Nedarim 12
וְהָא נוֹתָר וּפִיגּוּל לְאַחַר זְרִיקַת דָּמִים הוּא.
But notar and piggul are conditions that apply after the sprinkling of the blood, when the prohibition against misusing consecrated property, which the individual is attempting to extend to a permitted item, no longer applies. Since the vow takes effect, this proves that the individual is associating the object of his vow with the original forbidden status of the offering.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נָתָן: בְּנוֹתָר שֶׁל עוֹלָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִם כֵּן, לִיתְנֵי בִּבְשַׂר עוֹלָה!
Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to him: It is possible to say that it is speaking here about notar of a burnt-offering. Since a burnt-offering may not be eaten even after its blood is sprinkled, the original prohibition against misusing consecrated property continues to apply to the meat of this offering. Rava said to Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan: If so, let it teach explicitly that the individual referred to the meat of a burnt-offering.
לָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר: לָא מִיבַּעְיָא ״בְּשַׂר עוֹלָה״ דְּאָסוּר, דְּהָא בְּקׇרְבָּן קָא מַתְפֵּיס, נוֹתָר וּפִיגּוּל דְּעוֹלָה אִיצְטְרִיכָא,
The Gemara responds: The tanna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to state that if one associates the object of his vow with meat of a burnt-offering, it is forbidden, as he extends the status of an offering to the other item. However, if one extends the status of notar and piggul of a burnt-offering, it is necessary to say that the other item is forbidden.
סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא כְּאִיסּוּר נוֹתָר, כְּאִיסּוּר פִּיגּוּל, וְהָוֵה לֵיהּ כְּמַתְפֵּיס בְּדָבָר הָאָסוּר, וְלָא מִיתְּסַר, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
It could enter your mind to say that the individual intended to declare the item forbidden like the prohibition of notar or like the prohibition of piggul, and this would be like one who associates the object of his vow with an item that is forbidden by the Torah rather than an item forbidden by means of a vow. Consequently, the item is not forbidden, as one can take a vow by associating the object of his vow with a forbidden item only if that item is itself prohibited due to a vow. The mishna therefore teaches us that his intention is to transfer the prohibition of the offering, and the vow takes effect.
מֵיתִיבִי: אֵיזֶהוּ אִיסָּר הָאָמוּר בְּתוֹרָה? אָמַר: ״הֲרֵינִי שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל בָּשָׂר וְשֶׁלֹּא אֶשְׁתֶּה יַיִן כַּיּוֹם שֶׁמֵּת בּוֹ אָבִיו״, ״כַּיּוֹם שֶׁמֵּת בּוֹ רַבּוֹ״, ״כַּיּוֹם שֶׁנֶּהֱרַג בּוֹ גְּדַלְיָה בֶּן אֲחִיקָם״, ״כַּיּוֹם שֶׁרָאִיתִי יְרוּשָׁלַיִם בְּחוּרְבָּנָהּ״, וְאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: וְהוּא שֶׁנָּדוּר בְּאוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם.
The Gemara raises an objection based upon the following baraita: Which is the vow of prohibition [issar] mentioned in the Torah? It is a case where one said: I hereby declare that I will not eat meat and I will not drink wine today like the day his father died, referring to the father of the individual making the vow, as there is a custom to fast on the anniversary of a parent’s death, or: Like the day his teacher died, as one mourns his primary teacher like a father, or: Like the day Gedaliah, son of Ahikam, was killed (see Jeremiah, chapter 41), i.e., the Fast of Gedaliah, or: Like the day I saw Jerusalem in its state of destruction. And Shmuel said: And this is if he was obligated by a previous vow to abstain from meat and wine on that day that he refers to in his declaration.
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? לָאו כְּגוֹן דְּקָאֵי בְּחַד בְּשַׁבָּא דְּמִית בֵּיהּ אֲבוּהּ, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּאִיכָּא טוּבָא חַד בְּשַׁבָּא דְּהֶיתֵּרָא, וְקָתָנֵי אָסוּר. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ בְּעִיקָּר הוּא מַתְפֵּיס.
