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Today's Daf Yomi

December 12, 2022 | 讬状讞 讘讻住诇讜 转砖驻状讙

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

Nedarim 48

Today鈥檚 daf is sponsored by Deborah Schabes in memory of her mother鈥檚 yahrzeit, Judith Schoenfeld Schabes.
Today鈥檚 daf is sponsored by Ilana Friedman in memory of Yosef Eliezer Ben Chaim whose shloshim recently passed. 鈥淗e was a devoted Torah scholar and my best friend鈥檚 father 鈥 someone dear to my heart.”
If one is forbidden to benefit from another, they can benefit from public spaces that were made ownerless, but not from ones that are owned by the people in the city. What can be done to rectify this situation? If one cannot benefit from another but needs food, the other person can give the food as a gift to someone else, and then the one who is vowed not to benefit can take the food from them. However, a story is told of a son whose father couldn’t benefit from him and the son was marrying off his own son and wanted the father to attend the wedding. He gifted his meal and courtyard to someone else and said that he was doing it in order to allow his father to eat. The person he gave it to did not like being used in order to allow them to go against their vow and therefore sanctified it all to the Temple. After this, the rabbis said that if one gives a gift in a limited manner that the other will not be able to sanctify it if they want, then it is not a valid gift. The Gemara brings a story of a father who vowed that his son not benefit from him, but then wanted to give his property to his son in order to give it to his grandson in the event that the grandson becomes a Torah scholar. Is this possible? In Pumbedita they ruled that it didn’t work and Rav Nachman ruled that it did. Rav Ashi and Rava raised difficulties for Rav Nachman. He answered Rava’s question with two possible answers.

讜讗住讜专讬诐 讘讚讘专 砖诇 讗讜转讛 讛注讬专 讜讗讬讝讛讜 讚讘专 砖诇 注讜诇讬 讘讘诇 讻讙讜谉 讛专 讛讘讬转 讜讛注讝专讜转 讜讛讘讜专 砖讘讗诪爪注 讛讚专讱 讜讗讬讝讛讜 讚讘专 砖诇 讗讜转讛 讛注讬专 讻讙讜谉 讛专讞讘讛 讜讛诪专讞抓 讜讘讬转 讛讻谞住转 讜讛转讬讘讛 讜讛住驻专讬诐 讜讛讻讜转讘 讞诇拽讜 诇谞砖讬讗


But it is prohibited for them to benefit from objects of that city, which are considered to be jointly owned by all its residents. And what are examples of objects belonging to those who ascended from Babylonia? For example, the Temple Mount, and the Temple Courtyards, and the water cistern in the middle of the road. And what are objects of that city? For example, the city square, and the bathhouse, and the synagogue, and the ark which houses the Torah scrolls, and the Torah scrolls. And one who writes, i.e., signs, his portion of the shared objects of that city over to the Nasi.


专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗讞讚 讻讜转讘 诇谞砖讬讗 讜讗讞讚 讻讜转讘 诇讛讚讬讜讟 诪讛 讘讬谉 讻讜转讘 诇谞砖讬讗 诇讻讜转讘 诇讛讚讬讜讟 砖讛讻讜转讘 诇谞砖讬讗 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讝讻讜转 诇讛讚讬讜讟 爪专讬讱 诇讝讻讜转 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讞讚 讝讛 讜讗讞讚 讝讛 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 诇讗 讚讘专讜 讘谞砖讬讗 讗诇讗 讘讛讜讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 讗谞砖讬 讙诇讬诇 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇讻转讜讘 砖讻讘专 讻转讘讜 讗讘讜转讬讛谉 注诇 讬讚讬讛谉:


Rabbi Yehuda says: This is the halakha with regard to both one who writes his portion over to the Nasi and one who writes it over to a common person. Rabbi Yehuda adds: What is the difference between one who writes it over to the Nasi and one who writes it over to a common person? That one who writes it to the Nasi need not formally confer possession of the item, whereas one who writes it over to a common person must confer possession to him. And the Rabbis say: Both this one and that one must confer possession, and they specifically mentioned the Nasi only so as to speak in the present, addressing situations that were prevalent. Rabbi Yehuda says: The people of Galilee do not have to write their portion over to the Nasi because their fathers already wrote it for them, declaring that all the public property belongs to him.


