Menachot 82

ושלמים שם שם ממעשר ומינה מה שלמים אין גופן מעשר אף תודה נמי אין גופה מעשר והני חיטי הלקוחות במעות מעשר שני נמי אין גופן מעשר

And the halakha that a peace offering may be brought from second-tithe money is derived by a verbal analogy between “there” and “there” from the verse discussing second tithe. The verse states with regard to a peace offering: “And you shall sacrifice peace offerings and you shall eat there” (Deuteronomy 27:7), and the verse states with regard to second tithe: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place that He shall choose to cause His name to dwell there” (Deuteronomy 14:23). And from this it may be concluded: Just as peace offerings are not themselves brought from second tithe, as they are not produce, so too with regard to the loaves of a thanks offering, they are not themselves brought from second tithe. And that wheat which is purchased with second-tithe money is also not itself second tithe; it may therefore be used for the loaves of the thanks offering.

אימא טעמא דידי תודה מהיכא קא ילפינא לה משלמים ושלמים שם שם ממעשר מה שלמים אין מין מעשר אף תודה אין מין מעשר לאפוקי חיטין הלקוחות במעות מעשר שני דמין מעשר נינהו

Now I will say my reasoning for why one may not prepare the loaves of a thanks offering with wheat that was purchased with second-tithe money: From where do I derive the halakha that a thanks offering may be brought from second-tithe money? I derive it from the halakhot of a peace offering. And the halakha that a peace offering may be brought from second-tithe money is derived by a verbal analogy between “there” and “there” from second tithe. Therefore, just as a peace offering is not of the same species as second tithe, so too the loaves of a thanks offering may not be of the same species as second tithe. This serves to exclude wheat purchased with second-tithe money, which is of the same species as second tithe.

אמר רבי אמי המתפיס מעות מעשר שני לשלמים לא קנו שלמים מאי טעמא דלא אלימא קדושת השלמים למיחל אקדושת מעשר שני

§ Rabbi Ami says: In a case involving one who designates second-tithe money for a peace offering, the money does not assume the status of a peace offering. What is the reason? The reason is that the sanctity of the peace offering is not strong enough to take effect upon items that have the sanctity of second tithe.

מיתיבי הלוקח חיה לזבחי שלמים ובהמה לבשר תאוה לא יצא העור לחולין לאו למימרא דקני שלמים

The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna (Ma’aser Sheni 1:4): Ideally, one should use second-tithe money to purchase peace offerings. If one purchases a peace offering with second-tithe money, only the flesh of the animal is consecrated, while its hide is non-sacred. The mishna teaches: With regard to one who uses second-tithe money in an improper manner and purchases an undomesticated animal for a peace offering, a purpose for which an undomesticated animal cannot be used, or purchases a domesticated animal for meat of desire, i.e., ordinary meat, the Sages penalized him and decreed that the hide does not become non-sacred. The Gemara asks: Is that not to say that the hide of the animal purchased with the second-tithe money assumes the status of a peace offering, and it must be sold and the money used to purchase a peace offering, in contradiction to the statement of Rabbi Ami?

הא איתמר עלה אמר רב לא קני שלמים ומאי לא יצא העור לחולין הכי קאמר אינו בתורת לצאת העור לחולין מאי טעמא אמר רבה נעשה כלוקח שור לחרישה

The Gemara rejects this: Wasn’t it stated concerning that mishna that Rav said: The hide of the animal purchased with the second-tithe money does not assume the status of a peace offering; and what is the meaning of the mishna that the hide does not become non-sacred? This is what the mishna is saying: The hide, as part of an undomesticated animal, is not in the category of a peace offering at all so that its hide would become non-sacred. What is the reason? Rabba says: Since he used the second-tithe money in an improper manner, it is considered as if he purchased an ox for plowing, to which no sanctity of second tithe applies.

איתמר המתפיס מעות מעשר שני לשלמים רבי יוחנן אמר קני רבי אלעזר אומר לא קני

§ It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to one who designates second-tithe money for a peace offering. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The money assumes the status of a peace offering, and Rabbi Elazar says: The money does not assume the status of a peace offering.

