What is a case where one can be held liable for delaying a nazirite vow? Two answers were suggested in Nedarim 3b and three more suggestions are now brought. The last answer suggests that the prohibition of delaying relates to delaying the nazirite sacrifices. If this is so, why would that need to be derived from the juxtaposition (heikesh) of neder to nazir, when it could be simply derived from the laws of delaying all sacrifices, which include sin offerings (which is one of the sacrifices brought by a nazir)? Perhaps nazir is a chiddush, has unique laws, on account of which one would not be able to learn laws of nazir from laws of other sacrifices. Why would nazir be a chiddush? The Gemara brings four possibilities, two of which are rejected. One last question is asked on the braita from Nedarim 3a regarding the source for the law of annulment of nazir from a husband to a wife/father to a daughter. Shmuel has a unique way of reading the line of the Mishna relating to the details of yadot. However, the Gemara raises a question on his reading.
Siyum Masechet Avodah Zarah
Siyum Masechet Avodah Zarah is dedicated with love and pride to Terri Krivosha from her husband, Rabbi Hayim Herring, her children, Tamar, Avi and Shaina, and her grandchildren, Noam, Liba, and Orly, for completing her first Daf Yomi cycle. You embody the words of Micah 6:8, and “do justice, love goodness, and walk modestly with HaShem.”
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Siyum Masechet Avodah Zarah
Siyum Masechet Avodah Zarah is dedicated with love and pride to Terri Krivosha from her husband, Rabbi Hayim Herring, her children, Tamar, Avi and Shaina, and her grandchildren, Noam, Liba, and Orly, for completing her first Daf Yomi cycle. You embody the words of Micah 6:8, and “do justice, love goodness, and walk modestly with HaShem.”
Nedarim 4
רַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב אָמַר: כְּגוֹן דִּנְדַר וְהוּא בְּבֵית הַקְּבָרוֹת.
Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: The prohibition against delaying applies to a nazirite in a case where one vowed to become a nazirite while he was in a cemetery. Since it is prohibited for a nazirite to be in a cemetery, his term of naziriteship does not come into effect until he leaves the cemetery and ritually purifies himself. If he delays this process, he prevents the vow from taking effect and thereby transgresses the prohibition against delaying.
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר לָא חָיְילָא עֲלֵיהּ נְזִירוּת מֵאַלְתַּר. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מֵאַלְתַּר חָיְילָא עֲלֵיהּ, מִי אִיכָּא ״בַּל תְּאַחֵר״? וְעוֹד: הָאָמַר מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי: חָיְילָא נְזִירוּת עֲלֵיהּ מֵאַלְתַּר, וְכִי פְּלִיגִי — לְעִנְיַן מַלְקוֹת פְּלִיגִי!
The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that if one takes a vow of naziriteship while in a cemetery the naziriteship does not apply to him immediately. However, according to the one who said that the naziriteship applies to him immediately, is there a violation of the prohibition: You shall not delay? And furthermore, didn’t Mar bar Rav Ashi say that all agree that the naziriteship applies to him immediately and he need not repeat his vow of naziriteship when he leaves, and when they disagree it is only with regard to the matter of flogging, and it’s only about this that they disagree, i.e., whether the nazirite is flogged if he drinks wine or otherwise violates the prohibitions of a nazirite.
אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי קָם לֵיהּ בְּ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״, מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא מְאַחַר נְזִירוּת דְּטָהֳרָה. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: הוֹאִיל וְכֵן, נָזִיר שֶׁטִּימֵּא עַצְמוֹ בְּמֵזִיד — עוֹבֵר מִשּׁוּם ״בַּל תְּאַחֵר״ דִּנְזִירוּת טָהֳרָה.
The Gemara answers: Even so, he is liable for violating the prohibition: You shall not delay, because by remaining in the cemetery he delays a naziriteship of ritual purity. Although the halakhot of naziriteship take effect upon him immediately, he is still obligated to fulfill a term of naziriteship in a state of ritual purity, and if he delays doing so, he violates the prohibition against delaying. Rav Ashi said: Since this is so, a nazirite who intentionally renders himself ritually impure violates the prohibition: You shall not delay, with regard to a naziriteship of ritual purity, as he thereby prevents himself from completing his naziriteship in a state of ritual purity on time.
רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא אָמַר: עוֹבֵר בְּ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״ תִּגְלַחְתּוֹ.
Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, stated another explanation of how the prohibition against delaying applies with regard to naziriteship: The nazirite is commanded to shave his hair at the conclusion of his term, and if he causes this shaving to be delayed, he violates the prohibition: You shall not delay, with regard to his shaving.
וְלָא מִיבַּעְיָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר תִּגְלַחַת מְעַכֶּבֶת, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר תִּגְלַחַת אֵינָהּ מְעַכֶּבֶת, מִצְוַת גִּילּוּחַ מִיהָא לָא מְיקַיֵּים.
