replacement, the thanks offering does not require loaves, this too we already learned in the baraita, as it teaches that only the first offering requires loaves.