讙诪壮 讗诪讗讬 诪讬转住专 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讜诪讛 转拽谞转谉 讬讻转讘讜 讞诇拽谉 诇谞砖讬讗


GEMARA: The mishna appears to teach that one who is prohibited by a vow from benefiting from another may not benefit from property written over to the Nasi. The Gemara asks: Why is it forbidden? Rav Sheshet said: This is what the mishna is teaching: And what is their remedy, i.e., what can be done to enable the forbidden individuals to benefit from communal property? They should write their portion over to the Nasi, thereby relinquishing their shares in the communal property.


专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗讞讚 讻讜转讘 诇谞砖讬讗 讜讗讞讚 讻讜转讘 诇讛讚讬讜讟 讜诪讛 讘讬谉 讻讜转讘 诇谞砖讬讗 诇讻讜转讘 诇讛讚讬讜讟 讛讻讜转讘 诇谞砖讬讗 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讝讻讜转 讜讛讻讜转讘 诇讛讚讬讜讟 爪专讬讱 诇讝讻讜转 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讞讚 讝讛 讜讗讞讚 讝讛 爪专讬讻讬诐 诇讝讻讜转 诇讗 讚讘专讜 讘谞砖讬讗 讗诇讗 讘讛讜讛:


The Gemara continues its quotation from the mishna: This is the halakha with regard to both one who writes his portion over to the Nasi and one who writes it over to a common person. Rabbi Yehuda adds: What is the difference between one who writes it over to the Nasi and one who writes it over to a common person? That one who writes it to the Nasi need not formally confer possession of the item, whereas one who writes it over to a common person must confer possession to him. And the Rabbis say: Both this one and that one must confer possession, and they specifically mentioned the Nasi only so as to speak in the present.


专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 讗谞砖讬 讙诇讬诇 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 砖讻讘专 讻转讘讜 讗讘讜转讬讛谉 注诇 讬讚讬讛谉: 转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗谞砖讬 讙诇讬诇 拽谞讟专谞讬谉 讛讬讜 讜讛讬讜 谞讜讚专讬谉 讛谞讗讛 讝讛 诪讝讛 注诪讚讜 讗讘讜转讬讛诐 讜讻转讘讜 讞诇拽讬讛谉 诇谞砖讬讗:


搂 The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yehuda says: The people of Galilee do not have to confer possession of their portion to the Nasi because their forefathers already wrote it for them. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: The people of Galilee were quarrelsome [kanteranin] and would often take vows prohibiting benefit from one another. So their forefathers arose and wrote their portions of the public property over to the Nasi so that they would be able to use communal property.


诪转谞讬壮 讛诪讜讚专 讛谞讗讛 诪讞讘讬专讜 讜讗讬谉 诇讜 诪讛 讬讗讻诇 谞讜转谞讜 诇讗讞专 诇砖讜诐 诪转谞讛 讜讛诇讛 诪讜转专 讘讛 诪注砖讛 讘讗讞讚 讘讘讬转 讞讜专讜谉 砖讛讬讛 讗讘讬讜 谞讜讚专 讛讬诪谞讜 讛谞讗讛 讜讛讬讛 诪砖讬讗 讗转 讘谞讜 讜讗诪专 诇讞讘专讜 讞爪专 讜住注讜讚讛 谞转讜谞讬诐 讛讬谞谉 诇驻谞讬讱 讗诇讗 讻讚讬 砖讬讘讗 讗讘讗 讜讬讗讻诇 注诪谞讜 讘住注讜讚讛


MISHNA: With regard to one who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another and he does not have anything to eat, the other may give the food to someone else as a gift and he is then permitted to eat it. The mishna recounts: An incident occurred involving someone in the city of Beit 岣ron whose father had vowed not to derive benefit from him, and the son was marrying off his own son and wanted his father to be able to participate in the wedding meal. And he therefore said to another: The courtyard where the wedding will take place and the wedding meal are given before you as a gift, but only so that my father will come and eat with us at the meal.


