Today's Daf Yomi
February 21, 2023 | ל׳ בשבט תשפ״ג
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This month is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross z'l, on his 1st yahrzeit
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Masechet Nazir is sponsored by the family of Rabbi Howard Alpert, HaRav Tzvi Lipa ben Hillel, in honor of his first yahrzeit.
Nazir 29
This week’s learning is dedicated by Phyllis & Yossie Hecht in memory of Phyllis’s father’s 14th yahrzeit, l’zecher HaRav Yerachmiel Binyanim ben Zalman Tzvi Witkin. “Jerry Witkin, as he was affectionately known to all, was a true source of nachat to his friends, family and clal yisrael. Dad was a friend to all, activist and champion of causes and sameach b’chelko. As this week is Parshat Terumah, Dad only knew had to give and never learned how to take. It is so appropriate to commemorate this part of Adar in your memory as the yahrzeit is the first day of Rosh Chodesh Adar. Meshenichnas Adar Marbim B’Simcha! Dad was a baal koreh par excellence since he was 11 years old-and on Purim was the baal koreh of Megilat Esther which brought joy to so many. Your legacy of 6 children, 29 grandchildren and ever growing great-grandchildren – all Torah Jews continues to live on. You are so missed and we have been so blessed. Yehi Zichro Baruch.”
Why can a man make his son become a nazir but a woman cannot? Rabbi Yochanan says it is a halacha l’Moshe m’Sinai. Reish Lakish says it is because it is part of the father’s obligation of chinuch (education) for his son. Seven questions are brought against Reish Lakish’s opinion including, why wouldn’t a woman also be obligated to educate her child, why wouldn’t it apply to daughters as well, and how can the relatives protest the father’s educating of his child. In answer to the seventh question, the Gemara assumes that Reish Lakish holds like Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda that by Torah law one does not need to slaughter birds. A question is raised against that as it seems from another source that Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda does hold birds need proper slaughtering by Torah law. But, in the end, it can be explained that the other source was referring to rabbinic law. It is suggested that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish’s debate between Rebbi and Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda regarding the cut-off age at which a father can no longer take on a nazirite vow for his son. But that suggestion is rejected. Rebbi and Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda have the same debate as Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yosi as found in the Tosefta Nidda 5:6.
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אמר ריש לקיש כדי לחנכו במצות אי הכי אפילו אשה נמי סבר איש חייב לחנך בנו במצות ואין האשה חייבת לחנך את בנה
said that Reish Lakish said: The purpose is in order to educate him in mitzvot, to teach him how to observe the mitzva of naziriteship. The Gemara asks: If so, even a woman as well should be able to impose naziriteship on her son for educational purposes. The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish holds that a man is obligated to educate his son in mitzvot, but a woman is not obligated to educate her son in mitzvot.
בשלמא לרבי יוחנן דאמר הלכה היא בנזיר אמטו להכי בנו אין בתו לא אלא לריש לקיש אפילו בתו קסבר בנו חייב לחנכו בתו אינו חייב לחנכה
The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai with regard to a nazirite, for that reason one can understand the ruling of the mishna, which indicates that for his son, yes, a father can vow that he should be a nazirite, but with regard to his daughter, no, he cannot do so, as a halakha learned by tradition cannot be questioned. However, according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, a father should even be able to impose naziriteship upon his daughter for the sake of her education. Why does the mishna specify a son? The Gemara answers that Reish Lakish holds: A father is obligated to educate his son, whereas he is not obligated to educate his daughter, and for this reason he cannot vow that she should be a nazirite.
בשלמא לרבי יוחנן דאמר הלכה היא בנזיר אהכי בנזירות אין בנדרים לא אלא לריש לקיש אפילו נדרים נמי
The Gemara asks another question: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that it is a halakha with regard to a nazirite, this is why the mishna indicates that with regard to naziriteship, yes, a father can impose a vow upon his son, but with regard to other vows, no, he cannot do so. However, according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, who says it is for the son’s education, a father should even be able to impose regular vows upon him as well. Why does the mishna specify naziriteship?
