The third question against Rav Huna is answered and a fourth question is raised and answered. When the Mishna stated that one is not liable for an oath on an oath, Rava infers that one is not liable but the oath exists, meaning that if the first oath is undone, the second will move into its place. If the language of a vow is unclear, one rules stringently. But if the language was ambiguous and the one who vowed explained the meaning of their words to be referring to a language that would not be a valid vow, then we can rule leniently and it is not considered a vow. The Mishna brings different examples of cases where one would rule leniently or stringently. This Mishna contradicts an explicit Mishna that one rules leniently in cases of nazir, which is a type of vow.
This week’s learning is sponsored for the merit and safety of Haymanut (Emuna) Kasau, who was 9 years old when she disappeared from her home in Tzfat two years ago, on the 16th of Adar, 5784 (February 25, 2024), and whose whereabouts remain unknown.
This week’s learning is dedicated of the safety of our nation, the soldiers and citizens of Israel, and for the liberation of the Iranian people. May we soon see the realization of “ליהודים היתה אורה ושמחה וששון ויקר”.
This week’s learning is sponsored for the merit and safety of Haymanut (Emuna) Kasau, who was 9 years old when she disappeared from her home in Tzfat two years ago, on the 16th of Adar, 5784 (February 25, 2024), and whose whereabouts remain unknown.
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This week’s learning is sponsored for the merit and safety of Haymanut (Emuna) Kasau, who was 9 years old when she disappeared from her home in Tzfat two years ago, on the 16th of Adar, 5784 (February 25, 2024), and whose whereabouts remain unknown.
This week’s learning is dedicated of the safety of our nation, the soldiers and citizens of Israel, and for the liberation of the Iranian people. May we soon see the realization of “ליהודים היתה אורה ושמחה וששון ויקר”.
This week’s learning is sponsored for the merit and safety of Haymanut (Emuna) Kasau, who was 9 years old when she disappeared from her home in Tzfat two years ago, on the 16th of Adar, 5784 (February 25, 2024), and whose whereabouts remain unknown.
Nedarim 18
וּתְיוּבְתָּא דְרַב הוּנָא!
and this is a conclusive refutation of the statement of Rav Huna.
לָא, לְעוֹלָם ״הֲרֵינִי נָזִיר הַיּוֹם, הֲרֵינִי לְמָחָר״, וּמַאי ״עָלְתָה לוֹ״ — לְבַר מֵהָהוּא יוֹמָא יַתִּירָא. אִי נָמֵי, כְּגוֹן שֶׁקִּיבֵּל שְׁתֵּי נְזִירוּת בְּבַת אַחַת.
The Gemara answers: No, actually the case is where he said: I am hereby a nazirite today, I am hereby a nazirite tomorrow. And what is the meaning of the statement: The second term of naziriteship is counted for him instead of the first? It is counted except for that additional day, which he still must observe. Alternatively, it may be a case where he accepted upon himself two periods of naziriteship simultaneously, i.e., he said: I am hereby a nazirite twice. Therefore, when the vow with regard to the first term of naziriteship is dissolved, the days he observed count entirely for his second term.
מֵתִיב רַב הַמְנוּנָא: ״נָזִיר לְהַזִּיר״ — מִכָּאן שֶׁהַנְּזִירוּת חָל עַל הַנְּזִירוּת. שֶׁיָּכוֹל, וַהֲלֹא דִּין הוּא: וּמָה שְׁבוּעָה חֲמוּרָה — אֵין שְׁבוּעָה חָלָה עַל שְׁבוּעָה, נְזִירוּת קַלָּה לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: נָזִיר לְהַזִּיר, מִכָּאן שֶׁהַנְּזִירוּת חָלָה עַל הַנְּזִירוּת.
Rav Hamnuna raised an additional objection against the opinion of Rav Huna from a baraita. It is stated in the verse: “A nazirite, to consecrate [nazir lehazzir]” (Numbers 6:2). From the use of similar, repetitive wording in the verse here it is derived that naziriteship takes effect upon a prior vow of naziriteship. As one might have thought that it could be derived through an a fortiori inference that naziriteship does not take effect, as follows: And just as with regard to an oath, which is more stringent, an oath does not take effect upon a prior oath, with regard to naziriteship, which is more lenient, all the more so is it not clear that it does not take effect where a vow of naziriteship was already in effect? Therefore, the verse states: “Nazir lehazzir.” From here it is derived that naziriteship takes effect upon a prior vow of naziriteship.