The Gemara adds: And this explanation is not necessary to say, i.e., it is obvious, according to the one who says that shaving is indispensable for a nazirite and he is subject to all the prohibitions of a nazirite until he shaves, but even according to the one who says that shaving is not indispensable and the halakhot of naziriteship are terminated for him immediately after he brings his offerings, at least it can be said that he does not fulfill the mitzva of shaving until he actually shaves, and therefore if he delays, he violates the prohibition against delaying.
מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב מָרִי אָמַר: עוֹבֵר בְּ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״ קָרְבְּנוֹתָיו.
Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, stated another explanation of how the prohibition against delaying applies to a nazirite vow: He transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay, with regard to his offerings. When he completes his term as a nazirite he is obligated to bring certain offerings, and if he delays bringing them, he violates this prohibition.
וּמִן הָכָא נָפְקָא לֵיהּ? מֵהָתָם נָפְקָא לֵיהּ: ״כִּי דָרֹשׁ יִדְרְשֶׁנּוּ״ — אֵלּוּ חַטָּאֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת!
The Gemara asks: Is this halakha, that the prohibition against delaying applies to a nazirite vow, derived from here, i.e., the juxtaposition of vows and naziriteship? It is derived from there, a different exposition based upon the verse: “When you shall take a vow…you shall not delay to pay it; for the Lord your God will surely require it of you” (Deuteronomy 23:22). Those items included in the phrase “will surely require it” are sin-offerings and guilt-offerings, including the sin-offering and guilt-offering of a nazirite.
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: חִידּוּשׁ הוּא שֶׁחִידְּשָׁה תּוֹרָה בְּנָזִיר.
The Gemara explains: The derivation based on the juxtaposition of vows and naziriteship is still necessary lest you say that these offerings are a novelty that the Torah innovated with regard to a nazirite and therefore their halakhot cannot be derived from halakhot of other offerings.
מַאי חִידּוּשׁ? אִילֵּימָא דְּלָא מַתְפֵּיס לַיהּ לְחַטַּאת נָזִיר בְּנֶדֶר. הֲרֵי חַטַּאת חֵלֶב, שֶׁאֵין מַתְפִּיסָהּ בְּנֶדֶר, וְעוֹבֵר בְּ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״!
The Gemara asks: What is the novelty that the Torah introduced with regard to the nazirite? If we say it is that he cannot accept upon himself the sin-offering of a nazirite through a vow, i.e., if one who is not a nazirite says: I hereby vow to bring the sin-offering of a nazirite, his vow has no validity, this is not a unique halakha with regard to sin-offerings of a nazirite. There is also the case of the sin-offering of forbidden fat, i.e., a typical sin-offering that one brings when he inadvertently violates certain prohibitions, one of which is eating forbidden fat, which one cannot accept through a vow, as only one who has violated the prohibition may bring it; and nevertheless, one still transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay, if he delays bringing the offering.
אֶלָּא: מַאי חִידּוּשֵׁיהּ — סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי נָזִיר״ אֲפִילּוּ מִן חַרְצָן — הָוֵי נָזִיר לַכֹּל, אֵימָא לָא לַיעֲבוֹר עֲלֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם ״בַּל תְּאַחֵר״ — קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
Rather, what is its novelty that makes the juxtaposition between vows and naziriteship necessary? It might enter your mind to say that since if he said: I am hereby a nazirite, even if he accepted upon himself only one of the prohibitions of a nazirite, e.g., the requirement to abstain from grape seeds, he is nevertheless a nazirite with regard to all aspects of naziriteship, therefore say that he does not transgress the prohibition: You shall not delay. Since this halakha is a novelty, perhaps the principles of vows do not apply. The verse therefore teaches us through the juxtaposition of vows and naziriteship that the prohibition against delaying applies even in this case.
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר כִּי נָזִיר מִן חַרְצָן הָוֵי נָזִיר לַכֹּל, אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּאָמַר אֵין נָזִיר עַד שֶׁיַּזִּיר מִכּוּלָּן — מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? וְעוֹד: הַאי חִידּוּשׁ לְחוּמְרָא הוּא!
The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who said that when one vows to be a nazirite from grape seeds he is a nazirite in all respects. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that he is not a nazirite unless he explicitly vows to be a nazirite in all respects, what is there to say? And furthermore, this novelty is stringent in that it renders the individual a nazirite even if he did not explicitly accept all of the halakhot of naziriteship. How could this novelty indicate that the prohibition against delaying does not apply in this case, which is a leniency, so that the juxtaposition would be necessary?