לא מיבעיא קאמר לא מיבעיא בנדרים דלית ליה ניוול אלא אפילו בנזירות דאית ליה ניוול אפילו הכי חייב לחנכו
The Gemara answers: According to Reish Lakish the tanna of this mishna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, as follows: It is not necessary to ask whether a father can impose regular vows of a mitzva where there is no deprivation of the son when he fulfills his father’s vow, but even with regard to naziriteship, where there is deprivation of his son, as the son must refrain from wine and shaving, even so the father is obligated to educate him, and therefore he can vow in this manner too.
בשלמא לרבי יוחנן דאמר הלכה היא בנזיר היינו דקתני מיחה או שמיחוהו קרוביו
The Gemara asks another question: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai with regard to a nazirite, this explanation is consistent with that which the mishna teaches: If he objected, or his relatives objected for him, the naziriteship is canceled, as the transmitted halakha may be that the acquiescence of the relatives is necessary.
אלא לרבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אמר ריש לקיש כל כמיניהון קרובים דאמרין ליה לא תיגמריה מצות קסבר כל חינוך דלא חשיב לא ניחא ליה
The Gemara continues its question: However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who said that Reish Lakish said that this vow serves educational purposes, is this really in the power of the relatives to say to the father: Do not teach him mitzvot? The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish holds that with regard to any education that is not important, e.g., the optional mitzva of naziriteship, the son is not amenable to the suffering he must endure for this purpose, and therefore he or his relatives can object.
בשלמא לרבי יוחנן דאמר הלכה היא בנזיר משום הכי מגלח ועביד הקפה
The Gemara raises a further difficulty: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a halakha with regard to a nazirite, it is due to that reason that the son must shave all of his hair at the conclusion of his naziriteship, despite the fact that he thereby performs the rounding of the corners of his head, in violation of the prohibition: “You shall not round the corners of your heads” (Leviticus 19:27). Since a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai has the status of Torah law, a minor nazirite shaves despite this prohibition.
אלא לרבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אמר ריש לקיש כדי לחנכו במצות הא קעביד הקפה
The Gemara continues its question: However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who said that Reish Lakish said that the reason the vow of naziriteship takes effect is in order to educate him in mitzvot, and it applies only by rabbinic law, how does he explain the fact that this nazirite performs the rounding of the head? How does a naziriteship, which is by rabbinic law, override a Torah prohibition?
קסבר הקפת כל הראש מדרבנן וחינוך מדרבנן ואתי חינוך דרבנן ודחי הקפה דרבנן
The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish holds that the rounding of the entire head is prohibited only by rabbinic law, as the Torah itself prohibited shaving only the corners of the head, and the mitzva of education also applies by rabbinic law. And therefore the mitzva of education, which is by rabbinic law, comes and overrides the prohibition against rounding the head, which likewise applies by rabbinic law.
בשלמא לרבי יוחנן דאמר הלכה היא בנזיר אהכי מגלח מייתי קרבן
The Gemara continues to ask along the same lines: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a halakha with regard to a nazirite, this is why when he shaves at the conclusion of his naziriteship he brings an offering, as the halakha is that the minor is a nazirite in all regards, which means his offering is obligatory, like that of an adult nazirite.
אלא לרבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אמר ריש לקיש כדי לחנכו במצות הא קא מייתי חולין לעזרה קסבר חולין בעזרה לאו דאורייתא
The Gemara continues its question: However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who said that Reish Lakish said that the reason is in order to educate him in mitzvot, the minor’s offering is not a Torah obligation, which means that he brings non-sacred animals into the Temple courtyard for slaughter. The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish holds that the prohibition against slaughtering non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard does not apply by Torah law but by rabbinic law, and therefore this prohibition is disregarded due to the importance of the son’s education.
בשלמא לרבי יוחנן דאמר הלכה היא בנזיר אהכי כי מיטמא מייתי קרבן ציפרין ואכיל כהן מליקה
The Gemara asks yet another question: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a halakha with regard to a nazirite, this is why when the son becomes ritually impure he brings an offering of birds, and the priest may eat the bird sin-offering that was killed by means of pinching, nipping the neck of the bird, rather than by regular slaughter. This permits a bird to be eaten only in the case of a proper bird offering.
אלא לרבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אמר ריש לקיש הא קאכיל נבילה
The Gemara continues its question: However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who said that Reish Lakish said that the reason the vow takes effect is to educate the son in mitzvot, in this case the priest eats an unslaughtered animal carcass. If the son is not obligated to bring the offering, the priest will be eating a bird that was killed in a manner that does not render it fit for consumption, which means it has the status of an unslaughtered carcass.