The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances? Is it not a case where, for example, it was Sunday, the same day of the week on which his father died? And although there were many permitted Sundays in the interim, nevertheless, when he said he would not eat meat or drink wine like the day of the week on which his father died, his intention was to the particular Sunday when his father died, when he had vowed to abstain from meat and wine, and therefore the tanna teaches that it is prohibited. Learn from this that he associates the object of his vow with the original halakhic status of the Sunday his father died, and not the status of the intervening Sundays. Similarly, in the case of peace-offerings following the sprinkling of the blood, he is referring to the original status of the meat before the sprinkling of the blood.
דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, הָכִי אִיתְּמַר, אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: וְהוּא שֶׁנָּדוּר וּבָא מֵאוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם וְאֵילָךְ.
The Gemara responds that this is how the comment of Shmuel was stated: Shmuel said: And this is if he was continuously obligated by a vow from that day forward to abstain from meat and wine on the anniversary of his father’s death. Consequently, when he associates another day with the day of his father’s death, he expresses a vow based upon the current status of the day, and there is no proof with regard to the case of the meat of the peace-offering.
אָמַר רָבִינָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: ״כְּחַלַּת אַהֲרֹן״, ״וְכִתְרוּמָתוֹ״ — מוּתָּר. הָא ״כִּתְרוּמַת לַחְמֵי תוֹדָה״ — אָסוּר.
The Gemara cites another attempted proof. Ravina said: Come and hear that which was taught in the mishna (13b): If one declares an item to be like the ḥalla of Aaron, i.e., the portion of dough given to the priests, or like his teruma, the portion of agricultural produce given to priests, the item remains permitted. Although these items are prohibited to non-priests as soon as they are designated, they are considered forbidden by the Torah rather than forbidden by a vow. The Gemara infers: But if one declares an item to be like the teruma of the loaves of the thanks-offering, i.e., the four loaves of the thanks-offering that were eaten by the priests, the item is forbidden.
וְהָא תְּרוּמַת לַחְמֵי תוֹדָה — לְאַחַר זְרִיקַת דָּמִים הִיא.
Having made this inference, Ravina comments: But the teruma of the loaves of the thanks-offering is designated only after the sprinkling of the blood. Consequently, the individual must have made his vow after the sprinkling of the blood, when these loaves are permitted to priests. If the vow nevertheless takes effect, it must be because the individual is referring to the original forbidden status of the loaves before the sprinkling of the blood. This indicates that one has in mind the original status of the item rather than its current status.
אֵימָא: ״כִּתְרוּמַת הַלִּשְׁכָּה״ — אָסוּר.
The Gemara refutes this: Say that when the mishna specifies that if one said the food should be like the teruma of Aaron it remains permitted it thereby indicates that if he said it should be like the collection of the Temple treasury chamber, which is also called a teruma and is always forbidden, the food becomes forbidden. However, one cannot infer from the mishna that if one declares the food to be like the teruma of the loaves of the thanks-offering the food becomes forbidden.
אֲבָל תְּרוּמַת לַחְמֵי תוֹדָה מַאי — מוּתָּר? לִיתְנֵי לַחְמֵי תוֹדָה, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן תְּרוּמָתוֹ! הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן תְּרוּמַת לַחְמֵי תוֹדָה — תְּרוּמָתוֹ הִיא.
The Gemara asks: But according to this, if one said the food should be like the teruma of the loaves of the thanks-offering, what, does the food remain permitted? If so, let it teach in the mishna that if one said the food should be like the teruma of the loaves of the thanks-offering it remains permitted even though the thanks-offering is forbidden by means of a vow, and one would know on his own that if he says the food should be like the teruma of Aaron, all the more so the food remains permitted. The Gemara responds: It teaches us this: Teruma of the loaves of the thanks-offering is also referred to as his teruma and is therefore included in the mishna.
וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: תְּרוּמַת לַחְמֵי תוֹדָה נָמֵי קוֹדֶם זְרִיקַת דָּמִים הוּא. כְּגוֹן דְּאַפְרְשִׁינְהוּ בְּלֵישָׁה.