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵימָא דְּאָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי נָזִיר הַיּוֹם, הֲרֵינִי נָזִיר לְמָחָר״, הָא קְרָא בָּעֲיָא?! אֶלָּא לָאו: דְּאָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי נָזִיר הַיּוֹם, הֲרֵינִי נָזִיר הַיּוֹם״ — וְקָתָנֵי נְזִירוּת חָל עַל נְזִירוּת!
What are the circumstances? If we say it is a case where one said: I am hereby a nazirite today, I am hereby a nazirite tomorrow, does that case require proof from a verse that it takes effect? It is obvious that the second vow of naziriteship takes effect at least on the additional day. And as the minimum term of naziriteship is thirty days, an additional thirty days must be observed. Rather, is it not a case where one said: I am a nazirite today, I am a nazirite today? And the baraita teaches that in this case as well, naziriteship takes effect upon a prior vow of naziriteship, contrary to the opinion of Rav Huna.
לָא, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — כְּגוֹן שֶׁקִּיבֵּל עָלָיו שְׁתֵּי נְזִירוּת בְּבַת אַחַת.
The Gemara answers: That is not the case. Rather, with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he accepted upon himself two terms of naziriteship simultaneously. The baraita teaches that he must observe two terms of naziriteship and bring a separate offering for each.
וּמַאי חוּמְרָא דִּשְׁבוּעָה מִנֶּדֶר? אִילֵּימָא מִשּׁוּם דְּחָיְילָא אֲפִילּוּ עַל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ, נֶדֶר נָמֵי חָמוּר, שֶׁכֵּן חָל עַל הַמִּצְוָה כִּרְשׁוּת. אֶלָּא — מִשּׁוּם דִּכְתִיב בָּהּ בִּשְׁבוּעָה: ״לֹא יְנַקֶּה״.
The baraita stated that an oath is more stringent than a vow. The Gemara asks: And what is the stringency of an oath vis-à-vis a vow, such as a vow of naziriteship? If we say the baraita posits this because an oath, unlike a vow, takes effect even with regard to a matter that has no actual substance, there is a counterargument that a vow also has stringency vis-à-vis an oath, in that it, unlike an oath, takes effect with regard to a mitzva just as it does with regard to a matter that is permitted. Rather, oaths are more stringent because it is written with regard to an oath: “The Lord will not hold guiltless he who takes His name in vain” (Exodus 20:6).
״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל, שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְאָכַל — אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. אָמַר רָבָא: אִם נִשְׁאַל עַל הָרִאשׁוֹנָה — שְׁנִיָּה חָלָה עָלָיו. מִמַּאי — מִדְּלָא קָתָנֵי ״אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא אַחַת״, וְקָתָנֵי ״אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת״, רַוְוחָא הוּא דְּלֵית לַהּ. כִּי מִיתְּשִׁיל עַל חֲבֶירְתַּהּ — חָיְילָא.
§ It is taught in the mishna that if one said: I hereby take an oath that I will not eat, I hereby take an oath that I will not eat, and he then ate, he is liable to bring an offering for only one violation of an oath. Rava said: If he requested and received dissolution from a halakhic authority for the first oath, the second oath takes effect upon him. From where is this derived? From the fact that it is not taught in the mishna that there is only one, i.e., it is as though he took only one oath as the oaths are identical. Rather, it is taught that he is liable for only one. Evidently, he is not liable for the second oath only because it does not have a span of time in which to take effect, as he is already under oath not to eat. However, when he requests dissolution of the other oath, i.e. the first oath, the second oath has a span of time in which to take effect, and takes effect.
לִישָּׁנָא אַחֲרִינָא: חִיּוּבָא הוּא דְּלֵיכָּא, הָא שְׁבוּעָה אִיכָּא. לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא? לְכִדְרָבָא. דְּאָמַר רָבָא: נִשְׁאַל עַל הָרִאשׁוֹנָה — עָלְתָה לוֹ שְׁנִיָּה תַּחְתֶּיהָ.