קסבר כרבי יוסי ברבי יהודה דאין שחיטה לעוף מן התורה וחולין בעזרה לאו דאורייתא
The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that slaughter of a bird is not obligatory by Torah law. Rather, by Torah law birds are fit to be eaten no matter how they are killed, and it was the Sages who decreed that they must be slaughtered. And he also maintains that the prohibition against bringing non-sacred animals for slaughter in the Temple courtyard does not apply by Torah law. Consequently the rabbinic mitzva of education overrides these prohibitions, as they too are rabbinic.
וסבר רבי יוסי הכי והתניא רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה אומר מנין לחטאת העוף שהיא באה על הספק שאינה נאכלת תלמוד לומר והזב את זובו לזכר ולנקבה מקיש נקבה לזכר מה זכר מביא קרבן על הודאי אף נקבה מביאה קרבן על הודאי ומה זכר מביא על הספק אף נקבה מביאה על הספק
The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yosei hold this opinion? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: From where is it derived that the bird sin-offering that comes due to uncertainty is not eaten? The verse states: “And they who have an issue, whether a male or a female” (Leviticus 15:33), which juxtaposes a female to a male: Just as a male brings an offering for a definite sin, i.e., for a transgression he is sure he committed inadvertently, so too, a female brings an offering for a definite sin. And just as a male brings a provisional guilt-offering for his uncertain transgression, so too, a female brings an offering for her case of uncertainty.
ומה זכר ממין שהוא מביא על הודאי מביא על הספק אף נקבה ממין שהיא מביאה על הודאי מביאה על הספק אי מה זכר מביא קרבן ונאכל אף נקבה מביאה קרבן ונאכל אמרת
And furthermore: Just as a male brings an animal for his uncertain transgression, a ram as a guilt-offering, from the same type from which he brings a definite sin-offering, an animal sin-offering, so too, a female brings the same type for her case of uncertainty from the same type from which she brings for a definite offering, i.e., a bird if she is a zava or gave birth. This leads to the following question: If so, one can continue this line of thought: Just as a male brings an offering and it is eaten, so too, a female brings an offering and it should be eaten when she sacrifices an offering for uncertain childbirth. With regard to this case you say:
לא אם אמרת בזכר שכן איסור אחד תאמר בנקבה ששני איסורין
No, you cannot make this claim, because if you say that this is true with regard to a male, when bringing his offering involves only one uncertain prohibition, i.e., that he might be bringing non-sacred animals into the Temple courtyard, shall you also say that this is the case with regard to a female, whose case includes two prohibitions? This concludes the baraita.
מאי שני איסורין לאו איסור נבילה וחולין בעזרה מתקיף לה רב אחא בריה דרב איקא ודילמא מיחייב עליה משום דמיתחזי כתרין איסורין מדרבנן
The Gemara asks: What are these two prohibitions? Are they not the prohibition against consuming an unslaughtered animal carcass by eating a bird killed by pinching, and the prohibition against bringing non-sacred animals into the Temple courtyard? This shows that the prohibition against bringing non-sacred animals into the Temple courtyard applies by Torah law according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, objects to this: And perhaps one is not liable for these prohibitions by Torah law, rather, the baraita means that one is liable for this because it appears like two Torah prohibitions, although they actually apply only by rabbinic law.
לימא כתנאי עד מתי מדיר את בנו בנזיר עד שיביא שתי שערות דברי רבי רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה אומר עד שיגיע לעונת נדרים
§ The Gemara returns to the question of whether the ruling that a man can impose naziriteship on his son is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai or whether it is part of the boy’s education. Let us say that this is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught: Until when can a father vow that his son should be a nazirite? It is until the son develops two pubic hairs; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: It is until he reaches the age of vows, usually approximately a year earlier, when he demonstrates an understanding of the nature of vows. If he vows at that age and comprehends the significance of his utterance, his vow is valid.