ואליבא דרבי יהודה דאמר מעשר ממון הדיוט הוא דכולי עלמא לא פליגי דקני כי פליגי אליבא דרבי מאיר דאמר מעשר ממון גבוה הוא מאן דאמר לא קני כרבי מאיר ומאן דאמר קני כיון דמעשר קרי ליה שלמים כי מיתפסת ליה נמי תפיס

The Gemara elaborates: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: Second tithe is non-sacred property, everyone agrees that the money assumes the status of a peace offering. When they disagree, it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: Second tithe is property belonging to the Most High. The one who says that the money does not assume the status of a peace offering holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and one may not designate property of the Most High for another purpose. And the one who says that the money assumes the status of a peace offering holds that since second tithe is called a peace offering, as an animal purchased with second-tithe money without specification is brought as a peace offering, when he designates the money for a peace offering, it as well is designated with the sanctity of a peace offering.

מיתיבי המתפיס מעות מעשר שני לשלמים כשהוא פודן מוסיף עליהם שני חומשין אחד לקדש ואחד למעשר

The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of Rabbi Elazar from a baraita: In a case involving one who designates second-tithe money for a peace offering, the sanctity of a peace offering is applied to this money in addition to the sanctity of second tithe. Therefore, when he redeems this money, he adds to it two-fifths: One-fifth for the redemption of the sacrificial sanctity of a peace offering and one-fifth for the redemption of second tithe. Evidently, the sanctity of a peace offering does take effect on second-tithe money.

מי סברת דברי הכל היא הא מני רבי יהודה היא

The Gemara responds: Do you maintain that this baraita is agreed upon by everyone? In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that second-tithe money is non-sacred property. Accordingly, the sanctity of a peace offering takes effect on the money. Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

מתני׳ מנין לאומר הרי עלי תודה שלא יביא אלא מן החולין תלמוד לומר וזבחת פסח לה׳ אלהיך צאן ובקר והלא פסח אין בא אלא מן הכבשים ומן העזים אם כן מה תלמוד לומר צאן ובקר להקיש כל הבא מן הצאן ומן הבקר לפסח מה פסח דבר שבחובה ואין בא אלא מן החולין אף כל דבר שבחובה אין בא אלא מן החולין

MISHNA: From where is it derived with regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering, that he may bring it only from non-sacred money? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “And you shall sacrifice the Paschal offering to the Lord your God, of the flock and the herd” (Deuteronomy 16:2). The verse is difficult: Doesn’t the Paschal offering come only from lambs and goats? If so, why does the verse state: “The flock and the herd”? It is to juxtapose all offerings that come from the flock and from the herd to the Paschal offering, teaching that just as the Paschal offering is a matter of obligation and comes only from non-sacred money, so too any matter of obligation comes only from non-sacred money.

לפיכך האומר הרי עלי תודה הרי עלי שלמים הואיל ובאין חובה לא יביאו אלא מן החולין ונסכים בכל מקום לא יביאו אלא מן החולין

Therefore, in the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring a peace offering, since these offerings come as an obligation due to his vow, they may be brought only from non-sacred money. And libations, in any case, may be brought only from non-sacred money, and not from second-tithe money, because second-tithe money must be used to purchase items eaten by people, while libations are poured out next to the altar.

גמ׳ ופסח גופיה מנא לן דתניא רבי אליעזר אומר נאמר פסח במצרים ונאמר פסח לדורות מה פסח האמור במצרים לא בא אלא מן החולין אף פסח האמור לדורות לא בא אלא מן החולין

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the halakha that any matter of obligation must be brought from non-sacred property is derived from the halakha of the Paschal offering. The Gemara asks: And concerning the Paschal offering itself, from where do we derive that it is brought only from non-sacred property? As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: “Paschal offering” is stated in the Torah with regard to the offering sacrificed in Egypt (see Exodus 12:3), and “Paschal offering” is stated with regard to the yearly obligation throughout the generations (see Exodus 12:25). Therefore, just as the Paschal offering stated with regard to Egypt was brought only from non-sacred property, as there was no second tithe in Egypt, so too the Paschal offering stated with regard to the obligation throughout the generations may be brought only from non-sacred property.

אמר לו רבי עקיבא וכי דנין אפשר משאי אפשר אמר לו אף על פי שאי אפשר ראייה גדולה היא ונלמד הימנה

Rabbi Akiva said to him: But does one derive the possible from the impossible? Does one derive the halakha with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations, when there exists the possibility of using second-tithe money, from the halakha with regard to the Paschal offering sacrificed in Egypt, when there was no second tithe? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Even though it was impossible to bring the Paschal offering in Egypt from consecrated money, it is a great proof, and we shall derive this halakha from it.