Another version of Rava’s proof from the mishna is that it may be inferred from the statement: He is liable for only one, that although there is no liability to bring an offering for violating the second oath, there is an effective oath. But if there is no liability, then with regard to what halakha is it effective? Certainly it is effective with regard to the statement of Rava, as Rava said: If he requested and received dissolution from a halakhic authority for the first oath, the second is counted for him in its place.
לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: מִי שֶׁנָּדַר שְׁתֵּי נְזִירוֹת וּמָנָה אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה, וְהִפְרִישׁ קׇרְבָּן וְנִשְׁאַל עָלֶיהָ — עָלְתָה לוֹ שְׁנִיָּה בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה.
The Gemara proposes: Let us say that the following mishna (Shevuot 27b) supports his opinion: In the case of one who took two vows of naziriteship, and counted the first term, and set aside an offering, and requested and received dissolution from a halakhic authority for the first oath, the second term counts for him instead of the first. Evidently, although initially the second term of naziriteship did not have a span of time in which to take effect, it was not completely void. Therefore, when the first vow was dissolved, the second one immediately took its place. It may be proved from here that this is true with regard to oaths as well.
כְּגוֹן שֶׁקִּיבֵּל עָלָיו שְׁתֵּי נְזִירוֹת בְּבַת אַחַת.
The Gemara refutes this proof: That mishna may be referring to a case where he accepted upon himself two terms of naziriteship simultaneously. Since two terms cannot be observed concurrently, when he accepts two terms simultaneously, the halakha is that the second term commences immediately following the close of the first, which immediately took effect upon sequential periods of time. However, when one takes an oath prohibiting himself from a matter that is already prohibited by an oath in the same period of time, the second oath may not take effect at all.
מַתְנִי׳ סְתַם נְדָרִים לְהַחֲמִיר, וּפֵירוּשָׁם לְהָקֵל. כֵּיצַד? אָמַר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי כְּבָשָׂר מָלִיחַ״ ״כְּיֵין נֶסֶךְ״, אִם בְּשֶׁל שְׁלָמִים נָדַר — אָסוּר.
MISHNA: Unspecified vows are treated stringently, but their specification, if specification is necessary, is treated leniently. How so? If one said: This item is prohibited to me like salted meat, or: This item is prohibited to me like the wine used for libations, if he vowed in reference to meat or libations of a peace-offering, i.e., if he claimed that his intention was that the item will be forbidden to him like the salted meat of an offering, or like wine that is used for libations on the altar, it is forbidden, as he associated the item of the vow with an item forbidden by means of a vow, i.e., the offering.
אִם בְּשֶׁל עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה נָדַר — מוּתָּר. וְאִם סְתָם — אָסוּר.
If he claims that he vowed in reference to meat or libations of idol worship, i.e., that the item will be like the salted meat of an offering for an idol, or like wine that is used for libations as idol worship, it is permitted, as the item of the vow was associated with an item forbidden by the Torah. By enabling the one who took the vow to later clarify his intent, the vow is treated leniently. And if the vow was without specification, i.e., the one who took the vow did not specify whether his intention was to associate the item with an offering for Heaven or to associate the item with idol worship, it is forbidden.
״הֲרֵי עָלַי כְּחֵרֶם״, אִם כְּחֵרֶם שֶׁל שָׁמַיִם — אָסוּר, וְאִם כְּחֵרֶם שֶׁל כֹּהֲנִים — מוּתָּר. וְאִם סְתָם — אָסוּר.
Similarly, if one said: This item is hereby forbidden to me like an item dedicated to the Temple, if his intention was that it would be like a dedication to Heaven, which is a form of consecration, it is forbidden. And if his intention was that it would be like a dedication to priests, whereby one pledges his asset as a gift to priests, it is permitted, as this type of gift is not forbidden at all. And if he said it without specification, it is forbidden.
״הֲרֵי עָלַי כְּמַעֲשֵׂר״, אִם כְּמַעְשַׂר בְּהֵמָה נָדַר — אָסוּר. וְאִם שֶׁל גּוֹרֶן, — מוּתָּר. וְאִם סְתָם — אָסוּר.