The Gemara offers an alternative response to Ravina’s attempted proof from the case of the teruma of the loaves of the thanks-offering, that one has in mind the original status of an item when one expresses a vow. And if you wish, say that the teruma of the loaves of the thanks-offering can also be designated before the sprinkling of the blood, for example, when he separated the teruma during the kneading of the dough. Consequently, the case may be where one makes the vow before the sprinkling of the blood, when the loaves are forbidden to all, and that is the reason the vow takes effect.
וְכִי הָא דְּאָמַר רַב טוֹבִי בַּר קִיסְנָא אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לַחְמֵי תוֹדָה שֶׁאֲפָאָן בְּאַרְבַּע חַלּוֹת — יָצָא. וְהָכְתִיב אַרְבָּעִים! לְמִצְוָה.
And this is in accordance with that which Rav Tovi bar Kisna said that Shmuel said: If one baked the loaves of the thanks-offering as four loaves rather than the forty loaves that should ideally be baked, he has fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it written that forty loaves must be brought with the thanks-offering, ten loaves of each of the four different types? The Gemara answers: One must bake forty loaves in order to fulfill the mitzva in the optimal fashion, but he has nevertheless fulfilled his obligation with four loaves, one of each type.
וְהָא בָּעֵי לְמִשְׁקַל תְּרוּמָה! וְכִי תֵּימָא דְּשָׁקֵיל חֲדָא רִיפְתָּא עַל כּוּלַּהּ — וְהָתְנַן: אֶחָד מִכׇּל קׇרְבָּן. שֶׁלֹּא יִטּוֹל מִקׇּרְבָּן עַל חֲבֵירוֹ! וְכִי תֵּימָא דְּשָׁקֵיל פְּרוּסָה מִכׇּל חַד וְחַד, וְהָתְנַן: ״אֶחָד״, שֶׁלֹּא יִטּוֹל פְּרוּסָה!
The Gemara asks: But he is required to take teruma, i.e., designate one loaf of each type to be given to the priests. And if you would say that he takes one loaf of bread of the four as teruma for all the others, but didn’t we learn in a mishna (Menaḥot 77b) with regard to the verse “And of it he shall present one out of each offering for a gift to the Lord; it shall be the priest’s” (Leviticus 7:14), that it indicates that he should not take from one offering, i.e., one type of loaf, for another? And if you would say that he takes a slice from each one of the four loaves and gives them to the priest, but didn’t we learn in that mishna that the word one in the verse indicates that he may not take a slice but rather a complete loaf?
אֶלָּא דְּאַפְרְשִׁינְהוּ בְּלֵישָׁה. דְּשָׁקֵיל חֲדָא מֵחָמֵץ, וַחֲדָא מִן חַלּוֹת, וַחֲדָא מִן רְקִיקִים, וַחֲדָא מִן רְבוּכָה.
Rather, it must be that he separated the teruma during the time of kneading. He took one piece of dough from the leavened bread, one from the loaves, one from the wafers, and one from the flour mixed with water and oil. After separating one tenth of each type of dough for the priest, he then baked the remainder into four loaves. Since it is possible to separate the teruma at the time of the kneading, before the sprinkling of the blood of the offering, it is possible that the case is one where he expressed the vow at this time. Consequently, there is no proof that one has in mind the original status of an offering rather than its current status when one expresses a vow after the sprinkling of the blood.
לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: ״הֲרֵי עָלַי כִּבְכוֹר״, רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אוֹסֵר, וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה מַתִּיר.
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this question, whether one intends to extend the original or current status of an offering, is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. If one says: This meat is prohibited to me like the meat of a firstborn, Rabbi Ya’akov renders the meat forbidden and Rabbi Yehuda renders it permitted.
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי נֵימָא לִפְנֵי זְרִיקַת דָּמִים, מַאי טַעְמָא דְמַאן דְּשָׁרֵי. וְאִי לְאַחַר זְרִיקַת דָּמִים, מַאי טַעְמָא דְּמַאן דְּאָסַר? אֶלָּא לָאו,
The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that he associates the object of his vow with the status of a firstborn animal before the sprinkling of the blood, when it is forbidden as a consecrated item, what is the rationale of the one who renders it permitted? And if he associates the object of his vow with the status of a firstborn animal after the sprinkling of the blood, when it belongs to the priest and is permitted to be eaten, what is the rationale of the one who renders it forbidden? Rather, is it not