מאי לאו תנאי היא דרבי סבר הלכה היא בנזיר ואף על גב דהגיע לעונת נדרים מדיר ליה ואזיל עד דמייתי שתי שערות ורבי יוסי ברבי יהודה דאמר עד שיגיע לעונת נדרים סבר כדי לחנכו במצות וכיון דנפיק מרשותיה תו לא מיחייב
What, is it not the case that this is a dispute between tanna’im: As Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that it is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai with regard to a nazirite, and therefore even though the son has already reached the age of vows and is capable of making his own decision with regard to the vow, this halakha states that the father continues to vow for him until he develops two pubic hairs, the sign of maturity. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the father can vow for the son only until he reaches the age of vows, holds that he imposes a vow on his son in order to educate him in mitzvot, and since the son has left the father’s supervision to the degree that he can utter his own vows, the father is no longer obligated to educate him in this area of halakha.
אמרי לא דכולי עלמא הלכה היא בנזיר והכא במופלא הסמוך לאיש קמיפלגי
The Gemara rejects this argument. The Sages say in response: No; this is not the correct explanation of that dispute, as one can say that everyone, both Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, agrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan that it is a halakha with regard to a nazirite, and here they disagree with regard to the issue of a minor one year before he or she reaches majority. In other words, they dispute the case of a child who utters a vow when he is almost mature, on the verge of puberty. It is an accepted halakha that the vow of this child is valid if he understands its meaning. The dispute concerns the source of this halakha.
רבי סבר מופלא הסמוך לאיש דרבנן ואתיא דאורייתא דחיא דרבנן ורבי יוסי ברבי יהודה סבר מופלא הסמוך לאיש דאורייתא
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the status of a minor one year before he or she reaches majority applies by rabbinic law, and therefore the halakha by Torah law that a father can vow on behalf of his son comes and overrides the decree that one who is near the age of maturity is considered an independent adult with regard to vows, which is by rabbinic law. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the status of a minor one year before he or she reaches majority applies by Torah law. Consequently, the halakha that a father can vow on behalf of his son does not apply to this case.
ואיבעית אימא דכולי עלמא כדי לחנכו במצות ומופלא הסמוך לאיש דרבנן היא רבי סבר אתי חינוך דרבנן ודחי מופלא הסמוך לאיש דרבנן
And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that a father vows for his son in order to educate him in mitzvot, which means it is by rabbinic law, and likewise the status of a minor one year before he or she reaches majority is also by rabbinic law. In that case, the tanna’im dispute the following: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the mitzva of education, which applies by rabbinic law, comes and overrides the status of a minor one year before he or she reaches majority, which is also by rabbinic law.
ורבי יוסי ברבי יהודה דאמר עד שיגיע לעונת נדרים קסבר לא אתי חינוך דרבנן ודחי מופלא הסמוך לאיש
And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that a father can vow for his son only until he reaches the age of vows, holds that the mitzva of education by rabbinic law does not come and override the status of a minor one year before he or she reaches majority. Consequently, there is no necessary connection between this dispute of tanna’im and the argument between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish as to whether the ruling that a father can impose naziriteship on his son is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai or an educational tool.
לימא הני תנאי כי הני תנאי דתניא מעשה ברבי חנינא שהדירו אביו בנזיר והביאו לפני רבן גמליאל והיה רבן גמליאל בודקו לידע אם הביא שתי שערות אם לא הביא
With regard to the dispute concerning the time period for a father’s vow on behalf of his son, the Gemara suggests: Shall we say that the dispute between these tanna’im is like the dispute between those other tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Nidda 5:9): An incident occurred involving Rabbi Ḥanina in which his father vowed that he should be a nazirite when he was a minor, and they brought him before Rabban Gamliel, and Rabban Gamliel examined him to discern if he had already developed two pubic hairs, in which case the vow would not take effect, or if he had not developed them, which would mean that the vow was valid.
רבי יוסי אומר לידע אם הגיע לעונת נדרים אם לאו אמר לו רבי אל תצטער לבודקני אם קטן אני אהיה בשביל אבא אם גדול אני אהיה בשביל עצמי עמד רבן גמליאל ונשקו על ראשו אמר מובטח אני בזה שמורה הלכה בישראל אמרו לא היו ימים מועטים עד שהורה הוראה בישראל
Rabbi Yosei says that Rabban Gamliel examined him to discern whether he had reached the age of vows or not, which he maintains is the decisive factor. The child said to Rabban Gamliel: My teacher, do not go to the trouble of examining me, since if I am a minor I shall be a nazirite due to my father’s vow, and if I am an adult, I shall be a nazirite due to my own vow. Rabban Gamliel arose and kissed the child on his head. He said: I am certain of this child that he will eventually become an authority of halakha for the Jewish people. They said: In fact, it was only a few years later that the child issued rulings for the Jewish people.