Likewise, if he said: This item is hereby forbidden to me like tithes, if he took a vow with the intention that it would be like the animal tithe, it is forbidden, as the item of the vow was associated with an item forbidden by a vow. And if his intention was that it will be like the tithe of the granary, i.e., grain that is given to the Levites and has no sanctity, it is permitted. And if he said it without specification, it is forbidden.
״הֲרֵי עָלַי כִּתְרוּמָה״, אִם כִּתְרוּמַת הַלִּשְׁכָּה נָדַר — אָסוּר. וְאִם שֶׁל גּוֹרֶן — מוּתָּר. וְאִם סְתָם — אָסוּר. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
Similarly, if he said: This item is hereby forbidden to me like teruma, if he took a vow with the intention that it would be like the collection of the Temple treasury chamber [terumat halishka], which is a tax for the communal offerings, it is forbidden, his vow was associated with an item forbidden by a vow. And if his intention was that it would be like teruma of the granary that is given to the priests, it is permitted, as teruma is not an item forbidden by a vow. And if the vow was taken without specification, it is forbidden. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: סְתַם תְּרוּמָה, בִּיהוּדָה — אֲסוּרָה, בַּגָּלִיל — מוּתֶּרֶת, שֶׁאֵין אַנְשֵׁי גָלִיל מַכִּירִין אֶת תְּרוּמַת הַלִּשְׁכָּה. סְתַם חֲרָמִים, בִּיהוּדָה — מוּתָּרִין, בַּגָּלִיל — אֲסוּרִין, שֶׁאֵין אַנְשֵׁי גָלִיל מַכִּירִין אֶת חֶרְמֵי הַכֹּהֲנִים.
Rabbi Yehuda says: Unspecified teruma in Judea is forbidden. However, in the Galilee it is permitted, as the people of the Galilee are unfamiliar with the collection of the chamber. When they say teruma they are referring to the teruma allotted to the priests, which is familiar to them. Conversely, unspecified dedications in Judea are permitted, but in the Galilee they are forbidden, as the people of the Galilee are unfamiliar with dedications allotted to the priests, so when they say dedication they are referring to dedication to Heaven.
גְּמָ׳ וְהָתְנַן: סְפֵק נְזִירוּת לְהָקֵל?
GEMARA: The Gemara raises a problem with the principle stated in the mishna that unspecified vows are treated stringently. But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Taharot 4:12): Uncertainty with regard to naziriteship is treated leniently? And naziriteship is a type of vow.
אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא, לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, הָא רַבָּנַן. דְּתַנְיָא: הַמַּקְדִּישׁ חַיָּיתוֹ וּבְהֶמְתּוֹ — הִקְדִּישׁ אֶת הַכּוֹי. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: לֹא הִקְדִּישׁ אֶת הַכּוֹי.
Rabbi Zeira said: This is not difficult. That mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with him. As it is taught in a baraita: One who consecrates his undomesticated animal and his domesticated animal has consecrated the koy as well, although it is uncertain whether it is an undomesticated or a domesticated animal. Rabbi Eliezer says: He has not consecrated the koy.
מַאן דְּאָמַר מָמוֹנוֹ מְעַיֵּיל לִסְפֵיקָא, גּוּפֵיהּ נָמֵי מְעַיֵּיל. וּמַאן דְּאָמַר מָמוֹנוֹ לָא מְעַיֵּיל לִסְפֵיקָא, גּוּפֵיהּ (נָמֵי)
The Rabbis who said that one puts his possessions into a state of uncertainty, and therefore a koy is included in the aforementioned vow, hold that one enters himself into a state of uncertainty as well. Therefore, uncertainty with regard to naziriteship is treated stringently. And Rabbi Eliezer, who said that one does not put his possessions into a state of uncertainty, and therefore the phrase: Undomesticated and domesticated animals, refers only to definitely undomesticated and definitely domesticated animals,
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I began to learn this cycle of Daf Yomi after my husband passed away 2 1/2 years ago. It seemed a good way to connect to him. Even though I don’t know whether he would have encouraged women learning Gemara, it would have opened wonderful conversations. It also gives me more depth for understanding my frum children and grandchildren. Thank you Hadran and Rabbanit Michelle Farber!!