אֶלָּא: מַאי חִידּוּשֵׁיהּ? דְּסָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל
Rather, what is its novelty that makes the juxtaposition between vows and naziriteship necessary? It might enter your mind to say that since
וְאִם גִּילַּח עַל אַחַת מִשְּׁלׇשְׁתָּן — יָצָא, לָא לַיעֲבוֹר עֲלֵיהּ בְּ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
if he shaves upon bringing one of the three offerings that a nazirite must bring when completing his term as a nazirite, i.e., a burnt-offering, a sin-offering, and a peace-offering, he has fulfilled his obligation to shave and the restrictions of a nazirite are lifted, he therefore does not violate the prohibition: You shall not delay, for delaying the other offerings. Consequently, it teaches us that the prohibition against delaying applies to these offerings.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: מַאי חִדּוּשֵׁיהּ — מִשּׁוּם דְּלֹא מַתְפִּיסוֹ בְּנֶדֶר. וְהָא דְּקָא קַשְׁיָא לָךְ חַטַּאת חֵלֶב — חַטַּאת חֵלֶב קָאָתְיָא לְכַפָּרָה. חַטַּאת נָזִיר לְמַאי אָתְיָא?
And if you wish say: What is the novelty of the nazirite? The halakha of naziriteship is considered a novelty because the offerings of a nazirite cannot be accepted through a vow. And that which poses a difficulty for you based on the fact that one cannot accept upon himself a sin-offering of forbidden fat through a vow either, and nevertheless the prohibition against delaying applies, can be resolved. A sin-offering of forbidden fat comes for the purpose of atonement, and therefore if one delays bringing it he violates the prohibition against delaying. However, for what does the sin-offering of a nazirite come? Since it does not come to atone for a sin, one might have thought that the prohibition against delaying does not apply.
וַהֲרֵי חַטַּאת יוֹלֶדֶת דְּלָא אָתְיָא לְכַפָּרָה, וְעָבַר עֲלַהּ מִשּׁוּם ״בַּל תְּאַחֵר״! הָהִיא — קָא שָׁרְיָא לַהּ לְמֵיכַל בְּקָדָשִׁים.
The Gemara asks: But there is the precedent of the sin-offering of a woman who gave birth, which also does not come for the purpose of atonement, and yet if she does not bring the offering on time she still transgresses due to the prohibition: You shall not delay. The Gemara answers: That sin-offering of a woman who gave birth permits the woman to eat consecrated food. Although it does not come to effect atonement, it does come to permit a matter. On the other hand, the sin-offering of a nazirite does not permit anything, and therefore the fact that one cannot accept upon himself an obligation to bring this offering is a novelty. Consequently, it was necessary for there to be a separate source to indicate that one is liable for violating the prohibition against delaying in the case of this offering.
אָמַר מָר: וּמָה נְדָרִים, הָאָב מֵיפֵר נִדְרֵי בִתּוֹ וּבַעַל מֵיפֵר נִדְרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ — אַף נְזִירוּת, הָאָב מֵיפֵר נְזִירוּת בִּתּוֹ וּבַעַל מֵיפֵר נְזִירוּת אִשְׁתּוֹ. לְמָה לִי הֶיקֵּשָׁא? תֵּיתֵי בְּ״מָה מָצִינוּ״ מִנְּדָרִים!
§ The Master said in the baraita cited above: Just as with regard to vows, a father may nullify the vows of his daughter and a husband may nullify the vows of his wife, so too, with regard to nazirite vows, a father may nullify the nazirite vows of his daughter and a husband may nullify the nazirite vows of his wife. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the juxtaposition in the verse to teach us this halakha? Let this halakha come through the method of analogy known as: What do we find, from the halakha with regard to vows. In other words, the halakha in the case of regular vows should serve as a legal precedent that can be applied to nazirite vows even without a biblical juxtaposition.
דִּילְמָא גַּבֵּי נְדָרִים הוּא דְּמֵיפַר, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא אִית לֵיהּ קִיצּוּתָא. אֲבָל גַּבֵּי נְזִירוּת דְּאִית לֵיהּ קִיצּוּתָא, דִּסְתַם נְזִירוּת שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, אֵימָא לָא — קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara responds: If not for the juxtaposition, one might have said that perhaps it is only with regard to vows that he may nullify her statements because there is no time limit with regard to vows, but with regard to naziriteship, which has a time limit, as unspecified naziriteship is for thirty days, one might say no, he may not nullify her vows. Therefore, it teaches us through juxtaposition that he may nevertheless nullify her vows.
הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ מוּדָּר אֲנִי וְכוּ׳. אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: בְּכוּלָּן עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר, ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל לָךְ״, ״שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם לָךְ״.
§ It is taught in the mishna with regard to one who says to his fellow: I am avowed from you, or another intimation of a vow, that the vow takes effect. Shmuel said: In all these cases, the vow does not take effect until he says: I am avowed from you with regard to that which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours. Without this addition, the statement: I am avowed from you, is not considered even an intimation of a vow.