讗诪专 讗诐 砖诇讬 讛诐 讛专讬 讛诐 诪讜拽讚砖讬谉 诇砖诪讬诐 讗诪专 诇讜 谞转转讬 诇讱 讗转 砖诇讬 砖转拽讚讬砖诐 诇砖诪讬诐 讗诪专 诇讜 谞转转 诇讬 讗转 砖诇讱 讗诇讗 砖转讛讗 讗转讛 讜讗讘讬讱 讗讜讻诇讬谉 讜砖讜转讬谉 讜诪转专爪讬谉 讝讛 诇讝讛 讜讬讛讗 注讜谉 转诇讜讬 讘专讗砖讜 讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 讻诇 诪转谞讛 砖讗讬谞讛 砖讗诐 讛拽讚讬砖讛 转讛讗 诪拽讜讚砖转 讗讬谞讛 诪转谞讛:


The recipient said: If they are mine, they are all hereby consecrated to Heaven, i.e., the Temple, and are forbidden to everyone. The son said to him in anger: And did I give you my property so that you should consecrate it to Heaven? He, the recipient, said to him: You gave me your property only so that you and your father would eat and drink and thereby appease each other, and the sin of transgressing the vow would be hung on his, i.e., my, head, as I enabled the transgression. The Sages therefore said: Any gift that is not so absolute so that if the recipient were to consecrate the gift it would be consecrated, is not a gift. In other words, in order for it to be a gift, the recipient must have the ability to consecrate it.


讙诪壮 诪注砖讛 诇住转讜专 讞住讜专讬 诪讬讞住专讗 讜讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讜讗诐 讛讜讻讬讞 住讜驻讜 注诇 转讞讬诇转讜 讗住讜专 讜诪注砖讛 谞诪讬 讘讘讬转 讞讜专讜谉 讘讗讞讚 讚讛讜讛 住讜驻讜 诪讜讻讬讞 注诇 转讞讬诇转讜


GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Was an incident cited to contradict that which was initially stated in the mishna? The mishna explicitly stated that one may give a gift to another in order to bypass the prohibition of a vow. The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and is teaching like this: And if his ultimate actions prove the nature of his initial intent, i.e., if the prior owner protests that he gave the gift only as a technicality in order to bypass the vow, it is forbidden. And to illustrate this point, there was also an incident in Beit 岣ron concerning someone whose ultimate protest proved that his initial intent was not to give a true gift.


讗诪专 专讘讗 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讜讛讬谞谉 诇驻谞讬讱 讗诇讗 讻讚讬 砖讬讘讗 讗讘讗 讗讘诇 讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖讬讛讜 诇驻谞讬讱 砖讬讘讗 讗讘讗 诪讚注转讱 讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛


Rava said: They taught this prohibition only in a case where he said to him: And the gifts are given before you only so that my father should come, as he explicitly mentioned that he did not intend to give an absolute gift. But if he said to him less explicitly: That they should be before you that my father should come, there is no prohibition, since he is essentially saying to him: It is up to your judgment whether or not to invite him.


诇讬砖谞讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讗诪专讬谉 诇讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 诇讗 转讬诪讗 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讜讛讬谞谉 诇驻谞讬讱 讛讜讗 讚讗住讜专 讗讘诇 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛谉 诇驻谞讬讱 砖讬讘讗 讗讘讗 讜讬讗讻诇 诪讜转专 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛谉 诇驻谞讬讱 讬讘讗 讗讘讗 讜讬讗讻诇 讗住讜专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 住注讜讚转讜 诪讜讻讞转 注诇讬讜


Some say another version of this statement. Rava said: Do not say that the reason for the prohibition is because he said to him: And the gifts are given before you only so that my father will come, and that is why it is forbidden; but if he said to him: They are before you so my father should come and eat, it would be permitted. This is not so. Rather, even if he said to him: They are before you, my father should come and eat, it is forbidden. What is the reason for this? His wedding meal proves about him that his sole intention was to bypass the vow.


讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讘专讗 讚讛讜讛 砖诪讬讟 讻讬驻讬 讚讻讬转谞讗 讗住专讬谞讛讜 诇谞讻住讬讛 注诇讬讛 讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 讜讗讬 讛讜讗讬 讘专 讘专讱 爪讜专讘讗 诪专讘谞谉 诪讗讬 讗诪专 诇讛讜谉 诇讬拽谞讬 讛讚讬谉 讜讗讬 讛讜讗讬 讘专 讘专讬 爪讜专讘讗 诪专讘谞谉 诇拽谞讬讬讛 诪讗讬


There was a certain man who had a son who seized in theft sheaves [keifei] of flax, and the father took a vow prohibiting his son from deriving any benefit from his possessions. They said to the father: And if the son of your son would become a Torah scholar, and you would want him to be able to inherit your possessions, what would you do? He said to them: Let this son of mine acquire the possessions, and only if the son of my son becomes a Torah scholar then let him, my grandson, acquire them from my son. They asked: What is the ruling?