חזר רבי עקיבא ודנו דין אחר מה לפסח מצרים שכן אין טעון מתן דמים ואימורין לגבי מזבח

Rabbi Akiva then presented a different logical derivation to reject the proof of Rabbi Eliezer: One cannot derive the halakha with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations from that of the Paschal offering in Egypt, as what is notable about the Paschal offering sacrificed in Egypt? It is notable in that it did not require the placement of blood on the altar nor that the sacrificial portions be consumed by the altar.

תאמר בפסח דורות שטעון מתן דמים ואימורין לגבי מזבח

Can you say the same with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations, which requires the placement of blood on the altar and that the sacrificial portions be consumed by the altar?

אמר לו הרי הוא אומר ועבדת את העבדה הזאת בחדש הזה שיהיו כל עבודות של חודש הזה כזה

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The Paschal offerings should be compared, as the verse states with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations: “And it shall be when the Lord shall bring you into the land of the Canaanite, and the Hittite, and the Amorite, and the Hivite, and the Jebusite, which He swore to your fathers to give you, a land flowing with milk and honey, that you shall perform this service in this month” (Exodus 13:5). This indicates that all the services of this month for the generations shall be like this, the Paschal offering of Egypt.

ורבי עקיבא אי סבר לה דאין דנין אפשר משאי אפשר ליקו במילתיה

The Gemara discusses the opinion of Rabbi Akiva: Initially, Rabbi Akiva rejects the statement of Rabbi Eliezer based on the claim that one cannot derive the possible from the impossible. He then rejects the statement of Rabbi Eliezer on a technicality, namely that the two Paschal offerings have different sacrificial requirements. The Gemara therefore challenges: And as for Rabbi Akiva, if he holds that one does not derive the possible from the impossible, then let him stand by his statement.

אי הדר ביה והאי דלא גמר מפסח מצרים משום האי פירכא הוא פסח מדבר יוכיח

And if he retracted and conceded that one derives the possible from the impossible, and the fact that he did not derive the halakha with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations from the halakha of the Paschal offering in Egypt is due to that refutation that he proposed, i.e., that the Paschal offerings are different, then the Paschal offering that was sacrificed in the second year in the wilderness will prove that this refutation is incorrect. That offering did require placement of the blood and sacrificial portions on the altar, yet it was brought only from non-sacred money, as there were no tithes in the wilderness.

לדבריו דרבי אליעזר קאמר לדידי אין דנין אפשר משאי אפשר לדידך דאמרת דנין אפשר משאי אפשר מה לפסח מצרים שכן אינו טעון מתן דמים ואימורין לגבי מזבח תאמר בפסח דורות שטעון מתן דמים ואימורין לגבי מזבח

The Gemara explains: Rabbi Akiva stated this objection in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. He meant as follows: According to my opinion, one does not derive the possible from the impossible, and this is a sufficient reason why one cannot derive the halakha with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations from the halakha of the Paschal offering in Egypt. And even according to your opinion, in which you said that one derives the possible from the impossible, this comparison can be refuted: What is notable about the Paschal offering sacrificed in Egypt? It is notable in that it did not require the placement of blood on the altar nor that the sacrificial portions be consumed by the altar. Can you say the same with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations, which requires the placement of blood on the altar and that the sacrificial portions be consumed by the altar?

ואמר ליה רבי אליעזר ועבדת

And in response to this, Rabbi Eliezer said to him that the halakha with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations should be derived from the halakha of the Paschal offering in Egypt, since the verse states with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations: “That you shall keep this service in this month.”

ורבי אליעזר לימא ליה פסח מדבר יוכיח

The Gemara asks: But why must Rabbi Eliezer cite this verse? Let him say to Rabbi Akiva: The Paschal offering brought in the wilderness will prove that this refutation is incorrect, since it did require placement of the blood and consumption of sacrificial portions on the altar, yet it was brought only from non-sacred money.