מֵיתִיבִי: ״מוּדָּר אֲנִי מִמָּךְ״ ״מוּפְרְשַׁנִי מִמָּךְ״ ״מְרוּחָקֵנִי מִמָּךְ״ — הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר. ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל לָךְ״ ״שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם לָךְ״ — הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר! הָכִי קָתָנֵי: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — בְּאוֹמֵר: ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל לָךְ״ ״שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם לָךְ״.
The Gemara raises an objection based on the following baraita: If one says: I am avowed from you, or: I am separated from you, or: I am distanced from you, he is prohibited from benefiting from that individual. If he says: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours, he is prohibited from eating or tasting that individual’s food. This indicates that the phrases mentioned in the first clause of the baraita take effect as vows even if he does not add the phrases mentioned in the latter clause. The Gemara answers: This is what the baraita is teaching: In what case is this statement said i.e., if one says: I am avowed from you, or the like, the vow takes effect? It is in a case of one who says: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours.
וְהָתַנְיָא אִיפְּכָא: ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל לָךְ״, ״שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם לָךְ״ — אָסוּר, ״מוּדְּרַנִי מִמָּךְ״ וּ״מוּפְרְשַׁנִי מִמָּךְ״ ״מְרוּחֲקַנִי מִמָּךְ״ — הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר! תָּנֵי הָכִי: ״וּכְבָר אָמַר מוּדְּרַנִי״.
The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita in the opposite order? If one says: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours, he is prohibited from eating or tasting that individual’s food, i.e., the vow takes effect. If he says: I am avowed from you, or: I am separated from you, or: I am distanced from you, he is likewise prohibited. In this case, the baraita cannot be interpreted as explained above, and it appears that if one said: I am avowed from you, the vow takes effect even if he did not say: I am avowed from you with regard to that which I taste of yours. The Gemara answers: Teach the baraita as follows: The vow takes effect in the cases mentioned in the first clause when he already said: I am avowed.
אִי הָכִי, הַיְינוּ רֵישָׁא! וְעוֹד: ״אָסוּר״ ״אָסוּר״ לְמָה לֵיהּ לְמִתְנֵי?
The Gemara asks: If so, this is the same as the first baraita cited above. And furthermore, if the vow takes effect only if he combined the statements mentioned in the first and latter clauses of the baraita, why does the baraita teach that he is prohibited in the first clause of the baraita and then repeat that he is prohibited in the second clause of the baraita? The repetition of this ruling indicates that these are two separate cases.
אֶלָּא, אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל לָךְ״ ״שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם לָךְ״, הוּא דְּאָסוּר וַחֲבֵירוֹ מוּתָּר.
Rather, Shmuel actually said as follows: The reason is that he said: I am avowed from you with regard to that which I eat of yours, or with regard to that which I taste of yours; it is for this reason that he is prohibited from benefiting from his fellow, and his fellow is permitted to benefit from him, as this formulation indicates that he is applying his vow only to himself.
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I have joined the community of daf yomi learners at the start of this cycle. I have studied in different ways – by reading the page, translating the page, attending a local shiur and listening to Rabbanit Farber’s podcasts, depending on circumstances and where I was at the time. The reactions have been positive throughout – with no exception!
Guildford, United Kingdom
I started learning daf yomi at the beginning of this cycle. As the pandemic evolved, it’s been so helpful to me to have this discipline every morning to listen to the daf podcast after I’ve read the daf; learning about the relationships between the rabbis and the ways they were constructing our Jewish religion after the destruction of the Temple. I’m grateful to be on this journey!
Teaneck NJ, United States
Hadran entered my life after the last Siyum Hashaas, January 2020. I was inspired and challenged simultaneously, having never thought of learning Gemara. With my family’s encouragement, I googled “daf yomi for women”. A perfecr fit!
I especially enjoy when Rabbanit Michelle connects the daf to contemporary issues to share at the shabbat table e.g: looking at the Kohen during duchaning. Toda rabba
Jerusalem, Israel
I am a Reform rabbi and took Talmud courses in rabbinical school, but I knew there was so much more to learn. It felt inauthentic to serve as a rabbi without having read the entire Talmud, so when the opportunity arose to start Daf Yomi in 2020, I dove in! Thanks to Hadran, Daf Yomi has enriched my understanding of rabbinic Judaism and deepened my love of Jewish text & tradition. Todah rabbah!
California, United States
When I began the previous cycle, I promised myself that if I stuck with it, I would reward myself with a trip to Israel. Little did I know that the trip would involve attending the first ever women’s siyum and being inspired by so many learners. I am now over 2 years into my second cycle and being part of this large, diverse, fascinating learning family has enhanced my learning exponentially.
Minnesota, United States
I started Daf during the pandemic. I listened to a number of podcasts by various Rebbeim until one day, I discovered Rabbanit Farbers podcast. Subsequently I joined the Hadran family in Eruvin. Not the easiest place to begin, Rabbanit Farber made it all understandable and fun. The online live group has bonded together and have really become a supportive, encouraging family.
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
I started my Daf Yomi journey at the beginning of the COVID19 pandemic.
Los Angeles, United States
Blacksburg, United States
I began my Daf Yomi journey on January 5, 2020. I had never learned Talmud before. Initially it struck me as a bunch of inane and arcane details with mind bending logic. I am now smitten. Rabbanit Farber brings the page to life and I am eager to learn with her every day!
Highland Park, United States
Having never learned Talmud before, I started Daf Yomi in hopes of connecting to the Rabbinic tradition, sharing a daily idea on Instagram (@dafyomiadventures). With Hadran and Sefaria, I slowly gained confidence in my skills and understanding. Now, part of the Pardes Jewish Educators Program, I can’t wait to bring this love of learning with me as I continue to pass it on to my future students.
Pennsylvania, United States
I started at the beginning of this cycle. No 1 reason, but here’s 5.
In 2019 I read about the upcoming siyum hashas.
There was a sermon at shul about how anyone can learn Talmud.
Talmud references come up when I am studying. I wanted to know more.
Yentl was on telly. Not a great movie but it’s about studying Talmud.
I went to the Hadran website: A new cycle is starting. I’m gonna do this
Cambridge, United Kingdom
I am a Reform rabbi and took Talmud courses in rabbinical school, but I knew there was so much more to learn. It felt inauthentic to serve as a rabbi without having read the entire Talmud, so when the opportunity arose to start Daf Yomi in 2020, I dove in! Thanks to Hadran, Daf Yomi has enriched my understanding of rabbinic Judaism and deepened my love of Jewish text & tradition. Todah rabbah!
California, United States
After being so inspired by the siyum shas two years ago, I began tentatively learning daf yomi, like Rabbanut Michelle kept saying – taking one daf at a time. I’m still taking it one daf at a time, one masechet at a time, but I’m loving it and am still so inspired by Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran community, and yes – I am proud to be finishing Seder Mo’ed.
Bet Shemesh, Israel
I started learning at the beginning of the cycle after a friend persuaded me that it would be right up my alley. I was lucky enough to learn at Rabbanit Michelle’s house before it started on zoom and it was quickly part of my daily routine. I find it so important to see for myself where halachot were derived, where stories were told and to get more insight into how the Rabbis interacted.
Ra’anana, Israel
Inspired by Hadran’s first Siyum ha Shas L’Nashim two years ago, I began daf yomi right after for the next cycle. As to this extraordinary journey together with Hadran..as TS Eliot wrote “We must not cease from exploration and the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we began and to know the place for the first time.
Jerusalem, Israel
See video
Raanana, Israel
Tel Aviv, Israel
I started learning on January 5, 2020. When I complete the 7+ year cycle I will be 70 years old. I had been intimidated by those who said that I needed to study Talmud in a traditional way with a chevruta, but I decided the learning was more important to me than the method. Thankful for Daf Yomi for Women helping me catch up when I fall behind, and also being able to celebrate with each Siyum!
Bakersfield, United States
I heard about the syium in January 2020 & I was excited to start learning then the pandemic started. Learning Daf became something to focus on but also something stressful. As the world changed around me & my family I had to adjust my expectations for myself & the world. Daf Yomi & the Hadran podcast has been something I look forward to every day. It gives me a moment of centering & Judaism daily.
Denver, United States
I’ve been wanting to do Daf Yomi for years, but always wanted to start at the beginning and not in the middle of things. When the opportunity came in 2020, I decided: “this is now the time!” I’ve been posting my journey daily on social media, tracking my progress (#DafYomi); now it’s fully integrated into my daily routines. I’ve also inspired my partner to join, too!
Teaneck, United States
Nedarim 4
רַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב אָמַר: כְּגוֹן דִּנְדַר וְהוּא בְּבֵית הַקְּבָרוֹת.
Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: The prohibition against delaying applies to a nazirite in a case where one vowed to become a nazirite while he was in a cemetery. Since it is prohibited for a nazirite to be in a cemetery, his term of naziriteship does not come into effect until he leaves the cemetery and ritually purifies himself. If he delays this process, he prevents the vow from taking effect and thereby transgresses the prohibition against delaying.
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר לָא חָיְילָא עֲלֵיהּ נְזִירוּת מֵאַלְתַּר. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מֵאַלְתַּר חָיְילָא עֲלֵיהּ, מִי אִיכָּא ״בַּל תְּאַחֵר״? וְעוֹד: הָאָמַר מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי: חָיְילָא נְזִירוּת עֲלֵיהּ מֵאַלְתַּר, וְכִי פְּלִיגִי — לְעִנְיַן מַלְקוֹת פְּלִיגִי!
The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that if one takes a vow of naziriteship while in a cemetery the naziriteship does not apply to him immediately. However, according to the one who said that the naziriteship applies to him immediately, is there a violation of the prohibition: You shall not delay? And furthermore, didn’t Mar bar Rav Ashi say that all agree that the naziriteship applies to him immediately and he need not repeat his vow of naziriteship when he leaves, and when they disagree it is only with regard to the matter of flogging, and it’s only about this that they disagree, i.e., whether the nazirite is flogged if he drinks wine or otherwise violates the prohibitions of a nazirite.
אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי קָם לֵיהּ בְּ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״, מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא מְאַחַר נְזִירוּת דְּטָהֳרָה. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: הוֹאִיל וְכֵן, נָזִיר שֶׁטִּימֵּא עַצְמוֹ בְּמֵזִיד — עוֹבֵר מִשּׁוּם ״בַּל תְּאַחֵר״ דִּנְזִירוּת טָהֳרָה.
The Gemara answers: Even so, he is liable for violating the prohibition: You shall not delay, because by remaining in the cemetery he delays a naziriteship of ritual purity. Although the halakhot of naziriteship take effect upon him immediately, he is still obligated to fulfill a term of naziriteship in a state of ritual purity, and if he delays doing so, he violates the prohibition against delaying. Rav Ashi said: Since this is so, a nazirite who intentionally renders himself ritually impure violates the prohibition: You shall not delay, with regard to a naziriteship of ritual purity, as he thereby prevents himself from completing his naziriteship in a state of ritual purity on time.
רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא אָמַר: עוֹבֵר בְּ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״ תִּגְלַחְתּוֹ.
Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, stated another explanation of how the prohibition against delaying applies with regard to naziriteship: The nazirite is commanded to shave his hair at the conclusion of his term, and if he causes this shaving to be delayed, he violates the prohibition: You shall not delay, with regard to his shaving.
וְלָא מִיבַּעְיָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר תִּגְלַחַת מְעַכֶּבֶת, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר תִּגְלַחַת אֵינָהּ מְעַכֶּבֶת, מִצְוַת גִּילּוּחַ מִיהָא לָא מְיקַיֵּים.
The Gemara adds: And this explanation is not necessary to say, i.e., it is obvious, according to the one who says that shaving is indispensable for a nazirite and he is subject to all the prohibitions of a nazirite until he shaves, but even according to the one who says that shaving is not indispensable and the halakhot of naziriteship are terminated for him immediately after he brings his offerings, at least it can be said that he does not fulfill the mitzva of shaving until he actually shaves, and therefore if he delays, he violates the prohibition against delaying.
מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב מָרִי אָמַר: עוֹבֵר בְּ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״ קָרְבְּנוֹתָיו.
Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, stated another explanation of how the prohibition against delaying applies to a nazirite vow: He transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay, with regard to his offerings. When he completes his term as a nazirite he is obligated to bring certain offerings, and if he delays bringing them, he violates this prohibition.
וּמִן הָכָא נָפְקָא לֵיהּ? מֵהָתָם נָפְקָא לֵיהּ: ״כִּי דָרֹשׁ יִדְרְשֶׁנּוּ״ — אֵלּוּ חַטָּאֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת!
The Gemara asks: Is this halakha, that the prohibition against delaying applies to a nazirite vow, derived from here, i.e., the juxtaposition of vows and naziriteship? It is derived from there, a different exposition based upon the verse: “When you shall take a vow…you shall not delay to pay it; for the Lord your God will surely require it of you” (Deuteronomy 23:22). Those items included in the phrase “will surely require it” are sin-offerings and guilt-offerings, including the sin-offering and guilt-offering of a nazirite.
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: חִידּוּשׁ הוּא שֶׁחִידְּשָׁה תּוֹרָה בְּנָזִיר.
The Gemara explains: The derivation based on the juxtaposition of vows and naziriteship is still necessary lest you say that these offerings are a novelty that the Torah innovated with regard to a nazirite and therefore their halakhot cannot be derived from halakhot of other offerings.
מַאי חִידּוּשׁ? אִילֵּימָא דְּלָא מַתְפֵּיס לַיהּ לְחַטַּאת נָזִיר בְּנֶדֶר. הֲרֵי חַטַּאת חֵלֶב, שֶׁאֵין מַתְפִּיסָהּ בְּנֶדֶר, וְעוֹבֵר בְּ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״!
The Gemara asks: What is the novelty that the Torah introduced with regard to the nazirite? If we say it is that he cannot accept upon himself the sin-offering of a nazirite through a vow, i.e., if one who is not a nazirite says: I hereby vow to bring the sin-offering of a nazirite, his vow has no validity, this is not a unique halakha with regard to sin-offerings of a nazirite. There is also the case of the sin-offering of forbidden fat, i.e., a typical sin-offering that one brings when he inadvertently violates certain prohibitions, one of which is eating forbidden fat, which one cannot accept through a vow, as only one who has violated the prohibition may bring it; and nevertheless, one still transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay, if he delays bringing the offering.
אֶלָּא: מַאי חִידּוּשֵׁיהּ — סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי נָזִיר״ אֲפִילּוּ מִן חַרְצָן — הָוֵי נָזִיר לַכֹּל, אֵימָא לָא לַיעֲבוֹר עֲלֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם ״בַּל תְּאַחֵר״ — קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
Rather, what is its novelty that makes the juxtaposition between vows and naziriteship necessary? It might enter your mind to say that since if he said: I am hereby a nazirite, even if he accepted upon himself only one of the prohibitions of a nazirite, e.g., the requirement to abstain from grape seeds, he is nevertheless a nazirite with regard to all aspects of naziriteship, therefore say that he does not transgress the prohibition: You shall not delay. Since this halakha is a novelty, perhaps the principles of vows do not apply. The verse therefore teaches us through the juxtaposition of vows and naziriteship that the prohibition against delaying applies even in this case.
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר כִּי נָזִיר מִן חַרְצָן הָוֵי נָזִיר לַכֹּל, אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּאָמַר אֵין נָזִיר עַד שֶׁיַּזִּיר מִכּוּלָּן — מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? וְעוֹד: הַאי חִידּוּשׁ לְחוּמְרָא הוּא!
The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who said that when one vows to be a nazirite from grape seeds he is a nazirite in all respects. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that he is not a nazirite unless he explicitly vows to be a nazirite in all respects, what is there to say? And furthermore, this novelty is stringent in that it renders the individual a nazirite even if he did not explicitly accept all of the halakhot of naziriteship. How could this novelty indicate that the prohibition against delaying does not apply in this case, which is a leniency, so that the juxtaposition would be necessary?
אֶלָּא: מַאי חִידּוּשֵׁיהּ? דְּסָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל
Rather, what is its novelty that makes the juxtaposition between vows and naziriteship necessary? It might enter your mind to say that since
וְאִם גִּילַּח עַל אַחַת מִשְּׁלׇשְׁתָּן — יָצָא, לָא לַיעֲבוֹר עֲלֵיהּ בְּ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
if he shaves upon bringing one of the three offerings that a nazirite must bring when completing his term as a nazirite, i.e., a burnt-offering, a sin-offering, and a peace-offering, he has fulfilled his obligation to shave and the restrictions of a nazirite are lifted, he therefore does not violate the prohibition: You shall not delay, for delaying the other offerings. Consequently, it teaches us that the prohibition against delaying applies to these offerings.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: מַאי חִדּוּשֵׁיהּ — מִשּׁוּם דְּלֹא מַתְפִּיסוֹ בְּנֶדֶר. וְהָא דְּקָא קַשְׁיָא לָךְ חַטַּאת חֵלֶב — חַטַּאת חֵלֶב קָאָתְיָא לְכַפָּרָה. חַטַּאת נָזִיר לְמַאי אָתְיָא?
And if you wish say: What is the novelty of the nazirite? The halakha of naziriteship is considered a novelty because the offerings of a nazirite cannot be accepted through a vow. And that which poses a difficulty for you based on the fact that one cannot accept upon himself a sin-offering of forbidden fat through a vow either, and nevertheless the prohibition against delaying applies, can be resolved. A sin-offering of forbidden fat comes for the purpose of atonement, and therefore if one delays bringing it he violates the prohibition against delaying. However, for what does the sin-offering of a nazirite come? Since it does not come to atone for a sin, one might have thought that the prohibition against delaying does not apply.
וַהֲרֵי חַטַּאת יוֹלֶדֶת דְּלָא אָתְיָא לְכַפָּרָה, וְעָבַר עֲלַהּ מִשּׁוּם ״בַּל תְּאַחֵר״! הָהִיא — קָא שָׁרְיָא לַהּ לְמֵיכַל בְּקָדָשִׁים.
The Gemara asks: But there is the precedent of the sin-offering of a woman who gave birth, which also does not come for the purpose of atonement, and yet if she does not bring the offering on time she still transgresses due to the prohibition: You shall not delay. The Gemara answers: That sin-offering of a woman who gave birth permits the woman to eat consecrated food. Although it does not come to effect atonement, it does come to permit a matter. On the other hand, the sin-offering of a nazirite does not permit anything, and therefore the fact that one cannot accept upon himself an obligation to bring this offering is a novelty. Consequently, it was necessary for there to be a separate source to indicate that one is liable for violating the prohibition against delaying in the case of this offering.
אָמַר מָר: וּמָה נְדָרִים, הָאָב מֵיפֵר נִדְרֵי בִתּוֹ וּבַעַל מֵיפֵר נִדְרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ — אַף נְזִירוּת, הָאָב מֵיפֵר נְזִירוּת בִּתּוֹ וּבַעַל מֵיפֵר נְזִירוּת אִשְׁתּוֹ. לְמָה לִי הֶיקֵּשָׁא? תֵּיתֵי בְּ״מָה מָצִינוּ״ מִנְּדָרִים!