בשלמא לרבי יוסי ברבי יהודה דאמר עד שיגיע לעונת נדרים היינו דקאמר אם קטן אני אהיה בשביל אבא אלא לרבי דאמר עד שיביא שתי שערות ואם גדול אני אהיה בשביל עצמי
The Gemara explains its suggestion: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that a father can vow on behalf of his son only until he reaches the age of vows, this is why the child said: If I am a minor I shall be a nazirite due to my father, as he means: If I have not yet reached the age of vows. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said that a father can vow naziriteship for his son until he develops two pubic hairs, despite the fact that he is already mature with regard to vows, what is the meaning of: And if I am an adult, I shall be a nazirite due to my own vow?
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This month is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross z'l, on his 1st yahrzeit
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Masechet Nazir is sponsored by the family of Rabbi Howard Alpert, HaRav Tzvi Lipa ben Hillel, in honor of his first yahrzeit.
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Nazir 29
The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria
אמר ריש לקיש כדי לחנכו במצות אי הכי אפילו אשה נמי סבר איש חייב לחנך בנו במצות ואין האשה חייבת לחנך את בנה
said that Reish Lakish said: The purpose is in order to educate him in mitzvot, to teach him how to observe the mitzva of naziriteship. The Gemara asks: If so, even a woman as well should be able to impose naziriteship on her son for educational purposes. The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish holds that a man is obligated to educate his son in mitzvot, but a woman is not obligated to educate her son in mitzvot.
בשלמא לרבי יוחנן דאמר הלכה היא בנזיר אמטו להכי בנו אין בתו לא אלא לריש לקיש אפילו בתו קסבר בנו חייב לחנכו בתו אינו חייב לחנכה
The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai with regard to a nazirite, for that reason one can understand the ruling of the mishna, which indicates that for his son, yes, a father can vow that he should be a nazirite, but with regard to his daughter, no, he cannot do so, as a halakha learned by tradition cannot be questioned. However, according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, a father should even be able to impose naziriteship upon his daughter for the sake of her education. Why does the mishna specify a son? The Gemara answers that Reish Lakish holds: A father is obligated to educate his son, whereas he is not obligated to educate his daughter, and for this reason he cannot vow that she should be a nazirite.
בשלמא לרבי יוחנן דאמר הלכה היא בנזיר אהכי בנזירות אין בנדרים לא אלא לריש לקיש אפילו נדרים נמי
The Gemara asks another question: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that it is a halakha with regard to a nazirite, this is why the mishna indicates that with regard to naziriteship, yes, a father can impose a vow upon his son, but with regard to other vows, no, he cannot do so. However, according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, who says it is for the son’s education, a father should even be able to impose regular vows upon him as well. Why does the mishna specify naziriteship?
לא מיבעיא קאמר לא מיבעיא בנדרים דלית ליה ניוול אלא אפילו בנזירות דאית ליה ניוול אפילו הכי חייב לחנכו
The Gemara answers: According to Reish Lakish the tanna of this mishna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, as follows: It is not necessary to ask whether a father can impose regular vows of a mitzva where there is no deprivation of the son when he fulfills his father’s vow, but even with regard to naziriteship, where there is deprivation of his son, as the son must refrain from wine and shaving, even so the father is obligated to educate him, and therefore he can vow in this manner too.
בשלמא לרבי יוחנן דאמר הלכה היא בנזיר היינו דקתני מיחה או שמיחוהו קרוביו
The Gemara asks another question: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai with regard to a nazirite, this explanation is consistent with that which the mishna teaches: If he objected, or his relatives objected for him, the naziriteship is canceled, as the transmitted halakha may be that the acquiescence of the relatives is necessary.
אלא לרבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אמר ריש לקיש כל כמיניהון קרובים דאמרין ליה לא תיגמריה מצות קסבר כל חינוך דלא חשיב לא ניחא ליה
The Gemara continues its question: However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who said that Reish Lakish said that this vow serves educational purposes, is this really in the power of the relatives to say to the father: Do not teach him mitzvot? The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish holds that with regard to any education that is not important, e.g., the optional mitzva of naziriteship, the son is not amenable to the suffering he must endure for this purpose, and therefore he or his relatives can object.