לדבריו דרבי עקיבא קאמר ליה לדידי דנין אפשר משאי אפשר ומשום האי פירכא פסח מדבר יוכיח לדידך דאמרת אין דנין אפשר משאי אפשר ועבדת

The Gemara responds: Rabbi Eliezer stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Akiva. He meant as follows: In my opinion, one derives the possible from the impossible. And as for that refutation that you raised, that the Paschal offering in Egypt and the Paschal offering of the generations have different sacrificial requirements, the Paschal offering of the wilderness will prove that this is not a valid refutation. According to your opinion, in which you said that one does not derive the possible from the impossible, the verse states: “That you shall keep this service in this month,” indicating that the Paschal offering of the generations is compared to the Paschal offering in Egypt.

והשתא נמי ליפרוך אמר רב ששת זאת אומרת אין משיבין על ההיקש

The Gemara challenges: But even now, let Rabbi Akiva refute this comparison by the same claim that one cannot derive the possible from the impossible. Rav Sheshet says: That is to say that one cannot refute a juxtaposition, i.e., one cannot refute such a derivation based on reasoning.

ובתרביצא אמור וכי דבר הלמד בהיקש חוזר ומלמד בהיקש בכללא איתמר פסח כוליה חדא מילתא היא

And in the study hall [uvetarbitza] they discussed the statement of the mishna that the halakha that all obligatory offerings must be brought from non-sacred property is derived from the Paschal offering of the generations, and they said: But can a matter derived via juxtaposition, i.e., the Paschal offering of the generations, whose halakha is derived by juxtaposition from the Paschal offering in Egypt, again teach a matter via another juxtaposition? The Gemara responds: This is not considered an instance of a matter derived by juxtaposition teaching a matter derived by another juxtaposition. Rather, the statement of the mishna that all offerings are juxtaposed to the Paschal offering was stated in a general manner, since the entire Paschal offering is one matter. The Paschal offering in Egypt and the Paschal offering of the generations are both referred to as a Paschal offering.

ורבי עקיבא פסח דאינו בא אלא מן החולין מנא ליה נפקא ליה מהא דאמר שמואל משום רבי אליעזר זאת התורה לעלה ולמנחה ולחטאת ולאשם ולמלואים ולזבח השלמים

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Akiva, who rejects the proofs of Rabbi Eliezer, from where does he derive that the Paschal offering comes only from non-sacred money? The Gemara responds: Rabbi Akiva derives it from that which Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: It is stated: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the inauguration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37). This verse connects all of the specified offerings, such that individual aspects of each offering are applicable to all of the offerings.

עולה מה עולה טעונה כלי אף כל טעון כלי מאי היא אילימא מזרק גבי זבחי שלמי ציבור נמי כתיב וישם באגנת

The Gemara details these aspects. The verse states: “Of the burnt offering,” to teach that all of the offerings are like a burnt offering in that just as a burnt offering requires a utensil in its preparation, so too do all animal offerings require a utensil. What is the utensil? If we say it is a bowl, a utensil used for collecting the blood, as is learned from the burnt offerings that were sacrificed at Mount Sinai, that cannot be correct, as a utensil for collecting blood does not need to be learned from a burnt offering. With regard to communal peace offerings it is also written: “And they offered burnt offerings, and they sacrificed peace offerings…And Moses took half of the blood and put it in basins” (Exodus 24:5–6).

אלא סכין ועולה גופה מנלן דכתיב וישלח אברהם את ידו ויקח את המאכלת לשחט את בנו והתם עולה הוא דכתיב ויעלהו לעלה תחת בנו

Rather, the term utensil must be referring to a knife, as the slaughter may be performed only with a knife and not with a sharp stone or reed. The Gemara asks: And with regard to a burnt offering itself, from where do we derive that it must be slaughtered with a knife? This is learned from that which is written: “And Abraham stretched forth his hand, and took the knife to slaughter his son” (Genesis 22:10); and there, Abraham was sacrificing a burnt offering, as it is written: “And offered it up for a burnt offering instead of his son” (Genesis 22:13).

מנחה מה מנחה אינה נאכלת אלא לזכרי כהונה אף כל אין נאכלין אלא לזכרי כהונה מאי אי חטאת ואשם

The Gemara continues to expound the aforementioned verse (Leviticus 7:37). When the verse mentions a meal offering, it teaches that just as a meal offering is eaten only by males of the priesthood (see Leviticus 6:9–11), so too are all of the offerings mentioned in this verse eaten only by males of the priesthood. The Gemara asks: With regard to what offering is it that this halakha must be derived? If one suggests that it is with regard to the sin offering and the guilt offering,