Nedarim 7
״מֵעִמָּךְ״, זֶה לֶקֶט שִׁכְחָה וּפֵאָה.
The verse states with regard to offerings: “When you shall take a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay to pay it; for the Lord your God will surely require it of you” (Deuteronomy 23:22). With regard to the term “of you” the baraita states: This is a reference to gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe’a.
יֵשׁ יָד לִצְדָקָה, אוֹ אֵין יָד לִצְדָקָה? הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵימָא דְּאָמַר: ״הָדֵין זוּזָא לִצְדָקָה, וְהָדֵין נָמֵי״ — הָהוּא צְדָקָה עַצְמָהּ הִיא! אֶלָּא כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר ״הָדֵין״ וְלָא אָמַר ״נָמֵי״, מַאי? ״הָדֵין נָמֵי צְדָקָה״ קָאָמַר, אוֹ דִּלְמָא [מַאי] ״וְהָדֵין״ (נָמֵי) — לְנַפְקוּתָא בְּעָלְמָא קָאָמַר, וְדִבּוּרָא הוּא דְּלָא אַסְּקֵיהּ.
§ The Gemara asks: Is there intimation for charity or is there no intimation for charity? The Gemara clarifies the question: What are the circumstances of such a case? If we say that it is a case where one said: This dinar is for charity and this also, that itself is an explicit statement of donating to charity. Rather, it is a case where he said: This, and did not say: Also. What is his intention? Is he understood to be saying: This is also charity, or perhaps what is the meaning of: And this? He is saying that this coin is merely for general use, and he did not complete his statement.
מִי אָמְרִינַן: כֵּיוָן דְּאִיתַּקַּשׁ לְקׇרְבָּנוֹת, דִּכְתִיב: ״בְּפִיךְ״ — זוֹ צְדָקָה. מָה קׇרְבָּנוֹת יֵשׁ לָהֶן יָד, אַף צְדָקָה יֵשׁ לָהּ יָד. אוֹ דִלְמָא לְ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״ הוּא דְּאִיתַּקַּשׁ?
The Gemara explains the two sides of this dilemma: Do we say that since charity is juxtaposed to offerings, as it is written in a verse following the prohibition against delaying an offering: “That you have spoken with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24) and the Sages expounded that this is a reference to charity, therefore, just as there is intimation, i.e., intimation is effective, with regard to offerings, so too, there is intimation with regard to charity? Or perhaps it is only with regard to the prohibition: You shall not delay, that it is juxtaposed, but not with regard to other halakhot?
יֵשׁ יָד לְהֶפְקֵר, אוֹ דִלְמָא אֵין יָד לְהֶפְקֵר? הַיְינוּ צְדָקָה!
The Gemara asks further: Is there intimation for rendering one’s property ownerless, or perhaps there is no intimation for rendering one’s property ownerless. Does an incomplete expression employed by an owner to relinquish property take effect or not? The Gemara notes: This is the same as the previous question with regard to charity, which is comparable to rendering one’s property ownerless for the benefit of the poor.
אִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר קָאָמַר. אִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר יֵשׁ יָד לִצְדָקָה, דְּאֵין הֶיקֵּשׁ לְמֶחֱצָה. הֶפְקֵר מִי אָמְרִינַן הַיְינוּ צְדָקָה, אוֹ דִּלְמָא שָׁאנֵי צְדָקָה, דִּצְדָקָה לָא חַזְיָא אֶלָּא לַעֲנִיִּים, אֲבָל הֶפְקֵר בֵּין לַעֲנִיִּים בֵּין לַעֲשִׁירִים?
The Gemara responds: This question is stated in the style of: If you say, as follows: If you say there is intimation for charity, as there is no partial analogy based on juxtaposition, do we say that rendering one’s property ownerless is the same as charity; or perhaps charity is different, as charity is suitable only for the poor, but ownerless property is suitable for both the poor and the wealthy, and therefore it cannot be derived from the halakha with regard to charity.
בָּעֵי רָבִינָא: יֵשׁ יָד לְבֵית הַכִּסֵּא, אוֹ לָא? הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵימָא דַּאֲמַר ״הָדֵין בֵּיתָא לֶיהֱוֵי בֵּית הַכִּסֵּא, וְהָדֵין נָמֵי״, הַהוּא בֵּית הַכִּסֵּא נָמֵי הָוֵה! אֶלָּא כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר ״וְהָדֵין״ וְלָא אָמַר ״נָמֵי״. מַאי ״הָדֵין״ דְּאָמַר — ״וְהָדֵין נָמֵי בֵּית הַכִּסֵּא״, אוֹ דִלְמָא מַאי ״וְהָדֵין״ — לְתַשְׁמִישָׁא בְּעָלְמָא קָאָמַר.