בשלמא לרבי יוחנן דאמר הלכה היא בנזיר משום הכי מגלח ועביד הקפה
The Gemara raises a further difficulty: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a halakha with regard to a nazirite, it is due to that reason that the son must shave all of his hair at the conclusion of his naziriteship, despite the fact that he thereby performs the rounding of the corners of his head, in violation of the prohibition: “You shall not round the corners of your heads” (Leviticus 19:27). Since a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai has the status of Torah law, a minor nazirite shaves despite this prohibition.
אלא לרבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אמר ריש לקיש כדי לחנכו במצות הא קעביד הקפה
The Gemara continues its question: However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who said that Reish Lakish said that the reason the vow of naziriteship takes effect is in order to educate him in mitzvot, and it applies only by rabbinic law, how does he explain the fact that this nazirite performs the rounding of the head? How does a naziriteship, which is by rabbinic law, override a Torah prohibition?
קסבר הקפת כל הראש מדרבנן וחינוך מדרבנן ואתי חינוך דרבנן ודחי הקפה דרבנן
The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish holds that the rounding of the entire head is prohibited only by rabbinic law, as the Torah itself prohibited shaving only the corners of the head, and the mitzva of education also applies by rabbinic law. And therefore the mitzva of education, which is by rabbinic law, comes and overrides the prohibition against rounding the head, which likewise applies by rabbinic law.
בשלמא לרבי יוחנן דאמר הלכה היא בנזיר אהכי מגלח מייתי קרבן
The Gemara continues to ask along the same lines: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a halakha with regard to a nazirite, this is why when he shaves at the conclusion of his naziriteship he brings an offering, as the halakha is that the minor is a nazirite in all regards, which means his offering is obligatory, like that of an adult nazirite.
אלא לרבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אמר ריש לקיש כדי לחנכו במצות הא קא מייתי חולין לעזרה קסבר חולין בעזרה לאו דאורייתא
The Gemara continues its question: However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who said that Reish Lakish said that the reason is in order to educate him in mitzvot, the minor’s offering is not a Torah obligation, which means that he brings non-sacred animals into the Temple courtyard for slaughter. The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish holds that the prohibition against slaughtering non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard does not apply by Torah law but by rabbinic law, and therefore this prohibition is disregarded due to the importance of the son’s education.
בשלמא לרבי יוחנן דאמר הלכה היא בנזיר אהכי כי מיטמא מייתי קרבן ציפרין ואכיל כהן מליקה
The Gemara asks yet another question: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a halakha with regard to a nazirite, this is why when the son becomes ritually impure he brings an offering of birds, and the priest may eat the bird sin-offering that was killed by means of pinching, nipping the neck of the bird, rather than by regular slaughter. This permits a bird to be eaten only in the case of a proper bird offering.
אלא לרבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אמר ריש לקיש הא קאכיל נבילה
The Gemara continues its question: However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who said that Reish Lakish said that the reason the vow takes effect is to educate the son in mitzvot, in this case the priest eats an unslaughtered animal carcass. If the son is not obligated to bring the offering, the priest will be eating a bird that was killed in a manner that does not render it fit for consumption, which means it has the status of an unslaughtered carcass.
קסבר כרבי יוסי ברבי יהודה דאין שחיטה לעוף מן התורה וחולין בעזרה לאו דאורייתא
The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that slaughter of a bird is not obligatory by Torah law. Rather, by Torah law birds are fit to be eaten no matter how they are killed, and it was the Sages who decreed that they must be slaughtered. And he also maintains that the prohibition against bringing non-sacred animals for slaughter in the Temple courtyard does not apply by Torah law. Consequently the rabbinic mitzva of education overrides these prohibitions, as they too are rabbinic.
