Nedarim 4

רב אחא בר יעקב אמר כגון דנדר והוא בבית הקברות

Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: The prohibition against delaying applies to a nazirite in a case where one vowed to become a nazirite while he was in a cemetery. Since it is prohibited for a nazirite to be in a cemetery, his term of naziriteship does not come into effect until he leaves the cemetery and ritually purifies himself. If he delays this process, he prevents the vow from taking effect and thereby transgresses the prohibition against delaying.

הניחא למאן דאמר לא חיילא עליה נזירות מאלתר אלא למאן דאמר מאלתר חיילא עליה מי איכא בל תאחר ועוד האמר מר בר רב אשי חיילא נזירות עליה מאלתר וכי פליגי לענין מלקות פליגי

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that if one takes a vow of naziriteship while in a cemetery the naziriteship does not apply to him immediately. However, according to the one who said that the naziriteship applies to him immediately, is there a violation of the prohibition: You shall not delay? And furthermore, didn’t Mar bar Rav Ashi say that all agree that the naziriteship applies to him immediately and he need not repeat his vow of naziriteship when he leaves, and when they disagree it is only with regard to the matter of flogging, and it’s only about this that they disagree, i.e., whether the nazirite is flogged if he drinks wine or otherwise violates the prohibitions of a nazirite.

אפילו הכי קם ליה בבל תאחר משום דקא מאחר נזירות דטהרה אמר רב אשי הואיל וכן נזיר שטימא עצמו במזיד עובר משום בל תאחר דנזירות טהרה

The Gemara answers: Even so, he is liable for violating the prohibition: You shall not delay, because by remaining in the cemetery he delays a naziriteship of ritual purity. Although the halakhot of naziriteship take effect upon him immediately, he is still obligated to fulfill a term of naziriteship in a state of ritual purity, and if he delays doing so, he violates the prohibition against delaying. Rav Ashi said: Since this is so, a nazirite who intentionally renders himself ritually impure violates the prohibition: You shall not delay, with regard to a naziriteship of ritual purity, as he thereby prevents himself from completing his naziriteship in a state of ritual purity on time.

רב אחא בריה דרב איקא אמר עובר בבל תאחר תגלחתו

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, stated another explanation of how the prohibition against delaying applies with regard to naziriteship: The nazirite is commanded to shave his hair at the conclusion of his term, and if he causes this shaving to be delayed, he violates the prohibition: You shall not delay, with regard to his shaving.

ולא מיבעיא למאן דאמר תגלחת מעכבת אלא אפילו למאן דאמר תגלחת אינה מעכבת מצות גילוח מיהא לא מיקיים

The Gemara adds: And this explanation is not necessary to say, i.e., it is obvious, according to the one who says that shaving is indispensable for a nazirite and he is subject to all the prohibitions of a nazirite until he shaves, but even according to the one who says that shaving is not indispensable and the halakhot of naziriteship are terminated for him immediately after he brings his offerings, at least it can be said that he does not fulfill the mitzva of shaving until he actually shaves, and therefore if he delays, he violates the prohibition against delaying.

מר זוטרא בריה דרב מרי אמר עובר בבל תאחר קרבנותיו

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, stated another explanation of how the prohibition against delaying applies to a nazirite vow: He transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay, with regard to his offerings. When he completes his term as a nazirite he is obligated to bring certain offerings, and if he delays bringing them, he violates this prohibition.

ומן הכא נפקא ליה מהתם נפקא ליה כי דרש ידרשנו אלו חטאת ואשמות

The Gemara asks: Is this halakha, that the prohibition against delaying applies to a nazirite vow, derived from here, i.e., the juxtaposition of vows and naziriteship? It is derived from there, a different exposition based upon the verse: “When you shall take a vow…you shall not delay to pay it; for the Lord your God will surely require it of you” (Deuteronomy 23:22). Those items included in the phrase “will surely require it” are sin-offerings and guilt-offerings, including the sin-offering and guilt-offering of a nazirite.

מהו דתימא חידוש הוא שחידשה תורה בנזיר

The Gemara explains: The derivation based on the juxtaposition of vows and naziriteship is still necessary lest you say that these offerings are a novelty that the Torah innovated with regard to a nazirite and therefore their halakhot cannot be derived from halakhot of other offerings.