讗诪专讬 驻讜诪讘讚讬转讗讬 拽谞讬 注诇 诪谞转 诇讛拽谞讜转 讛讜讗 讜讻诇 拽谞讬 注诇 诪谞转 诇讛拽谞讜转 诇讗 拽谞讬


The Sages of Pumbedita say: This is just as if he stated: Acquire the property on the condition that you transfer it to your son. In such a case he has not given anything to the recipient, but has merely made him a conduit to transfer the item to someone else. And in any case where one says: Acquire this item on the condition that you transfer ownership, the recipient does not acquire the item, and the statement has no effect.


讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 拽谞讬 讚讛讗 住讜讚专讗 拽谞讬 注诇 诪谞转 诇讛拽谞讜转 讛讜讗


But Rav Na岣an said: He does acquire, as an acquisition by means of a cloth is a case of an act of acquisition performed only in order to transfer ownership. In such a case, one gives another a cloth in order to confer ownership of some other item, but the cloth itself does not assume new ownership. Still, this is an effective means of acquisition. So too, the property of the grandfather may be effectively conferred upon the grandson through the son, without the son acquiring it himself.


讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讜诪讗谉 诇讬诪讗 诇谉 讚住讜讚专讗 讗讬 转驻讬住 诇讬讛 诇讗 诪讬转驻讬住 讜注讜讚 住讜讚专讗 拽谞讬 注诇 诪谞转 诇讛拽谞讜转 讜拽谞讬 诪谉 讛砖转讗 讛诇讬谉 谞讬讻住讬谉 讚讛讚讬谉 诇讗讬诪转讬 拽谞讬 诇讻讬 讛讜讬 讘专 讘专讬讛 爪讜专讘讗 诪专讘谞谉 诇讻讬 讛讜讛 讛讚专 住讜讚专讗 诇诪专讬讛


Rav Ashi said: And who will say to us concerning the cloth that if the recipient of the cloth would seize it with the intention of keeping it that it would not be an effective seizure? While the cloth is technically transferred, the recipient does not usually exercise his right to it. And furthermore, an acquisition by means of a cloth is a case where the giver is saying: Acquire only in order to transfer ownership, but acquire from now. However, with regard to these possessions of this one who took the vow, when does the son acquire? Only when his son鈥檚 son becomes a Torah scholar. And when he becomes a Torah scholar, the cloth has already been returned to its owner, i.e., the act of acquisition had taken place long before the grandson became a Torah scholar. The initial transfer therefore has no effect.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讜讛讗 诪转谞转 讘讬转 讞讜专讜谉 讚拽谞讬 注诇 诪谞转 诇讛拽谞讜转 讛讜讗 讜诇讗 拽讗 拽谞讬


Rava said to Rav Na岣an: But the gift of Beit 岣ron discussed in the mishna is an example of an acquisition performed only in order to transfer ownership, and there he did not acquire it at all.


讝讬诪谞讬谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚住注讜讚转讜 诪讜讻讞转 注诇讬讜 讜讝讬诪谞讬谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 讜讬转讜专 讗住讜专 讘诪讜讚专 讛谞讗讛


The Gemara recounts: Sometimes when Rav Na岣an was asked this question he said to him: That is because his wedding meal proves about him that he did not truly intend to give the items to the recipient, and not because such an acquisition is invalid per se. And sometimes he said to him that in that case they followed the stringent opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said: Even negligible benefits ordinarily waived are forbidden to one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another. So too, Rabbi Eliezer holds that one cannot rely on an act of acquisition performed merely in order to transfer ownership to a third party.