וסבר רבי יוסי הכי והתניא רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה אומר מנין לחטאת העוף שהיא באה על הספק שאינה נאכלת תלמוד לומר והזב את זובו לזכר ולנקבה מקיש נקבה לזכר מה זכר מביא קרבן על הודאי אף נקבה מביאה קרבן על הודאי ומה זכר מביא על הספק אף נקבה מביאה על הספק
The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yosei hold this opinion? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: From where is it derived that the bird sin-offering that comes due to uncertainty is not eaten? The verse states: “And they who have an issue, whether a male or a female” (Leviticus 15:33), which juxtaposes a female to a male: Just as a male brings an offering for a definite sin, i.e., for a transgression he is sure he committed inadvertently, so too, a female brings an offering for a definite sin. And just as a male brings a provisional guilt-offering for his uncertain transgression, so too, a female brings an offering for her case of uncertainty.
ומה זכר ממין שהוא מביא על הודאי מביא על הספק אף נקבה ממין שהיא מביאה על הודאי מביאה על הספק אי מה זכר מביא קרבן ונאכל אף נקבה מביאה קרבן ונאכל אמרת
And furthermore: Just as a male brings an animal for his uncertain transgression, a ram as a guilt-offering, from the same type from which he brings a definite sin-offering, an animal sin-offering, so too, a female brings the same type for her case of uncertainty from the same type from which she brings for a definite offering, i.e., a bird if she is a zava or gave birth. This leads to the following question: If so, one can continue this line of thought: Just as a male brings an offering and it is eaten, so too, a female brings an offering and it should be eaten when she sacrifices an offering for uncertain childbirth. With regard to this case you say:
לא אם אמרת בזכר שכן איסור אחד תאמר בנקבה ששני איסורין
No, you cannot make this claim, because if you say that this is true with regard to a male, when bringing his offering involves only one uncertain prohibition, i.e., that he might be bringing non-sacred animals into the Temple courtyard, shall you also say that this is the case with regard to a female, whose case includes two prohibitions? This concludes the baraita.
מאי שני איסורין לאו איסור נבילה וחולין בעזרה מתקיף לה רב אחא בריה דרב איקא ודילמא מיחייב עליה משום דמיתחזי כתרין איסורין מדרבנן
The Gemara asks: What are these two prohibitions? Are they not the prohibition against consuming an unslaughtered animal carcass by eating a bird killed by pinching, and the prohibition against bringing non-sacred animals into the Temple courtyard? This shows that the prohibition against bringing non-sacred animals into the Temple courtyard applies by Torah law according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, objects to this: And perhaps one is not liable for these prohibitions by Torah law, rather, the baraita means that one is liable for this because it appears like two Torah prohibitions, although they actually apply only by rabbinic law.
לימא כתנאי עד מתי מדיר את בנו בנזיר עד שיביא שתי שערות דברי רבי רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה אומר עד שיגיע לעונת נדרים
§ The Gemara returns to the question of whether the ruling that a man can impose naziriteship on his son is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai or whether it is part of the boy’s education. Let us say that this is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught: Until when can a father vow that his son should be a nazirite? It is until the son develops two pubic hairs; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: It is until he reaches the age of vows, usually approximately a year earlier, when he demonstrates an understanding of the nature of vows. If he vows at that age and comprehends the significance of his utterance, his vow is valid.
מאי לאו תנאי היא דרבי סבר הלכה היא בנזיר ואף על גב דהגיע לעונת נדרים מדיר ליה ואזיל עד דמייתי שתי שערות ורבי יוסי ברבי יהודה דאמר עד שיגיע לעונת נדרים סבר כדי לחנכו במצות וכיון דנפיק מרשותיה תו לא מיחייב
What, is it not the case that this is a dispute between tanna’im: As Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that it is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai with regard to a nazirite, and therefore even though the son has already reached the age of vows and is capable of making his own decision with regard to the vow, this halakha states that the father continues to vow for him until he develops two pubic hairs, the sign of maturity. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the father can vow for the son only until he reaches the age of vows, holds that he imposes a vow on his son in order to educate him in mitzvot, and since the son has left the father’s supervision to the degree that he can utter his own vows, the father is no longer obligated to educate him in this area of halakha.
אמרי לא דכולי עלמא הלכה היא בנזיר והכא במופלא הסמוך לאיש קמיפלגי
The Gemara rejects this argument. The Sages say in response: No; this is not the correct explanation of that dispute, as one can say that everyone, both Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, agrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan that it is a halakha with regard to a nazirite, and here they disagree with regard to the issue of a minor one year before he or she reaches majority. In other words, they dispute the case of a child who utters a vow when he is almost mature, on the verge of puberty. It is an accepted halakha that the vow of this child is valid if he understands its meaning. The dispute concerns the source of this halakha.
