Nedarim 26
וְרָבָא אָמַר: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא, כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאָמַר: אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁאַבָּא בֵּינֵיכֶם הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר: ״פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי אֲסוּרִין וְאַבָּא מוּתָּר״ — כּוּלָּם מוּתָּרִין. לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אֶלָּא בְּאוֹמֵר: אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁאַבָּא בֵּינֵיכֶם, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר: ״כּוּלְּכֶם אֲסוּרִין חוּץ מֵאַבָּא״.
And Rava said: Everyone holds that anywhere that one says: Had I known that father was among you I would have said: So-and-so and so-and-so are prohibited to partake and father is permitted to do so, then all are permitted to partake. They disagree only in a case where one says: Had I known that father was among you I would have said: All of you are prohibited from partaking except for father.
בֵּית שַׁמַּאי סָבְרִי לַהּ כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּאָמַר: תְּפוֹס לָשׁוֹן רִאשׁוֹן.
The rationale of the dispute is the following: Beit Shammai hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: If one initially makes one declaration and immediately afterward makes a conflicting declaration, hold him accountable for the first expression. Since he initially said: All of you are prohibited from partaking, this expression is the effective one and they are all prohibited from doing so. The addition of the words: Except for father, is viewed as a clarification of the previous expression, simply indicating that his father is not included in the prohibition.
וּבֵית הִלֵּל סָבְרִי לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, דְּאָמַר: בִּגְמַר דְּבָרָיו אָדָם נִתְפָּס.
And by contrast, Beit Hillel hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said: A person is held accountable even for the conclusion of his statement, and the second formulation is the primary one. Therefore, the fact that one altered his formulation to exclude his father from the prohibition means that the vow is partially canceled, and a vow that is partially dissolved is dissolved completely.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְרָבָא: כֵּיצַד אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא נֶדֶר שֶׁהוּתַּר מִקְצָתוֹ הוּתַּר כּוּלּוֹ? ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה לְכוּלְּכֶם״, הוּתַּר אֶחָד מֵהֶן — הוּתְּרוּ כּוּלָּם. ״שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה לֹא לָזֶה וְלָזֶה״, הוּתַּר הָרִאשׁוֹן — הוּתְּרוּ כּוּלָּם, הוּתַּר הָאַחֲרוֹן — הָאַחֲרוֹן מוּתָּר וְכוּלָּן אֲסוּרִין.
Rav Pappa raised an objection to Rava from the following mishna (66a): In what case did Rabbi Akiva say that a vow which was partially dissolved is dissolved completely? For example, if one said: The property of all of you is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, if benefit from one of them was permitted for whatever reason, benefit from all of them is permitted. However, if one said: The property of this one and of that one is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, then if benefit from the first one was permitted for whatever reason, benefit from all of them is permitted, but if benefit from the last one was permitted, benefit from the last one alone is permitted and benefit from all the others is forbidden.
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבָּה, מוֹקֵים לֵהּ לְרֵישָׁא, דְּאָמַר לָזֶה וְלָזֶה.
Rav Pappa explains his objection: Rabba stated that when one qualifies his words by saying: I would have said all of you are prohibited from partaking except father, then all agree that everyone except his father is prohibited from doing so, but that when he adds to his words by saying: I would have said that so-and-so and so-and-so are prohibited from partaking and father is permitted to do so, there is a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. Granted, according to the opinion of Rabba, he establishes Rabbi Akiva’s first clause, where benefit from all is permitted, as a case where he retracts and says: I meant to say that the property of this one and of that one, but not that of so-and-so, is konam for me, which accords with the opinion of Beit Hillel.
וְסֵיפָא — דְּאָמַר ״לְכוּלְּכֶם״.
And the last clause of the mishna, in which benefit from the last one alone is permitted, but benefit from all the others remains forbidden, is a case where he retracts and says: The property of all of you is konam for me except for that of one of you. According to the opinion of Rabba, both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel would agree that in this case the one who stated the vow is permitted to benefit only from the one excluded from the vow.
אֶלָּא לְדִידָךְ: בִּשְׁלָמָא רֵישָׁא מוֹקֵים לֵהּ דְּאָמַר ״לְכוּלְּכֶם״.
But according to you, Rava, who holds that if he said: I would have said that so-and-so and so-and-so are prohibited to partake and father is permitted to do so, all concede that everyone is permitted to partake, and that the dispute pertains to when one says: I would have said that all of you are prohibited to partake except for father, granted, he establishes the first clause of Rabbi Akiva’s statement as a case where he retracts and says: The property of all of you is konam for me except for that of father, and benefit from all is permitted, in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.
אֶלָּא סֵיפָא, דְּאָמַר ״לָזֶה וְלָזֶה״, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הִיא, אַמַּאי פְּלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ? וְהָאָמְרַתְּ דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מוּתָּר!