Ravina raised another dilemma: Is there intimation for designating a location as a bathroom or not? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of the case? If we say that it is a case where one said: Let this structure be a bathroom and this one also, that second structure is certainly also a bathroom. Rather, it is a case where he said: And this, and he did not say: Also. What is his intention? Is the expression: And this, that he said, understood to mean: And this shall also be a bathroom? Or perhaps what is the meaning of: And this? He is saying that it is designated for general use rather than as a bathroom.
מִכְּלָל דִּפְשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ לְרָבִינָא דְּיֵשׁ זִימּוּן לְבֵית הַכִּסֵּא? וְהָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ לְרָבִינָא: הִזְמִינוֹ לְבֵית הַכִּסֵּא מַהוּ? הִזְמִינוֹ לְבֵית הַמֶּרְחָץ מַהוּ? זִימּוּן מוֹעִיל, אוֹ אֵין זִימּוּן מוֹעִיל?
The Gemara comments: Can it be derived by inference that it is obvious to Ravina that there is designation for a bathroom, i.e., that if one explicitly designates a location as a bathroom, it attains that status even before it is used for that purpose, so that one may not bring sacred items to that location? Didn’t Ravina raise this as a dilemma? He asked: If one designated a particular location as a bathroom, what is the halakha? If one designated it as a bathhouse, what is the halakha? In other words, is designation effective to grant the location a particular status, or is designation not effective?
רָבִינָא חֲדָא מִגּוֹ חֲדָא קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ: זִימּוּן מוֹעִיל אוֹ אֵין זִימּוּן מוֹעִיל. אִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר יֵשׁ זִימּוּן: יֵשׁ יָד אוֹ אֵין יָד תִּיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: Ravina raised one dilemma within another dilemma: Is designation effective or is designation not effective? And if you say there is designation, i.e., designation is effective, is there intimation or is there not intimation, i.e., is designation via intimation effective? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma remains unresolved.
מְנוּדֶּה אֲנִי לָךְ וְכוּ׳. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לְעִנְיַן מַלְקוֹת שֶׁאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה. דְּאִם כֵּן, נִיתְנֵי ״רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא מַחְמִיר״.
§ It was taught in the mishna that if one said: I am ostracized from you, Rabbi Akiva was uncertain about the halakha but was inclined to rule stringently about this. Abaye said: Rabbi Akiva concedes with regard to flogging that one is not flogged if he violates a vow that was expressed in this way. As, if so, if Rabbi Akiva held that one is liable to be flogged, let the mishna teach: Rabbi Akiva is stringent. The fact that it states: Rabbi Akiva was uncertain but was inclined to rule stringently, indicates that although Rabbi Akiva holds that one may not violate this vow, he concedes that one is not liable to be flogged if he does violate the vow.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: בִּ״נְדִינָא מִינָּךְ״ — דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאָסוּר. ״מְשַׁמַּתְנָא מִינָּךְ״ — לְכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא שְׁרֵי. בְּמַאי פְּלִיגִי —
Rav Pappa said: With regard to a vow that one expressed with the phrase: I am distanced [nadeina] from you, everyone agrees that he is prohibited from deriving benefit from the other individual, as this is an intimation of a vow. If he employs the expression: I am excommunicated [meshamattena] from you everyone agrees that he is permitted to derive benefit from the other person, even though he meant to distance himself from the other individual, because this is not the terminology of a vow. With regard to what do they disagree?
בִּ״מְנוּדֶּה אֲנִי לָךְ״, דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: לִישָּׁנָא דְנִידּוּיָא הוּא, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: לִישָּׁנָא דִמְשַׁמַּתְנָא הוּא.
They disagree with regard to a case when the language one uses is: I am ostracized from you, as Rabbi Akiva holds that it is a language of distancing and therefore expresses a vow, and the Rabbis hold that it is a language of excommunication, and not the terminology with which people express vows.
וּפְלִיגָא דְּרַב חִסְדָּא. דְּהָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּאָמַר ״מְשַׁמַּתְנָא בְּנִכְסֵיהּ דִּבְרֵיהּ דְּרַב יִרְמְיָה בַּר אַבָּא״ אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לֵית דְּחָשׁ לַהּ לְהָא דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. קָסָבַר: בִּ״מְשַׁמַּתְנָא״ פְּלִיגִי.
The Gemara comments: And Rav Pappa disagrees with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, as demonstrated in the following incident: There was a certain man who said: I am excommunicated from the property of the son of Rav Yirmeya bar Abba. He came before Rav Ḥisda to ask whether this statement was effective in generating a prohibition or not. Rav Ḥisda said to him: There is no one who, in practice, is concerned for that opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Apparently, Rav Ḥisda holds that they also disagree with regard to the phrase: I am excommunicated from you. This indicates that the dispute between the tanna’im is not with regard to specific terms but with regard to the more general question of whether terms of ostracism or excommunication are terms that can also express vows.
