Nedarim 63
מֵיתִיבִי: אֵיזוֹהִי זְמַנָּהּ שֶׁל רְבִיעָה? הַבְּכִירָה — בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, בֵּינוֹנִית — בְּשִׁבְעָה, אֲפִילָה — בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּשִׁבְעָה, וּבְשִׁבְעָה עָשָׂר, וּבְעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה.
The Gemara raises an objection against the statement by Rabbi Zeira from the following baraita: When is the time of the rainfall? The early rainfall occurs on the third of the month of Marḥeshvan; the intermediate rainfall is on the seventh of the month, while the late rainfall is on the twenty-third of the month. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: The respective dates are on the seventh, on the seventeenth, and on the twenty-third of Marḥeshvan.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: בְּשִׁבְעָה עָשָׂר, וּבְעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה, וּבְחוֹדֶשׁ כִּסְלֵיו. וְכֵן הָיָה רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אֵין הַיְּחִידִים מִתְעַנִּין עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ רֹאשׁ חֹדֶשׁ כִּסְלֵיו.
Rabbi Yosei says: The first two time periods are on the seventeenth and on the twenty-third of Marḥeshvan, and the last period is at the beginning of the month of Kislev. And so too, Rabbi Yosei would say: The learned individuals, who would start to fast due to a drought at an earlier time than the rest of the community, do not start to fast until the New Moon of Kislev arrives and no rain has fallen.
וְאָמְרִינַן עֲלַהּ: בִּשְׁלָמָא רְבִיעָה רִאשׁוֹנָה — לִישָּׁאֵל. שְׁלִישִׁית — לְהִתְעַנּוֹת. אֶלָּא שְׁנִיָּה לְמַאי? וְאָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: לְנוֹדֵר.
And we say about this: Granted, they disagreed over the time of the first rainfall, as this time is relevant with regard to asking for rain through prayer. The time when the third rainfall is expected is relevant with regard to fasting due to lack of rain. But as for the expected time for the second rainfall, for what purpose did they disagree about its date? And Rabbi Zeira said: It is significant for one who vows until the rain.
וְאָמְרִינַן עֲלַהּ: כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּתַנְיָא, רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: גְּשָׁמִים שֶׁיָּרְדוּ שִׁבְעָה יָמִים זֶה אַחַר זֶה — אַתָּה מוֹנֶה בָּהֶן רְבִיעָה רִאשׁוֹנָה וּשְׁנִיָּה. כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי!
And furthermore, we say about this: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in the baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In the case of rains that fell for seven days, one after another, you count them as the first rainfall and the second. In accordance with whose opinion is this statement? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who is the only tanna who holds that the first and second periods of rainfall span seven days. It is evident from this discussion that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel argues that one who vows until the rain must wait until after the second actual rainfall. This contradicts the statement of Rabbi Zeira that until the rain is referring to the date when rain is supposed to fall.
הַהוּא דְּאָמַר ״עַד הַגְּשָׁמִים״.
The Gemara answers: That baraita is referring to one who said: Until the rains, rather than: Until the rain. Consequently, the expiration of his vow is determined by the actual time of rainfall.
מַתְנִי׳ ״קֻוֽנָּם יַיִן שֶׁאֵינִי טוֹעֵם לְשָׁנָה״, נִתְעַבְּרָה הַשָּׁנָה — אָסוּר בָּהּ וּבְעִיבּוּרָהּ. ״עַד רֹאשׁ אֲדָר״ — עַד רֹאשׁ אֲדָר הָרִאשׁוֹן. ״עַד סוֹף אֲדָר״ — עַד סוֹף אֲדָר הָרִאשׁוֹן.
MISHNA: In the case of one who said: Wine is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste it for the entire year, if the year was extended, i.e., it was declared to be a leap year, he is prohibited from drinking wine during the year and its intercalated month. If he vowed until the beginning of the month of Adar, the vow remains in effect until the beginning of the first Adar. Similarly, if he says that his vow applies until the end of Adar, the vow remains in effect until the end of the first Adar.
גְּמָ׳ אַלְמָא סְתָמָא דַּ״אֲדָר״ דְּקָאָמַר — רִאשׁוֹן הוּא.
GEMARA: The Gemara comments on the statement in the mishna that if one takes a vow until the beginning of Adar, it remains in effect until the beginning of the first Adar. Apparently, when one says Adar without specification, his statement is understood as a reference to the first Adar.
לֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: אֲדָר הָרִאשׁוֹן — כּוֹתֵב ״אֲדָר הָרִאשׁוֹן״, אֲדָר שֵׁנִי — כּוֹתֵב ״אֲדָר״ סְתָם, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֲדָר הָרִאשׁוֹן — כּוֹתֵב סְתָם, אֲדָר שֵׁנִי — כּוֹתֵב ״תִּינְיָין״.
The Gemara asks: Shall we say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? As it is taught in a baraita: In the first month of Adar, when dating a document, one writes that the document was composed in the first Adar. During the second Adar, one writes the name of the month of Adar without specification; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says the reverse: During the first Adar one writes the name of the month without specification, and in the second Adar he writes that the document was composed in the second Adar.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר, הָא דְּיָדַע דִּמְעַבְּרָא שַׁתָּא, הָא דְּלָא יָדַע.
Abaye said: You can even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as there is a difference between the cases: In this baraita, the case is one where the individual who took the vow knew that the year was extended, i.e., declared as a leap year, and the disagreement concerns which Adar is considered the principal one. Conversely, that mishna is referring to a case where he did not know that it is a leap year and that there are two months of Adar. Consequently, when he referred to Adar, all agree that he meant the first Adar.
וְהָתַנְיָא: ״עַד רֹאשׁ חֹדֶשׁ אֲדָר״ — עַד רֹאשׁ חֹדֶשׁ אֲדָר הָרִאשׁוֹן, אִם הָיְתָה שָׁנָה מְעוּבֶּרֶת — עַד רֹאשׁ חֹדֶשׁ אֲדָר הַשֵּׁנִי.
And, so too, it is taught in a baraita: If one vows until the New Moon of Adar, the vow remains in effect until the New Moon of the first Adar, and if it was a leap year, it remains in effect until the New Moon of the second Adar.
מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא לָאו בִּמְעוּבֶּרֶת עָסְקִינַן?! שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: הָא דִּפְשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ דִּמְעַבְּרָא שַׁתָּא, הָא דְּלָא יָדַע.
The Gemara analyzes this baraita: Does the latter clause prove by inference that in the first clause, we are not dealing with a leap year? In a regular year there is only one month of Adar, so it is impossible to speak of a first or second Adar. Rather, learn from it that this latter clause is referring to a case where it is obvious to him that the year was extended, and therefore when he refers to the month of Adar he means the second Adar, whereas that first clause is referring to a case where he did not know that it was a leap year, in which case he means the first Adar.
מַתְנִי׳ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: ״קֻוֽנָּם יַיִן שֶׁאֵינִי טוֹעֵם עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא הַפֶּסַח״ — לֹא נִתְכַּוֵּון זֶה אֶלָּא עַד לֵיל הַפֶּסַח, עַד שָׁעָה שֶׁדֶּרֶךְ בְּנֵי אָדָם לִשְׁתּוֹת יַיִן.
MISHNA: Rabbi Yehuda says: In the case of one who says: Wine is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste it until it will be Passover, it is understood that this individual intended for his vow to apply only until the night of Passover, i.e., until the time when it is customary for people to drink wine in order to fulfill the mitzva of drinking the four cups, but he did not intend to prevent himself from being able to fulfill this mitzva.
אָמַר ״קֻוֽנָּם בָּשָׂר שֶׁאֵינִי טוֹעֵם עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא הַצּוֹם״ — אֵינוֹ אָסוּר אֶלָּא עַד לֵילֵי צוֹם, שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּון זֶה אֶלָּא עַד שָׁעָה שֶׁדֶּרֶךְ בְּנֵי אָדָם לֶאֱכוֹל בָּשָׂר. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּנוֹ אוֹמֵר: ״קֻוֽנָּם שׁוּם שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא שַׁבָּת״, אֵינוֹ אָסוּר אֶלָּא עַד לֵילֵי שַׁבָּת, שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּון זֶה אֶלָּא עַד שָׁעָה שֶׁדֶּרֶךְ בְּנֵי אָדָם לֶאֱכוֹל בְּשׁוּם.