Tzur Hadassah, Israel
With Rabbanit Dr. Naomi Cohen in the Women’s Talmud class, over 30 years ago. It was a “known” class and it was accepted, because of who taught. Since then I have also studied with Avigail Gross-Gelman and Dr. Gabriel Hazut for about a year). Years ago, in a shiur in my shul, I did know about Persians doing 3 things with their clothes on. They opened the shiur to woman after that!
Haifa, Israel
I tried Daf Yomi in the middle of the last cycle after realizing I could listen to Michelle’s shiurim online. It lasted all of 2 days! Then the new cycle started just days before my father’s first yahrzeit and my youngest daughter’s bat mitzvah. It seemed the right time for a new beginning. My family, friends, colleagues are immensely supportive!
Zichron Yaakov, Israel
When I began learning Daf Yomi at the beginning of the current cycle, I was preparing for an upcoming surgery and thought that learning the Daf would be something positive I could do each day during my recovery, even if I accomplished nothing else. I had no idea what a lifeline learning the Daf would turn out to be in so many ways.
Lexington, MA, United States
My curiosity was peaked after seeing posts about the end of the last cycle. I am always looking for opportunities to increase my Jewish literacy & I am someone that is drawn to habit and consistency. Dinnertime includes a “Guess what I learned on the daf” segment for my husband and 18 year old twins. I also love the feelings of connection with my colleagues who are also learning.
Tampa, United States
I started learning Talmud with R’ Haramati in Yeshivah of Flatbush. But after a respite of 60 years, Rabbanit Michelle lit my fire – after attending the last three world siyumim in Miami Beach, Meadowlands and Boca Raton, and now that I’m retired, I decided – “I can do this!” It has been an incredible journey so far, and I look forward to learning Daf everyday – Mazal Tov to everyone!
Florida, United States
I started my Daf Yomi journey at the beginning of the COVID19 pandemic.
Los Angeles, United States
I had never heard of Daf Yomi and after reading the book, The Weight of Ink, I explored more about it. I discovered that it was only 6 months before a whole new cycle started and I was determined to give it a try. I tried to get a friend to join me on the journey but after the first few weeks they all dropped it. I haven’t missed a day of reading and of listening to the podcast.
Elkins Park, United States
Ontario, Canada
I started learning at the beginning of this cycle more than 2 years ago, and I have not missed a day or a daf. It’s been challenging and enlightening and even mind-numbing at times, but the learning and the shared experience have all been worth it. If you are open to it, there’s no telling what might come into your life.
Phoenix, Arizona, United States
Nedarim 18
וּתְיוּבְתָּא דְרַב הוּנָא!
and this is a conclusive refutation of the statement of Rav Huna.
לָא, לְעוֹלָם ״הֲרֵינִי נָזִיר הַיּוֹם, הֲרֵינִי לְמָחָר״, וּמַאי ״עָלְתָה לוֹ״ — לְבַר מֵהָהוּא יוֹמָא יַתִּירָא. אִי נָמֵי, כְּגוֹן שֶׁקִּיבֵּל שְׁתֵּי נְזִירוּת בְּבַת אַחַת.
The Gemara answers: No, actually the case is where he said: I am hereby a nazirite today, I am hereby a nazirite tomorrow. And what is the meaning of the statement: The second term of naziriteship is counted for him instead of the first? It is counted except for that additional day, which he still must observe. Alternatively, it may be a case where he accepted upon himself two periods of naziriteship simultaneously, i.e., he said: I am hereby a nazirite twice. Therefore, when the vow with regard to the first term of naziriteship is dissolved, the days he observed count entirely for his second term.
מֵתִיב רַב הַמְנוּנָא: ״נָזִיר לְהַזִּיר״ — מִכָּאן שֶׁהַנְּזִירוּת חָל עַל הַנְּזִירוּת. שֶׁיָּכוֹל, וַהֲלֹא דִּין הוּא: וּמָה שְׁבוּעָה חֲמוּרָה — אֵין שְׁבוּעָה חָלָה עַל שְׁבוּעָה, נְזִירוּת קַלָּה לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: נָזִיר לְהַזִּיר, מִכָּאן שֶׁהַנְּזִירוּת חָלָה עַל הַנְּזִירוּת.