מאי חידוש אילימא דלא מתפיס ליה לחטאת נזיר בנדר הרי חטאת חלב שאין מתפיסה בנדר ועובר בבל תאחר

The Gemara asks: What is the novelty that the Torah introduced with regard to the nazirite? If we say it is that he cannot accept upon himself the sin-offering of a nazirite through a vow, i.e., if one who is not a nazirite says: I hereby vow to bring the sin-offering of a nazirite, his vow has no validity, this is not a unique halakha with regard to sin-offerings of a nazirite. There is also the case of the sin-offering of forbidden fat, i.e., a typical sin-offering that one brings when he inadvertently violates certain prohibitions, one of which is eating forbidden fat, which one cannot accept through a vow, as only one who has violated the prohibition may bring it; and nevertheless, one still transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay, if he delays bringing the offering.

אלא מאי חידושיה סלקא דעתך אמינא הואיל ואם אמר הריני נזיר אפילו מן חרצן הוי נזיר לכל אימא לא ליעבור עליה משום בל תאחר קא משמע לן

Rather, what is its novelty that makes the juxtaposition between vows and naziriteship necessary? It might enter your mind to say that since if he said: I am hereby a nazirite, even if he accepted upon himself only one of the prohibitions of a nazirite, e.g., the requirement to abstain from grape seeds, he is nevertheless a nazirite with regard to all aspects of naziriteship, therefore say that he does not transgress the prohibition: You shall not delay. Since this halakha is a novelty, perhaps the principles of vows do not apply. The verse therefore teaches us through the juxtaposition of vows and naziriteship that the prohibition against delaying applies even in this case.

הניחא למאן דאמר כי נזיר מן חרצן הוי נזיר לכל אלא לרבי שמעון דאמר אין נזיר עד שיזיר מכולן מאי איכא למימר ועוד האי חידוש לחומרא הוא

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who said that when one vows to be a nazirite from grape seeds he is a nazirite in all respects. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that he is not a nazirite unless he explicitly vows to be a nazirite in all respects, what is there to say? And furthermore, this novelty is stringent in that it renders the individual a nazirite even if he did not explicitly accept all of the halakhot of naziriteship. How could this novelty indicate that the prohibition against delaying does not apply in this case, which is a leniency, so that the juxtaposition would be necessary?

אלא מאי חידושיה דסלקא דעתך אמינא הואיל

Rather, what is its novelty that makes the juxtaposition between vows and naziriteship necessary? It might enter your mind to say that since

ואם גילח על אחת משלשתן יצא לא ליעבור עליה בבל תאחר קא משמע לן

if he shaves upon bringing one of the three offerings that a nazirite must bring when completing his term as a nazirite, i.e., a burnt-offering, a sin-offering, and a peace-offering, he has fulfilled his obligation to shave and the restrictions of a nazirite are lifted, he therefore does not violate the prohibition: You shall not delay, for delaying the other offerings. Consequently, it teaches us that the prohibition against delaying applies to these offerings.

ואיבעית אימא מאי חדושיה משום דלא מתפיסו בנדר והא דקא קשיא לך חטאת חלב חטאת חלב קאתיא לכפרה חטאת נזיר למאי אתיא

And if you wish say: What is the novelty of the nazirite? The halakha of naziriteship is considered a novelty because the offerings of a nazirite cannot be accepted through a vow. And that which poses a difficulty for you based on the fact that one cannot accept upon himself a sin-offering of forbidden fat through a vow either, and nevertheless the prohibition against delaying applies, can be resolved. A sin-offering of forbidden fat comes for the purpose of atonement, and therefore if one delays bringing it he violates the prohibition against delaying. However, for what does the sin-offering of a nazirite come? Since it does not come to atone for a sin, one might have thought that the prohibition against delaying does not apply.

והרי חטאת יולדת דלא אתיא לכפרה ועבר עלה משום בל תאחר ההיא קא שריא לה למיכל בקדשים

The Gemara asks: But there is the precedent of the sin-offering of a woman who gave birth, which also does not come for the purpose of atonement, and yet if she does not bring the offering on time she still transgresses due to the prohibition: You shall not delay. The Gemara answers: That sin-offering of a woman who gave birth permits the woman to eat consecrated food. Although it does not come to effect atonement, it does come to permit a matter. On the other hand, the sin-offering of a nazirite does not permit anything, and therefore the fact that one cannot accept upon himself an obligation to bring this offering is a novelty. Consequently, it was necessary for there to be a separate source to indicate that one is liable for violating the prohibition against delaying in the case of this offering.