Similarly, if he said: Meat is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste it until it will be the fast of Yom Kippur, he is prohibited from eating meat only until the eve of [leilei] the fast. This is because it is understood that this individual intended for his vow to apply only until the time when it is customary for people to eat meat in the festive meal before the fast, and he did not intend to prevent himself from being able to participate in that meal. Rabbi Yosei, his son, says: One who vows: Garlic is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste it until it will be Shabbat, it is prohibited for him to eat garlic only until the eve of Shabbat, as it is understood that this individual intended for his vow to apply only until the time when it is customary for people to eat garlic.
הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֲנִי נֶהֱנֶה לְךָ אִם אֵין אַתְּ בָּא וְנוֹטֵל לְבָנֶיךָ כּוֹר אֶחָד שֶׁל חִטִּין וּשְׁתֵּי חָבִיּוֹת שֶׁל יַיִן״ — הֲרֵי זֶה יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר אֶת נִדְרוֹ שֶׁלֹּא עַל פִּי חָכָם. וְיֹאמַר לוֹ: כְּלוּם אָמַרְתָּ אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי כְבוֹדִי — זֶהוּ כְּבוֹדִי.
In the case of one who says to another: Benefiting from you is konam for me, i.e., I am prohibited from deriving benefit from you, if you do not come and take for your son one kor of wheat and two barrels of wine as a gift, this other individual can dissolve his vow without the consent of a halakhic authority. This is because he can say to him: Did you say your vow for any reason other than due to my honor, in order to convince me to accept a gift for my son? This is my honor, that I refrain from accepting the gift, and consequently the vow is annulled.
וְכֵן הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאַתְּ נֶהֱנֵית לִי אִם אֵין אַתְּ בָּא וְנוֹתֵן לִבְנִי כּוֹר שֶׁל חִטִּין וּשְׁתֵּי חָבִיּוֹת שֶׁל יַיִן״, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אָסוּר עַד שֶׁיִּתֵּן, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אַף זֶה יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר אֶת נִדְרוֹ שֶׁלֹּא עַל פִּי חָכָם, וְיֹאמַר לוֹ: הֲרֵי אֲנִי כְּאִילּוּ נִתְקַבַּלְתִּי.
And, so too, in the case of one who says to another: Benefiting from me is konam for you, i.e., you are prohibited from deriving benefit from me, if you do not come and give my son one kor of wheat and two barrels of wine, Rabbi Meir says: It is prohibited for the other individual to benefit from the speaker until he gives the gifts to his son. However, the Rabbis say: Even this individual who took the vow can dissolve his own vow without the consent of a halakhic authority. This is because he can say to him: I hereby consider it as though I have received the gift.
הָיָה מְסָרֵב בּוֹ לָשֵׂאת בַּת אֲחוֹתוֹ, וְאָמַר ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁהִיא נֶהֱנֵית לִי לְעוֹלָם״, וְכֵן הַמְגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ, אוֹמֵר ״קֻוֽנָּם אִשְׁתִּי נֶהֱנֵית לִי לְעוֹלָם״ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מוּתָּרוֹת לֵהָנוֹת לוֹ, שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּון זֶה אֶלָּא לְשׁוּם אִישׁוּת.
If an individual was urging another to marry the daughter of his sister, and in order to deflect the pressure, the other man said: Benefiting from me is konam for her forever, i.e., she is prohibited from deriving any benefit from me forever, and, so too, if there is one who divorces his wife and says: Benefiting from me is konam for my wife forever, these women are permitted to derive benefit from him, as this man intended to take this vow only for the purpose of prohibiting marriage between them, but not to prohibit all forms of benefit.
הָיָה מְסָרֵב בַּחֲבֵירוֹ שֶׁיֹּאכַל אֶצְלוֹ, אָמַר: ״קֻוֽנָּם לְבֵיתְךָ שֶׁאֲנִי נִכְנָס, טִיפַּת צוֹנֵן שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם לָךְ״ — מוּתָּר לִיכָּנֵס לְבֵיתוֹ וְלִשְׁתּוֹת מִמֶּנּוּ צוֹנֵן, שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּון זֶה אֶלָּא לְשׁוּם אֲכִילָה וּשְׁתִיָּה.
Similarly, if one was urging another to eat with him, and the latter said: Entering your house is konam for me, as is tasting even a drop of cold liquid of yours, the individual who took the vow is nevertheless permitted to enter his house and to drink a cold beverage of his. This is because this individual intended to take this vow only for the purpose of eating and drinking a meal, but not to prohibit himself from entering the house entirely or from drinking in small quantities (Commentary on Nedarim).
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ קֻוֽנָּם יַיִן