Rav Hamnuna raised an additional objection against the opinion of Rav Huna from a baraita. It is stated in the verse: “A nazirite, to consecrate [nazir lehazzir]” (Numbers 6:2). From the use of similar, repetitive wording in the verse here it is derived that naziriteship takes effect upon a prior vow of naziriteship. As one might have thought that it could be derived through an a fortiori inference that naziriteship does not take effect, as follows: And just as with regard to an oath, which is more stringent, an oath does not take effect upon a prior oath, with regard to naziriteship, which is more lenient, all the more so is it not clear that it does not take effect where a vow of naziriteship was already in effect? Therefore, the verse states: “Nazir lehazzir.” From here it is derived that naziriteship takes effect upon a prior vow of naziriteship.
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵימָא דְּאָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי נָזִיר הַיּוֹם, הֲרֵינִי נָזִיר לְמָחָר״, הָא קְרָא בָּעֲיָא?! אֶלָּא לָאו: דְּאָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי נָזִיר הַיּוֹם, הֲרֵינִי נָזִיר הַיּוֹם״ — וְקָתָנֵי נְזִירוּת חָל עַל נְזִירוּת!
What are the circumstances? If we say it is a case where one said: I am hereby a nazirite today, I am hereby a nazirite tomorrow, does that case require proof from a verse that it takes effect? It is obvious that the second vow of naziriteship takes effect at least on the additional day. And as the minimum term of naziriteship is thirty days, an additional thirty days must be observed. Rather, is it not a case where one said: I am a nazirite today, I am a nazirite today? And the baraita teaches that in this case as well, naziriteship takes effect upon a prior vow of naziriteship, contrary to the opinion of Rav Huna.
לָא, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — כְּגוֹן שֶׁקִּיבֵּל עָלָיו שְׁתֵּי נְזִירוּת בְּבַת אַחַת.
The Gemara answers: That is not the case. Rather, with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he accepted upon himself two terms of naziriteship simultaneously. The baraita teaches that he must observe two terms of naziriteship and bring a separate offering for each.
וּמַאי חוּמְרָא דִּשְׁבוּעָה מִנֶּדֶר? אִילֵּימָא מִשּׁוּם דְּחָיְילָא אֲפִילּוּ עַל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ, נֶדֶר נָמֵי חָמוּר, שֶׁכֵּן חָל עַל הַמִּצְוָה כִּרְשׁוּת. אֶלָּא — מִשּׁוּם דִּכְתִיב בָּהּ בִּשְׁבוּעָה: ״לֹא יְנַקֶּה״.
The baraita stated that an oath is more stringent than a vow. The Gemara asks: And what is the stringency of an oath vis-à-vis a vow, such as a vow of naziriteship? If we say the baraita posits this because an oath, unlike a vow, takes effect even with regard to a matter that has no actual substance, there is a counterargument that a vow also has stringency vis-à-vis an oath, in that it, unlike an oath, takes effect with regard to a mitzva just as it does with regard to a matter that is permitted. Rather, oaths are more stringent because it is written with regard to an oath: “The Lord will not hold guiltless he who takes His name in vain” (Exodus 20:6).
״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל, שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְאָכַל — אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. אָמַר רָבָא: אִם נִשְׁאַל עַל הָרִאשׁוֹנָה — שְׁנִיָּה חָלָה עָלָיו. מִמַּאי — מִדְּלָא קָתָנֵי ״אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא אַחַת״, וְקָתָנֵי ״אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת״, רַוְוחָא הוּא דְּלֵית לַהּ. כִּי מִיתְּשִׁיל עַל חֲבֶירְתַּהּ — חָיְילָא.
§ It is taught in the mishna that if one said: I hereby take an oath that I will not eat, I hereby take an oath that I will not eat, and he then ate, he is liable to bring an offering for only one violation of an oath. Rava said: If he requested and received dissolution from a halakhic authority for the first oath, the second oath takes effect upon him. From where is this derived? From the fact that it is not taught in the mishna that there is only one, i.e., it is as though he took only one oath as the oaths are identical. Rather, it is taught that he is liable for only one. Evidently, he is not liable for the second oath only because it does not have a span of time in which to take effect, as he is already under oath not to eat. However, when he requests dissolution of the other oath, i.e. the first oath, the second oath has a span of time in which to take effect, and takes effect.