רבי סבר מופלא הסמוך לאיש דרבנן ואתיא דאורייתא דחיא דרבנן ורבי יוסי ברבי יהודה סבר מופלא הסמוך לאיש דאורייתא
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the status of a minor one year before he or she reaches majority applies by rabbinic law, and therefore the halakha by Torah law that a father can vow on behalf of his son comes and overrides the decree that one who is near the age of maturity is considered an independent adult with regard to vows, which is by rabbinic law. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the status of a minor one year before he or she reaches majority applies by Torah law. Consequently, the halakha that a father can vow on behalf of his son does not apply to this case.
ואיבעית אימא דכולי עלמא כדי לחנכו במצות ומופלא הסמוך לאיש דרבנן היא רבי סבר אתי חינוך דרבנן ודחי מופלא הסמוך לאיש דרבנן
And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that a father vows for his son in order to educate him in mitzvot, which means it is by rabbinic law, and likewise the status of a minor one year before he or she reaches majority is also by rabbinic law. In that case, the tanna’im dispute the following: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the mitzva of education, which applies by rabbinic law, comes and overrides the status of a minor one year before he or she reaches majority, which is also by rabbinic law.
ורבי יוסי ברבי יהודה דאמר עד שיגיע לעונת נדרים קסבר לא אתי חינוך דרבנן ודחי מופלא הסמוך לאיש
And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that a father can vow for his son only until he reaches the age of vows, holds that the mitzva of education by rabbinic law does not come and override the status of a minor one year before he or she reaches majority. Consequently, there is no necessary connection between this dispute of tanna’im and the argument between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish as to whether the ruling that a father can impose naziriteship on his son is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai or an educational tool.
לימא הני תנאי כי הני תנאי דתניא מעשה ברבי חנינא שהדירו אביו בנזיר והביאו לפני רבן גמליאל והיה רבן גמליאל בודקו לידע אם הביא שתי שערות אם לא הביא
With regard to the dispute concerning the time period for a father’s vow on behalf of his son, the Gemara suggests: Shall we say that the dispute between these tanna’im is like the dispute between those other tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Nidda 5:9): An incident occurred involving Rabbi Ḥanina in which his father vowed that he should be a nazirite when he was a minor, and they brought him before Rabban Gamliel, and Rabban Gamliel examined him to discern if he had already developed two pubic hairs, in which case the vow would not take effect, or if he had not developed them, which would mean that the vow was valid.
רבי יוסי אומר לידע אם הגיע לעונת נדרים אם לאו אמר לו רבי אל תצטער לבודקני אם קטן אני אהיה בשביל אבא אם גדול אני אהיה בשביל עצמי עמד רבן גמליאל ונשקו על ראשו אמר מובטח אני בזה שמורה הלכה בישראל אמרו לא היו ימים מועטים עד שהורה הוראה בישראל
Rabbi Yosei says that Rabban Gamliel examined him to discern whether he had reached the age of vows or not, which he maintains is the decisive factor. The child said to Rabban Gamliel: My teacher, do not go to the trouble of examining me, since if I am a minor I shall be a nazirite due to my father’s vow, and if I am an adult, I shall be a nazirite due to my own vow. Rabban Gamliel arose and kissed the child on his head. He said: I am certain of this child that he will eventually become an authority of halakha for the Jewish people. They said: In fact, it was only a few years later that the child issued rulings for the Jewish people.
בשלמא לרבי יוסי ברבי יהודה דאמר עד שיגיע לעונת נדרים היינו דקאמר אם קטן אני אהיה בשביל אבא אלא לרבי דאמר עד שיביא שתי שערות ואם גדול אני אהיה בשביל עצמי
The Gemara explains its suggestion: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that a father can vow on behalf of his son only until he reaches the age of vows, this is why the child said: If I am a minor I shall be a nazirite due to my father, as he means: If I have not yet reached the age of vows. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said that a father can vow naziriteship for his son until he develops two pubic hairs, despite the fact that he is already mature with regard to vows, what is the meaning of: And if I am an adult, I shall be a nazirite due to my own vow?