转谞谉 讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 讻诇 诪转谞讛 砖讗讬谞讛 砖讗诐 讛拽讚讬砖讛 转讛讗 诪拽讜讚砖转 讗讬谞讛 诪转谞讛 讻诇 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 诇讗转讜讬讬 讛讗 诪讬诇转讗 讚砖讚讬讗 讘讻讬驻讬 诇讗 诇讗转讜讬讬 诇讬砖谞讗 讘转专讗讛 讚砖诪注转讬讛 讚专讘讗:


We learned in the mishna (48a): The Sages therefore said: Any gift that is not so absolute so that, if the recipient were to consecrate the gift it would be consecrated, is not a gift. The Gemara asks: What is added by the word: Any? Is it not adding this matter of one who seized sheaves of flax, and to say that the gift of the father has no effect? The Gemara responds: No, the intent is to add the latter version of the aforementioned statement of Rava, that a gift given as a means of circumventing a vow has no effect, even when the giver mentions the nature of the gift only casually and does not stipulate it as a formal condition.


讛讚专谉 注诇讱 讛砖讜转驻讬谉



  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

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Nedarim 48

讜讗住讜专讬诐 讘讚讘专 砖诇 讗讜转讛 讛注讬专 讜讗讬讝讛讜 讚讘专 砖诇 注讜诇讬 讘讘诇 讻讙讜谉 讛专 讛讘讬转 讜讛注讝专讜转 讜讛讘讜专 砖讘讗诪爪注 讛讚专讱 讜讗讬讝讛讜 讚讘专 砖诇 讗讜转讛 讛注讬专 讻讙讜谉 讛专讞讘讛 讜讛诪专讞抓 讜讘讬转 讛讻谞住转 讜讛转讬讘讛 讜讛住驻专讬诐 讜讛讻讜转讘 讞诇拽讜 诇谞砖讬讗


But it is prohibited for them to benefit from objects of that city, which are considered to be jointly owned by all its residents. And what are examples of objects belonging to those who ascended from Babylonia? For example, the Temple Mount, and the Temple Courtyards, and the water cistern in the middle of the road. And what are objects of that city? For example, the city square, and the bathhouse, and the synagogue, and the ark which houses the Torah scrolls, and the Torah scrolls. And one who writes, i.e., signs, his portion of the shared objects of that city over to the Nasi.


专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗讞讚 讻讜转讘 诇谞砖讬讗 讜讗讞讚 讻讜转讘 诇讛讚讬讜讟 诪讛 讘讬谉 讻讜转讘 诇谞砖讬讗 诇讻讜转讘 诇讛讚讬讜讟 砖讛讻讜转讘 诇谞砖讬讗 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讝讻讜转 诇讛讚讬讜讟 爪专讬讱 诇讝讻讜转 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讞讚 讝讛 讜讗讞讚 讝讛 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 诇讗 讚讘专讜 讘谞砖讬讗 讗诇讗 讘讛讜讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 讗谞砖讬 讙诇讬诇 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇讻转讜讘 砖讻讘专 讻转讘讜 讗讘讜转讬讛谉 注诇 讬讚讬讛谉:


Rabbi Yehuda says: This is the halakha with regard to both one who writes his portion over to the Nasi and one who writes it over to a common person. Rabbi Yehuda adds: What is the difference between one who writes it over to the Nasi and one who writes it over to a common person? That one who writes it to the Nasi need not formally confer possession of the item, whereas one who writes it over to a common person must confer possession to him. And the Rabbis say: Both this one and that one must confer possession, and they specifically mentioned the Nasi only so as to speak in the present, addressing situations that were prevalent. Rabbi Yehuda says: The people of Galilee do not have to write their portion over to the Nasi because their fathers already wrote it for them, declaring that all the public property belongs to him.


讙诪壮 讗诪讗讬 诪讬转住专 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讜诪讛 转拽谞转谉 讬讻转讘讜 讞诇拽谉 诇谞砖讬讗


GEMARA: The mishna appears to teach that one who is prohibited by a vow from benefiting from another may not benefit from property written over to the Nasi. The Gemara asks: Why is it forbidden? Rav Sheshet said: This is what the mishna is teaching: And what is their remedy, i.e., what can be done to enable the forbidden individuals to benefit from communal property? They should write their portion over to the Nasi, thereby relinquishing their shares in the communal property.