לִישָּׁנָא אַחֲרִינָא: חִיּוּבָא הוּא דְּלֵיכָּא, הָא שְׁבוּעָה אִיכָּא. לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא? לְכִדְרָבָא. דְּאָמַר רָבָא: נִשְׁאַל עַל הָרִאשׁוֹנָה — עָלְתָה לוֹ שְׁנִיָּה תַּחְתֶּיהָ.
Another version of Rava’s proof from the mishna is that it may be inferred from the statement: He is liable for only one, that although there is no liability to bring an offering for violating the second oath, there is an effective oath. But if there is no liability, then with regard to what halakha is it effective? Certainly it is effective with regard to the statement of Rava, as Rava said: If he requested and received dissolution from a halakhic authority for the first oath, the second is counted for him in its place.
לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: מִי שֶׁנָּדַר שְׁתֵּי נְזִירוֹת וּמָנָה אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה, וְהִפְרִישׁ קׇרְבָּן וְנִשְׁאַל עָלֶיהָ — עָלְתָה לוֹ שְׁנִיָּה בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה.
The Gemara proposes: Let us say that the following mishna (Shevuot 27b) supports his opinion: In the case of one who took two vows of naziriteship, and counted the first term, and set aside an offering, and requested and received dissolution from a halakhic authority for the first oath, the second term counts for him instead of the first. Evidently, although initially the second term of naziriteship did not have a span of time in which to take effect, it was not completely void. Therefore, when the first vow was dissolved, the second one immediately took its place. It may be proved from here that this is true with regard to oaths as well.
כְּגוֹן שֶׁקִּיבֵּל עָלָיו שְׁתֵּי נְזִירוֹת בְּבַת אַחַת.
The Gemara refutes this proof: That mishna may be referring to a case where he accepted upon himself two terms of naziriteship simultaneously. Since two terms cannot be observed concurrently, when he accepts two terms simultaneously, the halakha is that the second term commences immediately following the close of the first, which immediately took effect upon sequential periods of time. However, when one takes an oath prohibiting himself from a matter that is already prohibited by an oath in the same period of time, the second oath may not take effect at all.
מַתְנִי׳ סְתַם נְדָרִים לְהַחֲמִיר, וּפֵירוּשָׁם לְהָקֵל. כֵּיצַד? אָמַר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי כְּבָשָׂר מָלִיחַ״ ״כְּיֵין נֶסֶךְ״, אִם בְּשֶׁל שְׁלָמִים נָדַר — אָסוּר.
MISHNA: Unspecified vows are treated stringently, but their specification, if specification is necessary, is treated leniently. How so? If one said: This item is prohibited to me like salted meat, or: This item is prohibited to me like the wine used for libations, if he vowed in reference to meat or libations of a peace-offering, i.e., if he claimed that his intention was that the item will be forbidden to him like the salted meat of an offering, or like wine that is used for libations on the altar, it is forbidden, as he associated the item of the vow with an item forbidden by means of a vow, i.e., the offering.
אִם בְּשֶׁל עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה נָדַר — מוּתָּר. וְאִם סְתָם — אָסוּר.
If he claims that he vowed in reference to meat or libations of idol worship, i.e., that the item will be like the salted meat of an offering for an idol, or like wine that is used for libations as idol worship, it is permitted, as the item of the vow was associated with an item forbidden by the Torah. By enabling the one who took the vow to later clarify his intent, the vow is treated leniently. And if the vow was without specification, i.e., the one who took the vow did not specify whether his intention was to associate the item with an offering for Heaven or to associate the item with idol worship, it is forbidden.
״הֲרֵי עָלַי כְּחֵרֶם״, אִם כְּחֵרֶם שֶׁל שָׁמַיִם — אָסוּר, וְאִם כְּחֵרֶם שֶׁל כֹּהֲנִים — מוּתָּר. וְאִם סְתָם — אָסוּר.
Similarly, if one said: This item is hereby forbidden to me like an item dedicated to the Temple, if his intention was that it would be like a dedication to Heaven, which is a form of consecration, it is forbidden. And if his intention was that it would be like a dedication to priests, whereby one pledges his asset as a gift to priests, it is permitted, as this type of gift is not forbidden at all. And if he said it without specification, it is forbidden.