אָמַר רַבִּי אִילָא אָמַר רַב: נִדָּהוּ בְּפָנָיו — אֵין מַתִּירִין לוֹ אֶלָּא בְּפָנָיו. נִדָּהוּ שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו — מַתִּירִין לוֹ בֵּין בְּפָנָיו בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו.
§ Rabbi Ila said that Rav said: If one ostracized another individual in his presence, one may dissolve it for him only in his presence. If one ostracized him not in his presence, one may dissolve it for him in his presence or not in his presence.
אָמַר רַב חָנִין אָמַר רַב: הַשּׁוֹמֵעַ הַזְכָּרַת הַשֵּׁם מִפִּי חֲבֵירוֹ צָרִיךְ לְנַדּוֹתוֹ, וְאִם לֹא נִידָּהוּ — הוּא עַצְמוֹ יְהֵא בְּנִידּוּי. שֶׁכׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁהַזְכָּרַת הַשֵּׁם מְצוּיָה, שָׁם עֲנִיּוּת מְצוּיָה.
Rav Ḥanin said that Rav said: One who hears mention of the name of God in vain by another individual must ostracize him for doing so. And if he did not ostracize him, he himself, the listener, shall be ostracized, as wherever mention of God’s name in vain is common, poverty is also common there.
וַעֲנִיּוּת, כְּמִיתָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי מֵתוּ כׇּל הָאֲנָשִׁים״, וְתַנְיָא: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁ״נָּתְנוּ חֲכָמִים עֵינֵיהֶם״, אוֹ מִיתָה אוֹ עוֹנִי.
And poverty is so harsh that it is considered like death, as it is stated: “For all the men are dead who sought your life” (Exodus 4:19). The Sages had a tradition that Dathan and Abiram had sought to have Moses killed in Egypt and that they were the men referred to in the quoted verse (see 64b). They were still alive at that time but had become impoverished. And additionally, it is taught in a baraita: Wherever it says that the Sages set their eyes on a particular individual, the result was either death or poverty. This also indicates that death and poverty are equivalent.
אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא: הֲוָה קָאֵימְנָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא, שַׁמְעַהּ לְהָךְ אִיתְּתָא דְּאַפִּקָה הַזְכָּרַת הַשֵּׁם לְבַטָּלָה, שַׁמְּתַהּ וּשְׁרָא לַהּ לְאַלְתַּר בְּאַפַּהּ. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תְּלָת: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ הַשּׁוֹמֵעַ הַזְכָּרַת הַשֵּׁם מִפִּי חֲבֵירוֹ צָרִיךְ לְנַדּוֹתוֹ, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: נִידָּהוּ בְּפָנָיו, אֵין מַתִּירִין לוֹ אֶלָּא בְּפָנָיו, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: אֵין בֵּין נִידּוּי לַהֲפָרָה וְלֹא כְּלוּם.
Rabbi Abba said: I was standing before Rav Huna, and he heard a certain woman utter a mention of the name of God in vain. He excommunicated her and immediately dissolved the excommunication for her in her presence. The Gemara comments: Learn three things from this. Learn from this that one who hears mention of the name of God in vain by another individual must ostracize him; and learn from this that if one ostracized another in his presence, one may dissolve it for him only in his presence; and learn from this that there is nothing, i.e., no minimum time that must pass, between ostracism and nullification of the ostracism.
אָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב: תַּלְמִיד חָכָם מְנַדֶּה לְעַצְמוֹ, וּמֵיפֵר לְעַצְמוֹ. פְּשִׁיטָא? מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: ״אֵין חָבוּשׁ מַתִּיר עַצְמוֹ מִבֵּית הָאֲסוּרִין״, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
Rav Giddel said that Rav said: A Torah scholar can ostracize himself, and he can nullify the ostracism for himself. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that he can nullify the ostracism for himself, just as he is able to do for others? The Gemara answers: It states this lest you say, as per the popular maxim: A prisoner cannot free himself from prison, and since he is ostracized he cannot dissolve the ostracism for himself; therefore it teaches us that he can do so.
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי: כִּי הָא דְּמָר זוּטְרָא חֲסִידָא, כִּי מִחַיַּיב בַּר בֵּי רַב שַׁמְתָּא — מְשַׁמֵּית נַפְשֵׁיהּ בְּרֵישָׁא, וַהֲדַר מְשַׁמֵּת בַּר בֵּי רַב. וְכִי עָיֵיל לְבֵיתֵיהּ, שָׁרֵי לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ וַהֲדַר שָׁרֵי לֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances where a Torah scholar might ostracize himself? It is like that case involving Mar Zutra Ḥasida. When a student in the academy was liable to receive excommunication, Mar Zutra Ḥasida would first excommunicate himself and then he would excommunicate the student of Torah. And when he would enter his home, he would dissolve the excommunication for himself and then dissolve the excommunication for the student.
וְאָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב:
And Rav Giddel said that Rav said:
