The Gemara rejects the possibility of the answer to Rami bar Hama’s question (about whether a vow that was attached to the meat of a peace offering applies to the object as it is now or as it was previously) is a tannaitic debate (the case of a firstborn animal). The debate about the firstborn is due to a difference in perspective of the firstborn – is it considered a vowed item or a forbidden item? A braita says that if one used any language relating to a sacrifice, if one finishes with the words, “that I will eat from you,” it is forbidden, “that I will not eat from you,” it is permitted. The braita seems to follow Rabbi Meir, however, it also seems not to follow Rabbi Meir’s position. How is this resolved? The Mishna discusses more languages of sacrifices that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda debate. The Gemara raises some questions about Rabbi Meir’s positions in light of his opinion in other places and then resolves the difficulties. If one says to another that one’s mouth is konam from speaking to the other, or one’s hands will be konam to not produce anything for the other or one’s legs are konam from walking with the other, the vow is valid. How can this be reconciled with a braita that states the differences between vows and oaths and states that vows do not apply to non-tangible items? The Mishna says that if one takes a vow and says that something is forbidden like a forbidden item such as non-kosher food or something used for idol worship, it is not a valid vow. If one forbid’s one’s wife from deriving benefit from him by saying “like my mother is forbidden to me,” even though it is not a valid vow, he must go to a chacham to annul the vow by a petach, by explaining that had he known…, he never would have taken the vow. This is used as a preventative method so that he doesn’t take vows like this again. According to whose opinion does the Mishna follow?
Nedarim 13
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This month’s learning is dedicated to the refuah shleima of our dear friend, Phyllis Hecht, גיטל פעשא בת מאשה רחל by all her many friends who love and admire her. Phyllis’ emuna, strength, and positivity are an inspiration.
Nedarim 13
דְּמַחֵית בְּשַׂר בְּכוֹר וּמַחֵית בָּשָׂר דְּהַאיְךְ גַּבֵּיהּ, וְאָמַר ״זֶה כָּזֶה״. וְתַנָּאֵי הִיא.
that he places the meat of a firstborn animal in one place and he places another piece of meat next to it, and he said: This second piece of meat is hereby like that meat of the firstborn animal, and it is a dispute between tanna’im about whether he is referring to the original forbidden status of the firstborn animal or its current permitted status?
לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לִפְנֵי זְרִיקַת דָּמִים, וּמַאי טַעְמָא דְמַאן דְּשָׁרֵי — אָמַר קְרָא: ״כִּי יִדֹּר״, עַד שֶׁיִּדּוֹר בְּדָבָר הַנָּדוּר, לְאַפּוֹקֵי בְּכוֹר, דְּדָבָר הָאָסוּר הוּא.
The Gemara responds: No, everyone agrees that he is referring to the status of the animal before the sprinkling of the blood, and what is the reason of the one who renders it permitted? The verse states: “When a man takes a vow” (Numbers 30:3), which indicates that he has not done so until he takes a vow with an item forbidden by means of a vow, i.e., by extending the status of an item that itself was forbidden by a means of a vow. This comes to exclude a firstborn, which is an item that is forbidden by the Torah rather than by means of a vow; a firstborn animal is sacred simply because it is born first.
וּמַאן דְּאָסַר, אָמַר קְרָא: ״לַה׳״, לְרַבּוֹת דָּבָר הָאָסוּר.
And the one who renders it forbidden holds that it is because the verse states: “To the Lord” (Numbers 30:3), which comes to include one who takes a vow by associating an object with an item that is forbidden by the Torah.
וּמַאן דְּשָׁרֵי, ״לַה׳״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְמַתְפִּיס בְּחַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם.
The Gemara asks: And the one who renders it permitted based on the principle that one cannot take a vow by associating the item with an item that is forbidden by the Torah, what does he do with the expression “to the Lord”? The Gemara answers: He requires this expression to include the case of one who associates the object of his vow with a sin-offering and a guilt-offering. Although these offerings are obligatory rather than voluntary, and in that regard they are dissimilar to items forbidden by means of a vow, one can render another item forbidden by associating it with these offerings.
וּמָה רָאִיתָ לְרַבּוֹת חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם וּלְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַבְּכוֹר? מְרַבֶּה אֲנִי חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם שֶׁהוּא מַתְפִּיס בְּנֶדֶר, וּמוֹצִיא אֲנִי אֶת הַבְּכוֹר שֶׁהוּא קָדוֹשׁ מִמְּעֵי אִמּוֹ.
The Gemara asks: And what did you see that led you to include a sin-offering and a guilt-offering and to exclude the firstborn? The Gemara answers: I include the sin-offering and guilt-offering due to the fact that he associates the object of his vow with an animal forbidden by means of a vow, as it is the individual who designates a particular animal for one of these offerings. And I remove the firstborn, because it is sacred from its mother’s womb.
וּמַאן דְּאָסַר, בְּכוֹר נָמֵי מַתְפִּיסוֹ בְּנֶדֶר הוּא. דְּתַנְיָא, מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אָמְרוּ: מִנַּיִן לְנוֹלַד בְּכוֹר בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ, שֶׁמִּצְוָה לְהַקְדִּישׁוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״הַזָּכָר תַּקְדִּישׁ״.
And the one who renders it forbidden is of the opinion that one who says that a piece of meat shall be considered for him like the meat of a firstborn also associates the object of his vow with an item forbidden by a vow, as it is taught in a baraita: They said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: From where is it derived that if one has a firstborn animal born in his home it is still a mitzva to consecrate it? As it is stated: “The males you shall consecrate” (Deuteronomy 15:19). Although a firstborn animal is considered consecrated from birth, its owner is still commanded to declare it consecrated, and it is therefore considered an item forbidden by means of a vow.
וּמַאן דְּשָׁרֵי, כִּי לָא מַקְדֵּישׁ לֵיהּ מִי לָא מִיקַּדֵּישׁ?
And the one who renders it permitted in this case argues that although the owner is required to declare it consecrated, if he does not consecrate it, is it not consecrated? Since it is consecrated in any event, it is considered to have been rendered forbidden by the Torah rather than through a vow.
״כְּאִימְּרָא״, ״כַּדִּירִים״.
§ It is taught in the mishna that if one says that food shall be considered like the lamb [imra] of the daily offering, or like the animals designated as offerings and kept in special enclosures, the vow takes effect.
תָּנָא: ״אִימְּרָא״, ״לְאִימְּרָא״, ״כְּאִימְּרָא״, ״דִּירִים״, ״לַדִּירִים״ ״כַּדִּירִים״, ״עֵצִים״, ״לָעֵצִים״, ״כָּעֵצִים״, ״אִישִּׁים״, ״לָאִישִּׁים״, ״כָּאִישִּׁים״, ״מִזְבֵּחַ״, ״לַמִּזְבֵּחַ״, ״כַּמִּזְבֵּחַ״, ״הֵיכָל״, ״לַהֵיכָל״, ״כַּהֵיכָל״, ״יְרוּשָׁלַיִם״, ״לִירוּשָׁלַיִם״, ״כִּירוּשָׁלַיִם״, כּוּלָּן: ״שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״ — אָסוּר. ״לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״ — מוּתָּר.
It was taught in a baraita: If one says that food shall be considered a lamb, for a lamb, like a lamb; enclosures, for enclosures, like enclosures; wood, for wood, like wood; fires, for fires, like fires; the altar, for the altar, like the altar; the Sanctuary, for the Sanctuary, like the Sanctuary; Jerusalem, for Jerusalem, like Jerusalem; with regard to all of them, if he adds: That which I will eat of yours, it is forbidden. This is because his intent is that whatever he eats that belongs to the other individual should be forbidden to him like one of these consecrated items. However, if he adds: That which I will not eat of yours, the food is permitted, since the only implication of his statement is that whatever he does not eat shall be forbidden.
מַאן שָׁמְעִינַן לֵיהּ דְּלָא שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ ״אִימְּרָא״ ״לְאִימְּרָא״ ״כְּאִימְּרָא״ — רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא.
The Gemara asks: Who is the Sage of whom we have heard, for whom there is no difference whether one said a lamb, for a lamb, or like a lamb, that I eat of yours? It is Rabbi Meir. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the vow takes effect only if one says: Like a lamb.
אֵימָא סֵיפָא: וְכוּלָּן ״לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״ — מוּתָּר. וְהָתְנַן: ״לַקָּרְבָּן לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״ — רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹסֵר, וְאָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא: נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר ״לְקָרְבָּן יְהֵא, לְפִיכָךְ לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״.
However, say the latter clause of the baraita: With regard to all of them, if he adds: That which I will not eat of yours, the food remains permitted. But didn’t we learn in the next mishna that if one says: That which I will not eat of yours shall be for an offering [lekorban], Rabbi Meir prohibits him from eating food belonging to the other individual? And Rabbi Abba said in explanation of this ruling that it is as though he said: It shall be for an offering [lekorban], and therefore I will not eat that which is yours. Apparently, according to Rabbi Meir the food is forbidden even if he said: That which I will not eat of yours.
לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דְּאָמַר ״לָא לְאִימְּרָא״, הָא דְּאָמַר ״לְאִימְּרָא״.
The Gemara responds: This is not difficult: This baraita is referring to a case where one said: That which I do not eat from you shall not [la] be for a lamb [le’imra]. Although this statement implies that what he does eat shall be considered like the lamb of the daily offering, Rabbi Meir holds that one cannot infer a positive statement from a negative statement. Conversely, that mishna is referring to a case where he said: For a lamb [le’imra]. In that case, his statement is interpreted as though he said: It shall be considered the lamb used for the daily offering, and therefore I will not eat it.
מַתְנִי׳ הָאוֹמֵר ״קׇרְבָּן״, ״עוֹלָה״, ״מִנְחָה״, ״חַטָּאת״, ״תּוֹדָה״, ״שְׁלָמִים״, ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל לָךְ״ — אָסוּר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מַתִּיר. ״הַקׇּרְבָּן״, ״כַּקׇּרְבָּן״, ״קׇרְבָּן שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״ — אָסוּר. ״לַקׇּרְבָּן לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״ — רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹסֵר.
MISHNA: With regard to one who says: An offering, a burnt-offering, a meal-offering, a sin-offering, a thanks-offering, or a peace-offering, and adds: That which I eat of yours, the vow takes effect and the food is forbidden. Rabbi Yehuda renders the food permitted in all these cases. If one says: The offering, like an offering, or an offering, and adds: That which I will eat of yours, the food is forbidden. If he says: That which I will not eat of yours shall be for an offering, Rabbi Meir renders the food forbidden.
גְּמָ׳ קָתָנֵי ״קׇרְבָּן״, ״הַקׇּרְבָּן״, ״כַּקׇּרְבָּן שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״ — אָסוּר. סְתָמָא תְּנָא כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּלָא שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ בֵּין ״אִימְּרָא״ ״לְאִימְּרָא״.
GEMARA: It teaches in the mishna that if one says: An offering, the offering, or like an offering, and then adds: That which I will eat of yours, it is forbidden. This indicates that this unattributed opinion in the mishna was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, for whom there is no difference whether one says a lamb [imra] or as a lamb [le’imra].
[אִי רַבִּי מֵאִיר — הָא] דְּקָתָנֵי: ״הַקׇּרְבָּן שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״ — אָסוּר, וְהָתַנְיָא: מוֹדִים חֲכָמִים לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בְּאוֹמֵר ״הָא קׇרְבָּן״, וְ״הָא עוֹלָה״ וְ״הָא מִנְחָה״ וְ״הָא חַטָּאת שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״ — שֶׁמּוּתָּר? שֶׁלֹּא נָדַר זֶה אֶלָּא בְּחַיֵּי קׇרְבָּן!
The Gemara asks: However, if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that which it teaches is difficult. It teaches that if one says: The offering [hakorban], and adds: That which I will eat of yours, the food is forbidden. But isn’t it taught in a baraita that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda that with regard to one who says: This offering [ha korban], or this burnt-offering [ha ola], or this meal-offering [ha minḥa], or this sin-offering [ha ḥatat], and then adds: That I will eat of yours, the vow does not take effect and the food is permitted? The reason for this is that the individual did not take a vow that the item should be associated with an offering; rather, he took a vow by the life of the offering, which is not a valid expression of a vow.
לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דְּאָמַר ״הָא קׇרְבָּן״, וְהָא דְּאָמַר ״הַקׇּרְבָּן״. מַאי טַעְמָא? חַיֵּי קׇרְבָּן קָאָמַר.
The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This case, where the vow does not take effect, is where one said: This offering [ha korban], and that case, where the vow does take effect, is where one said: The offering [hakorban]. What is the reason that the vow does not take effect when he says this offering [ha korban]? It is because he is saying that he is taking a vow by the life of this offering, which is not a valid way to express a vow.
קָתָנֵי: ״לַקׇּרְבָּן לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹסֵר. וְהָא לֵית לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר מִכְּלָל לָאו אַתָּה שׁוֹמֵעַ הֵן! אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא: נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר: לְקׇרְבָּן יְהֵא, לְפִיכָךְ לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ.
The mishna teaches that if one says: That which I will not eat of yours is lakorban, which indicates la korban, it is not an offering, Rabbi Meir prohibits him from eating food belonging to the other individual. This is because his statement indicates that what he does eat shall be considered an offering. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it true that Rabbi Meir does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Abba said: It is as though he said: It shall be for an offering [lekorban], and therefore I will not eat that which is yours.
מַתְנִי׳ הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״קֻוֽנָּם פִּי מְדַבֵּר עִמָּךְ״, ״יָדִי עוֹשָׂה עִמָּךְ״, ״רַגְלִי מְהַלֶּכֶת עִמָּךְ״ — אָסוּר.
MISHNA: One who says to another: It is konam for me for my mouth to speak with you, or: It is konam for me for my hand to work with you, or: It is konam for me for my foot to walk with you, it is prohibited for him to speak with, work with, or walk with the other individual.
גְּמָ׳ וּרְמִינְהוּ: חוֹמֶר בַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת מִבַּנְּדָרִים וּבַנְּדָרִים מִבַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת. חוֹמֶר בַּנְּדָרִים, שֶׁהַנְּדָרִים חָלִים עַל הַמִּצְוָה כְּבָרְשׁוּת, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת. וְחוֹמֶר בַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת, שֶׁהַשְּׁבוּעוֹת חָלוֹת עַל דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ וְשֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בַּנְּדָרִים.
GEMARA: The Gemara raises a contradiction from the following baraita: There is a stricture that applies to oaths beyond the strictures that apply to vows, and there is a stricture that applies to vows beyond the strictures that apply to oaths. The stricture that applies to vows is that vows take effect with regard to a mitzva as they do with regard to optional activities, which is not the case with regard to oaths, as one cannot take an oath to neglect a mitzva. And the stricture that applies to oaths is that oaths take effect upon a matter that has substance and a matter that does not have substance, which is not the case with regard to vows, which take effect only upon a matter that has substance. This contradicts the mishna, which states that a vow can apply to speech or actions, which are not physical items that have concrete substance.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: בְּאוֹמֵר ״יֵאָסֵר פִּי לְדִיבּוּרִי״, ״יָדַי לְמַעֲשֵׂיהֶם״, ״רַגְלַי לְהִילּוּכָן״. דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי ״פִּי מְדַבֵּר עִמָּךְ״, וְלָא קָתָנֵי ״שֶׁאֲנִי מְדַבֵּר עִמָּךְ״.
Rav Yehuda said: The mishna is referring to one who says: My mouth shall be forbidden with regard to my speech, or: My hands shall be forbidden with regard to their work, or: My feet should be forbidden with regard to their walking. In these cases the vow applies to a limb, which is a concrete item, and therefore it takes effect. The Gemara comments: The language of the mishna is also precise according to this interpretation, as it teaches: For my mouth to speak with you, and it does not teach: That which I speak with you. This indicates that he imposed the vow upon his mouth and not upon the act of speaking.
הַדְרָן עֲלָךְ כׇּל כִּנּוּיֵי
מַתְנִי׳ וְאֵלּוּ מוּתָּרִין: ״חוּלִּין שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״, ״כִּבְשַׂר חֲזִיר״, ״כַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה״, ״כְּעוֹרוֹת לְבוּבִין״, ״כִּנְבֵילוֹת וּטְרֵיפוֹת״, ״כִּשְׁקָצִים וּרְמָשִׂים״, ״כְּחַלַּת אַהֲרֹן וְכִתְרוּמָתוֹ״ — מוּתָּר.
MISHNA: And these are the vows in which the one who takes the vow attempts to create a prohibition on an item by associating it with an item in an ineffective manner, rendering the vow void and leaving the item permitted: If one says: That which I will eat of yours will be non-sacred [ḥullin]; or: That which I will eat of yours will be like pig meat; or: Like an object of idol worship; or: Like the hides of animal offerings whose hearts were removed as a form of idol worship, and it is therefore prohibited to derive benefit from those animals; or: Like animal carcasses and animals with a wound that will cause them to die within twelve months [tereifot]; or: Like non-kosher repugnant creatures and non-kosher creeping animals; or: Like the ḥalla of Aaron, the first priest, or like his teruma; in all these cases, the food is permitted. Although none of these items may be eaten, they are forbidden by Torah law, not by means of a vow. Therefore, it is impossible to extend their prohibition to other items by means of a vow that associates them with those items.
הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ עָלַי כְּאִימָּא״ — פּוֹתְחִין לוֹ פֶּתַח מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר. שֶׁלֹּא יָקֵל רֹאשׁוֹ לְכָךְ.
With regard to a man who says to his wife: You are hereby to me like my mother, i.e., deriving benefit from you should be forbidden to me like engaging in sexual intercourse with my mother, dissolution is broached with him by suggesting a different extenuation, i.e., a halakhic authority suggests other, extenuating circumstances that enable the dissolution of the vow. Although this vow does not take effect either, as engaging in sexual intercourse with one’s mother is prohibited by Torah law, by rabbinic law this is treated like an actual vow and requires dissolution by a halakhic authority, so that he will not take genuine vows lightly.
גְּמָ׳ טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר ״חוּלִּין שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״ הָא אָמַר ״לַחוּלִּין שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״, מַשְׁמַע: לָא לְחוּלִּין לֶיהֱוֵי אֶלָּא קׇרְבָּן.
GEMARA: It may be inferred from the first case in the mishna that the reason the vow does not take effect is that he said: That which I will eat of yours will be ḥullin; but if he said: That which I will eat of yours will be laḥullin, that indicates that he is saying: It will not [la] be non-sacred [ḥullin], but rather like an offering, which is a vow that takes effect.
מַנִּי מַתְנִיתִין? אִי רַבִּי מֵאִיר — הָא לֵית לֵיהּ מִכְּלָל
Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? If it is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, isn’t he of the opinion that one does not say: From
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Nedarim 13
דְּמַחֵית בְּשַׂר בְּכוֹר וּמַחֵית בָּשָׂר דְּהַאיְךְ גַּבֵּיהּ, וְאָמַר ״זֶה כָּזֶה״. וְתַנָּאֵי הִיא.
that he places the meat of a firstborn animal in one place and he places another piece of meat next to it, and he said: This second piece of meat is hereby like that meat of the firstborn animal, and it is a dispute between tanna’im about whether he is referring to the original forbidden status of the firstborn animal or its current permitted status?
לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לִפְנֵי זְרִיקַת דָּמִים, וּמַאי טַעְמָא דְמַאן דְּשָׁרֵי — אָמַר קְרָא: ״כִּי יִדֹּר״, עַד שֶׁיִּדּוֹר בְּדָבָר הַנָּדוּר, לְאַפּוֹקֵי בְּכוֹר, דְּדָבָר הָאָסוּר הוּא.
The Gemara responds: No, everyone agrees that he is referring to the status of the animal before the sprinkling of the blood, and what is the reason of the one who renders it permitted? The verse states: “When a man takes a vow” (Numbers 30:3), which indicates that he has not done so until he takes a vow with an item forbidden by means of a vow, i.e., by extending the status of an item that itself was forbidden by a means of a vow. This comes to exclude a firstborn, which is an item that is forbidden by the Torah rather than by means of a vow; a firstborn animal is sacred simply because it is born first.
וּמַאן דְּאָסַר, אָמַר קְרָא: ״לַה׳״, לְרַבּוֹת דָּבָר הָאָסוּר.
And the one who renders it forbidden holds that it is because the verse states: “To the Lord” (Numbers 30:3), which comes to include one who takes a vow by associating an object with an item that is forbidden by the Torah.
וּמַאן דְּשָׁרֵי, ״לַה׳״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְמַתְפִּיס בְּחַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם.
The Gemara asks: And the one who renders it permitted based on the principle that one cannot take a vow by associating the item with an item that is forbidden by the Torah, what does he do with the expression “to the Lord”? The Gemara answers: He requires this expression to include the case of one who associates the object of his vow with a sin-offering and a guilt-offering. Although these offerings are obligatory rather than voluntary, and in that regard they are dissimilar to items forbidden by means of a vow, one can render another item forbidden by associating it with these offerings.
וּמָה רָאִיתָ לְרַבּוֹת חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם וּלְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַבְּכוֹר? מְרַבֶּה אֲנִי חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם שֶׁהוּא מַתְפִּיס בְּנֶדֶר, וּמוֹצִיא אֲנִי אֶת הַבְּכוֹר שֶׁהוּא קָדוֹשׁ מִמְּעֵי אִמּוֹ.
The Gemara asks: And what did you see that led you to include a sin-offering and a guilt-offering and to exclude the firstborn? The Gemara answers: I include the sin-offering and guilt-offering due to the fact that he associates the object of his vow with an animal forbidden by means of a vow, as it is the individual who designates a particular animal for one of these offerings. And I remove the firstborn, because it is sacred from its mother’s womb.
וּמַאן דְּאָסַר, בְּכוֹר נָמֵי מַתְפִּיסוֹ בְּנֶדֶר הוּא. דְּתַנְיָא, מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אָמְרוּ: מִנַּיִן לְנוֹלַד בְּכוֹר בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ, שֶׁמִּצְוָה לְהַקְדִּישׁוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״הַזָּכָר תַּקְדִּישׁ״.
And the one who renders it forbidden is of the opinion that one who says that a piece of meat shall be considered for him like the meat of a firstborn also associates the object of his vow with an item forbidden by a vow, as it is taught in a baraita: They said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: From where is it derived that if one has a firstborn animal born in his home it is still a mitzva to consecrate it? As it is stated: “The males you shall consecrate” (Deuteronomy 15:19). Although a firstborn animal is considered consecrated from birth, its owner is still commanded to declare it consecrated, and it is therefore considered an item forbidden by means of a vow.
וּמַאן דְּשָׁרֵי, כִּי לָא מַקְדֵּישׁ לֵיהּ מִי לָא מִיקַּדֵּישׁ?
And the one who renders it permitted in this case argues that although the owner is required to declare it consecrated, if he does not consecrate it, is it not consecrated? Since it is consecrated in any event, it is considered to have been rendered forbidden by the Torah rather than through a vow.
״כְּאִימְּרָא״, ״כַּדִּירִים״.
§ It is taught in the mishna that if one says that food shall be considered like the lamb [imra] of the daily offering, or like the animals designated as offerings and kept in special enclosures, the vow takes effect.
תָּנָא: ״אִימְּרָא״, ״לְאִימְּרָא״, ״כְּאִימְּרָא״, ״דִּירִים״, ״לַדִּירִים״ ״כַּדִּירִים״, ״עֵצִים״, ״לָעֵצִים״, ״כָּעֵצִים״, ״אִישִּׁים״, ״לָאִישִּׁים״, ״כָּאִישִּׁים״, ״מִזְבֵּחַ״, ״לַמִּזְבֵּחַ״, ״כַּמִּזְבֵּחַ״, ״הֵיכָל״, ״לַהֵיכָל״, ״כַּהֵיכָל״, ״יְרוּשָׁלַיִם״, ״לִירוּשָׁלַיִם״, ״כִּירוּשָׁלַיִם״, כּוּלָּן: ״שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״ — אָסוּר. ״לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״ — מוּתָּר.
It was taught in a baraita: If one says that food shall be considered a lamb, for a lamb, like a lamb; enclosures, for enclosures, like enclosures; wood, for wood, like wood; fires, for fires, like fires; the altar, for the altar, like the altar; the Sanctuary, for the Sanctuary, like the Sanctuary; Jerusalem, for Jerusalem, like Jerusalem; with regard to all of them, if he adds: That which I will eat of yours, it is forbidden. This is because his intent is that whatever he eats that belongs to the other individual should be forbidden to him like one of these consecrated items. However, if he adds: That which I will not eat of yours, the food is permitted, since the only implication of his statement is that whatever he does not eat shall be forbidden.
מַאן שָׁמְעִינַן לֵיהּ דְּלָא שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ ״אִימְּרָא״ ״לְאִימְּרָא״ ״כְּאִימְּרָא״ — רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא.
The Gemara asks: Who is the Sage of whom we have heard, for whom there is no difference whether one said a lamb, for a lamb, or like a lamb, that I eat of yours? It is Rabbi Meir. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the vow takes effect only if one says: Like a lamb.
אֵימָא סֵיפָא: וְכוּלָּן ״לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״ — מוּתָּר. וְהָתְנַן: ״לַקָּרְבָּן לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״ — רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹסֵר, וְאָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא: נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר ״לְקָרְבָּן יְהֵא, לְפִיכָךְ לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״.
However, say the latter clause of the baraita: With regard to all of them, if he adds: That which I will not eat of yours, the food remains permitted. But didn’t we learn in the next mishna that if one says: That which I will not eat of yours shall be for an offering [lekorban], Rabbi Meir prohibits him from eating food belonging to the other individual? And Rabbi Abba said in explanation of this ruling that it is as though he said: It shall be for an offering [lekorban], and therefore I will not eat that which is yours. Apparently, according to Rabbi Meir the food is forbidden even if he said: That which I will not eat of yours.
לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דְּאָמַר ״לָא לְאִימְּרָא״, הָא דְּאָמַר ״לְאִימְּרָא״.
The Gemara responds: This is not difficult: This baraita is referring to a case where one said: That which I do not eat from you shall not [la] be for a lamb [le’imra]. Although this statement implies that what he does eat shall be considered like the lamb of the daily offering, Rabbi Meir holds that one cannot infer a positive statement from a negative statement. Conversely, that mishna is referring to a case where he said: For a lamb [le’imra]. In that case, his statement is interpreted as though he said: It shall be considered the lamb used for the daily offering, and therefore I will not eat it.
מַתְנִי׳ הָאוֹמֵר ״קׇרְבָּן״, ״עוֹלָה״, ״מִנְחָה״, ״חַטָּאת״, ״תּוֹדָה״, ״שְׁלָמִים״, ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל לָךְ״ — אָסוּר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מַתִּיר. ״הַקׇּרְבָּן״, ״כַּקׇּרְבָּן״, ״קׇרְבָּן שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״ — אָסוּר. ״לַקׇּרְבָּן לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״ — רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹסֵר.
MISHNA: With regard to one who says: An offering, a burnt-offering, a meal-offering, a sin-offering, a thanks-offering, or a peace-offering, and adds: That which I eat of yours, the vow takes effect and the food is forbidden. Rabbi Yehuda renders the food permitted in all these cases. If one says: The offering, like an offering, or an offering, and adds: That which I will eat of yours, the food is forbidden. If he says: That which I will not eat of yours shall be for an offering, Rabbi Meir renders the food forbidden.
גְּמָ׳ קָתָנֵי ״קׇרְבָּן״, ״הַקׇּרְבָּן״, ״כַּקׇּרְבָּן שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״ — אָסוּר. סְתָמָא תְּנָא כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּלָא שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ בֵּין ״אִימְּרָא״ ״לְאִימְּרָא״.
GEMARA: It teaches in the mishna that if one says: An offering, the offering, or like an offering, and then adds: That which I will eat of yours, it is forbidden. This indicates that this unattributed opinion in the mishna was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, for whom there is no difference whether one says a lamb [imra] or as a lamb [le’imra].
[אִי רַבִּי מֵאִיר — הָא] דְּקָתָנֵי: ״הַקׇּרְבָּן שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״ — אָסוּר, וְהָתַנְיָא: מוֹדִים חֲכָמִים לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בְּאוֹמֵר ״הָא קׇרְבָּן״, וְ״הָא עוֹלָה״ וְ״הָא מִנְחָה״ וְ״הָא חַטָּאת שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״ — שֶׁמּוּתָּר? שֶׁלֹּא נָדַר זֶה אֶלָּא בְּחַיֵּי קׇרְבָּן!
The Gemara asks: However, if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that which it teaches is difficult. It teaches that if one says: The offering [hakorban], and adds: That which I will eat of yours, the food is forbidden. But isn’t it taught in a baraita that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda that with regard to one who says: This offering [ha korban], or this burnt-offering [ha ola], or this meal-offering [ha minḥa], or this sin-offering [ha ḥatat], and then adds: That I will eat of yours, the vow does not take effect and the food is permitted? The reason for this is that the individual did not take a vow that the item should be associated with an offering; rather, he took a vow by the life of the offering, which is not a valid expression of a vow.
לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דְּאָמַר ״הָא קׇרְבָּן״, וְהָא דְּאָמַר ״הַקׇּרְבָּן״. מַאי טַעְמָא? חַיֵּי קׇרְבָּן קָאָמַר.
The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This case, where the vow does not take effect, is where one said: This offering [ha korban], and that case, where the vow does take effect, is where one said: The offering [hakorban]. What is the reason that the vow does not take effect when he says this offering [ha korban]? It is because he is saying that he is taking a vow by the life of this offering, which is not a valid way to express a vow.
קָתָנֵי: ״לַקׇּרְבָּן לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹסֵר. וְהָא לֵית לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר מִכְּלָל לָאו אַתָּה שׁוֹמֵעַ הֵן! אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא: נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר: לְקׇרְבָּן יְהֵא, לְפִיכָךְ לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ.
The mishna teaches that if one says: That which I will not eat of yours is lakorban, which indicates la korban, it is not an offering, Rabbi Meir prohibits him from eating food belonging to the other individual. This is because his statement indicates that what he does eat shall be considered an offering. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it true that Rabbi Meir does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Abba said: It is as though he said: It shall be for an offering [lekorban], and therefore I will not eat that which is yours.
מַתְנִי׳ הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״קֻוֽנָּם פִּי מְדַבֵּר עִמָּךְ״, ״יָדִי עוֹשָׂה עִמָּךְ״, ״רַגְלִי מְהַלֶּכֶת עִמָּךְ״ — אָסוּר.
MISHNA: One who says to another: It is konam for me for my mouth to speak with you, or: It is konam for me for my hand to work with you, or: It is konam for me for my foot to walk with you, it is prohibited for him to speak with, work with, or walk with the other individual.
גְּמָ׳ וּרְמִינְהוּ: חוֹמֶר בַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת מִבַּנְּדָרִים וּבַנְּדָרִים מִבַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת. חוֹמֶר בַּנְּדָרִים, שֶׁהַנְּדָרִים חָלִים עַל הַמִּצְוָה כְּבָרְשׁוּת, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת. וְחוֹמֶר בַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת, שֶׁהַשְּׁבוּעוֹת חָלוֹת עַל דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ וְשֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בַּנְּדָרִים.
GEMARA: The Gemara raises a contradiction from the following baraita: There is a stricture that applies to oaths beyond the strictures that apply to vows, and there is a stricture that applies to vows beyond the strictures that apply to oaths. The stricture that applies to vows is that vows take effect with regard to a mitzva as they do with regard to optional activities, which is not the case with regard to oaths, as one cannot take an oath to neglect a mitzva. And the stricture that applies to oaths is that oaths take effect upon a matter that has substance and a matter that does not have substance, which is not the case with regard to vows, which take effect only upon a matter that has substance. This contradicts the mishna, which states that a vow can apply to speech or actions, which are not physical items that have concrete substance.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: בְּאוֹמֵר ״יֵאָסֵר פִּי לְדִיבּוּרִי״, ״יָדַי לְמַעֲשֵׂיהֶם״, ״רַגְלַי לְהִילּוּכָן״. דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי ״פִּי מְדַבֵּר עִמָּךְ״, וְלָא קָתָנֵי ״שֶׁאֲנִי מְדַבֵּר עִמָּךְ״.
Rav Yehuda said: The mishna is referring to one who says: My mouth shall be forbidden with regard to my speech, or: My hands shall be forbidden with regard to their work, or: My feet should be forbidden with regard to their walking. In these cases the vow applies to a limb, which is a concrete item, and therefore it takes effect. The Gemara comments: The language of the mishna is also precise according to this interpretation, as it teaches: For my mouth to speak with you, and it does not teach: That which I speak with you. This indicates that he imposed the vow upon his mouth and not upon the act of speaking.
הַדְרָן עֲלָךְ כׇּל כִּנּוּיֵי
מַתְנִי׳ וְאֵלּוּ מוּתָּרִין: ״חוּלִּין שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״, ״כִּבְשַׂר חֲזִיר״, ״כַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה״, ״כְּעוֹרוֹת לְבוּבִין״, ״כִּנְבֵילוֹת וּטְרֵיפוֹת״, ״כִּשְׁקָצִים וּרְמָשִׂים״, ״כְּחַלַּת אַהֲרֹן וְכִתְרוּמָתוֹ״ — מוּתָּר.
MISHNA: And these are the vows in which the one who takes the vow attempts to create a prohibition on an item by associating it with an item in an ineffective manner, rendering the vow void and leaving the item permitted: If one says: That which I will eat of yours will be non-sacred [ḥullin]; or: That which I will eat of yours will be like pig meat; or: Like an object of idol worship; or: Like the hides of animal offerings whose hearts were removed as a form of idol worship, and it is therefore prohibited to derive benefit from those animals; or: Like animal carcasses and animals with a wound that will cause them to die within twelve months [tereifot]; or: Like non-kosher repugnant creatures and non-kosher creeping animals; or: Like the ḥalla of Aaron, the first priest, or like his teruma; in all these cases, the food is permitted. Although none of these items may be eaten, they are forbidden by Torah law, not by means of a vow. Therefore, it is impossible to extend their prohibition to other items by means of a vow that associates them with those items.
הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ עָלַי כְּאִימָּא״ — פּוֹתְחִין לוֹ פֶּתַח מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר. שֶׁלֹּא יָקֵל רֹאשׁוֹ לְכָךְ.
With regard to a man who says to his wife: You are hereby to me like my mother, i.e., deriving benefit from you should be forbidden to me like engaging in sexual intercourse with my mother, dissolution is broached with him by suggesting a different extenuation, i.e., a halakhic authority suggests other, extenuating circumstances that enable the dissolution of the vow. Although this vow does not take effect either, as engaging in sexual intercourse with one’s mother is prohibited by Torah law, by rabbinic law this is treated like an actual vow and requires dissolution by a halakhic authority, so that he will not take genuine vows lightly.
גְּמָ׳ טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר ״חוּלִּין שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״ הָא אָמַר ״לַחוּלִּין שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״, מַשְׁמַע: לָא לְחוּלִּין לֶיהֱוֵי אֶלָּא קׇרְבָּן.
GEMARA: It may be inferred from the first case in the mishna that the reason the vow does not take effect is that he said: That which I will eat of yours will be ḥullin; but if he said: That which I will eat of yours will be laḥullin, that indicates that he is saying: It will not [la] be non-sacred [ḥullin], but rather like an offering, which is a vow that takes effect.
מַנִּי מַתְנִיתִין? אִי רַבִּי מֵאִיר — הָא לֵית לֵיהּ מִכְּלָל
Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? If it is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, isn’t he of the opinion that one does not say: From