专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗讞讚 讻讜转讘 诇谞砖讬讗 讜讗讞讚 讻讜转讘 诇讛讚讬讜讟 讜诪讛 讘讬谉 讻讜转讘 诇谞砖讬讗 诇讻讜转讘 诇讛讚讬讜讟 讛讻讜转讘 诇谞砖讬讗 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讝讻讜转 讜讛讻讜转讘 诇讛讚讬讜讟 爪专讬讱 诇讝讻讜转 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讞讚 讝讛 讜讗讞讚 讝讛 爪专讬讻讬诐 诇讝讻讜转 诇讗 讚讘专讜 讘谞砖讬讗 讗诇讗 讘讛讜讛:


The Gemara continues its quotation from the mishna: This is the halakha with regard to both one who writes his portion over to the Nasi and one who writes it over to a common person. Rabbi Yehuda adds: What is the difference between one who writes it over to the Nasi and one who writes it over to a common person? That one who writes it to the Nasi need not formally confer possession of the item, whereas one who writes it over to a common person must confer possession to him. And the Rabbis say: Both this one and that one must confer possession, and they specifically mentioned the Nasi only so as to speak in the present.


专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 讗谞砖讬 讙诇讬诇 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 砖讻讘专 讻转讘讜 讗讘讜转讬讛谉 注诇 讬讚讬讛谉: 转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗谞砖讬 讙诇讬诇 拽谞讟专谞讬谉 讛讬讜 讜讛讬讜 谞讜讚专讬谉 讛谞讗讛 讝讛 诪讝讛 注诪讚讜 讗讘讜转讬讛诐 讜讻转讘讜 讞诇拽讬讛谉 诇谞砖讬讗:


搂 The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yehuda says: The people of Galilee do not have to confer possession of their portion to the Nasi because their forefathers already wrote it for them. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: The people of Galilee were quarrelsome [kanteranin] and would often take vows prohibiting benefit from one another. So their forefathers arose and wrote their portions of the public property over to the Nasi so that they would be able to use communal property.


诪转谞讬壮 讛诪讜讚专 讛谞讗讛 诪讞讘讬专讜 讜讗讬谉 诇讜 诪讛 讬讗讻诇 谞讜转谞讜 诇讗讞专 诇砖讜诐 诪转谞讛 讜讛诇讛 诪讜转专 讘讛 诪注砖讛 讘讗讞讚 讘讘讬转 讞讜专讜谉 砖讛讬讛 讗讘讬讜 谞讜讚专 讛讬诪谞讜 讛谞讗讛 讜讛讬讛 诪砖讬讗 讗转 讘谞讜 讜讗诪专 诇讞讘专讜 讞爪专 讜住注讜讚讛 谞转讜谞讬诐 讛讬谞谉 诇驻谞讬讱 讗诇讗 讻讚讬 砖讬讘讗 讗讘讗 讜讬讗讻诇 注诪谞讜 讘住注讜讚讛


MISHNA: With regard to one who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another and he does not have anything to eat, the other may give the food to someone else as a gift and he is then permitted to eat it. The mishna recounts: An incident occurred involving someone in the city of Beit 岣ron whose father had vowed not to derive benefit from him, and the son was marrying off his own son and wanted his father to be able to participate in the wedding meal. And he therefore said to another: The courtyard where the wedding will take place and the wedding meal are given before you as a gift, but only so that my father will come and eat with us at the meal.


讗诪专 讗诐 砖诇讬 讛诐 讛专讬 讛诐 诪讜拽讚砖讬谉 诇砖诪讬诐 讗诪专 诇讜 谞转转讬 诇讱 讗转 砖诇讬 砖转拽讚讬砖诐 诇砖诪讬诐 讗诪专 诇讜 谞转转 诇讬 讗转 砖诇讱 讗诇讗 砖转讛讗 讗转讛 讜讗讘讬讱 讗讜讻诇讬谉 讜砖讜转讬谉 讜诪转专爪讬谉 讝讛 诇讝讛 讜讬讛讗 注讜谉 转诇讜讬 讘专讗砖讜 讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 讻诇 诪转谞讛 砖讗讬谞讛 砖讗诐 讛拽讚讬砖讛 转讛讗 诪拽讜讚砖转 讗讬谞讛 诪转谞讛:


The recipient said: If they are mine, they are all hereby consecrated to Heaven, i.e., the Temple, and are forbidden to everyone. The son said to him in anger: And did I give you my property so that you should consecrate it to Heaven? He, the recipient, said to him: You gave me your property only so that you and your father would eat and drink and thereby appease each other, and the sin of transgressing the vow would be hung on his, i.e., my, head, as I enabled the transgression. The Sages therefore said: Any gift that is not so absolute so that if the recipient were to consecrate the gift it would be consecrated, is not a gift. In other words, in order for it to be a gift, the recipient must have the ability to consecrate it.