But as the latter clause of that mishna, in the case where he said: I intended to prohibit eating figs to this one and to that one, and they are all permitted to do so, is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, which is evident from the fact that this halakha is cited in his name, then according to your opinion why do the Rabbis disagree with him? But haven’t you said that all agree that they are all permitted to partake when the one who took the vow explains that he meant: To this one and to that one?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: וּלְרַבָּה לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא מִי נִיחָא סֵיפָא? בְּמַאי מוֹקֵים לֵהּ — דְּאָמַר ״לְכוּלְּכֶם״, הֵי דֵין הוּא רִאשׁוֹן וְהֵי דֵין הוּא אַחֲרוֹן?
Rava said to Rav Pappa: And according to Rabba, whose opinion you are supporting with this objection, does the latter clause work out well according to Rabbi Akiva? In what case does he establish it? In a case where one retracted and said: From all of you, which of them is the first one and which of them is the last one? The mishna stated that if benefit from the last one was permitted, benefit from the last one alone is permitted and benefit from all the others is forbidden. If he is now saying: From all of you, who is the first and who is the last?
אֶלָּא: רֵישָׁא דְּאָמַר ״לְכוּלְּכֶם״, וְסֵיפָא, כְּגוֹן שֶׁתְּלָאָן זֶה בָּזֶה, וְאָמַר: ״פְּלוֹנִי כִּפְלוֹנִי, וּפְלוֹנִי כִּפְלוֹנִי״.
Rather, Rava explains as follows: The first clause is referring to where he said: From all of you, and this follows the opinion of Beit Hillel, who say, according to Rava, that the entire vow is dissolved. And in the latter clause, i.e., the last two cases, it is referring to where he did not specify: From this one and from that one, but where, for example, he linked them to one another and said: So-and-so should be prohibited to partake like so-and-so, and so-and-so like so-and-so, but there is no general prohibition on all of them. Rather, each prohibition is linked to another one. Therefore, if the prohibition pertaining to the first individual is dissolved, then all those prohibitions linked to that one are dissolved as well.
דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּתַנְיָא: הוּתַּר הָאֶמְצָעִי — הֵימֶנּוּ וּלְמַטָּה מוּתָּרִין, וּלְמַעְלָה — אֲסוּרִין.
The Gemara comments: The language is also precise, as it is taught in a baraita concerning this mishna: If the middle one in this chain of people prohibited by the vow from partaking was permitted to do so, then from him and below, i.e., those who were mentioned after him, are permitted to partake, and from him and above, i.e., those who were mentioned before him, are prohibited from partaking. This indicates that the mishna speaks about a case where the prohibitions are linked together. Therefore, the prohibition is dissolved for those who were mentioned after that individual whose prohibition is dissolved.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה לְרָבָא: ״קֻוֽנָּם בָּצָל שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם, שֶׁהַבָּצָל רַע לַלֵּב״. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: וַהֲלֹא הַכּוּפְרִי יָפֶה לַלֵּב! הוּתַּר בַּכּוּפְרִי. וְלֹא בַּכּוּפְרִי בִּלְבַד הוּתַּר, אֶלָּא בְּכׇל הַבְּצָלִים. מַעֲשֶׂה הָיָה, וְהִתִּירוֹ רַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּכׇל הַבְּצָלִים.
Rav Adda bar Ahava raised an objection to Rava: The mishna (66a) states that if one says: Onions are konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste them, because onions are bad for the heart, and others said to him: But isn’t the kuferi onion good for the heart, the vow is dissolved with regard to kuferi onions, and not only with regard to kuferi onions is it dissolved, but with regard to all types of onions. The mishna relates that an incident of this kind occurred, and Rabbi Meir dissolved the vow with regard to all types of onions.
מַאי לָאו, דְּאָמַר: אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁהַכּוּפְרִי יָפֶה לַלֵּב, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר ״כׇּל הַבְּצָלִים אֲסוּרִין וְכוּפְרִי מוּתָּר״?
What, is it not speaking here of a case where that person said: Had I known that the kuferi onion is good for the heart I would have said: All onions are forbidden and the kuferi onion is permitted? This would be difficult for Rabba, who argues in similar cases that all opinions maintain that the other onions are forbidden, as well as for Rava, who would hold that only Beit Shammai, who follow the opinion of Rabbi Meir, maintain that all onions are forbidden in this type of case, and yet here Rabbi Meir himself permits all types of onions.
לֹא, בְּאוֹמֵר: אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁהַכּוּפְרִי יָפֶה לַלֵּב, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר: ״בָּצָל פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי אֲסוּרִין וְכוּפְרִי מוּתָּר״. וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְאַלִּיבָּא דְרַבָּנַן.
The Gemara responds: No, this should be explained as a case where one says: If I had known that the kuferi onion is good for the heart, I would have said: Such an onion and such an onion are forbidden to me and the kuferi onion is permitted, and the opinion of Rabbi Meir is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and also in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. This is because, according to Rava, when one says: This one and that one, all agree that everything is permitted.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרָבָא: רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: יֵשׁ נֶדֶר שֶׁמִּקְצָתוֹ מוּתָּר וּמִקְצָתוֹ אָסוּר. כֵּיצַד? נָדַר מִן הַכַּלְכַּלָּה,
Ravina raised an objection to Rava: Rabbi Natan says there is a vow that is partially dissolved and partially binding. How so? One who took a vow that benefit from all the items in a basket be forbidden to him,