§ The Master said in the baraita cited above: Just as with regard to vows, a father may nullify the vows of his daughter and a husband may nullify the vows of his wife, so too, with regard to nazirite vows, a father may nullify the nazirite vows of his daughter and a husband may nullify the nazirite vows of his wife. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the juxtaposition in the verse to teach us this halakha? Let this halakha come through the method of analogy known as: What do we find, from the halakha with regard to vows. In other words, the halakha in the case of regular vows should serve as a legal precedent that can be applied to nazirite vows even without a biblical juxtaposition.
דִּילְמָא גַּבֵּי נְדָרִים הוּא דְּמֵיפַר, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא אִית לֵיהּ קִיצּוּתָא. אֲבָל גַּבֵּי נְזִירוּת דְּאִית לֵיהּ קִיצּוּתָא, דִּסְתַם נְזִירוּת שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, אֵימָא לָא — קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara responds: If not for the juxtaposition, one might have said that perhaps it is only with regard to vows that he may nullify her statements because there is no time limit with regard to vows, but with regard to naziriteship, which has a time limit, as unspecified naziriteship is for thirty days, one might say no, he may not nullify her vows. Therefore, it teaches us through juxtaposition that he may nevertheless nullify her vows.
הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ מוּדָּר אֲנִי וְכוּ׳. אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: בְּכוּלָּן עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר, ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל לָךְ״, ״שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם לָךְ״.
§ It is taught in the mishna with regard to one who says to his fellow: I am avowed from you, or another intimation of a vow, that the vow takes effect. Shmuel said: In all these cases, the vow does not take effect until he says: I am avowed from you with regard to that which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours. Without this addition, the statement: I am avowed from you, is not considered even an intimation of a vow.
מֵיתִיבִי: ״מוּדָּר אֲנִי מִמָּךְ״ ״מוּפְרְשַׁנִי מִמָּךְ״ ״מְרוּחָקֵנִי מִמָּךְ״ — הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר. ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל לָךְ״ ״שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם לָךְ״ — הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר! הָכִי קָתָנֵי: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — בְּאוֹמֵר: ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל לָךְ״ ״שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם לָךְ״.
The Gemara raises an objection based on the following baraita: If one says: I am avowed from you, or: I am separated from you, or: I am distanced from you, he is prohibited from benefiting from that individual. If he says: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours, he is prohibited from eating or tasting that individual’s food. This indicates that the phrases mentioned in the first clause of the baraita take effect as vows even if he does not add the phrases mentioned in the latter clause. The Gemara answers: This is what the baraita is teaching: In what case is this statement said i.e., if one says: I am avowed from you, or the like, the vow takes effect? It is in a case of one who says: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours.
וְהָתַנְיָא אִיפְּכָא: ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל לָךְ״, ״שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם לָךְ״ — אָסוּר, ״מוּדְּרַנִי מִמָּךְ״ וּ״מוּפְרְשַׁנִי מִמָּךְ״ ״מְרוּחֲקַנִי מִמָּךְ״ — הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר! תָּנֵי הָכִי: ״וּכְבָר אָמַר מוּדְּרַנִי״.
The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita in the opposite order? If one says: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours, he is prohibited from eating or tasting that individual’s food, i.e., the vow takes effect. If he says: I am avowed from you, or: I am separated from you, or: I am distanced from you, he is likewise prohibited. In this case, the baraita cannot be interpreted as explained above, and it appears that if one said: I am avowed from you, the vow takes effect even if he did not say: I am avowed from you with regard to that which I taste of yours. The Gemara answers: Teach the baraita as follows: The vow takes effect in the cases mentioned in the first clause when he already said: I am avowed.
אִי הָכִי, הַיְינוּ רֵישָׁא! וְעוֹד: ״אָסוּר״ ״אָסוּר״ לְמָה לֵיהּ לְמִתְנֵי?
The Gemara asks: If so, this is the same as the first baraita cited above. And furthermore, if the vow takes effect only if he combined the statements mentioned in the first and latter clauses of the baraita, why does the baraita teach that he is prohibited in the first clause of the baraita and then repeat that he is prohibited in the second clause of the baraita? The repetition of this ruling indicates that these are two separate cases.
אֶלָּא, אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל לָךְ״ ״שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם לָךְ״, הוּא דְּאָסוּר וַחֲבֵירוֹ מוּתָּר.
Rather, Shmuel actually said as follows: The reason is that he said: I am avowed from you with regard to that which I eat of yours, or with regard to that which I taste of yours; it is for this reason that he is prohibited from benefiting from his fellow, and his fellow is permitted to benefit from him, as this formulation indicates that he is applying his vow only to himself.