״הֲרֵי עָלַי כְּמַעֲשֵׂר״, אִם כְּמַעְשַׂר בְּהֵמָה נָדַר — אָסוּר. וְאִם שֶׁל גּוֹרֶן, — מוּתָּר. וְאִם סְתָם — אָסוּר.
Likewise, if he said: This item is hereby forbidden to me like tithes, if he took a vow with the intention that it would be like the animal tithe, it is forbidden, as the item of the vow was associated with an item forbidden by a vow. And if his intention was that it will be like the tithe of the granary, i.e., grain that is given to the Levites and has no sanctity, it is permitted. And if he said it without specification, it is forbidden.
״הֲרֵי עָלַי כִּתְרוּמָה״, אִם כִּתְרוּמַת הַלִּשְׁכָּה נָדַר — אָסוּר. וְאִם שֶׁל גּוֹרֶן — מוּתָּר. וְאִם סְתָם — אָסוּר. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
Similarly, if he said: This item is hereby forbidden to me like teruma, if he took a vow with the intention that it would be like the collection of the Temple treasury chamber [terumat halishka], which is a tax for the communal offerings, it is forbidden, his vow was associated with an item forbidden by a vow. And if his intention was that it would be like teruma of the granary that is given to the priests, it is permitted, as teruma is not an item forbidden by a vow. And if the vow was taken without specification, it is forbidden. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: סְתַם תְּרוּמָה, בִּיהוּדָה — אֲסוּרָה, בַּגָּלִיל — מוּתֶּרֶת, שֶׁאֵין אַנְשֵׁי גָלִיל מַכִּירִין אֶת תְּרוּמַת הַלִּשְׁכָּה. סְתַם חֲרָמִים, בִּיהוּדָה — מוּתָּרִין, בַּגָּלִיל — אֲסוּרִין, שֶׁאֵין אַנְשֵׁי גָלִיל מַכִּירִין אֶת חֶרְמֵי הַכֹּהֲנִים.
Rabbi Yehuda says: Unspecified teruma in Judea is forbidden. However, in the Galilee it is permitted, as the people of the Galilee are unfamiliar with the collection of the chamber. When they say teruma they are referring to the teruma allotted to the priests, which is familiar to them. Conversely, unspecified dedications in Judea are permitted, but in the Galilee they are forbidden, as the people of the Galilee are unfamiliar with dedications allotted to the priests, so when they say dedication they are referring to dedication to Heaven.
גְּמָ׳ וְהָתְנַן: סְפֵק נְזִירוּת לְהָקֵל?
GEMARA: The Gemara raises a problem with the principle stated in the mishna that unspecified vows are treated stringently. But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Taharot 4:12): Uncertainty with regard to naziriteship is treated leniently? And naziriteship is a type of vow.
אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא, לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, הָא רַבָּנַן. דְּתַנְיָא: הַמַּקְדִּישׁ חַיָּיתוֹ וּבְהֶמְתּוֹ — הִקְדִּישׁ אֶת הַכּוֹי. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: לֹא הִקְדִּישׁ אֶת הַכּוֹי.
Rabbi Zeira said: This is not difficult. That mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with him. As it is taught in a baraita: One who consecrates his undomesticated animal and his domesticated animal has consecrated the koy as well, although it is uncertain whether it is an undomesticated or a domesticated animal. Rabbi Eliezer says: He has not consecrated the koy.
מַאן דְּאָמַר מָמוֹנוֹ מְעַיֵּיל לִסְפֵיקָא, גּוּפֵיהּ נָמֵי מְעַיֵּיל. וּמַאן דְּאָמַר מָמוֹנוֹ לָא מְעַיֵּיל לִסְפֵיקָא, גּוּפֵיהּ (נָמֵי)
The Rabbis who said that one puts his possessions into a state of uncertainty, and therefore a koy is included in the aforementioned vow, hold that one enters himself into a state of uncertainty as well. Therefore, uncertainty with regard to naziriteship is treated stringently. And Rabbi Eliezer, who said that one does not put his possessions into a state of uncertainty, and therefore the phrase: Undomesticated and domesticated animals, refers only to definitely undomesticated and definitely domesticated animals,