讙诪壮 诪注砖讛 诇住转讜专 讞住讜专讬 诪讬讞住专讗 讜讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讜讗诐 讛讜讻讬讞 住讜驻讜 注诇 转讞讬诇转讜 讗住讜专 讜诪注砖讛 谞诪讬 讘讘讬转 讞讜专讜谉 讘讗讞讚 讚讛讜讛 住讜驻讜 诪讜讻讬讞 注诇 转讞讬诇转讜


GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Was an incident cited to contradict that which was initially stated in the mishna? The mishna explicitly stated that one may give a gift to another in order to bypass the prohibition of a vow. The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and is teaching like this: And if his ultimate actions prove the nature of his initial intent, i.e., if the prior owner protests that he gave the gift only as a technicality in order to bypass the vow, it is forbidden. And to illustrate this point, there was also an incident in Beit 岣ron concerning someone whose ultimate protest proved that his initial intent was not to give a true gift.


讗诪专 专讘讗 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讜讛讬谞谉 诇驻谞讬讱 讗诇讗 讻讚讬 砖讬讘讗 讗讘讗 讗讘诇 讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖讬讛讜 诇驻谞讬讱 砖讬讘讗 讗讘讗 诪讚注转讱 讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛


Rava said: They taught this prohibition only in a case where he said to him: And the gifts are given before you only so that my father should come, as he explicitly mentioned that he did not intend to give an absolute gift. But if he said to him less explicitly: That they should be before you that my father should come, there is no prohibition, since he is essentially saying to him: It is up to your judgment whether or not to invite him.


诇讬砖谞讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讗诪专讬谉 诇讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 诇讗 转讬诪讗 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讜讛讬谞谉 诇驻谞讬讱 讛讜讗 讚讗住讜专 讗讘诇 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛谉 诇驻谞讬讱 砖讬讘讗 讗讘讗 讜讬讗讻诇 诪讜转专 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛谉 诇驻谞讬讱 讬讘讗 讗讘讗 讜讬讗讻诇 讗住讜专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 住注讜讚转讜 诪讜讻讞转 注诇讬讜


Some say another version of this statement. Rava said: Do not say that the reason for the prohibition is because he said to him: And the gifts are given before you only so that my father will come, and that is why it is forbidden; but if he said to him: They are before you so my father should come and eat, it would be permitted. This is not so. Rather, even if he said to him: They are before you, my father should come and eat, it is forbidden. What is the reason for this? His wedding meal proves about him that his sole intention was to bypass the vow.


讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讘专讗 讚讛讜讛 砖诪讬讟 讻讬驻讬 讚讻讬转谞讗 讗住专讬谞讛讜 诇谞讻住讬讛 注诇讬讛 讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 讜讗讬 讛讜讗讬 讘专 讘专讱 爪讜专讘讗 诪专讘谞谉 诪讗讬 讗诪专 诇讛讜谉 诇讬拽谞讬 讛讚讬谉 讜讗讬 讛讜讗讬 讘专 讘专讬 爪讜专讘讗 诪专讘谞谉 诇拽谞讬讬讛 诪讗讬


There was a certain man who had a son who seized in theft sheaves [keifei] of flax, and the father took a vow prohibiting his son from deriving any benefit from his possessions. They said to the father: And if the son of your son would become a Torah scholar, and you would want him to be able to inherit your possessions, what would you do? He said to them: Let this son of mine acquire the possessions, and only if the son of my son becomes a Torah scholar then let him, my grandson, acquire them from my son. They asked: What is the ruling?


讗诪专讬 驻讜诪讘讚讬转讗讬 拽谞讬 注诇 诪谞转 诇讛拽谞讜转 讛讜讗 讜讻诇 拽谞讬 注诇 诪谞转 诇讛拽谞讜转 诇讗 拽谞讬


The Sages of Pumbedita say: This is just as if he stated: Acquire the property on the condition that you transfer it to your son. In such a case he has not given anything to the recipient, but has merely made him a conduit to transfer the item to someone else. And in any case where one says: Acquire this item on the condition that you transfer ownership, the recipient does not acquire the item, and the statement has no effect.


讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 拽谞讬 讚讛讗 住讜讚专讗 拽谞讬 注诇 诪谞转 诇讛拽谞讜转 讛讜讗


But Rav Na岣an said: He does acquire, as an acquisition by means of a cloth is a case of an act of acquisition performed only in order to transfer ownership. In such a case, one gives another a cloth in order to confer ownership of some other item, but the cloth itself does not assume new ownership. Still, this is an effective means of acquisition. So too, the property of the grandfather may be effectively conferred upon the grandson through the son, without the son acquiring it himself.


讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讜诪讗谉 诇讬诪讗 诇谉 讚住讜讚专讗 讗讬 转驻讬住 诇讬讛 诇讗 诪讬转驻讬住 讜注讜讚 住讜讚专讗 拽谞讬 注诇 诪谞转 诇讛拽谞讜转 讜拽谞讬 诪谉 讛砖转讗 讛诇讬谉 谞讬讻住讬谉 讚讛讚讬谉 诇讗讬诪转讬 拽谞讬 诇讻讬 讛讜讬 讘专 讘专讬讛 爪讜专讘讗 诪专讘谞谉 诇讻讬 讛讜讛 讛讚专 住讜讚专讗 诇诪专讬讛


Rav Ashi said: And who will say to us concerning the cloth that if the recipient of the cloth would seize it with the intention of keeping it that it would not be an effective seizure? While the cloth is technically transferred, the recipient does not usually exercise his right to it. And furthermore, an acquisition by means of a cloth is a case where the giver is saying: Acquire only in order to transfer ownership, but acquire from now. However, with regard to these possessions of this one who took the vow, when does the son acquire? Only when his son鈥檚 son becomes a Torah scholar. And when he becomes a Torah scholar, the cloth has already been returned to its owner, i.e., the act of acquisition had taken place long before the grandson became a Torah scholar. The initial transfer therefore has no effect.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讜讛讗 诪转谞转 讘讬转 讞讜专讜谉 讚拽谞讬 注诇 诪谞转 诇讛拽谞讜转 讛讜讗 讜诇讗 拽讗 拽谞讬


Rava said to Rav Na岣an: But the gift of Beit 岣ron discussed in the mishna is an example of an acquisition performed only in order to transfer ownership, and there he did not acquire it at all.


讝讬诪谞讬谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚住注讜讚转讜 诪讜讻讞转 注诇讬讜 讜讝讬诪谞讬谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 讜讬转讜专 讗住讜专 讘诪讜讚专 讛谞讗讛


The Gemara recounts: Sometimes when Rav Na岣an was asked this question he said to him: That is because his wedding meal proves about him that he did not truly intend to give the items to the recipient, and not because such an acquisition is invalid per se. And sometimes he said to him that in that case they followed the stringent opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said: Even negligible benefits ordinarily waived are forbidden to one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another. So too, Rabbi Eliezer holds that one cannot rely on an act of acquisition performed merely in order to transfer ownership to a third party.


转谞谉 讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 讻诇 诪转谞讛 砖讗讬谞讛 砖讗诐 讛拽讚讬砖讛 转讛讗 诪拽讜讚砖转 讗讬谞讛 诪转谞讛 讻诇 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 诇讗转讜讬讬 讛讗 诪讬诇转讗 讚砖讚讬讗 讘讻讬驻讬 诇讗 诇讗转讜讬讬 诇讬砖谞讗 讘转专讗讛 讚砖诪注转讬讛 讚专讘讗:


We learned in the mishna (48a): The Sages therefore said: Any gift that is not so absolute so that, if the recipient were to consecrate the gift it would be consecrated, is not a gift. The Gemara asks: What is added by the word: Any? Is it not adding this matter of one who seized sheaves of flax, and to say that the gift of the father has no effect? The Gemara responds: No, the intent is to add the latter version of the aforementioned statement of Rava, that a gift given as a means of circumventing a vow has no effect, even when the giver mentions the nature of the gift only casually and does not stipulate it as a formal condition.


讛讚专谉 注诇讱 讛砖讜转驻讬谉



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