אמר מר ומה נדרים האב מיפר נדרי בתו ובעל מיפר נדרי אשתו אף נזירות האב מיפר נזירות בתו ובעל מיפר נזירות אשתו למה לי היקשא תיתי במה מצינו מנדרים

§ The Master said in the baraita cited above: Just as with regard to vows, a father may nullify the vows of his daughter and a husband may nullify the vows of his wife, so too, with regard to nazirite vows, a father may nullify the nazirite vows of his daughter and a husband may nullify the nazirite vows of his wife. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the juxtaposition in the verse to teach us this halakha? Let this halakha come through the method of analogy known as: What do we find, from the halakha with regard to vows. In other words, the halakha in the case of regular vows should serve as a legal precedent that can be applied to nazirite vows even without a biblical juxtaposition.

דילמא גבי נדרים הוא דמיפר משום דלא אית ליה קיצותא אבל גבי נזירות דאית ליה קיצותא דסתם נזירות שלשים יום אימא לא קא משמע לן

The Gemara responds: If not for the juxtaposition, one might have said that perhaps it is only with regard to vows that he may nullify her statements because there is no time limit with regard to vows, but with regard to naziriteship, which has a time limit, as unspecified naziriteship is for thirty days, one might say no, he may not nullify her vows. Therefore, it teaches us through juxtaposition that he may nevertheless nullify her vows.

האומר לחבירו מודר אני וכו׳ אמר שמואל בכולן עד שיאמר שאני אוכל לך שאני טועם לך

§ It is taught in the mishna with regard to one who says to his fellow: I am avowed from you, or another intimation of a vow, that the vow takes effect. Shmuel said: In all these cases, the vow does not take effect until he says: I am avowed from you with regard to that which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours. Without this addition, the statement: I am avowed from you, is not considered even an intimation of a vow.

מיתיבי מודר אני ממך מופרשני ממך מרוחקני ממך הרי זה אסור שאני אוכל לך שאני טועם לך הרי זה אסור הכי קתני במה דברים אמורים באומר שאני אוכל לך שאני טועם לך

The Gemara raises an objection based on the following baraita: If one says: I am avowed from you, or: I am separated from you, or: I am distanced from you, he is prohibited from benefiting from that individual. If he says: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours, he is prohibited from eating or tasting that individual’s food. This indicates that the phrases mentioned in the first clause of the baraita take effect as vows even if he does not add the phrases mentioned in the latter clause. The Gemara answers: This is what the baraita is teaching: In what case is this statement said i.e., if one says: I am avowed from you, or the like, the vow takes effect? It is in a case of one who says: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours.

והתניא איפכא שאני אוכל לך שאני טועם לך אסור מודרני ממך ומופרשני ממך מרוחקני ממך הרי זה אסור תני הכי וכבר אמר מודרני

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita in the opposite order? If one says: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours, he is prohibited from eating or tasting that individual’s food, i.e., the vow takes effect. If he says: I am avowed from you, or: I am separated from you, or: I am distanced from you, he is likewise prohibited. In this case, the baraita cannot be interpreted as explained above, and it appears that if one said: I am avowed from you, the vow takes effect even if he did not say: I am avowed from you with regard to that which I taste of yours. The Gemara answers: Teach the baraita as follows: The vow takes effect in the cases mentioned in the first clause when he already said: I am avowed.

אי הכי היינו רישא ועוד אסור אסור למה ליה למתני

The Gemara asks: If so, this is the same as the first baraita cited above. And furthermore, if the vow takes effect only if he combined the statements mentioned in the first and latter clauses of the baraita, why does the baraita teach that he is prohibited in the first clause of the baraita and then repeat that he is prohibited in the second clause of the baraita? The repetition of this ruling indicates that these are two separate cases.

אלא אמר שמואל טעמא דאמר שאני אוכל לך שאני טועם לך הוא דאסור וחבירו מותר

Rather, Shmuel actually said as follows: The reason is that he said: I am avowed from you with regard to that which I eat of yours, or with regard to that which I taste of yours; it is for this reason that he is prohibited from benefiting from his fellow, and his fellow is permitted to benefit from him, as this formulation indicates that he is applying his vow only to himself.